The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘Angela Bacescu’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 16, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  I have essentially been the only researcher who has consistently advocated this understanding.  Most others–including Peter Siani-Davies–tended to dismiss it.  Now we have documentary evidence that it took place.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film seems to start at min. 19:00 and has to be rewound to its beginning.)  Here, I will focus on the claim beginning at approximately min. 17:40 that the destruction of Timisoara shops and storefronts was organized and a pretext to justify–including legally–the repression by the Ceausescu regime of Timisoara demonstrators.  Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu’s declaration of 17 March 1990 confirms this claim and the observations of eyewitnesses.

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

Tudor Postelnicu (Ministerul de Interne in decembrie 1989):  “Unii militari de la trupele de securitate ale brigazii Timisoara au facut unele provocari la unele magazine si vitrine spargind geamurile sa imprastie participantii de pe straziile din apropriere, apoi au intrat in altercatie cu ei, si acum (?) vor sa le faca militia ordine.  ‘Nu am aflat ca costa provocare a zis Gl. Nuta, am trimis pe …” (17.III.1990) 

http://sensidev.com/fc/dosare%20de%20urmarire%20penala/dosar%20%20de%20urmarire%20penala%20volumul%2011/IMG_2576.JPG (Dosarul de Urmarire Penala, Vol. 11, IMG 2576)

IMG_2576

image0

Before we move on here, it is worth noting how this destruction was covered in Peter Siani-Davies’ 2005 volume The Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  As I have written on many occasions, Siani-Davies’ volume is wonderfully-written and is excellent, but the claim by Daniel Chirot that is a “near-definitive” account is far off the mark.  One of the negative characteristics of Siani-Davies’ work is the use of “filler” rational choice, cui bono arguments where he concludes there is not enough information to make a valid judgment.  The problem is the question is never one of “what was possible?” “what makes ‘sense’?” but rather what did happen?

Thus, for example in the case of the destruction of Timisoara Siani-Davies argues that there was already enough of a basis for the regime to crackdown, therefore why would they need to create a pretext for cracking down:  “Given the seriousness of the situation and the fact that shots had already been fired elsewhere, the security forces hardly needed to produce a further ‘excuse’ for the massacre which was to follow.” (p. 68)

image0-001

image0-003

Back to exploring more of the evidence…

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997/

image0-005

Moldovan Fica (martor ocular)

image0-001

image0

Andras Vasile (martor ocular)

image0-003

image0-002

image0-004

Ioan Savu discussed the windowbreakers as follows:

0282

0280

———————————-

Other depictions of this event available online:

Conducerea partidului, alarmată, a trimis în Piaţa Maria, conform Ordinului 02600, numeroşi miliţieni şi trupe speciale, pentru a lichida manifestaţia care luase amploare. Circulaţia în zonă se întrerupsese. În Piaţa Maria au fost trimişi aproximativ 200 de activişti de partid, miliţieni şi numeroşi ofiţeri de securitate, îmbrăcaţi în haine civile. Au urmat ciocniri violente, mai ales după ce manifestanţii s-au încolonat şi au pornit spre sediul CJ PCR, strigând “Libertate”, “Vrem pâine”, “Vrem căldură”, “Azi la Timişoara, mâine în toată ţara”.
În acea seară echipe de miliţie dinainte pregătite au spart vitrinele magazinelor din centrul oraşului, pentru a avea argumente pentru o intervenţie în forţă. Desigur, multe vitrine au fost sparte şi de derbedei, asupra cărora s-au găsit bunuri furate. În acea noapte au fost arestate aproape 5-600 de cetăţeni. Ei au fost duşi la Penitenciarul oraşului, unde au fost bătuţi în mod bestial. În zilele care au urmat arestării au fost anchetaţi în vederea trimiterii lor în judecată. Bineînţeles, dacă Revoluţia n-ar fi reuşit.

“Azi la Timişoara”
Ivan Sabin

http://revista.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=371

Totuşi, se ştie că în acele zile fierbinţi din Timişoara au existat „personaje neidentificate” care au acţionat în mai multe zone ale oraşului. Am să amintesc aici doar două aspecte concrete cu privire la implicarea acestora în evenimentele din Timişoara. În zilele de 16 şi 17 decembrie au fost sparte aproape toate vitrinele magazinelor din zona centrală a oraşului. Sunt zeci de declaraţii ale revoluţionarilor care fac o descriere clară a celor care au spart acele geamuri. Au fost oameni bine îmbrăcaţi, robuşti şi tunşi scurt. Aceştia erau dotaţi cu nişte beţe speciale cu care printr-un gest scurt şi foarte bine exersat loveau vitrinele, după care plecau fără a încerca să sustragă ceva din magazine. Aceste persoane au fost văzute chiar şi de forţele de ordine desfăşurate în acea zonă, care în mod ciudat nu au luat măsuri împotriva lor, ci au acţionat împotriva manifestanţilor ce demonstrau împotriva regimului ceauşist. Un alt aspect relatat de mulţi timişoreni se referă mai ales la zilele de 17-19 decembrie, când, în rândul cordoanelor militare din diferite dispozitive amplasate în zonele importante ale oraşului, între soldaţi, erau intercalate persoane mai în vârstă, nebărbierite îmbrăcate doar parţial în uniforme militare, care nu făceau parte din acele unităţi militare.

Cine au fost acele „persoane neidentificate”? De ce s-a dorit în unele cercuri, cu insistenţă chiar, acreditarea ideii că oamenii au fost scoşi în stradă de agenţi străini? De ce, chiar şi după 20 de ani, se fac afirmaţii de genul: cadavrele celor arşi la Crematoriul „Cenuşa” erau ale unor agenţi străini? Nu voi căuta acum răspunsuri la aceste întrebări, dar, cu siguranţă, ele există.

Kali Adrian Matei

nascut in 30 iulie 1968 la Timisoara, muncitor la IJPIPS (1989), profesor de istorie la Liceul de informatica (1998), impuscat in spate

La Bijuterii concetatenii nostri tigani carau ce puteau. Numai la “Modex” nu era spart. Un grup de oameni se uitau cum niste indivizi bine instruiti spargeau geamurile de linga restaurantul Bulevard. Am rugat oamenii sa apere Modexul, pentru ca era clar ca spargatorii n-aveau nimic comun cu revolta.  30 septembrie 1995  http://timisoara.com/newmioc/4.htm

“În data de 14 decembrie, securitatea a spart toate gemurile din partea străzii principale, iar clădirea arăta ca o cetate asediată. Fostul primar al Timişorei, Petre Moţ l-a vizitat pe Tokes şi a ieşit la geam pentru a vorbi mulţimii. Moţ a cerut să se pună geamuri noi. Erau foarte multe maşini ale securiştilor. Întreaga stradă era ocupată. Se făcea filaj. Eu locuiam acolo, ba intram, ba ieşeam. Nu se vorbea încă revoluţie. Era o solidaritatea faţă de pastor”, declarat Iosif Kabai (foto), care locuieşte şi acum în clădirea bisericii reformate.Citeste mai mult: adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/16-decembrie-1989-ziua-timisoara-s-a-strigat-data-democratie-jos-comunismul-1_50bd3d887c42d5a663c8e01f/index.html

Radu Tinu cu Angela Bacescu…

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

image0-006

RADU TINU:…SINGURLE COMPLEXE COMERCIALE RAMASE INTREGI AU FOST CELE DIN FATA MILITIEI JUDETENE SI CEL DE LANGA FABRICA “MODERN”…

image0-007

image0-008

 

The significance of window-breaking as a justification for repression–something the Securitate would have realized–was outlined by Nicolae Ceausescu in his teleconference of 17 December 1989 as follows:

“Oricine intra intr-un Consiliu Popular, intr-un sediu de partid sau sparge un geam la un magazin trebuie sa primeasca riposta imediat.

