The Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch 22 December 1989 Groundhog Day Production. Presenting the Strictly Personal Research and Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘nicolae ceausescu 1989’

Before the Narratives of December 1989 Consolidated (Slight Return): Looking through the 272 Issues of the PNTCD’s “Dreptatea” Newspaper from 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 6, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

Thanks to the Fundatia Corneliu Coposu site at http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/sectiune/index.php/239-ziarul-dreptatea/ copies of the PNTCD’s daily Dreptatea from the early 1990s are available to the public.  I have looked through the first 200 editions, from early February 1990 to early October 1990.  Many fascinating aspects of Romanian politics and life jump out at the reader.  For our purposes here, the most interesting aspect is the details that make their way into articles about December 1989.  This was at a time when, although beginning to consolidate, narratives of December 1989 remained somewhat fluid, focusing on what happened and less on how it did or did not fit into competing narratives.  It would not be long before these competing narratives would become not just descriptions of what had happened but increasingly political and ideological lenses to view and interpret what had happened–thus leading to the exclusion, knowingly or unknowingly, of details that contradicted or did not “fit” the narrative in question.  New theories and even new memories or perhaps better put, lapses in memory or amnesia, would displace earlier memories and details.

It is therefore almost surreal to read the details of December 1989 in the pages of the National Christian-Democratic Peasant Party’s daily Dreptatea, a party and a paper whose opposition to the National Salvation Front and the former communist nomenklatura, was unquestionable at the time and comes through clearly in the pages of this publication–including when it was not published for several days in June 1990 because miners at the behest of the Front’s leaders devastated the offices of the party and the daily….And yet, in articles about December 1989, journalists relayed details which today their political and ideological heirs consistently deny or seek to explain away or wouldn’t be caught dead including in any article about December 1989.  Most importantly, that the terrorists of December 1989 existed, that their core was provided by the Securitate and included Arabs from countries friendly to the dictatorial communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, and that the terrorists possessed and used atypical and highly destructive munitions that no other forces in Romania possessed:  in particular, exploding DUM-DUM bullets that are outlawed by an international convention of which Romania was a signatory.

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Two recent finds to add to the original tranche:

Florin Oprea Salceanu, “Unde sint teroristii, domnule Iliescu?” Dreptatea (nr. 224) 1 noiembrie 1990, p. 3.

Adincurile noptii erau zguduite de vaietele ranitilor si suierul gloantelor dum-dum, de trasoare, de vidia.  Teroristii ocrotiti de noapte, in pozitiile cheie, impuscati fara mustrare de constiinta.

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Virginia Stanescu si Gabriel Stanescu, “Ce facem pentru eroii revolutiei?” Dreptatea (nr. 230), 8 noiembrie 1990, p. 1

Tinarul de 20 de ani, Marcel Ungureanu, ranit la 23 decembrie 1989 la Aeroportul Otopeni, facea parte din Unitatea Militara 01370 Focsani….Totul s-a petrecut intr-o clipita si Marcel s-a trezit la Spitalul nr. 9, impuscat in git si coloana, la sectia reanimare.  Din pacate, atentia acordata de cadrele medicale a fost de asa natura incit a ajuns in Italia [la Centrul Toscana-Ortopedie din Florenta] cu ranile infectate…Cei doi ramasi, Marcel si Mugur (acesta din urma impuscat cu gloante dum-dum care au explodat in corp distrugindu-i ficatul si rinichii) continua sa fie vizitati si ajutati de familii italiene.

 

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http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/06/14/before-the-narratives-of-december-1989-consolidated-looking-through-the-first-200-issues-of-the-pntcds-dreptatea-newspaper/

 

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Niculae Lucian, 30 ani, 21 decembrie 1989, Intercontinental (Bucuresti), piciorul distrus de gloantele dum-dum (also mentioned in http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/18/surgeons-from-bucharests-main-hospitals-discuss-their-experiences-in-december-1989-lt-gnl-traian-oancea-dr-nicolae-nae-constantinescu-dr-dan-gavriliu-dr-nicolae-angelescu/)

G.L. [Gilda Lazar], “Pentru un erou al Revolutiei,” Dreptatea, nr. 52 (6 aprilie 1990), p. 2. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr52-1990-0406.pdf

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Aurelian Lazu, “REMEMBER,” Dreptatea, nr. 96 (1 iunie 1990), p. 2. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr96-1990-0601.pdf

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soldat Eugen Mardare, glont dum-dum s-a explodat in abdomen

Raluca Gabriel Mocanu, “Eroii Tragici,” Dreptatea, nr. 100 (6 iunie 1990), p. 4. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr100-1990-0606.pdf

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Ovidiu Craciun, doua dum-dum-uri

Traian Calin Uba, “Noi amintiri in alb,” Dreptatea, nr. 138 (24 iulie 1990), p. 3.  http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr138-1990-0724.pdf

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Ilie Costache, “Accident? [despre cazul avionului TAROM AN-24 prabusit pe 28 decembrie 1989], Dreptatea, nr. 36 (17 martie 1990), p. 3. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr138-1990-0724.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

 

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gloantele cu virful taiat

Odette Hanganu si Remus Agatinei, “Si Braila e oras martir.  Cind se va afla adevarul?,” Dreptatea, nr. 69 (28 aprilie 1990), p. 4. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr69-1990-0428.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/29/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-iii-a-fistful-of-bullets-unregistered-atyp/

 

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gloante cu cap vidia

Tudor Barbu, “Trei momente din decembrie si semnele lor de intrebare,” Dreptatea, nr. 36 (17 martie 1990), p. 3. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr36-1990-0317.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/06/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-iii/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

 

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Sibiu, ROMBAC, 80 de specialisti din capitala

Cristina Mladin, “Inexactitati,” Dreptatea, nr. 101 (7 iunie 1990), p. 3. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr101-1990-0607.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/16/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-iv/

 

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

The Tragic Death of Photojournalist Ian Parry: Romanian Media on the Shootdown of TAROM AN-24 Bucharest-Belgrade

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 3, 2014

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Horia Tabau, Criminalii din ‘Triunghiul Bermudelor,’ Expres, octombrie 1991.

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see no. 17

[91] See Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de palat din Romania:  Capii complotului dezvaluie,” Baricada, no. 32 (21 August 1990), p.3.  The speculation by Ratesh that the “anonymous plotters” were “surely Brucan and Militaru” seems correct; in fact, their photos appear in the center of the article, see Nestor Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution (New York:  Praeger, 1991), p. 65. Ion Cristoiu maintained in 1993 that, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, a key figure in the early Front, had then recently told him, that the British photo journalist (Ian Parry) who perished in the still murky incident surrounding the shooting down of an AN-24 on 28 December 1989, “had stayed at the ‘Hotel National’ and discovered, it appears, on a list many Libyans.” See Constantin Iftime, Cu ION CRISTOIU prin infernul contemporan (Bucharest:  Edtirua Contraria, 1993), pp. 31-32.

see http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/23/asta-nu-este-pentru-urechile-publicului-muammar-gaddafi-teroristi-libieni-plan-z-z-si-decembrie-1989-in-romania/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/08/09/misterele-revolutiei-la-brasov-au-ars-dosarele-procuraturii-despre-evenimentele-din-decembrie-romulus-nicolae-cuvintul-nr-32-august-1991/

from Richard Andrew Hall (2006)

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:” PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 (Part Seven, Foreign Involvement)

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/03/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-seven-foreign-involvement/

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Related:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ian_Parry

http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/a-legacy-helps-young-photographers/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

http://www.ianparry.org/

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentul_aviatic_din_28_decembrie_1989

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments »

Fara indoiala…se intimpla ceva. Securitatea nu spune dar sugereaza. “Lasa sa-i scape” mici detalii.

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 15, 2014

(purely personal views–to suggest otherwise is to misrepresent me–based on two decades of prior research and publications, not for unauthorized reproduction, thank you)

“Without a doubt…something is going on.  The Securitate doesn’t say but it suggests.  It allows small details to leak out.”

In the seemingly endless discussions of the alleged role of large numbers of Soviet agents (using the cover of being tourists) in the December 1989 overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu’s communist dictatorship, I am inevitably reminded of this July 1991 quote from Radu Ciobotea that I used in my 2005 article “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game.”

(For a recent example, 12 August, of the reappearance of such a claim see: http://cultural.bzi.ro/25-000-de-spioni-kgb-au-stapanit-romania-aproape-un-an-18070 )

from THE 1989 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION AS GEOPOLITICAL PARLOR GAME: BRANDSTATTER’S “CHECKMATE” DOCUMENTARY AND THE LATEST WAVE IN A SEA OF REVISIONISM, Part III (cleared in March 2005)

Reporting in July 1991 on the trial involving many of those involved in the Timisoara repression, Radu Ciobotea noted with what was probably an apt amount of skepticism and cynicism, what was telling in the confessions of those on trial:

Is the End of Amnesia Approaching?…

Without question, something is happening with this trial.  The Securitate doesn’t say, but it suggests.  It let’s small details ‘slip out.’…Increasingly worthy of interest are the reactions of those on trial….Traian Sima (the former head of the county’s Securitate) testifies happily that, finally, the Securitate has been accepted at the trial, after having been rejected by Justice.  Filip Teodorescu utters the magic word ‘diplomats’ and, suddenly, the witness discovers the key to the drawer with surpise and declares, after five hours of amnesia, that in Timisoara, there appeared in the days in question, foreign spies under the cover of being journalists and diplomats, that in a conversation intercepted by a mobile Securitate surveillance unit Tokes was reported as  ‘well,’ and that all these (and other) counterespionage actions that can’t be made public to the mass media can be revealed behind closed doors to the judge….[Timis County party boss] Radu Balan ‘remembers’ that on 18 December at midnight when he was heading toward IAEM, he passed a group of ten soviet cars stopped 100 meters from the county hospital. (It turns out that in this night, in the sight of the Soviets, the corpses were loaded!).” [emphasis in the original] (Flacara, no. 27, 1991, p. 9).

So what is the substance of the most recent popular iteration of the so-called “Soviet tourist” hypothesis as outlined in the 12 August article above?  It is actually from a 23 December 2012 article in the daily Libertatea under the bombastic headline, “25.000 de spioni KGB au stăpânit România aproape un an! Ceauşescu a fost detronat de o armată secretă sovietică, care a stat în ţara noastră în perioada decembrie 1989 – octombrie 1990″ (http://www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/25-000-de-spioni-kgb-au-stapanit-romania-aproape-un-an-428106.html#ixzz3APp0Eq5v)

“La expunerea clară, concisă a lui Caraman (Mihai Caraman – n.r.), directorul Centralei de Informaţii Externe, am cerut sovieticilor să-şi retragă comandourile. Era vorba despre aproximativ 25.000 – 30.000 de oameni. S-au retras ca urmare a faptului că Gorbaciov modificase strategia şi spusese că URSS nu mai este jandarm în această zonă”. Declaraţia îi aparţine lui Petre Roman, fostul premier al României în perioada decembrie 1989 – septembrie 1991 şi a fost inclusă într-o carte a istoricului Alex Mihai Stoenescu.

In the same article, Larry L. Watt’s 2010 volume Fereşte-mă, Doamne, de prieteni (the English version entitled With Friends Like These) is invoked.  In the English version, Watts wrote on page 16, with a footnote on page 26:

“It is suggestive that more than 25,000 of the 37,000 “extra” Soviet tourists that deemed Romania a desirable place to visit or transit in the two weeks prior to its revolution in December 1989 chose not to leave until almost a year later, in October 1990, after the Romanian government formally insisted on their departure.90”

90. “Ceauşescu protested the sudden influx of Soviet ‘tourists’ to Moscow at the time, none of whom stayed in hotels. See e.g. Mircea Munteanu, New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania, e-Dossier no. 5, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 2001, pp. 3-11, CWIHP. The Romanian Senate’s investigation into the events of December 1989 disclosed the extraordinary jump in Soviet ‘tourists’ from 30,000 in 1988 to 67,000 in 1989 as recorded in customs and border statistics, as well as the unexplained delay in their departure. Mention of this glaring anomaly was qualified as unwarranted “conspiracy theory.” See e.g. Depostion of Petre Roman, Transcript no. 90/8.03.1994, Romanian Senate Archive, Bucharest, pp. 44-45. According to ex-Prime Minister Roman, 30,000 Russians ‘tourists’ remained in Romania for almost a year, until officially requested to leave in October 1990. Allegedly, Caraman’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) informed Roman about them only at that time. However, since at least March, Romanian TV had broadcast news stories of the Russian encampments.”]

Marius Mioc reproduced the Romanian version of the passages as follows (Răstălmăcirile lui Larry Watts şi răstălmăcirile altora despre Larry Watts):

Cel mai important fragment din cartea lui Larry Watts care se referă la revoluţie îl găsim la pagina 55, şi este următorul:

Este sugestiv faptul că peste 25000 din cei 37000 de turişti sovietici care au considerat România locul preferat pentru vizite sau tranzit, în cele două săptămînă anterioare revoluţiei din decembrie 1989, au ales să nu mai plece timp de aproape un an, pînă în octombrie 1990, după ce guvernul român le-a cerut oficial şi insistent să părăsească ţara.

Aici se face trimitere la o notă de subsol în care se scrie:

Ceauşescu a protestat împotriva afluxului brusc de turişti de la Moscova, din care nici unul nu stătea la vreun hotel. Vezi Mircea Munteanu, New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania, e-Dossier nr. 5, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, decembrie 2001, pp. 3-11, CWIHP. Ancheta Senatului României asupra evenimentelor din 1989 menţionează un salt de la 30000 turişti sovietici în 1988 la 67000 în 1989, precum şi o întîrziere inexplicabilă în plecarea acestora. Vezi Depoziţia lui Petre Roman, transcript nr. 90/8.03.1994, Arhiva Senatului României, pp. 44-45. Conform prim-ministrului Petre Roman, 30000 de turişti ruşi au rămas în România peste un an, pînă cînd li s-a cerut oficial să plece, în octombrie 1990. Conform lui Roman, şeful SIE, Caraman, l-a informat numai la acea dată despre aceştia. Totuşi încă din martie televiziunea română relata despre taberele sovietice.

But, as it turns out, Watts’ claim is neither new, nor his own.  It indeed appears to belong to Alex Mihai Stoenescu.  Stoenescu wrote the following in a 2004 volume which I found online here, although unfortunately without the endnotes,  http://hot24.weebly.com/uploads/5/2/3/8/5238782/alex_mihai_stoenescu_-_istoria_loviturilor_de_stat_in_romania_vol_4-1.pdf)

...Asadar, coloanele de „turisti” sovietici se prezentau ca fiind în tranzit spre sau din Iugoslavia, dar nu fãceau tranzitul. Ei au rãmas pe teritoriul României în preajma marilor orase pentru a interveni în cazul esecului diversiunilor care trebuiau sã provoace cãderea lui Ceausescu. Au fost pur si simplu dati afarã din tarã abia în octombrie 1990 de cãtre priniul-ministru Petre Roman: „A mai fost un moment foarte delicat, în octombrie 1990, cînd în tarã se aflau 30 000 de rusi! Cu masinile lor! Eu, cînd am aflat de a-ceasta, în calitate de prim-ministru, de la organul competent, adicã S.I. Externe, am fãcut mare tãrãboi si, mã rog, pînã la urmã am reactionat, au fost scosi din tarã. A mai fost o miscare foarte ciudatã înainte de 19 martie 1990 la Tîrgu-Mures”395. într-o discutie particularã, Petre Roman i-a confirmat autorului cã identitatea acestor „turisti” ca luptãtori ai fortelor speciale sovietice fusese deplin documentatã de SIE. Ce fel de tranzit era acela în care 30 000 de turisti (probabil cã nu toti erau luptãtori ai fortelor speciale sovietice, dar ei ofereau acoperirea) rãmîn pe teritoriul unui stat, prin care se presupune cã trec în maximum 48 de ore, si rãmîn un an de zile! (pp. 189-190)

I have through some searching been able to find the sources for Stoenescu’s claim:  Arhiva Senatului României, Stenograma nr.90/8 martie 1994, Audiere Petre Roman, pp.44-45.
http://internationalfreemedia.wordpress.com/2013/01/14/relatiile-romano-americane-de-la-razboiul-absurd-la-fratia-in-nato/#_ftn7 .  The claim from Stoenescu’s 2004 volume appears to have made its way into the press beginning in 2006 in Evenimentul Zilei, ironically (?) on the eve of the presentation to parliament of the Report by the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (CPADCR) on 18 December 2006, despite the fact that Evenimentul Zilei was/is supposedly the hub of opposition to communist and Securitate revisionism in Romania! (it must be, since Vladimir Tismaneanu, head of the CPADCR, published op-eds there at the time and still does!):  http://www.evz.ro/operatiunea-kgb-decembrie-1989-423201.html.

In other words, Watts’ claim is recycled and originates with Alex Mihai Stoenescu.  Watts likes to point out that because Petre Roman was a former Prime Minister and was testifying under oath to a parliamentary committee, and because Roman claims he received the information from the then head of foreign intelligence that this enhances the credibility of the claim (see his comment on the post Mostenirea Clandestina).  Marius Mioc’s observation thus seems appropriate in light of such an interpretation:

Ceilalţi – Comisia Senatorială “Decembrie 1989″, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Larry Watts, Grigore Cartianu, Sorin Golea – nu fac decît să repete cele spuse de Petre Roman. Remarc că Comisia Senatorială “Decembrie 1989″ n-a făcut nici minima verificare de a-l contacta şi pe Mihai Caraman, pentru a vedea dacă acesta confirmă spusele lui Petre Roman. Despre căutarea unor documente în arhivele Guvernului României sau ale Ministerului Afacerilor Externe care să ateste cererea făcută către sovietici de a-şi retrage agenţii nici nu mai vorbesc.

