Sibiu, 20-22 December: Nicu Ceausescu, the USLA, poisoned water, and Dr. Heyndrickx’s toxicology report
(purely personal views, as always, based on over two decades of prior research and publications)
Yes, dear friends, according to a toxicology report filed in late December 1989 by Belgian toxicologist Dr. Aubin Heyndrickx, the water in Sibiu had indeed been poisoned. Romanians, Romanianists, and foreigners who assure their audiences without a shred of self-doubt that there was no basis, no reason for Romanian Television, and specifically television presenter Teodor Brates, to panic the population with claims that the “water in Sibiu has been poisoned” are simply: wrong! Does this mean Dr. Heyndrickx’s claims and findings were necessarily right? No. Were his tests tainted or interpretation of them colored by the collective state of mind that prevailed in Romania and abroad about Romania in late 1989? I don’t know. As with so many other things, the Romanian military procuracy apparently never sought to follow-up on Heyndrickx’s toxicology report, or, if they did, they long since buried it. What is clear is that Dr. Heyndrickx’s test results mean that there was an understandable basis for suspicion that the water in Sibiu had been poisoned and that those who continue to treat the poison water in Sibiu rumor as obviously false and obviously baseless do public understanding inside and outside Romania a tremendous disservice.
report from Sibiu starts at approximately 2:20 (Tagesschau 27.12.1989)
I suspect that if the water was indeed poisoned–I tend to believe Henyndrickx’s report–that it was most likely linked–given the timing of when sickness broke out in Sibiu–to the arrival on the evening of the 20th in Sibiu of USLA (special unit for anti-terrorist warfare) personnel, who among different Romanian forces would have been the most likely to have access to such toxins. Below coverage of Heyndrickx’s report, I recount the arrival of the USLA at the request of Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu Ceausescu, to Sibiu. The idea later placed in the public imagination–by the former Securitate–and repeated in official reports like the Sandulescu-Gabrielescu parliamentary commission’s report published in 1996, that these were in fact DIA Army and not USLA Securitate personnel, is highly unlikely for several plain reasons. (We know that DIA personnel were sent from Buzau to Timisoara in the days prior: they natural traveled by a military transport plane, as one would expect military forces to do so. The rest of the DIA personnel remained in Buzau until the 22nd. By contrast, the forces transported–requested by Nicu Ceausescu of Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu and relayed to Securitate Director General Iulian N. Vlad–traveled a) from Bucharest (Baneasa) to Sibiu on a commerical TAROM flight. It goes without saying that if they had been DIA personnel, why should they leave from Bucharest and not Buzau to go to Sibiu, and why would they not have traveled as did the previous DIA group which went to Timisoara by military transport?)
Romania
On December 21, 1989, people drinking from water tank #4 in Sibiu experienced headache, visual disturbances, loss of consciousness, vomiting, etc. These symptoms are all compatible with organophosphate poisoning. The analysis of the water (by gas chromatography) and the determination of the cholinesterase activity of the blood was done in the University of Cluj. The conclusion was that an organophosphate had been used. Atropine sulfate and toxogonin were advised.
As soon as the symptoms appeared among the population, water tank #4 was shut off, rinsed, and cleaned. The people received water from army trucks.
A few days later, there was a fight in Timisoara between the army and Securitate over the water tanks. Poisoning was feared, as had occurred in Sibiu. According to witnesses, the Securitate possesses “all possible chemical warfare agents.”
Toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx supervised the chemical tests and interviewed the physicians at Central Hospital who treated the patients. From the tests and from the very high dose of atropine required to produce a response, he concluded that the tank was poisoned with sarin or VX (Report on the Humanitarian Mission to Romania, December 23-29, 1989, Laboratoria voor Toxicologie Criminalistiek, State University of Ghent).
Indeed, one can watch a brief discussion of the incident with Dr. Heyndrickx beginning at approximately the 40 second mark from an ITN broadcast of 27 December 1989
}T27128901 ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89 relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX to treat the people who were injured during the fight against
Securitate (secret police). Toxicologists have found evidence
that the security police poisoned the water supply. Injured
Securitate are being treated in hospitals alongside the people
they shot.
}T27128901 ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89 relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX to treat the ...
