The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Foreign Intervention (Plan Z-Z)

–It would not be too surprising to find out one day that much of the mystery regarding the terrorists stemmed from the role foreign elements played in the fighting that followed the revolution. (Nestor Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, 1991, p. 64)

INDEED!

from and in association with the following previous publications:

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:” PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 (Part Seven, Foreign Involvement)

not just the physical disappearance of the foreign terrorists was underway in mid-January 1990, but it was already being denied that they had ever existed!

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/anatomy-of-a-cover-up-or-constanta-we-have-a-problem/

Foto: Ion Laurenţiu  Fotografia de mai sus este realizată de Ion Laurenţiu, în sediul CC -PCR, în noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.

http://www.romanialibera.ro/blog/romulus.cristea/fotografii-cu-teroristii-arestati-in-comitetul-central-in-decembrie-1989-si-despre-retinerea-sefului-centrului-de-informatii-externe-248549.html

the above was apparently removed!…lucikly, the following still exist:

image0

fotografiile lui Ion Laurentiu, CC-ul PCR-ului, in noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.

https://plus.google.com/photos/109794872578116972195/albums/5417438035204009089

Au fost sau nu si teroristi straini?!

Se stie prea bine ce zice romanul despre politica si totusi…Dupa ce in primele zile ale revolutiei pe micul ecran, la radio, si n presa s-a spus clar despre participarea unor teroristi straini in actiunile criminale indreptate impotriva poporului nostru, aflam cu uimire, din declaratiile unor oficiali ca acum se dezminte aceasta participare!  Cind atitia si atitia oameni din spitalele tarii au vazut raniti sau morti, teroristi cu fizionomie de strain!  Si acestia au varsat singele nevinovat ai romanilor, au ranit mamelor fiii cei dragi–nu avem voie, in numele nici unor politici din lume, sa ascundem acest adevar?  Cerem sa se declare raspicat si public adevarul! (O.U.) (14 ianuarie 1990, Tineretul Liber, p. 1)

“Asta nu este pentru urechile publicului…” Romania Libera, 4 octombrie 1990, p. 8a.

“Operatiunea ‘Deghizarea’ (IV),” Romania Libera, 19 martie 1992, p. 5a.  Generalul Militaru:

“Va sfatuiesc sa cercetati un detaliu privind vizita lui Ceausescu in Iran:  colonelul Ardeleanu, seful de la USLA, i-a insotit la plecare.  La intoarcere a venit cu o zi mai tirziu, aterizind cu un avion, incarcat cu persoane pe aeroportul Kogalniceanu.  Pe de alta parte, in ziua de 29-30 decembrie, de pe aeroportul Baneasa s-au luat zborul mai multe avioane libiene.  Cu oameni imbarcati.!

Revista “Expres,” nr. 8 23-29 martie 1990, p. 8.

“Unde e Abdul?”  Dan Pavel, 22, nr. 5.

THE MOPPING UP OPERATION BEGAN AS EARLY AS 25 DECEMBER 1989–THE DAY THE CEAUSESCUS WERE EXECUTED.  IT REMAINS UNCLEAR AT THIS POINT IF THE NEW NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT LEADERSHIP WAS COMPLICIT AS THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME IN THE WEEKS THAT FOLLOWED.

Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de Palat:  Capii Complotului Se Dezvlauie,” Baricada, nr. 32, p. 3

Unii “teroristi” au fost evident straini.  Nu este intimplator ca pe 25 decembrie 1989, primul avion sosit cu ajutoare a venit din Libia.  El insa a plecat plin inapoi, incarcat cu persoane.  In haosul aproape total care domnea atunci, Noua Putere nu a stiut de incarcatura, spre Libia a avionului respectiv (care a decolat de pe Otopeni, cind inca aeroportul era inchis pentru trafic).”

More details emerged about this flight late in 1994.

Robert Cullen, “Report from Romania:  Down with the Tyrant,” The New Yorker, 2 April 1990.

Late the next night, Romanian television showed Ceausescu’s corpse, lying in a pool of blood.  After that, the Securitate resistance wilted, although sporadic sniping continued for a week or so.  It turned out that not all of the Securitate fighters were Romanian.  A ranking member of the National Salvation Front told me that about a hundred of them, including some who fought the longest, were from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries with histories of involvement in terrorism.  They had come to Romania ostensibly as exchange students, but had in fact received commando training.  In return, they agreed to serve the Securitate for several years.  As these foreigners were captured, and rumors–accurate ones–about their origins began to spread, the Front publicly denied that any Arabs had been involved with the Securitate.  It did so because it wished to avoid any trouble in relations with the Arab world, the Front official explained.  I asked what would become of the captured Arab commandos, and he responded by silently drawing his index finger across his throat.

CONTACT WITH QADDAFI

Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland – A telephone contact took place between the brother leader of the revolution (Qaddafi) and Ion Iliescu, President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation in Rumania in order to set his mind at rest with regard to the progress of the popular revolution there.

The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation reassured the brother leader of the revolution regarding the successful progress of the popular revolution in Rumania. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation saluted the attitudes of the great Al-Fatih revolution and the Libyan Arab people to the people of Rumania and its revolution. President Iliescu informed the brother leader of the revolution that the popular revolutionary leadership does not believe the rumors about the participation of Arabs in the fighting against the popular revolution and said that those rumors were spread by enemies in order to influence our morale, the progress of the popular revolution, and our friendship with the Arabs.

President Iliescu confirmed to the brother leader of the revolution that authority will be that of the people because the popular revolution was carried out by the whole Rumanian people.

President Iliescu expressed his thanks for and appreciation of the Libyan Arab people for the urgent humanitarian assistance provided by air to the Rumanian people.

http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/29/world/upheaval-in-the-east-news-reports-excerpts-from-broadcasts-and-a-press-dispatch.html

Angela Bacescu with the Libyan ambassador to Romania Abu Ghula, Europa (Est/Vest), no. 94, September 1992, pp. 14-15

The Libyan ambassador discusses how on 25 or 26 December 1989 the then Libyan ambassador went on Romanian television to deny the rumors of Libyans fighting.  “What is more, he called for the delivery of any Libyan terrorirsts [!]”  On 29 or 30 December, Colonel Khadaffi addressed the Romanian people by satellite.  “Libya sent 4 planes with humanitarian aid (food, beds, medicine) that landed at Otopeni airport, were unloaded and then returned empty to Libya [interesting that he should have to specify that they returned empty to Libya].”

Pe 28 decembrie am predat patru cetateni de nationalitate araba.  Aveau pasaport, Republica Iraq. 

Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17. (syndicated copy above)

WASHINGTON — Romanian despot Nicolae Ceausescu got some help last-minute help from a soul mate who is now embarrassed about coming to the aid of a loser.  Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to prop up Ceausescu by sending Iranian security goons to Romania to protect him.  Ceausescu’s three-day visit to Iran while his troops massacred dissidents at home contributed to the foment that eventually overthrew him.  Rafsanjani’s embrace of the Romanian dictator on that trip has not helped his stock with the Western diplomatic community. Iranian and Romanian sources and intelligence sources now tell us what went on behind the scenes when Ceausescu was in Iran. He flew to Tehran on Dec 18 while his troops were brutally putting down a riot in the Romanian city of Timisoara. The day before, Ceausescu’s secret police had used tanks and machine guns to open fire on crowds of demonstrators. Hundreds of men women and children were murdered. The battle continued while Ceausescu was being welcomed by an elated Rafsanjani. In his first six months as president of Iran, no other head of state had bothered to visit. The two men openly conferred about trade issues. Romania has been a major trading partner with Iran, and their business amounted to about $1.8 billion last year.  Ceausescu had become so enamored of Iran, according to Romanian sources, that in November he secretly deposited millions of dollars in gold for safekeeping in Iranian banks. He mistrusted Western banks after seeing some of them freeze the ill-gotten gain of another opportunist Ferdinand Marcos. On the second day of his visit to Tehran, Ceausescu placed a wreath on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini. In doing so, he became the only head of state to kiss up to Khomeini after death.  In retrospect, it was a kiss of death back home.  That night, with word that the demonstrations were out of control in Romania, Ceausescu begged Rajsanjani for help.  Rafsanjani supplied some of his most loyal Iranian bodyguards to protect Ceausescu on his return.  The next day, Dec 20, a contingent of Iranian Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard, secretly flew to Bucharest. Two days later, when the Romanian army turned against Ceausescu’s security police. the despot knew it was over.  He and his wife Elena fled Bucharest but were captured by peasants. Meanwhile, Timisoara was still a battleground where eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed the forces were not all Romanians.  According to some witnesses, Iranians or Libyans were doing some of the shooting. Similar reports of Iranian and Libyan snipers came from the industrial city of Craiova. In a two-hour secret trial on Christmas Day, the Ceausescus were convicted of genocide of 60,000 Romanians and theft of more than billion. “You should have stayed in Iran where you had flown to, the prosecutor told them. “We do not stay abroad,” Elena Ceausescu said. “This is our home.” The two were executed by firing squad. Rafsanjani was fit to be tied. He was embarrassed about helping Ceausescu at the end because he feared it would jeopardize trade arrangements with the new Romanian government. Rafsanjani dismissed his ambassador to Romania for not telling him about the power of the anti-Ceausescu forces in time to spare Iran the humiliation of hosting a has-been.

in relation to Ceausescu’s trip to Iran, from Orwellian…Positively Orwellian

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go? What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]? Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator? If not for that reason, why? Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released. The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be. It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia. But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original]

http://rendszervaltas.mti.hu/Pages/News.aspx?se=1&wo=pasdaran&sd=19890101&ed=19901231&sp=0&ni=231602&ty=1


Irán – Románia – fegyveres gárdisták

Bagdad, 1990. január 2. kedd (MTI/AFP)- A Modzsahedin Khalk (Népi Modzsahedin) elnevezésű iráni ellenzéki szervezet irodája Bagdadból közleményt juttatott el kedden az MTI-hez. Ebben a szervezet Iránból származó – pontosan meg nem nevezett – forrásokra hivatkozva közli: amikor Romániában kiéleződtek a belső harcok, december 20-án Rafszandzsani iráni elnök utasítására fegyveres gárdát (pasdaran) küldtek Bukarestbe a Ceausescu-rendszer védelmére.A december 19-i romániai véres összecsapást követően
Rafszandzsani és Ceausescu december 19-én este Teheránban állapodott
meg abban, hogy a gárdistákat sürgősen átdobják – írja a Modzsahedin
Khalk közleménye. A bagdadi székhelyű szervezet a hír hitelességének
alátámasztására hét, Romániába küldött gárdistát név szerint is
megemlít: Morteza Hazveh, Szejed Reza Arai, Mohaved Tezar-Parto
Dezfuli, Masszud Orei, Szejed Ali-Aszgar Szadegi, Morteza Nikokar,
és M. Szalamati.Az AFP bagdadi irodájának jelentése szerint az iráni ellenzéki
szervezet azonos tartalmú közleményt juttatott el hozzájuk, s ezt a
francia hírügynökség kedden nyilvánosságra hozta.+++1990. január 2., kedd 13:37

Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul Z-Z si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 septembrie 1990.

Dupa citeva saptamini presedintele unei tari direct implicate a amenintat guvernul roman ca va recurge la represalii impotriva celor citeva mii de cetateni romani aflati cu contract de munca in tara respectiva daca nu vor fi returnati teroristii straini, vii sau morti.  Santajul respectiv si-a facut efectul si un avion romanesc a efectuat o cursa mai putin obisnuita catre un aeroport polonez, de unde o “incarcatura” mai putin obisnuita constind in persoane valide, raniti si cosciuge a fost transferata pe un alt avion, plecand intr-o directie necunoscuta.  In ziua aceea se stergeau orice urme ale planului “Z-Z”

24 ianuarie 1990

Mircea Dinescu:

De când erau în Cehoslovacia… Simulatoarele imitau mitralierele, soldaţii trăgeau uşurel, cu gloanţe în infraroşu, eu am văzut, erau împuşcaţi numai în frunte, aşa: în C.C., în întuneric! Numai acolo-ntr-o oră au fost împuşcaţi şaişpe inşi. Numai pe lumină stinsă, în frunte, doar erau profesionişti, erau băieţi care… aveau arme speciale cu lunetă! A existat şi o echipă specială care-l păzea pe Ceauşescu şi erau Arabi. Erau de-ai lui Araffat. Erau libieni, care au fost arestaţi de ai noştri, dar în acea vreme lucrau în Libia lui Gadaffi vreo zece mii de români. Ăla, terorist de rang mondial, a ameninţat că dacă nu li-se dă drumul imediat, ne împuşcă compatrioţii! A apărut şi la televiziunea lor, se ştie… Vă daşi seama ce ieşea? Şi le-a dat drumul înapoi, şi gata.

Eugen Evu despre un glont vidia, decembrie 1989, Hunedoara I

9 ianuarie 1990; 11-17 ianuarie 1990

“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor.  Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare.  Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122″ chema indicativele “49″, “38″, “89″, “11″, “82″, “44″, “38″, “84″, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00″.  La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare.  Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine.  S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere.  Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti?  Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo?  Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor.  Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?”
Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), mai 1990.)

