Cit de penibile, strigatoare la cer, si usor de tagaduit sunt minciunile lui Dan Voinea (si cum a fost posibil ca nici un ziarist roman n-a incercat sa-l contrazica)? Iata chestia cu simulatoarele…
Romulus Cristea: Au fost descoperite undeva dispozitive automate de tragere sau simulatoare?
Dan Voinea- Nu! Nici o confirmare despre astfel de dispozitive de simulare a focului de arma! Pana in prezent nu suntem in posesia a nici unui astfel de dispozitiv. Nimeni nu a vazut un astfel de simulator de tragere. A fost prezentat la TV un dispozitiv ca simulator, dar care nici pe departe nu era asa ceva. A fost o minciuna! Inainte de ’89, orice dispozitiv trebuia sa fie in inventarul unei institutii. Nici o institutie de la noi, de la armata, interne sau servicii de informatii nu a avut in dotare o astfel de instalatie. Nu numai ca nu au existat in dotare, nu au fost gasite, dar nici nu avem dovezi ca asemenea aparate au fost aduse in tara. In alta ordine de idei, trebuie sa precizez ca noi ii cautam pe cei vinovati de uciderea si ranirea unor oameni. Nu ucizi oameni cu simulatorul. Interesul nostru se indreapta spre tragatorii reali, nu simulatoare.
deci e clar, Voinea spune: “Nici o institutie de la noi, de la armata, interne sau servicii de informatii nu a avut in dotare o astfel de instalatie” Zau? Iata ceea ce Seful Securitatii Generalul Iulian Vlad a spus in fata comisiei lui Gabrielescu in 1994:
“In declaratiile pe care le-a dat sub prestare de juramant in fata Comisiei parlamentare de ancheta, generalul Vlad nu aminteste despre acest episod, iar la intrebarile puse de membrii Comisiei este fie evaziv, fie le deturneaza sensul. Fara sa vrea, lamureste insa partial una dintre problemele obscure privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989. Reproducem stenograma:
�Domnul Gabrielescu: Ati auzit despre acele simulatoare care s-au folosit?
Domnul Vlad: Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea… Mi se pare ca tot un asemenea aparat electronic s-a folosit si in ziua de 21 decembrie cand s-a spart mitingul. Dupa ce a facut Nica Leon (a strigat �Timisoara, Timisoara!� – n.n.) s-a auzit o arma automata si s-a creat panica mare…�”
(Sa nu uitam aici cum Dan Voinea era slavit de catre Sorin Iliesiu: Justiţia română a dovedit diversiunea “teroriştii” şi nu a găsit nici un terorist printre morţi, răniţi sau arestaţi. D-l gen. Dan Voinea spune clar: “Teroriştii nu au existat. S-a minţit pentru a-i ascunde pe adevăraţii criminali”….Rechizitoriul Justiţiei române, spiritul acestora regăsindu-se în Raportul [Raport Final CPADCR]…)
in interviul citat de mai sus (“Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” 22 decembrie 2005, Romania Libera), inainte de a vorbi despre simulatoarele care n-au existat, Voinea a fost intrebat despre asa-numitul razboi electronic?…sigur, ca pentru Voinea era vorba numai despre un “joc de calculator”:
Razboiul electronic, un joc pe calculator
- A fost practicat razboiul electronic pe durata evenimentelor din decembrie 1989? Ce dovezi exista?
- Acest razboi electronic a fost deseori invocat ca un factor care a creat perturbari, confuzii. Prin acest razboi electronic s-ar fi simulat anumite tinte considerate initial elicoptere teroriste. Poate ca in realitate erau simple jocuri pe calculator sau mai stiu eu ce… Este insa clar ca nu avem victime ale razboiului electronic. Oameni macelariti au fost pe strada, la televiziunea publica, la CC-PCR, in jurul unitatilor militare, langa marile intreprinderi si unde nu au fost semnalate actiuni ale elicopterelor sau alte fenomene ale razboiului electronic.
deci hai sa incercam sa explicam ce s-a intimplat pe 9 ianuarie 1990?!
“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor. Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare. Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122″ chema indicativele “49″, “38″, “89″, “11″, “82″, “44″, “38″, “84″, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00″. La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare. Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine. S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere. Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti? Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo? Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor. Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), mai 1990.)