NADLAC, Romania — A member of a French medical team said Friday that doctors determined nerve gas was dumped into a Romanian town’s water supply during the anti-Ceausescu revolt, and five people were seriously poisoned before the substance diluted.
Once uprising leaders discovered the apparent sabotage in the municipal water tank in Sibiu, they drained the contaminated supply, said Auvin Heyndrickx, a Belgian doctor who treated some of the victims.
Heyndrickx said he went to Sibiu with a team of doctors from the French relief group ‘Doctors Without Borders’ upon hearing unconfirmed reports of the poisoning, which townspeople attributed to dictator Nicolae Ceausescu’s hated Securitate police force.
Set in the Transylvanian mountains of western Romania with a population of more than half a million, Sibiu was lorded over by Nicu Ceausescu, who was nabbed by citizens last week and remained under arrest by the new government. The government executed his father and mother, Elena, Monday on charges of ‘genocide’ and other crimes.
Heyndrickx, a professor of toxicology at the University of Ghent, Belgium, spoke with United Press International as his team passed through the town of Nadlac near the Hungarian border on their way back to France.
The French team determined that two highly toxic nerve gases, known as sarin and VX, were dumped in liquid form into Sibiu’s water on Dec. 20. Iraq, Libya and possibly Romania are the main producers of the poisons, Heyndrickx said.
Five peoplewere hospitalized with severe poisoning, he said, describing their symptoms as vomiting and ‘unknown brain damage.’
Heyndrickx attributed the relatively low number of injuries to the low concentration of the poisons in the water.
‘The quantity was very diluted,’ he said.
He held out hope that the brain damage suffered by the five victims would not be severe, but said the success of their recovery would remain unclear for days.
City workers drained and inspected the water tower before beginning the lengthy refilling process, he said.
Heyndrickx said first aid supplies from around the world had arrived in ample quantities in Sibiu and other towns in western Romania, but said long-term medical supplies and equipment are in critically short supply.
Baby formula and infant foods are desperately needed in Sibiu, as are antibiotics, anesthetics, surgical gloves and other supplies.
‘In the Sibiu pediatric hospital there is terrible malnutrition among the children, who are completely underfed,’ he said. ‘They don’t even have powdered milk.’
Foodstuffs have been in short supply in Romania despite strict rationing, which was halted this week by the new government.
Also in one of its first acts, the ruling National Salvation Front government Wednesday abolished a Ceausescu-imposed nutrition scheme that used pseudo-scientific methods to justify harmfully low daily calorie intake levels.
Monica N. Marginean, “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 33 (septembrie 1990), p. 2.
Sa continuam dialogul inceput acum citeva saptamini prin limpezirea unor aspecte din evenimentele lui decembrie 1989 la Sibiu, aspecte pe care dubla calitate de procuror si membru al Comisiei de ancheta va impiedicau sa le dati publicitatii. Deci, de fapt, ce a putut afla, in ciuda obstructiilor si piedicilor de tot felul, fostul procuror Marian Valer, despre implicarea unor elemente ale fostei securitati si militii in evenimentele singeroase din Sibiu?
In urma anchetelor desfasurate la Sibiu, rezulta ca la data evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, organele Ministerului de Interne aveau adoptate doua planuri de actiune in cazul aparitiei unei defectiuni antiregim sub forma revoltei sau manifestatiei anti-ceausiste ale populatiei, ori sub forma unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara. Astfel, in primul rind, pe baza ordinului ministrului de interne nr. 02600/1988, la data respectiva functia sus mentionata fiind detinuta de Tudor Postelnicu, ordin emis ca urmare a manifestatiilor anticeausiste de la Brasov, din 15 noiembrie 1987, s-a adoptat la nivelul Inspectoratului judetean Sibiu al M.I. un plan unic de actiune si interventie in cazul unor manifestatii, in care urmau sa fie implicate securitatea, militia, trupele de securitate si cele de pompieri din cadrul Ministerului de Interne. Intr-o asemenea eventualitate, un rol deosebit urmau sa detina plutoane de interventie special constituite, respectiv plutoantele