(purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of prior research and publications)

In episode one, Nicolae Stefan Soucoup related the capture and interrogation of terrorist suspect Silviu Dutu, a sergeant major from UM 0530 Rosu, a Securitate special unit (in this respect, readers may recall the references in December 1989 and in the initial months thereafter according to which the “terrorists” were members of Securitate “special units”).  Far from a unique case, Dutu was to later escape prosecution based on the medical diagnosis of having “exercised poor judgment” as a result of “shock”: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-i/

In episode two, Soucoup related the words of the mortally-wounded rugby player Bogdan Serban Stan, who insisted that “I was shot by a civilian near me,” while defending the Television Station.  Elsewhere in 1990, Soucoup was one of those who discussed the use of 5,6 mm caliber ammunition by those they were fighting against, the terrorists.  Elena Bancila, the tenacious, grieving mother of Bogdan Serban Stan, detailed how the medical records at the hospital to which her son was taken showed he had been hit with a bullet smaller than 6 mm: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-ii/

In episode three, we looked at video evidence from 24 December 1989 in the streets surrounding the Television building.  In one of the videos, a revolutionary demonstrates for the camera the difference between the size of the bullets the enemy, the terrorists, were firing, and the standard ammunition the military and civilians were using.  In the second, a draftee described the difference between the weapons they were using and those of the terrorists:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-iii/.

In episode four, we looked at the comments of weapons’ specialists who in early January 1990 recounted that the “terrorists” had most likely used among other weapons, 5,6 mm Heckler-Koch guns–thereby indirectly confirming the above observations regarding the use of unusual ammunition by the “terrorists,” especially bullets under 6 mm caliber:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-iv/ .

In episode five, we saw how fellow former Military Prosecutor, General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan, and soldiers, officers, and civilians cited in the first Senatorial Commission Report give details which corroborate what we learned from episodes 1-4.  Unlike General Dan Voinea, promoted and trumpeted by Tismaneanu Commission’s Final Report–who vigorously denies the use of any unusual ammunition in December 1989–these direct participants in the events that transpired in the Television zone believe that unusual ammunition was used:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-v/

In episode six, we examined other participant accounts which claim the use of atypical munitions–which explodes the myth peddled by Dan Voinea, his supporters, and the Tismaneanu Report.  Some refer to the aforementioned under 6 mm “vidia” bullets and others to exploding dum-dum bullets.  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/the-tismaneanu-commissions-final-report-television-and-the-terrorists-vi/

“Vile de pe [Calea] Dorobanti din care s-a tras” (Tineretul Liber, 21 decembrie 1991)

see, in relation to this topic, from 2008 and 2009: The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums (Part I) by Richard Andrew Hall ; The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums (Part II) by Richard Andrew Hall; The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums (Part III) by Richard Andrew Hall; The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums (Part IV) by Richard Andrew Hall; Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (by Richard Andrew Hall)

Prin televiziune s-au făcut majoritatea diversiunilor, cea mai eficientă fiind reprezentată de „pericolul de moarte” omniprezent întruchipat de „teroriştii fideli dictatorului Ceauşescu”; acesta a fost arestat în 22 decembrie, într-o unitate militară din Târgovişte. Pericolul părea total credibil întrucât în perioada 22-27 decembrie au fost înregistraţi 942 de morţi şi mii de răniţi. Majoritatea au fost ucişi şi răniţi pe străzile din centrul capitalei şi al altor oraşe martirizate ca urmare a acestei diversiuni. Ulterior nu a fost acuzat şi judecat nici un terorist….Potrivit declaraţiilor generalului-magistrat Dan Voinea…„În decembrie 1989 scopul era deturnarea caracterului anticomunist al revoluţiei şi preluarea puterii prin teroarea instalată”17.  [pp. 623-624]

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-tismaneanu-commission-presents-the-final-report-romanian-communism

The 2006 Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (also known as the Tismaneanu Report, after its Chairman, Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu) stridently alleges that Romanian Television and those who appeared on it beginning the afternoon of 22 December 1989 were intentionally responsible for creating the “majority of the diversions” through which 942 people died in the days which followed (versus 162 before 22 December under orders from Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu) by claiming that “terrorists loyal to the Ceausescu dictatorship” posed a lethal threat. The authors of the Report then add, as if to confirm their contention that the “terrorists” were an invention of those who took power in December 1989:  “Later not a single terrorist was charged or tried.”  To bolster their argument, they invoke the findings of Military Prosecutor General Dan Voinea [who led the investigation of the December 1989 events for much of the post-communist era], who states “In December 1989, the goal was to divert the anticommunist character of the revolution and to seize power through the terror they had installed.”

The Tismaneanu Report misunderstands and misrepresents both the “terrorists” and the role of Romanian Television.  In fact, not only does it get the “terrorists” wrong overall, it doesn’t even manage to get right what happened in and around the Television building itself.  Here’s why:

In this episode, we return to additional comments by Nicolae Stefan Soucoup on the capture of “terrorists” at/and held in the Television building.

M-am reintors in dispozitiv.  Nu dupa mult timp a inceput atacul de noapte, cu diversiuni in special in interiorul Televiziunii.  Atunci a intervenit si ambuscada din coltul corpului tehnic, unde locotenetul major Dragomirescu a fost impuscat impreuna cu sapte militari.  Au murit toti….Inca o persona care mi s-a parut fara rost in Televiziune a fost si un maior de militie, care era la fel de ambiguu si de mare conducator ca si generalul Tudor.  Acest maior–nu-i stiu numele–este pe undeva e implicat in tot ce s-a intimplat in ambuscada in care au murit Dragomirescu Liviu si parasutistii din jurul sau….

In dimineata zilei de 24, capitanul Radu Chiranescu a scos cu pumnalul capacul la o gura de ventilatie din cele patru de la etajul 1, prin care baniuam ca ar fi putut patrunde teroristii in cladire, si si-a dat drumul inauntru, pe tubulatura.  Acelasi lucru s-a realizat si pe alte trasee.  S-au gasit, asa cum am anticipat, tuburi si cartuse abia consumate.  Se confirmau, astfel, observatiile mele anterioare, precum si afirmatiile lui Dutu [securist arestat ca terorist, vezi episoade anterioare].  Dupa aceasta actiune s-a pus sub paza severa si accesul la gurile de ventilatie….Ca martor direct si total implicat in lupta si evenimente, pot sa spun ca noi, civilii–inarmati sau nu–nu am incurcat armata, cum si-au permis sa afirme anumite persoane din conducerea militara, cum a fost cazul generalului Tudor.  Dimpotriva, am fost liantul dintre oamenii care s-au alaturat cauzei Revolutiei, ai celor doua ministere, M.Ap.N. si M.I.  Fara dirzenia noastra, Televiziunea ar fi fost cu certitudine cucerita.  Exclud din capul locului ca am fi tras noi in noi.  Daca s-a petrecut asa ceva, n-au fost lucruri inimplatoare, ci au fost lucruri impuse, dirijate.