(For the English of this discussion, see below the excerpts from “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea\’s Campaign 2006)
Chiar daca stim din Inginer Hristea Teodor, fost lucrator in fosta unitate speciala “P” din DSS “USLA s-a transformat in teroristi” ca “In 23 dimineata am tinut o sedinta cu efectivul. Noi suntem ca orice unitate de cercetare si productie (microproductie). Am dat ordin ca documentatiile tehnice cu continut de secret si strict secret sa fie adunate intr-o zona considerata mai sigura. Gen. Militaru s-a referit la transferul unor unitati de la MI si securitate la MApN. A spus ca USLA s-a transformat in teroristi. S-au reluat ascultarile de la unele obiective- in special ambasadele arabe” S-au reluat ascultarile de la unele obiective- in special ambasadele arab
si stim ca intr-un document cu data de 1 martie 1990, seful de cabinet al directorului Generalul Iulian Vlad, Ion Aurel Rogojan, a fost solicitat sa scria care a fost rolul lui USLA in decembrie 1989 si care a fost relatia intre DSS si unitatea speciala “al-Fatah” a OEP. In legatura cu solicitarea aceasta, Rogojan a scris despre antrenare cadrelor USLA sub colonelului (r) Firan cu grupa aceasta, pe baza de un protocol semnat in 1979-1980. (vezi reprooducerea documentului in articolul lui E. O. Ohanesian, “Pe stil vechi-colonel de securitate, pe stil nou-general NATO,” Romania Libera, 8 April 2004),
si chiar daca fost ofiter de Directia 1 a Securitatii la Timisoara Roland Vasilevici a scris…
“Prioritate aveau camerele studentilor straini, in special arabi, care erau ocupate, in mare masura, de indivizi pregatiti prin diverse tabere internationale de antrenament si de instruire terorista sau prin Muntii Fagaras. Acestia aveau misiunea sa coopereze si cu ofiterii de Securitate, din cadrul U.S.L.A., sectorul de “informatii”, care isi avea “sediul legal” in Timisoara la ultimul nivel al cladirii din Bulevardul Leontin Salajan…Intrucit acestia vorbeau mai mult araba, s-a instituit o sectie de lingvistica cu acest profil de studiu la Scoala de ofiteri de Securitate de la Baneasa, unde fiica lui Ion Dinca (temutul “pumn de fier” al ex-presedintelui, supranumit “te-leaga”) era sefa de catedra.
De foarte multe ori s-a emis si ipoteza ca, in total secret, multi dintre acesti studenti straini, care ii venereaza pe Allah, pe Mahomed sau pe urmasii sai: Abu-Bekr, Omar, Otman si Ali, fie ca sint palestinieni, irakieni sau libieni–toti beneficiarii unor burse romanesti–ar constitui un “COMANDO” condus de Bucuresti, bine pregatit, menit sa apere, in caz extrem, perechea prezidentiala romana, in schimbul sprijinului acordat de Ceausescu patriei lor, prin donatii de armament, munitii, alimente, si tehnologie de virf importata din Vest. Revolutia a confirmat aceste suspiciuni, desi adevarul se va cunoaste peste cincizeci de ani, tainuirea avind o motivatie economica, inerenta conjuncturii actuale, cind multi muncitori romani lucreaza pe unele santiere arabo-africane, in zona Golfului…”
“Cei din U.S.L.A. si unii studenti straini, alaturati lor, trageau cu niste cartuse speciale, care, la lovirea tintei, provocau noi explozii.“
Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (editura de vest, 1991), pp. 72, 73, si 61:
totusi, mai exista oameni care nici nu cred in teroristi arabi in decembrie 1989.
