The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Archive for December 14th, 2014

John Simpson’s BBC Documentary “10 Days that Fooled the World” (annotated)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 14, 2014

(strictly personal views as always, based on more than two decades of prior research and publications)

for discussion of Simpson’s article from the 16 December 1994 Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/ten-days-that-fooled-the-world-1387659.html reprinted below) please see my 2005 article here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-two/)

posted as 10 zile care au păcălit lumea (Revoluția Română) by Uniti Salvam

In the event, the video cannot be see here, go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-1to2Pzjeg

approx. min 3:42 The enigmatic Nica Leon, makes an interesting claim that those around him did not originally react to his shout against Ceausescu on 21 December 1989 during Ceausescu’s address from the balcony of the CC because they were used to and anticipating the usual pro-Ceausescu chant (for more on Nica Leon…see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/24/cc-ul-in-zilele-fierbinte-decembrie-1989/)

min. 4:20 Interesting and rarely heard explanation for what sounded like firecrackers in the square–people dropping banners and wooden supports being crushed in the panic and confusion of the moment (for a discussion, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/20/21-decembrie-bucuresti-in-legatura-cu-busculada-de-la-mitingul-lui-nicolae-ceausescu/)

min. 4:40 A good characterizations, along the lines Romanians “now know Ceausescu’s authority is under direct challenge.”

min. 5:21 An unfortunate discussion of Stanculescu, talking about his putting his leg in a cast (“ghipsulescu”) but nothing about his direct role in ordering the repression of demonstrators in Timisoara (Marius Mioc has detailed Stanculescu’s role in Timisoara extensively at mariusmioc.wordpress.com, for a recent post on the topic, see  http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/12/05/victor-stanculescu-invitatul-lui-basescu-la-receptia-dedicata-zilei-de-1-decembrie/)

min. 6:10 12:08 East of Bucharest, Ceausescu flees by helicopter via the route he had “always planned to take if the Russians invaded” (see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/nicolae-ceausescu-flight-interrupted-and-pictures-at-an-execution/ and  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/ )

min. 6:45-7:20 Dan Iosif as intelligent (?); clever perhaps but…more honest is his own self-depiction at 7:20 as a “working man”

min. 8:50 Classic, Petre Roman depicts himself as noticing that he is the “only one from the streets” at the formation of the National Salvation Front, while all the rest are old politicians!

min. 11:04-11:25 Discussion of military plot’s plan to arrest Ceausescu in February 1990, but that the arms were only supposed to arrived by January 1990, and they were overtaken by events.

min. 11:53 Militaru claims emphatically that Iliescu was part of the background, more enduring conspiracy

min. 12:58 Militaru suggests Iliescu was involved (in fact it was Iliescu’s brainchild, he suggests) in the sending of a manifesto to a foreign radio station in the name of the National Salvation Front in the months leading up to December (for discussion, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/18/25-years-ago-front-du-salut-national-frontul-salvarii-nationale-gets-international-press-coverage-for-the-first-time/)

min. 15:55-16:16 Interesting discussion of Militaru’s visit to the Soviet Consulate on 20 August 1987

min. 16:38 Surprise!  Emil Barbulescu, Ceausescu’s nephew says Gorbachev and the Soviets overthrew his uncle, in part because of Ceausescu’s territorial claims over Bessarabia and demand that the Russians return the Romanian tezaur (treasure)!

min. 17:31 Magureanu in his characterization of the time of Soviet involvement (for details, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/17/virgil-magureanu-despre-decembrie-1989-strict-secret-18-decembrie-1990-romania-libera-1-iulie-1994/)

min 18:09 Discussion of counterrevolution of Ceausescu’s security forces and Order 2600 (re. the latter see here https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ordinul-2600-1988-al-ministerului-de-interne/)

min. 21:44 (Correctly) Discounts theories of a staged execution

min. 22:53 Panipat pastry shop (ah, memories of Bucharest 1994) and discussion of Romania someday getting into the EU

min. 23:43 Interesting observation of the different posthumous treatment of Nicolae v. Elena Ceausescu and the already then in 1994 nostalgia for Nicolae Ceausescu.