0007

Col. Ion Popescu (sef IGM)’s defense lawyer appealed to Legea 21 and Decretul 121 specifically as obligating Interior Ministry (M.I.–Militia and Securitate) forces to intervene in response to the breaking of windows of commercial units…

image0-001

image0

Thus, the breaking of windows, which according to Interior Minister was instigated and carried out in part by Securitate Brigade 30 under the command of Ion Bunoaica served a bureaucratic and legalistic function–a tactic not unknown in the annals of other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes…

image-18image-17image-16image-15

image-4image-9

———————————–

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

“A group of former Securitate officers” wrote to the Ceausist Democratia in September 1990 that after the Militia and Securitate refused to respond to the demonstrations provoked by the “foreign tourists”: “they advance[d] to the next stage: the massive destruction of public property designed to provoke forcible interventions–human victims were needed.”[68]

Nevertheless, here is how one opposition journalist, Grid Modorcea, has described the strange character of Timisoara destruction:

For the first time in history, a revolution…was announced in a previously unknown and absolutely original manner, both literally and figuratively speaking: through the methodical breakage of thousands of windows. On 16 and 17 December 1989, Timisoara was the city of [glass] shards. Well-trained groups of athletes spread throughout the town, tactically, but energetically smashing to pieces hundreds of huge windows without apparently being interested in stealing from these stores…they were like mythical Magis coming to announce the end of one world and the beginning of another. And they gave it an apocalyptic quality: the sound produced by the breaking glass was infernal. The panic this caused was indescribable….Those who “executed” the windows did so with karate-like kicks while yelling “Liberty and Justice”!…The crowds of people who came out into the streets transformed spontaneously into columns of demonstrators, of authentic revolutionaries. The effect was therefore monumental: the breaking of the windows unleashed the popular revolt against the dictator.[69]

Modorcea is convinced that the Tokes case was “merely a pretext” and that “someone–perhaps those who planned the vandalizing of the windows–has an interest in preventing it from being known who broke the windows.” Although Modorcea maintains he is unsure who was responsible, he insists on observing that:

Only the Customs people know how many tourists there were. All were men and long-haired. Inside their cars they had canisters. This fits with the method of the breaking of the windows, with the Molotov cocktails, and the drums used as barricades–they were exactly of the same type….To what extent the new regime which came to power was implicated, we cannot say![70]

Many Timisoara protesters appear torn between wishing to rationalize the extensive destruction as the courageous response of an enraged, long-suffering population, and denying that the perpetrators could have come from among their ranks. Even those investigators attuned to the retroactive psychology of the protesters cannot help but admit that widespread destruction occurred and that it could not have been wholly spontaneous.[71] Furthermore, as Laszlo Tokes has observed in discussing the events at Piata Maria, manipulation and attempts to instigate the crowd to violence were constant features during these days.

Tokes maintains that Securitate provocateurs had tried to agitate the crowd by shouting things like, “Let’s break into the house. The Securitate are in there; they’re trying to kidnap Laszlo Tokes! Let’s rush them!” and by appealing for him to “Come down into the street and lead us!”[72] According to Tokes:

I was alarmed at the obvious provocation from individuals in the crowd clearly intent on making the situation uncontrollable….Later, thinking about the events of those two days, I realized that the authorities would have had a great deal to gain if the situation had become a riot.[73]

Mircea Balan questions whether the protesters would have set stores on fire which were located on the ground floor of the buildings in which the protesters themselves lived.[74] Moreover, he wonders how even the revolutionary fury of the crowd could drive protesters to break so many windows, particularly given the presence of repressive forces on the streets. It is what Balan has termed the “systematic devastation” of property which raises questions.

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

Mircea Balan has little doubt who committed this “systematic destruction”:

Demonstrators might have thrown rocks in windows, but the destruction of the entire store was not their work…Nobody need believe that for such a thing foreign intervention was necessary, seeing as there were enough first-class specialists in destruction and demolition right here at home. The Securitate could not have been foreign to what happened, no matter how much it fiercely attempts to deny this today. They were professionals in the art of destruction. They needed a justification for the bloody repression.[78]

In March 1990, Puspoki had been willing to identify the culprits more specifically. According to Puspoki, as the demonstrators began to gather to prevent Tokes’ eviction:

The USLA’s Sabotage and Diversion team was readied to break store windows, to devastate and set fires–to create the conditions necessary for mass repression: the existence of disorder in the streets and theft on the part of the demonstrators.[79]

Securitate Major Radu Tinu’s observation that the commercial complex “in front of the county Militia building” (i.e. the Inspectorate in which both the Securitate and Militia offices were located) was one of only two such complexes in the whole city to remain intact during these days may also be an indication of the source of the destruction.[80]

It is possible then that to the extent that this destruction did indeed contain an organized component, it was designed by the regime to subvert and cast suspicion upon the intentions of the protesters and to create a pretext for repression. To the extent that an organized component did contribute to the destruction, it was far more likely to have been regime forces attempting to undermine the protests than foreign agents attempting to provoke an uprising against the regime.

[65].. See, for example, Grid Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor [The Breaking of the Windows],” Expres Magazin, no. 49 (1991), 8-9; Mircea Bunea, “Eroii noi si vechi [New and old heroes],” Adevarul, 2 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 448-449; Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 57-58.

[66].. See, for example, the comments of Radu Tinu, the deputy director of the Timis County Securitate, in Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 67-85.

[67].. Mircea Bunea, “Ipse Dixit,” Adevarul, 21 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 463. Vlad’s determination to emphasize that these were “acts without precedent” makes one wonder if they were indeed without precedent.

[68].. A group of former Securitate officers, “Asa va place revolutia? Asa a fost! [You like the revolution? Here is how it was!],” Democratia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4. The lengthy defense by these officers of the Fifth Directorate in this letter suggests that they were members of this directorate.

[69].. Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” 8.

[70].. Ibid.

[71].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[72].. Tokes, With God, for the People, 153, 156.

[73].. Ibid., 156.

[74].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[75].. Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 96.

[76].. Ibid, 118. The fact that the two persons supervising the destruction are described as having worn “leather jackets” strongly suggests they may have been Securitate men. Mihai Decean claims that on a train headed for Bucharest on 25 December (therefore after Ceausescu’s flight), he helped in the arrest of two USLA officers whom he describes as “athletic, with shaved heads, and wearing leather jackets.” See Laura Ganea, “La Timisoara se mai trage inca” Tinerama, no. 77 (July 1991), 3.

[77].. Ibid., 71, 122. Some of the eyewitnesses cited in Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” say similar things; Modorcea, however, gives them a very different interpretation.

[78].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[79].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III).”

[80].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 80.

The following was added some years later as a footnote to the section above in republications of this chapter.  Badea says here “many years later” Postelnicu admitted this, but as we can now see from the Timisoara files, he wrote it in his declaration/statement dated 17 March 1990.

(In connection with the “window breakers” we do know a little more today than we did then back in 1996.  Dan Badea wrote in 1999 Bunoaica and the Window Breakers that “Tudor Postelnicu, the Interior Minister at the time, was to declare many years later that the “breaking of the windows” was a mission executed by personnel from the 30th Securitate Brigade led by col. Ion Bunoaica).  Orele 20.00 – 21.00: Sint sparte toate vitrinele magazinelor de pe Bulevardul 6 Martie (Tudor Postelnicu, ministru de interne la acea vreme, avea sa declare multi ani mai tirziu ca “spargerea vitrinelor” a fost o misiune executata de militari ai Brigazii 30 Securitate condusa de col. Ion Bunoaica).

