Dinel Staicu (fost USLA), Craiova, si decembrie 1989
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 26, 2014
(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)
Ion Spanu, “Un ofiter de militie vorbeste despre ostateteci ai revolutionarilor,” Expres nr. 28 (179), 13-19 iulie 1993.
http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinel_Staicu
Dinel Staicu: „Misiunea mea a fost sa-l infiltrez pe Sandu in prefectura“
Dinel Staicu se considera singurul implicat cu adevarat in evenimentele din decembrie „singurul care-i capacitasem pe toti,… si totul a fost cum am vrut eu“. De aici sa intelegem ca artizanul „Revolutiei“ craiovene a fost un locotenent de militie?
Referitor la activitatea de atunci a sefilor lui, Staicu declara: „In zilele de dupa erau: Langa, Vaduva, Velicu, Sandu… Erau prezenti mai mult cu fizicul, in rest erau absenti total. Cam asta a fost aportul lor. Erau un fel de ostatici… Atunci, ceea ce puteai sa lucrezi era cam ceea ce am facut eu. Sa-i organizez pe studenti, sa linistesc starea de spirit“.
In ceea ce priveste vinovatii pentru victimele din decembrie ’89, pentru ca s-a tras in Craiova, Staicu e de parere ca „sint vinovati cu intentie si vinovati fara intentie, adica vinovati din culpa, asa-zisii incompetenti. Ca au fost generali sau au fost plutonieri, nu are importanta doar daca au avut capacitate de decizie“.
La intrebarea daca in Craiova evenimentele ar fi putut sa se desfasoare fara varsare de singe, ni se raspunde: „Cu o conditie, daca in Craiova n-ar fi existat unitati militare“.
Si iata ca, dupa atita osteneala, lt. maj. Staicu Dinel nici macar nu a fost avansat, de aceste binefaceri beneficiind „unii care n-au avut nici in clin, nici in mineca cu Revolutia“. Intr-un tirziu a fost totusi inaintat la gradul de capitan, ocazie cu care a avut urmatoarea conversatie cu colonelul (de-acum, generalul de miine? Asta ne-ar mai lipsi – n.r.) Sandu: „Ba, eu te-am facut capitan la exceptional. Imi pare rau, cam ai dreptate, dar de ce-mi strigi chestia asta? „…Dumneavoastra ati inceput“. In ceea ce priveste institutia in care a lucrat capitanul Staicu, relativ la „curatirea“ personalului, dl Staicu este drastic: „Este imposibil sa faca asa ceva, pentru ca ar trebui sa lichidezi 80-90% din efective, ceea ce nu se face peste noapte, se face in timp“.
Iata ca, pe masura ce trece timpul, capitanul isi pierde prietenii, care uita ca au fost avansati la exceptional datorita lui si incep sa-l marginalizeze. (Dl Sandu, pe care-l consideram… zice: „Mai putin Staicu – de la arme – referitor cu participarea la o sedinta“). Simtind aceasta marginalizare, Staicu, orientat deja spre zona afacerilor (deschisese chiar un gratar impreuna cu un amic de-ai sai, care i-a creat baza economica a „viitorului om de afaceri“, inca din anul 1990), ca orice politist care se respecta s-a apucat de cu totul altceva decit ii lasa dreptul legea, avind in vedere ca inca era functionar public. In virtutea experientei cu negustorii in general pentru ca „Eram anchetator la cercetare penala, in general lucram la dosare economice, de comert. D-aia ma pricep acum la afaceri, ca am invatat de la negustori“.
Si cum militia este „casa negustorilor“, a avut de unde invata.
from one of my publications, Hall 2006
Craiova: Finally, there is the case of one of the big personalities of the post-Ceausescu era, Dinel Staicu, a one-time soccer club mogul and owner of a kitschy Ceausescu nostalgic restaurant and park/museum.[48] Apparently, he “shot 63 bullets during the events,” but “according to him ‘only 11 to 13 stupid people died”[49]:
“Dinel Staicu moved about in those days unhindered, entering and exiting the prefecture, each time being armed, despite the interrogations to which he had been subject. It would be interesting to know if the seizure of his weapons was recorded because, if not, it means, he still possesses them [the article dates from 1992]. After he was confined to his home for six days, for carrying an arm during the events, he resumed his mission: ‘This time I succeeded to infiltrate Mr. Sandu, since he was my boss and bosses must stay at the helm.’ Implicated during this period in the policing of Valea Rosie (a neighborhood that had been raked by gunfire), forced by the former Militia commander, Colonel Langa, to verify to General Rosu [Army], the existence of vidia bullets following his confinement to his home, Dinel Staicu attempted a diversion in order to replace those who had seized power (Nisipeanu, Popa), …Although [technically-speaking] it was still confined to barracks, the Securitate (col. Gheorghe) ‘lent Mr. D. Staicu two TAB vehicles and some men from the Securitate’s USLA platoon (not from the Militia), even though the Securitate had been ordered not to carry arms. But Mr. Staicu came on behalf of the Front…’
Following the inspection he performed in Valea Rosie, Staicu maintained that there were no terrorists (despite the fact that he himself is an example that contradicts such a denial), his basic training (Commander of Group 2-a USLA) being both for diversion and disinformation. His opinion is that the Army fired millions of cartridges and that anywhere there was a military unit, the earth filled up with them. Only that the military unit from Craiovita where there was no firing disputes this (…)[50]
In other words, a member of the USLA denies the existence of vidia bullets and “terrorists”….
“Antimafia”–un Armagedon de Craiova, Adevarul, 3 mai 2002
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