(from Răstălmăcirile lui Larry Watts şi răstălmăcirile altora despre Larry Watts)

Moreover, what is the background of the people making such allegations or to whom such allegations are ascribed?  Mihai Caraman was a long-time member of the Securitate’s Foreign Intelligence organization, named the CIE in its latter days.  Thus, Petre Roman’s source for this information is a former high-ranking Securitate official.  As I have argued consistently and repeatedly for over two decades in publications, for the purposes of investigating December 1989 three questions are relevant when it comes to what former Securitate personnel argue:

1) Does what they argue absolve the Securitate as an institution of wrongdoing in December 1989–wrongdoing that can be proved as having been committed by Securitate personnel?

2) Is what they argue similar to what other former Securitate personnel argue and can therefore be interpreted as an institutional view?

3) What was their personal relationship with the Securitate:  did they work for the institution?  Were they informers or collaborators of the institution during the communist era?

For example, Mihai Caraman, the alleged source of former PM Petre Roman’s claim was a longtime member of the Securitate’s foreign intelligence organization, and his claim about the alleged presence and role of numerous Soviet agents in the overthrow has been enunciated by numerous other former Securitate personnel (whether internal or external) from 1990 onward, as this site has demonstrated on numerous occasions.

Likewise, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, who first drew attention to the 1994 Petre Roman statement, has been defintively declared by CNSAS as having collaborated with the Securitate in the 1980s (see http://activenews.ro/decizie-definitiva-iccj-istoricul-alex-mihai-stoenescu-colaborat-cu-fosta-securitate_1829506.html or http://www.avocatura.com/stire/10316/istoricul-alex-mihai-stoenescu-verdict-irevocabil-de-colaborator-al-securitatii.html)

Finally, it has to be stressed that, besides sounding absurd–even if we ignore Petre Roman’s supposed earlier clarification to Stoenescu, according to Stoenescu, that all 30,000 of these Soviet tourists were members of Soviet special forces and estimate “conservatively” that “only” 10 percent were actual Soviet agents, that still leaves 3,000 Soviet agents (an incredible devotion of man power) traversing Romania not in Romanian Dacias so as to not draw attention but instead supposedly in Ladas and Moskovici!!!–THERE IS NO RECORD OF A SINGLE “SOVIET TOURIST” HAVING BEEN ARRESTED UPON SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT, LET ALONE ARMED INVOLVEMENT, IN THE UPHEAVAL THAT OVERTURNED THE REGIME OF NICOLAE CEAUSESCU BEFORE OR AFTER 22 DECEMBER 1989!  (And specifically with regard to the beginnings of the uprising in Timisoara, Securitate officials themselves, in the immediate aftermath of the events, confessed that despite being tasked from Bucharest to supply evidence of alleged foreign tourist involvement in the demonstrations and riots against Nicolae Ceausescu and his regime, they were unable to do so! See 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising)

This then is why as Radu Ciobotea wrote, “The Securitate doesn’t say but it suggests.  It allows small details to leak out.”–precisely because it has no tactical proof of Soviet tourist responsibility for the December 1989 events, its former personnel must appeal to broad, structural, and unverifiable claims, such as the overall number of Soviet tourists in 1989, to suggest that by the mere presence of so many Soviet tourists they must have been involved.

 

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Nicolae Ghircoiaș, Colonel de Miliție, Director al Institutului de Criminalistică din Inspectoratul General al Miliției (IGM), decembrie 1989 – ianuarie 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 26, 2014

(strictly personal view, as always, based on over two decades or prior research and publications, thank you)

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Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus-numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel Negoiu din Bucuresti.  Medicii de spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri.  Colonel Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii, i-a adunat pe toti indivizii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristii, facindu-i disparuti.

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Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera , 21 august 1992, p. 1, p. 3.

for confirmation suggesting Cornel Tripon’s arrest under suspicion of being a “terrorist” (28 December 1989, Hotel Negoiu, Bucuresti) during the December 1989 events, see http://www.danbadea.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/img036.jpg ; for confirmation that Ghircoias himself was (later) (re-) arrested, see http://www.danbadea.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/img043.jpg .

for the suggestion that Tripon’s status as a member of the Militie was merely a cover mechanism see,

“La internarea in spital, militianul Cornel Tripon a prezentat un buletin pe care avea trecuta ca adresa de domiciliu str. Academiei 24. Aceeasi adresa de domiciliu (fictiv) era trecuta in buletinul mai multor ofiteri de la UM 0666. Militianul ranit a fost ridicat chiar a doua zi din spital si transportat, se pare, la o unitate spitaliceasca a Ministerului de Interne.”

from Romulus Cristea, 20 decembrie 2006, http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/reportaje/salvarile-nu-erau-pentru-raniti–80867

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 elsewhere Dr. Nicolae Nae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, recounted Chircoias (sic Ghircoias)’s arrival and actions on 1-2 January 1990.

(English) Cited in The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, surgeon at Coltea Hospital: “I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of a department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments. I didn’t hear anything back from Chircoias or any expert. Those who made the evidence disappear neglected the fact that there still exist x-rays and other military documents that I put at the disposition of the [Military] Prosecutor.”

( http://www.romanialibera.ro/a113826/revolutia-5-000-de-victime-nici-un-vinovat.html)

Screen Capture of a registry presented by Dr. Nicolae Nae Constantinescu in TVR documentary by Toma Roman Jr. mentioning an atypical bullet with cap (varf) retezat extracted from a patient on 23 December 1989 and later “collected” by Ghircoias.

Origin 7272014 112744 AM

 

 

In early March 1990, Agence France Presse reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  [Significantly, a slew of military prosecutors, among them General Dan Voinea, General Romeo Balan, and General Teodor Ungureanu have attempted to deceive Romanians in the years since by denying or avoiding mention of the existence and use of DUM-DUM munitions in December 1989.]

Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

 

 

©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
411FD1741841E311716203546AC34BEC9C6CF7F0A69644B4

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea:  “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.Dosarele revolutiei -  "Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile"

- Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.

Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Procurori timorati

- Ati sesizat Parchetul Militar? Ati cerut sa se faca o ancheta in legatura cu cei impuscati la revolutie?
– Bineinteles, am anuntat Parchetul, am cerut o ancheta. De exemplu, cand le-am aratat apartamentul de unde s-a tras la revolutie, de la etajul 4, de la cinematograful “Luceafarul”, procurorii mi-au zis ca au facut verificarile si au depistat ca acolo era o locuinta conspirativa a Securitatii si atat. In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare. Neprimind nici un raspuns, dupa sase luni m-am dus la Parchet sa intreb ce se intampla. Mi s-a raspuns ca se lucreaza, mi-au aratat doua-trei avize puse pe colturile cererii si atat. Unul dintre procurori m-a luat cu el pe un coridor si mi-a spus ca “are copil, are nevasta, e foarte complicat…”. Ma intreba pe mine ce sa mai faca… Am izbucnit, le-am spus ca nu sunt un om care sa fie, asa, aburit cu una, cu doua. Le-am aratat radiografiile celor impuscati, le-am aratat gloante in ficat. Radiografiile existau, nu erau inventiile mele, nu mi se nazarise asa, dintr-o data sa cer ancheta! Le-am spus ca niste oameni doresc sa afle adevarul si ca cei care au semnat memoriul catre Parchet nu sunt niste persoane oarecare, ci medici cu experienta, somitati in materie. Degeaba am solicitat expertize balistice sau alte cercetari, degeaba am prezentat acte, documente, radiografii, lucrari. Nu se dorea sa se faca o ancheta serioasa.

extras din articolul lui Romulus Cristea
Miercuri, 20 Decembrie 2006 Romania Libera

Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile

http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/reportaje/–nici-acum-nu-mi-dau-seama-cum-am-putut-sa-operez-nonstop-timp-de-trei-zile—80869

http://www.romanialibera.ro/aldine/history/dosarul-revolutia-1989-142100

—————————————————-

For a discussion of Ghircoias’s activities in Timisoara before 22 December, please see the following:

and in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1) 2010, Marius Rotar, “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania in December 1989.”  pp. 1- 17.

—————————————————-

discussion in one of my previous publications:

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1]

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information. [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Part I

His name was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias.

And in Romania in December 1989 and January 1990, Nicolae Ghircoias was a very busy man.

We know, officially, of Nicolae Ghircoias’ actions in the last days leading up to the fall of the regime of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on 22 December 1989, as a result of what he and others said at a trial later in January 1990.  In bureaucratic parlance, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias, was the Director of the Criminalistic Institute of the Militia’s [Police’s] General Inspectorate.   In colloquial terms, in December 1989 it appears that this amounted to being something of a “cleaner,” or “fixer,” the kind of guy who could make unpleasant things—such as corpses—go away, without leaving a trace.

After regime forces opened fire on anti-regime protesters in the western city of Timisoara on 17 and 18 December 1989, Colonel Ghircoias was dispatched to recover the corpses of those with gunshot wounds from the city’s morgue.  The unautopsied cadavers of 43 demonstrators were stolen from the morgue in the dead of night and then transported to the outskirts of the capital Bucharest by refrigerated truck, where they were cremated.[2] Ghircoias was also in charge of collecting and destroying the hospital records and any other incriminating material that might indicate not just the death, but also the life of those who had perished—the official explanation for the disappearance of these citizens was to be that they had fled the country, thus taking their documents with them.  In other words, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias’ job was primarily, it seems, the destruction of evidence.[3]

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]


Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

[1]For some of my previous publications on this topic, see Richard Andrew Hall:

Hall 2008 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romrevfordumdums042108tk.html,

Hall 2006 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html,

Hall 2005 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.html,

Hall 2004 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/doublespeak%20romania%203-2004.html,

Hall 2002 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romania%20securitate%205-2002.html,

Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Action and Revolution:  Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989,” Europe-Asia Studies 2000, no. 6 (September 2000).

Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity:  The ‘Staged-War’ Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies vol 13, no. 3 (Fall 1999) (University of California Berkeley Press).

[2] For a good discussion of this in English, which explains how cremation practices were  at odds with Romanian burial traditions, see the article entitled “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania 1989,” in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1).

[3]For more information online, see, for example, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae_Ghircoia%C5%9F, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opera%C5%A3iunea_Trandafirul, http://www.romanialibera.ro/a51078/cine-a-organizat-furtul-cadavrelor-din-morga-spitalului-judetean.html, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/67.htm. Even the 1994 SRI report admits that confusion surrounding the identity of those who were cremated stems from Ghircoias’ burning—after the flight of the Ceausescus on 22 December—of all relevant documents he had seized from the Timisoara county hospital http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/raportul_sri11.htm.  Thus, it seems appropriate to say Ghircoias’ job involved making things disappear…

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

 

 

 

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Before the Narratives of December 1989 Consolidated: Looking through the First 200 Issues of the PNTCD’s “Dreptatea” Newspaper

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on June 14, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

Thanks to the Fundatia Corneliu Coposu site at http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/sectiune/index.php/239-ziarul-dreptatea/ copies of the PNTCD’s daily Dreptatea from the early 1990s are available to the public.  I have looked through the first 200 editions, from early February 1990 to early October 1990.  Many fascinating aspects of Romanian politics and life jump out at the reader.  For our purposes here, the most interesting aspect is the details that make their way into articles about December 1989.  This was at a time when, although beginning to consolidate, narratives of December 1989 remained somewhat fluid, focusing on what happened and less on how it did or did not fit into competing narratives.  It would not be long before these competing narratives would become not just descriptions of what had happened but increasingly political and ideological lenses to view and interpret what had happened–thus leading to the exclusion, knowingly or unknowingly, of details that contradicted or did not “fit” the narrative in question.  New theories and even new memories or perhaps better put, lapses in memory or amnesia, would displace earlier memories and details.

It is therefore almost surreal to read the details of December 1989 in the pages of the National Christian-Democratic Peasant Party’s daily Dreptatea, a party and a paper whose opposition to the National Salvation Front and the former communist nomenklatura, was unquestionable at the time and comes through clearly in the pages of this publication–including when it was not published for several days in June 1990 because miners at the behest of the Front’s leaders devastated the offices of the party and the daily….And yet, in articles about December 1989, journalists relayed details which today their political and ideological heirs consistently deny or seek to explain away or wouldn’t be caught dead including in any article about December 1989.  Most importantly, that the terrorists of December 1989 existed, that their core was provided by the Securitate and included Arabs from countries friendly to the dictatorial communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, and that the terrorists possessed and used atypical and highly destructive munitions that no other forces in Romania possessed:  in particular, exploding DUM-DUM bullets that are outlawed by an international convention of which Romania was a signatory.

image0-011

Niculae Lucian, 30 ani, 21 decembrie 1989, Intercontinental (Bucuresti), piciorul distrus de gloantele dum-dum (also mentioned in http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/18/surgeons-from-bucharests-main-hospitals-discuss-their-experiences-in-december-1989-lt-gnl-traian-oancea-dr-nicolae-nae-constantinescu-dr-dan-gavriliu-dr-nicolae-angelescu/)

G.L. [Gilda Lazar], “Pentru un erou al Revolutiei,” Dreptatea, nr. 52 (6 aprilie 1990), p. 2. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr52-1990-0406.pdf

image0-001

Aurelian Lazu, “REMEMBER,” Dreptatea, nr. 96 (1 iunie 1990), p. 2. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr96-1990-0601.pdf

image0-015

soldat Eugen Mardare, glont dum-dum s-a explodat in abdomen

Raluca Gabriel Mocanu, “Eroii Tragici,” Dreptatea, nr. 100 (6 iunie 1990), p. 4. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr100-1990-0606.pdf

image0-005

Ovidiu Craciun, doua dum-dum-uri

Traian Calin Uba, “Noi amintiri in alb,” Dreptatea, nr. 138 (24 iulie 1990), p. 3.  http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr138-1990-0724.pdf

image0-003

Ilie Costache, “Accident? [despre cazul avionului TAROM AN-24 prabusit pe 28 decembrie 1989], Dreptatea, nr. 36 (17 martie 1990), p. 3. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr138-1990-0724.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

 

image0-013

gloantele cu virful taiat

Odette Hanganu si Remus Agatinei, “Si Braila e oras martir.  Cind se va afla adevarul?,” Dreptatea, nr. 69 (28 aprilie 1990), p. 4. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr69-1990-0428.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/29/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-iii-a-fistful-of-bullets-unregistered-atyp/

 

image0-008

gloante cu cap vidia

Tudor Barbu, “Trei momente din decembrie si semnele lor de intrebare,” Dreptatea, nr. 36 (17 martie 1990), p. 3. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr36-1990-0317.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/06/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-iii/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

 

image0-017

Sibiu, ROMBAC, 80 de specialisti din capitala

Cristina Mladin, “Inexactitati,” Dreptatea, nr. 101 (7 iunie 1990), p. 3. http://www.corneliu-coposu.ro/u/p/image/ziarul-dreptatea/dreptatea-nr101-1990-0607.pdf

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/16/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-iv/

 

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New Research on the Overthrow Of Nicolae Ceausescu and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989: Recent Posts

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on June 4, 2014

(purely and strictly personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications, thank you!)

image0-001

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

image0-003

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This (likely aperiodic) series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

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On 23 December 1989 Leaders of the National Salvation Front Requested Soviet Military Assistance: Addressing the What and the Why (II)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 11, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications; please do not cite without prior author approval, thank you)

Despite Ion Iliescu’s fervent and repeated denials to the contrary, leaders of the National Salvation Front, including apparently Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, panicked on 23 December 1989 and requested Soviet military assistance, as verified by three accounts herehttp://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/10/on-23-december-1989-leaders-of-the-national-salvation-front-requested-soviet-military-assistance-addressing-the-what-and-the-why-i/How much of their unwillingness today to acknowledge that they made this request is dictated by embarrassment in such a Russophobic country over having made such a request and how much of it is dictated by the effort to erase the existence, actions, and culpability of the “terrorists” is unclear.

For many Romanians, that is all they need to know:  they don’t care about the context in which such a decision was made, that the Soviets appear to have for the most part turned down the request, and that the Front decision was dictated by the genuine confusion and fear that permeated the hours during which these appeals were made.  What then is the reality of the reasons Front officials gave for the request for Soviet assistance?  As Nestor Ratesh wrote in 1991 in The Entangled Revolution (p. 111):

In any case, on December 23, 1989, between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M., Romanian television and Radio Bucharest in a joint broadcast carried the following announcement:  “We are informed that the help of the Soviet army was requested through the Embassy of the USSR, due to the fact that the terrorists have resorted to helicopters through foreign interventionists.”

So we have two data points to investigate:

1) the existence of helicopters not under control of forces loyal to Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow, and 2) the existence of non-Romanians among the so-called “terrorists.”

We know that the claim of unidentified helicopters was an issue on the night of 22/23 December 1989, as this video makes clear.

[The following passage is indicative of Securitate General Iulian Vlad's duplicity and lack of credibility.  Playing dumb about the report of unidentified helicopters, he responds to one of the revolutionary's questions--suggesting that the helicopters belonged to Vlad's Securitate--in a ridiculous and unserious manner,"perhaps they are yours?" he says to the man (!)]