in schimb, ei au incredere in procurorul Dan Voinea, cel care a descoperit nici teroristi, nici gloante dum-dum, nici simulatoare, nici razboi-electronic, cu alte cuvinte aproape nimic in legatura cu decembrie 1989…
sau in procurorul Teodor Ungureanu, care se pare crede in teroristi, dar numai daca au fost furnizate de catre aramata (mai ales DIA)…in nici un caz, n-au fost securisti sau mercenari arabi…
Ungureanu ne spune ca el a asistat la audierea “teribilul terorist OWT”…si ca OWT n-a fost nici terorist, nici arab…(sigur domnule, totusi e interesant ca omul nu scrie numele OWT, fiindca stim ca numele cu litera “W” este cum sa zicem foarte rar si in romana si in maghiara…dar nu e asa de rar in numele arab de exemplu, Walid sau asa ceva…deci cum se cheama OWT in realitate? oricum aici este frumoasa poveste a lui Teodor Ungureanu)
“TEORISTUL OWT”. La un moment dat seful colectivului (M. Popa-Cherecheanu) ne-a chemat in biroul unde se gasea si am asistat la audierea “teribilului terorist OWT”, despre care, in tabelele puse la dispozitie de un ofiter MApN, se consemnase faptul ca fusese retinut in apropierea ministerului, avand un comportament suspect si necunoscand limba romana. Dupa cateva minute de tatonari, s-a constatat cu stupoare ca “teroristul” nu era decat un biet om cu grave deficiente de vorbire, pe fondul unei evidente afectiuni insotita de retard intelectual (neputand sa mormaie decat niste sunete care s-ar fi putut transcrie, fonetic, prin majusculele mai-sus amintite)… Asupra barbatului pipernicit si jerpelit din fata noastra nu se gasise nici arma si nici vreun alt lucru compromitator. De altfel, acesta nu a fost singurul sau cel mai “gogonat” caz dintre cele pe care aveam sa le intalnesc atunci. Am vazut cu ochii mei consemnat, in tabelele intocmite la minister, faptul ca un barbat cu figura mai negricioasa (banuit a fi fost arab) isi pierduse libertatea pentru ca alergase dupa… tramvai! In acele zile si nopti au fost retinuti mai multi cetateni straini, studenti arabi la diferite facultati bucurestene. Pe unii i-am vazut si eu, la MapN. Fusesera retinuti in strada sau in locuintele lor ori ale prietenelor din cartierul Drumul Taberei. Asa se face ca unul dintre acestia, student medicinist, daca nu gresesc, era total “neinspirat” imbracat pentru un anotimp rece… De departe, cel mai “interesant” caz a fost cel al unui alt student de origine araba, parca iranian, care fusese molestat destul de puternic si acuza o fractura costala. Era de-a dreptul comic modul in care se chinuia, pe un dialect colorat, sa ne explice ca “la taru meu trecut doi revoluti si ei nu coasta rupt!”…
teodor ungureanu si teroristul OWT
Hai sa trecem la martuiri mai credibili si putini influentati de politica partizana si securista… despre teroristi arabi vazuti sau arestati:
1) Dl. Savin Chiritescu
“Vreau sa arat ca subsemnatul si mai multi colegi din aceeasi unitate de tancuri [UM 01060 Bucuresti-Pantelimon] am capturat teroristi arabi (dintre care unul ne-a spus ca este din Beirut) inarmati, pe care i-am predate la Marele Stat Major. Unul era student, am gasit asupra lui un pistol mitraliera de calibrul 5.62 seria UF 060866, cu cadenta de ambreiaj, lung de vreo 40 cm, portabil pe sub haine: arma parea facuta dintr-un plastic foarte dur, cu exceptia tevii si a mecanismului de dare a focului. “
Al. Mihalcea, “O gafa monumentala,” Romania Libera, 31 October 1990, p. 5a.
2) Danka la http://www.jurnalul.ro/comentarii.read.php?id=79510 aprilie 2006
22 decembrie 1989, la unitatea militara 010__ de la marginea padurii Branesti.
Padurea Branesti adaposteste unul din cele mai mari depozite de munitie din jurul capitalei. Se spune ca o explozie la acest depozit ar rade cartierul Pantelimon de la capatul tramvaiului 14.
Spre seara a inceput sa se traga asupra unitatii dinspre calea ferata. Se tragea in orice folosindu-se armament de calibru mic si pusti automate. Dupa focul de la gura tevii pareau 3 persoane ascunse dupa rambeul cai ferate care au deschis foc cu scopul de a creea panica.
Soldatii au iesit din dormitoare si s-au adapostit in parcul auto pe sub camioane.
Nu se putea sta in cladiri, “teroristii” trageau in geamuri.
Desi se daduse alarma in acea zi mai devreme nimeni nu era pregatit sa riposteze decit cei aflati in garda. Un grup de soldati cu subofiteri si ofiteri echipati cu AK 47, si pistoale TT au pornit la un atac prin invaluire.
Toti au ajuns in amplasamentele stabilite fara incidente, la adapostul intunericului dar si pentru faptul ca intrusi erau mai mult ocupati sa mentina foc consistent asupra unitatii.
La un moment dat soldatii au deschis focul, lupta a durat mai putin de 10 minute. Micutele lor UZ fara precizie la distanta nu au facut fata la renumitul AK 47
Unul dintre teroristi a fost impuscat in cap iar ceilalti doi au fost raniti cind incercau sa fuga peste cimp in directia opusa unitatii militare.
Cei trei au fost transportati la corpul de garda unde s-a aprins lumina (pina atunci unitate fusese in bezna) si s-a constatat ca unul dintre cei doi suprevietuitori era de fapt femeie.
Toti erasu maslinii la fata, imbracati in combinezoane negre si ce doi suprevietuitori raniti se vaitau spunind ceva in limba araba.
Dupa o jumatate de ora un a sosit un ARO al armatei care s-a spus ca a venit de la statul major al diviziei si i-a luat pe toti trei. Dupa citeva zile toti soldatii care au participat la actiunea de noaptea aceea au fosti pusi sa semneze o declaratie prin care se angajau sa nu divulge nimic din ce s-a intimplat.
Toate acestea sint adevarate si usor de verificat.”
3) Citeva cazuri in engleza
“Terorist cu un portfel cu pasaport libian si o adevarinta de tipul celor care inlocuiesc buletinul…impuscat mortal in fostul sediu al CC al PCR in seara zilei de 22 decembrie 1989…asupra lui au fost gasite un pumnal militar si un pistol ‘Makarov’ seria DL 7028 ” Weapons similar to those of Directorate V-a and the USLA could have shown up anywhere during the Revolution, in anybody’s hands, but what is interesting is among whose hands they did show up. Official Army documents and recollections by Army participants in the early 1990s show that a citizen with a Libyan passport in his billfold shot in the CC building on the night of 22 December was found in possession of a 9 mm“Makarov” pistol…a pistol whose serial number was traced back to a V-a member who claimed that he had “thrown it away” earlier that afternoon.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[109]<!–[endif]–>
Paul Vincius, “Moartea unui terorist,” Zig-Zag, no. 106 (April 1992), p. 7. One of the documents attesting to the ownership of the weapon is reproduced in the article.
in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[81]<!–[endif]–>Mirel Paun, “Ion Capatana: ‘Argeseni, va cer scuze ca am participat la Revolutie!” Cotidianul Argesul, 5/8/05 online at http://www.cotidianul-argesul.ro.
4) Cazul Brasov
Adrian Socaciu, “Dupa nopti de groaza si tortura, toti teroristi sint liberi,” Cuvintul, nr. 1-2 ianuarie 1991, pp. 3-5.
Pe pagina 3, ziaristul scrie despre gloante de calibru special, cap vidia sau exploziv.
Pe pagina 4, despre un individual la cantina partidului imbracat in negru, cu o pusca cu teava scurta, gloante 7,62 mm dar explozive, despre gloante de “grosimea unui creion, de culoarea aluminumului.”
Pe pagina 5, ca au fost arestati 5 indivizi suspectati ca teroristi, 3 arabi si 2 romani…
5) Cateva martuiri din forumisti..
Am fost martor ocular la capturarea unui terorist (dupa culoarea tenului as jura ca era arab) care folosea un PSL si tragea in populatie… a fost prins viu si batut sub ochii mei de catre armata, apoi luat pe sus intr-un camion, tot de armata… zilele urmatoare s-a continuat sa se sustina sus si tare la radio/TV ca NU au existat teroristi, sau ca nu s-au dat prinsi! Sigur, si-a cumparat PSL-ul de la magazinul universal… dar politica a dictat ca este mai bine pentru interesul meu propriu si personal sa nu se spuna adevarul, nu?
Mai bine imi vad de ale mele.
– pe la data de 24 parca, am fost martora vizuala cand soldatii au capturat un lunetist arab (brunet si vorbea stricat romaneste) – folosea vestita Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta (PSL – parca romaneasca) modificata din ak47. Sunt sigura ca fusese folosita, si nu pentru a-l ajuta la deplasare. L-au suit intr-un camion si l-au dus cica la comandamentul unui oras mare (Brasov). Ulterior s-a spus peste tot ca NU au fost implicate forte straine, sau daca au fost, ca nu exista nici un fel de urme care sa dovedeasca asta. Pentru mine a fost momentul in care am inceput sa cred ca inghit o gogoasa cu ulei impotriva vointei mele;
http://forum.softpedia.com/lofiversion/index.php/t96198.html.
6) Fosti securisti siliti sa dea declaratii dupa evenimentele
http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/arhiva/2005_285.html.
Cpt. Soare Ovidiu din fosta Directie a V-a, serviciul 4+5, domiciliul in Bucuresti, strada Mendeleev, declara urmatoarele:
Sediul Ministerului Apararii Nationale,
22/23.12.1989
In noaptea de 22/23 decembrie 1989, aflandu-se in sediul MApN, in jurul orelor 22,00, a inceput un armat, in forta, asupra MApN, din Complexul “Orizont” si dinspre blocurile din stanga si dreapta acestuia. Dupa modul cum au actionat si dupa cum aratau victimele dintre militarii care au aparat peste noapte obiectivul (impuscati in cap sau in zona capului), au concluzionat cu totii ca s-a tras cu arme cu luneta cu dispozitiv de infrarosii. Se afla impreuna cu lt. maj. Grigoras de la S.M.B., cpt. Arusoaie de la Unitatea speciala “T” si alte cadre.
Atacul asupra sediului MApN s-a desfasurat cu fanatism, unul dintre atacatori a sarit gardul inarmat doar cu un cutit, a fost impuscat, iar dimineata l-a vazut de la circa 5-6 metri si afirma ca avea infatisare de arab (ten masliniu, parul si mustata negre si crete). Se spunea ca nu avea asupra sa documente de identitate.
In noaptea de 23/24 decembrie 1989, aflandu-se la locuinta mamei sale, a vazut pe geam cum actionau trei teroristi, atacand sediul MApN Erau in uniforme de armata, cu caschete si actionau astfel:
– fugea cate unul spre chioscul LOTOPRONOSPORT din fata MApN, trageau doua-trei focuri, apoi fugeau inapoi; intre blocuri;
– apoi, in grup, unul tragea spre MApN, iar ceilalti doi trageau in sus cu trasoare.
Despre acest lucru a telefonat si informat la MApN pe maiorul Colt.
NOTA: Relatarile ofiterului se coroboreaza cu declaratiile surorii sale Mihaila Sanda Cristina cu domiciliul in Bucuresti, Aleea Poiana Mare nr. 8, bloc B9, apart. 47, sector 6.
Un articol de Catalin Antohe
Lt. mr. APOSTOL M. ANTON, fost ofiter in serviciul 1 declara:
In ziua de 29 decembrie 1989 a aflat de la vecinul PIPOI REMUS, care locuieste la etajul 2, sub apartamentul lui, ca a vazut mai multe persoane tragand spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, despre care era convins ca nu erau romani. I s-a parut ca ar fi arabi. Trageau cu niste pistoale automate mici.
in sfirsit, ceea ce ne-a spus fostul ofiter USLA Marian Romanescu in 1991
(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)
COMANDOURILE USLAC
Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul. S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului. S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.
Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLA erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului. Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania. Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane: unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.
ENGLISH
excerpts from Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea\’s Campaign 2006
Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.” Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:
“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.
The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital. It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route]. Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad. Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note: possible reference to 5 mm weapons]. Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic. The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks. They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out]. Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty. A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area. All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit. At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes. Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47. One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit. The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman. All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic. After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three. After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened. All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]
liviu viorel craciun admission
Finally, there are the recollections of eyewitnesses, a decade and a half later, who—despite the onslaught of cynicism toward such ideas—continue to maintain they saw what they thought they saw…
“I was an eyewitness to the capture of a terrorist (based on the color of his tan I’d swear he was Arab) who was using a PSL [i.e. sharpshooting rifle, a lunetist] and firing into the population…he was taken alive and beaten in front of my own eyes by the Army, then taken up into a truck, also by the Army…in the following days they continued to sustain over and over on radio and TV that there did NOT exist any terrorists, or at least that none had been captured…Yeah, I’m sure this guy bought his PSL at the ‘Universal’ department store.”
“On the 24th I think, I was an eyewitness when soldiers captured an Arab sharpshooter (brown[-skinned] and he spoke broken Romanian)—who was using the famous “Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta” (PSL—apparently Romanian) modified from an AK47. I’m sure that he had used it, and not just to help on his travels. They whisked him away in a truck and they brought him to the command [post] of a large town (Brasov). Later it was said that foreign forces were NOT implicated, or if they were, that there were no traces to prove it. For me, that was the moment in which I began to believe that I was having a lie forced down my throat.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[26]<!–[endif]–>
Foreign Involvement
So far in this piece, we have seen references to the arrest or killing as “terrorists” of the following as apparent foreigners, notably Arabs: 1) the arrest of one with a PSL in Bucharest, 2) the arrest of another with a PSL, apparently somewhere near Brasov, 3) the revelations of soldiers who killed and arrested several in the Pantelimon area of Bucharest (I will consider these two revelations one and the same for our purposes here). Years after the Revolution, there are still claims that Arabs were captured elsewhere: in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[81]<!–[endif]–> Later we will see reports written by two Securitate officers immediately after the events—apparently required of them by Army officials—attesting to the killing of Arab “terrorists” in the area around the Defense Ministry building in Bucharest. We shall also see how a weapon registered to a member of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate just happened to show up in the hands of a man with a Libyan passport in his billfold who was shot in the Central Committee building in Bucharest on the night of 22 December.
Indeed, the presence and activity of these foreign, apparently mostly Arab terrorists, was almost prosaic. Liviu Viorel Craciun (appropriately enough craciun means “Christmas”), the so-called “First Interior Minister of the Revolution” in one of the protogovernments that tried to form in the CC after the Ceausescus fled and—a source of much confusion in research on the events (more on this below)—a former USLA officer until 1986, reported that on 28 December 1989: “…in the morning five cadavers were collected and a rough count was made, out of the five terrorist cadavers found in the street, two belonged to Arab mercenaries…The shot terrorists could not be identified and they did not seem to interest anyone.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[82]<!–[endif]–>
So what was the role of foreigners, specifically Arabs, in the Revolution? Interesting in this regard is a report dated 1 March 1990 by Lt-Colonel Ion Aurel Rogojan, who in 1989 was Securitate Director General Vlad’s chief of cabinet staff. As B. Mihalache speculates somebody must have been interested in this question, “since Rogojan was ordered to write a report on it.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[83]<!–[endif]–> Rogojan wrote in his 1 March 1990 report that he “has knowledge of the fact that between the Department of State Security and the ‘Al Fatah’ Security [service] of the Palestinian Liberation Organization there existed relations of cooperation based on a protocol.” Rogojan continues in this report:
“At the same time, some activities for the training of USLA cadres abroad were carried out (the group was led by reserve colonel Firan, former chief of general staff of the mentioned unit). The protocol was established in the period 1979-1980 and a copy can be found in the protocol relations division of the former Independent Judicial Secretariat Service of the DSS [i.e. Securitate]. In connection with the existence of this protocol, I was asked in recent weeks, by Colonel Ardeleanu Gheorghe, USLA Commander. The Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare was coordinated on behalf of the DSS’ Executive Bureau by General-Colonel Iulian Vlad in the period 1977-1987, and after that by Secretary of State General-Major Alexie Stefan and Deputy Minister Major General Bucurescu Gianu. In the USLA there existed a special detachment for antiterrorist intervention, organized in three shifts and subordinated to the chief of the general staff. I don’t have any data concerning the activity of the USLA in the period of the December ’89 events.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[84]<!–[endif]–>
It should also be abundantly clear here that Rogojan was being asked to write not just about the role of outside forces, but specifically about the role of the USLA in December 1989. Once again, why such interest in the USLA?
