The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:” PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 (Part Two, Sergeant Schultz)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 28, 2010

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

This paper MAY be cited when accompanied by a full, proper citation.  Thank you.

PART ONE:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/03/26/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-one-groundhog-day/

PART TWO:

Judging Voinea’s Credibility

Why do I question Voinea’s credibility on the “terrorist” question—despite the chorus of adulation, gratitude, and acceptance outlined above?  Before moving on directly to the issue of the “terrorists,” let us look at two potentially-related—in fact, I argue, related—matters as test cases of Voinea’s credibility in his recent comments on the Revolution.  Although not necessarily central to the story of December 1989, allegations regarding the existence, use, and discovery of gunfire simulators, and the institutional affiliation of so-called “lunetisti” (sharpshooters/snipers), are part of that story.  These should not be difficult questions for Voinea, but instead he dismisses them with an unexpected salvo of “definitive” answers, designed to leave little room for further questioning from the interviewer.  As I shall demonstrate, however, it leaves an ocean of doubt.

Test Case I:  Automatic Gunfire Simulators

Romulus Cristea (reporter “Romania Libera,” interview 22 December 2005):  “Were any automatic gunfire devices or simulators found?”

Dan Voinea:  “No!  We don’t have a single confirmation of any such gunfire simulator!  Until now we have not come into possession of any such device.  No one saw such a gunfire simulator.  A device was presented on TV as a simulator, but [it] was nothing of the sort.  It was a lie!  Before 1989, any device would have been in the inventory of a[n state] institution.  No organization of ours, from the army to the Interior Ministry to the information services had such an apparatus in its stockpile.  Not only did they not exist in the stockpiles, none were found, and we do not have any evidence that such apparatuses were brought into the country….”[14]

Doesn’t leave a lot of room for misinterpretation or doubt, huh?  Let us observe three key elements in Voinea’s response.  He denies not only that 1) no Romanian institution had such device, but that 2) no such devices were used in December 1989, and 3) no such devices were found in December 1989.  This offers us three potential points of access to refuting his argument.

To begin with, there are the comments of senior communist official, CPEx (Romania’s version of the Politburo) member Silviu Curticeanu, who was in the Central Committee building [the center of Nicolae Ceausescu’s power] during these fateful December days.  Asked by the daily Jurnalul National about Ceausescu’s reaction to the disruption of his ill-conceived outdoor mass rally on 21 December 1989, Curticeanu responded:

“There was no public reaction.  He called together everyone responsible for the organization and smooth functioning of the meeting.  Those from the Securitate came and brought these nightsticks of which I spoke earlier, [as well as] simulators.  They had some electronic apparatuses. Everyone said the meeting was a provocation and everyone concluded the meeting was a provocation.  After that [Ceausescu] left, as I said earlier, and then he held the teleconference [with party officials throughout the country] and that was it.”[15]

So, according to Curticeanu, there were simulators:   they were brought to the CC building, and they were brought by the Securitate.

But wait, you say, Curticeanu was a party official, how would he know if these were simulators?  A fair question.  Well, then, let us look at the response of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad before the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events during the early 1990s:

“Mr. Gabrielescu:  Did you hear about these simulators that were used?”

“Mr. Vlad:  Of course, all of the Securitate had them…It seems to me that just such an electronic apparatus was used also on 21 December when the meeting broke up.  After Nica Leon (shouted ‘Timisoara, Timisoara!’) automatic gunfire was heard and panic broke out…”[16]

So, according to no less than the head of the Securitate himself, the Securitate had such simulators and such a device was used on 21 December (—significantly he leaves the context ambiguous, suggesting indeed that they could have been used to break up the rally after it had turned against Ceausescu).

But neither of these sources, even if somewhat unintentionally divulging details that undermine their claims about December 1989, has a great deal of credibility.  How about someone else—particularly someone with greater credibility among those who accept Voinea’s arguments—and how about a discussion of the simulators after 22 December?  Understood.

Dumitru Mazilu, a key player in the December events who had by the time of the following comments become a fierce critic of Ion Iliescu and his cohorts, declared in 1991:

Reporter:  What do you know about these controversial simulators?