1:32 Iulian Vlad: Dar eu nu-nţeleg de ce au plecat elicopterele.
1:34 Bărbat: Ale teroriştilor.
1:35 Iulian Vlad: Care terorişti, domnule, de unde au venit ăştia? Că n-au…
1:38 Bărbat: (neînţelegibil) speciale
1:40 Iulian Vlad: Păi de unde? Ori ale dînsului (arată spre Guşă), ori ale mele tre’ să fie. Altele nu sînt.
1:44 Bărbat: Ale dumneavoastră.
1:46 Iulian Vlad: Ale dumneavoastră, măi copii.
1:47 Bărbat: Au fost şi altele.
1:49 Iulian Vlad: Foarte curioasă treaba asta.
1:51 Bărbat: Sînt de la dumneavoastră cu alte ordine.

1:53 Iulian Vlad: Păi nu am decît trei elicoptere.

transcribed at http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2011/01/14/stefan-gusa-alerta-totala-peste-tot-astia-au-fost-niste-dementi-au-doborit-8-elicoptere-o-fi-avut-un-regiment-subteran-pe-undeva-video/

1) The question of unidentified HELICOPTERS:

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/securitate-helicopters-transmitters-per-hungarian-defense-officials/

Hungarian defense officials related interesting and important information during the days of 23-26 December 1989.  (These are xeroxes from the Library of Congress of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations performed in December 1989.  Unfortunately, for some unknown reason, they were filed under Hungary and not Romania–unclear what the methodology for categorization was–meaning that they were easily missed by researchers, including myself, for many years.) Details include:

1) Not only did the Securitate have “a large number of helicopters” (Def. Min. Ferenc Karpati) but on Saturday 23 December 1989, two of them briefly violated Hungarian airspace near Battonya (which is not far from the Romanian city of Arad)

2) The Hungarian Army monitored and passed on to the Romanian Army locations of secret Securitate radio transmitters (in a later report, it is detailed that the number of active Securitate radio transmitters fell during these days from 31 to 19 to 5, concomitant with the decline in counter-revolutionary fighting).

3) Hungarian forces recognized “stories being spread by the Romanian security services and the forces loyal to Ceausescu,” including the reports that the Romanian Army was low on ammunition (a rumor designed to create panic and give the impression that the Romanian armed forces could be conquered) and that the Hungarians were to send planes into Romania (suggesting an effort to invade or take advantage of the chaos in Romania) which Col. Gyorgy Keleti of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense claimed he was asked about by Romanian Lt. Gen Eftimescu, whom he reassured it was an untrue rumor.

 

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/14/lying-in-wait-securitate-director-general-vlad-in-the-cc-building-i/

Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu admitted to journalist Dan Badea in 1991 that the USLA (special anti-terrorist unit) had its own helicopter force, thereby substantiating the suspicion of the unidentified revolutionary that the helicopters in question were “special”/”from a special unit.”  Thus, it is abundantly clear that Vlad’s claim that the Securitate had “just three helicopters” was a bald-faced lie.

image-12

2) Regarding the involvement of “foreign interventionists”–in particular, mercenaries from Arab countries (and Iran) with treaty obligations to Ceausescu and Romania–the per cost AFP archives are a bonanza.

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/anatomy-of-a-cover-up-or-constanta-we-have-a-problem/

Note:  Not everything at this point had “disappeared”:  General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).

Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably:  The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.

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©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 08:33 – Heure Paris (386 mots)
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
   ” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
   ” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
   Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
   Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
   En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
   Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
   Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
   Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
   Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
   nm/jga/vr.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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©AFP Général – Mercredi 27 Décembre 1989 – 18:14 – Heure Paris (671 mots)

Roumanie Sibiu
Sibiu, la ville ou les combats ont ete les plus violents de l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   SIBIU (Roumanie) 27 dec – Sibiu, dans le centre de la Roumanie, est indubitablement la ville ou les combats entre l armee et la Securitate, fidele a Nicolae Ceausescu, ont ete les plus violents. C est la que Nicu, fils du dictateur, etait chef du parti.
   Des maisons totalement detruites et calcinees dont il ne reste plus que les murs, des eclats de verre partout dans les rues, des toits eventres par des tirs de grenades et par les mitrailleuses des tanks, des voitures et blindes brulant encore en travers de la route: tel etait le spectacle de desolation qu offraient mercredi plusieurs quartiers de Sibiu, a constate un envoye special de l AFP.
   Du 22 au 25 decembre, les affrontements se sont concentres aux abords des trois ecoles militaires de Sibiu, du siege de la police et de celui de la Securitate. Il ne reste plus grand-chose des deux batiments a trois etages qui abritaient la police et les services secrets. Les fenetres ont vole en eclats. Toutes les maisons des alentours, ou s etaient retranches les agents de la police secrete, portent d innombrables traces, et, dans la cour de la police, un blinde leger calcine est observe avec curiosite par les passants.
   ” C etait la guerre ici, avec des tanks, des balles explosives et des unites de commando. C est ici que Nicu Ceausescu a essaye de lancer une contre-offensive contre nous ” , souligne un militaire qui garde maintenant les lieux.
   Lynchages.
   Devant cet immeuble, une centaine de personnes commentent a haute voix un extrait des archives qu elles viennent de decouvrir: les fiches de renseignements que la Securitate avait etablies sur chaque habitant de Sibiu. ” Ecrit a un cousin en Suisse. Propos sans importance. Pendant son service militaire, ne frequentait que des soldats d origine allemande comme lui ” , est-il indique sur une de ces fiches qui comportent de nombreux renseignements personnels, certaines remontant a 1958.
   Dans la foule, on raconte comment une dizaine de Securistes (agents de la Securitate) arretes pendant les affrontements de ces derniers jours ont ete lynches par la population qui les a tues a coups de pied et de poing: ” Nous n avons pas de mots pour qualifier ces gens de la Securitate, ils sont pires que des monstres ” , dit une dame d une cinquantaine d annees, qui s interrompt et fond en larmes. Certains ont reussi neanmoins a conserver un certain sens de l humour noir: ” Quand les voitures de la Securitate ont ete brulees devant chez moi, j ai pense que c etait bien la premiere fois qu il faisait chaud dans mon appartement ” , a declare a l AFP une habitante de Sibiu, en faisant allusion a l impossibilite pour les Roumains de se chauffer en raison des restrictions.
   Les combats ont egalement ete tres durs dans le centre de Sibiu. Le principal hotel de la ville, le ” Continental ” , n a plus de fenetres sur cinq etages, et des traces de balles sont visibles jusqu au 11eme etage.
   ” Les Securistes avait pris position dans l hotel et avaient rempli deux etages de munitions ” , explique un employe de l etablissement. Des incendies ont eclate dans certaines chambres, touchees par des balles incendiaires. Face a l hotel, un panneau est reste accroche a un lampadaire: ” Militaires, ne tirez pas sur nos freres et nos parents. L armee est avec nous ” .
   Dans les rues de Sibiu, ou de tres nombreuses vitrines sont recouvertes de carton, la population vaquait normalement a ses occupations mercredi soir. Patrouilles de militaires, blindes legers et ambulances croisaient des voitures portant des cercueils sur le toit et des camions apportant de l aide alimentaire et medicale de Hongrie, de Tchecoslovaquie et de RFA.
   Sibiu pense deja a renaitre de ses cendres: malgre le froid tres vif, des equipes de nettoyage et de vitriers travaillaient tard dans la soiree dans la ville.
   nm/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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©AFP Général – Mardi 2 Janvier 1990 – 14:22 – Heure Paris (298 mots)

Roumanie Securitate
Il ne faut pas considerer les troupes de la Securitate comme des terroristes, selon le chef d etat-major roumain
   PARIS 2 jan – Les membres de la Securitate, la police politique de Nicolae Ceausescu, ne sont pas dans leur majorite des ” terroristes ” , ceux- ci se recrutant dans la garde personnelle de l ancien dictateur, a affirme mardi le general Vasile Ionel, chef d etat-major de l armee roumaine.
   ” On n a pas le droit de considerer les troupes de la Securitate comme des terroristes ” , a declare a Radio France Internationale M. Ionel, adjoint du ministre de la Defense le general Nicolae Militaru. Pour le general Ionel, ” la majorite de la Securitate est devouee au peuple ” .
   Il a ajoute que lorsque M. Ceausescu avait donne l ordre de tirer sur la foule a Bucarest, le 22 decembre, ” certaines unites de la Securitate ont tire, mais il y en a eu d autres qui n ont pas tire ” .
   Le lendemain, quand le chef de la Securitate a lance a la radio l ordre de ne plus participer aux combats, ” toutes les unites de la Securitate sont retournees dans les casernes ” , a declare le general Ionel, ajoutant que ce sont des membres de la garde personnelle de Ceausescu, evalues a ” plusieurs centaines ” qui ont poursuivi les combats.
   L armee, a-t-il dit ” ne soupconnait auparavant ni le nombre ni l efficacite de ses hommes – des tireurs d elite – ni la nature du materiel. “.
   Interroge sur la provenance de leurs armes, le general Ionel affirme qu elles ne viennent ” d aucun pays du Pacte de Varsovie ” , sans toutefois preciser leur origine. Il ajoute en revanche que les ” terroristes ” ont utilise certains types d armements interdits par les traites internationaux, des balles explosives par exemple.
   ps/af.
©AFP Général – Samedi 30 Décembre 1989 – 12:28 – Heure Paris (310 mots)

Roumanie mercenaires
Temoignages sur la presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie
   BUDAPEST 30 dec – La presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie, notamment de differents pays arabes et de l Iran, est hors de doute, selon le correspondant de l agence hongroise MTI a Bucarest largement cite dans la presse hongroise samedi.
   Toutefois, aucun ” mercenaire etranger ” n a jusqu a present ete identifie, presente a la television, ou interviewe a la radio.
   ” La participation d unites militaires etrangeres aux combats en Roumanie est un fait ” , selon le correspondant qui se refere aux temoignages de soldats roumains qui ont ” neutralise ” un groupe de 27 ” terroristes ” iraniens. Un des prisonniers a admis, selon le correspondant, que le commando ” etait venu directement de l Iran ” .
   Il etait connu, selon le correspondant de MTI, que quelque 12.000 etudiants etaient inscrits aux differentes hautes ecoles et universites roumaines et que des ” camps ont existe en Roumanie pour l entrainement d unites speciales au compte de differents pays arabes ” . Un de ces camps etait situe a proximite de Bucarest, dans la ville de Snagov, mais il en existait d autres un peu partout dans le pays, precise le correspondant toujours en reference a des recits de soldats roumains.
   Le correspondant de MTI revele egalement l existence d unites speciales de la Securitate nommees les ” Chemises Noirs ” qui fonctionnaient selon l exemple de la Loge P-2 (Loge maconnique clandestine italienne). Les plus hauts dirigeants roumains ont appartenu a cette loge clandestine dont notamment l ancien ministre de l Interieur, Tudor Postelnicu, un des chefs de la Securitate, le vice-premier ministre Ion Dinca et le fils du dictateur roumain dechu, Nicu Ceausescu. La Securitate etait divisee en 17 unites surveillant toute la Roumanie. Ses bases se trouvaient generalement dans des villas de luxe, precise le correspondant de MTI a Bucarest.
   ph-wb/nev/nl.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
CC12A16A1A31DB1EF1DA0D141071207DBFC664CE89959FCA
©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 19:13 – Heure Paris (679 mots)
Roumanie, prev Dans un train de Noel: psychose des tireurs isoles et chasse aux hommes de la Securitate de l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, Jean-Anne CHALET
   A BORD DU TRAIN TIMISOARA-BUCAREST 25 dec – Dans le premier train de Noel entre Timisoara (ouest de la Roumanie) et Bucarest, les voyageurs partagent le pain et le sel et sont deja entres dans l ere de l ” apres-Ceausescu ” .
   Malgre la psychose des tireurs isoles, ce sont les agents de l ancien regime, les hommes de la Securitate, qui sont devenus les pourchasses, apres avoir ete chasseurs pendant des annees.
   Ces hommes, les plus craints de l ancien appareil repressif de Nicolae Ceausescu, qui continuent a resister dans plusieurs villes de Roumanie, sont traques. Lundi, deux d entre eux ont ete arretes par une garde patriotique dans la gare de Timisoara, la cite martyre, ou l on a denombre, selon les dernieres estimations, pres de cinq mille morts.
   Mais ils continuent de faire peur. Toute la nuit de Noel, les tirs ont ete incessants dans le centre de Timisoara, et lundi matin, il etait pratiquement impossible de circuler a pied ou en voiture.
   Pour gagner la gare a pied, l envoye special de l AFP a essuye le feu de tireurs isoles et il a fallu que les soldats interviennent au fusil mitrailleur pour le couvrir. Le train est parti de Timisoara avec une demi-heure de retard, apres l arrestation des deux agents de la Securitate. En cours de route, une bombe a ete decouverte dans le convoi et tous les voyageurs invites a descendre. Le wagon ou se trouvait l engin a ete detache du train.
   Les nouvelles sur un transistor.
   Dans la plupart des gares traversees, les references a l ancien regime avaient ete effacees, les drapeaux bleu-jaune-rouge de la Roumanie comportaient un grand trou au milieu, la ou figuraient jadis les emblemes du communisme. Des inscriptions aussi un peu partout : ” Mort au tyran ” , ” Vive la Roumanie libre ” .
   Dans ce compartiment, voyagent ensemble un ingenieur de 60 ans, un ancien architecte devenu tanneur par la force des choses, un jeune garde patriotique, un camionneur et un paysan.
   Le pain et le sel ont ete partages entre tous dans cette journee de Noel, et les informations captees sur un transistor commentees en termes severes. Tous sont d accord pour estimer que Ceausescu et son clan s etaient rendus responsables de veritables atrocites durant les 25 ans ou ils ont ete au pouvoir. ” Notre pays etait une sorte de bagne. Non seulement nous n avions aucune liberte, mais en plus, le tyran a fait executer beaucoup de Roumains, uniquement parce qu ils avaient ose resister ou discuter les ordres ” , declare le tanneur. ” Il poursuit son action criminelle encore aujourd hui, alors qu il a ete arrete, a travers les activites de la Securitate, qui mettent le pays a feu et a sang ” , surencherit l ingenieur.
   Tout le monde sous les banquettes.
   A ce moment, comme pour donner plus de poids a ces propos, une rafale d arme automatique est tiree le long de la voie, obligeant tout le monde a se cacher sous les banquettes. Nouvelle alerte quelques kilometres plus loin, avec arret force, controle de toutes les identites, et cinq interpellations de voyageurs d origine arabe.
   La psychose des mercenaires qui seraient a la solde de l ancien dictateur, ajoutee a celle des hommes de la Securitate, a cree, dans toutes les regions traversees par le train, une nervosite tant dans les rangs de l armee que parmi les gardes patriotiques. Cette affaire de mercenaires evoquee dimanche soir a Timisoara, au cours d une conference de presse par le commandant local des gardes patriotiques, a pris de l ampleur au cours de la journee de lundi, et diverses radios ” libres ” locales, captees dans le train, y ont fait allusion.
   Apres plusieurs haltes de controle, le train de Noel de Timisoara est arrive a Bucarest avec deux heures de retard et les impacts des rafales tirees durant le voyage.
   JAC/PSR/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 20:10 – Heure Paris (191 mots)