Foreign Involvement

So far in this piece, we have seen references to the arrest or killing as “terrorists” of the following as apparent foreigners, notably Arabs:  1) the arrest of one with a PSL in Bucharest, 2) the arrest of another with a PSL, apparently somewhere near Brasov, 3) the revelations of soldiers who killed and arrested several in the Pantelimon area of Bucharest (I will consider these two revelations one and the same for our purposes here).  Years after the Revolution, there are still claims that Arabs were captured elsewhere:  in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”[81] Later we will see reports written by two Securitate officers immediately after the events—apparently required of them by Army officials—attesting to the killing of Arab “terrorists” in the area around the Defense Ministry building in Bucharest. We shall also see how a weapon registered to a member of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate just happened to show up in the hands of a man with a Libyan passport in his billfold who was shot in the Central Committee building in Bucharest on the night of 22 December.

Indeed, the presence and activity of these foreign, apparently mostly Arab terrorists, was almost prosaic.  Liviu Viorel Craciun (appropriately enough craciun means “Christmas”), the so-called “First Interior Minister of the Revolution” in one of the protogovernments that tried to form in the CC after the Ceausescus fled and—a source of much confusion in research on the events (more on this below)—a former USLA officer until 1986, reported that on 28 December 1989:  “…in the morning five cadavers were collected and a rough count was made, out of the five terrorist cadavers found in the street, two belonged to Arab mercenaries…The shot terrorists could not be identified and they did not seem to interest anyone.”[82]

So what was the role of foreigners, specifically Arabs, in the Revolution?  Interesting in this regard is a report dated 1 March 1990 by Lt-Colonel Ion Aurel Rogojan, who in 1989 was Securitate Director General Vlad’s chief of cabinet staff.  As B. Mihalache speculates somebody must have been interested in this question, “since Rogojan was ordered to write a report on it.”[83] Rogojan wrote in his 1 March 1990 report that he “has knowledge of the fact that between the Department of State Security and the ‘Al Fatah’ Security [service] of the Palestinian Liberation Organization there existed relations of cooperation based on a protocol.”  Rogojan continues in this report:

“At the same time, some activities for the training of USLA cadres abroad were carried out (the group was led by reserve colonel Firan, former chief of general staff of the mentioned unit).  The protocol was established in the period 1979-1980 and a copy can be found in the protocol relations division of the former Independent Judicial Secretariat Service of the DSS [i.e. Securitate].  In connection with the existence of this protocol, I was asked in recent weeks, by Colonel Ardeleanu Gheorghe, USLA Commander.  The Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare was coordinated on behalf of the DSS’ Executive Bureau by General-Colonel Iulian Vlad in the period 1977-1987, and after that by Secretary of State General-Major Alexie Stefan and Deputy Minister Major General Bucurescu Gianu.  In the USLA there existed a special detachment for antiterrorist intervention, organized in three shifts and subordinated to the chief of the general staff.  I don’t have any data concerning the activity of the USLA in the period of the December ’89 events.”[84]

It should also be abundantly clear here that Rogojan was being asked to write not just about the role of outside forces, but specifically about the role of the USLA in December 1989.  Once again, why such interest in the USLA?

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go?  What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]?  Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator?  If not for that reason, why?  Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released.  The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be.  It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia.  But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original][85]

We know from the revelations of a former worker (engineer Hristea Todor) at the Securitate’s special unit “P,” that the new Front leadership was sufficiently suspicious of Arab presence that “General Militaru referred to the transfer of some units from the MI and Securitate to the Defense Ministry.  He said the USLA had transformed into terrorists.  The electronic (telephone) surveillance of certain objectives was started up again—in particular Arab embassies.”[86] (Note:  this appears yet another reference to the aforementioned meeting at USLA headquarters on the evening of 25 December.)  Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.[87]

Notably, of course, with these exceptions, the former Securitate and their apologists—whom as Army General Urdareanu suggests uniformly don’t believe in the existence of real terrorists in December 1989, yet who love to blame foreign interference for Ceausescu’s overthrow (in particular, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews)—do not like to make reference to or talk about “Arab terrorists.”

Further evidence of the involvement of “Arab terrorists” comes from the behavior in late December 1989, as much as the later statements, of the usually garrulous Silviu Brucan.  In August 1990, Brucan would allege the involvement of “some 30 foreigners,” according to him, mostly Palestinian, who had been trained by the Securitate—what Michael Shafir termed “the first admission of foreign intervention by a member of the December 1989 leadership.”[88] Reminiscent of Tanasescu’s curt response to the reporter’s question about the involvement of foreign terrorists (discussed above)—“I ask that you be so kind as to…” not ask me about this—back on 29 December 1989, Brucan, at the time a key decision-maker in the new Front leadership (he would leave in February), told Le Monde that the issue was “very delicate” and “involving diplomatic implications that must still be worked out”; “better to be cautious,” he opined.[89] That was, of course, no denial; indeed, it sounds like the new leadership was trying to find a solution to the dilemma they found themselves in.

Suspicion, in particular, surrounded the role of Libyans, which, as we have seen, at the very least, somehow found themselves in areas of gunfire in December.  Sergiu Nicolaescu claims—I have been unable to verify this—that of all the countries to recognize the new National Salvation Front government, running to the top of the line to be first was…Qadafi’s Libya![90] The “anonymous plotters” who leaked information to Liviu Valenas of Baricada in August 1990 maintained that “It isn’t accidental that on 25 December 1989, the first plane bringing aid came from Libya.  However, when it went on its return route it was loaded with people.  In the almost complete chaos that dominated at the time, the New Power [i.e. the Front] did not know what the plane to Libya was carrying (it left from Otopeni, when the airport was still closed to traffic).”[91] In 1994, two journalists specified that the plane in question on the 25th was a DC9 and that “40 Arabs” had been loaded aboard, and noted that they had learned that on 28-29 December 1989, “the [Otopeni’s] airport archive had disappeared.”[92]

Michael Shafir at Radio Free Europe Research at the time noted in October 1990 that “unconfirmed but very reliable military and governmental Romanian sources interviewed by RFE said that shortly after the capture of Palestinians, Libyans, and other Arabs who had fought on the side of pro-Ceausescu forces, Quadhafi had threatened to kill all Romanian specialists in Libya if the Arabs were not allowed to leave Romania.”[93] Certainly, this is what Constantin Vranceanu hinted at in September 1990 in Romania Libera when he wrote of “Plan Z-Z”—according to him, “practically an alliance, on many levels, including military between Romania and several other countries with totalitarian regimes (Iran, Libya, Syria), to which was added the PLO…which called for the other parties to intervene with armed forces to reestablish state order when one of the leaderships was in trouble”:

“Several weeks after 22 December, the president of one of the countries directly involved threatened the Romanian government that it would make recourse to reprisals against those several thousand Romania citizens who were working in that country if [the Romanian government] did not return the foreign terrorists, [whether] alive or dead.  This blackmail worked and a Romanian plane went on an unusual route to a Polish airport, from where the ‘contents,’ unusually including the able-bodied, wounded, and coffins, were transferred to another plane, that took off in an unknown direction.”[94]

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch.  This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’  I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people.  And I was told:  Only you and two other people know this.  I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]

Relatedly, in July 1990, Liviu Valenas noted that,

“On 24 January 1990, the new Foreign Minister of Romania announced on Television and Radio that a series of secret treaties between the R.S.R. [Romanian Socialist Republic] and third countries had been abrogated, and are no longer valid and operational for the new Romania.  The New Power pledged to deal with these countries concerning Romania’s obligations through the abrogation of these accords.  An ambiguous text, apparently launched by Sergiu Celac’s group,led public opinion in Romania to believe that these treaties concerned ‘terrorist assistance.’”[96]

It is noteworthy that in the context of a series entitled “The Truth about the U.S.L.A.,” (more on this infamous series below), Horia Alexandrescu paused on 14 March 1990 to quote from a 1 February article by another journalist about TAROM flight 259 (to Warsaw and back):

“24 January, 4 PM:  After the aircraft was inspected [“controlul antiterorist”] (after the Revolution of 22 December, ,soimi’ as those who performed antiterrorist protection [i.e. USLA] were called by the pilots, were removed from both internal and external TAROM flights, even though all airlines have such teams), the plane left for Bucharest.  Meanwhile, however, the 45 Lebanese [sic. ? Libyan] passengers, who had gotten off for 5-6 hours in a layover at Otopeni, wanted to cross ‘the Polish border.’”[97]

According to Alexandrescu, the Polish authorities would not allow the TAROM plane to leave Poland, so it sat on the runway in Warsaw…until a second TAROM plane came—this time, according to Alexandru, including “uslasi”—the moral of the story of course being that the USLA needed to be put back on flights as soon as possible.[98] It is possible this is the plane Vranceanu was referring to in the quotation above.  One thing’s for sure, this seemingly insignificant incident got unusual media coverage, in particular with regard to the USLA.

Not surprisingly, in June 2006, Prosecutor General Dan Voinea reiterated his contention that there was no foreign involvement/intervention in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution!

image-18image-17image-16image-15

…i s-a gasit in portofel un pasaport libian…

[81] Mirel Paun, “Ion Capatana:  ‘Argeseni, va cer scuze ca am participat la Revolutie!” Cotidianul Argesul, 5/8/05 online at http://www.cotidianul-argesul.ro.

[82] Interestingly and notably, Craciun, who attempted in these days to form a political party with other revolutionaries, bitterly describes how the vague language that emerged in Front declarations by the ultimatum of the 27th—suggesting anyone without authorization was prohibited from carrying an arm—allowed the rump party-state that was the Front to essentially crush any alternative nascent groups of anti-communist opposition.  That said, it is important to point out that Craciun had no doubt as to the existence of the “terrorists” that fought in these days; he describes matters as follows:  “…for five days they fought against the last partisans of the ‘Conducator’ [i.e. Ceausescu], the terrorists who attacked every night, using secret tunnels that allowed them to communicate between different government buildings.  The battlefield was well-defined:  Piata Republicii, on the one hand, the Presidential Palace, to which the terrorists would repair, on the other.”  See Liviu Viorel Craciun, with Horatiu Firica, “Destainuirile unui ministru de interne,” Zig-Zag, no. 70, 71, 72 (July and August 1991), p. 6, quotes from issue no. 72.

Soldiers entered the tunnels of the former Central Committee building, with Major Gheorghe Grigoras and Nicolae Grigoras, of the special unit for antiterrorist warfare [i.e. USLA].  The museum curator Dan Falcan relates the findings of the soldiers as follows:

“…in the basement of the building they found a tunnel, not very long, that descended into a type of barracks.  There were eight rooms with folding beds.  These rooms gave way to many hallways, one leading to the second floor of the building.  Via another hallway a larger bunker 7 meters deep could be reached.  This led to an armored door and a spacious apartment, 9 meters deep.  The soldiers found a room with a ventilation system and from there found a new corridor.  After going approximately 30 meters the soldiers noticed an alcove with a large trunk, in which there were 16 rubber rafts with pumps.  Twenty meters forward they found another room with synthetic…10 meters further and they were under water….  Following reconnaissance it was discovered that there were exits to 80 objectives in Bucharest, such as the ASE building, the Enescu House, the Romanian Opera, etc….”  (Sorin Golea, “Cai de navigatie secrete sub Bucuresti,” Libertatea, 22 December 2002, online edition, originally accessed at http://news.softpedia.com/news/1/2002/December/1913.shtml.)

[83] B. Mihalache, Romania Libera, 19 December 2004, online edition.

[84] Document reproduced in E. O. Ohanesian, “Pe stil vechi-colonel de securitate, pe stil nou-general NATO,” Romania Libera, 8 April 2004, online edition.

[85] Marian Romanescu with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si Fratii Musulmani,” Expres, no. 26 (2-8 July 1991), p. 8.  In no.8 (23-30 March 1990) Expres p. 8, Cornel Nistorescu wrote in “Tot Felul,”

“Our compatriots tried and are trying to sell a lie:  that the USLA had no role in guarding the dictator.  Mr. General Stanculescu, we communicate publicly to you something you know:  that every time Ceausescu went out in Bucharest, in each convoy there was an USLA team.  And for Ceausescu’s visit to Iran on flight RO 247 of 9 December to Istanbul and on to Tehran were the following:  Mortoriu Aurel, Ardeleanu Gheorghe, Bucuci Mihai, Ivan Gelu, Grigore Corneliu, Floarea Nicolae, Rotar Ion and Grecu Florin.  These weren’t diplomats and they weren’t going for a snack.”

[86] “Marturii din 23 decembrie,” Ziua , 23 December 2005, online edition.

[87] Gheorghe Ratiu, interview by Ilie Neacsu (episode 17), Europa, 7-22 March 1995, cited in Hall 1997, p. 366.

[88] See Michael Shafir, “Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past,” Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 1, no. 41 (12 October 1990), p. 36.

[89] Quoted in Shafir, “Preparing for the Future,” p. 37, fn. 35; also FBIS, 30 December 1989, for the last quote.