http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/ten-days-that-fooled-the-world-1387659.html

Ten days that fooled the world

Five years ago this week, the world rejoiced as Romania rose to overthr ow its dictator. JOHN SIMPSON, who was there for the BBC, went back and has dis covered startling evidence that the revolution was not as it seemed

It was the defining revolution of our time, a darkly satisfying affair that opened with the dictator’s moment of comic stupefaction when the crowd presumed to boo him, reached its height as the wild-eyed, newly liberated crowds stormed the Centra l Committee building, waving flags with holes where the Communist insignia had been and chanting songs about Nicolae Ceausescu being no more, and closed with the spectacle of the tyrant and his Lady Macbeth wife lying dead in the snow at Tirgoviste.

No velvet revolution here: this sprang from an ancient, autochthonous affinity for violence. From the first confrontation in Timisoara on 16 December to the executions on Christmas Day, these were 10 days which sated the world’s appetite for drama and revenge.

And yet it wasn’t just a popular insurrection, pure and simple. Within hours of the capture of the Central Committee building as the crowds bayed in the square outside and Ceausescu’s office was taken over by a romantic gaggle of revolutionaries – film-makers, sculptors, actresses, petty crooks, and a former circus stunt-man who was almost acclaimed president – a meeting was being held in a small, windowless room elsewhere in the building at which the real leaders of the new Romania were sorting out thecountry’s future.

There was nothing romantic about these men. All were former communists, and most had been high-ranking officials under Ceausescu. What united them was the fact that they had become disaffected, and wanted to get rid of him. Several had strong links with Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, and wanted to create his kind of perestroika communism in Romania.

Recently, I travelled with a film crew to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, to interview Gorbachev’s former lieutenant, Eduard Shevardnadze. He looked tired, puffy-faced, and his familiar white quiff was wilting. It felt very strange to see a man of this international distinction in such distant, small-time surroundings; rather like finding that Douglas Hurd had become governor general of your Caribbean holiday island, or meeting Valery Giscard d’Estaing in a mayor’s parlour in the Auvergne.

Shevardnadze explained how Ceausescu represented a serious stumbling-block to Gorbachev’s plans for a new Europe. Like Erich Honecker in East Germany and Milos Jakes in Czechoslovakia, only worse.

“All these leaders had to go,” he said meaningfully, and described how Gorbachev and Ceausescu had had such a violent row not long before the revolution that the security men almost had to be called in.

So had the KGB been involved in Ceausescu’s overthrow?

“You can’t always tell with an organisation as secretive as that,” Shevardnadze said. “It’s possible; but to organise everything that happened in Romania was beyond the KGB’s capacity. This was a real expression of popular protest against the regime.”

Still, there was certainly a great deal of KGB activity in Romania that December. Virgil Magureanu, the former dissident who is now head of the SRI, the cleaned-up Romanian intelligence organisation which took over from the Securitate, invited us into his headquarters in Bucharest to talk about it.

“It was clear at the time,” Magureanu said, “that the Soviet special services, the KGB, put a great deal of effort not just into finding out what was going on in Romania, but also in carrying out `diversions’ against the former regime.”

Some of these people came in disguised as tourists, he said, and drove around in Russian cars; though he felt that this had been rather unprofessional of them.

Whatever the “diversions” they carried out – he wouldn’t elaborate – there were certainly several conspiracies among the Romanian armed forces, and even in the Securitate itself, to overthrow Ceausescu; and the Russians were told about the most importantone early on.

The central figure was General Nicolae Militaru, who was briefly to become defence minister after the revolution. Nowadays he lives on his small and scarcely adequate service pension in a rambling house in one of the best Art Deco suburbs of Bucharest. Trained at the Frunze military academy in Russia, where Soviet intelligence recruited a great many agents among the Eastern European cadets, Militaru began plotting actively against Ceausescu in 1984.