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

Advertisements

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments »

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on February 13, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This (likely aperiodic) series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  I have essentially been the only researcher who has consistently advocated this understanding.  Most others–including Peter Siani-Davies–tended to dismiss it.  Now we have documentary evidence that it took place.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film seems to start at min. 19:00 and has to be rewound to its beginning.)  Here, I will focus on the claim beginning at approximately min. 17:40 that the destruction of Timisoara shops and storefronts was organized and a pretext to justify–including legally–the repression by the Ceausescu regime of Timisoara demonstrators.  Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu’s declaration of 17 March 1990 confirms this claim and the observations of eyewitnesses.

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

Tudor Postelnicu (Ministerul de Interne in decembrie 1989):  “Unii militari de la trupele de securitate ale brigazii Timisoara au facut unele provocari la unele magazine si vitrine spargind geamurile sa imprastie participantii de pe straziile din apropriere, apoi au intrat in altercatie cu ei, si acum (?) vor sa le faca militia ordine.  ‘Nu am aflat ca costa provocare a zis Gl. Nuta, am trimis pe …” (17.III.1990) 

http://sensidev.com/fc/dosare%20de%20urmarire%20penala/dosar%20%20de%20urmarire%20penala%20volumul%2011/IMG_2576.JPG (Dosarul de Urmarire Penala, Vol. 11, IMG 2576)

IMG_2576

image0

Before we move on here, it is worth noting how this destruction was covered in Peter Siani-Davies’ 2005 volume The Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  As I have written on many occasions, Siani-Davies’ volume is wonderfully-written and is excellent, but the claim by Daniel Chirot that is a “near-definitive” account is far off the mark.  One of the negative characteristics of Siani-Davies’ work is the use of “filler” rational choice, cui bono arguments where he concludes there is not enough information to make a valid judgment.  The problem is the question is never one of “what was possible?” “what makes ‘sense’?” but rather what did happen?

Thus, for example in the case of the destruction of Timisoara Siani-Davies argues that there was already enough of a basis for the regime to crackdown, therefore why would they need to create a pretext for cracking down:  “Given the seriousness of the situation and the fact that shots had already been fired elsewhere, the security forces hardly needed to produce a further ‘excuse’ for the massacre which was to follow.” (p. 68)

image0-001

image0-003

Back to exploring more of the evidence…

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997/

image0-005

Moldovan Fica (martor ocular)

image0-001

image0

Andras Vasile (martor ocular)

image0-003

image0-002

image0-004

Ioan Savu discussed the windowbreakers as follows:

0282

0280

———————————-

Other depictions of this event available online:

Conducerea partidului, alarmată, a trimis în Piaţa Maria, conform Ordinului 02600, numeroşi miliţieni şi trupe speciale, pentru a lichida manifestaţia care luase amploare. Circulaţia în zonă se întrerupsese. În Piaţa Maria au fost trimişi aproximativ 200 de activişti de partid, miliţieni şi numeroşi ofiţeri de securitate, îmbrăcaţi în haine civile. Au urmat ciocniri violente, mai ales după ce manifestanţii s-au încolonat şi au pornit spre sediul CJ PCR, strigând “Libertate”, “Vrem pâine”, “Vrem căldură”, “Azi la Timişoara, mâine în toată ţara”.
În acea seară echipe de miliţie dinainte pregătite au spart vitrinele magazinelor din centrul oraşului, pentru a avea argumente pentru o intervenţie în forţă. Desigur, multe vitrine au fost sparte şi de derbedei, asupra cărora s-au găsit bunuri furate. În acea noapte au fost arestate aproape 5-600 de cetăţeni. Ei au fost duşi la Penitenciarul oraşului, unde au fost bătuţi în mod bestial. În zilele care au urmat arestării au fost anchetaţi în vederea trimiterii lor în judecată. Bineînţeles, dacă Revoluţia n-ar fi reuşit.

“Azi la Timişoara”
Ivan Sabin

http://revista.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=371

Totuşi, se ştie că în acele zile fierbinţi din Timişoara au existat „personaje neidentificate” care au acţionat în mai multe zone ale oraşului. Am să amintesc aici doar două aspecte concrete cu privire la implicarea acestora în evenimentele din Timişoara. În zilele de 16 şi 17 decembrie au fost sparte aproape toate vitrinele magazinelor din zona centrală a oraşului. Sunt zeci de declaraţii ale revoluţionarilor care fac o descriere clară a celor care au spart acele geamuri. Au fost oameni bine îmbrăcaţi, robuşti şi tunşi scurt. Aceştia erau dotaţi cu nişte beţe speciale cu care printr-un gest scurt şi foarte bine exersat loveau vitrinele, după care plecau fără a încerca să sustragă ceva din magazine. Aceste persoane au fost văzute chiar şi de forţele de ordine desfăşurate în acea zonă, care în mod ciudat nu au luat măsuri împotriva lor, ci au acţionat împotriva manifestanţilor ce demonstrau împotriva regimului ceauşist. Un alt aspect relatat de mulţi timişoreni se referă mai ales la zilele de 17-19 decembrie, când, în rândul cordoanelor militare din diferite dispozitive amplasate în zonele importante ale oraşului, între soldaţi, erau intercalate persoane mai în vârstă, nebărbierite îmbrăcate doar parţial în uniforme militare, care nu făceau parte din acele unităţi militare.

Cine au fost acele „persoane neidentificate”? De ce s-a dorit în unele cercuri, cu insistenţă chiar, acreditarea ideii că oamenii au fost scoşi în stradă de agenţi străini? De ce, chiar şi după 20 de ani, se fac afirmaţii de genul: cadavrele celor arşi la Crematoriul „Cenuşa” erau ale unor agenţi străini? Nu voi căuta acum răspunsuri la aceste întrebări, dar, cu siguranţă, ele există.

Kali Adrian Matei

nascut in 30 iulie 1968 la Timisoara, muncitor la IJPIPS (1989), profesor de istorie la Liceul de informatica (1998), impuscat in spate

La Bijuterii concetatenii nostri tigani carau ce puteau. Numai la “Modex” nu era spart. Un grup de oameni se uitau cum niste indivizi bine instruiti spargeau geamurile de linga restaurantul Bulevard. Am rugat oamenii sa apere Modexul, pentru ca era clar ca spargatorii n-aveau nimic comun cu revolta.  30 septembrie 1995  http://timisoara.com/newmioc/4.htm

“În data de 14 decembrie, securitatea a spart toate gemurile din partea străzii principale, iar clădirea arăta ca o cetate asediată. Fostul primar al Timişorei, Petre Moţ l-a vizitat pe Tokes şi a ieşit la geam pentru a vorbi mulţimii. Moţ a cerut să se pună geamuri noi. Erau foarte multe maşini ale securiştilor. Întreaga stradă era ocupată. Se făcea filaj. Eu locuiam acolo, ba intram, ba ieşeam. Nu se vorbea încă revoluţie. Era o solidaritatea faţă de pastor”, declarat Iosif Kabai (foto), care locuieşte şi acum în clădirea bisericii reformate.Citeste mai mult: adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/16-decembrie-1989-ziua-timisoara-s-a-strigat-data-democratie-jos-comunismul-1_50bd3d887c42d5a663c8e01f/index.html

Radu Tinu cu Angela Bacescu…

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

image0-006

RADU TINU:…SINGURLE COMPLEXE COMERCIALE RAMASE INTREGI AU FOST CELE DIN FATA MILITIEI JUDETENE SI CEL DE LANGA FABRICA “MODERN”…

image0-007

image0-008

 

The significance of window-breaking as a justification for repression–something the Securitate would have realized–was outlined by Nicolae Ceausescu in his teleconference of 17 December 1989 as follows:

“Oricine intra intr-un Consiliu Popular, intr-un sediu de partid sau sparge un geam la un magazin trebuie sa primeasca riposta imediat.