[90] See Sergiu Nicolaescu, Revolutia:  inceputul adevarului (Bucharest:  Editura TOPAZ, 1995), concluding chapter.  The Libyan ambassador gave a hasty statement on Romanian Television on 25 December 1989, becoming the first foreign ambassador to recognize the new government, according to Valenas et. al. (see next note #91, and Ratesh 1991, pp. 65-66).  According to FBIS, Bucharest’s Domestic Service on 30 December 1989 announced Dumitru Mazilu of the Front had met with “Qadafi’s representative.”

[91] See Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de palat din Romania:  Capii complotului dezvaluie,” Baricada, no. 32 (21 August 1990), p.3.  The speculation by Ratesh that the “anonymous plotters” were “surely Brucan and Militaru” seems correct; in fact, their photos appear in the center of the article, see Nestor Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution (New York:  Praeger, 1991), p. 65. Ion Cristoiu maintained in 1993 that, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, a key figure in the early Front, had then recently told him, that the British photo journalist (Ian Parry) who perished in the still murky incident surrounding the shooting down of an AN-24 on 28 December 1989, “had stayed at the ‘Hotel National’ and discovered, it appears, on a list many Libyans.” See Constantin Iftime, Cu ION CRISTOIU prin infernul contemporan (Bucharest:  Edtirua Contraria, 1993), pp. 31-32.

[92] Toma Roman, jr. and Lucia Stefanovici, “In 25 decembrie 1989, un avion DC9 venit din Libia as scos din tara 40 de arabi, la ordinul unui ‘emanat,’” Flacara, no 43 (25-31 October 1994), p. 6.

[93] Shafir, “Preparing the Past,” p. 37, fn. 35.

[94] Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul ,Z-Z’ si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 September 1990, p. 3.  The information was given, according to Vranceanu, to him by a high-level anonymous political personality and supposedly confirmed by people of high-rank in the Securitate.  Vranceanu claimed he was told Soviet pressure led the countries involved to renounce fulfilling their end of the agreement.

[95] Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990.  I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.

[96] Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de palat din Romania:  Enigma ,teroristilor (I),’ Baricada, no. 29 (31 July 1990), p. 3.  Once again, I am unsure of the accuracy of the date used here, this time by Valenas.

[97] Horia Alexandrescu, “Adevarul despre U.S.L.A.:  Pornind de la ,Odiseea Zborului RO-259’,” Tineretul Liber, 14 March 1990, p.4.  He is quoting Rodica Dumitrescu’s article in Lumea, no. 5 (1 February 1990).

[98] I should add here:  they actually returned to airport duties in July 1990, but not before protests by airport employees.

Arabesque II: Arab Terrorists in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution

ARABESQUE: Arab Terrorists in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution

Those who participated in the events of December 1989 are not dumb.  They know they saw what they saw and heard what they heard.  They know the difference between a Roma (Gypsy, tigan), a Hungarian, and an Arab (although the common erroneous confusion of Iranians as Arabs inevitably creeps in).

Marcus I.

Revolutia ne-au furat-o altii. Noi generatia in blugi si adidasi am inceput aceasta revolutie impotriva tiranului am invins si am fost dati la o parte de altii. Unde sunt teroristii libieni? Eu personal am vazut doi prinsi dezarmati de arme necunoscute noua si arestati de militarii romani. Vorbeau stricat romaneste cu accent arab. Cui i-au fost predati?
Am fost la televiziune… Cine a tras asupra noastra si cine vroia sa cucereasca postul national de televiziune? De ce se spune acum ca nu au existat ofiteri de securitate fanatici care au luptat si au fost loiali dictatorului?
De ce se spune acum ca nu au existat teroristi? Nu contest ca au fost si situatii nefericite cand datorita dezinformarii militarii au tras unii in altii… Dar astea au fost cazuri izolate.
Am avut noroc ca Armata Romana ni s-a alaturat la indemnul nostru “ARMATA E CU NOI”, altfel varsarea de sange ar fi fost mai mare.
Si acum dupa 20 de ani se ascunde adevarul despre REVOLUTIA ROMANA…
Am fost acolo… am vazut tot… pe mine nu ma poate prosti nimeni…
DUMNEZEU SA-I ODIHNEASCA IN PACE PE TOTI EROII NOSTRII DIN 89…

http://ligamilitarilor.ro/eroii-neamului/recunostinta-eroilor-revolutiei-din-%E2%80%9989-timisoara/

revolutia mea (2) (Miercuri, 21 decembrie 2011, 21:09)gigi marga [anonim]

(continuare)

2 – Cred ca era pe 23… “teroristii straini activau”; Cineva m-a rugat sa merg sa-l intalnesc undeva in centru Brasovului, dincolo de primarie. Cand am ajuns langa un mic cimitir acolo (langa cimitirul actual al eroilor) soldatii tocmai reusisera sa prinda un individ care semanase panica in zona cu un PSL (pusca luneta) si se ascundea in cimitir. L-au scos de acolo si ii trageau bocanci peste tot pana cand a venit un ofiter/locotenent parca, moment in care eram si eu aproape. M-am uitat bine la “prizonier” – avea figura de arab, nu vorbea deloc desi cred ca stia/intelegea romaneste, era bine echipat, camuflaj, bine facut parea un mercenar. Ofiterul in cauza a incercat sa-l interogheze fara succes, dupa ce a anuntatse captura la superiori, dar in scurt timp a venit un camion in care s-au suit si l-au dus la “cazarma”; ei stiu unde.
In zilele urmatoare am tot asteptat sa vad/aud/citesc cine era individul/teroristul in cauza!? Am asteptat eu mult si bine pana mi s-au lungit urechile ca la iepuri si atunci m-am hotarat relativ subit ca e momentul sa trag cortina, sa ma duc si sa-mi traiesc viata in pace pe meleaguri mai “normale” (asa am visat eu mereu si visul nu ti-l poate lua nimeni!)

Un Craciun Fericit!
la toata lumea (exclus teroristii, ucigasii, hotzii, pungashii si probabil politicienii)

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-10999290-.htm?nomobile

Bitch_in_Red
15th December 2005, 22:06

tomaso, eu te cred si apreciez ca inca mai crezi in ceea ce ai vazut si simtit. Asa sa-ti ajute Dumnezeu!