Mazilu:  In several places simulators were found.  These imitated perfectly the rat-a-tat-tat of machine guns, making an infernal racket, which provoked a lot of panic in the population and confused the young revolutionaries and soldiers.[17]

Yes, but what about eyewitness accounts, by average citizens?  Andrei Ionescu, who claims to have demonstrated on 21 December in University Square and to have participated in the events of the next several days in and around the Central Committee [i.e., CC] building, stated in 1992: “They didn’t break a single window [firing] in the CC.  There were simulators because a bunch of us verified this in the ‘Romarta’ bloc, on the second floor.”[18]

Those inclined to give Prosecutor Voinea the benefit of the doubt also happen to be people who otherwise listen to what poet Mircea Dinescu has to say—with the convenient exception of the Revolution:

Interviewer:  But the terrorists existed?

Mircea Dinescu:  Yes, they existed!  They exist! [the interview transpires in 1997]  I also saw the electronic simulators, Bucharest was full of them, there were long-existing plans, for the eventuality of invasions, attacks, etc.[19]

Nor were simulators found in only in Bucharest.  Recent articles on the Internet show people discovering them in Arad (Gai), Brasov, Sibiu, and Satu Mare.[20] These findings are significant because they show pattern, and, likely, planning and pre-positioning, across distant reaches of the country—just as Dinescu surmises.

Yet, remember:  Prosecutor Voinea wants us to believe that the gunfire simulators did not exist and were not used in December 1989.

Test Case II:  The Lunetisti

Romulus Cristea:  “If the terrorists didn’t exist, what can you tell us about the sharpshooters [lunetisti]?

Dan Voinea:  “The sharpshooters existed, all those who were equipped with weapons with scopes and were dispatched in battle at the time.  There was shooting with weapons with scopes.  The sharpshooters were from the army. [emphasis added]”[21]

That the Army had sharpshooters with gun scopes is not in question.  But Voinea’s certainty that those who shot with them in December 1989 were from the Army is jarring.  In fact, it was the Securitate who we know had sharpshooters dispatched during these days.  How do we know it?  Well, here is Alexandru Cristescu, former chief of special operations for the Securitate’s “Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare” (USLA), in front of the (Gabrielescu) Senate Commission investigating the December events in the early 1990s:

“On the night of 20-21 December, the decision was made to hold the meeting [i.e. Ceausescu’s ill-fated outdoor address].  At 5 AM I was called to organize measures for the meeting.  I had 5 reserve [groups] of about 20 cadres, in 5 places, and 5 observation posts in the buildings surrounding the square with the CC building.  The officers had pistols, while the observation posts had guns with scopes [“pusca cu luneta,” PSL, i.e. what lunetisti use], with five cartridges each, and binoculars.”[22]

Andreea Tudor and Vasile Surcel more recently wrote of having come into possession of the “notes” of an “information service” that suggest that the Bucharest Municipal Securitate’s “Service 8 Guards” were deployed on 21 December 1989 in central Bucharest, some near University Square [where demonstrators were later massacred]:

“‘observer-sharpshooters’ were placed on the ‘Generala’ bloc, the tower of the bloc on Boteanu Street number 3.  In the ‘Generala’ bloc there even existed a ‘safe house’ apartment in which ‘sharpshooters’ were usually ‘located.’  The same ‘Note’ shows that, on 21 December 1989, Lt. Dumitru Safta was placed in this bloc, on the fourth floor, in apartment 23, that officially belongs to the Piciu family.  The officer had on his person a Makarov [9 mm] pistol with 12 cartridges, a machine gun with 120 cartridges, a sharpshooter rifle, binoculars, and a walkie-talkie.”[23]

Razvan Belciuganu observes of a document from the Army’s Chief of the General Staff listing the weapons found on 109 suspected “terrorists” during the events:  “What is interesting is the fact that on many of these [people] were found hunting rifles to which had been attached scopes [“lunete”], and even sophisticated night-vision devices.”[24]

Finally, there are the recollections of eyewitnesses, a decade and a half later, who—despite the onslaught of cynicism toward such ideas—continue to maintain they saw what they thought they saw…

