The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #25 After the Ceausescus Were Executed: The Counter-Revolution is Disappeared (26 December 1989 – 24 January 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on January 4, 2015

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/gallery-of-images-uploaded-1000/

By the last full week of January 1990 the door on what happened in December 1989 was beginning to close.  Here, a last glimpse of some of those details from an official:

image0-001

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
[Submitted to CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) 19 November 2009; cleared without changes by PRB 15 December 2009; final FEAB clearance for publication 22 December 2009]

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

for full article and citations, please see here: (word file and pdf respectively)

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

Romania, December 1989: a Revolution, a Coup d’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

This December marks twenty years since the implosion of the communist regimeof Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. It is well-known, but bears repeating: Romania not only came late in the wave of communist regime collapse in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact in the fall of 1989 (Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria), it came last—and inevitably that was significant. Despite the more highly personalist (vs. corporate) nature of the Ceausescu regime, the higher level of fear and deprivation that characterized society, and the comparative insulation from the rest of the East European Warsaw Pact states, Romania could not escape the implications of the collapse of the other communist party-states. Despite the differences, there simply were too many institutional and ideological similarities, or as is often most importantly the case, that is how members of both the state and society interpreted matters. “Going last” [in turn, in show] almost inevitably implies that the opportunities for mimicry, for opportunism, for simulation on the one hand and dissimulation on the other, are greater than for the predecessors…and, indeed, one can argue that some of what we saw in Romania in December 1989 reflects this.

Much of the debate about what happened in December 1989 has revolved around how to define those events…and their consequences. [These can be analytically distinct categories and depending on how one defines things, solely by focusing on the events themselves or the consequences, or some combination thereof, will inevitably shape the answer one gets]. The primary fulcrum or axis of the definitional debate has been between whether December 1989 and its aftermath were/have been a revolution or a coup d’etat. But Romanian citizens and foreign observers have long since improvised linguistically to capture the hybrid and unclear nature of the events and their consequences. Perhaps the most neutral, cynical, and fatalistic is the common “evenimentele din decembrie 1989”—the events of December 1989—but it should also be pointed out that the former Securitate and Ceausescu nostalgics have also embraced, incorporated and promoted, such terminology. More innovative are terms such as rivolutie (an apparent invocation of or allusion to the famous Romanian satirist Ion Luca Caragiale’s 1880 play Conu Leonida fata cu reactiunea , where he used the older colloquial spelling revulutie) or lovilutie (a term apparently coined by the humorists at Academia Catavencu, and combining the Romanian for coup d’etat, lovitura de stat, and the Romanian for revolution, revolutie).

The following characterization of what happened in December 1989 comes from an online poster, Florentin, who was stationed at the Targoviste barracks—the exact location where Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu would be summarily tried and executed on 25 December 1989. Although his definitions may be too economically-based for my taste—authoritarianism/dictatorship vs. democracy would be preferable—and the picture he presents may be oversimplified at points, the poster’s characterization shows that sometimes the unadorned straighttalk of the plainspoken citizen can cut to the chase better than many an academic tome:

I did my military service, in Targoviste, in fact in the barracks at which the Ceausescu couple were executed…It appears that a coup d’etat was organized and executed to its final step, the proof being how the President of the R.S.R. (Romanian Socialist Republic) died, but in parallel a revolution took place. Out of this situation has transpired all the confusion. As far as I know this might be a unique historical case, if I am not mistaken. People went into the streets, calling not just for the downfall of the president then, but for the change of the political regime, and that is what we call a revolution. This revolution triumphed, because today we have neither communism, nor even neocommunism with a human face. The European Union would not have accepted a communist state among its ranks. The organizers of the coup d’etat foresaw only the replacement of the dictator and the maintenance of a communist/neocommunist system, in which they did not succeed, although there are those who still hope that it would have succeeded. Some talk about the stealing of the revolution, but the reality is that we live in capitalism, even if what we have experienced in these years has been more an attempt at capitalism, orchestrated by an oligarchy with diverse interests…

This is indeed the great and perhaps tragic irony of what happened in December 1989 in Romania: without the Revolution, the Coup might well have failed, but without the Coup, neither would the Revolution have succeeded. The latter is particularly difficult for the rigidly ideological and politically partisan to accept; yet it is more than merely a talking point and legitimating alibi of the second-rung nomenklatura who seized power (although it is that too). The very atomization of Romanian society that had been fueled and exploited by the Ceausescu regime explained why Romania came last in the wave of Fall 1989, but also why it was and would have been virtually impossible for genuine representatives of society—led by dissidents and protesters—to form an alternative governing body on 22 December whose decisions would have been accepted as sufficiently authoritative to be respected and implemented by the rump party-state bureaucracy, especially the armed forces and security and police structures. The chaos that would have ensued—with likely multiple alternative power centers, including geographically—would have likely led to a far greater death toll and could have enabled those still betting on the return of the Ceausescus to after a time reconquer power or seriously impede the functioning of any new government for an extended period.

