(purely personal views, based on over two decades of prior research and publications)

I have finally been able to zero in better on the dates of https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/sinteza-intocmita-de-procuratura-militara-1992-1993-despre-diversiunea-razboiul-psihologic-si-radio-electronica/.  From my notes it appears that the findings of the military procuracy below were published in the 25 decembrie 1992 edition of Evenimentul Zilei ; it discusses in some detail the psychological war and the radio-electronic war.

Thanks to Domnita Stefanescu’s useful 1995 chronology of the first five years after the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu, we can pinpoint the date when this was made public:  10-11 decembrie 1992.

We can also figure out when the “opinion” of the military procuracy frequently invoked by Timisoara researcher Marius Mioc https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/diversiunea-radio-electronica-o-opinie-a-parchetului-militar/ was published:  21 decembrie 1994.

„Trebuie să relevăm faptul că în perioada de după 22 decembrie 1989 au existat acţiuni de diversiune ce au produs efecte atît în acţiunile maselor de civili cît şi în rîndurile forţelor armate. Se pare că efectul cel mai puternic l-au avut acele „informaţii” vehiculate de către TVRL. În ceea ce priveşte intoxicarea anumitor eşaloane ale armatei a rezultat că, în numeroase cazuri, aceasta a pornit dinspre structurile superioare către unităţile operative inferioare. Considerăm util să menţionăm aici că, în cursul cercetărilor întreprinse asupra fenomenelor de „război radio-electronic” şi „diversiune”, parchetul militar a fost pus într-o situaţie limită.

Pe de o parte, ceea ce s-a definit ca „diversiune telefonică” nu poate fi acum probată prin mijloace materiale (inclusiv mijloace tehnice). Pe de altă parte, chiar în situaţia în care s-a încercat administrarea unor probe materiale referitoare la „războiul radio-electronic” parchetului i-au fost puse la dispoziţie doar concluziile unor specialişti militari. Cum o anchetă penală nu poate fi executată după principiul „crede şi nu cerceta”, în anumite cauze au fost solicitate mijloace de probă – situaţii aero-spaţiale şi benzi magnetice (materiale care, după opinia noastră, ar fi trebuit păstrate chiar şi numai ca material istoric şi de analiză pentru Marele Stat Major, dacă avem în vedere caracterul deosebit şi singular al acţiunilor de luptă din acea perioadă).

În mod oficial s-a răspuns că respectivele materiale au fost distruse, la expirarea termenului de păstrare”

(Sinteza aspectelor rezultate din anchetele efectuate de Parchetul Militar în perioada 1990 – 1994, în cauze privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989, pag 304-305)

excerpt from https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/revolutia-fara-teroristi-si-procurori-militari-popa-cherecheanu-si-samoila-joarza-1993-1997/

Many Romanians and Romanianists believe that the position of the Military Procuracy on December 1989 has been almost completely an issue of politics.  Thus, they take a superficial view based on who is in office politically as the explanation for the stance of the Military Procuracy.  This ignores the bureaucratic (Steaua-Dinamo) and patron-client battles beneath the surface.  It turns out that particularly on the question of the “terrorists” of December 1989, there was an important nuanced difference before and after 1993 in the Romanian Military Procuracy under the Iliescu (FSN/FDSN/PDSR) regime.  From what I can tell, the claim that “there were no terrorists” in December 1989 consolidated and became an official stance of the Military Procuracy when Mihai Ulupiu Popa Cherecheanu was in charge (although we can see the direction Cherecheanu was heading already in late 1992:  http://www.evz.ro/25-de-ani-de-la-evenimentele-din-decembrie-1989-enigmele-teroristilor-descifrate-de-procuratura-in-1992-ciungul-de-la-radio-care-a-tras-o-zi-intreaga-in-populatie-a-capatat-o-identitate.html ) The procuracy headed by Mugurel Florescu tended to be much more coy and non-committal, failing to say who the terrorists were but leaving it to be understood that they may nevertheless have existed.  Instead, the procuracy under Cherecheanu became much more determined in suggesting that everyone who had been arrested as a terrorist had been arrested by accident based on erroneous suspicions.  The difference can be seen, for example, in the nuanced transformation of views of the so-called diversionist psychological and radioelectronic warfare between 1992 and 1994.

My guess is that some of this may also have been related to Iliescu’s second election victory in fall 1992 and the formation of the government under Nicolae Vacaraoiu, a period during which many Romanian critics alleged a “restoration” of parts of the old Ceausescu order were under way.  Below two Doru Braia questions from a 1997 interview with General Victor Atanasie Stanculescu, that demonstrate that 1) prior to Dan Voinea coming to the helm of the military procuracy, Cherecheanu was still in charge into 1997, despite the Constantinescu-CDR victory in the fall 1996, and 2) Samoila Joarza was not only denying to Braia that the terrorists had existed, but denied the very existence of a list of the terrorists!  Thus, Dan Voinea did not originate the idea of a “revolution without terrorists,” but inherited from the PDSR-appointed procuracy the claim that the terrorists were an “invention” (what did differentiate Voinea from Cherecheanu’s procuracy was that he began the prosecution of almost exclusively Army officers for their role in the December 1989 repression–Militia and Securitate officers were conspicuously absent).