0007

Col. Ion Popescu (sef IGM)’s defense lawyer appealed to Legea 21 and Decretul 121 specifically as obligating Interior Ministry (M.I.–Militia and Securitate) forces to intervene in response to the breaking of windows of commercial units…

image0-001

image0

Thus, the breaking of windows, which according to Interior Minister was instigated and carried out in part by Securitate Brigade 30 under the command of Ion Bunoaica served a bureaucratic and legalistic function–a tactic not unknown in the annals of other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes…

image-18image-17image-16image-15

image-4image-9

———————————–

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

“A group of former Securitate officers” wrote to the Ceausist Democratia in September 1990 that after the Militia and Securitate refused to respond to the demonstrations provoked by the “foreign tourists”: “they advance[d] to the next stage: the massive destruction of public property designed to provoke forcible interventions–human victims were needed.”[68]

Nevertheless, here is how one opposition journalist, Grid Modorcea, has described the strange character of Timisoara destruction:

For the first time in history, a revolution…was announced in a previously unknown and absolutely original manner, both literally and figuratively speaking: through the methodical breakage of thousands of windows. On 16 and 17 December 1989, Timisoara was the city of [glass] shards. Well-trained groups of athletes spread throughout the town, tactically, but energetically smashing to pieces hundreds of huge windows without apparently being interested in stealing from these stores…they were like mythical Magis coming to announce the end of one world and the beginning of another. And they gave it an apocalyptic quality: the sound produced by the breaking glass was infernal. The panic this caused was indescribable….Those who “executed” the windows did so with karate-like kicks while yelling “Liberty and Justice”!…The crowds of people who came out into the streets transformed spontaneously into columns of demonstrators, of authentic revolutionaries. The effect was therefore monumental: the breaking of the windows unleashed the popular revolt against the dictator.[69]

Modorcea is convinced that the Tokes case was “merely a pretext” and that “someone–perhaps those who planned the vandalizing of the windows–has an interest in preventing it from being known who broke the windows.” Although Modorcea maintains he is unsure who was responsible, he insists on observing that:

Only the Customs people know how many tourists there were. All were men and long-haired. Inside their cars they had canisters. This fits with the method of the breaking of the windows, with the Molotov cocktails, and the drums used as barricades–they were exactly of the same type….To what extent the new regime which came to power was implicated, we cannot say![70]

Many Timisoara protesters appear torn between wishing to rationalize the extensive destruction as the courageous response of an enraged, long-suffering population, and denying that the perpetrators could have come from among their ranks. Even those investigators attuned to the retroactive psychology of the protesters cannot help but admit that widespread destruction occurred and that it could not have been wholly spontaneous.[71] Furthermore, as Laszlo Tokes has observed in discussing the events at Piata Maria, manipulation and attempts to instigate the crowd to violence were constant features during these days.

Tokes maintains that Securitate provocateurs had tried to agitate the crowd by shouting things like, “Let’s break into the house. The Securitate are in there; they’re trying to kidnap Laszlo Tokes! Let’s rush them!” and by appealing for him to “Come down into the street and lead us!”[72] According to Tokes:

I was alarmed at the obvious provocation from individuals in the crowd clearly intent on making the situation uncontrollable….Later, thinking about the events of those two days, I realized that the authorities would have had a great deal to gain if the situation had become a riot.[73]

Mircea Balan questions whether the protesters would have set stores on fire which were located on the ground floor of the buildings in which the protesters themselves lived.[74] Moreover, he wonders how even the revolutionary fury of the crowd could drive protesters to break so many windows, particularly given the presence of repressive forces on the streets. It is what Balan has termed the “systematic devastation” of property which raises questions.

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

Mircea Balan has little doubt who committed this “systematic destruction”:

Demonstrators might have thrown rocks in windows, but the destruction of the entire store was not their work…Nobody need believe that for such a thing foreign intervention was necessary, seeing as there were enough first-class specialists in destruction and demolition right here at home. The Securitate could not have been foreign to what happened, no matter how much it fiercely attempts to deny this today. They were professionals in the art of destruction. They needed a justification for the bloody repression.[78]

In March 1990, Puspoki had been willing to identify the culprits more specifically. According to Puspoki, as the demonstrators began to gather to prevent Tokes’ eviction:

The USLA’s Sabotage and Diversion team was readied to break store windows, to devastate and set fires–to create the conditions necessary for mass repression: the existence of disorder in the streets and theft on the part of the demonstrators.[79]

Securitate Major Radu Tinu’s observation that the commercial complex “in front of the county Militia building” (i.e. the Inspectorate in which both the Securitate and Militia offices were located) was one of only two such complexes in the whole city to remain intact during these days may also be an indication of the source of the destruction.[80]

It is possible then that to the extent that this destruction did indeed contain an organized component, it was designed by the regime to subvert and cast suspicion upon the intentions of the protesters and to create a pretext for repression. To the extent that an organized component did contribute to the destruction, it was far more likely to have been regime forces attempting to undermine the protests than foreign agents attempting to provoke an uprising against the regime.

[65].. See, for example, Grid Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor [The Breaking of the Windows],” Expres Magazin, no. 49 (1991), 8-9; Mircea Bunea, “Eroii noi si vechi [New and old heroes],” Adevarul, 2 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 448-449; Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 57-58.

[66].. See, for example, the comments of Radu Tinu, the deputy director of the Timis County Securitate, in Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 67-85.

[67].. Mircea Bunea, “Ipse Dixit,” Adevarul, 21 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 463. Vlad’s determination to emphasize that these were “acts without precedent” makes one wonder if they were indeed without precedent.

[68].. A group of former Securitate officers, “Asa va place revolutia? Asa a fost! [You like the revolution? Here is how it was!],” Democratia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4. The lengthy defense by these officers of the Fifth Directorate in this letter suggests that they were members of this directorate.

[69].. Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” 8.

[70].. Ibid.

[71].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[72].. Tokes, With God, for the People, 153, 156.

[73].. Ibid., 156.

[74].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[75].. Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 96.

[76].. Ibid, 118. The fact that the two persons supervising the destruction are described as having worn “leather jackets” strongly suggests they may have been Securitate men. Mihai Decean claims that on a train headed for Bucharest on 25 December (therefore after Ceausescu’s flight), he helped in the arrest of two USLA officers whom he describes as “athletic, with shaved heads, and wearing leather jackets.” See Laura Ganea, “La Timisoara se mai trage inca” Tinerama, no. 77 (July 1991), 3.

[77].. Ibid., 71, 122. Some of the eyewitnesses cited in Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” say similar things; Modorcea, however, gives them a very different interpretation.

[78].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[79].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III).”

[80].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 80.

The following was added some years later as a footnote to the section above in republications of this chapter.  Badea says here “many years later” Postelnicu admitted this, but as we can now see from the Timisoara files, he wrote it in his declaration/statement dated 17 March 1990.