“I was an eyewitness to the capture of a terrorist (based on the color of his tan I’d swear he was Arab) who was using a PSL [i.e. sharpshooting rifle, a lunetist] and firing into the population…he was taken alive and beaten in front of my own eyes by the Army, then taken up into a truck, also by the Army…in the following days they continued to sustain over and over on radio and TV that there did NOT exist any terrorists, or at least that none had been captured…Yeah, I’m sure this guy bought his PSL at the ‘Universal’ department store.” [25]

and…

“On the 24th I think, I was an eyewitness when soldiers captured an Arab sharpshooter (brown[-skinned] and he spoke broken Romanian)—who was using the famous “Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta” (PSL—apparently Romanian) modified from an AK47.  I’m sure that he had  used it, and not just to help on his travels.  They whisked him away in a truck and they brought him to the command [post] of a large town (Brasov).  Later it was said that foreign forces were NOT implicated, or if they were, that there were no traces to prove it.  For me, that was the moment in which I began to believe that I was having a lie forced down my throat.”[26]

But Prosecutor Voinea can tell us—point blank—that those sharpshooters who fired in December were only from the Army!

What kind of people do not agree with Prosecutor Voinea’s type of conclusions regarding  the “lunetisti” and the alleged non-existence of  “terrorists”?  People like Andrei Firica, head of Floreasca Emergency Hospital in December 1989.  In 2004, he recalled of those who were shot after 22 December:

“…The conduct of a terrorist is to kill innocent people, to create panic.  When combatants are at war with one another, these can’t be considered terrorists.  But what else can you call someone who shoots [someone] right between the eyes, as happened to a woman on the 8th floor of a bloc on Balcescu Boulevard, in the area of the Unic department store…That person who fired was a ‘lunetist’ and for good reason was considered a terrorist.  Or what happened to a colleague of ours, a secretary at the Medical Sciences Academy, who was sitting in his home when he was hit in the middle of his head by a bullet.  These lunetisti, these sharpshooters, for good reason we call them terrorists….From a [medical] diagnostic standpoint, those who say that there were no terrorists are telling a boldfaced lie (porcarie).  In the Emergency hospital there were brought people who were shot with precision in the front, demonstrators hit by gunfire, from the back, from several meters away from the line of demonstrators, only terrorists could have done such things…”[27]

Firica claims that he “made a small file of the medical situations of the 15-20 suspected terrorists from [i.e. interned at] the Emergency Hospital,” but as he adds “of course, all these files disappeared.”  Firica reports that a Militia colonel, who he later saw on TV in stripes as a defendant in the Timisoara trial, came to the hospital and advised him “not to bring reporters to the beds of the terrorists, because these were just terrorist suspects and I didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone” (!)  The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects into a bus and off they went.[28]

Voinea stands 0-for-2 then…and these were seemingly the easy questions.

Let us move on then from these two test cases, directly now to the question of the “terrorists”’ alleged non-existence.

[14] Interview with General Dan Voinea, by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil [Everyone was chasing after an invisible enemy],” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005 online edition.

[15] “‘Trebuie sa demascam si sa lichidam actiunea,’” Jurnalul National, 17 November 2004, online edition.

[16] Quoted in Vlad Mihai, “Recurs la adevar.  Profesionistii diversiunii,” Dimineata, no. 244 (1801), December 1996, online edition.

[17] Dumitru Mazilu, interview by Emanoil Catan, “Mari Mistificari ale Istoriei Revolutiei Romane,” Expres Magazin, no. 64 (September 1991), p. 12.

[18] Rodica Chelaru, “De la Revolutie la cantina saracilor,” Expres, no. 101 (7-13 January 1992), p. 10.

[19] Mircea Dinescu, with Eugen Evu, “Dialoguri integrale in forum: ‘Tenebre romanian color,’” 1997 at http://www.agero-stuttgart.de.  Inevitably, such claims recall initial reporting about the December events:  according to Blaine Harden on 30 December 1989, “In the days of street fighting that followed, he [a soldier] said, Securitate forces played tape recordings of gunfire over hidden speakers to confuse soldiers into firing their weapons.”  See Blaine Harden, “Elite Unit of Romanian Secret Police Seen Battling to the Death,” The Washington Post, 30 December 1989, p. A14.