COINCIDENTE. Chiar din acea seara de 22 decembrie 1989, cam pe la aceeasi ora, pe ecranele radarelor Armatei au inceput sa apara, deodata, o sumedenie de tinte. Concomitent, la sediul Comitetului Central rapaielile de arme automate au bagat groaza in cei din piata. Actorul Ion Caramitru striga: “Nu mai trageti!”. Conform logicii militare, apararea antiaeriana trebuia sa doboare tintele sau aviatia militara sa le intercepteze. “Apareau 20 de tinte simultan si aceasta se intampla, cu precadere, de-a lungul Dunarii, de-a lungul Prutului, al Tisei. Se crea impresia de invazie aeriana”, si-aminteste comandorul [Radu Borcea, in decembrie 1989, seful compartimentului de lupta electronica din Comandamentul Aviatiei Militare.]. In primele momente a aparut in comandament si ideea ca toate aceste actiuni erau lansate din fostele locuri de vanatoare ale lui Nicolae Ceausescu, unde, evident, aveau acces cei de la Securitate. [DA! Asa a fost...cititi mai sus, povestea lui Bodea!]
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on June 10, 2009
[Well, turns out it was "red door" and not "riddle," but I always thought I heard the word "riddle"...see what I mean in the excerpt from Orwellian...Positively Orwellian below: MEN IN BLACK:The Recurring Theme of “Black Jumpsuits” Part of the great riddle of the “terrorists” concerns their clothing...]
“Nici una din victimele sau luptatorii din perioada Revolutiei nu a fost identificata de procurorii militari [deci Dan Voinea] care au efectuat cercetari in dosarul revolutiei ca terorist sau facand parte din organizatii ale altor state.” Romulus Cristea,”Dosarul Revolutia 1989,” Romania Libera, 19 decembrie 2008, http://www.romanialibera.ro/a142100/dosarul-revolutia-1989.html
si totusi…in articolul lui Romulus Cristea, “Au recunoscut ca au tras la Revolutie,” Romania Libera, 24 decembrie 2008, http://www.romanialibera.ro/a142447/au-recunoscut-ca-au-tras-la-revolutie.html ne povesteste despre…
“Alte intalniri cu teroristii
Mai multe dosare care au fost instrumentate de Parchetul Militar consemneaza declaratiile unor martori ce sustin ca au avut intalniri, fata in fata cu teroristii. Unele cazuri au fost semnalate in zona Ministerului Apararii Nationale. Soldatul Ion Ene si sergentul major Viorel Bularda au fost raniti in acele zile ale lunii decembrie 1989. Ambii prezentau plagi impuscate si, potrivit declaratiilor acestora, ranile ar fi provenit din incidente petrecute pe durata executarii serviciului de paza la Directia de Telecomunicatii Speciale (DTS) – punctul de control nr. 2.
Cei doi au sustinut, mentinandu-si explicatiile neschimbate si in declaratiile date in fata procurorilor militari, ca “un individ voinic, imbracat intr-un combinezon negru cu multe buzunare, ar fi escaladat gardul din vecinatatea punctului de control si paza”. In acele momente, i-ar fi ranit cu focuri de pistolet pe soldatul Ion Ene, aflat in serviciu de garda, si pe sergentul Viorel Bularda, care facea parte din grupa de control si paza a Comandamentului Serviciilor Armatei. Intamplarea nu a putut fi probata in totalitate din simplul motiv ca individul imbracat in combinezon negru nu a fost retinut, ranit sau ucis, astfel ca procurorii au retinut incidentul doar ca “o posibila secventa caracteristica din timpul acelor evenimente in care au actionat tragatori individuali avand scopuri diversioniste”.
Alta situatie similara a fost semnalata de proprietarul unei case din strada Batistei. Ion Simion a sustinut in fata anchetatorilor ca, sesizand ca se trage din podul casei sale,
s-a deplasat cu un grup de civili la locul respectiv, unde au gasit “un individ in combinezon negru si care avea o pusca cu luneta indreptata spre cladirea de vizavi”.
Simion a mai precizat ca, dupa ce l-au imobilizat cu greu pe acest individ, au anuntat o echipa de militari aflata in trecere prin zona. Individul suspect si arma cu luneta au fost predate celor de la Armata. Ion Simion a mai mentionat in declaratiile pe care le-a dat procurorilor ca nu mai stie nimic despre ce s-a intamplat ulterior si nici nu a fost contactat timp de un an de nimeni interesat de acest caz.”
Am scris deja despre “combinezoane negre” sau “salopete negre” in “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian”
MEN IN BLACK:The Recurring Theme of “Black Jumpsuits”
Part of the great riddle of the “terrorists” concerns their clothing.In Brasov, it was noted the individual arrested on 23 December firing a 5.65 mm Thomson automatic was wearing a “black jumpsuit.”The descriptions go by different names—“combinezoane negre,” “salopete negre,” or “de culor inchis,” for example—but they all note the black or dark outfits of many of those suspected of being “terrorists.”