(In connection with the “window breakers” we do know a little more today than we did then back in 1996.  Dan Badea wrote in 1999 Bunoaica and the Window Breakers that “Tudor Postelnicu, the Interior Minister at the time, was to declare many years later that the “breaking of the windows” was a mission executed by personnel from the 30th Securitate Brigade led by col. Ion Bunoaica).  Orele 20.00 – 21.00: Sint sparte toate vitrinele magazinelor de pe Bulevardul 6 Martie (Tudor Postelnicu, ministru de interne la acea vreme, avea sa declare multi ani mai tirziu ca “spargerea vitrinelor” a fost o misiune executata de militari ai Brigazii 30 Securitate condusa de col. Ion Bunoaica).

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

Posted in decembrie 1989 | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments »

Revizionism securist despre spargerea vitrinelor la Timisoara si cateva adevaruri incomode pentru securisti-revizionisti

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 27, 2013

(as always, a strictly personal point of view, based on research dating back to the 1990s and my dissertation defended at Indiana University in December 1996…not for nothing did I include in the title of my dissertation “the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism”!!!; punct de vedere strict personal, ca intotdeauna)

Iata, ce scrie Evenimentul Zilei, un ziar, despre care se spune, ca este mai putin influentat de interesele fostilor securisti…

Marian Ştef, fost securist din Timișoara

”Nu m-au lăsat, la Proces, să vorbesc despre agenții KGB”

Când a început Procesul Revoluţiei, Ştef a ajuns martor al apărării. “Am încercat să povestesc despre “combinezoanele negre” , adică despre agenţii KGB care au făcut atmosferă la Revoluţie. Nu m-au lăsat. În seara de 16 decembrie, aproape de biserica lui Tokes, undeva între orele 19 şi 20, i-am văzut 
prima dată pe agenţi. Erau opt, îmbrăcaţi în negru. Spărgeau vitrinele la Librăria Mihail Sadoveanu şi îi îndemnau şi pe puştanii de stradă să facă la fel. Mi-a sărit în faţă vocea lor: vorbeau româneşte, dar suna diferit. Aveau accent străin. Peste trei zile, am reîntâlnit  combinezoanele negre  pe podul de la Elba, când a fost incendiat un tractor. Erau 12. Instigau oamenii. Au introdus elemente de teroare în rândul oamenilor”, îşi aminteşte fostul ofiţer de contraspionaj economic. A condus singur, jumătate de an, SRI. Dacă la Revoluţie a fost trecut în rezervă, odată cu toate cadrele din fosta Securitate, la scurt timp după înfiinţarea SRI, în august 1990, s-a angajat în structură. Avea gradul de locotenent major. A avut o evoluţie interesantă. Patru ani mai târziu a fost numai prim adjunct al şefului SRI, funcţie pe care a deţinut-o opt ani. Şase luni din această perioadă a condus singur serviciul. S-a pensionat în 2006. 

Citiţi mai mult: Destăinuirile unui fost SECURIST din Timișoara: Revoluția a fost animată cu agenți KGB – EVZ Special > EVZ.ro http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/povestea-securistului-de-bine-revolutia-a-fost-animata-cu-agenti-kgb-1073612.html#ixzz2odWHnsHx 
EVZ.ro

De ce nu cred in ceea ce spune fostul securist

1) Marturia olografica lui Tudor Postelnicu din 17 martie 1990

2) Martori oculari din cartea lui Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu sufletul la Gura (Timisoara, 1990)

3) Un detaliu “scapat” dintr-un interviu intre Radu Tinu, fost securist din Timisoara, si Angela Bacescu in 1991

1)

IMG_2576

Tudor Postelnicu (Ministerul de Interne in decembrie 1989):  “Unii militari de la trupele de securitate ale brigazii Timisoara au facut unele provocari la unele magazine si vitrine spargind geamurile sa imprastie participantii de pe straziile din apropriere, apoi au intrat in altercatie cu ei, si acum (?) vor sa le faca militia ordine.  ‘Nu am aflat ca costa provocare a zis Gl. Nuta, am trimis pe …” (17.III.1990)  http://sensidev.com/fc/dosare%20de%20urmarire%20penala/dosar%20%20de%20urmarire%20penala%20volumul%2011/IMG_2576.JPG (Dosarul de Urmarire Penala, Vol. 11, IMG 2576)

Cateva observatii:

a) Postelnicu nu spune nimic despre asa-zisii “turisti sovietici” sau “turisti rusi” (o tema revizionista foarte populara) …nu spune ca ei au facut distrugerea…

b) In schimb, Postelnicu spune ca securistii au facut provocarile…dar atentie:  nu spune ca ei le-au facut sa intareasca demonstrantii, ci “sa imprastie participantii de pe straziile din apropriere…”

deci nu intr-un scop ca detonatorii a unei revolutii (alta tema revizionista foarte populara), ci ca o tactica din arsenalul represiunii!

Nicolae Serban, “Cine a tras?” Romania Libera, 23 martie 1991, p. 2a.

image0

2) Ioan Savu, declaratie, 11 iulie 1991

Ioan Savu discussed the windowbreakers as follows:

0282

0280

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997/

image0-005

Moldovan Fica (martor ocular)

image0-001

image0

Andras Vasile (martor ocular)

image0-003

image0-002

image0-004

3) Radu Tinu cu Angela Bacescu…

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

image0-006

RADU TINU:…SINGURLE COMPLEXE COMERCIALE RAMASE INTREGI AU FOST CELE DIN FATA MILITIEI JUDETENE SI CEL DE LANGA FABRICA “MODERN”…

image0-007

image0-008

Posted in decembrie 1989 | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Cine este Constantin Isac (“martor la moartea lui Trosca”)?

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 18, 2010

Constantin Isac

http://www.adevarul.ro/sfarsitul_ceausestilor/Constantin_Isac-fost_revolutionar-_Martor_la_moartea_colonelului_Trosca_0_251375419.html

Ce explicaţie aţi găsit pentru uciderea „uslaşilor”?

Simplu: aveau nevoie de „terorişti” ca să justifice ce s-a întâmplat, ca să justifice acţiunile Armatei. Populaţia era chemată pe stradă să apere Televiziunea, Ministerul de trupele fidele regimului. Era felul prin care justificau noua putere. Să ne dovedească faptul că noua putere a venit să lupte pentru noi şi că ne-au salvat de terorişti. Uite, noi ne-am organizat, i-am prins, am luptat cu ei, uitaţi-i!

si pe pagina Asociatiei 21 decembre, membrul Constantin Isac incearca sa ne convinga ca n-au existat teroristi reali in decembrie 1989 http://www.asociatia21decembrie.ro/2010/02/lunetistii/ , numai ca cine este dle. Isac?…Demn de interes pentru iesenii…Constantin Isac in dialog cu Angela Bacescu la revista Europa in 1991…

[Cassian Maria Spiridon, Iaşi 14 decembrie 1989, începutul revoluţiei române, Iaşi, 1994;]

CONSTANTIN ISAC:

“In 13, 14, 15 decembrie 1989 cu ma aflam la Iasi unde participam la Dinamoviada de judo in calitate de arbitru.  Sint arbitru international de judo….Da, Dinamoviada din anul trecut a avut loc la Iasi.  In fiecare an Federatia Romana de judo organiza o competitie sportiva de judo pentru Ministerul de Interne la care iau parte trupe si cadre.  La capitolul trupe intrau tinerii care erau incorporati pentru satisfacerea stagiul militar, la capitolul cadre intrau toti cei care au facut judo, cadre active, constituind o etapa de pregatire dar mai mult o etapa de intilnire intre prieteni.”