The fact that the Revolution enabled the coup plotters to seize power, and that the coup enabled the Revolution to triumph should be identified as yet another version—one particular to the idiosyncracies of the Romanian communist regime—of what Linz and Stepan have identified as the costs or compromises of the transition from authoritarian rule. In Poland, for example, this meant that 65 percent of the Sejm was elected in non-competitive elections, but given co-equal authority with the Senate implying that “a body with nondemocratic origins was given an important role in the drafting of a democratic constitution”; in fact, Poland’s first completely competitive elections to both houses of Parliament occurred only in October 1991, fully two years after the formation of the first Solidarity government in August 1989. In Romania, this meant that second-rung nomenklaturists—a displaced generation of elites eager to finally have their day in the sun—who to a large extent still harbored only Gorbachevian perestroikist views of the changes in the system as being necessary, were able to consolidate power following the elimination of the ruling Ceausescu couple.

The self-description by senior Front officials (Ion Iliescu) and media promoters (such as Darie Novaceanu in Adevarul) of the FSN (National Salvation Front) as the “emanation of the Revolution” does not seem justified. It seems directly tied to two late January 1990 events—the decision of the Front’s leaders to run as a political party in the first post-Ceausescu elections and the contestation from the street of the Front’s leaders’ legitimacy to rule and to run in those elections. It also seems difficult to defend objectively as a legitimate description, since even according to their own accounts, senior Front officials had been in contact with one another and discussed overthrowing the Ceausescus prior to the Revolution, since there had existed no real competing non-Ceausescu regime alternative on 22 December 1989 (an argument they themselves make), and since they had clearly not been elected to office. Moreover, when senior former Front officials, Iliescu among them, point to their winning of two-thirds of the votes for the new parliament in May 1990 and Iliescu’s 85 percent vote for the presidency, the numbers in and of themselves—even beyond the by now pretty obvious and substantiated manipulation, surveillance, and intimidation of opposition parties, candidates, movements and civil society/non-governmental organizations that characterized the election campaign—are a red flag to the tainted and only partly free and fair character of those founding elections.

But if the FSN and Ion Iliescu cannot be accurately and legitimately described as the “emanation of the Revolution,” it also seems reasonable to suggest that the term “stolen revolution” is somewhat unfair. The term “stolen revolution” inevitably suggests a central, identifiable, and sufficiently coherent ideological character of the revolution and the presence of an alternative non-Ceausescu, non-Front leadership that could have ensured the retreat of Ceausescu forces and been able to govern and administer the country in the days and weeks that followed. The absence of the latter was pretty clear on 22 December 1989—Iasi, Timisoara, and Arad among others, had local, authentic nuclei leading local movements (for example, the FDR, Frontul Democrat Roman), but no direct presence in Bucharest—and the so-called Dide and Verdet “22 minute” alternative governments were even more heavily compromised by former high-ranking communist dignitary inclusion than the FSN was (the one with the least, headed by Dumitru Mazilu, was rapidly overtaken and incorporated into the FSN).

As to the question of the ideological character of the revolt against Ceausescu, it is once again instructive to turn to what a direct participant, in this case in the Timisoara protests, has to say about it. Marius Mioc , who participated in the defense of Pastor Tokes’ residence and in the street demonstrations that grew out of it, was arrested, interrogated, and beaten from the 16th until his release with other detainees on the 22nd and who has written with longstanding hostility toward former Securitate and party officials, IIiescu, the FSN, and their successors, gives a refreshingly honest account of those demonstrations that is in stark contrast to the often hyperpoliticized, post-facto interpretations of December 1989 prefered by ideologues:

I don’t know if the 1989 revolution was as solidly anticommunist as is the fashion to say today. Among the declarations from the balcony of the Opera in Timisoara were some such as “we don’t want capitalism, we want democratic socialism,” and at the same time the names of some local PCR [communist] dignitaries were shouted. These things shouldn’t be generalized, they could have been tactical declarations, and there existed at the same time the slogans “Down with communism!” and flags with the [communist] emblem cut out, which implicitly signified a break from communism. [But] the Revolution did not have a clear ideological orientation, but rather demanded free elections and the right to free speech.