Eu am numai 2 episoade scurte:
– in 22 seara era sa ma impuste un idiot matol pulbere care cica tocmai se pregatea sa traga intr-un terorist care la o distanta de aprox. 500m sau ma mult, la ultimul etaj al unui bloc de 10 etaje, tragea salve in aer! si eu tocmai am ajuns acolo tocmai cand el lua tinta (ochea), si ca atare s-a intors brusc, speriat, si putin a lipsit sa nu-mi puna un plumb in cap. N-am stiut ca-i pulbere pana cand nu s-a miscat si a deschis gura… ulterior am mers la biserica si am aprins o lumanare multumindu-i Celui de Sus din inima ca a avut grija de mine!
– pe la data de 24 parca, am fost martora vizuala cand soldatii au capturat un lunetist arab (brunet si vorbea stricat romaneste) – folosea vestita Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta (PSL – parca romaneasca) modificata din ak47. Sunt sigura ca fusese folosita, si nu pentru a-l ajuta la deplasare. L-au suit intr-un camion si l-au dus cica la comandamentul unui oras mare (Brasov). Ulterior s-a spus peste tot ca NU au fost implicate forte straine, sau daca au fost, ca nu exista nici un fel de urme care sa dovedeasca asta. Pentru mine a fost momentul in care am inceput sa cred ca inghit o gogoasa cu ulei impotriva vointei mele;
Ulterior am inceput sa puke.gif si am plecat. Oricum, eu am rabdat ceva mai mult timp ca tine tomaso wink.gif insa din pacate nu cred ca o sa ma mai loveasca vreodata dorul atat de tare incat sa revin…

Si apropo’ in cariera mea, nu am putut sa pun niciodata, una linga alta “securist” si “baiat de treaba”… eventual “securist” si “bataie de treaba”. Evident, ca anumite chestii se vad diferit din alte perspective, mai ales atunci cand ai rude, prieteni care au fugit sau sarit “pârleazul” inca de pe vremea nanasului…

http://forum.softpedia.com/lofiversion/index.php/t96198.html

“AM DAT NAS IN NAS CU ARABII”
“Si inainte de 1989 am fost un mare pasionat al muntelui. Asa i-am cunoscut pe cei de la statia meteo de pe Tarcu. Ei mi-au dat caseta cu inregistrarile acelea din zilele revolutiei. Am incercat o traducere cu studentii mei de la Facultatea de Medicina. In mare parte, am reusit sa dezleg misterul, dar, din pacate, mai exista pasaje pe care inca nu am reusit sa le deslusesc. Pot doar sa va spun, cu toata convingerea, ca teroristi arabi au existat, in Timisoara, in perioada decembrie 1989. I-am vazut cu ochii mei langa fosta Policlinica cu plata. In plus, imediat dupa evenimentele de atunci, in pasul Sercaia, in timp ce faceam fotografii, am dat nas in nas cu indivizi ce aveau alura de arabi, imbracati in haine militare romanesti. Cred ca acolo era o tabara de antrenament”
dr. Adrian Siniteanu

http://www.jurnalul.ro/special/libienii-pe-frecventa-revolutiei-la-timisoara-53715.htm

Teroriştii libieni. Teroriştii libieni au plecat cu 2 avioane de pe Otopeni, în 27 decembrie 1989, ă, ’90. Teroriştii sirieni şi alţi arabi erau printre noi şi majoritatea au rămas printre noi. Erau studenţi, cum spunem noi, cu acoperire. Conserva. Teroriştii interni. Teroriştii interni au fost în primul rînd trupele speciale ale lui Ceauşescu, care îl şi purtau pe Ceauşescu la gît. Unul dintre ei este celebrul mort în revoluţie, care acuma îmi scapă numele, care pe masa de operaţie, sub narcoză spunea: “Unde-i tătucul să-mi dea gloanţe să trag?” Da, mă rog, acuma…

V.P. Spune:

august 5, 2010 at 1:33 pm

Interesant ca langa cadavrul lui Iosif Costinas au gasit ambalaj de la diazepam, asa cum s-au gasit si in cazul enoriasului lui Tokes, a carui cadavru a fost descoperit intr-o padure de langa Timisoara, cu cateva luni inainte de decembrie 1989. Oare cu adevarat s-au sinucis amandoi, sau mai degraba au fost ‘sinucisi’? Iar despre teroristii libieni sau arabi care au plecat de la Otopeni, mai multi martori sustin ca asa a fost….Normal ca ambasadorul Siriei sau Libiei, sau al nu stiu carei tara a avut pe-acolo teroristi ar da in judecata Romania daca s-ar spune ceva oficial in legatura cu asta…Ca doar n-o fi prost ca sa sustina ca oamenii lor au fost implicati atat de bine in ‘evenimentele’ din Romania…

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/07/07/culisele-revolutiei-6/

Căderea lui Gadaffi ar putea lămuri unele mistere din 1989

Întrebat ce părere are despre revoluționarii care cer indemnizații mai mari, Dinescu a spus tranșant că sunt niște profitori, la fel ca Grigore Cartianu. ”Acest individ trăiește din sângele Revoluției, ceea ce este tot o formă de a profita de sacrificiul unor oameni. Este o rușine pentru istorici, că nu s-a găsit altul care să lămurească lucrurile. Știm câte țiitoare a avut Ștefan cel Mare și  nu știm ce s-a întâmplat în 21-22 decembrie 1989… De pildă, s-a spus că au fost libieni, îmbrăcați în salopete. După căderea lui Gadaffi ar trebui să se solicite date din arhive. Erau sute de militari libieni la antrenament în România, exact cum s-au folosit, acum, mercenari străini în Libia. Și au fost răniți, există mărturii din spitalele de urgență. Gadaffi a amenințat că dacă nu le dă drumul, îi arestează pe cei 10.000 de români care lucrau în Libia, în acel moment. Așa că un avion cu soldați libieni a plecat în decembrie la Tripoli. Aștept ca istoricii să afle adevărul, să nu mai vină toți amatorii cu scorneli despre Revoluție”.

http://www.dcnews.ro/2011/12/dinescu-ii-cere-lui-patriciu-demiterea-lui-cartianu-%E2%80%9Dun-profitor-al-revolu%C8%9Biei%E2%80%9D/

teroristi in combinezon negru au fost retinuti inclusiv in arestul unuitatilor militare din Focsani. ne cereau tigari de dupa gratii si erau calmi si nu stiau limba romana. noi, simpli soldati le aratam cartusele din incarcator in locul tigarilor. asta e adevarul. apoi s-au volatilizat la ordin “de sus”.

1. teroristi la Focani in arest 10:16 | 20 Iulie

luul

http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/au-recunoscut-ca-au-tras-la-revolutie-142447.html

Au fost teroristi!!!!! 11:49:22, 22 Dec 2010

Stefan : Cateva intrebari: 1. Care a fost primul diplomat strain care a aparut la TVR, nu cumva ambasadorul libian….dupa aceasta interventie au disparut din spitale, etc toate persoanele care trebuiau sa dispara (au fost transportati cu masini utilizate pentru transportul painii) si dusi la Otopeni. Dupa aceasta data au incetat si luptele….O parte din teroristi ( in special libieni, palestinieni, etc.)erau din taberele de antrenament de la Cincu unde erau coordonati si antrenati de ofiteri romani contra cost in special pentru lupte de comando si in schimbul unoor tratate speciale cu tarile arabe.

25 – Repet ca intre anii 1982-1984 am lucrat contractual exclusiv cu cetateni straini, libieni, pregatiti in Romania ca specialisti pentru industria militara!;

26 – In decembrie 1989, la Revolutie, in Brasov, unii dintre acesti libieni s-au aflat printre cei care au tras de la ultimele doua etaje ale hotelului Capitol in brasovenii manifestanti;

27 – Desi prinsi de catre Armata, acei tragatori libieni au fost uterior eliberati;

28 – Cetatenii brasoveni cunosc aceste situatii;

Brasov, 28 august 2006 Autor – Ioan Ghise, deputat liberal’

http://www.amosnews.ro/2006/index.phtml?name=Comments&pid=0&sid=184440&req=Reply

The greatest fury appears to be directed at agents of the elite anti-terrorist squads, known by their Romanian initials, USLA, who are blamed for the worst of the shooting here.

The anger in the streets has been further inflamed by constantly repeated but never verified rumors that Ceausescu loyalists are being aided by foreign mercenaries, variously described as Asian or Arab–Libyan, Palestinian or Syrian. These reports have made many Romanians suspicious of nearly all foreigners.

Ceausescu reportedly had provided training grounds in the countryside for terrorist groups, and he had maintained close security links with North Korea and some hard-line Arab states.

Reuters news agency quoted Lt. Col. Georges Ionesco as saying that six men killed in Saturday night fighting were believed to be Syrians, and a Reuters photographer visiting a Bucharest hospital quoted medical personnel as saying that some of the Securitate men they had treated were Arabs.

A British Broadcasting Corp. radio correspondent with long experience in the region reported that he saw a wounded Securitate man in the hospital “who looked suspiciously Asian.”

http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-25/news/mn-702_1_provisional-government/2

“Arab terrorists are known to wear a certain kind of black underpants,“ the doctor, Horia Georgescu, explained gravely. “These men were wearing such underpants.“

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-12-28/news/8903210434_1_elena-ceausescu-nicolae-ceausescu-bucharest-and-other-cities

De altfel, si Florin Ghiuzela afirma ca Nicolae Serbulescu ar fi spus ca a interceptat niste mesaje în limba araba. De asemenea, tot în acele zile s-a vorbit ca înspre lacul Cincis ar fi încercat sa ajunga un grup format din trei persoane, printre care si un barbat care a declarat ca este student iranian sau irakian.

http://www.replicahd.ro/images/replica165/special3.htm

1) Dl. Savin Chiritescu

Vreau sa arat ca subsemnatul si mai multi colegi din aceeasi unitate de tancuri [UM 01060 Bucuresti-Pantelimon] am capturat teroristi arabi (dintre care unul ne-a spus ca este din Beirut) inarmati, pe care i-am predate la Marele Stat Major. Unul era student, am gasit asupra lui un pistol mitraliera de calibrul 5.62 seria UF 060866, cu cadenta de ambreiaj, lung de vreo 40 cm, portabil pe sub haine: arma parea facuta dintr-un plastic foarte dur, cu exceptia tevii si a mecanismului de dare a focului. “

Al. Mihalcea, “O gafa monumentala,” Romania Libera, 31 October 1990, p. 5a.

2)  Danka la http://www.jurnalul.ro/comentarii.read.php?id=79510  aprilie 2006

22 decembrie 1989, la unitatea militara 010__ de la marginea padurii Branesti.

Padurea Branesti adaposteste unul din cele mai mari depozite de munitie din jurul capitalei.  Se spune ca o explozie la acest depozit ar rade cartierul Pantelimon de la capatul tramvaiului 14.

Spre seara a inceput sa se traga asupra unitatii dinspre calea ferata.  Se tragea in orice folosindu-se armament de calibru mic si pusti automate.  Dupa focul de la gura tevii pareau 3 persoane ascunse dupa rambeul cai ferate care au deschis foc cu scopul de a creea panica.

Soldatii au iesit din dormitoare si s-au adapostit in parcul auto pe sub camioane.

Nu se putea sta in cladiri, “teroristii” trageau in geamuri.

Desi se daduse alarma in acea zi mai devreme nimeni nu era pregatit sa riposteze decit cei aflati in garda.  Un grup de soldati cu subofiteri si ofiteri echipati cu AK 47, si pistoale TT au pornit la un atac prin invaluire.

Toti au ajuns in amplasamentele stabilite fara incidente, la adapostul intunericului dar si pentru faptul ca intrusi erau mai mult ocupati sa mentina foc consistent asupra unitatii.

La un moment dat soldatii au deschis focul, lupta a durat mai putin de 10 minute.  Micutele lor UZ fara precizie la distanta nu au facut fata la renumitul AK 47

Unul dintre teroristi a fost impuscat in cap iar ceilalti doi au fost raniti cind incercau sa fuga peste cimp in directia opusa unitatii militare.

Cei trei au fost transportati la corpul de garda unde s-a aprins lumina (pina atunci unitate fusese in bezna) si s-a constatat ca unul dintre cei doi suprevietuitori era de fapt femeie.

Toti erasu maslinii la fata, imbracati in combinezoane negre si ce doi suprevietuitori raniti se vaitau spunind ceva in limba araba.

Dupa o jumatate de ora un a sosit un ARO al armatei care s-a spus ca a venit de la statul major al diviziei si i-a luat pe toti trei.  Dupa citeva zile toti soldatii care au participat la actiunea de noaptea aceea au fosti pusi sa semneze o declaratie prin care se angajau sa nu divulge nimic din ce s-a intimplat.

Toate acestea sint adevarate si usor de verificat.”

…si de ce tocmai Branesti?

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-presa_regionala_arhiva-1717686-serviciile-secrete-ori-proaste-ori-complice.htm

Agentii arabi pregatiti la unitatile militare speciale de la Baneasa sau Branesti – teroristii din 22-23 decembrie 1989 – erau ofiteri de securitate romani care aveau in subordine ofiteri romani. O parte din teroristii care au impuscat romani pe strada au devenit si “luptatori” ai Revolutiei Romane.

http://www.romanialibera.ro/index.php?section=articol&screen=print&id=119903&page=0&order=0&redactie=0

Pana in 1989, Departamentul Securitatii Statului avea trei scoli importante pentru pregatirea ofiterilor acoperiti. La Bran (judetul Brasov) si la Ganeasa (judetul Ilfov) erau pregatiti ofiterii acoperiti pentru Securitatea interna, iar la Branesti (judetul Ilfov), pentru Securitatea externa. La Branesti au fost antrenati, intre altii, si teroristii de pe filiera Yasser Arafat (OEP) si Carlos sacalul, sustine Pantea. scoala de la Branesti a ramas la SIE (Serviciul de Informatii Externe).