Cassian Maria Spiridon, Iaşi 14 decembrie 1989, începutul revoluţiei române, Iaşi, 1994;

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

Dupa 20 de ani: Adevarul vinde…minciuni…fabricate de catre fosta securitate (Angela Bacescu, aprilie 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010

Cazul Angela Bacescu

image-57image-58image-59image-60

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , | 1 Comment »

EUROPA: cu Doru Teodor Maries! Adevarul (despre decembrie 1989) e greu…

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 29, 2010


TEODOR MARIES (13 iunie 1991, interviu luat de Angela Bacescu, revista Europa):

“Am citit aproape toate interviurile luate de dumneavoastra.  Ati facut lumina prin interviul colectiv luat in penitenciarul din Timisoara prin care a fost demascata activitatea de tradare de tara a lui Laszlo Tokes.”

“Doamna Bacescu, dupa mirarea dumneavoastra ar rezulta ca Ceausescu ar fi avut dreptate:  Agenturile straine…”

“Eu n-am sa-l regret niciodata pe Ceausescu.  Singura calitate pe care i-o atribui este ca a fost UN MARE PATRIOT.  A tinut la granite.  Dar in schim ne-a tinut in frig, foame, teroare, iar nevasta sa ne ura efectiv.”

“Eu sustin ca martor ocular ca [securistii] nu au tras.  Ba, mai mult, si-au lasat armele si munitia.  Acum inteleg de ce.  Probabil ca aveau informatii ca gogorita cu “teroristii” o sa fie pusa in spinarea lor.  Au fost bine informati.  Nu s-au implicat in conflict, nu au tras.  Altfel ar fi fost razboi civil, se omora frate cu frate.”


TEODOR MARIES:

“In primul rind in timpul lui Ceausescu nu erau arestati.  Spun acestea pentru ca triplul spion Silviu Brucan, tradatorul neamului romanesc, Laszlo Tokes, si altii sint liberi, si ei sint liberi si acum, inseamna ca atunci tradau tara pusi de catre cei care acum nu-i trag la raspundere cind s-a confirmat vinovatia lor.  In timpul lui Ceausescu daca faceai greva foamei in trei zile venea procurorul militar si rezolva problema.  Dar asta nu-l scuza cu nimic pe Ceausescu.”

iata surpriza (si dezamagirea) mea din 1997 cand am citit si am copiat interviul acesta:  se pare ca romanilor ii plac mituri mai mult decat adevaruri…asa este…


Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Dezinformare securista despre decembrie 1989 in actiune (Zig-Zag, anul 1990): Angela Bacescu (teroristii n-au fost securisti, nici n-au existat teroristi…), Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan (teroristii au fost din DIA, deci Armata, in nici un caz securisti), si Ion Cristoiu (I)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2009

Cazul Angela Bacescu

image-57image-58image-59image-60

Posted in raport final | Tagged: , , , , , | 4 Comments »

ianuarie 1990: “Acum securistii vintura versiunea lor…’Ati tras voi in voi, ca prostii’.” Cum si cind s-a nascut ideea ca teroristii n-au existat in decembrie 1989. Cazul Brasov.

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 9, 2009

Cine a spus prima data ca teroristii n-au existat?

Fostii securisti ei insusi…o dovada in plus aici, din 17 ianuarie 1990–

(…idea ca, cumva, a aparut un articol in aprilie 1990, si cineva povesteste ca el credea si vorbea din 26 decembrie 1989 ca teroristii n-au existat este usor respinsa…fiindca omul a vorbit in presa pentru prima data atunci in aprilie 1990…deci cine stie cind el incepea sa se gindeasca asa?…si atentie, in aprilie 1990, ideea ca teroristii n-ar fi existat in decembrie 1989 era deja larg raspindita..vedeti de exemplu articolul faimos al portavocii fostei securitatii Angela Basescu in Zig-Zag din aprilie 1990 care sugera ca teroristii n-au existat sau au fost imaginari sau inventati (Angela Bacescu Zig-Zag aprilie 1990)…acest articolul de mai jos, din 17 ianuarie 1990, dovedeste, nu dintr-o perspectiva retrospectiva, dar dintr- relatare actuala ca cei care au incercat sa vinda intens teoria ca teroristii n-au existat au fost fosti securisti ei insusi…oare de ce?!)

image-18image-17

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

Securitatea si decembrie 1989: Planul Zig-Zig din 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 30, 2009

Constantin Iftime:  Cat ati stat la “Zig-Zag” ati avut sentimentul ca sunteti manipulat, ca revista este intoxicata?

Ion Cristoiu:  Nu…De unde au pornit toate aceste legende cu manipularea?  Eu am fost primul care, in “Zig-Zag” am deschis acea lunga campanie in legatura cu Revolutia.  Despre revolta populara si lovitura de stat.  Dintre cei care ne aduceau documente pe aceasta tema, era si celebra gazetarita de la “Europa” [e vorba de Angela Bacescu].  Ma trezisem intr-o zi cu o cetateanca in redactie, care sustinea ca vrea sa spuna adevarul, ca nu are nevoie de nici-un ban si ca are multe documente.  Intr-adevar, a adus foarte multe documente, care dadeau si punctul de vedere al Securitatii despre 22 decembrie 1989.  Le-am publicat.  Ulterior, vazand ca ea, Angela Bacescu, a ajuns la “Europa”, am putut presupune ca fusese infiltrata.  Dar nu regret si nu am constiinta ca am fost intoxicati.  Asa am avut mult succes.  In acea perioada conta si punctul de vedere al celeilalte parti.  Eu am aceasta obsesie, nu poate sa existe democratie in care punctului celuilalt de vedere sa i puna pumnul la gura.  Pana in aprilie 1990, Securitatea fusese prezentata ca o forta a raului.  Stiam foarte bine ca, potrivit scenariului, nu ar fi putut sa aiba loc aceasta lovitura de stat fara contributia macar a unei parti a Securitatii.  Deci Securiataea voia sa ajunga la o asemenea gazeta, care avea un atat de mare succes.  Chiar daca veneau si ei cu puncte de vedere, nu am considerat ca suntem intoxicati.  Succesul ziarului dovedea ca cititorii nu erau atat de prosti.  Isi dadeau seama ca si in ceea ce sustinea Securitatea era ceva adevar.  Era o tema absolut noua.  Un punct de vedere socant intr-o perioada in care puterea inca glorifica Revolutia si vorbea mereu de martiri…Iata, cineva incerca, cu documente, sa aduca un alt punct de vedere.  Asa am reabilitat situatia de la Sibiu [fieful lui Nicu Ceausescu] si am aratat ca acolo a fost o mare cacialma.  Am reabilitat asa-zisa batalie cu scoala de politie de la Baneasa.  Am aratat ca, de fapt, nu fusese nici un terorist acolo.  Ulterior, toate lucrurile astea s-au confirmat.

Constantin Iftime:  Pana la urma, Paunescu a fost adus la “Zig-Zag”

Ion Cristoiu: …Bineinteles, in primul sau editorial, Paunescu a spus ca vrea sa puna “Zig-Zag”-ul pe sine si a inceput elogiile la adresa lui Iliescu.  Gestul a fost catastrofal.

(Constantin Iftime, Cu ION CRISTOIU prin infernul contemporan, Bucuresti:  Editura Contraria, 1993, pp. 126-127.)

Angela Bacescu, “Adevarul despre Sibiu,” Zig-Zag, nr. 15, 19-26 iunie 1990, p. 8:

ziarista vorbeste in articolul acesta despre “asa-zisilor teroristi de la Sibiu” si despre “teroristii imagnari“:

Toti arestati din bazin ofiteri si subofiteri de la Ministru de Interne, erau nevinovati.  Ei nu au fost teroristi.  Ei au fost omoriti si retinuti cind civilii aceia ne impuscau pe strazile Sibiului.”