[20] Vasile Surcel, “19 oameni au murit la Arad in zilele Revolutiei,” Jurnalul National, 29 October 2004, online edition.  Pintea Mos recounted in 2004 that in Arad in December 1989, “at the unit in Gai, on the covers of the entrance gunfire simulators were found.”  See “Remember 1989:  Revolutie de la Brasov,” 21 December 2003, at www.arhiva.informatia.ro. and “Remember decembrie 1989,” 22 August 2005 at www.einformatii.ro concerning events in Brasov and Satu Mare.  For an older account placing them in Brasov, see Adrian Socaciu, “Cronica unei morti inexplicabile,” Cuvintul, January 1991, reproduced at http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/arhiva/1991_226.html..  In Sibiu, “The locals are convinced that in Sibiu the famous ‘gunfire simulators’ ‘functioned,’ electronic apparatuses, not very complex, were placed in the attics of houses, but also on certain official buildings, that created panic among people through the broadcast of sounds similar to automatic gunfire” (Andreea Tudorica and Vasile Surcel, “Misterul disparitiei ‘baietilor in negru’, [“The mystery of the disappearance of ‘the boys in black’”], Jurnalul National, 15 September 2004, online edition.)

[21] Interview with General Dan Voinea, by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005 online edition.

[22] Alexandru Cristescu, quoted in Cornel Dumitrescu, “Alte Dezvaluiri Senationale despre decembrie ’89,” Lumea Libera (New York), 18 March 1995, p. 21.

[23] Andreea Tudor and Vasile Surcel, “Mecanismul Terorii,” Jurnalul National, December 2004, online edition.

[24] Razvan Belciuganu, “Armele cu care au tras teroristii,” Jurnalul National, 6 December 2004, online edition.

[25] Posted on http://forum.softpedia.com/lofiversion/index.php/t18855.html, 2 December 2003.

[26] Posted on  http://forum.softpedia.com/lofiversion/index.php/t96198.html, 15 December 2005.

[27] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[28] Ibid.

Advertisements

10 Responses to ““ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:” PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 (Part Two, Sergeant Schultz)”

  1. romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

    Constantin Isac, who like Doru Teodor Maries could be found in 1991-1992 giving interviews to Ilie Neacsu and Angela Bacescu’s “Europa,” renews this convenient half-truth about the ‘lunetistii’ in the article below:

    http://www.asociatia21decembrie.ro/2010/02/lunetistii/

  2. romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

    It will be curious, to say the least, to see how these two things are resolved, given Voinea’s definitive removal in 2009 and Kovesi’s comments on Voinea (of course, Tismaneanu continues to ignore those comments according to the following formula: inconvenient reality = denial ):

    http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/echipa-tismaneanu-bate-palma-cu-parchetul-pentru-eternizarea-crimelor-890499.html

    Laura Codruța Kovesi, procurorul general al României, şi Ioan Stanomir, preşedintele Institutului pentru Investigarea Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, s-au întâlnit pentru a analiza posibilitatea unei colaborări instituţionale fără precedent.

    Chiar Vladimir Tismăneanu a spus-o, într-un interviu acordat în exclusivitate pentru EVZ: “Vom acţiona pentru includerea în legislaţia românească a acelor prevederi care asigură imprescriptibilitatea crimelor împotriva umanităţii. Domnul general Dan Voinea îşi va continua activitatea în cadrul Institutului, vom colabora cu Asociaţia 21 Decembrie, cu autorii cei mai cunoscuţi pe probleme legate de evenimentele din decembrie 1989 şi de mineriade. Pot să vă asigur că sprijinul politic, dacă vă gândiţi la preşedintele Traian Băsescu şi primul ministru Emil Boc, este cât se poate de concret şi puternic”.

    http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:Jey5gOA_cbMJ:www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/868918/Kovesi-despre-revolutia-ratata-a-lui-Voinea-A-gresit-ca-un-incepator/+kovesi+voinea+incepator&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

    Ce îi reproşaţi, totuşi, lui Voinea? Punctual, ce greşeli a făcut în instrumentarea cauzelor?
    Sunt foarte multe greşeli, o să menţionez însă doar câteva. Spre exemplu, s-a început urmărirea penală faţă de persoane decedate. Poate îmi explică dumnealui cum poţi să faci cercetări faţă de o persoană decedată! Apoi, s-a început urmărirea penală pentru fapte care nu erau prevăzute în Codul Penal. În plus, deşi nu a fost desemnat să lucreze, spre exemplu, într-un dosar privind mineriada (repartizat unui alt procuror), domnul procuror Dan Voinea a luat dosarul, a început urmărirea penală, după care l-a restituit procurorului de caz. Vă imaginaţi cum ar fi dacă eu, ca procuror general, aş lua dosarul unui coleg din subordine, aş începe urmărirea penală după care i l-aş înapoia. Cam aşa ceva s-a întâmplat şi aici.

    Mai mult, a început urmărirea penală într-o cauză, deşi, potrivit unei decizii a Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie, era incompatibil să mai facă asta. E vorba despre dosarul 74/p/1998 (dosar în care Voinea l-a acuzat pe fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu că, în iunie 1990, a determinat cu intenţie intervenţia în forţă a militarilor împotriva manifestanţilor din Capitală – n.r.).

    Apoi au fost situaţii în care s-a început urmărirea penală prin acte scrise de mână, care nu au fost înregistrate în registrul special de începere a urmăririi penale. Aceste documente, spre exemplu, nu prevedeau în ce constau faptele comise de presupuşii învinuiţi, nu conţin datele personale ale acestora. De exemplu, avem rezoluţii de începere a urmăririi penale care-l privesc pe Radu Ion sau pe Gheorghe Dumitru, ori nu ştim cine este Gheorghe Dumitru, nu ştim cine este Radu Ion.

    „Parchetul să-şi asume tergiversarea anchetelor”

    Credeţi că, în cazul lui Voinea, au fost doar greşeli sau că a fost vorba de intenţie, ştiind că acuzaţii vor scăpa?
    Nu cunosc motivele care au stat la baza acestor decizii şi, prin urmare, nu le pot comenta.

    Poate fi vorba şi despre complexitatea acestor dosare?
    Când ai asemenea dosare în lucru, nu faci astfel de greşeli, de începător. Eşti mult mai atent când ai cauze de o asemenea importanţă pentru societatea românească.

    Pot să vă spun că, în volumul mare de activităţi realizate, a fost implicat de-a lungul timpului un număr foarte mare de oameni: în jur de 40 de poliţişti şi 15 procurori militari. Ca şi date statistice, cu privire la evenimentele din decembrie 1989, am avut în jur de 4.400 de dosare penale la Parchetele militare şi 52 de dosare penale la Parchetele civile.

    În prezent, mai avem în lucru doar două dosare. Cu privire la aceste dosare pot să va spun că au fost 112 rechizitorii, fiind trimişi în judecată 245 de inculpaţi. Dintre aceştia, 24 au avut funcţii importante – membri ai comitetului politic executiv al Partidului Comunist -, iar 18 au fost generali din Apărare şi de la Interne.

  3. mariusmioc said

    It seems that no simulators were submitted, as an evidence, to the prosecutor office. At least, no prosecutor is denying Voinea’s claims. While prosecutors maybe are not allowed to speak about the cases which are not finished, after the “21 December” association received a lot of copies from the files regarding the revolution, it would be interesting to see if there is evidence that any simulator arrived at the prosecutor office.
    In Ceausescu’s Romania a strict evidence of guns existed. Normally, any gun (AKM, PSL or whatever) had a serial number engraved on it, and based on this it can be traced the millitary unit where it belongs. There should be documents showing the serial number of the guns which were founded on those suspected as terrorists.
    I am not convinced by the identifications of some persons as “Arabs” based on skin colour. A gypsy can have a skin colour like an Arab, and there are many Arabs light-skinned.

  4. romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

    Marius,

    Many things that existed and were used in December 1989 either never made it to the Prosecutor’s Office or disappeared early on: there is abundant evidence of that, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/december-1989-2009-bullets-lies-and-videotape/ .