Roumanie Securitate
Une grande base d helicopteres en Roumanie serait aux mains de la Securitate, selon Budapest
   BUDAPEST 25 dec – Une importante base d helicopteres en Roumanie serait aux mains de la Securitate, la police secrete de Ceausescu, a declare lundi le porte- parole du ministere hongrois de la Defense a la television hongroise.
   Le colonel Gyorgy Keleti n a pas precise le nom de cette base, indiquant seulement qu elle se trouvait en Roumanie, a une centaine de km de la frontiere hongroise.
   ” Il semble que cette base soit aux mains des terroristes ” (la Securitate), a declare le porte-parole en rappelant que des helicopteres roumains avaient viole l espace aerien hongrois plusieurs fois ces derniers jours.
   D autre part, le colonel Keleti a annonce que l organisation caritative de l ordre de Malte avait recu l autorisation exceptionnelle de monter une station de radio sur la base militaire hongroise de Szeged, toute proche de la Roumanie. Cette station vise a assurer les communications entre l organisation et son siege en RFA, afin de faciliter la logistique de l acheminement des dons vers la Roumanie.
   rb/ph/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
FE1B113C1B51B81391170AE4CFD3FFE3749689D6828ED1AC
©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 19:28 – Heure Paris (539 mots)
Roumanie Securitate, prev Les hommes de la Securitate attaquent encore l armee mais cherchent surtout a fuir De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, Nicolas MILETITCH
   MOLDOVA-NOUA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Des commandos de la Securitate ont attaque des unites militaires lundi, en fin de matinee, a Resica et Oravita, dans le sud du pays, mais divers indices indiquent que leur objectif reste principalement de quitter le pays.
   D autres affrontements armes ont ete egalement observes lundi a Tournu Sevrin, plus au sud, de l autre cote de la chaine des Carpates meridionales, et les routes de la region sont peu sures, a indique a l AFP un officier de l armee a Moldova-Noua.
   Selon des sources militaires, il y a eu d autres affrontements de l autre cote du pays, a Constanza, sur la Mer Noire.
   Sur les routes, les controles, souvent nerveux, effectues par les militaires et les patrouilles populaires, nombreux et minutieux, notamment a proximite de la frontiere, temoignent de la confusion qui regne encore dans plusieurs regions ou des commandos de la Securitate menent des actions isolees.
   La chasse a l homme se poursuit en Roumanie pour s emparer des derniers elements de la Securitate, qui tentent de fuir le pays, sans doute peu nombreux, mais bien equipes et entraines.
   Plusieurs d entre eux ont ete arretes en Yougoslavie, dans l apres- midi, pres de Klodovo, par les unites speciales de la police yougoslave envoyees sur place depuis quelques jours. Ces agents de la Securitate emportaient avec eux d importantes quantites d or.
   Dirigeants locaux elus.
   D autres se cachent encore dans les forets de la region, a-t-on indique a l AFP de source policiere. Sur la route qui longe le Danube entre Pojejenea et Macesti, des militaires, arme au poing, arretent les voitures.
   ” Beaucoup de terroristes (agents de la Securitate) tentent de passer de l autre cote en Yougoslavie ” , explique l un d eux. Juste retour des choses, l extraordinaire dispositif (barbeles, miradors, postes de garde tous les cent metres), mis en place par la police le long du Danube pour empecher les Roumains de fuir vers la Yougoslavie, est aujourd hui un obstacle supplementaire pour les agents de la police secrete aux abois.
   Il faudra sans doute encore attendre quelques jours pour que soient liquidees les dernieres poches de resistance, les agents de la Securitate risquant de manquer bientot de munitions, ont souligne a l AFP plusieurs officiers charges d assurer la securite dans la region.
   Si la situation n est pas encore completement sous le controle des nouvelles autorites et de l armee, sur la route (la circulation de nuit reste fortement deconseillee) et dans certaines villes, la vie semble revenir a la normale a peu pres partout ailleurs.
   ” Une nouvelle administration est deja mise en place dans notre region. Nous recevons nos instructions par la radio et la tele de Bucarest, et la vie a repris son cours ” , declare le directeur des Mines de Moldova-Noua, Ionec Danciu. Les nouveaux dirigeants de la ville ont ete elus librement par leurs citoyens . ” C est bien la premiere fois ” , releve Ionec Danciu, et parmi eux, se trouvent meme des membres du Parti communiste.
   NM/PSR/chm.
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©AFP Général – Mercredi 10 Janvier 1990 – 12:25 – Heure Paris (500 mots)
Roumanie medecine, lead Cinq jeunes Roumains, blesses durant les evenements, hospitalises a Marseille
   MARSEILLE 10 jan – Les premiers Roumains rapatries en France depuis les recents evenements, quatre hommes et une femme grievement blesses par balles a Bucarest et a Timisoara, sont arrives dans la nuit de mardi a mercredi, a Marseille, ou ils ont ete hospitalises.
   Ces personnes, rapatriees par un Transall de l armee francaise qui avait ete specialement affrete, ont ete admises dans cinq des onze etablissements de l Assistance publique de Marseille. Aucune indication n a ete fournie sur ces hopitaux, ni sur la nature precise des blessures.
   Selon le docteur Richard Domergue, responsable adjoint du SAMU de Marseille, qui a dirige ce rapatriement, la femme et ses quatre compatriotes, ” atteints par des projectiles de guerre dum-dum (NDLR: balles entaillees en croix, de maniere a provoquer de larges dechirures), souffrent de graves problemes fonctionnels mais nullement vitaux ” , a-t-il declare a l AFP.
   Le docteur avait ete avise de cette evacuation sanitaire, dans la nuit de lundi a mardi, par un telex de la cellule interministerielle de crise, mise en place par le gouvernement francais depuis des evenements en Roumanie.
   L equipe du SAMU, constituee de deux medecins et de deux infirmieres, a ete acheminee jusqu a Bucarest ou l attendait le Dr Lamare, de la cellule logistique en place a l ambassade de France.
   Quelques heures plus tard l avion, transportant les cinq blesses, places sous perfusion, se posait sur la base aerienne d Istres (Bouches-du-Rhone) ou attendaient des ambulances.
   Arrives a l hopital de la Timone, vers minuit, les Roumains, ages de 20 a 35 ans et parlant seulement leur langue natale, ont ete repartis dans divers etablissements, ” en fonction des places disponibles et des besoins medicaux : traumatologie, micro-chirurgie, orthopedie ” .
   ” Ces personnes ont ete atteintes lors de manifestations de rue pacifiques, par un ou deux projectiles, selon les cas, a explique le Dr Domergue. Elles presentent de grosses lesions pouvant entrainer la paralysie de membres ” . Elles vont subir un bilan de sante complet qui permettra notamment d etablir les risques eventuels de sequelles.
   Ambiance soixante-huitarde a Bucarest, selon le medecin marseillais.
   Il a precise que la femme a ete blessee lors de la manifestation de rue du 17 decembre a Timisoara. ” Elle a raconte avoir ete admise dans un hopital d ou elle a du etre evacuee apres que des tirs eurent ete entendus dans l etablissement ou des hommes de la Securitate achevaient des blesses ” , a rapporte le Dr Domergue.
   Il regne a Bucarest, selon le medecin marseillais, ” une ambiance soixante-huitarde, un peu revolutionnaire. On sent une certaine exhaltation et il y a beaucoup de mouvements dans les rues ” , a-t-il temoigne. Il a souligne ” la chaleur touchante ” manifestee par les Roumains a l equipe medicale francaise. ” Ils ont une confiance totale en nous. Nous ne pouvons pas les decevoir. Nous allons les dorloter, ca parait le minimun ” , a-t-il assure.
   JLL/dv.
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©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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©AFP Général – Jeudi 5 Avril 1990 – 17:27 – Heure Paris (504 mots)

Roumanie justice
La repression escamotee dans le proces du general Ceausescu
   BUCAREST 5 avr – Le proces du general Nicolae-Andruta Ceausescu, frere du dictateur roumain, continue a donner l impression que la repression qui a fait des dizaines de morts et des centaines de blesses le 21 decembre pres de l hotel Intercontinental a Bucarest etait le fait d un homme seul, tirant avec un pistolet.
   Oubliees les centaines de personnes touchees par balles, les blessures a la balle dum-dum, les manifestants abattus a bout portant, selon les expertises des medecins et chirurgiens de l hopital Coltea.
   Au quatrieme jour des debats, devant le tribunal militaire de Bucarest, un seul temoignage, aussitot interrompu par le procureur militaire, a fait etat de l utilisation de leurs armes par des ” hommes en civil venant du service d ordre ” .
   Apres une vingtaine de temoins interroges depuis mardi matin, tous membres de l Ecole de la Securitate que commandait le general Ceausescu et presentant la meme version monocorde qui vise a innocenter en bloc l Ecole a l exception du general, le colonel Teodor Amariucai, premier officier de l armee -et non de la police- appele a la barre a cree la surprise en donnant sa version des affrontements du 21.
   ” Vers 19H30, une deuxieme serie de rafales de sommation tirees en l air par l armee, pour faire reculer les manifestants boulevard Balcescu, a provoque la confusion dans la foule, de nombreux manifestants se couchant a terre pour se proteger ” , a-t-il dit.
   contrepartie.
   ” C est alors que de nombreux civils en manteau, surgissant de derriere le cordon des forces de l ordre ou j etais, l ont traverse pour se lancer vers les manifestants. Certains matraquaient ceux qui etaient a terre, d autres tiraient de dessous leur manteau sur ceux qui s enfuyaient, on voyait leur poche tressaillir a chaque coup. J ai vu des flaques de sang, et des morts qu on trainait vers une camionnette.. “.
   Double intervention du procureur et du president du tribunal: ” ces faits font l objet de poursuites judiciaires, et seront penalement sanctionnes. Revenons aux faits concernant l inculpe ” .
   Officiellement, dans le cadre de ce proces, les temoignages se concentrent donc sur un ” fait divers ” , celui d un general se jetant sur la foule avec son pistolet d ordonnance ” sous l emprise d une crise de diabete ” .
   Deux nouveaux temoignages ont ” confirme ” jeudi que le general Ceausescu avait ” perdu le controle de lui-meme ” , notamment celui de son chauffeur, l adjudant Ion Turcin, qui dit que le general a braque son arme sur lui.
   Le general ecoute les temoins, tantot avec agacement, tantot avec indifference, mais sans rien ajouter.
   Les observateurs en viennent a se demander si le general n a pas d avance accepte de ne mettre personne en cause, parmi les personnes qui ont participe avec lui a la repression, pour obtenir en contrepartie des garanties pour lui ou, plus vraisemblablement, pour son epouse malade, son fils, sa fille et ses petits-enfants.
   BAY/ccd.
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AE1FA1E713113F1AE1BE0C848578C928046086B100BBDC48 http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

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Doru Viorel Ursu (fost Ministru de Interne): „Terorişti n-au existat niciodată”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 25, 2014

(ca intotdeauna, un punct de vedere strict personal)

De reţinut ce spunea Ursu: „Terorişti n-au existat niciodată”, chiar dacă Iliescu şi Brucan îi vedeau „trăgând din toate direcţiile”.

http://www.mesagerul.ro/2014/04/23/teroristi-n-au-existat-niciodata

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doru-Viorel_Ursu

Doru-Viorel Ursu

De la Wikipedia, enciclopedia liberă
Fișier:Doru-ViorelUrsu.jpg

Deputatul Doru-Viorel Ursu

Doru-Viorel Ursu (n.1 martie 1953) este un politician român, deputat în legislatura 1992-1996, ales în județul Argeș. A fost Ministru de Interne al României în perioada 16 iunie 199016 octombrie 1991, în guvernul Petre Roman.

S-a născut la Drobeta-Turnu Severin, pe 1 martie 1953. În 1976 a terminat Facultatea de Drept din București [!], cu nota 9,95. A devenit procuror la Procuratura Sectorului 2. Este căsătorit din 1979 si are 3 copii. 1980 devine judecător la Tribunalul Militar București. 1989 devine președintele Tribunalului Militar. Mai 1990 primește dosarul lui Nicu Ceausescu. 14 iunie 1990 devine ministru de Interne în guvernul Petre Roman, până în 16 octombrie 1991, apoi este secretar de stat la Ministerul de Externe. 1992 devine deputat de Argeș, al Partidului Democrat. Iși incepe cariera in avocatură. Până în 1996 este membru al Comisiei de Control a SRI. 1997 iși dă doctoratul în Drept Penal și ajunge până la gradul de conferențiar universitar. Renunță la politică și la profesorat pentru avocatură. În prezent este avocat titular al Cabinetului de avocat “Doru Viorel Ursu” cu sediul in București.

http://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/culisele-procesului-nicu-ceausescu-72484.html#

 

TERORISTII N-AU EXISTAT NICIODATA!(???)  BA DA!!!

On 29 January 1990, Securitate General Iulian Vlad confessed the painful truth:  the “terrorists” who were responsible for almost a thousand deaths and several thousand injuries beginning on the afternoon of 22 December 1989 were from the institution he commanded, the Securitate.  Not all confessions are equal:  it means much more when someone confesses that the institution of which he is a member was responsible for a particular crime.  It means even more when the person confessing is the head of that institution…even if, as in this case, Vlad personally evades responsibility for the actions of those under his command.  (As to the corroboration of Vlad’s confession:  this website abounds in details from eyewitnesses that, indeed, the terrorists were from the Securitate.  It is only the politics of post-Ceausescu Romania and the role of Securitate disinformation in manipulating the narrative space that this is actually “news” and should come as such a surprise.  It speaks volumes that General Vlad’s 29 January 1990 confession has never been mentioned, published, or transcribed by the Romanian media in 23 years…it is as if it had never existed…)

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

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Army General Ion Hortopan’s declaration of 16 February 1990 suggests that later on 23 December 1989 Vlad attempted to suggest that those shooting were the revolutionaries themselves, including the ill-intentioned among them who had served prison time…

“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta–in scopul de a ne induce in eroare–a raspuns ca manifestantii , patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra.” (p. 317)

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Declaratia generalului colonel I. Hortopan, 16.02.1990 (din cate cunosc, pana publicarea cartii lui Dan Ioan, timp de 22 de ani, aceasta declaratie n-a aparut in presa romana)

“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta — in scopul de ne induce in eroare — a raspuns ca manifestantii patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra.  In timpul actiunii, trupele noastre au prins un numar de teroristi care faceau din unitatile de Securitate, au cerut cuvantul si au prezentat numarul unitatilor din care faceau parte (UM-0672F, UM-0639, UM-0106, UM-0620), la care Vlad, tot pentru inducere in eroare, a afirmat ca acestia s-ar putea sa fie fanatici, care, chipurile, ar actiona pe cont propriu.”

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If during the events of December 1989, Vlad attempted to disinform those around him with suggestions that the “terrorists” were Hungarians or revolutionaries, including those with prison records, who had seized weapons–that this hypothesis has penetrated the popular consciousness can be seen in the ongoing Adevarul series on December 1989 and to some extent in the works of Ruxandra Cesereanu, Peter Siani-Davies, and the Raport Final of the CPADCR Tismaneanu Commission which placed its uncritical trust in former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea–in court in September 1990 he pleaded ignorance, but speculated it was the hand of agents in the service of foreign powers.  In other words, Vlad has done what those engaging in lies and disinformation usually do:  he takes and plays the field, promoting any alternative theory that diverts and contradicts the truth, since the goal is not the success of any specific counter theory, but the marginalization and delegitimization of the truth…in this case, what he revealed on 29 January 1990…

Generalul Iulian Vlad:  “Vreau sa adaug ca aceia care au hotarit sa faca ceea ce s-a facut au organizat diversiunea pentru ca niste puteri straine aveau tot interesul ca aceasta sa se produca.  Si haosul s-a produs…Practic s-a deschis tara pentru toate serviciile de spionaj straine si pentru toate formele de diversiune, de subminare…Care sint teroristii?  De unde au venit?  Cine le-a dat ordin?  Eu personal nu am cunostiinta sa se fi stabilit cine au fost teroristii, cine a ucis dupa 22 decembrie.  Mi se spune si mie in sarcina.  Pentru ca despre unii aflati in serviciul unor puteri straine si care au rivnit la putere aici, in Romania, securitatea stia multe lucruri si nu convenabile pentru niste patrioti revolutionari romani.  Acestia si puterile straine in slujba carora s-au pus au nimicit securitatea.  Sint inculpat nu pentru ca as fi vinovat, ci pentru ca trebuia sa fiu inculpat.  Sint constient, de asemenea, ca ma expun unor pericole grave si iminente.  Dar toate lucrurile acestea trebuie spuse.”  Numai ca, inainte de pauza care a premers acestor dezvaluiri (dintre care, fie vorba intre noi, unele nu apar pentru prima data in presa) generalul anuntase ca ne va spune cine sint teroristii.  Dupa pauza, desi instanta s-a aratat dornica sa stie cine sint, nu mai vorbim de asistenta, fostul sef al Securitatii a spus cu candoare: Daca i-as fi stiut, i-as fi rezolvat cu 8 luni in urma.” (Al. Mihalcea, “Procesul Generalului:  ‘Sint inculpat nu pentru ca as fi vinovat, ci pentru ca trebuia sa fiu inculpat,” Romania Libera, 12 septembrie 1990, p. 2)

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http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/04/declaratia-generalului-ion-hortopan-cum-a-vazut-armata-colaborarea-generalului-iulian-vlad/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/15/ill-take-the-field-or-how-securitate-general-vlads-disinformation-illuminates-the-truth-the-uses-of-hungarians-revolutionaries-with-criminal-records-and-foreign-agents/

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Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (II)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 4, 2013

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/01/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribui-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-i/

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“Despre existenta simulatoarele, senatorul Sergiu Nicolaescu a adresat o intrebare fostului sef al Departmamentului Securitatii Statului, gl. Vlad Iulian, care a raspuns…”Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea…” (declaratie Iulian Vlad, pag. 75).

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In aceasta perioada, in zona Televiziunii au fost observate semnale luminoase ce prezentau imaginea unei balizari si care marcau inceputul sau incetarea atacurilor.

image0-001

Mai mult despre “semnale luminoase”:

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/19/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-ii/

Doru Sciadei’s statement, 27 January 1990

“O persoana dintre militari a luminat cu o lanterna, iar altii 3-4 p(ersoane?) au tras (d)in casa (scarilor)”  [pagina 1 e greu de citit]

IMG_0932

“In urma radiografiei facute la Spitalul Judetean au spus ca am 2 schije in picior…consemnat de medicul radiolog si chirurg, care m-au consultat.

Convingerea mea este ca in acest atac (pe ?) Calea Girocului, asupra unor oameni pasnici si (?) s-au folosit cel putin doua tipuri de gloante, convingerea intirita de glontul scos din coapsa (?) si schijele din piciorul meu, care cred ca provin de un glonte exploziv.

…Se trage sistematic si concomitent cu tragerea de lumina de catre unul din ei cu o lanterna.”

IMG_0929

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/16/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-i/

For example, in a 7 September 1995 interview, Dorina Aparaschivei told Marius Mioc about how her husband, Valentin Aparaschivei, was shot to death on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara ( “A luminat cu o lanterna si apoi a tras” http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT04~1.HTM ).  Among the details, she notes, “Cind militarii au ajuns in fata blocului unul dintre ei, mai batrin si cu mustata, a luminat cu o lanterna puternica si apoi a tras mai multe focuri spre noi. Sotul a fost impuscat in piept si a cazut pe spate.”

Thanks to the publication of Dosarele Revolutiei de la Timisoara, we can now confirm that was reported in the media in July 2008 is indeed the actual quote of Dumitru Marcu, commander of U.M. 01380 Arad, as recorded in his report dated 4 January 1990.  In this report, Marcu spoke of unidentified personnel infiltrated among the personnel of his military unit who used powerful flashlights (lanterns/lamps), and he suggests that these may have been Securitate/Militie personnel.