Three years later he felt ready to approach the Russians. He visited the Soviet consul in the Romanian port of Constanta and asked him what Moscow’s response would be if Ceausescu were to be overthrown. The consul left the room to consult Moscow. When h e returned, he was smiling: “Comrade Militaru, the Soviet Union does not interfere in the domestic affairs of Romania.”

“I realised,” Militaru told us, “that the message was, do whatever you think you need to.” Together with Ion Iliescu and other disaffected, pro-Gorbachev figures, he formed the National Salvation Front, and sent a manifesto in its name to Radio Free Europe in the spring of 1989. The intention was to stage a bloodless coup against Ceausescu in February 1990. The conspirators would disable his bodyguards with tranquillizer guns, arrest him and put him on trial.

Like everyone else, they were taken by surprise when the uprising in Timisoara led to outright revolution in Bucharest a few days later. The plot came to nothing, but those who had planned it were organised, and that gave them a head-start when it came to taking over power.

On 22 December, a few hours after the crowd had stormed the Central Committee building and Ceausescu had got away by helicopter from the roof, following the old escape route he had always planned to take if the Russians invaded Romania, Iliescu, Militar u and several others held their meeting in a windowless room.

Iliescu was the acknowledged leader. There were two outsiders present. One was Petre Roman, the son of a famous old communist, but himself an academic who had been swept into the Central Committee building in the first wave of revolutionaries. The other

was an amateur photographer brandishing a video camera. Roman’s incisive intelligence, allied to his father’s name, made him instantly acceptable. As for the cameraman, things were so chaotic in the room that scarcely anyone noticed him.

We have been given the videotape he recorded, and will be broadcasting it fully for the first time. The man who gave it to us decided to get out of Romania because of the threats he was receiving.

The reason for these threats appears about half way through the tape, when someone suggests that the new government should be called the National Salvation Front. Petre Roman objects at first, saying the name sounds much too Communist. General Militaru, a gloomy presence standing behind Iliescu’s chair, then blurts out the secret: it wasn’t chance that had caused this particular group of people to gather here in order to decide Romania’s future government. “Look, my dear chaps,” he says, “the National Salvation Front has been in existence for six months.”

Afterwards, Militaru never wanted to make any secret of the fact that he had plotted against Ceausescu. Others, however, tried to make him keep quiet about it. Silviu Brucan, the political scientist who had once been something of a Stalinist but had ended up in opposition to Ceausescu, poured cold water on Militaru’s claims, perhaps because he had been under house arrest himself and had played no part in the plot.

As for Iliescu, his landslide victory at the polls in May 1990 gave him, and the National Salvation Front, full legitimation. For this reason, perhaps, Iliescu dislikes the suggestion that the Front first came to power through manipulation and conspiracy. “I don’t think revolutions can be organised by someone outside the process itself,” Iliescu told us.

“There’s another suggestion, that the Romanian revolution has been confiscated by Iliescu and his friends,” he went on, pointing at his chest. “It is a non-realistic, non-political and non-scientific approach to a social process.”

Non-scientific”, “social process”: Iliescu has learnt the arts of democracy in the past five years, but he still can’t entirely shake off the language of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In many ways though, he’s right. The revolution was much too big for a small group of men to hijack, and anyway the reform communism which the Front existed to promote was always a non-starter. The crowds in the square hadn’t thrown Ceausescu out in order to have a milder version of Marxism-Leninism imposed on them. There was a simple, unspoken trade-off: Iliescu and his friends were allowed to rule, but they had to do so in the way the crowd wanted. And what the crowds wanted was a return to capitalism.

To an extent, that’s what they now have. Romania’s economy isn’t particularly thriving, but the country has been transformed during the past five years. Clothes are better, there is decent food in the shops, and there are fewer beggars than there used tobe. There used to be such privation here that immediately after the revolution, I saw two 11-year-old boys looking at the oranges on display in a shop window and arguing whether they were things you played with, or things you ate.