Scutul, Soimii si U.S.L.A. In al doilea rind, in urma investigatiilor efectuate a rezultat ca organele M.I. mai aveau un plan secret de actiune impotriva unitatilor Ministerului Apararii in cazul unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara sau a altei atitudini antiregim a armatei. Probabil ca acest plan era in conexiune cu planul Z-Z, la care facea referire Ion Dinca in cazul procesului sau si care consta in acorduri secrete incheiate de Ceausescu cu 5 state arabe pentru acordarea de asistenta militara directa in cazul unui puci militar in Romania. In acest sens, in timpul evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din Sibiu, armata a gasit o harta cu casele conspirative ale Securitatii din jurul unitatilor militare din municipiu, in care urmau sa fie plasate cadre de securitate care sa actioneze impotriva acestora, in eventualitatea dezicerii armatei de regimul ceausist. In urma investigatiilor efectuate, s-a constatat ca din asemenea case s-a actionat cu foc asupra unor unitati militare, incepind cu dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, deci dupa rasturnarea dictaturii. S-a mai constatat ca, in general, in casele respective locuiau foste cadre de securitate sau militie, care se pensionsera sau trecusera in rezerva, sau informatori al securitatii, precum si ca, dupa inceperea manifestatiilor anticeausiste la Sibiu, la casele respective au intrat autoturisme care aveau numere de inmatriculare din alte judete, de exemplu Constanta, Iasi, Bacau. Astfel asupra U.M. 01512, s-a tras din imobilul nr. 7 din str. Stefan cel Mare, situat vis-a-vis de pavilionul central ai acesteia, in care locuiau familii ale unui fost comandant al securitatii din Sibiu si un informator al securitatii, precum si din imobilele situate in str. Moscovei, paralela cu unitatea militara. Asupra U.M. 1606, s-a tras din imobilul cu nr. 47 de pe str. Moldoveanu, in care locuiau un fost sef al militiei judetului Sibiu, iar asupra U.M. 01080 s-a tras din vila Branga, de pe Calea Dumbravii, in care locuia cu familia un mare crescator de oi, precum si din vila unui medic. A mai rezultat ca locatarii imobilelor respective au lipsit de la domiciliu in timpul evenimentelor, parasindu-le cu citeva zile in prealabil, precum si ca in unele din aceste case nu s-au gasit urme de mobilier sau de obiecte casnice. Harta caselor conspirative ale securitatii si militiei a ajuns in posesia locotenent-colonelului Dragomir, comandantul garnizoanei Sibiu, dar acesta, fiind solicitat sa o depuna la comisia de ancheta, a motivat ca nu o mai gaseste.
Monica N. Marginean: Sa revenim la datele concrete ale regiei de care vorbeam anterior. Cum arata, de pilda, povestea atit de dezbatuta la procesul lui Nicu Ceausescu a cursei ROMBAC, daca o privim din perspectiva Comisiei de ancheta?
fostul procuror Marian Valer: In mod normal, cursa de avion Bucuresti-Sibiu trebuia sa decoleze de pe aeroportul Baneasa, la orele 17,10 folosindu-se pe acest traseu avioane marca Antonov. In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, insa, in jurul orelor 17, deci in apropierea orei prevazute pentru decolarea cursei obisnuite, pasagerii pentru Sibiu au fost invitati si dusi la Aeroportul Otopeni unde au fost imbarcati intr-un avion marca ROMBAC care a decolat in jurul orelor 18,30 si a aterizat pe aeroportul Sibiu in jur de ora 19. Fac precizarea ca in dupa-amiaza aceleiasi zile, cu aproape 2 ore inaintea decolarii acestei curse, a aterizat pe aeroportul Otopeni avionul prezidential cu care Ceausescu s-a reintors din Iran. Conform datelor furnizate de agentia TAROM Bucuresti, in avionul respectiv spre Sibiu au fost imbarcati 81 pasageri. In radiograma cursei sint consemnate domiciile doar la o parte din pasageri, cu mentiunea ca unele sint incomplete, lipsind fie localitatea, fie strada, fie numarul, iar la restul pasagerilor figureaza doar mentiunile ,rezervat’ sau Pasaport RSR. In urma investigatiilor efectuate, au putut fi identificati doar 44 de pasageri, majoritatea avind domiciliul in municipul si judetul Sibiu, stabilindu-se ca au fost persoane trimise in delegatie la foruri tutelare din capitala, sau studenti plecati in vacanta, iar citiva domiciliati in judetul Alba. Mentionez ca asupra acestor persoane nu planeaza nici un dubiu. Dubiile sint create insa in primul rind de faptul ca mai multi pasageri figureaza cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, dar in realitate nu domiciliaza la adresele