Angela Bacescu, “Unde e Mortul lui Veverca?”  Zig-Zag, nr. 25, 28 august – 3 septembrie 1990, p. 8.

E de netagaduit:  In 1990 Zig-Zag a fost o publicatie de opozitie…si acolo portavocile securistilor (Bacescu, Olbojan…) au inceput campania lor de dezinformare:  n-au existat teroristi adevarati in decembrie 1989 (deci militieni sau securisti), ci numai falsi teroristi sau teroristi imaginari, samd (deci neexistenti sau daca au existat militari din armata)…foarte convenabil pentru fostii securisti, nu?  Si deloc intimplator… Norocul nostru ca marii politologi de atunci ne-au semnalat ca ceva n-a fost in ordine, si ca modelul binar si simplist de o presa buna (anti-fsn) si o presa mincinoasa (pro-fsn) a fost putin gresit.  Slava Domnului! 

Posted in raport final, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

“Crima?!” [Sediul M.Ap.N. 23 – 24 decembrie 1989]

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 26, 2009

In legatura cu episodul acesta, vedeti video-ul postat de catre destituirea pe site-ul de jos:

USLA bullets called \”vidia\” or \”dum-dum\”

———————————————————————————————————————————–

Faptul ca, de la Revolutie incoace, armata este tinta unor atacuri bine dirijate si din ce in ce mai insistente, il poate constata oricine.  Prea putini dintre ziaristii care isi pun semnatura sub articolele defaimatoare care apar in unele publicatii, mai sint interesati de aportul armatei la apararea Revolutiei, la victorie.  Jertfa celor 267 de ofiteri, maistri militari, subofiteri, elevi si soldati, nu mai are, acum, nico o importanta!  Tot ce-i preocupa pe respectivii “oameni de bine” este sa arate ca armata a contribuit la genocid, eventual sa demonstreze ca aceasta contributie a fost cit mai mare.

Iata, insa, ca, in ultima vreme, concertul dirijat impotriva ostirii si-a largit repertoriul.  Au aparut voci distincte–unele caracterizate prin tonalitatii foarte inalte.  Acum armata este acuzata, incriminata si pentru ce a facut dupa 22 decembrie.  In cadrul acestei orientari noi, in mod deosebit se remarca articolul “O crima ce trebuie neaparat dezvaluita” semnat de doamna Angela Bacescu in revista de actualitati si reportaje “ZIG-ZAG MAGAZIN” numarul 9, din 23-29 aprilie 1990.  Nu stim in ce redactie si-a facut doamna Bacescu ucenicia in ale scrisului.  Un gazetar oricit ar fi el de tinar, isi alege cu grija cuvintele, nu se joaca cu ele.  Or cuvintul “crima” — folosit cu atita nonsalanta, chiar in titlu, presupune si un subiect.  Pe cine acuza doamna ziarista, in ce directie trage?  Spre armata, bineinteles.  Insa autoarea merge mult mai departe cu insinuarile.  Acuza “populatia isterizata de pericolul terorist”,  sustine ca pe teroristi “nu-i vazuse nimeni…”.  “Daca acestia au fost”.  De unde este asa de bine (dez)informata?  Sau vrea sa strecoare subtil, ideea ca cei din sediul M.Ap.N. s-au luptat cu propriile inchipuiri, iar locatarii blocurilor din zona Orizont au fost bintuiti de halucinatii?  Numai ca toate argumentele pe care le aduce provin doar de la una din partile participante la ceea ce s-a intimplat in cumplita noapte de 23/24 decembrie.  Concret, aduce o singura marturie — a sergentului-major Stefan Soldea, unul dintre uslasii supravietuitori — restul informatiilor avind o provenienta dubioasa.  Ca doar n-a fost prezenta, in acea noapte, la sediul M.Ap.N.  (Eu, insa, am fost !)  Se pare ca dictonul latin “audeatur et altera pars” (asculta si partea cealalta) ii este strain.  Tocmai de aceea, in cele ce urmeaza, vom exprima punctul de vedere al militarilor care au urmarit sau au luat parte mijlocita la acel “macel stupid”  — ca o sa citam pe doamna Bacescu.  Am mai scris despre acest subiect.  De aceea m-am hotarit sa reiau firul evenimentelor.  N-am dreptul sa tac.

Au venit pe furis…

Capitan Victor Stoica:  Noi — cei care ne aflam in Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. — au putut urmari in intregime, ca dintr-un amfiteatru, acel spectacol zguduitor.  Pina acum, nu am luat atitudine, desi eram la curent cu stradaniile unor ziaristi de a-i face eroi pe cei de la U.S.L.A.  Am tacut deoarece ne-am gindit ca in urma celor cazuti au ramas sotii, copii –care nu au nici o vina.  Dar acum–pentru ca am fost acuzati de crima, sin in nici unul din ziarele civile nu s-a prezentat punctul nostru de vedere–avem obligatia sa spunem ce am vazut.  Observatorii nostri au fost contrariati de faptul ca cele doua A.B.I.-uri, venind de pe strada Ho Si Min, au stins farurile cu 20-30 metri inainte de a vira la dreapta, pe Drumul Taberei.  Nici o masina blindata–tanc sau T.A.B.–nu procedase, pina atunci astfel.  Eram la etajul intii.  Am vazut clar cum cele doua autovehicule blindate, s-au furisat intre tancuri, unde au stationat, pret de 20-30 minute.  Nici vorba de steagul alb, pomenit de doamna ziarista!  Daca au venit cu ginduri curate, de ce s-au oprit intre tancuri si nu s-au indreptat spre poarta ministerului?  Probabil din cauza ca — asa cum s-a constatat dimineata — nici un uslas nu avea asupra sa documente de identitate –iata un raspuns care contine alta intrebare!  De ce nu au incercat sa ia legatura cu noi?  (In A.B.I.-uri, dimineata s-au gasit doua portavoce).  Dar sa continuam cu faptele.  Am fugit repede la postul meu de lupta, schimbul de focuri incepuse si am vazut, cu ochii mei, cum mitraliera de pe un A.B.I. tragea spre unul din blindatele noastre.  Pe unul din tancuri am vazut o umbra — mi s-a parut ca cineva incearca sa foloseasca mitraliera a.a.  !!  Pentru mine nu este clar nici cum au ajuns cei trei supravietuitori in blocul A.1.  Probabil ca ei debarcasera inainte — focul nostru era prea dens ca sa mai scape cineva.  Oricum, din felul cum au actionat cele doua echipaje, este clar ca nu au avut intentii prietenesti…Si inca ceva.  La aproximativ o ora dupa incetarea focului am vazut vreo zece indivizi care au iesit — cu mare dexteritate — pe unul din geamurile de la parterul blocului B.3…

Colonel Romulus Antonescu:  Si eu vazut, pe unul din tancuri — inainte de a trage A.B.I.-ul din fata lui — o umbra:  mi-era chiar teama sa nu fie lovita de tragatorii nostri.  Afirmatia din Zig-Zag — ca cei de las U.S.L.A. “n-au tras nici un foc” — nu este adevarata.  Pe toti ne-a mirat lumina alba de la teava mitralierei de pe A.B.I. (ei trageau fara trasoare):  dovada ca se tragea, din turela tancului sareau scintei asemeni artificiilor de la pomul de iarna.