    Officially, DUM-DUM and vidia munitions did not exist in Romania in December 1989, yet the videos of Alexandru Stepanian, Maria Petrascu, and others caught them on tape, thereby confirming the longheld claims of hospital doctors, military officers, and civilians (see the videos in “Seeing is Believing” episodes of the article above.

    It’s funny you should mention serial numbers on guns because there are several incidences on this site where the exact serial number is mentioned: see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2009/12/06/decembrie-1989-o-gafa-monumentala-romania-libera-31-10-90/ with xerox of the original article

    Savin Chiritescu wrote to Romania Libera in October 1990:

    “…myself and many colleagues from this tank unit [UM 01060 Bucuresti-Pantelimon] captured armed Arab terrorists (one of whom told us he was from Beirut), who we turned over to the Chief of Staff’s Division. One was a student, upon whom we found a machine gun of 5.62 caliber series UF 060866, 40 cm long, capable of being carried under clothes: the weapon was made from a hard plastic, with the exception of the gun barrel and the trigger. He admitted he had been paid and that he loved Ceausescu greatly. He was wearing leather pants, PUMA sneakers and a black sweater….”[40]

    “Terorist cu un portfel cu pasaport libian si o adevarinta de tipul celor care inlocuiesc buletinul…impuscat mortal in fostul sediu al CC al PCR in seara zilei de 22 decembrie 1989…asupra lui au fost gasite un pumnal militar si un pistol ‘Makarov’ seria DL 7028 ” Weapons similar to those of Directorate V-a and the USLA could have shown up anywhere during the Revolution, in anybody’s hands, but what is interesting is among whose hands they did show up. Official Army documents and recollections by Army participants in the early 1990s show that a citizen with a Libyan passport in his billfold shot in the CC building on the night of 22 December was found in possession of a 9 mm“Makarov” pistol…a pistol whose serial number was traced back to a V-a member who claimed that he had “thrown it away” earlier that afternoon.[109]

    Voinea’s lies regarding simulators are bald-faced. He could of course just say, yes none showed up at the Prosecutor’s Office, but no he has to go further, saying they didnt even exist, which is evidence of his lack of credibility (see below).

    Romulus Cristea: Au fost descoperite undeva dispozitive automate de tragere sau simulatoare?
    Dan Voinea- Nu! Nici o confirmare despre astfel de dispozitive de simulare a focului de arma! Pana in prezent nu suntem in posesia a nici unui astfel de dispozitiv. Nimeni nu a vazut un astfel de simulator de tragere. A fost prezentat la TV un dispozitiv ca simulator, dar care nici pe departe nu era asa ceva. A fost o minciuna! Inainte de ‘89, orice dispozitiv trebuia sa fie in inventarul unei institutii. Nici o institutie de la noi, de la armata, interne sau servicii de informatii nu a avut in dotare o astfel de instalatie. Nu numai ca nu au existat in dotare, nu au fost gasite, dar nici nu avem dovezi ca asemenea aparate au fost aduse in tara. In alta ordine de idei, trebuie sa precizez ca noi ii cautam pe cei vinovati de uciderea si ranirea unor oameni. Nu ucizi oameni cu simulatorul. Interesul nostru se indreapta spre tragatorii reali, nu simulatoare.
    \”Nici simulatoare de tragere\” Romania Libera 22 decembrie 2005

    deci e clar, Voinea spune: “Nici o institutie de la noi, de la armata, interne sau servicii de informatii nu a avut in dotare o astfel de instalatie” Zau? Iata ceea ce Seful Securitatii Generalul Iulian Vlad a spus in fata comisiei lui Gabrielescu in 1994:

    “In declaratiile pe care le-a dat sub prestare de juramant in fata Comisiei parlamentare de ancheta, generalul Vlad nu aminteste despre acest episod, iar la intrebarile puse de membrii Comisiei este fie evaziv, fie le deturneaza sensul. Fara sa vrea, lamureste insa partial una dintre problemele obscure privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989. Reproducem stenograma:

    �Domnul Gabrielescu: Ati auzit despre acele simulatoare care s-au folosit?