IMG_3084

Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

http://www.mediafax.ro/social/jurnalul-de-lupta-al-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-desecretizat-galerie-foto-2767638

Comandantul unitatii militare din Arad, martor al evenimentelor, a raportat ca “printre militarii care au actionat pe Calea Girocului s-au strecurat si persoane necunoscute, in uniforma, care aveau lanterne foarte puternice cu care luminau balcoanele blocurilor din apropiere, dupa care trageau asupra lor”.

1.  Intensitatea maxima a tragerilor executate de elementele teroriste a fost situata intre 22.12.1989 si 26.12.1989.

2.  Tragerile s-au executat indeosebi de pe terasele blocurilor, din apartamente, din spatiile dintre cladiri si mijloace mobile (conform schemei) si in detaliu astfel:

a) Latura dinspre Drumul Taberei:

–din mijloace mobile–turism Opel si camion cu remorca in noaptea de 22/23.12 si doua autoturisme blindate tip A.B.I. in noaptea de 23/24.12;

–de pe terasa blocului situat la intersectia str. HO SI MIN cu str. DRUMUL TABEREI;

–de pe terasa blocului A-2, etajul 2, scara A – cu pusca cu luneta, iar din fata partilor laterale ale acestuia — cu arme automate;

–de pe blocul A-1, de la etajul III si parter, scara A – cu pusca cu luneta;

–din spatele ghenei de gunoi (de langa B1, B4) – cu arme automate;

–de pe terasa complexului “ORIZONT”, de la farmacie, chioscul de ziare, cabinele telefonice, mercerie si de langa restaurantul “ORIZONT” (in special, in zilele de 22-23.12.1989);

–de pe Scoala generala nr. 193 si blocul 108 (in zilele de 24-25.12.1989);

–de pe acoperisurile blocurilor C-2, C-4 si T-8 s-a tras cu pusca cu luneta si pistoale, iar dinspre flancul drept al blocului T-9 si de pe C-2, in unele nopti, s-au executat semnale luminoase catre blocurile vecine si spre minister, urmate ulterior de executarea tragerilor, de catre elemente teroriste, din diferite directii asupra sediului M.Ap.N.;

–de pe terasele blocurilor A-2 si A-4, in noaptea de 22.12.1989, s-a tras cu pusti cu luneta si arme automate.  De asemenea, de pe B1.  A-2 s-au executat diferite semnale luminoase, urmate de executarea tragerilor.

b) Latura dinspre Aleea HAIDUCULUI:

–de pe terasa blocului 2 S-14 s-a tras asupra tancurilor aflate pe str. DRUMUL TABEREI;

–de pe blocul E-23 s-a tras asupra unui T.A.B., aflat in dispozitiv pe str. MIRON CONSTANTINESCU;

–de pe blocurile 4 S-14 si 28 s-au executat trageri asupra hotelului militar, situat pe Aleea HAIDUCULUI;

–de pe blocurile Z-10 si Z-11 s-a executat foc automat si cu pusca cu luneta asupra militarilor din dispozitivul de aparare situat pe latura dinspre cimitirul GHENCEA, foc dirijat prin semnale luminoase de pe blocul Z-8;

–in strada MIRON CONSTANTINESCU s-a executat foc din blocurile C-2 (etj. 4-5), Z-17 (etj. 10), C-1 (etj. 7), iar de la etj. 7 s-au facut semnale luminoase.

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/05/04/decembrie-1989-situatia-prvind-actiunea-prin-foc-a-elementelor-teroriste-asupra-sediului-ministerului-apararii-nationale-in-perioada-22-2712-1989/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/17/la-resita-s-a-jucat-o-mare-carte-a-revolutiei-dovada-de-adevar-ce-spun-fosti-securisti-revista-vitralii/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ceva-era-putred-in-dobrogea/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/15/decembrie-1989-cine-trage-dintr-un-aro/

Mai mult despre “simulatoare”

“O lupta cu fortele raului,” Orizont (Timisoara), nr. 5 (2 februarie 1990), p. 5.

Iosif Costinas: Care este opinia ta despre felul cum au actionat securistii-teroristi?

Lt. Col. Petre Ghinea: Spre deosebire de militarii nostri, ei au fost foarte bine pregatiti pentru lupta in oras. Dispuneau de armament modern, special (inclusiv simulatoare de foc). De pilda, la automatele lor rabatabile, cu gloante videa [vidia] sau gloante explozive, nu se putea vedea flacara la gura tevii….Initial, dupa opinia mea, au intrat in lupta elemente extrem de bine instruite, apoi acestea au disparut, lasind in locul lor o seama de colaboratori ai fostei Securitatii (din diferite, ca sa zi asa, categorii, socio-profesionale).  A fost un plan diabolic, indeplinit, din nefericire, in buna masura….

“In declaratiile pe care le-a dat sub prestare de juramant in fata Comisiei parlamentare de ancheta, generalul Vlad nu aminteste despre acest episod, iar la intrebarile puse de membrii Comisiei este fie evaziv, fie le deturneaza sensul. Fara sa vrea, lamureste insa partial una dintre problemele obscure privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989. Reproducem stenograma:

�Domnul Gabrielescu: Ati auzit despre acele simulatoare care s-au folosit?

Domnul Vlad: Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea… Mi se pare ca tot un asemenea aparat electronic s-a folosit si in ziua de 21 decembrie cand s-a spart mitingul. Dupa ce a facut Nica Leon (a strigat �Timisoara, Timisoara!� – n.n.) s-a auzit o arma automata si s-a creat panica mare…�”

Recurs la adevar

„Am fost împuşcat de un terorist” Costinel Venus Mirea, copleşit de amintirile de la Revoluţie    Foto: Victor C. Boldîr Domnule Costinel Venus Mirea, în decembrie 1989 eraţi locotenent-major la UM 01047. Care era atmosfera în unitate? Era o tensiune extraordinară. După ce în noaptea de 22 spre 23 s-a tras continuu asupra noastră, în următoarea noapte, odată cu lăsarea întunericului, au început iar să tragă. Noi răspundeam mereu cu foc automat, pentru că aşa prevedea regulamentul. Schimburile de focuri erau doar noaptea. Aveaţi idee cine trăgea? În blocurile din faţa unităţii, trăgătorul executa foc dintr-o armă, îşi punea un simulator, iar el se deplasa în alt loc şi continua tragerea, pentru a crea diversiunea. Au fost şi simulatoare, dar asta am aflat mai târziu.

 adevarul.ro/news/societate/masacrul-craiova-ordinul-militaru-1_50ad46457c42d5a663920ac2/index.html

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/06/02/iosif-costinas-cu-locotenent-colonelul-petre-ghinea-o-lupta-cu-fortele-raului-orizont-timisoara-nr-5-221990-p-5/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/27/dumitru-mazilu-si-mircea-dinescu-despre-revolutia-romana/

Mircea Dinescu:

Au existat, da! Există! Eu am văzut şi simulatoare electronice, astea erau împânzite în tot Bucureştiul, erau planuri vechi, pentru eventualitatea unor invazii, atacuri, etc.

 

Eugen Evu:

Acelaşi scenariu, peste tot unde s-a tras în oameni. Şi la Hunedoara, jur că s-a tras asupra mea, eram în faţa Poştei, cu o doamnă de la sindicate… Urma, gaura de glonţ vidia, alături de una normală, a stat mult timp în geamul intrării poştei, s-a tras asupra mea, eram de mult urmărit de securişti şi de unii de la miliţie, care mă arestau periodic, m-au anchetat şi penal, căci îi scrisesem lui Ceauşescu şi nu am vrut să recunosc! (ibidem,n.2006) În actuala Hunedoară, o biserică cu hramul martirilor prin împuşcare (şase la număr), stagnează de ani buni fără fonduri a se isprăvi. Pare un stigmat. Predicile se aud în oraş unele sunt de-a dreptul patetice, cu apeluri disperate, dar enoriaşii n-au bani, iar cei ce au nu prea se-apleacă. (ibid).

 

Mircea Dinescu:

De când erau în Cehoslovacia… Simulatoarele imitau mitralierele, soldaţii trăgeau uşurel, cu gloanţe în infraroşu, eu am văzut, erau împuşcaţi numai în frunte, aşa: în C.C., în întuneric! Numai acolo-ntr-o oră au fost împuşcaţi şaişpe inşi. Numai pe lumină stinsă, în frunte, doar erau profesionişti, erau băieţi care… aveau arme speciale cu lunetă!

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/arhivarev/docs/16.htm.
În jurul orei 2. La staţia de amplificare din CJ se anunţă că un grup de terorişti se pregăteşte în barul ARO să atace. Primele focuri de armă. Primă victimă, un bărbat ce vorbea mulţimii la un microfon din faţa CJ. Imediat se stinge lumina în toată clădirea Comitetului Judeţean. După câteva minute de linişte, a urmat dezlănţuirea infernului. Indivizi necunoscuţi trăgeau în populaţie din poziţii situate în clădirea Modarom, Facultatea de Electrotehnică şi hotelul Capitol. Simultan au fost semnalate atacuri asupra Rafinăriei, Metromului, Uzinei 2 şi Tipografiei. Abia mai târziu s-a demonstrat că toate aceste atacuri au fost simple diversiuni. Mulţimea se înghesuie în clădirea CJ. Focurile de armă încetează, iar lumina este restabilită în clădire.
Ora 3. Morţii sunt duşi în sala 105 din CJ. Şase dintre ei sunt soldaţi de la UM 01090 – Predeal – Vânători de Munte care nu aveau nici o oră de tragere. Locurile de la ferestrele CJ au fost ocupate de soldaţi care trăgeau în gol. La scurt timp, apărătorii au rămas fără muniţie.
Ora 4. Un camion cu muniţie este parcat în spatele CJ.
Ora 5. Focurile de armă au încetat. Sosesc câteva ambulanţe pentru a evacua morţii din clădirea CJ. Civilii sunt evacuaţi din clădire, rămânând doar cei din FSN.
Ora 6. Oraşul este cufundat în linişte. Se înmulţesc zvonurile de tot felul. La cei din CJ ajunge informaţia că în hotelul Capitol au fost reţinuţi trei terorişti, dar care au dispărut fără urmă. Alţi trei terorişti sunt văzuţi pe un bloc la Gemenii, nu trece mult timp şi o blindată MLVM îşi face apariţia în zonă. Teroriştii au dispărut şi de această dată. Muncitorii de la Rafinărie susţin că au găsit două simulatoare de arme de foc pe care le-au predat unui ofiţer de Miliţie. Simulatoarele au dispărut şi ele.

http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-decembrie-89/enigmele-neelucidate-ale-revolutiei-sibiene-528001.html

ANCHETA
La scurt timp după restabilirea liniştii, cercetarea evenimentelor de la Sibiu a fost preluată de anchetatorii Parchetului Militar Braşov, conduşi de către procurorul Socaciu. Revoluţionarul Ioan Nemeş ne-a declarat că în acea perioadă a adunat tot felul de gloanţe din zidurile caselor în care s-a tras, precum şi părţi componente ale unor puşti cu lunetă, găsite prin poduri. Alţi localnici afirmă că mai multe simulatoare de foc, găsite în imobilele amplasate în jurul unor unităţi militare, au fost predate comisiei de anchetă, conduse de acelaşi Socaciu.

Tot acolo s-a predat şi o ciudată geantă diplomat în interiorul căreia era mascat un revolver cu care se putea deschide focul în mod discret. Imaginea acelui dispozitiv a apărut în mai multe ziare. După doi ani, anchetatorii au anunţat că toate aceste probe, alături de mai multe declaraţii de martor, au dispărut fără urmă şi nu au mai fost găsite niciodată.

NUMAI CA E FOARTE INTERESANT SA NE AMINTIM CINE AU CALATORIT CU SI AU ADUS IN SIBIU “GENTI DIPOMATI” IN ACESTE ZILE:  USLASII (“turisti rusi”) COMANDATI DE CATRE PRINTISORUL, NICU CEAUSESCU, CARE AU VENIT CU ROMBAC-UL IN SEARA DE 20 DECEMBRIE 1989:

Posted in decembrie 1989 | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

The Securitate’s “Recovered Memories” about Timisoara

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 25, 2013

The declarations of senior Securitate officers Filip Teodorescu, Emil Macri, Liviu Dinulescu, and Nicolae Mavru from late December 1989/early 1990

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/17/filip-teodorescu-adj-sef-dir-iii-contraspionaj-d-s-s-nu-sint-date-ca-ar-exista-instigatori-sau-conducatori-anume-veniti-din-strainatate/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/16/emil-macri-rezumind-sintetic-informatiile-obtinute-ele-nu-au-pus-in-evidenta-nici-lideri-si-nici-amestecul-vreunei-puteri-straine-in-producerea-evenimentelor-de-la-timisoara/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/10/liviu-dinulescu-cpt-la-serviciul-de-pasapoarte-al-jud-timis-precizez-ca-anterior-declansarii-evenimentelor-de-la-timisoara-din-datele-ce-le-detineam-serviciul-nostru-nu-rezulta-vreun-amestec-di/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/06/secretele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-col-niculae-mavru-fost-sef-al-sectiei-filaj-si-investigatie-de-la-securitatea-timis/

http://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ultimul-raport-al-securitatii-catre-nicolae-ceausescu/

Below some of my discussion of the Securitate’s “recovered memory”

through the years (1996, 2002, 2005)

“Asa va place revolutia?  Asa a fost!” Democratia, septembrie 1990, din partea fostilor ofiteri din Directia V-a a Securitatii.

Raportul SRI, publicat in Adevarul, 13 iulie 1994.

image-81

THE 1989 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION AS GEOPOLITICAL PARLOR GAME:  BRANDSTATTER’S “CHECKMATE” DOCUMENTARY AND THE LATEST WAVE IN A SEA OF REVISIONISM

By Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  This material has been reviewed by CIA.  That review neither constitutes CIA authentification of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author’s views.

Please Note:  This article is not to be cited, reproduced, translated, or used in any form without the acknowledgement and permission of the author.

Part 3:  Ruse

A SECURITATE RIDDLE:  SOVIET “TOURISTS” AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE CEAUSESCU REGIME

Although I have written a good deal on the “tourist” conundrum in the past (see, for example, Hall 2002), I have not formally addressed the role of foreign histories of Ceausescu’s overthrow in the historiography of December 1989, particularly in regard to this topic.  In the wake of the broadcast of Brandstatter’s “Checkmate” documentary in February 2004, Vladimir Bukovski’s invocation of journalist John Simpson’s 1994 article on the topic (discussed in Part 2 of this series) suggests, however, that it needs to be broached in greater detail.  Moreover, as the year-long look-back at the December 1989 events in “Jurnalul National” shows, the “tourist” question—somewhat surprisingly to me—has become more and more central to arguments about the Revolution, thereby amplifying what is already tremendous confusion over the events in the Romanian press and public.  Of course, as has traditionally been the case, the Soviet/Russian tourists figure prominently, and, to a lesser extent, the Hungarian tourists.  However, the stock of other tourist groups has also gone up.  For example, the role of Yugoslav (specifically Serb) tourists has found a greater emphasis, and, seemingly out of nowhere, so have East German/STASI tourists!  The principal sources for all of these allegations are, as usual, former Securitate and Militia officers, with some military (intelligence) personnel thrown in for good measure.

FOREIGN FORUM, ROMANIAN CONTEXT

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact first mention of “the tourists” and their alleged role in the Revolution, but it appears that although the source of the claim was Romanian, the publication was foreign.  James F. Burke, whose name is unfortunately left off the well-researched and widely-consulted web document “The December 1989 Revolt and the Romanian Coup d‘etat,” alludes to the “Romanian filmmaker” who first made these allegations (Burke, 1994).  The claims are contained in an article by Richard Bassett in the 2 March 1990 edition of “The Times (London).”  According to Bassett,

“Mr. [Grigore] Corpacescu has no doubt that the revolution here was carefully stage-managed—as was the case in Prague and East Berlin—by the Russians…According to Mr. Corpacescu a party of Soviet ‘tourists,’ all usually on individual visas, arrived in Timisoara two days before the first demonstration outside Mr. [i.e. Pastor] Tokes’ house.  Police records trace them reaching Bucharest on December 20.  By the 24th, two days after Ceausescu fled by helicopter, the Russians had disappeared.  No police records exist to indicate how they left the country. (“The Times (London),” 2 March 1990)

But Bassett’s interlocutor, Mr. Corpacescu, says some strange things.  Bassett is not clear but it appears that Corpacescu suggests that the post-Revolution Interior Minister Mihai Chitac, who was involved in the Timisoara events as head of the army’s chemical troops, somehow purposely coaxed the demonstrations against the regime because the tear-gas cannisters his unit fired failed to explode—the failure somehow an intended outcome.  But beyond this, Corpacescu, who is at the time of the article filming the recreation of Ceausescu’s flight on the 22nd—using the same helicopter and pilot involved in the actual event—makes the following curious statement:

“The pilot of this helicopter is an old friend.  I have many friends in the police, Timisoara was not started by the Hungarian pastor, the Reverend Laszlo Tokes [i.e. it was carefully stage-managed…by the Russians].” (“The Times (London),” 2 March 1990)

The pilot of the helicopter was in fact Vasile Malutan, an officer of the Securitate’s V-a Directorate.  What kind of a person would it have been at that time—and how credible could that person have been–who has the pilot as an old friend and “many friends in the police?”  And it would have been one thing perhaps two months after the revolution to talk about the presence of foreign agents “observing” events in Timisoara, but to deny the spontaneity of the demonstrations and denigrate Tokes’ role at this juncture is highly suspicious.  I have been unable to unearth additional information on Mr. Corpacescu, but his revelations just happen to serve his friends extremely well—particularly at at time when the prospect of trials and jail time, for participation in the repression in Timisoara and elsewhere during the Revolution, still faced many former Securitate and Militia [i.e. police] members.

