The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

So you tell me Stanculescu was with Vlad and the Securitate after Ceausescu fled on 22 December 1989 (II)…

(punct de vedere STRICT PERSONAL, va multumesc)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/so-you-tell-me-stanculescu-was-with-vlad-and-the-securitate-after-ceausescu-fled-on-22-december-1989-i/

Recently, for reasons I won’t get into, but I can only speculate about, a certain theory has gained some unexpected adherents: the idea that after Nicolae Ceausescu fled the Central Committee Building at “12:08” (East of Bucharest), the rump core of the Romanian Communist Party, led by Ion Iliescu, the Securitate, headed by Generalul Iulian Vlad, and the Military ALL banded together to create the military diversion of the “terrorists” to put to an end the anti-communist rebellion from the streets. Such a theory has the attraction of gathering people from diverse constituencies and making a larger group of people satisfied/happy so-to-speak. Only problem is history is often far less populist.

One of the elements of this new theory is the idea that, yeah ok, so the Securitate had to be behind the diversion, it’s the only theory that makes structural sense (even here they ignore the evidence backing up this argument, for overarching logical explanations…), but the heads of the Army were also part of it. They were either compromised by their previous ties to the Securitate before December 1989 or they had blood on their hands for their role in the repression of demonstrators in Timisoara and elsewhere before Ceausescu fled (and needed to absolve themselves, prevent themselves from having to pay for their crimes).

In this order of ideas, General Victor Atanasie Stanculescu is frequently mentioned. He knew about the diversion, but did nothing to stop it, he went along with it, didn’t call troops to come to root out the “terrorists” etc.

Really? Let’s look at Stanculescu’s actions on 22 December 1989 and immediately after.  Tell me this, does this sound like someone who the Securitate thought was on their side, going along with their diversion or counter-revolution???

Sibiu:  the afternoon of 22 December 1989, Army Lt. Col. Dragomir calls to say his men are being attacked by the Securitate and Militia.  He is told to cease fire or surrender by the following people:

1) Ilie Ceausescu

2) Corneliu Pircalabescu

3) Dan Voinea (!)

De asemenea, deşi gen. mr. Ştefan Guşă ordonă, în intervenţia de la ora 15.30 la televizune, retragerea în cazărmi a elevilor de la şcolile militare şi a celorlalţi militari din Sibiu16, gen. lt. Victor Atanasie Stănculescu ordonă continuarea atacurilor asupra obiectivelor aparţinând M.I. http://acmrr-sri.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/vitraliino9.pdf

Am ordonat sa se raspundea cu foc.  M-am dus la infirmerie–punctul de comanda de rezerva, m-a sunat col. Pircalabescu ca “de ce se trage?”  I-am raspuns ca sintem atacati.  Mi s-a spus sa opresc focul.  Ilie Ceausescu a spus sa ma predau.  I-am trinti telefonul.  Apoi m-a sunat Stanculescu.  I-am spus ca sintem atacati.  Stanculescu mi-a spus:  “Apara-te!” (Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir)

Dan Badea, “Secretele Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 22 (7-13 iunie 1994), pp. 8-9

from my “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” (2006)

Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:

…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons.  I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits.  The Militia told me that they weren’t their people.  At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire.  I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?”  I told him we were being attacked.  He told me to cease fire.  Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender.  I slammed the telephone down.  Then [Army General] Stanculescu called.  I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me:  ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified:  they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]

Armata Poporului, “Sub tirul incrucisat…(II)” interviu cu Aurel Dragomir, nr. 46, noiembrie 1990 p. 3.