consemnate, iar la unele adrese sint intreprinderi. Un alt element creator de dubii il constituie prezenta in avionul respectiv a unui inspector de la Departmentul Aviatiei Civile, cu numele de Nevrozeanu, care nu figureaza pe lista pasagerilor si cu privire la care s-a stabilit ca, in trecut, se deplasa cu avionul in cazuri speciale doar pe relatia Moscova, fiind un bun cunoscator al limbii ruse. Mai multi pasageri sustin ca in partea dreapta din fata a avionului au sesizat un grup de barbati, mai inalti, atletici, imbracati sportiv, multi dintre ei fiind blonzi, grup care li s-a parut suspect. Aceste afirmatii se coroboreaza cu faptul ca in zona respectiva a avionului nu a stat nici unul din pasagerii identificati. Mai mult, verificindu-se la hotelurile din municipiul Sibiu persoane care aveau numele celor 37 de persoane neidentificate, s-a constatat ca doar un pasager neidentificat care figureaza pe listele TAROM-ului cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, care nu exista la adresa respectiva din localitate, a fost cazat la hotelul Bulevard, dar in registrul de evidenta figureaza cu un alt domiciliu din Bucuresti. Ambele domicilii, si cei din diagrama TAROM si cel de la hotel sint false. Cu ocazia acelorasi verificari s-a constatat ca in perioada respectiva in hotelurile din Sibiu au fost cazati multi turisti sovietici, in special la Imparatul Romanilor, Continental, si Bulevard, situate in zona centrala a municipiului. Fac mentiunea ca din hotelurile respective s-a tras asupra manifestantilor si a armatei. Am omis sa precizez ca pe aeroportul Otopeni, in avionul ROMBAC au fost incarcate sute de colete identice ca format, dimensiuni si culoare, de marime apropriata unei genti diplomat, precum si ca, cu citeva minute inaintea decolarii cursei spre Sibiu, de pe acelasi aeroport au decolat curse ROMBAC spre Timisoara si Arad. Consider ca, in legatura cu pasagerii neidentificati, sint posibile doua versiuni, respectiv sa fie au fost luptatorii U.S.L.A. trimisi in sprijinul lui Nicu Ceausescu, fie au fost agenti sovietici trimisi sa actioneze in scopul rasturnarii regimului Ceausescu.
Monica N. Marginean: Ce alte demersuri a facut Comisia de ancheta pentru elucidarea misterului celor 37 de pasageri neidentificati?
Marian Valer: Am luat contact cu unul din loctiitorii comandamentului trupelor U.S.L.A. din capitala, caruia i-am solicitat sa-mi puna la dispozitie pe cei trei insotitori U.S.L.A. ai avionului ROMBAC. Loctiitorul mi-a spus ca acestia au fost audiati de un procuror militar si nu mai este de acord sa fie audiati inca o data.
Monica M. Maginean: “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.
Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
Sibiu, 19-22 December 1989
In Sibiu, Siani-Davies tells us:
Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989. It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[151]
From the standpoint of Siani-Davies’ unsuspecting reader such a conclusion may seem not only credible, but judicious. But one of Siani-Davies’ habits—identified negatively by even those who praise the book—is his tendency to draw negative equivalencies: i.e. there is about as much evidence to support x as there is to support y, in order to disprove or discount both propositions. In a review, Doris Mironescu writes:
“Very common are claims such as the following: ‘Finding the proof to sustain such an explanation of the events [that the Army’s Intelligence arm, the DIA simulated the “terrorist diversion,” to permit the Front’s takeover and a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of the country] is as difficult as proving that special units of the securitate took up arms against the revolution’ (p. 154). Mutually contradictory hypotheses are invoked in order to negate each other, not so much because of the weight of the claims, but through the ideological similarity of both.”[152]
This tendency definitely affects Siani-Davies’ analysis of the “terrorists” and its accuracy. To begin with, in the very book (Sandulescu) invoked by Siani-Davies, the head of the DIA (Battalion 404 Buzau), Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) that “we hardly had 80 fighters in this battalion.”[153] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[154] This makes it highly unlikely that they were on the 20 December TAROM flight to Sibiu that is in question.[155]
in decembrie 1989, “temuta” unitate DIA Batalionul 404…avea…80 de luptatori!
Contrast this with the signs that exist pointing to the mystery passengers as having been from the Securitate/Interior Ministry, in particular the USLA. Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December 1989, in a crisis meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests.[156] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[157] If they were, indeed, DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and Postelnicu informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?
Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December in a crisis meeting, Ceausescu’s son announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests (“Baricada,” no. 45, 1990). Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request (“Romania Libera,” 30 January 1990.)
The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA. Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:
“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ – after which one no longer heard anything of them – they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…”[158]
Beginning, at least as early as August 1990, with the allusions of Major Mihai Floca, and later seemingly indirectly confirmed by former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, it was suggested that when USLA Commander Ardeleanu was confronted at the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December 1989, Ardeleanu reportedly admitted that “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’.”[159] Finally, and along these lines, we bring things full circle—and recall our “phantoms in black” again in the process—with the testimony of Army officer Hortopan to the same Serban Sandulescu at the Gabrielescu Commission hearings:
Sandulescu: About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?
Hortopan: On the contrary. These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu]. I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was: out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders. Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[160]
Bringing us up to the morning of 22 December 1989, and setting the stage for what was to come, Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:
Dragomir: Events began to develop quickly on 22 December. In the morning some of the students posted in different parts of the town began to observe some suspect individuals in black jumpsuits on the roofs in the lights of the attics of several buildings.
Reporter: The same equipment as the USLAsi killed out front of the Defense Ministry…
Dragomir: And on the roof of the Militia building there were three or four similar individuals…[161]
Armata Poporului, “Sub tirul incrucisat…(II)” interviu cu Aurel Dragomir, nr. 46, noiembrie 1990 p. 3.
Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation. Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[162]
[153] Serban Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana (Bucharest: Omega, 1996), p. 214. Sandulescu’s book was marketed and printed by Sorin Rosca Stanescu’s Ziua press. Rosca Stanescu was a former USLA informer between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Who was Sandulescu’s chief counselor on these matters? Stefan Radoi, a former USLA officer in the early 1980s! These are the type of people who, of course, believe the passengers were DIA and not USLA! See my discussion of this whole fiasco in “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale,” RFE “East European Perspectives” 4-6/2002, online.
[154] See Dinu’s testimony in Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat, p. 220. Also see the claims of another senior DIA officer Remus Ghergulescu in Jurnalul National, March 2004, online edition.
[155] Speaking even more broadly, Army parachutists (whether from Buzau, Caracal, Campia Turzii, or Boteni) were in Timisoara, Caransebes, and Television, Piata Palatului and the Otopeni Airport in Bucharest during the December events, but that clearly leaves many places where there were “terrorist actions”—including Sibiu—without them, decreasing their likelihood as plausible suspects. See Catalin Tintareanu, “Sarbatoare la Scoala de Aplicatie pentru Parasutisti ‘General Grigore Bastan,” Opinia (Buzau), 10 June 2005, online edition.
[156] Nicu Silvestru, “Cine a ordonat sa se traga la Sibiu?” Baricada, no. 45, 1990, p.5.
[157] Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neintrebat,” Romania Libera, 30 January 1990, p. 1
[158] Interview with Nicu Ceausescu in Zig-Zag, no. 20, 21-27 August 1990.
[159]Adevarul, 29 August 1990. Also, Romanescu with Badea “U.S.L.A, Bula Moise…” 1991.
[160] “Virgil Magureanu sustine ca revolta din 1989 a fost sprijinita din interiorul sistemului,” Gardianul, 12 November 2005, online edition.
[161] Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, interview by Colonel Dragos Dragoi, “Sub tirul incrucisat al acuzatiilor (II),” Armata Poporului, no. 46 (November 1990), p. 3. Remus Ghergulescu specified USLA appearance as follows: “Over their black jumpsuits (‘combinezoanele negre’) in which they were dressed they had kaki vests. This was normal. They were equipped with the jumpsuits as “war gear,” while the vests were “city wear.’” (Colonel Remus Ghergulescu, interview with Razvan Belciuganu, “Teroristii au iesit din haos,” Jurnalul National, 29 November 2004, online edition.)
[162] See Evenimentul Zilei, 25 November 1992, p. 3.
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The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 