In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:
Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go? What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]? Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator? If not for that reason, why? Because it is known what followed…
On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released. The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be. It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia. But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original]<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[85]<!–[endif]–>
We know from the revelations of a former worker (engineer Hristea Todor) at the Securitate’s special unit “P,” that the new Front leadership was sufficiently suspicious of Arab presence that “General Militaru referred to the transfer of some units from the MI and Securitate to the Defense Ministry. He said the USLA had transformed into terrorists. The electronic (telephone) surveillance of certain objectives was started up again—in particular Arab embassies.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[86]<!–[endif]–> (Note: this appears yet another reference to the aforementioned meeting at USLA headquarters on the evening of 25 December.) Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[87]<!–[endif]–>
Notably, of course, with these exceptions, the former Securitate and their apologists—whom as Army General Urdareanu suggests uniformly don’t believe in the existence of real terrorists in December 1989, yet who love to blame foreign interference for Ceausescu’s overthrow (in particular, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews)—do not like to make reference to or talk about “Arab terrorists.”
Further evidence of the involvement of “Arab terrorists” comes from the behavior in late December 1989, as much as the later statements, of the usually garrulous Silviu Brucan. In August 1990, Brucan would allege the involvement of “some 30 foreigners,” according to him, mostly Palestinian, who had been trained by the Securitate—what Michael Shafir termed “the first admission of foreign intervention by a member of the December 1989 leadership.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[88]<!–[endif]–> Reminiscent of Tanasescu’s curt response to the reporter’s question about the involvement of foreign terrorists (discussed above)—“I ask that you be so kind as to…” not ask me about this—back on 29 December 1989, Brucan, at the time a key decision-maker in the new Front leadership (he would leave in February), told Le Monde that the issue was “very delicate” and “involving diplomatic implications that must still be worked out”; “better to be cautious,” he opined.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[89]<!–[endif]–> That was, of course, no denial; indeed, it sounds like the new leadership was trying to find a solution to the dilemma they found themselves in.
Suspicion, in particular, surrounded the role of Libyans, which, as we have seen, at the very least, somehow found themselves in areas of gunfire in December. Sergiu Nicolaescu claims—I have been unable to verify this—that of all the countries to recognize the new National Salvation Front government, running to the top of the line to be first was…Qadafi’s Libya!<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[90]<!–[endif]–> The “anonymous plotters” who leaked information to Liviu Valenas of Baricada in August 1990 maintained that “It isn’t accidental that on 25 December 1989, the first plane bringing aid came from Libya. However, when it went on its return route it was loaded with people. In the almost complete chaos that dominated at the time, the New Power [i.e. the Front] did not know what the plane to Libya was carrying (it left from Otopeni, when the airport was still closed to traffic).”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[91]<!–[endif]–> In 1994, two journalists specified that the plane in question on the 25th was a DC9 and that “40 Arabs” had been loaded aboard, and noted that they had learned that on 28-29 December 1989, “the [Otopeni’s] airport archive had disappeared.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[92]<!–[endif]–>
Michael Shafir at Radio Free Europe Research at the time noted in October 1990 that “unconfirmed but very reliable military and governmental Romanian sources interviewed by RFE said that shortly after the capture of Palestinians, Libyans, and other Arabs who had fought on the side of pro-Ceausescu forces, Quadhafi had threatened to kill all Romanian specialists in Libya if the Arabs were not allowed to leave Romania.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[93]<!–[endif]–> Certainly, this is what Constantin Vranceanu hinted at in September 1990 in Romania Libera when he wrote of “Plan Z-Z”—according to him, “practically an alliance, on many levels, including military between Romania and several other countries with totalitarian regimes (Iran, Libya, Syria), to which was added the PLO…which called for the other parties to intervene with armed forces to reestablish state order when one of the leaderships was in trouble”:
“Several weeks after 22 December, the president of one of the countries directly involved threatened the Romanian government that it would make recourse to reprisals against those several thousand Romania citizens who were working in that country if [the Romanian government] did not return the foreign terrorists, [whether] alive or dead. This blackmail worked and a Romanian plane went on an unusual route to a Polish airport, from where the ‘contents,’ unusually including the able-bodied, wounded, and coffins, were transferred to another plane, that took off in an unknown direction.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[94]<!–[endif]–>
Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:
“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch. This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’ I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people. And I was told: Only you and two other people know this. I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[95]<!–[endif]–>
Relatedly, in July 1990, Liviu Valenas noted that,
“On 24 January 1990, the new Foreign Minister of Romania announced on Television and Radio that a series of secret treaties between the R.S.R. [Romanian Socialist Republic] and third countries had been abrogated, and are no longer valid and operational for the new Romania. The New Power pledged to deal with these countries concerning Romania’s obligations through the abrogation of these accords. An ambiguous text, apparently launched by Sergiu Celac’s group,led public opinion in Romania to believe that these treaties concerned ‘terrorist assistance.’”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[96]<!–[endif]–>
It is noteworthy that in the context of a series entitled “The Truth about the U.S.L.A.,” (more on this infamous series below), Horia Alexandrescu paused on 14 March 1990 to quote from a 1 February article by another journalist about TAROM flight 259 (to Warsaw and back):
“24 January, 4 PM: After the aircraft was inspected [“controlul antiterorist”] (after the Revolution of 22 December, ,soimi’ as those who performed antiterrorist protection [i.e. USLA] were called by the pilots, were removed from both internal and external TAROM flights, even though all airlines have such teams), the plane left for Bucharest. Meanwhile, however, the 45 Libyan passengers, who had gotten off for 5-6 hours in a layover at Otopeni, wanted to cross ‘the Polish border.’”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[97]<!–[endif]–>
According to Alexandrescu, the Polish authorities would not allow the TAROM plane to leave Poland, so it sat on the runway in Warsaw…until a second TAROM plane came—this time, according to Alexandru, including “uslasi”—the moral of the story of course being that the USLA needed to be put back on flights as soon as possible.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[98]<!–[endif]–> It is possible this is the plane Vranceanu was referring to in the quotation above. One thing’s for sure, this seemingly insignificant incident got unusual media coverage, in particular with regard to the USLA.
Not surprisingly, in June 2006, Prosecutor General Dan Voinea reiterated his contention that there was no foreign involvement/intervention in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution!
In early January 1990, “Cpt. Soare Ovidiu, [of Securitate] Directorate V-a, Services 4+5, resident of Bucharest, Mendeleev Street,” presumably under questioning, spoke about those he had seen killed as “terrorists”:
“Defense Ministry Headquarters [M.Ap.N.], 22/23.12.1989
On the night of 22/23 December 1989, being located in the Defense Ministry Headquarters, around 22:00, a forceful attack began upon the building from the ‘Orizont’ Complex and from the blocs to the left and right of it. Based on the manner in which they acted and how the victims from among the soldiers who were defending the building appeared (shot in the head or in the area of the head), everybody concluded that they were shot by guns with infrared night scopes [emphasis added]….The attack upon MapN Headquarters was unleashed with fanaticism, one of the attackers jumped a wall armed with a knife, he was shot, and in the morning I saw him from a distance of about 5-6 meters and I could conclude that he appeared Arab (olive-skinned, black hair and mustache). It was said he had no documents upon his person….”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[117]<!–[endif]–>
Lt. Mr. Apostol M. Anton, Service 1: “On 29 December 1989 he learned form his neighbor Pipoi Remus, who lives on the second floor, beneath his apartment, that he saw many people shooting toward the Defense Ministry, whom he was convinced were not Romanian. They appeared to him to be Arab. They were shooting with small automatic guns.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[118]<!–[endif]–>
Se pare, totusi, ca nu toti au uitat…
Mircea: Am arestat in 24 decembrie 1989 din apartamentul situat pe str.Garii de Nord,vis-a-vis de centrul de calcul un irakian care nu a incetat sa traga pana la venirea mea si a prietenului meu.L-am luat pentru ca era deja drogat.Am avut noroc chior.L-am dus la subsolul Min.Transporturilor unde se aflau demult doua unitati militare.La nivelul 2 subsol am predat pe irakian unui ofiter colonel.Irakianul nu avea viza din anul 1981.Tot ce povestesc aici e extrem de adevarat.Mai multe indicii nu pot sa dau,dar se pare ca in Bucuresti au actionat in jur de 73 de luptatori de gherila urbana specializati in lichidari de persoane de nationalitate araba.Asta e tot ce pot sa scriu.In zona Garii de Nord.
Luni, 06 Aprilie 2009 22:19
The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 