The old sense of fear and oppression has gone completely. The “new man” who once supported Ceausescu’s ludicrous, North Korean personality cult still undoubtedly exists: cynical, empty, dedicated merely to making a career for himself. Many of them, afterleaving the Party or the Securitate, are now doing well in business. The smooth, well-educated and cynical Securitate major who arrested my colleagues and me in Cluj not long before the revolution has a big Mercedes now and runs an importing company.

This was a very strange kind of revolution: plotted in the interests of a superpower that was just about to disappear, by men who were forced to turn the country back to capitalism, even though they knew scarcely anything about it, and in which the greatest beneficiaries are probably the people who did most to make the old dictatorship unendurable.

And yet everyone benefited from Ceausescu’s overthrow – particularly those ecstatic crowds who came out on to the streets on 22 December 1989 and took control of their own lives for the first time.

John Simpson’s investigation into the Romanian revolution will be broadcast tonight in `Newsnight’ on BBC2 at 10.30pm.

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Romania’s Olympic Sharpshooters during the Revolution against Nicolae Ceausescu

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 14, 2014

Ion Corneliu, Olympic sharpshooter:  “The terrorists had a lot of sophisticated equipment. So, even though they were small in numbers they could cover a great area. The Securitat[e] ran the country, even the army.”  
Ion Corneliu
Sorin Babii
 

Romanian Olympic Shooter Downplays His Role in Revolution

April 14, 1990|ELLIOTT ALMOND | TIMES STAFF WRITER

From every revolution blossom legendary moments.

Paul Revere’s ride. Marie Antoinette’s beheading. A lone Chinese man blocking the path of a Red Army tank in Tien An Men Square.

Situations are magnified when performed in the theater of change.

But sometimes, in this chaotic environment, circumstances become muddled and legends exaggerated.

Last December, the world was entranced by an unfolding drama on the streets of Bucharest, Romania. Previously faceless citizens were voicing opposition to the repressive rule of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

In contrast to nearby Czechoslovakia, where the downfall of the Communist Party was accomplished peacefully, Ceausescu was being uprooted by force.

Daily televised reports showed mobs in Bucharest’s Palace Square chanting slogans and opposing the Securitat, the dictator’s private army that controlled the country through intimidation.

In 11 days of bloodshed, many riveting stories were reported. But perhaps none was as captivating as those about Romanian Olympic pistol shooters Ion Corneliu and Sorin Babii, who reportedly volunteered to flush out Communist forces and defend a military target.

Now, though, Corneliu, Romania’s three-time Olympian in pistol competition, says such reports were exaggerated.

“It’s just not true,” he said last week at the 1990 World Cup USA tournament at Petersen’s Prado Tiro Ranges in Chino.

Corneliu, 39, one of six Romanians on an international tour, downplayed his role in last winter’s fighting. He and Tiron Costica, the national team trainer, spoke about the revolution and its legacy with the help of U.S. national pistol coach, Dan Iuga, a Romanian who defected seven years ago.

“The shooters (mostly military personnel) were confined to their units,” Corneliu recalled. “They stayed put and fought from there.”

Corneliu, a major, won a gold medal at the Moscow Olympics and a silver at Los Angeles. Partially because of these performances, he recently was named president of the Romanian Shooting Federation.

During the 11 days that shook Romania, Corneliu had more important concerns than target practice at his military club in the Ghencea neighborhood of northeast Bucharest.

“During the first night of fighting, the captain of our (national) rugby team [RAH note:  see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/23/la-inceput-adevarul-povestea-unui-tanar-rugbyst-florin-butiri-impuscat-cu-gloante-dum-dum-pe-24-decembrie-1989/ and for the case of another rugby player Bogdan Serban Stan, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/11/14/gloante-vidia-de-56-mm-22-24-decembrie-89-zona-tvr/]  was killed and a couple others were wounded at our base,” Corneliu said. “Somehow the people were prepared to fight the regime. But you know, it is scary to start to fight. . . . They were shooting real bullets.”

Corneliu said the national shooting team missed the major battles because it was stationed outside the city center. He said that although most of the shooters were military club personnel, they were considered soldiers once the rapid-fire events began.

