The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

“I’ll take the field!” or how Securitate General Vlad’s Disinformation Illuminates the Truth: The Uses of Hungarians, revolutionaries with “criminal records,” and “foreign agents”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 15, 2013

On 29 January 1990, Securitate General Iulian Vlad confessed the painful truth:  the “terrorists” who were responsible for almost a thousand deaths and several thousand injuries beginning on the afternoon of 22 December 1989 were from the institution he commanded, the Securitate.  Not all confessions are equal:  it means much more when someone confesses that the institution of which he is a member was responsible for a particular crime.  It means even more when the person confessing is the head of that institution…even if, as in this case, Vlad personally evades responsibility for the actions of those under his command.  (As to the corroboration of Vlad’s confession:  this website abounds in details from eyewitnesses that, indeed, the terrorists were from the Securitate.  It is only the politics of post-Ceausescu Romania and the role of Securitate disinformation in manipulating the narrative space that this is actually “news” and should come as such a surprise.  It speaks volumes that General Vlad’s 29 January 1990 confession has never been mentioned, published, or transcribed by the Romanian media in 23 years…it is as if it had never existed…)

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

— arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

— alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

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It is worth comparing General Vlad’s confession, while under arrest, and in conditions where he feared for his future, with his claims while the December 1989 Romanian Revolution was unfolding.  We have two reports to this effect:  the first from former Securitate officer Pavel Corut; the second from Army General Ion Hortopan.  We also have his statement in court in September 1990, by which time Securitate revisionism about December 1989 had made sharp inroads into popular and elite understandings of December 1989, and by which time it had become clear that the Iliescu regime was not intent upon providing answers about what had happened in December 1989–i.e. he had much less to fear.

According to Corut, in the early hours of 23 December 1989 Vlad attempted to suggest that helicopters in Romanian air space belonged to Hungary and were transporting Hungarian parachutists into Transylvania (see pages 186 and 187 below, Pavel Corut Floarea de Argint (Editura Miracol, 1994), pp. 182-191 ).

The above passage from page 187 shows pretty clearly that Securitate General Iulian Vlad was intentionally misleading the revolutionaries in the CC and others, as he alleges an invasion of Hungarian parachutists in six Transylvanian cities.  There is absolutely no evidence–either in accounts of the time or since–that Hungarian parachutists turned up in these cities.  Thus, while Vlad attempted to play dumb regarding the suspected presence and activation of Arab terrorists allied with the Securitate on behalf on the Ceausescus–particularly in the Black Sea Coast region–he was seeking to disseminate disinformation about a non-existent–but highly nationalist, paranoid, and potentially resonant, especially perhaps in Transylvania–invasion by neighboring Hungary.

Army General Ion Hortopan’s declaration of 16 February 1990 suggests that later on 23 December 1989 Vlad attempted to suggest that those shooting were the revolutionaries themselves, including the ill-intentioned among them who had served prison time…

“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta–in scopul de a ne induce in eroare–a raspuns ca manifestantii , patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra.” (p. 317)

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If during the events of December 1989, Vlad attempted to disinform those around him with suggestions that the “terrorists” were Hungarians or revolutionaries, including those with prison records, who had seized weapons–that this hypothesis has penetrated the popular consciousness can be seen in the ongoing Adevarul series on December 1989 and to some extent in the works of Ruxandra Cesereanu, Peter Siani-Davies, and the Raport Final of the CPADCR Tismaneanu Commission which placed its uncritical trust in former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea–in court in September 1990 he pleaded ignorance, but speculated it was the hand of agents in the service of foreign powers.  In other words, Vlad has done what those engaging in lies and disinformation usually do:  he takes and plays the field, promoting any alternative theory that diverts and contradicts the truth, since the goal is not the success of any specific counter theory, but the marginalization and delegitimization of the truth…in this case, what he revealed on 29 January 1990…

Generalul Iulian Vlad:  “Vreau sa adaug ca aceia care au hotarit sa faca ceea ce s-a facut au organizat diversiunea pentru ca niste puteri straine aveau tot interesul ca aceasta sa se produca.  Si haosul s-a produs…Practic s-a deschis tara pentru toate serviciile de spionaj straine si pentru toate formele de diversiune, de subminare…Care sint teroristii?  De unde au venit?  Cine le-a dat ordin?  Eu personal nu am cunostiinta sa se fi stabilit cine au fost teroristii, cine a ucis dupa 22 decembrie.  Mi se spune si mie in sarcina.  Pentru ca despre unii aflati in serviciul unor puteri straine si care au rivnit la putere aici, in Romania, securitatea stia multe lucruri si nu convenabile pentru niste patrioti revolutionari romani.  Acestia si puterile straine in slujba carora s-au pus au nimicit securitatea.  Sint inculpat nu pentru ca as fi vinovat, ci pentru ca trebuia sa fiu inculpat.  Sint constient, de asemenea, ca ma expun unor pericole grave si iminente.  Dar toate lucrurile acestea trebuie spuse.”  Numai ca, inainte de pauza care a premers acestor dezvaluiri (dintre care, fie vorba intre noi, unele nu apar pentru prima data in presa) generalul anuntase ca ne va spune cine sint teroristii.  Dupa pauza, desi instanta s-a aratat dornica sa stie cine sint, nu mai vorbim de asistenta, fostul sef al Securitatii a spus cu candoare: Daca i-as fi stiut, i-as fi rezolvat cu 8 luni in urma.” (Al. Mihalcea, “Procesul Generalului:  ‘Sint inculpat nu pentru ca as fi vinovat, ci pentru ca trebuia sa fiu inculpat,” Romania Libera, 12 septembrie 1990, p. 2)

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3 Responses to ““I’ll take the field!” or how Securitate General Vlad’s Disinformation Illuminates the Truth: The Uses of Hungarians, revolutionaries with “criminal records,” and “foreign agents””

  1. […] https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/15/ill-take-the-field-or-how-securitate-general-… […]

  2. […] related see: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/15/ill-take-the-field-or-how-securitate-general-… […]

  3. […] related see: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/15/ill-take-the-field-or-how-securitate-general-… […]

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