“Copilul meu a participat la incarcarea intr-un avion a unor cadavre de libieni”, spune mama lui BUTEICA Emanoil-Marius. Născut marţi, 3 ianuarie 1968, a participat pe 21 şi 22 Decembrie 1989 la manifestaţia din Piaţa Romană şi de la Televiziune. în 23 a plecat la serviciu, la Otopeni. lată ce spune tatăl: “Trece pe lângă cele 5 camioane de la Câmpina cu ostaşi şi ofiţeri morţi, iar după câţiva zeci de metri începe să se tragă în plin, în maşină… îl găsim pe 24 decembrie carbonizat parţial, cu trupul ciuruit de gloanţe, sfârtecat oribil…Doamne!” –

BUTEICA Emanoil-Marius, născut marţi, 3 ianuarie 1968, a participat pe 21 şi 22 Decembrie 1989 la manifestaţia din Piaţa Romană şi de la Televiziune. în 23 a plecat la serviciu, la Otopeni. lată ce spune tatăl: “Trece pe lângă cele 5 camioane de la Câmpina cu ostaşi şi ofiţeri morţi, iar după câţiva zeci de metri începe să se tragă în plin, în maşină… îl găsim pe 24 decembrie carbonizat parţial, cu trupul ciuruit de gloanţe, sfârtecat oribil…Doamne!”

http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/Dumitru_Graur_a_pazit_teroristi-_-Erau_libieni_0_607139601.html

Chiar erau terorişti?

M-am uitat la ei – da, erau… terorişti! Aveau tenul foarte măsliniu, nu vorbeau româneşte. Erau libieni – eu aşa cred. Şi îi legasem fedeleş şi îi păzeam cu coada de mătură. Le ziceam: „Dacă mişti, îţi dau cu asta în cap!” Ăia cu mătura… au dispărut a doua zi. I-a luat colonelul Oană pe toţi şi i-a dus, asta se ştie. Probabil că Gaddafi din Libia a zis că dacă mi-i împuşcaţi, vă împuşc şi eu vreo 300 de români în Libia, la mine! De-aia nici nu se putea spune nimic. Dar oamenii aceia au existat! Asta este teoria mea! Dacă lucrurile ar fi decurs altfel, dacă oamenii care aveau puterea ar fi decis să fie de partea lui Ceauşescu, eram oale şi ulcele, bătrâne! Păi, când a tras colonelul Oană salva de tun, am simţit că genunchii s-au tăiat şi am căzut la pământ imediat. Am ieşit în curte, era soare, frumos, şi deasupra – cu ochii mei, ţi-o spun, Andrei – am văzut, la o înălţime cam de o mie de metri, un elicopter şi unii cu o puşcă-mitralieră trăgeau în noi. Cum mă vezi şi cum te văd! Stupefiant! Cine era ăla? De ce trăgea în Televiziune? Incredibil! Erau atâtea evenimente că nu se poate spune, pe care să le ţii minte mai abitir?

Tata i-a dat o haina militara pt ca pe vremea aia era frig si ningea. Nu vorbea Romaneste dar avea accent si silabisea intr-o limba araba care nu am putut la vremea respectiva sa o descifrez a fiin Iraniana, Libaneza, Siriana sau Irakiana. L-am lasat in bloc pe scari singur. A doa zi nu l-am mai vazut. FSN nu era inca infiintat. Blocul era langa cimitirul de pe strada Antiaeriana (Calea Rahovei) ci nu langa MAPN

destituirea 3 years ago
http://www.youtube.com/all_comments?v=YlBRSxUVQ5E

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,216

Adi2011-06-09 19:24:46Am fost si in curtea unitatii 1047 sa duc mancare soldatilor inghetati care pazeau gardul unitatii in gropi verticale pentru un singut soldat si am auzit povestile de la ofiteri cu asa zisele elicoptere doborate in Valea Fetii (in prima zi doborate x elicoptere iar a doua zi y elicoptere, in total peste 10, nu mai retin exact). :) Am discutat si cu ofiter, seful unei echipe de soldati care cauta teroristii prin blocurile din Valea Rosie cum “a impuscat in cap un lunetist care tragea de pe bloc turn vis-a-vis de unitatea exact in momentul in care-si punea manusile in mana”. :) Am prins un “terorist” arab si era sa fim amandoi linsati dupa o scena asemanatoare cand s-a strigat de la balcon “Uitati teroristii!” :)

Gigga Adrian Tudor app de arabi… [c/p din Doc “Marturii”]
Gigga Adrian Tudor: adaug si eu 2 cazuri, povestite direct mie de 2 prieteni care erau soldati in termen in Ghencea si au vazut/tras:
1. Ins cu aspect de arab, sare gadul unitatii cu foc de acoperire dintr`o arma ce nu era in doatarea niciunei institutii ro; este ciuruit de militarii din interior; la verificare acestia observa ca avea 3 randuri de haine: pulover pe gat, trening si uniforma militara.
2. Un civil este semnalat de 1 soldat ca se ascunde intre roata si caroseria unei masini de lupta; vin ofiteri si soldati, il someaza, nu iese, si il ciuruie si p`asta; ce crezi ca au vazut dupa? unu` IDENTIC cu primul! Nu mai stiu la care din ei i se desprinsese capul de la atatea gloante; de nervi l`au pus pe botul unei masini, ca trofeu cumva..
*Adaug acum in Doc: am vazut f.multe urme de gloante pe zidul dinspre strada al UM din Ghencea pomenita mai sus; cine a tras?
+ in alte UM? si de ce??

Gigga Adrian Tudor puloverele erau gri

December 26, 2011 at 11:12am · Like

Corneliu N. Vaida nu am vazut rusi, dar arabi imbracati in combinezoane negre arestati si apoi disparuti din arest …am vazut!
Corneliu N. Vaida D-le Hall – Am fost de fata cand in 23 sau 24 Dec. la Comandamentul Garnizoanei Timisoara a fostadus(arestat) un luptator arab imbracat intr-un combinezon negru(ca de tanchist) cand l-am injurat si intrebat de ce a tras in oameni a ripostat cu o lovitura de picior(cu toate ca era incatusat si escortat). La cateva zile cand l-am intrebat pe un ofiter de soarta arabului acesta mi-a raspuns zambind “Care arab?” …..
Corneliu N. Vaida Si eu am vazut un arab arestat de armata, imbracat tot in combinezon negru. A incercat sa ma loveasca cand l-am injurat si i-am cerut socoteala, chiar si asa incatusat cum era. Dupa doua zile nimeni din Comandamentul de Garnizoana nu-si mai adecea aminte de el!!!
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