    Domnul Vlad: Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea… Mi se pare ca tot un asemenea aparat electronic s-a folosit si in ziua de 21 decembrie cand s-a spart mitingul. Dupa ce a facut Nica Leon (a strigat �Timisoara, Timisoara!� – n.n.) s-a auzit o arma automata si s-a creat panica mare…�”

    Some other claims since the article above:

    Dar iata ce spune intr-un articolul potat pe 7 martie 2010 despre spusele lui Teodor Maries http://www.asociatia21decembrie.ro/2010/03/maries-in-1989-jurnalistul-belgian-danny-huwe-a-fost-ucis-de-graniceri/:

    Privind dispozitivul Comandamentului Trupelor de Graniceri, nu e existat un inamic potential. Totul a decurs dupa niste scenarii preconcepute de catre niste soecialisti ai geniului, folosindu-se simulatoare de foc de arma.

    Lt. Col. Petre Ghinea: Spre deosebire de militarii nostri, ei au fost foarte bine pregatiti pentru lupta in oras. Dispuneau de armament modern, special (inclusiv simulatoare de foc). De pilda, la automatele lor rabatabile, cu gloante videa [vidia] sau gloante explozive, nu se putea vedea flacara la gura tevii….Initial, dupa opinia mea, au intrat in lupta elemente extrem de bine instruite, apoi acestea au disparut, lasind in locul lor o seama de colaboratori ai fostei Securitatii (din diferite, ca sa zi asa, categorii, socio-profesionale). A fost un plan diabolic, indeplinit, din nefericire, in buna masura….

    https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2009/03/28/pe-strazile-timisoarei-22-24-decembrie-1989/

    Jean Constantinescu isi aminteste:

    “…Cu totul pe neaşteptate, pe la orele 17:45 [22 decembrie 1989, zona CCului], atmosfera destul de destinsă a fost brusc curmată de împuşcături de foc automat, care mie mi s-a parut intens. Am fost atunci sigur că ricoşează gloanţe printre noi. Ulterior, privind din stradă clădirea, m-au mirat puţinele urme de gloanţe din jurul ferestrelor şi am ajuns la înţelegerea că răpăiala aceea intensă a fost în mare parte simulată.”

    E adevarat ca “am ajuns la înţelegerea că răpăiala aceea intensă a fost în mare parte simulată” nu inseamna neaparat simulatoare, dar avem alte dovezi ca au fost intr-adevar simulatoare in zona CC-ului…

    It’s about lies and coverup, Marius, it is that simple. Thank you. Regards

  5. romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

    for the following, see the link below (bottom of article)

    https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/03/06/romania-decembrie-1989-astia-nu-este-pentru-urechile-publicului-despre-teroristii-planul-z-z-si-arme-stecikin/

  6. romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

    Moartea unui terorist:

    “Terorist cu un portfel cu pasaport libian si o adevarinta de tipul celor care inlocuiesc buletinul…impuscat mortal in fostul sediu al CC al PCR in seara zilei de 22 decembrie 1989…asupra lui au fost gasite un pumnal militar si un pistol ‘Makarov’ seria DL 7028 ” Weapons similar to those of Directorate V-a and the USLA could have shown up anywhere during the Revolution, in anybody’s hands, but what is interesting is among whose hands they did show up. Official Army documents and recollections by Army participants in the early 1990s show that a citizen with a Libyan passport in his billfold shot in the CC building on the night of 22 December was found in possession of a 9 mm“Makarov” pistol…a pistol whose serial number was traced back to a V-a member who claimed that he had “thrown it away” earlier that afternoon.[109]

    https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/03/06/romania-decembrie-1989-astia-nu-este-pentru-urechile-publicului-despre-teroristii-planul-z-z-si-arme-stecikin/

  7. […] https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/03/26/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positive… […]

  8. […] , https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positive… ) Tunelurile secrete ale mincinosilor – Ani de zile s-a tot vorbit despre tunelurile secrete pline […]

  9. […] , https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positive… […]

  10. […] , https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positive… […]

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

 
%d bloggers like this: