I once read a review that credited Peter Siani-Davies’ The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (2005, Cornell University Press) with “placing the ‘terrorists’ in context.” That is an odd way to phrase it, because Siani-Davies denies their existence. Of course you are going to relativize their importance, downplay their significance, spend less time discussing them and more time discussing other issues, “put them in context,” if your conclusion is that they didn’t exist!

With such reviews and reviewers, it should come as little surprise that basic questionable assumptions made by Siani-Davies did not and do not face scrutiny, pre-or post-publication. Take the issue of “rumors and stories” spread by telephone calls. Look up “telephone” in the Google Books version of Siani-Davies’ volume and you get the following:

“The television and radio stations had both fed on and in turn fed popular prejudices, and, caught center stage in the excitement and drama of the events, they came to reflect the fears and suspicions of the country as a whole. With the radio freely giving out telephone numbers throughout the day, all manners of rumors and stories had been broadcast just as they were received, without the slightest attempt at verification….The popular expectation was that there would be an enemy and now, as darkness fell, that foe was to emerge. (p. 122)”

All the elements are there for a structural argument to explain the outcome in question. Popular “prejudices, fears and suspicions,” feelings of excitement and drama (the emotional state of those involved), free-floating telephone numbers, “rumors and stories,” the need for and expectation of an enemy, and darkness (contributing to human associations of darkness with evil and wrongdoing, of the playground of real and imagined enemies, and of an inability to see what is going on; once again the emotional state of those involved). But this is not an exercise in crafting intellectually seductive arguments, but in finding the argument that accurately reflects the evidence.

Ironically, Siani-Davies also makes a lot of either/or assumptions. Thus the spread of rumors is either a largely spontaneous process, quite free from an intentional disinformation campaign, OR it is a disinformation campaign. The idea that ALL OF THE ABOVE (a disinformation campaign, the psychological impact of a disinformation campaign, AND organic rumors typical of conditions of great uncertainty) could be at play largely eludes him.

Yes, television and radio gave out phone numbers that contributed to the scope of the confusion, and arguably incentivized the spread of incorrect information. A Western academic audience will love this. See, it was all understandable, without having to go down the rabbit hole of “conspiratorial-thinking”…like so many of those silly Romanians (they don’t say the latter out loud, but it is implied).

It is a massive and fundamental mistake to reduce the confusion and spread of false information in December 1989 to organic processes. It is simply at odds with the historical record as becomes clear in Dosarul Revolutiei (The Files of the Revolution). Below, three examples to emphasize different points in this regard. They show how those involved in this situation, deduced that at least some of the disinformation 1) received including on Operational Classified Lines (did television and radio give out those numbers, Dr. Siani-Davies?) 2) included information clearly prepared in advance 3) was beyond the means of average citizens and 4) ceased or could be avoided by employing different countermeasures. For the time being in Romanian.

1&2) Dumitru Polivanov, declaratie, 09.04.2008

“Din momentul instalarii in acest birou pe telefoanele existente (guvernmental, TO, scurt, MANP [?sic.], interior si telefonul public cu exteriorul) au inceput sa curga informatii privind elicoptere inamice care ataca Bucurestiul sau semnalizate in alte locuri din tara: Slobozia, teroristi care intentioneaza sa atace diferite obiective, existenta unor explozivi in diferite locuri, si din CC, otravirea apei, etc. Astfel de informatii au fost transmise si prin biletele, scrisori, alte documente CHIAR DACTILOGRAFIATE CU LITERE DE DIMENSIUNI MINISTERIALE, CEEA CE PRESPUNEA CA ERAU FACUTE DIN TIMP.”

2&3) Ploiesti Misiunile si Actiunile Unitatilor Armatei, Jurnal-Sinteza

“In acest timp a sunat telefonul pe oras si s-a transmis urmatorul mesaj:

‘Sunt directorul Ovidiu Popescu si vorbesc de la Oficiul P. T. T. R. Nord. La benzinaria de la km. 6 au aterizat 4 elicoptere cu teroristi care au capturat personalul si ameninta sa arunce totul in aer.’

Desi directorul atipise totusi vocea ii apartinea indubitabil acestuia. Cand ofiterul i-a cerut sa repete cine este interlocutorul n-a facut-o, mesajul derulandu-se ca pe banda.

Aceasta intamplare a ajutat foarte mult la intelegerea tehnologiei fabricarii zvonurilor si la gasirea antidotului. ERA INREGISTRATA VOCEA AUTENTICA A PERSOANEI CARE PRETINDEA CA FACE, APELUL, IAR CONTINUAREA MESAJULUI SE FACEA CU UN TIMBRU APROPIAT DE CATRE CEL CE FABRICA STIREA FALSA.”

1&4)

“La orele 23,55, generalul-maior Puiu Dumitru a sunat pe T.O. de la Marele Stat Major si l-a informat pe generalul-maior Popa Dimitrie ca au fos aprobate 100 de programari care vor patrunde din U.R.S.S. in spatiul aerian al Romaniei, intre Iasi si Galati incepand cu 23.12.1989 orele 24,00 (Bucuresti) cu destinatia Alexandria si Boteni. Informatia a fost verificata si s-a dovedit a fi falsa.”

“IN CONSECINTA, COMANDANTUL MARII UNITATI DE APARARE ANTIAERIANA, CU SPRIJINUL DIRECTORULUI P. T. T. R. OVIDIU POPESCU, AU RUPT TOATE LEGATURILE PRIN CARE PERSONALUL DE LA SEDIUL INSPECTORATULUI JUDETEAN AL M.I. AR FI PUTUT COMUNICA CU EXTERIORUL, ? TRUNCHIUL CU TELEFOANELE DE ORAS, FARA IESIRE LA INTERURBAN SI LA CARE A DISPUS INLOCUIREA FOSTELOR CENTRALISTE CU ALTELE DE U.M. 010907.

URMAREA A FOST SISTAREA PRIMIRII ZVONURILOR PRIN T.O.”

1) Thus, once they cut off IJMI, and isolated those associated with the M.I., suddenly they did not have the same problem with the intoxicating rumors.

2) Generalul Maior Puiu Dumitru was at the time Sef al Departamentul Aviatiei Civilie and adjunct al Ministerului Transporturilor si Telecomunicatilor (see in comments, a snip from early 1989). Puiu Dumitru (Dumitru Puiu) died on 28 martie 1990. The only thing I have been able to find on the circumstances of his death is from a county (Csongrad) newspaper from Hungary that says he suddenly became ill on 24 March, was taken to a psychiatric hospital, and died on 28 March. He was 60 years old. He had also, according to that article, been recently on local Timisoara radio prior to this happening.

Having inhabited both the intelligence analysis and academic worlds in my professional life, I believe I gained insights that I would not have acquired had I resided solely in one world or the other. A fundamental observation involves the level of emphasis placed on voluntarist vs. structural explanations of behavior and outcomes. This is a first, early, and unfinished take on this question.

Nothing is more of a “nullifier” in the Western academic world than the taint of “conspiratorial thinking.” I don’t think this is accidental. In part, it is a somewhat reflexive, defensive reaction to the conspiratorial thinking that Western academics identify in the non-Western countries they study. Critics might call this a variant of neo-Orientalism. My own experience comes in particular in the study of communist/post-communist “Eastern Europe,” the Balkans, especially Romania.

While it is true that locals attracted by and desirous of integrating Western academic trends in Romania also denounce the conspiratorial thinking of others, often their competitors or their enemies, they remain a minority. Moreover, and perhaps more interesting, is that Romanian academic emigres to the West are unwilling in practice to fully assimilate the same level of preference for structure over agency, and for unintentional or accidental outcomes, that their non-emigre Romanianist colleagues display. There seems to be precious little acknowledgement and discussion that such a Western academic preference is itself potentially a cultural affect, derivative of the status of outsiders examining a foreign country. This is not to say that it is wrong, or even automatically wrong, just to say that it needs to be acknowledged, just as the proclivity of Romanians for “conspiratorial thinking” is stressed by these same scholars.

Take, the most “Western academic” among “Western academic studies” on the topic, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Cornell University Press, 2005) by Peter Siani-Davies. You can do a search, as I did, on Google Books, for terms like “rumor” and “myth” and get back essentially three dozen hits for each. Of course, both rumor and myth in the Western connotation, especially Western academic connotation, tend to subsume/be preceded by the word “false.” And, crucially, the underlying assumption is that these are predominantly organic phenomena, that to the extent they are wrong, they were/are unintentional or accidental. A good counterpoint is to look up terms like “disinform/ation,” “misinform/ation,” or “lie” in Siani-Davies volume. One finds almost nothing. This highlights a major flaw underlying Siani-Davies’ analysis: the unspoken assumption that confusion, stereotypes, and understandable, but ultimately unsubstantiated suspicion, explain ACCURATELY what happened in December 1989 in Romania. That should be a hypothesis, something to be tested, not a stealth assumption in the background.

In Siani-Davies’ volume, a search for “radar” in Google Books comes up with three hits, but only one of any real consequence. Even then, Siani-Davies blithely recounts that “in several cities the first shooting during the revolution was by antiaircraft guns firing at targets located by radar.” Siani-Davies makes no attempt to investigate the targets on radar further, focusing instead on the misunderstandings that ensued. This is also a fundamental error in Siani-Davies’ analysis: the assumption that misunderstandings completely take the place of or cannot coexist with real, intentional confrontations. Siani-Davies fails to ask if the targets on the radar were real or artificial, the latter a consequence of intentional disinformation, or both? That is a critical question and one that has dominated much of the discussion of this question in Romania. Siani-Davies should have known that, and perhaps does, although it is doubtful a single reviewer of his work did, cared, or realized its significance.

We see just how important the issue of disinformation and psychological warfare was in December 1989 in the following almost 20 page document from 1 June 1990 concerning “the actions of disinformation and radioelectronic jamming executed between 22.12.1989 and 21.01.1990 against (military) units of antiaircraft defense, aviation, and the navy.” This is an after-action report for internal use only and as it says it was tasked by the first deputy of the Defense Ministry and Chief Head of Defense. The commission investigating these questions contained officers from the Chiefs of Staff, the Territorial Air Defense Command, the Military Aviation Command, the Naval Command, and other units, and was carried out in March and April 1990. It clearly suggests this was a big deal and not just some talking point for public consumption, as Siani-Davies, to the extent he even mentions it, and others, would have us believe….

Radio-electronic and psychological warfare were intentional, important, and integral components of what happened in December 1989 in Romania. However, what Catalin Ranco Pitu and the other military prosecutors have attempted to do in recent years is to focus on these absent the context of the real (urban guerrilla) warfare that rather naturally accompanied them.

Case in point, is the following document from 09.04.1990, “Constatari” for short, conducted by CAAT. Remember, Pitu claimed to Ion Cristoiu in May 2023 (see previous two posts here) that ALL Army structures, to include CAAT (“aparare antiaeriana,” the Territorial Anti-aircraft Defense Command), conducted their own independent studies after January 1990 and came to the same conclusion: THE TERRORISTS DID NOT EXIST.

I ask my readers to examine the following. Pitu’s characterization of Constatari in Rechizitoriul din dosarul Revolutiei and in Ruperea blestemului. Read what he selected to cite in those publications and then read the entire document, especially from page 84 section II. 1., information that is left out by Pitu. Dear reader, did CAAT indeed conclude as Pitu claims in Rechizitoriul and in Ruperea blestemului that the “terrorists did not exist”?! The answer is pretty clear. Pitu lies by omission in this particular case.