THE FORMER SECURITATE AND MILITIA REMINISCE ABOUT THE SOVIET “TOURISTS”

A week after “The Times” article, the chief of the Securitate’s Counter-espionage Directorate, Colonel Filip Teodorescu, mentioned at his trial for his role in the Ceausescu regime’s crackdown in Timisoara that he had in fact detained “foreign agents” during the events there (“Romania Libera,” 9 March 1990).  In his 1992 book, he developed further on this theme, specifically focusing on the role of “Soviet tourists:”

“There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these ‘tourists’” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 92).

Reporting in July 1991 on the trial involving many of those involved in the Timisoara repression, Radu Ciobotea noted with what was probably an apt amount of skepticism and cynicism, what was telling in the confessions of those on trial:

Is the End of Amnesia Approaching?…

Without question, something is happening with this trial.  The Securitate doesn’t say, but it suggests.  It let’s small details ‘slip out.’…Increasingly worthy of interest are the reactions of those on trial….Traian Sima (the former head of the county’s Securitate) testifies happily that, finally, the Securitate has been accepted at the trial, after having been rejected by Justice.  Filip Teodorescu utters the magic word ‘diplomats’ and, suddenly, the witness discovers the key to the drawer with surpise and declares, after five hours of amnesia, that in Timisoara, there appeared in the days in question, foreign spies under the cover of being journalists and diplomats, that in a conversation intercepted by a mobile Securitate surveillance unit Tokes was reported as  ‘well,’ and that all these (and other) counterespionage actions that can’t be made public to the mass media can be revealed behind closed doors to the judge….[Timis County party boss] Radu Balan ‘remembers’ that on 18 December at midnight when he was heading toward IAEM, he passed a group of ten soviet cars stopped 100 meters from the county hospital. (It turns out that in this night, in the sight of the Soviets, the corpses were loaded!).” [emphasis in the original] (Flacara, no. 27, 1991, p. 9).

The reference to the corpses being loaded is to an operation by the Militia and Securitate on the night of 18-19 December 1989, in which the cadavers of 40 people killed during the repression of anti-regime protesters were secretly transported from Timisoara’s main hospital to Bucharest for cremation (reputedly on Elena Ceausescu’s personal order).

Finally, as yet another of many possible examples, we have the recollections of Bucharest Militia Captain Ionel Bejan, which apparently appeared in print for the first time only in 2004, in a book by Alex Mihai Stoenescu (excerpted in “Jurnalul National,” 7 December 2004).  According to Bejan, around 2 AM on the night of 21-22 December, not far from University Plaza, where at that moment regime forces were firing their way through a barricade set up by protesters (48 were killed that night, 604 wounded, and 684 arrested), he spotted two LADA automobiles with Soviet plates and two men and a woman studying a map and pointing to different locations among the surrounding buildings.  Bejan recalled:

“One thing’s for sure, and that is that although they looked like tourists, they didn’t behave like tourists who had just arrived in town or were lost, especially as close by there were compact groups of demonstrators, while from armored personnel carriers there was intense warning fire and a helicopter hovered overhead with lights ablaze.  I don’t know what kind of tourist tours somewhere in such conditions. They left the impression that they were sure of themselves, they didn’t need any directions, proof which was that they didn’t ask us anything even though we were nearby and, being uniformed Militia, were in the position to give them any directions they needed.  One thing’s for sure when I returned to that location in January 1990…the buildings displayed visible signs of bullet holes…[emphasis added]” (“Jurnalul National,” 7 December 2004)

STRANGE “TOURISTS”…STRANGER STILL, THE REACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES

We can agree with Ionel Bejan in one respect.  One thing is for sure:  these were some very strange tourists.  (They give a whole new meaning to the term, “adventure tourism.”)  As curious as the “Soviet tourists” themselves is how little the Romanian authorities who claim to have seen them did to stop them—or even try to collect more information about them.  Why is it that no official questioned the enigmatic “Soviet tourists” or asked them to leave the area when, as Radu Balan claims, he saw ten LADAs outside the Timis county hospital at 1 AM in the morning the night the cadavers of protesters were being loaded onto a truck for cremation?  Or, as Ionel Bejan claims, he spotted several of them in the center of Bucharest at 2 AM, when the area was essentially a warzone of regime repression?  The regime had closed the borders to virtually all other foreigners, tourists or otherwise, it was trying to prevent any word of the repression from reaching the outside world, and yet Romanian authorities were not concerned about these “tourists” taking pictures or relaying what they were seeing?!

As I have written before, if it was obvious before 18 December, as these Ceausescu regime officials claim, that “Soviet tourists” were involved in the events in Timisoara, then why was it precisely “Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia” who were the only group declared exempt from the ban on “tourism” announced on that day (see AFP, 19 December 1989 as cited in Hall 2002b)?  In fact, an Agent France-Presse correspondent reported that two Romanian border guards on the Yugoslav frontier curtly told him:  “Go back home, only Russians can get through”!!!  The few official documents from the December events that have made their way into the public domain show the Romanian Ambassador to Moscow, Ion Bucur, appealing to the Soviets to honor the Romanian news blackout on events in Timisoara, but never once mentioning—let alone objecting to—the presence or behavior of “Soviet tourists” in Romania during these chaotic days of crisis for the Ceausescu regime (CWHIP, “New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania,” 2001).  It truly strains the imagination to believe that the Romanian authorities were so “frightened” of committing a diplomatic incident with the Soviets that they would allow Soviet agents to roam the country virtually unhindered, allowing them to go anywhere and do anything they wanted.

BUT WAIT, THERE’S MORE…A “SOVIET TOURIST” ENCORE IN 1990

Add to all of this (!), the allegations that the “Soviet tourists” were seen again on the streets during major crises in 1990, such as the ethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 (for evidence of the reach of the allegation of KGB manipulation via the “tourist” mechanism both in December 1989 AND in March 1990, see Emil Hurezeanu, “Cotidianul,” 23 December 1999; according to Hurezeanu, “It appears they didn’t leave the country until 1991, following a visit by [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu to Moscow”!).  Then there is the famous April 1991 interview of an alleged KGB officer—who spoke flawless Romania and was in Romania during the December 1989 events—who the interviewer, the vigorous anti-Iliescu foe, Sorin Rosca Stanescu, claimed to have just stumbled into in Paris.  Of all the reporters who could have stumbled into a KGB officer present in Romania during the Revolution—the only such case I know of—it was Rosca Stanescu, who, it turned out later, had been an informer for the Securitate until the mid-1980s—but not just for anybody, but for the USLA.  Intererstingly, although the article appeared on the non-descript page 8 of the primary opposition daily at the time (“Romania Libera”), the aforementioned Filip Teodorescu and Radu Balan invoked it in support of their contentions regarding the the “tourists” (for a discussion of this, see Hall 2002).  Even more suprising, or not, depending on your point of view, in his April 1991 article, Stanescu attempted to tie together December 1989 with December 1990 (!):

“As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil [in December 1989] of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania?” (emphasis added) (“Romania Libera,” 18 April 1991)

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Indeed, what were they doing in Romania?  But, more aptly:

WHO COULD THEY HAVE BEEN?

Some other recollections and comments may offer clues to the answer to this vexing question.  For example, the Caransebes Militia Chief claims he helped a group of “Soviet tourists” coming from Timisoara on the night of 20-21 December when one of their cars—as usual, “it was part of a convoy of 20 cars, all of the same make and with 3-4 passengers per car”—went off the road (from “Europa,” no. 20, 1991, see the discussion in Hall 2002b).  According to Teodorescu, the “tourists” greeted the militia chief with the phrase “What the hell?  We are colleagues; you have to help us” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 93).  The militia chief opines that despite their Soviet passports, “to this day, I don’t really know where they were from.”

Nicu Ceausescu, Nicolae’s son and most likely heir and party secretary in Sibiu at the time of the Revolution, claimed that he also had to deal with enigmatic “tourists” during these historic days (the following several paragraphs borrow heavily from Hall 2002b).  From his prison cell in 1990, Nicu recounted how on the night of 20 December 1989, a top party official came to inform him that the State Tourist Agency was requesting that he — the party secretary for Sibiu! — “find lodgings for a group of tourists who did not have accommodation” He kindly obliged and made the appropriate arrangements (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

Interestingly, in the same interview Nicu discusses the “tourists” for which he was asked to find accommodations in the context of a group of mysterious passengers who had arrived by plane from Bucharest on the evening of 20 December 1989. We know that in the period immediately following these events, the then-military prosecutor, Anton Socaciu, had alleged that these passengers from Bucharest were members of the Securitate’s elite USLA unit (Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare) and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred in Sibiu during the December events.  Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December in a crisis meeting, Ceausescu’s son announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests (“Baricada,” no. 45, 1990).  Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request (“Romania Libera,” 30 January 1990.)

The rewriting of the story of the Revolution, the “tourists,” and the “terrorists” was already in full swing, when in August 1990, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight's passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

The impact of this “reconsideration” by the authorities could be seen in the comments of Socaciu’s successor as military prosecutor in charge of the Sibiu case, Marian Valer (see Hall 1997, pp. 314-315). Valer commented in September 1990 that investigations yielded the fact that there were 37 unidentified passengers on board the 20 December flight from Bucharest and that many of the other passengers maintained that “on the right side of the plane there had been a group of tall, athletic men, dressed in sporting attire, many of them blond, who had raised their suspicions.”  The USLA, which were responsible for airport security and had “air marshals” on all flights (three in this case), refused to discuss the identity of these passengers with Valer.  While investigations revealed that during this time there “were many Soviet tourists staying in Sibiu’s hotels,” they also established that “military units were fired upon from Securitate safehouses located around these units as of the afternoon of 22 December, after the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime.” He thus carefully concludes:

“As far as the unidentified passengers are concerned, there are two possible variants: Either they were USLA fighters sent to defend Nicu Ceausescu, or they were Soviet agents sent to act with the intent of overthrowing the Ceausescu regime” (“Expres,” no. 33, September 1990).

Clearly, one of these hypotheses is a lot more plauisble than the other…As I wrote in December 1996, partly based on the statements of the Military Prosecutor Marian Valer who stepped down from investigating the Sibiu events in fall 1990, citing duress:  “thus as the USLA began to disappear from the historiography and therefore history of the Revolution, so the Soviet tourists began to enter it.” (Hall, 1996)….

SOURCES

“Baricada (Bucharest),” 1990.

Burke, J. F., 1994, “The December 1989 Revolt and the Romanian Coup d‘etat,” at http://www.timisoara.com/timisoara/coup.html.

Ciobotea, R., 1991, “Politia Politica in Instanta [The Political Police on Trial],” “Flacara,” 3 July.

“Cotidianul” (Bucharest), 1999, web edition, http://www.cotidianul.ro.

CWIHP (Cold War International History Project), 2001, “New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania,” (ed. Mircea Munteanu), at http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/e-dossier5.

Corut, P., 1994, Cantecul Nemuririi [Song of the Undying] (Bucharest:  Editura Miracol).

Deletant, D., 1995, Ceausescu and the Securitate:  Coercion and Dissent, 1965-1989 (Armonk, NY:  M.E. Sharpe).

“Evenimentul zilei” (Bucharest), 1999, web edition, http://www.evenimentulzilei.ro.

“Europa (Bucharest),” 1990, 1991.

Hall, R.A., 1996, “Ce demonstreaza probele balistice dupa sapte ani? [Seven Years After:  What Does the Ballistics’ Evidence Tell Us]” trans. Bobeica, A., in “22 (Bucharest),” 17-23 December.

Hall, R. A. 1997, “Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University).

Hall, R. A., 1999, “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” in “East European Politics and Societies,” Vol. 13, no.3, pp. 501-542.

Hall, R. A., 2002, “Part 2:  Tourists are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns,” “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale:  The Press, the Former Securitate, and the Historiography of December 1989,” Radio Free Europe “East European Perspectives,” Vol. 4, no 8.

“Jurnalul National,” (Bucharest), 2004, web edition, http://www.jurnalul.ro.

“New York Times,” 1989.

“Romania Libera,” 1990.

Teodorescu, F., 1992, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989, [An Assumed Risk: Timisoara, December 1989] (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc).

“The Times (London),” 1990.

“Zig-Zag” (Bucharest), 1990.

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cleared March 2002

RFE/RL Reports Print Version  E-mail this page to a friend

17 April 2002, Volume  4, Number  8

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

Part 2: ‘Tourists Are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns…’ *
The distance traveled by Securitate disinformation on the December 1989 events can be breathtaking. Bubbling up through the springs of popular rumor and speculation, it flows into the tributaries of the media as peripheral subplots to other stories and eventually wends its way — carried upon the waves of consensus and credibility that flow from its acceptance among prominent Romanian journalists and intellectuals — into the writings of Western journalists, analysts, and academics. Popular myths, which either have their origins in disinformation disseminated by the former Securitate, or which originated in the conspiratorial musings of the populace but proved propitious for the former secret police and thus were appropriated, nurtured, and reinjected into popular discourse, are today routinely repeated both inside and outside Romania. Frequently, this dissemination occurs without the faintest concern over, or knowledge of, the myth’s etymology or much thought given to the broader context and how it plays into the issue of the Securitate’s institutional culpability.

Take, for example, the “tourist” myth — perhaps the former Securitate’s most fanciful and enduring piece of disinformation. This myth suggests that in December 1989, Soviet, Hungarian, and other foreign agents posing as “tourists” instigated and/or nurtured anti-Ceausescu demonstrations in Timisoara, Bucharest, and elsewhere, and/or were responsible for the “terrorist” violence after 22 December that claimed over 900 victims, or almost 90 percent of those killed during the Revolution. The implication of such allegations is clear: It questions the spontaneity — and hence, inevitably, to a certain degree, the legitimacy — of the anti-Ceausescu demonstrations and the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime; it raises doubt about the popular legitimacy of those who seized power during the events; and it suggests that those who seized power lied about who was responsible for the terrorist violence and may ultimately have themselves been responsible for the bloodshed.

A robust exegesis of the “tourist” hypothesis was outlined on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the December 1989 events in the pages of the daily “Ziua” by Vladimir Alexe. Alexe has been a vigorous critic of Ion Iliescu and the former communists of the National Salvation Front (FSN) who took power in December 1989, maintaining that they overthrew Ceausescu in a Soviet-sponsored coup d’etat:

“The outbreak of the December events was preceded by an odd fact characteristic of the last 10 years. After 10 December 1989, an unprecedented number of Soviet ‘tourists’ entered the country. Whole convoys of Lada automobiles, with approximately four athletic men per car, were observed at the borders with the Moldovan Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, and Hungary. A detail worthy of mention: The Soviet ‘tourists’ entered Romania without passports, which suggests the complicity of higher-ups. According to the statistics, an estimated 67,000 Soviet ‘tourists’ entered Romania in December 1989″ (“Ziua”, 24 December 1999).

It is worth noting that Alexe considers elsewhere in this series of articles from December 1999 that the Russian “tourists” were an omnipresent, critical, and catalytic factor in the collapse of communism throughout ALL of Eastern Europe in December 1989.

Nor has the “tourist” hypothesis been confined strictly to the realm of investigative journalism. Serban Sandulescu, a bitter critic of Ion Iliescu and the former communists who seized power in December 1989, led the third parliamentary commission to investigate the December 1989 events as a Senator for the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNTCD). In 1996, he published the findings of his commission as a book titled “December ’89: The Coup d’Etat That Abducted The Romanian Revolution.” He commented on the “tourists” as follows:

“From the data we have obtained and tabulated it appears that we are talking somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000-6,000 ‘tourists’…. Soviet agents [who] came under the cover of being ‘tourists’ either in large organized groups that came by coach, or in smaller groups of 3-4 people that fanned out in Lada and Moskvich automobiles. They covered the whole country, being seen in all the important cities in the country. They contributed to the stoking of the internal revolutionary process, supervising its unfolding, and they fought [during the so-called 'terrorist' phase after 22 December]…” (Sandulescu, 1996, pp. 35, 45).

DECEMBER 1989: NICOLAE CEAUSESCU INITIATES THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH
Not surprisingly, the “tourist” myth originated with none other than Nicolae Ceausescu. This myth inevitably implies illegitimate and cynical “foreign intervention,” and Ceausescu used it to make sense of what were — probably genuinely, for him — the unimaginable and surreal antiregime protests which began in Timisoara on 15 December 1989.

In an emergency meeting of the Romanian equivalent of the politburo (CPEX) on the afternoon of Sunday, 17 December 1989 — the afternoon on which regime forces were to open fire on the anti-Ceausescu demonstrators in Timisoara, killing scores and wounding hundreds — Ceausescu alleged that foreign interference and manipulation were behind the protests:

“Everything that has happened and is happening in Germany, in Czechoslovakia, and in Bulgaria now, and in the past in Poland and Hungary, are things organized by the Soviet Union with American and Western help” (cited in Bunea, 1994, p. 34).

That Ceausescu saw “tourists” specifically playing a nefarious role in stimulating the Timisoara protests is made clear by his order at the close of this emergency meeting:

“I have ordered that all tourist activity be interrupted at once. Not one more foreign tourist will be allowed in, because they have all turned into agents of espionage…. Not even those from the socialist countries will be allowed in, with the exception of [North] Korea, China, and Cuba. Because all the neighboring socialist countries are untrustworthy. Those sent from the neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents” (cited in Bunea, 1994, p. 34).