That was a few days before the actual fighting, Corneliu said. When it was apparent that independent movements from cities such as Timisoara were spreading throughout the country, army leaders were told to suppress the activists.

Commanders, however, emerged as a pivotal opposition force, and earned enormous prestige.

“When the time came for Ceausescu to leave, we received orders to defend our position against anybody who would try to attack,” Corneliu said. “We suddenly became part of the revolution.

“It was very lucky that the army was ordered not to move. If we had received an order to fight against the revolution it would have been a blood bath.

“The army was not trained for this kind of war in the city, and the psychological warfare. The Securitat already had alternate plans in case something like this happened. The army just wondered what it should do.”

In an effort to thwart revolutionaries, Securitat forces tried to overtake strategic points around Bucharest, including television, radio and telephone communication centers, the airport and Corneliu’s base.

Corneliu said Ceausescu’s forces wanted access to the base’s gunnery.

“They would shoot in our direction and we would answer,” he said. “But we didn’t know who was there or where they were.

“The terrorists had a lot of sophisticated equipment. So, even though they were small in numbers they could cover a great area. The Securitat ran the country, even the army.”

The loyalist sharpshooters were equipped with infrared telescopic sights and were able to pick off Romania’s revolutionary soldiers at night, the Soviet news agency Tass reported last December.

Whereas Corneliu and other Romanian national shooters were isolated in their fortress, Costica was among the thousands in Palace Square demanding Ceausescu’s ouster after 24 years of control.

Costica said the gripping, spontaneous scenes will stay with him forever.

“A separate group of security forces were dressed like riot police one day,” he said. “We were face to face with them. We asked them, ‘You’re our brothers. What are you doing?’ They did not say anything. They were unmoving, as if they were on drugs.”

Some of the poignant moments downtown occurred when armored trucks and tanks crushed people who tried to block their way. Corneliu said his brother, a doctor who worked in a hospital emergency room, treated some of those victims.

After a month’s traveling, the Romanians looked a bit weary but understood the importance of talking publicly about their country’s plight. Western curiosity has generated an endless stream of questions.

Four months ago, they would have been uncomfortable discussing the East European political landscape in the United States.

“(Before), when we left the country we couldn’t say anything,” Costica said. “We could never tell people that we didn’t believe in the Communist system but only played along because it was the only way to participate in what you wanted to do.

“Our athletes feel they have been persecuted by the system too. We didn’t get any special advantages. We would have been thrown in prison the next day if we said anything while out of the country.”

(Page 2 of 2)

Romanian Olympic Shooter Downplays His Role in Revolution

April 14, 1990|ELLIOTT ALMOND | TIMES STAFF WRITER

Some of the poignant moments downtown occurred when armored trucks and tanks crushed people who tried to block their way. Corneliu said his brother, a doctor who worked in a hospital emergency room, treated some of those victims.

After a month’s traveling, the Romanians looked a bit weary but understood the importance of talking publicly about their country’s plight. Western curiosity has generated an endless stream of questions.

Four months ago, they would have been uncomfortable discussing the East European political landscape in the United States.

“(Before), when we left the country we couldn’t say anything,” Costica said. “We could never tell people that we didn’t believe in the Communist system but only played along because it was the only way to participate in what you wanted to do.

“Our athletes feel they have been persecuted by the system too. We didn’t get any special advantages. We would have been thrown in prison the next day if we said anything while out of the country.”

So now they talk. And they dream.

The political and economic realities have replaced the giddiness of those heady days just after Ceausescu and his family were executed.

To the west, there is the Hungarian question in Transylvania. The Romanians do not want the minority population there to join neighboring Hungary.

To the east there is the Moldavian question in the Soviet Union. The Romanians want to reunite with the Soviet republic. A secret pact by Hitler in 1939 allowed Moldavia’s annexation by the USSR.

Corneliu said he cannot predict the outcome of these pressing issues.