It is critical to note that we have evidence that the focus on the black clothing of those identified as “terrorists” occurred among participants at the time, and is not merely some expost facto artifact.Major A.D. of Directorate V-a (probably Major Aurel David) recounted in early 1991 that while under arrest on 27 December 1989, the Army soldiers guarding him asked “If” as Major A.D. had sought to convince them, “it isn’t Ceausescu’s guard [i.e. V-a]” who was firing, “then who are the black-shirted ones [emphasis added]?”[52]The report of the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor] on Timisoara indirectly confirms Army suspicion when alleging that Army Colonel Constantin Zeca gave the order after 22 December 1989, to shoot at anybody “in a blue, navy blue, or black jumpsuit.”[53]Why this clothing in particular, and why the suspicion then?
Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.” Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:
“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.
The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital.It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route].Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad.Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note:possible reference to 5 mm weapons].Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic.The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks.They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out].Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty.A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area.All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit.At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes.Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47.One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit.The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman.All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic.After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three.After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened.All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]
Another small group of people wearing “black jumpsuits” held a military convoy under fire near the city of Buzau. On the evening of 23 December 1989, a military convoy from Piatra Neamt en route to Bucharest reached the community of Maracineni near Buzau.Members of the local military unit told the soldiers from Piatra Neamt that
…the unit had been attacked by two people, a civilian and Militia NCO, who disappeared with an Oltcit [car] and an ABI vehicle [an armored transport used exclusively by the Securitate’s USLA].Shortly after [being told] this, gunfire opened on the convoy.And gunfire reopened on the local military unit….those from the unit fired back with ordinance that lit the sky, in this way enabling them to observe a group of 3-4 armed people, wearing black jumpsuits (“salopete negre”) who were shooting while constantly changing position.At the same time, on the radio frequencies of the convoy, they received messages about coming devastating attacks, and even Soviet intervention.All of these proved to be simple disinformation.The next day, in a moment of calm, villagers brought the soldiers food, and related how the terrorists had occupied attics of their houses.They said they [the occupiers] were Romanians and that in a few words they had ordered [the villagers] to let them into the attics of their houses….In general, they shot at night, but on 25 December the cannonade continued during the day…. Curiously, the ‘fighting’ in Maracineni continued until 30 December.Who and for whom were they trying to impress? [emphasis added][55]
Indeed, there are three key aspects here:1) this was not a heavily populated area, thereby undermining arguments about “operetta-like” fake warfare to impress the population, 2) it is difficult to explain this episode as the result of “misunderstandings” between units, and 3) the gunfire lasted well over a week, a fact that is difficult to ascribe to confusion.
Did the black-suited ones have any affiliation to any institution?After all, is it not odd that so many of them would appear to be dressed in the same garb?In 1990, an engineer, Mircea Georgescu, expressed his frustration about the post-December disappearance of the “terrorists” in Sibiu, Nicu Ceausescu’s fiefdom, as follows:
“Who fired from the attics of Sibiu on 21-22 December 1989?Who are the so-called terrorists?Where are their guns with scopes and unmistakable cadence?Silence on all fronts:…
c) A fighter from the guards, along with his brother, captured in these days (23-25 dec.) some 8 securisti among whom:one about 45-50 years old, at the State Theater Sibiu, we surrendered him to the Commander at the Army House.He was taken under guard by 4 civilian fighters (one in front had a club in his hand) and by a soldier with a gun at his side.He was dressed in a vest (like a smith’s) and a pant-suit (combinezon) that was black or a very dark grey…brown with short hair, well-built and 1,70-1,75 m tall….What, nobody knows anything about this guy either?…[emphases added]”[56]
Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:
…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons.I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits.The Militia told me that they weren’t their people.At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire.I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?”I told him we were being attacked.He told me to cease fire.Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender.I slammed the telephone down.Then [Army General] Stanculescu called.I told him that we are under attack.Stanculescu said to me:‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came.The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified:they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]
Finally, in this context, the comments of a Codrut H. in July 1990 about what he and other civilians found when they occupied Securitate headquarters in Brasov on the night of 22 December:“What appeared suspicious to me was that the Securitate there appeared to have been prepared [for something]….Out front of the building there was a white ARO [automobile] in which there were complete antiterrorist kits [emphasis added].” What else did the civilians find there?…combinezoane negre.[58]
[52] Maior A.D., “Scenariile si Realitatea:Marturie la dosarul ,Teroristi’ (VI),” Timpul (ed. Raoul Sorban), 1 March 1991, p. 11.
[53] See Raportul SRI EPISODUL I (2/2) Timisoara ’89 at www.ceausescu.org/ceausesscu texts/revolution/raportul sri12.htm. As if to confirm the suspicions, Securitate officer Filip Teodorescu told the Gabrielescu Commission that “Whoever had the idea to dress [them] in combinezoane negre had a clever idea!” (using the English translation at en.wikisource.org.wiki/Stenograma sedintei de audiere din 14 decembrie 1994).
[54] Posted on the web forum at Jurnalul National, April 2006, online edition.