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE ‘TOURISTS’ ITINERARY AND ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO TOP SECURITATE AND PARTY OFFICIALS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF DECEMBER 1989
Filip Teodorescu, who as head of the Securitate’s Counterespionage Directorate (Directorate III) had been dispatched to Timisoara and was later arrested for his role in the repression there, maintained in March 1990 at his trial that he detained “foreign agents” during the Timisoara events (“Romania libera,” 9 March 1990). In a book that appeared in 1992, Teodorescu described as follows the events in Timisoara on Monday, 18 December — that is, after the bloody regime repression of anti-Ceausescu demonstrators the night before:

“There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these ‘tourists’” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 92).

Teodorescu appears here to be attempting to account for the fact that on Monday, 18 December 1989 — presumably as a consequence of Ceausescu’s tirade the afternoon before about the malicious intent of virtually all “tourists” — Romania announced, in typically Orwellian fashion, that it would not accept any more tourists because of a “shortage of hotel rooms” and because “weather conditions are not suitable for tourism” (Belgrade Domestic Service, 20 December 1989). Ironically, the only ones exempted from this ban were “Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia” (!) (AFP, 19 December 1989).

Radu Balan, former Timis County party boss, picks up the story from there. While serving a prison sentence for his complicity in the Timisoara repression, in 1991 Balan told one of Ceausescu’s most famous “court poets,” Adrian Paunescu, that on the night of 18-19 December — during which in reality some 40 cadavers were secretly transported from Timisoara’s main hospital to Bucharest for cremation (reputedly on Elena Ceausescu’s personal order) — he too witnessed the role of these “foreign agents”:

“We had been receiving information, in daily bulletins, from the Securitate, that far more people were returning from Yugoslavia and Hungary than were going there and about the presence of Lada automobiles filled with Soviets. I saw them at the border and the border posts, and the cars were full. I wanted to know where and what they were eating and how they were crossing the border and going through cities and everywhere. More telling, on the night of 18-19 December, when I was at a fire at the I.A.M. factory, in front of the county hospital, I spotted 11 white ‘Lada’ automobiles at 1 a.m. in the morning. They pretended to ask me the road to Buzias.The 11 white Ladas had Soviet plates, not Romanian ones, and were in front of the hospital” (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October 1991).

Nicu Ceausescu, Nicolae’s son and most likely heir and party secretary in Sibiu at the time of the Revolution, claimed that he also had to deal with enigmatic “tourists” during these historic days. From his prison cell in 1990, Nicu recounted how on the night of 20 December 1989, a top party official came to inform him that the State Tourist Agency was requesting that he — the party secretary for Sibiu! — “find lodgings for a group of tourists who did not have accommodation.” He kindly obliged and made the appropriate arrangements (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

Nor was Gheorghe Roset, head of the Militia in the city of Caransebes at the time of the Revolution, able to elude a visit from the “tourists” during these days. Writing from his prison cell in January 1991, he recounted:

“Stationed on the night of 20-21 December 1989 at headquarters, I received the order to issue an authorization for repairs for a Lada automobile that had overturned in Soceni, in Caras-Severin county, an order that was approved by the chief of the county Militia with the clarification that the passengers of this car were military personnel from the USSR. I was more than a little surprised when this car arrived in Caransebes and I saw that it was part of a convoy of 20 cars, all of the same make and with 3-4 passengers per car. Lengthy discussions with the person who had requested the authorization confirmed for me the accident and the fact that this convoy of cars was coming from Timisoara, on its way to Bucharest, as well as the fact that these were colleagues of ours from the country in question. He presented a passport in order to receive the documents he had requested, although not even today can I say with certainty that he belonged to this or that country. A short time after the convoy left on its way, it was reported to me that five of the cars had headed in the direction of Hateg, while the more numerous group headed for Bucharest” (“Europa,” no. 20, March 1991).

A September 1990 open letter authored by “some officers of the former Securitate” — most likely from the Fifth Directorate charged with guarding Ceausescu and the rest of the Romanian communist leadership — and addressed to the xenophobic, neo-Ceausist weekly “Democratia” (which was edited by Eugen Florescu, one of Ceausescu’s chief propagandists and speechwriters), sought to summarize the entire record of the “tourists” wanderings and activities in December 1989 as follows:

“11-15 [December] — a massive penetration of so-called Hungarian tourists takes place in Timisoara and Soviet tourists in Cluj;

15-16 [December] — upon the initiative of these groups, protests of support for the sinister ‘Priest [Father Laszlo Tokes of Timisoara]‘ break out;

16-17-18 [December] — in the midst of the general state of confusion building in the city, the army intervenes to reestablish order;

– this provides a long-awaited opportunity for the ‘tourists’ to start — in the midst of warning shots in the air — to shoot and stab in the back the demonstrators among whom they are located and whom they have incited;…

19-20-21 — a good part of the ‘tourists’ and their brethren among the locals begin to migrate — an old habit — from the main cities of Transylvania, according to plan, in order to destabilize: Cluj, Sibiu, Alba Iulia, Targu Mures, Satu Mare, Oradea, etc.” (“Democratia,” no. 36, 24-30 September 1990).

The authors of this chronology then maintain that this scene was replicated in Bucharest on 21 December, causing the famous disruption of Ceausescu’s speech and the death of civilians in University Square that evening.

Not to be out-done, Cluj Securitate chief Ion Serbanoiu claimed in a 1991 interview that, as of 21 December 1989, there were over 800 Russian and Hungarian tourists, mostly driving almost brand-new Lada automobiles (but also Dacia and Wartburg cars), in the city (interview with Angela Bacescu in “Europa,” no. 55, December 1991). In February 1991 during his trial, former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad, not surprisingly, also spoke of “massive groups of Soviet tourists…the majority were men…deploy[ing] in a coordinated manner in a convoy of brand-new Lada automobiles” (see Bunea, 1994, pp. 460-461), while the infamous Pavel Corut has written of “the infiltration on Romanian territory of groups of Soviet commandos (“Spetsnaz”) under the cover of being tourists” (Corut, 1994).

REBUTTING THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH
I vividly recall early on in my research of the December 1989 events being told emphatically, and not for the last time, by a journalist at the Cluj weekly “Nu” — a publication staunchly critical of the Iliescu regime — that the guest lists of Romanian hotels for December 1989 were nowhere to be found because they contained the secrets of the Revolution. Certainly, this rumor has intersected with the “tourist” myth and has been used as confirmation of the latter.

Significantly, Marius Mioc has sought to investigate the reality of this matter in Timisoara (Mioc, 2000). The numbers provided to the 17 December Timisoara Association (which Mioc heads) by all of Timisoara’s hotels and by the State Tourist Agency for Timisoara lay bare two of the key components upon which the “tourist” myth has relied: a) that the records of the December 1989 manifests do not exist, and b) that there was an unusually dramatic increase in the number of foreign tourists staying in Romanian hotels during this period. In fact, the opposite proves to be true, the number of foreign tourists — and specifically those from other “socialist” countries — declined in December 1989 both in comparison to the previous December and in comparison to November 1989!

Of course, as we have seen, proponents of the “tourist” myth have also suggested that many of the alleged foreign agents posing as tourists “avoided staying in hotels.” But this still raises the question of why the Securitate allowed them into the country in the first place and why they then seemed unable to follow their movements and prevent their activities. A 1991 open letter by “a group of [Romanian Army] officers from the Timisoara garrison” perhaps provides the best riposte to the dubious logic underlying the “tourist” hypothesis:

“If they [the tourists] appeared suspect to the special forces of the Securitate and military counterintelligence, why did they not attempt to keep them under surveillance? During this period, did the Securitate and the counterintelligence officers not know how to do their jobs? Did they somehow forget why they were paid such weighty sums from the state budget?” (“Romania libera,” 15 October 1991).

One must also ask: If it was precisely Soviet tourists who were most suspected at the time of being up to no good in the country, then why was it precisely they who were the sole group among “tourists” in the country at the time to be permitted to stay and go about their business unhindered?

HOW THE ‘TOURISTS’ ENTRY INTO THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989 PARALLELS THE EXIT OF THE SECURITATE
In commenting in August 1990 upon how the details of the state’s case against him had changed since early in the year, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, ironically highlighted how Securitate forces had begun to fade away from the historiography of the December 1989 events. In the August 1990 interview from his prison cell with Ion Cristoiu’s “Zig-Zag” (mentioned above), Nicu discusses the “tourists” for which he was asked to find accommodations in the context of a group of mysterious passengers who had arrived by plane from Bucharest on the evening of 20 December 1989. We know that in the period immediately following these events, the then-military prosecutor, Anton Socaciu, had alleged that these passengers from Bucharest were members of the Securitate’s elite USLA unit (Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare) and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred in Sibiu during the December events (for a discussion, see Hall, 1996). In August 1990, however, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight's passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

The impact of this “reconsideration” by the authorities could be seen in the comments of Socaciu’s successor as military prosecutor in charge of the Sibiu case, Marian Valer (see Hall 1997a, pp. 314-315). Valer commented in September 1990 that investigations yielded the fact that there were 37 unidentified passengers on board the 20 December flight from Bucharest and that many of the other passengers maintained that “on the right side of the plane there had been a group of tall, athletic men, dressed in sporting attire, many of them blond, who had raised their suspicions.” While investigations revealed that during this time there “were many Soviet tourists staying in Sibiu’s hotels,” they also established that “military units were fired upon from Securitate safehouses located around these units as of the afternoon of 22 December, after the overturning of the Ceausescu regime.” He thus carefully concludes:

“As far as the unidentified passengers are concerned, there are two possible variants: Either they were USLA fighters sent to defend Nicu Ceausescu, or they were Soviet agents sent to act with the intent of overthrowing the Ceausescu regime” (“Expres,” no. 33, September 1990).

Thus, as the “tourists” began to enter the historiography of the December 1989 events, so the Securitate — specifically the USLA — began to disappear.

HOW THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH NEVERTHELESS GAINED MAINSTREAM CREDIBILITY AND ACCEPTANCE
How, then, did the “tourist” myth gain credibility and acceptance in the Romanian press, given its rather obvious pedigree in the remnants of the Ceausescu regime, especially among former high-ranking Securitate officers and others most in need of an alibi/diversion to save their careers and avoid the possibility of going to jail? Although the reference to “tourists” during the December events probably entered the lexicon of mainstream reporting on the Revolution as early as April 1990 — not insignificantly, first in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s weekly “Zig-Zag,” it appears — it was in particular journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu who gave the theme legitimacy in the mainstream press.

Without specifying the term “tourists” — but clearly speaking in the same vein — Stanescu was probably the first to articulate the thesis most precisely and to tie the Soviet angle to it. In June 1990 in a piece entitled “Is The Conspiracy of Silence Breaking Down?” in the sharply anti-government daily “Romania libera,” Stanescu wrote:

“And still in connection with the breaking down of the conspiracy of silence, in the army there is more and more insistent talk about the over 4,000 Lada cars with two men per car that traveled many different roads in the days before the Revolution and then disappeared” (“Romania libera,” 14 June 1990).

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Stanescu’s article was vigorously anti-FSN and anti-Iliescu and left little doubt that this thesis was part of the “unofficial” history of the December events, injurious to the new leaders, and something they did not wish to see published or wish to clarify.

But it was Stanescu’s April 1991 article in “Romania libera,” entitled “Is Iliescu Being Protected By The KGB?,” that truly gave impetus to the “tourist” thesis. Stanescu wrote:

“A KGB officer wanders in France. He is losing his patience and searching for a way to get to Latin America. Yesterday I met him in Paris. He talked to me after finding out that I was a Romanian journalist. He fears the French press. He knows Romanian and was in Timisoara in December 1989. As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania? Witness what the anonymous Soviet officer related to me in Paris:

‘There existed an intervention plan that for whatever reason was not activated. I received the order to enter Romania on 14 December and to head for Timisoara. Myself and my colleague were armed. During the events, we circulated in the military zone around Calea Girocului [Giriocul Road]. Those who headed toward Bucharest had the same mission. Several larger cities were targeted. We were to open fire in order to create a state of confusion. I never, however, received such an order. I left Romania on 26 December.’

I don’t have any reason to suspect the validity of these revelations. This short confession is naturally incomplete, but not inconclusive. What purpose would this elaborate, but aborted, KGB plan have had? The only plausible explanation is that it wasn’t necessary for KGB agents to intervene. The events were unfolding in the desired direction without need for the direct intervention of the Soviets. But this leads to other questions: What did the Ceausescu couple know, but were not allowed to say [prior to their hurried execution]? Why is Securitate General Vlad being held in limbo? To what degree has President Iliescu maintained ties to the Soviets? What are the secret clauses of the Friendship Treaty recently signed in Moscow? Is Iliescu being protected by the KGB or not? Perhaps the SRI [the Securitate's institutional successor, the Romanian Information Service] would like to respond to these questions?”

Stanescu’s April 1991 article did not go unnoticed — despite its nondescript placement on page eight — and has since received recognition and praise from what might seem unexpected corners. For example, previously-discussed former Securitate Colonel Filip Teodorescu cited extensive excerpts from Stanescu’s article in his 1992 book on the December events, and he added cryptically:

“Moreover, I don’t have any reason to suspect that the journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu would have invented a story in order to come to the aid of those accused, by the courts or by public opinion, for the results of the tragic events of December 1989″ (Teodorescu, 1992, pp. 92-94).

Radu Balan, former Timis County party secretary, imprisoned for his role in the December events, has also invoked Stanescu’s April 1991 article as proof of his revisionist view that “tourists” rather than “non-existent ‘terrorists’” were to blame for the December 1989 bloodshed:

“…[W]hile at Jilava [the jail where he was imprisoned at the time of the interview, in October 1991], I read ‘Romania libera’ from 18 April. And Rosca Stanescu writes from Paris that a KGB agent who deserted the KGB and is in transit to the U.S. stated that on 18 December [1989] he had the mission to create panic on Calea Girocului [a thoroughfare in Timisoara]. What is more, on the 18th, these 11 cars were at the top of Calea Girocului, where I saw them. I was dumbfounded, I tell you. I didn’t tell anybody. Please study ‘Romania libera,’ the last page, from 18 April 1991″ (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October1991).

In this regard, it would be irresponsible to totally discount the relevance of Rosca Stanescu’s past. Since December 1989, Stanescu has undeniably been a vigorous critic of, and made damaging revelations about, the Securitate’s institutional heir, the SRI, and the Iliescu regime, and he has frequently written ill of the former Securitate and the Ceausescu regime. Nevertheless, in 1992 it was leaked to the press — and Rosca Stanescu himself confirmed — that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s he was an informer for the Securitate (for a discussion, see Hall, 1997b, pp. 111-113). What was significant, however, was precisely for which branch of the Securitate Rosca Stanescu had been an informer: the USLA.

THE ‘TOURISTS’ MYTH TRAVELS WESTWARD
Almost inevitably, the “tourist” thesis has made its way into Western academic literature. For example, in a book lauded by experts (see for example, Professor Archie Brown’s review in “Slavic Review,” Winter 1998), Jacques Levesque invokes as “rare evidence” that the Soviets were responsible for igniting and fanning the flames of the Timisoara uprising the following:

“…testimony of an imprisoned Securitate colonel who was freed in 1991 [he is referring to the aforementioned Filip Teodorescu]. He writes that the Securitate had noted the arrival of ‘numerous false Soviet tourists’ in Timisoara in early December, coming from Soviet Moldova. He also reports that a convoy of several Lada cars, with Soviet license plates and containing three to four men each, had refused to stop at a police checkpoint in Craiova. After the Romanian police opened fire and killed several men, he claims that the Soviet authorities recovered the bodies without issuing an official protest. To the extent that this information is absolutely correct, it would tend to prove the presence of Soviet agents in Romania (which no one doubts), without, however, indicating to us their exact role in the events” (Levesque, 1997, p. 197).

Levesque seems generally unaware of or concerned with the problematic nature of the source of this “rare evidence” and thus never really considers the possibility that the Securitate colonel is engaging in disinformation. This is indicative of how upside-down the understanding of the December 1989 events has become in the post-Ceausescu era — and of the influence of the far-reaching and generally unchallenged revisionism of the events within Romania itself — that Western writers invoking the thesis seem to accept the claims at face value, never even enunciating any doubt about why the Securitate source in question might seek to make such an argument.

* A memorable phrase from Andrei Codrescu’s PBS special “Road Scholar” of the early 1990s.

(Richard Andrew Hall received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University in 1997. He currently works and lives in northern Virginia. Comments can be directed to him at hallria@msn.com.)

SOURCES

AFP, 19 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-242, 19 December 1989.

Belgrade Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 20 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-243, 20 December 1989.

Brown, A., 1998, “Review of Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe,” in “Slavic Review,” Vol. 57, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 882-883.

Bunea, M., 1994, Praf in ochi: Procesul celor 24-1-2 [Mud in the Eyes: The Trial of the 24-1-2], (Bucharest: Editura Scripta).

Court, P., 1994, Cantecul Nemuririi [Song of Immortality], (Bucharest: Editura Miracol).

“Democratia” (Bucharest), 1990.

“Europa,” (Bucharest), 1991

“Expres,” (Bucharest), 1990.

Hall, R. A., 1996, “Ce demonstreaza probele balistice dupa 7 ani?” [Seven Years Later What Does the Ballistic Evidence Tell Us?] in “22″ (Bucharest), 17-23 December.

Hall, R. A. 1997a, “Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University).

Hall, R. A., 1997b, “The Dynamics of Media Independence in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” in O’Neil, P. H. (ed.) Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass), pp. 102-123.

Levesque, J., 1997, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe, (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Mioc, Marius, 2000, “Turisti straini in timpul revolutiei,” [Foreign Tourists During the Revolution] timisoara.com/newmioc/54.htm.

“Romania libera” (Bucharest), 1990-91.

Sandulescu, S., 1996, Decembrie ’89: Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana [December '89: The Coup d'tat Abducted the Romanian Revolution], (Bucharest: Editura Omega Press Investment).

Teodorescu, F., 1992, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989, [An Assumed Risk: Timisoara, December 1989] (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc).

“Totusi iubirea” (Bucharest), 1991.

“Ziua” (Bucharest), 1999.

“Zig-Zag” (Bucharest), 1990.

Compiled by Michael Shafir

—————————————————————————-

Rewriting the Revolution (1997): Chapter 5 Timisoara 15-17 December 1989

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five

“Yalta-Malta” and the Theme of Foreign Intervention in the Timisoara Uprising

At an emergency CPEx meeting on the afternoon of 17 December 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu sought to make sense out of the news from Timisoara by attempting to fit it in with what had happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe thus far that fall:

Everything which has happened and is happening in Germany, in Czechoslovakia, and in Bulgaria now and in the past in Poland and Hungary are things organized by the Soviet Union with American and Western help. It is necessary to be very clear in this matter, what has happened in the last three countries–in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, were coups d’etat organized by the dregs of society with foreign help.[1]

Ceausescu was giving voice to what would later become known as the “Yalta-Malta” theory. Significantly, the idea that the Soviet Union and, to different degrees of complicity, the United States and the West, played a pivotal role in the December 1989 events pervades the vast majority of accounts about December 1989 in post-Ceausescu Romania, regardless of the part of the ideological spectrum from which they come.

The theory suggests that after having first been sold out to Stalin and the Soviet Union at Yalta, in early December 1989 American President George Bush sold Romania out to Mikhail Gorbachev during their summit in Malta. The convenient rhyme of the two sites of Romania’s alleged betrayal have become a shorthand for Romania’s fate at the hands of the Russians and other traditional enemies (especially the Hungarians and Jews). To be sure, similar versions of this theory have cropped up throughout post-communist Eastern Europe among those disappointed with the pace and character of change in their country since 1989.[2] The different versions share the belief that Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet KGB engineered the sudden, region-wide collapse of communism in 1989. Their successors in Russia have been able to maintain behind-the-scenes control in Eastern Europe in the post-communist era by means of hidden influence and the help of collaborators within those countries. “Yalta-Malta” has become the mantra of those who seem to have experienced Eastern Europe’s el desencanto most deeply.[3]

Although one can probably find adherents to the Yalta-Malta theory in every East European country–particularly since the “Return of the Left” through the ballot box–there is little doubt that the theory finds its widest and most convinced audience–both at elite and mass levels–in Romania.[4] This is because, as we have seen, the suggestion that the Soviet Union and the KGB were attempting to undermine the regime leadership and infringe upon national sovereignty was not an ad hoc slogan in Romania in 1989, as it was in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria where aging political leaderships hinted at such arguments in a last-ditch effort to save their positions. Such appeals had far greater resonance in Romania in December 1989–particularly within the regime–because they had been tenets of the Romanian regime’s ideology for well over two decades. And they have had a lingering popularity in the post-Ceausescu era for that same reason. It is the uniquely antagonistic character of the relationship between the Securitate and the KGB during the Ceausescu era (discussed in chapter four), and the genuine, scarcely-veiled animosity between Ceausescu and Gorbachev, which give the Yalta-Malta scenario a plausibility and credibility (however spurious) in Romania it cannot find elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

Western analysts have frequently caricatured the views of the former Securitate towards the Ceausescu era by suggesting that they uniformly look back favorably and nostalgically upon it. In fact, many of them now openly criticize Nicolae Ceausescu’s misguided policies, erratic behavior, and harsh rule.[5] Clearly, much of this is post facto judgement. The deceased Ceausescu serves as a convenient scapegoat for all that went wrong during his rule and by blaming him they can absolve themselves. Nevertheless, regardless of how they now view Nicolae Ceausescu, almost every former Securitate officer challenges the spontaneity of the Timisoara protests and suggests that the catalyst for the unrest came from outside Romania’s borders. Thus, they argue, even if Nicolae Ceausescu had brought the country to the point of profound crisis, this “foreign intervention” converted the Timisoara events primarily into a matter of national security.

It is interesting to recall Nicolae Ceausescu’s own interpretation of the Timisoara events during a rambling, scarcely coherent teleconference on 20 December 1989:

…all of these grave incidents in Timisoara were organized and directed by revanchist, revisionist circles, by foreign espionage services, with the clear intention of provoking disorder, of destabilizing the situation in Romania, of acting in order to eliminate the independence and territorial integrity of Romania….It is necessary to attract the attention of everyone, not only of the communists [emphasis added], but everyone to the shameful…campaign… unleashed right now by different circles, beginning with Budapest, convincingly demonstrates that…, including the declarations of the president of the United States, who declared that he had discussed the problems of Romania with Gorbachev at Malta…[6]

In their discussion of the December events, the former Securitate have expanded upon Ceausescu’s allegations of “foreign intervention.”

In February 1991, while on trial for his part in ordering the repression of demonstrators in December 1989, the former director of the Securitate, General Iulian Vlad, proposed two principal groups of suspects for the Timisoara unrest.[7] He described the first group as Romanian citizens (the majority of whom were presumably of Hungarian ethnicity) who had fled to Hungary, passed through refugee camps, and been sent back to Romania with a mission to engage in “destabilizing acts.” According to Vlad, “only able-bodied males” were sent back. The second group of suspects were large groups of so-called Soviet “tourists.” Here is Vlad’s depiction of this second group:

Halfway through December 1989 massive groups of Soviet tourists began to enter the country. They entered coming directly from the USSR or from Yugoslavia or Hungary. The majority were men and–in a coordinated fashion–they deployed in a convoy of brand-new “LADA” automobiles. During the night of 16-17 December ‘89 such a column attempted to enter Timisoara. Some of these cars were forced to make a detour around the town, others managed to enter it…[8]

Pavel Corut, a former high-ranking Securitate counter-military intelligence officer who has written dozens of novels seeking to rehabilitate the reputation of the former Securitate, has written of “the infiltration on Romanian territory of groups of Soviet commandos (Spetsnaz) under the cover of being tourists. It is noteworthy that December is not a tourist month and nevertheless the number of Soviet tourists grew greatly.”[9]

In 1994, the Securitate’s official institutional heir, the Romanian Information Service (or SRI), declared in a report on the December events:

In addition to gathering information, some Soviet agents from among our ranks received the mission to make propaganda for “changes,” even at the risk of being found out. Actions at direct incitement [of the population] were also initiated by Soviet “tourists,” whose number had grown in the preceding period and had taken on exceptional proportions by the end of 1989.

Beginning on 9 December 1989, the number of Soviet “tourists” in “private” vehicles grew from around 80 to 1,000 cars a day. This phenomenon, although realized at the time, did not lead to the necessary conclusions and measures. The occupants (two to three per car), athletic men between 25 and 40 years in the majority, avoided lodging facilities, sleeping in their cars…The cars were mostly of a “LADA” and “MOSKOVICI” make, deployed in a convoy, and had consecutively-numbered license plates and similar new equipment. The majority were “in transit towards Yugoslavia”…

It is certain that during the Timisoara events there was a large number

of Soviet “tourists.” During 15, 16, and 17 December 1989, to these already in the country were added those “returning from Yugoslavia,” the majority by car.[10]

But the reach of this theory extends well beyond the former Securitate and their cheerleaders in the Ceausist nostalgic press. The head of the first Senatorial commission investigating the December events, film director Sergiu Nicolaescu–a key figure in the newly-formed National Salvation Front during the events of 22-25 December 1989 and a legislator of the ruling Front after 1989–described the catalyst of the December events to a journalist in December 1993 as follows:

By chance, everything began in Timisoara. It could have begun elsewhere since many places were prepared. It is known that in Iasi something was being prepared, and also in Brasov and Bucharest. There was clearly foreign intervention….For example, the intervention of the Russians in Romania. A year before in 1988 about 30,000 Russians came. A year later in 1989, in December, the number doubled. Thus, it reached 67,000. It is known that there were at least 1,000 automobiles in which there were two to three men between the ages of 30 and 40 years old, at a maximum 45 years old. It is very interesting to observe that, only a few months earlier, the Securitate had ordered that for those from socialist countries crossing the border, it was no longer necessary to note their license plate number or how many people were on board.[11]

Asked who in the Securitate gave the order to no longer record this information, Nicolaescu insinuated that they were Soviet “moles” who had been placed there “4, 5, 10, and even 30 years earlier.”[12]

The theory has also found its way into the opposition media. Cornel Ivanciuc, who in 1995 wrote one of the most influential exposes to date on the former Securitate for the weekly 22, maintains that the Soviets achieved their aims in December 1989 by means of the so-called “tourist-incursionists, whose activity during the revolution was identical to those of the Spetsnaz special troops for reconnaissance and diversion of the GRU [Soviet military intelligence].”[13] Two months after General Vlad’s 1991 court statement, Sorin Rosca Stanescu, one of the most prominent journalist critics of the Iliescu regime and the SRI, presented an interview in the leading opposition daily Romania Libera with an anonymous KGB officer residing in Paris who outlined a familiar scenario.[14] The KGB officer claimed that he had entered Romania on 14 December with others as part of a KGB plan to open fire and create confusion. He had been in Timisoara during the events, but suggested he never received the anticipated order to open fire and left the country on 26 December. Rosca Stanescu, however, made sure to remind his audience of “the insistent rumors which have been circulating referring to the existence on Romanian territory of 2,000 “LADA” automobiles with Soviet tags and two men inside each car…”[15] Stanescu closed by asking his readers: “What did the Ceausescu couple know but were unable to say? Why is general Vlad held in this ambiguous chess game?…Is Iliescu protected by the KGB?”

Stanescu’s intentions are further drawn into question by the fact that this particular article has been cited positively by former Securitate officers in their writings. Colonel Filip Teodorescu of the Securitate’s Counter-espionage Directorate, the second highest-ranking Securitate officer in Timisoara during the repression and sentenced to prison for his role in those events, cites extensively and favorably from this very article by Stanescu in a book on the December events.[16] Pavel Corut also invokes Rosca Stanescu’s interview in support his arguments.[17] Moreover, Rosca Stanescu’s questionable comments make the issue of his (revealed and acknowledged) past collaboration with the Securitate’s USLA unit between 1975 and 1985 relevant.[18]

Securitate accounts also routinely insinuate that foreign diplomats who came to Timisoara ostensibly to “monitor the situation” there, and foreign radio stations such as Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, the BBC, and Deutsche Welle which transmitted information about Timisoara developments, contributed directly and intentionally to the unrest.[19] For example, the former deputy director of the Timis county Securitate, Major Radu Tinu, highlights the allegedly suspicious role played by representatives of the American and British embassies who came to Timisoara on 15 December 1989 and transmitted back to Bucharest that “everything is in order, we have seen him,” apparently referring to pastor Tokes.[20]

Similar elements also creep into some opposition accounts. Ilie Stoian, a journalist for Expres and then Tinerama, ranks among those who have written most extensively about the December events. Stoian argues for a “Yalta-Malta” interpretation of the December events.[21] In discussing the Timisoara events, he notes the presence of Hungarians who were filming the events from their “LADA” automobiles and the expulsion of Russians across the Yugoslav border by the Securitate–thus insinuating that they were somehow implicated in the unrest.[22] According to Stoian:

…the December revolution was prepared in advance. In order to make things even clearer, we draw your attention to the fact that prior to the date fixed by the authorities for the evacuation of pastor Tokes from the parochial residence, in almost every evening Voice of America and Radio Free Europe would broadcast long pieces about this personage. Moreover, inside the country, foreign diplomats began to fuss….[23]

Finally, Stoian asks:

Wasn’t the presence of foreign diplomats somehow to verify if everything “was in order,” as was said during a telephone conversation intercepted on 15 December? Weren’t they somehow doing more than just supervising and reporting on these events to their superiors? We think the answer is yes.[24]

[1].. See the stenogram from the emergency CPEx meeting of 17 December 1989 in Mircea Bunea, Praf in ochi. Procesul celor 24-1-2. (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 34.

[2].. Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land. Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism (New York: Random House, 1995), 109-117, 235. Rosenberg suggests the theory’s popularity in Poland and especially in the former Czechoslovakia.

[3].. Huntington discusses the concept of el desencanto (the characteristic disillusionment or disenchantment which sets in after the transition) in Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 255-256.

[4].. By contrast, Rosenberg clearly suggests that those who buy into the Yalta-Malta conspiracy theory elsewhere in Eastern Europe are a distinct minority in political circles and marginal figures in the post-communist era.

[5].. This has come through, for example, in the novels and articles of the well-known, former high-ranking military counter-intelligence officer, Pavel Corut, and in the comments of the former head of the First Directorate (Internal Affairs), Colonel Gheorghe Ratiu, in an extended interview during 1994 and 1995 with the Ceausist weekly Europa.

[6].. See the transcript in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 47. Ceausescu goes on to link the US invasion of Panama which was taking place at this time to a general offensive by the superpowers to eliminate the sovereignty of independent states. The fact that Ceausescu appeals “not only to the communists” suggests his attempt to play on a non-ideological Romanian nationalism.

[7].. See Vlad’s testimony in Mircea Bunea, “Da sau Ba?” Adevarul, 16 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 460-461.

[8].. Ibid.

[9].. Pavel Corut, Cantecul Nemuririi [The Song of Immortality] (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), 165.

[10].. See the excerpts of the SRI’s preliminary report on the December events in “Dispozitivul informativ si de diversiune sovietic a fost conectat la toate fazele evenimentelor (III) [Soviet information and diversion teams were connected to all phases of the events],” Curierul National, 11 July 1994, 2a.

[11].. Sergiu Nicolaescu, interview by Ion Cristoiu, “Moartea lui Milea, Momentul Crucial al Caderii,” Expres Magazin, no. 48 (8-15 December 1993), 31.

[12].. Ibid.

[13].. Cornel Ivanciuc, “Raporturile dintre Frontul Salvarii Nationale si KGB [The Relations between the National Salvation Front and the KGB],” 22, no. 21 (24-30 May 1995), 11.

[14].. Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Iliescu aparat de K.G.B.? [Iliescu defended by the KGB]” Romania Libera, 18 April 1991, 8.

[15].. Ibid. Rosca Stanescu had in fact already floated this theory. In June 1990, he wrote: “…in the Army, more and more insistently there is talk of the over 4,000 ‘LADA’ automobiles with two men per car, which travelled by various routes in the days preceding the Revolution and then disappeared…” (Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Se destrama conspiratia tacerii? [Is the conspiracy of silence unravelling?]” Romania Libera, 14 June 1990, 2a). At that time it could be argued that Rosca Stanescu was unaware of the Securitate account. It is difficult to say the same of his comment in April 1991.

[16].. Filip Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989 (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc, 1992), 93-94. Curiously, Teodorescu adds: “Besides, I have no reason to suspect that the journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu would have invented a story in order to come to the defense of those accused by the judicial system and public opinion of the tragic consequences of the December 1989 events.”

[17].. Although Corut does not mention Stanescu by name as does Teodorescu, the references are unambiguous. See Pavel Corut, Floarea de Argint [The Silver Flower] (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), 173; idem, Fulgerul Albastru [Blue Lightning] (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1993), 211.

[18].. In April 1992, documents were leaked (presumably by regime sources) to the media and foreign embassies showing that Stanescu had been an informer for the Securitate’s elite anti-terrorist unit (the USLA) between 1975 and 1985. Stanescu admitted that the charges were true. Although released from Romania Libera in June 1992, he was picked up elsewhere in the opposition press, returned to Romania Libera the following year, and eventually became editor of an opposition daily owned by the trust which runs Romania Libera. Prominent opposition figures have steadfastly defended him as a victim of the Iliescu regime, and in spite of his past, his writings have largely gone unscrutinized. On Stanescu’s case, see Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Securea lui Magureanu,” Romania Libera, 17 April 1992, 1, 3 (the article which personally attacked the SRI’s Director Virgil Magureanu and appears to have prompted the release of Stanescu’s file); Anton Uncu, “Opriti-l pe Arturo Ui,” Romania Libera, 30 April 1992, 1, 3; Rosca Stanescu, “Sint H-15,” Romania Libera, 9 May 1992, 5; idem, interview by Andreea Pora, “‘H-15′ in slujba patriei,” 22, no. 120 (15-21 May 1992), 13; “Catre SRI,” Romania Libera, 9 June 1992, 1; “Goodbye Magureanu,” The Economist, no. 2212 (18 June 1992) in Tinerama, no. 85 (10-17 July 1992), 3.

[19].. See, for example, the comments of the deputy director of the Timis county Securitate, Major Radu Tinu, in Angela Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea Navalirilor Barbare [Once again in the path of barbaric invaders] (Cluj-Napoca: Editura “Zalmoxis,” 1994), 72-74. This book consists of articles and interviews which appeared in the Ceausist weekly Europa between 1990 and 1994.

[20].. Ibid., 73.

[21].. Ilie Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta diversiunii. (Bucharest: Editura Colaj, 1993), 7-10. This book is a collection of articles he wrote while at Expres between 1991 and 1993.

[22].. Ibid., 11.

[23].. Ibid.

[24].. Ibid., 12.

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