But revolutionary hero or not, he is proud to have played a role in determining Romania’s future.

http://articles.latimes.com/1990-04-14/sports/sp-1113_1_romanian-olympic

http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1989/12/28/page/29/article/marksmen-score-with-new-rulers

Richard Andrew Hall, The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums (like me…and perhaps even you)

Another apparent synonym for “vidia” is “crestata” or “notched.” I take it that the reference is to the same type of munitions because the damage caused to those wounded by them was equally catastrophic. In December 2007, Alexandru Tudor, a soccer official famous apparently for his stern, unsmiling demeanor, who was shot on 23 December 1989 around 10 am in the area of Piata Aviatorilor near the TV studio, recounted the episode that ended his career:

They brought me to Colentina Hospital and there I had the great fortune of two great doctors. If they had operated on me, they would have to amputate both my legs beneath the knee, but instead they left the bullets in there 12 days. Their explanation was that the bullets were too close to arteries, and since they were gloante crestate (notched bullets), it was very dangerous. After they were removed, I kept the bullets, I have them at home. I was on crutches for six months, I went through therapy, but I had to give up soccer.[22]

Also on the 18th anniversary of the Revolution, a frustrated poster to another site asked pointedly:

Who in Romania in 1989 had 5.5 mm caliber NATO-type munition, that in addition was “notched”—something outlawed by the Geneva Convention, while it is known that the Romanian Army had only the caliber used by Warsaw Pact nations for their weapons, that is to say 7,62 mm….At that time even the Olympic speed shooting champion, Sorin Babii, expressed his surprise….I had in my hand several samples of this cartridge: small, black, with a spiral on the top, or with 4 cuts (those who know a little bit about ballistics and medical forensics can attest to the devastating role caused by these modifications). I await a response to my questions…perhaps someone will be willing to break the silence. I thank you in advance. [emphases added][23]

[22]“A invatat sa zambeasca, [He learned how to smile],” http://marianmanescu.wordpress.com/2007/12/21/a-invatat-sa-zambeasca.

[23] http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-2121712-ultimele_zile_revolutiei_romane.htm.

Intrebari(Duminică, 23 decembrie 2007, 11:33)Istoric [anonim]
Cu repectul cuvenit fatza de cei omoriti in decembrie 1989,civili si militari,in calitate de rezervist al armatei Romane,indraznesc sa intreb si eu :
1. De ce NIMENI,absolut NIMENI ,nu incearca sa explice articolul din “Scinteia Tineretului” din 17.12.1989 (presa controlata in TOTALITATE de cenzura ceausista ) ,articol intitulat “Sfaturi pentru turistii aflati ACUM LA MARE ” (!),publicat in pagina a VII -a a ziarului sub forma unei coloane ,articol din care mai tin minte si acum (nu voi uita niciodata)sfaturi de genul “Cei ce se vor avinta prea mult in larg,sa stie ca serviciile Salvamar nu ii vor cauta” sau “Cei ce prefera baile de soare sa stie ca cea mai mare concentratie de Ultraviolete este intre orele 4 si 6 dimineatza” sau “Cei ce prefera muntele marii sa stie ca nu vor fi iertati”;;;;;Cam ciudate sfaturi pentru turistii ce mergeau la mare sa se imbaieze in decembrie…
2. Cine avea in Romania anului 1989,munitie tip NATO, 5.5 mm calibru, in plus “crestata” – lucru interzis de Conventia de la Geneva,stiut fiind faptul ca Armata Romana avea la vremea aceea calibrul Pactului de laVarsovia ,pentru armamentul usor,adica 7,62 mm…..La vremea aceea chiar campionul olimpic la proba de pistol viteza,Sorin Babii,isi exprima nedumerirea….Eu am avut in mina citeva mostre din aceste cartuse :mici,negre,cu o spirala in virf,sau cu 4 muchii (cei ce cunosc putina balistica si medicina legala isi vor da seama de rolul devastator al acestor modoficari…
Astept si acum raspuns la intrebarile mele…poate ca totusi cineva se vagasi sa rupa tacerea…II multumesc anticipat !

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