Capitan Mihai Munteanu:  Este oare, intimplator ca din echipajele respective faceau parte doi fost ceisti?  De unul dintre acestia destul de dur le era frica multora dintre ofiteri armatei din Bucuresti…iar faptul ca in noaptea respectiva, aceeasi persoana purta uniforma de -a noastra –avind la manta epoletii de locotenent-colonel de geniu si la vestonul de fresco (!) epoleti de maior inginer — cum poate fi interpretat?

Locotonent-major Cristian Costache:  Ca ofiter de control si comanduire, asiguram traficul in sediul ministerului.  Era acalmie, liniste deplina.  Nu fusesem preveniti de sosirea A.B.I.-urilor.  Primul care le-a zarit — “doua mogildete” intre tancuri — a fost colegul meu Radu Dragos, capitan post-mortem.  A fost impuscat in seara de 24 decembrie…

Ce zic tanchistii?

–Domnule capitan Gheorge Tanase, sinteti comandantul companiei de tancuri care, in acea noapte ocupa dispozitiv de lupta in fata Centrului de Calcul.  Ce s-a intimplat, de fapt?

–In primul rind, am fost total surprinsi de venirea — la orele 0,10 — si stationarea celor doua A.B.I.-uri intre tancurile noastre.  Incepind cu noi — cei din linia intii — si terminind cu grupa centrala, care conducea actiunile in sediul M.Ap.N. Nu am fost in nici un fel avertizati, nu ni s-a comunicat semnele de recunoastere si cooperare.  N-am deschis focu de indata ce i-am remarcat — cumne acuza doamna ziarista.  Intre venirea lor si deschiderea focului a trecut aproape o jumatate de ceas!  Initial ni s-a ordonat sa asteptam pina se vor face cercetari.  Prin statie am auzit ca cei din A.B.I.-uri au raportat ca sint trimisi de un oarecare maior Roman de la F.G.M.S. (Din cite am inteles acest ofiter nu exista).  Ni s-a cerut sa vedem ce-i cu ele si, la nevoie sa procedam conform situatiei in care ne aflam, adica de lupta.  Nu a fost nici eroare, nici crima.  Noi am tras fiind convinsi ca nu avem de-a face cu prieteni…

–In afara de modul –interpretat ca suspect–, in care au patruns in dispozitivul dumneavoastra, ce dovezi mai aveti?

–Faptul ca, la teava unuia dintre tancuri, tabla de protectie a fost rupta in doua locuri, trei din pistoalele mitraliera pe care le-am “capturat” (cu teava scurta si incarcator de 20 cartuse)  aveau tevile afumate, turela tancului de comandat de locotenentul maior Vasile Barbu a fost blocata, iar dimineata plutonierul Butoi a gasit pe tancul sau un pistol mitraliera si o lanterna de semnalizare…Cit despre dotare, sa nu-mi zica mie cum am citit intr-un ziar de mare tiraj– ca era jalnica, in nivelul armatei.  A doua zi, am recuperat, din cele doua autoblindate, radiotelefoane Telefunken, veste antiglont, pistoale de 9 mm, pumnale, binoclu cu infrarosu — care pentru noi constituiau noutatii absolute.  Si, pentru ca tot am fost provocati, sa va mai spun ceva.  Dimineata, cind l-am intrebat “de ce ai tras, ma?” unul dintre cei trei supravietuitori, pe care i-am gasit in blocul de vizavi mi-a raspuns:  “Ce p. mati, si eu execut acelasi ordin ca si tine!!!”  E clar ca nu au venit ca prieteni!

–In Zig-Zag, sub o poza, sta urmatoarea explicatie:  “A.B.I.-il dupa ce s-a tras in ei cu tunul”…

Locotenent Liviu Lita: Nu ma mai mira nimic, din moment ce o ziarista se amesteca in probleme de armament si munitie.  Noi o informam — daca vrea, intr-adevar, sa stie adevarul — ca greutatea unui proiectil nu este cu mult sub 20 kilograme, iar viteza cu care paraseste teava depaseste 800 pe secunda.  in asemenea conditii — avind in vedere si distanta mica de tragere — A.B.I.-ul ar fi fost facut praf.  Dar noi nu am folosit tunul pentru ca, la citiva pasi, erau blocul de locuinte…La fel de gogonata este si minciuna ca am fi tras cu mitraliera de 12,7 mm.  Folosirea acesteia presupune ridicarea deasupra turelei, ori nimeni nu era nebun sa puna in pericol viata servantiilor, atita vreme cit teroristii misunau prin blocurile de peste drum!

Partea civila

Trei din membrii celor doua echipaje, ramasi in viata s-au refugiat in blocul A.1., la scara B.  Redam mai jos ce ne-au declarat doua dintre locaterele imobilului:

Maria Sincai (apart. 34):  In jurul orei 02,00 am auzit ca in usa a batut cineva, nu tare, tare.  Apoi a sunat.  nu am raspuns.  Jos se tragea.  Numai cind a inceput sa piriieyala am deschis.  Pe prag — lac de singe:  erau trei oameni in niste uniforme mai deosebite, un fel de combinezoane kaki, unul singera la stomac si picior.  Am aflat ca a mai ramas unul ranit in mijlocul strazii, si carea ajutor, dar fiind mai corpolent, nu l-au putut trage.  Ne-au rugat sa stergem singele de pe scare spunind:  “astia de jos stiu ca sintem aici si ne iau ca din oala.”  Am intrebat daca exista posibilitati — pe la subsol sau prin pod — ca sa poata parasi blocul pe partea cealalta.  Nu stiu cind au ascuns pistolul sub covor.  Baiatului meu i-au cerut haine civile.  Unul din ei, Romica a telefonat de vreo doua ori, la seful lor, probabil.  Au si primit un telefon.  La un moment dat, spre dimineata, spune cam asa:  “Ce faceti, domnule, cum ne scoateti de aici, ca ne fac praf?  Ei ne-au luat drept altii”…  “Sa stit ca sint foarte bine pregatiti.  De la Favorit la poarta de intrare sint tancuri pe amindoua partile.  Ne-au facut zob”…

Stela Baila (apart. 25):  Dimineata, eu am cules doua pistoale de pe scari si le-am predat tanchistilor.  Cind baiatul doamnei Sincai a coborit (in pijama), eu am anuntat armata ca avem “oaspeti”.  Apoi, au venit militarii, i-au ridicat.  unul din cei trei ne-a zis rizind:  “O sa vedeti, sintem armata, sintem romani, nu teroristi.”

In loc de concluziile, sa redam si opinia unui alt martor ocular, locontenent-colonelul Vasile Tintas:  Stim acum, ca U.S.L.A. era o unitate formata in principal din cadre din foarte buni profesionisti.  Ei trebuiau sa-si dea seama ca aici vor intilni tot profesionisti.  Or, prin modul in care s-au comportat, chiar in varianta ca au fost chemati — si au facut dovada celui mai pur amatorism, daca nu este vorba de altceva.  Pentru ca toata conduita lor — incepind cu parasirea cazarmii de catre seful de stat major intr-un moment in care comandantul unitatii lipsea, apoi stingerea farurilor etc. —  a contrazis modul firesc de actiune.  Asa ca in nici un caz accidental nu a fost generat de trupele aflate in dispozitiv.

Deci lucrurile nu stau asa de simplu, pe cit incearca sa le prezinte doamna Bacescu.  Declaratiile redate mai sus isca o multime de intrebari.  Cei patru uslasi care au supravietuit — locotenent-major Romulus Girz, plutonierul Petre Gainescu, sergentii-majorit Stefan Soldea si Ionel Paduraru — speram sa ne fie in curind interlocutori.

Maior MIHAI FLOCA

“Crima?!” Armata Poporului, nr. 23 (6 iunie 1990), p. 3.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments »