The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Tismaneanu Report 2006 v. CIA NID 28.12.1989

(purely personal views as always; punct de vedere strict personal)

On 10 December 2019, the Wilson Center released the following:  https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/633/cia-reports-on-the-collapse-of-communism-in-europe/5

  • December 28, 1989

    Romania: New Regime Consolidating Security

    An analysis of the new government’s efforts to eliminate the threat posed by Securitate troops.

    Fullscreen capture 1252019 85638 AM

    (Although, for clear reasons of the need to protect sources and methods, the higher/highest levels of reporting are redacted…the reader can be assured that the conclusions must be in keeping with the redactions…as a result of standard tradecraft)

 

In 2010, Mircea Munteanu, then of the Wilson Center, was kind enough to offer me the opportunity to speak at the Wilson Center on my research on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  It would have been the first time since I started publishing in 1996, that I had been invited to speak on December 1989.  (In fact, it would have been the only time in 23 years that I was invited to speak on December 1989!) Alas, it was not to be.  My deputy manager counseled me…it would not be such a good idea.

Why would it not have been such a good idea?  Well, at that point I had 100 pages of single spaced research (two papers, 2008 and 2010) on a country not named Romania, that had been banned (in fact it is still banned).  My deputy manager was obliquely referring to what had happened three years earlier!

In September 2007, I had blogged criticism of the so-called Tismaneanu Report, the Final Report (Raport Final) of the Presidential Commission to Analyze the Communist Dictatorship of Romania.  My criticism was limited to the chapter on December 1989, a subject of which by then I had studied for 17 years (ten before I joined government service…seven thereafter), in particular the following passage:

Prin televiziune s-au făcut majoritatea diversiunilor, cea mai eficientă fiind reprezentată de „pericolul de moarte” omniprezent întruchipat de „teroriştii fideli dictatorului Ceauşescu”; acesta a fost arestat în 22 decembrie, într-o unitate militară din Târgovişte. Pericolul părea total credibil întrucât în perioada 22-27 decembrie au fost înregistraţi 942 de morţi şi mii de răniţi. Majoritatea au fost ucişi şi răniţi pe străzile din centrul capitalei şi al altor oraşe martirizate ca urmare a acestei diversiuni. Ulterior nu a fost acuzat şi judecat nici un terorist….Potrivit declaraţiilor generalului-magistrat Dan Voinea…„În decembrie 1989 scopul era deturnarea caracterului anticomunist al revoluţiei şi preluarea puterii prin teroarea instalată”17.  [pp. 623-624]

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-tismaneanu-commission-presents-the-final-report-romanian-communism

Below, you can read what I blogged at the time.  In late October of that year, a scurrilous journalist (Victor Roncea) who I knew only too well (heck, I cited and criticized him in my research) contacted me:  could he use what I had blogged?  It was a conundrum:  as I told him, my values were totally different than his and so was my understanding of December 1989.  I foolishly and regrettably said to myself and to him:  well, you found what I blogged, finders keepers, publish it as you want!  A terrible mistake.

Vladimir Tismaneanu had several choices when he read my republished criticism of the Raport Final’s chapter on December 1989.  1) Ignore me.  I was a nobody, he was a “somebody,” well-established in Romania and in the US.  2) Respond to me.  Reject what I had written.  Tell me why I was wrong. or 3) What he chose:  pile/cunostiinte (PCR–pile, cunostiinte, relatii/rude).  He chose to call up a connection at my then employer and scream bloody-murder…if they did not do something about me…he would take things to a higher level!  How many academics, how many of you reading this, would have done what Tismaneanu did?

But wait, there’s more!  Knowing most likely that I could not defend myself after his vindictive telephone call…his then minions, Sorin Iliesiu and Andrei Badin, attempted to argue…that I had been expelled from CIA after six months (see below, for incompetence or concerns over my loyalty)…it was a total lie…but precisely because of Tismaneanu’s phone call, I was unable to defend myself (how is that for perverse irony?!)…As R.I. told me at the time:  VT had successfully insinuated himself between and separated me from my then institution.  What does Tismaneanu say now about the CIA NID from 28 December 1989?  Perhaps he needs to call and complain about the analysts who wrote it at the time (not me) and those who declassified it (not me)…how dare they contradict the Tismaneanu Report!

If Vladimir Tismaneanu or the reader of this page wishes to understand how we ended up where we are, how the Tismaneanu Report could get so wrong the tremendous bloodshed after 22 December 1989, I direct them to kindly read my 1999 article in EEPS (which Tismaneanu generously attempted to smear me with publicly by pointing out that a “peer reviewer”–likely Maria Bucur Deckard of Indiana University–gave the article a negative review and advised it should not be published…perhaps Tismaneanu and the reviewer in question should now go back and read it, to understand why they got things so wrong):  The Uses of Absurdity Romania

Saturday, September 8, 2007

“Raportul Tismaneanu” and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Part I)

Until now I have generally avoided discussion of the “Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania” (663 pages). First, the bulk of my research on Romania has focused on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 and events of the post-1989 era: I prefer to be on more solid footing when I comment on something and I recognize that there are people more steeped in detail on the communist era than myself and thus leave it primarily to them to analyze those sections of the report. Second, the events of December 1989 were the end of the communist era and, not surprisingly, not the focus of the report–indeed, they are almost tacked on and left open to some extent as an issue for another day. Third, the discussion of December 1989 is so perfunctory, so vague, and in some places so easy to counter, that to go through line-by-line is more of a task than a n enjoyable assignement–akin to shooting fish-in-a-barrel which lacks the challenge of intellectual sport. Anybody the least bit familiar with my research on December 1989 knows that I have no problem taking on any details and any argument from any corner that is original and that is critical to counter if my own research is to prevail as more credible.
But the manner in which Vladimir Tismaneanu, the head of the Presidential Commission and the lead author of the Report–and whose work and the spirit of his work that suffuses the Report–continues to arrogantly refuse to respond to and engage scholarly criticism of the Report, leads me to chime in here. Sure, Tismaneanu has no problem naming–and, in fact, appears to relish doing so–critics of his report with dubious reputations, critics who focus on Tismaneanu’s Jewish roots, his father’s role in the early communist regime, his alleged “neo-communist” leanings because of his flirtation with Marxist revisionism and his wri tings while in Romania until his early 30s, and then being an exile in the West during the worst part of the Ceausescu era during the 1980s. Thus, he rails against the likes of Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Mihai Ungheanu, Victor Roncea, and Dan Ciachir, and refers to the “Paunescu-Vadim-Iliescu Triad.” In other words: shooting fish-in-a-barrel, going after the weakest and most tendentious of arguments.
Astfel ca aceasta strategie a lui Vladimir Tismaneanu de a raspunde prompt si aplicat calomniilor mizerabile, din care si citeaza abundent, dar de a ignora criticile rezonabile (nu am vazut nicaieri vreun astfel de raspuns) poate deveni, voluntar sau nu, o modalitate de impunere necritica a Raportului si a intregului demers care il insoteste, inhibind posibilele dezbateri asupra lui prin crearea senzatiei ca orice critici nu pot fi decit reprobabile. (Ciprian Siulea, “Tentati a unui nou absolutism moral: Cu cine si de ce polemizeaza Vladimir Tismaneanu? Observator Cultural, nr. 379, (5-11 iulie 2007))
But when it comes to the scholarly and level-headed questions and criticism directed at the Report–for example, those posed by Ciprian Siulea in Observator Cultural above, Michael Shafir (see 1/12/07 interview with Dan Tapalaga in Ziua de Cluj, in longer form in 3/1/07 Tribuna (Cluj) and then nr. 11 www.eleonardo.tk, and his “Scrisoare (ultra)deschisa” in Observator Cultural responding to Siulea), and Sorin Adam Matei in Adevarul (8/13/07 “Unde ma duci bestie”) …Tismaneanu has nothing to say. He simply won’t engage. Instead, he practices a va riety of relatively transparent end-run mechanisms.
First, he will make an allusion to a criticism–usually responding to a question or aspect about it that was not at issue, i.e. he responds to a straw-man–but not mention the author or speaker who made it. There are many reasons for not mentioning the author of a certain argument and I can say that I know of almost no one in the academic and journalistic world who doesn’t do it consciously or unconsciously at least on occasion. Some of the uses are more defensible than others–for example, when someone does not wish to discredit or hurt a friend or colleague one respects, or in particular someone just breaking into a field or struggling (i.e. don’t kick ‘em when they are down). It can also be a mechanism for maximizing humor, wit, and adding an air mystery and engaging the reader to be more active. Conflict-aversion and perhaps the fear of accusations of libel may also play a role. Finally, I do wonder if it is more prono unced among those who have lived under totatlitarianism–where “writing around things,” self-preservation, and maintaining implicit and tacit cirles of supporters were necessities of life, especially in the already esoteric world of intellectuals…
Aparent, anumite lucruri s-au schimbat de la data publicarii articolului dumneavoastra. Schimbarea a fost insa una caragialeasca, in sensul ca domnul Tismaneanu a catadicsit, intr-un tirziu, sa reactioneze si la remarcile mele in ce priveste raportul comisiei pe care cu onoare a condus-o. Reactia domniei sale a aparut in revista Dilema veche, nr. 177 din 30 iunie curent, in articolul intitulat „Liberalismul civic anticomunist“. Dar cum „reactioneaza“ reputatul politolog? El scrie: „Din primul moment, comunismul recurge la crime impotriva umanitatii. Fie ca vrem sa-l numim, cu un termen care stirneste discutii, «regim geno cidar», fie ca vrem sa-l numim «regim bazat pe politicid sau pe democid», pentru mine este o discutie semantica, nu neaparat roditoare“ (s.m.). Nici o referinta la cei care au pus la indoiala acuratetea termenului de „genocid“ folosit in Raport (in ordine cronologica, Gabriel Andreescu si subsemnatul) si mai ales nici o referinta la locul si data unde au fost ridicate aceste probleme. (Michael Shafir, “Scrisoare (ultra)deschisa” Observator Cultural, nr. 382 (26 iulie-1 august 2007))
In Tismaneanu’s case, however, his refusal to engage his critics by name, I think stems from something else. This is an old tactic and many use it: indeed, there must be something to it because politicians all the time avoid mentioning their opponents and competitors. Why? Because to do so is seen as free advertising for the opponent or competitor. More important, it appears to put the opponent or competitor on an equal footing, it gives them and their argument legitimacy in a sense by merely invoking, let alone responding to them. To not mention the name of one’s opponent, competitor, or critic is then ultimately about POWER and CONTROL, and attempting to belittle the person being slighted. This puts the low in low politics and the poor in poor professional ethics. I also think it has another name: intellectual cowardice.
How does Tismaneanu get away with it and avoid responding to reasonable, solid criticisms and questions? Well, take another instance of how he responded to Siulea–remember, of course, since he doesn’t name Siulea by name and invoke his article, he can always deny his allusion is a response to Siulea, whether or not it actually is…another underhanded element to this practice. Remember: the subtitle of Siulea’s article was “Cu cine si de ce polemizeaza Vladimir Tismaneanu?” So a month after Siulea’s article, in his editorial entitled “Din nou de spre refuzul de a uita,” (Evenimentul Zilei, 15 august 2007) Tismaneanu states in his teaser:”Polemicile intelectuale au valoare cata vreme sunt inspirate de devotamentul pentru adevar, nu de vanitati, vendete si resentimente.”
So in other words, Tismaneanu attemtps to establish the ground-rules for polemics. What are the ground-rules? “Intellectual polemics have value as long as they are inspired totally by [the pursuit of] truth, and not vanity, vendettas or resentments.” So Tismaneanu is to be the arbiter of what is an acceptable polemic. Shafir criticizes the use of the term “genocide” in the report, the incredibly vague estimation of the number of vicitms under the regime to between 500,000 and 2 million (something anyone without any access to the archives could have come up with), etc. Dr. Tismaneanu, are Michael Shafir’s misgivings not motivated by a search for the truth, a devotion to the truth? If so, why are you unable to engage his arguments by name. Similarly, what about the reasoned argumentation of Ciprian Siulea? It is important to note too, that Tismaneanu’s use of the terms “vanity, vendettas, and resentments” are incredibly subjective. When Tom Gallagher criticized Tismaneanu’s interview book “Marele Soc” with Ion Iliescu, Tismaneanu responded that this was “an outburst of resentments” on the part of Gallagher; three years later indirectly Tismaneanu has all but admitted Gallagher was correct and that he made a mistake. In other words, this is Tismaneanu’s standard operating procedure for responding to criticism.
Indeed, this has become the standing problem with Tismaneanu’s defense of the Report and of his own work, writings, statements, and contributions in general. The goals of the report are so noble, criticism is illegitimate and any errors it has must be forgiven. And critics of the report, are automatically dubbed “critics of liberalism,” “critics of the open society.” Critics are ill-willed and demonized by defnition. And of course where do we know this logic from: the goals are so noble, the ends-justify-the-means? Why isn’t it the communist regime under analysis?
Those who focus on Tismaneanu’s writings in communist Romania and implausibly accuse him of “neo-communism” today (his writings over two decades show that is ridiculous) miss the point. (Ironically, but poignantly, in August two weeks after railing against people having dug up his old articles from the 1970s and early 1980s in Romania, he turned around and quoted Ion Iliescu at length from the late 1960s in vituperative terms!) What links the young Tismaneanu and the one of today–other tha n the Securitate report from 1983 when a 32 yr. old Tismaneanu was identified as having a self-destructive weakness for flattery–”…sensibil la laudele care i se aduc de catre persoane din anturajul sau, ceea ce il face in multe ocazii sa se ralieze la actiuni nechibzuite care ii sint sugerate de persoane ce-i speculeaza tendinte spre infatuare…” Dan Tapalaga, “Turnat de prieteni, demonizat de Securitate,” Cotidianul, 24 iulie 2006) is the ideological zealotry: then it was Marxist revisionism, today “civic anti-communist liberalism” or “anti-communism as a moral obligation” as he calls it. He is a born-again of a sort, having found the redemptive faith of crusading liberalism, and the enemies of that liberalism, according to Tismaneanu, are everywhere…(To be continued)
…a fost si ramane un ina mic al adevarului istoric. Structura sa mentala este imuna la evidente faptice. El gandeste in termeni bolsevici, conform preceptului leninist: „Care pe care”.
Lumea este divizata pentru el in aliati si adversari, nefiind loc pentru niciun fel de pozitii intermediare. (29 august 2007 “Asa grait-a Ion Iliescu atunci si acum” Evenimentul Zilei)
Tismaneanu on Ion Iliescu…but also an eerily accurate portrayal of himself…

Sunday, September 9, 2007

“Raportul Tismaneanu” and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Part 2)

You can be forgiven if in reading the section of “Raportul Tismaneanu” on the December 1989 Revolution (pp. 618-625) you get a strange sense of deja vu, all over, again and again. Why? Because in yet another exhibition of “Tismaneanu Thought”–of which the report is full–this is merely a lightly reedited regifting of Tismaneanu’s earlier writings, in this case on the Revolution. (About the only good thing I can say about it is that he includes a footnote referencing Marius Mioc’s work–a Timisoara-based researcher who probably has not gotten the sufficient recognition he deserves for his work on December 1989.) Indeed, the degree of this excercise in intellectual regifting goes down to the footnotes–many of which are almost verbatim from Tismaneanu’s works years earlier.
I first sensed the certainty of the deja vu feeling when I read the following sentence on page 622:
“Povestea fugii cuplului Ceausescu si capturarea sa ulterioara, procesul secret si executia din ziu a de Craciun necesita insa clarificari suplimentare.” Readers are referred in the footnote (no. 15) to Tismaneanu’s coauthored piece with Matei Calinescu from Problems of Communism, April 1991–a piece that was written in late 1990! (I have discussed elsewhere the sloppiness of that article, including the claim that the trial “lasted nine hours,” a claim without a source, and one which I have not been able to find in 17 years of research of Romanian, Hungarian, French, and English sources.) Now I asked myself: where was it that I had read exactly that phraseology before?
Well, I found it, and it turns out to be the source for much of the “Raportul Tismaneanu” section on the Revolution: Tismaneanu’s 1997 article : “Romanian exceptionalism?” in the Dawisha and Parrott volume on Southeast Europe (pp. 403-451). There on page 417 it reads “The story of Ceausescu’s flight and his subsequent capture, secret trial, and execution on Christmas day remains to be clarified.” In other wo rds, a verbatim translation of the Romanian above. And if one reads pp. 414-417, one will find much of what appears in “Raportul Tismaneanu” on the Revolution.
Why is this problematic? Well, for one thing, “Raportul Tismaneanu” makes no note that the bulk of this section, even verbatim, is taken from Tismaneanu’s previous work, published with Cambridge University Press. Moreover, how much of an effort does it tell you that Tismaneanu has made to stay current with anything connected to the Revolution such that a decade later he could still make the bold claim that these issues “remain to be clarified.” What makes it worse is that his claim isn’t even true. Interviews with personnel from Tirgoviste back in December 1990 in Flacara, interviews by Petre Mihai Bacanu in December 1993 in Romania Libera, and especially Viorel Domenico’s interviews and collection of service journals and other documents from those involved in these events “Ceausescu la Tirgoviste” (1999) have pretty much cleared up these issues.
And if that isn’t enough, those events are effectively discussed in Peter Siani-Davies excellent volume published in 2005. Oh yeah, perhaps Vladimir has heard of that one. After all, he contributed a blurb to the back of the dust jacket praising it, and yet no where does it show up in the footnotes on December 1989 in “Raportul Tismaneanu.” Instead, we are directed to Tismaneanu’s own article–surprise!–when in fact, Siani-Davies is infinitely superior by any standard of detail and precision. (Indeed, this is a problem: footnotes for this section of “Raportul Tismaneanu” are mostly either a) old ones taken verbatim from previous Tismaneanu’s works, or b) Tismaneanu’s Romanian friends, Stelian Tanase, Matei Calinescu, Nestor Ratesh (although Ratesh’s is far superior to the others).)
Let’s face it: that in a document of the supposed importance as “Raportul Tismaneanu,” it just speaks to Tismaneanu’s combination of vanity and laziness when it comes to historical detail and the literature of others that he could publish this–and it speaks to the issue of hagiography that the others on the Commission could let this pass as it did. The weakness of Romania’s political and intellectual culture for cults of personality and clientelistic relationships is visibly on display in this part of “Raportul Tismaneanu”…and why do I suspect not just in that part. (To be continued.)

Friday, September 14, 2007

“Raportul Tismaneanu” and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Part 3)

As I stated previously, combatting the Tismaneanu Report’s coverage of December 1989 (pp. 618-625) is somewhat tedious, because it lacks intellectual challenge: it is like shooting fish-in-a-barrel, precisely because Tismaneanu himself has performed so little actual research into the events, has read so little of the literature, and is so vague and imprecise in his account. Nevertheless, let us look at an example: Tismaneanu’s discussion of the role of Romanian Television (TVR) during the events.
Much of what Tismaneanu writes is sheer, unsubtantiated innuendo, but that said one has to admit he is hardly alone: hence why it will likely, probably go unchallenged outside few corners, if at all. For example, he doesn’t say so explicitly but it is clear he intimates the story of the Ceausescu loyalist [Securitate] “terrorists” was a “diversion,” a sham perpetrated by those who seized power in Ceausescu’s wake–made clear by his ascription of only 162 of the 1104 deaths durin g these days to the Ceausescus (p. 623). This is majority opinion. Back in November 1999, a poll reported in Ziua showed 9 of 10 Romanians essentially agreeing with what Tismaneanu suggests in the Report: they rejected “the lie of the [Ceausescu loyalist Securitate] terrorists.”
I would venture to guess that when it comes to the role of TVR during the December events, that if asked, similar numbers of Romanians (90%) would share the view that those reporting information on television during these days cynically, intentionally, and premeditatedly attempted to disinform the public. Hence, the following Tismaneanu line in the Report (p. 623) is likely greeted with a yawn, a statement of incontrovertible fact:
“Prin televiziune s-au facut majoritatea diversiunilor, cea mai eficienta fiind reprezentata de ‘pericolul de moarte’ omniprezent intruchipat de ‘teroristi fideli dictatorului Ceausescu.’”
“Through television the majority of the diversions were accomplished, the most efficient being represented by the omnipresent “lethal danger” embodied by the “terrorists loyal to the dictator Ceausescu.’”
I have no doubt that many, perhaps most, Romanians remember things this way–that Television was uniformly panicking the population.
BUT THE TRANSCRIPTS OF WHAT WAS SAID ON TELEVISION TELL ANOTHER STORY and here the historical record shows the gap that emerges from selective, politicized, and fading memory.
Take a favorite, that Tismaneanu does not mention directly above, but clearly has in mind–Ion Iliescu’s oft-invoked quote from his speech on TVR on 23 December 1989 that the terrorists “shoot from any position.” People routinely site this to suggest that Iliescu intentionally attempted to create a bogeyman, to scare people off th e streets, that he wished to paint the darkest picture.
The transcript shows that this belief and memory is simply wrong. In that same statement, Iliescu states emphatically “Actually, I must tell you that we are not dealing with a large number of terrorist elements, but rather they are specially trained and equipped for this kind of action” (FBIS-EEU-89-246, 23 December 1989, p. 61, “Ion Iliescu announces capture of the Ceausescus,” Bucharest Domestic Service, 1616 GMT) (When Army General Tudor spoke he referred to “only some special units…few in number, but embittered.” see p. 518 of “The Uses of Absurdity” noted below). I challenge anyone to explain to me why you would make such definitive statements attempting to limit the image of threat if your goal was a “diversion” to intentionally hype the threat.
(It is important to note: Tismaneanu has no excuse whatsoever for not knowing this. It is included in my Fall 1999 EEPS article “The Uses of Absurdity” on pp. 516-517. Tismaneanu was the Editor of EEPS at the time and has claimed to me he read it, but I continue to have strong doubts as to how closely he did so…if at all. That he arrogantly glossed over its content and apparently made little attempt to understand the article is shall we say, very in keeping with his character.)
Linked to the allegations of supposedly intentionally hyping the threat posed by the “terrorists” is the certitude with which many Romanians and Romanianists assert that TV personnel (especially Teodor Brates) intentionally spread rumors about the water being poisioned and the army running out of ammunition in Sibiu etc.–rumors that proved to be unsubstantiated. Here is what they likely remember:
“One moment, please…from Sibiu it has been communicated that the army no longer has ammunition and the Securitate troops continue to attack mili tary units….We want to inform you that in Sibiu, military units are urgently requesting help…We are constantly receiving communications…of course, we do not have the possibility to verify their authenticity…but we ask for your attention…It is said that the enemy elements, the securisti, have poisoned the water in Sibiu, in Timisoara…the water must be boiled before being consumed.” (from the transcript of 22 December 1989 in “Revolutia Romana in Direct” (Bucharest: 1990), pp. 47, 48, 51, quoted p. 324, Richard Andrew Hall, 1997, Ph.D. Dissertation, “Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania”)
What they don’t remember is that Brates returned later to inform the audience a) when the fighting had ceased in Sibiu, b) when supplies of bottled water were on their way to Sibiu, and c) when the competent authorities verified that the water in Bucharest was safe to drink (“Revol utia Romana in Direct,” pp. 71, 72, 75, discussed p. 327 Hall, “Rewriting the Revolution”) This is there…in the transcript of what was said on Television…it is not a matter of a “difference of opinion” as the likes of Tismanenau and others in denial would have us believe. It is the old saw from American baseball: as the famous manager Casey Stengel used to say “You can look it up!” Once again: if your goal is “diversion,” intentional panic and manipulation, is it likely that you would return to the same subjects and say things designed to calm fears? Of course, not.
This is, of course, the tip of the iceberg with regards to Raportul Tismaneanu and much of the common wisdom/consensus inside and outside Romania about the December 1989 Revolution. For an official document supposedly as important as Raportul Tismaneanu, its discussion of the Revolution is–I am sorry–rank amateurism. Romanians deserved better.


Sorin Iliesiu, membru al Comisiei Tismaneanu, ii da replica lui Richard Andrew Hall, un pretins analist al CIA, prezentat victorios in ZIUA de Victor Roncea ca fiind un personaj care face praf raportul Tismaneanu. L-am cautat si eu pe Richard Andrew Hall.I-am gasit o pagina de net unde isi publica operele.Si am gasit precizarea:
Richard Andrew Hall holds a BA from the University of Virginia (1988) and a PhD from Indiana University (1997). He joined the CIA in September 2000 and served as a Romanian Political Analyst from October 2000 to April 2001″ Plus precizarea pentru articolele respectivului: Disclaimer: This mate rial has been reviewed by CIA. That review neither constitutes CIA authentification of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author’s views.Adica, tipul a lucrat vreo sapte luni la CIA acum sapte ani, “amanunt” uitat de Roncea care il da si acum angajat la Langley. Oricum daca lucrezi sapte luni la CIA nu e mare lucru. Intrebarea este de ce a fost pus pe liber asa repede.Din sistem iesi repede daca esti incapabil sau sunt dubii in privinta ta. Poate ne va spune Victor Roncea. Sunt de acord ca raportul Tismaneanu are hibe dar inventiile nu fac rau decat celui care le face deoarece ies repede la iveala. Si daca le cauta cineva: nu trebuie decat un search pe google. Greseala si Comisiei Tismaneanu ca nu a verificat identitatea personajului scos la inaintare de Roncea si s-a aruncat in drepturi la replica fara a stii cu cine are de-a face.

Reiau integral protestul lui Sorin Iliesiu:
Sorin Ilieºiu: Drept la replicã la articolul “Raportul Tismaneanu pus la zid de un analist CIA” publicat de “Ziua” în 27 octombrie 2007 În calitate de membru al Comisiei care a elaborat raportul de condamnare a crimelor comunismului ºi de coautor al capitolului despre revoluþie ºi al capitolului Concluzii, sunt îndreptãþit sã fac urmãtoarele comentarii la articolul “Raportul Tismãneanu pus la zid de un analist CIA” – respectiv de d-l Richard Hall, articol publicat de “Ziua” în 27 octombrie 2007:
Domnule Hall, pretindeþi cã sunteþi analist CIA ºi expert în istoria recentã a R omâniei. De ce ignoraþi cã raportul elaborat de comisia coordonatã de prof. Tismãneanu a fost asumat de ºeful statului, fiind declarat document de stat, ºi faptul cã în baza lui s-a fãcut condamnarea crimelor comunismului – cel mai important eveniment din istoria postcomunistã a României, alãturi de aderarea la NATO ºi intergrarea în UE? D-le Hall, în celelalte foste þãri comuniste, condamnarea s-a fãcut fãrã un raport de prezentare a teribilelor crime de care s-a fãcut vinovat comunismul. Condamnarea fãcutã în România în baza unui raport ºtiinþific extrem de detaliat (600 de pagini) are o imensã valoare moralã ºi educativã, reprezentând un model pentru viitoarea condamnare internaþionalã a crimelor comunismului. D-le Hall, de ce nu apreciaþi absolut deloc marile calitãþi ale raportului referitoare la istoria recentã pe care afirmaþi cã aþi cercetat-o. Ca “analist CIA”, de ce nu vedeþi consecinþele benefice ale raportului pentru istoria viitoare?
Subliniez, d-le Hall, cã meritu l raportului ºi al coordonatorului acestuia este recunoscut de numeroºi specialiºti români sau experþi internaþionali precum prof. Tom Gallagher de la Universitatea Bradford din Marea Britanie. Citez din articolul dânsului publicat în România libera, în 14 sept.2007: “Indiferent de criticile aduse unor elemente de detaliu (…) raportul rãmâne un act de pionierat care a plasat România în avanscena istoriografiei postcomuniste din Europa, indispensabil ca urmare a represaliilor trãite de milioane de oameni. (…) Îl asigur pe Vladimir Tismãneanu de întreaga mea consideraþie pentru eforturile domniei sale ºi ale membrilor Comisiei. Atât rezultatele demersului ºtiinþific, cât ºi determinarea sa indomptabilã meritã preþuite – în special în lumina insultelor care i-au fost aduse de elitarii postcomuniºti ºi adepþii acestora din mass-media. Daca raportul va dezvolta o proprie dinamicã de impulsionare, atunci va contribui ºi la (re)evaluarea bilanþului perioadei postcomuniste – dovedindu- se, în final, infinit mai mult decât un act de dreptate fãcutã strict victimelor represiunii. Acesta este ºi motivul pentru care Ion Iliescu devine de-a dreptul apoplectic la auzul numelui Tismãneanu (…). ”. Domnule Hall, de ce nu recunoaºteþi cã raportul are o valoare excepþionalã?
De ce preferaþi, d-le Hall, un atac incalificabil la persoana prof.Tismãneanu ºi ignoraþi cu bunã ºtiinþã meritele academice recunoscute ale acestuia în Statele Unite ºi în România? Chiar nu aþi auzit despre premiul de excelenþã în predarea ºtiinþelor politice acordat de American Political Science Association, premiul Disinguished International Service la Universitatea Maryland, de titlul de doctor honoris causa a douã universitãþi, de lucrãrile devenite clasice, de analizã a comunismului românesc ºi internaþional? De altfel, d-le Hall, acestea au fost raþiunile pentru care ºeful statului l-a numit în fruntea comisiei ºi pentru care membrii acesteia i-au acordat încredere; chiar în ziua respectivei numiri (5 aprilie 2006), în calitate de autor al apelului de condmnare, am declarat public cã “numirea prof.Tismãneanu în fruntea comisiei înseamnã certitudinea cã România va fi prima þarã în care comunismul va fi condamnat aºa cum trebuie.“ Spre cinstea României, aºa a ºi fost. D-le Hall, orice om onest recunoaºte cã raportul este scris cu bunã-credinþã ºi respect pentru adevãr. Cei care nu au citit raportul se vor convinge, întrucât raportul va apare în librãrii peste o lunã, într-o versiune amelioratã care a þinut cont de observaþiile pertinente care s-au fãcut dupã apariþia primei versiuni (aºa cum s-a procedat ºi în cazul raportului Comisiei Wiesel).
Este incredibil, d-le Hall, cã jigniþi demnitatea celor 39 de membri ai comisiei, afirmând cã textul raportului ar fi fost manipulat de prof. Tismãneanu care ar fi scris raportul aproape singur. Precizez cã cele 660 de pagini ale raportului au fost scrise ºi asumate de cei 39 de experþi, reprezentanþi ai societãþii civile ºi disidenþi anticomuniºti, în frunte cu cel mai titrat istoric al României de azi: d-l acad. Alexandru Zub – preºedintele Secþiei de Stiinþe Istorice a Academiei Române. Domnule Hall, este posibil ca asemenea oameni sã fie manipulaþi? Dimpotrivã, profesorul Tismãneanu a fost extrem de receptiv faþã de opiniile colegilor în elaborarea raportului. Trebuie sã vã cereþi scuze faþi de toþi membri comisiei, domnule Hall.
Cea mai mare parte a articolului denigrator al dvs, d-le Hall, încearcã sã demonstreze cã prezentarea revoluþiei din 1989 nu corespunde adevãrului ºi ar fi fãcutã în stil “amatorist” ºi fãrã argumente. Repet: am fãcut parte din grupul care a redactat acest capitol. Menþionez cã una din recomandãrile raportului nostru a fost finalizarea urgentã a cercetãrilor Justiþiei referitoare la revoluþie, inclusiv la masacrul din decembrie 1989, în speranþa cã o viitoare versiune a raportului va putea beneficia de concluziile Justiþiei. Din pãcate, cercetãrile nu sunt finalizate.< BR>Iatã câteva fragmente din Raport, d-le Hall, care infirmã acuzaþiile nedrepte ale dvs.. Îi rog pe cititori sã judece singuri dacã am fost sau nu am fost corecþi:
„România a fost singura þarã din Europa de Est care, în procesul revoluþionar din toamna anului 1989, a înregistrat morþi ºi rãniþi. Anume: 1104 morþi; 162 pânã la 22 decembrie 1989 ºi 942 între 22 ºi 27 decembrie.(…) Revoluþia din 1989 a avut un caracter pronunþat anticomunist. (…) În perioada care a urmat imediat dupã 22 decembrie 1989, grupul care a preluat puterea a deturnat caracterul pronunþat anticomunist al revoluþiei, prin subminarea demonstraþiilor spontane populare anticomuniste, prin cenzurarea mesajelor anticomuniste în cadrul emisiunilor televiziunii, care devenise „cartierul general” al unei „telerevoluþii” în premierã mondialã. Prin televiziune s-au fãcut majoritatea diversiunilor, cea mai eficientã fiind reprezentatã de „pericolul de moarte” omniprezent întruchipat de „teroriºtii fideli dictatoru lui Ceauºescu”; acesta a fost arestat în 22 decembrie, într-o unitate militarã din Târgoviºte. Pericolul pãrea total credibil întrucât în perioada 22-27 decembrie au fost înregistraþi 942 de morþi ºi mii de rãniþi. Majoritatea au fost uciºi ºi rãniþi pe strãzile din centrul capitalei ºi al altor oraºe martirizate ca urmare a acestei diversiuni. Ulterior nu a fost acuzat ºi judecat nici un terorist. (…) Potrivit declaraþiilor generalului-magistrat Dan Voinea care a cercetat, prin Ministerul Justiþiei, evenimentele(…): «În decembrie 1989 scopul era deturnarea caracterului anticomunist al revoluþiei ºi peluarea puterii prin teroarea instalatã». Deturnarea caracterului anticomunist al revoluþiei din decembrie 1989 ºi reprimarea manifestãrilor anticomuniste au constituit acte deliberate de asfixiere a pluralismului democratic ºi tentative de restaurare a unui regim autoritar, de tip dictatorial”.
Cu ce am greºit, domnule Hall? În schimb, dvs. greºiþi fundamental! În articolul dv s., negaþi adevãrul afirmaþiei noastre incluse în citatul de mai sus referitoare la diversiunile extrem de grave fãcute prin TVR în timpul revoluþiei. De ce încercaþi sã-i disculpaþi pe d-l Ion Iliescu ºi pe redactorii TVR? Este de necrezut cã aþi fi “analist CIA” ºi aþi scris recent un studiu “minuþios” despre revoluþie în care nu aþi citat pasajele elocvente din Rechizitoriul Justiþiei române, publicat anterior studiului dvs.. Îi rog pe cititori sã cântãreascã cu maximã atenþie urmãtoarele citate din Rechizitoriul Justiþiei române, spiritul acestora regãsindu-se în Raportul pe care-l contestaþi:
«În primele zile ale evenimentelor – dar ºi dupã aceea – prin declaraþii publice (…) s-a acreditat ideea cã principalii vinovaþi (…) sunt teroriºtii. Întreþinerea acestei diversiuni s-a fãcut prin presã, radio ºi prin crainicul postului de televiziune naþional redactorul ºef Brateº ºi a cãpãtat credibilitate prin afirmaþiile fãcute pe postul TV de cãtre persoane importante ale noii puteri ca de exemplu:
– Ion Iliescu: Acþiunile diversioniste, teroriste, criminale, a grupelor de teroriºti care vor sã împiedice funcþionarea noii puteri ºi sã destabilizeze societatea noastrã. (…) Teroriºtii acþioneazã din clãdirile locuite, chiar din apartamente, (…) este o perfidie fãrã seamãn, o cruzime…(…) Vrem sã vã spunem cã teroriºtii nu sunt în uniformã, ei sunt civili! De multe ori cautã sã creeze confuzie – ºi-au pus ºi banderole ca sã fie confundaþi cu oameni din formaþiunile acestea organizate, cetãþeneºti (o voce: κi pun ºi uniforme sã creeze confuzie! Împuºcã din orice poziþie!) ºi sã creeze confuzie. Împuºcã din orice poziþie. De aceea este important ca cetãþenii (…) sã nu acþioneze pentru cã pot fi confundaþi cu teroriºtii ºi sã cadã victimã confruntãrilor cu unitãþile militare.
– Teodor Brateº (redactor TVR): Sunt grupuri din acestea teroriste organizate care nu vor sã cedeze de bunã voie (o voce: Au armament, sunt fanatici ºi sunt nebuni ca ºi ºeful lor!). …grupuri de teroriºti se îndreaptã de la blocul Turn din Piaþa Palatului spre Radiodifuziunea de pe str. Temiºana, urmând sã se alimenteze cu muniþie în punctele Povernei, Moxa ºi Lemnea. Toþi cei aflaþi în zonã sunt rugaþi sã acþioneze sã nu-i lãsãm (o voce: Sã-i împiedicãm!)».
Citãm în continuare din concluzia Rechizitoriului: «Aºadar, dupã ocuparea mijloacelor de informare în masã, s-a declanºat o vastã operaþiune de diversiune cãreia i-a cãzut victimã populaþia românã. (…) Cetãþenii români nu aveau de unde sã ºtie cã ceea ce se petrece sub ochii lor era de fapt una dintre cele mai mari diversiuni de acest fel din istorie. Dar în lupta pentru putere din acele zile nu interesa faptul cã din cauza diversiunii erau luaþi prizonieri, rãniþi sau uciºi oameni nevinovaþi…».
De ce, domnule Iliescu, aþi fost implicat într-“una dintre cele mai mari diversiuni de acest fel din istorie”? Justiþia românã a dovedit diversiunea “teroriºtii” ºi nu a gãsit nici un tero rist printre morþi, rãniþi sau arestaþi. D-l gen. Dan Voinea spune clar: “Teroriºtii nu au existat. S-a minþit pentru a-i ascunde pe adevãraþii criminali”.
Domnule Hall, nimeni nu a fost judecat pentru cele 942 de crime înfãptuite între 22 ºi 27 decembrie 1989, adicã dupã ce noua putere l-a înlocuit pe Ceauºescu. A fost sau n-a fost diversiune pentru a se justifica deturnarea prin masacru a revoluþiei anticomuniste, domnule Hall? Aºteptãm un rãspuns din partea dvs., care vã recomandaþi analist CIA ºi pretindeþi cã recent aþi cercetat detaliat adevãrul despre masacrul din decembrie 1989.
Sorin Ilieºiu, 30 oct. 2007
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