Romania December 1989 was thus both revolution and coup, but its primary definitive characteristic was that of revolution, as outlined by “Florentin” and Marius Mioc above. To this must be added what is little talked about or acknowledged as such today: the counter-revolution of December 1989. Prior to 22 December 1989, the primary target of this repression was society, peaceful demonstrators—although the Army itself was both perpetrator of this repression but also the target of Securitate forces attempting to ensure their loyalty to the regime and their direct participation and culpabilization in the repression of demonstrators. After 22 December 1989, the primary target of this violence was the Army and civilians who had picked up weapons, rather than citizens at large. It is probably justified to say that in terms of tactics, after 22 December 1989, the actions of Ceausist forces were counter-coup in nature, contingencies prepared in the event of an Army defection and the possibility of foreign intervention in support of such a defection. However, precisely because of what occurred prior to 22 December 1989, the brutal, bloody repression of peaceful demonstrators, and because the success of the coup was necessary for the success of the revolution already underway, it is probably accurate to say that the Ceausescu regime’s actions as a whole constituted a counter-revolution. If indeed the plotters had not been able to effectively seize power after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December 1989 and Ceausescu or his direct acolytes had been able to recapture power, we would be talking of the success not of a counter-coup, but of the counter-revolution.

A key component of the counter-revolution of December 1989 concerns the, as they were christened at the time, so-called “terrorists,” those who were believed then to be fighting in defense of the Ceausescu couple. It is indeed true as Siani-Davies has written that the Revolution is about so much more than “the Front” and “the terrorists.” True enough, but the outstanding and most vexing question about December 1989—one that resulted in 942 killed and 2,251 injured after 22 December 1989—is nevertheless the question of “the terrorists.” Finding out if they existed, who they were, and who they were defending remains the key unclarified question of December 1989 two decades later: that much is inescapable.

We also know from Romanescu and a second source that USLA commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu (Bula Moise) addressed his troops as follows:

“On 25 December at around 8 pm, after the execution of the dictators, Colonel Ardeleanu gathered the unit’s members into an improvised room and said to them:
‘The Dictatorship has fallen! The Unit’s members are in the service of the people. The Romanian Communist Party [PCR] is not disbanding! It is necessary for us to regroup in the democratic circles of the PCR—the inheritor of the noble ideas of the people of which we are a part!…Corpses were found, individuals with USLAC (Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare) identity cards and identifications with the 0620 stamp of the USLA, identity cards that they had no right to be in possession of when they were found…’ He instructed that the identity cards [of members of the unit] had to be turned in within 24 hours, at which time all of them would receive new ones with Defense Ministry markings.”

In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun. In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed. By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.

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A Brief Timeline of the Counter-Revolutionary Coverup

26 December 1989

(Those who argue that there was no “other side” during the fighting of 22-25 December 1989–that the “terrorists” did not exist, that they were from the Army (in particular DIA), that it was all just “friendly fire,” misunderstanding, paranoia, fear, and suspicion (such post-modernist excess permeates the accounts of Peter Siani-Davies, Ruxandra Cesereanu , Adrian Cioflanca, to name a few of the more recent accounts, as well as reviews of films such as A Fost sau N-a Fost?/12:08 East of Bucharest)–have difficulty explaining how the Hungarian military maintains they were tracking Securitate radio transmitters/transmissions and relaying the information to the Romanian military leadership and that the operation of these Securitate transmitters dropped off in sync with the drop off in counter-revolutionary resistance posed by the Securitate…Then again they are not aware of this or most of the details/evidence presented for the period 26 December 1989 – 24 January 1990 below…) 

Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, head of the Hungarian People’s Army Press Department:  “…I would like to say that a progressive weakening of the Securitate has been experienced.  We ourselves can see this, because our radio searching and locating units which were in Hungary a few days ago were monitoring broadcasts from 31 Securitate radio centers–yesterday 19, and today only 5.  We of course put this data at the disposal of the Romanian military leadership.”

Ferenc Karpati:  “A Securitate erői ellen hosszú, küzdelmes harcot folytattak a hadsereg és a forradalom más erői. Felszámolásuk érdekében a Magyar Honvédség speciális képzettségu rádióbemérő egységeinek egy részét átcsoportosítottuk a román államhatár közelébe, s így sikerült rádióállomásaikat bemérni, álláshelyeiket pontosan meghatározni. Az adatok átadásával jelentősen elősegítettük a Securitate-bázisok felszámolását.”  KÁRPÁTI FERENC: A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése

1990. január 11., csütörtök 18:55


A Honvédelmi Minisztérium közleménye (4. rész) (OS)
A kezdeti időszakban, amikor a diktátorhoz hű Securitate a
forradalom vérbe fojtására jelentős erőket vetett be, a Magyar
Néphadsereg speciális képzettségű rádióbemérő alakulatainak egy
részét átcsoportosította a magyar-román államhatár közelébe a
Securitate rádióállomásainak bemérésére, helyeinek meghatározására.
Ezeknek az adatoknak az átadásával, az adók bemért földrajzi
helyeinek megjelölésével feltehetően segítséget nyújtott a Magyar
Néphadsereg a Securitate-bázisok felszámolásában, megsemmisítésében.
Szinte napról napra érzékelhető volt ezek számának csökkenése, ami a
magyar szakértők szerint arról tanúskodott, hogy a diktátorhoz hű
erők törzseit a román hadsereg folyamatosan számolja fel. Ezt
példázza, hogy a december 26-án nyilvánosságra hozottak szerint
24-én még 31, 25-én már 19 és 26-án csupán öt
Securitate-rádióközpont működését rögzítették és mérték be a magyar
rádiófelderítő és bemérő alegységek.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/16/hungarian-and-romanian-defense-officials-on-the-violation-of-hungarian-airspace-by-securitate-helicopters-in-december-1989/

Hungarian Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati and Romanian Defense Attache to Hungary Colonel Ioan Todericiu (see videos below) confirm below the violation of Hungarian airspace by Romanian helicopters during the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 that overthrew communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu 25 years ago.  The context makes clear these were Securitate helicopters in the service of the Romanian secret police, the Securitate, and Nicolae Ceausescu.

Both at the time (Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the United States Government, FBIS-EEU-89-246, 26 December 1989) and 10 years later in 2000, Karpati acknowledged the violation of Hungarian airspace by Securitate helicopters.  He didn’t have any doubt, these were not just the alleged suppositions of Hungarian journalists, and more than a decade after the events–in other words, after a tsunami of Securitate-inspired revisionism in Romania–he continued to maintain they belonged to the Securitate…not to the Romanian military as the timeless deniers would have us believe…

related see: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/15/ill-take-the-field-or-how-securitate-general-vlads-disinformation-illuminates-the-truth-the-uses-of-hungarians-revolutionaries-with-criminal-records-and-foreign-agents/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/image0-22.jpg

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/securitate-helicopters-transmitters-per-hungarian-defense-officials/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/14/lying-in-wait-securitate-director-general-vlad-in-the-cc-building-i/

Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu admitted to journalist Dan Badea in 1991 that the USLA (special anti-terrorist unit) had its own helicopter force, thereby substantiating the suspicion of the unidentified revolutionary that the helicopters in question were “special”/”from a special unit.”  Thus, it is abundantly clear that Vlad’s claim that the Securitate had “just three helicopters” was a bald-faced lie.

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A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. KÁRPÁTI Ferenc.  A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése. http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/en/tartalom/historia/00-04/ch10.html

Komoly gondot okozott a december végi sűrű ködös időben az alacsonyan repülő Securitate-csapatok helikoptereinek lokátorokkal történő bemérése. Ezek jelentették a magyar határvédelemre a legnagyobb veszélyt. Összesen öt alkalommal sértették meg az ilyen helikopterek a Magyar Köztársaság légterét.
The locational identification of low-flying Securitate unit helicopters caused real problems in the thick fog of late December.  These represented the greatest threat to the Hungarian border defense.  In total on five occasions such helicopters violated the airspace of the Hungarian Republic.
 
Other information from 2009 reinforces this claim:

Öt helikopter berepült Magyarországra

Ha a hadseregek közti fegyveres konfliktus esélyét minimálisnak is tekintette a magyar honvédség vezetése, a román belső feszültségekről a figyelmet elterelő provokációval továbbra is komolyan számoltak. Számos lakossági bejelentés érkezett, hogy hol láttak landoló román helikoptereket. Összesen öt légtérsértés valóban történt ezekben a napokban, helikopterek repültek át Romániából, de leszállás nélkül gyorsan vissza is tértek, ezért a magyar légierő állandó készültségben lévő MiG-21-esei nem is emelkedtek fel a betonról. Hogy csak tesztelték a rendszert, vagy besódródtak, az nem derült ki. De egy, a két évvel későbbi barcsi esethez hasonló ügynek – amikor a délszláv háború idején egy szerb gép kazettás bombát dobott le egy házra – a pattanásig feszült helyzetben komolyabb következményei lehettek volna.

Nem könnyítette meg a magyar honvédség dolgát, hogy 89 december közepén, végén szinte végig taknyos, ködös idő volt. Ezért Keleti György visszaemlékezése szerint külön őröket állítottak a laktanyákba, hogy füleljenek és ha különös zajra lesznek figyelmesek, azonnal jelentsék.

http://index.hu/belfold/1989/2009/12/22/megoldani_erdely_ugyet_ugyes-okosan/

The Romanian Defense Attache to Budapest at the time, Col. Ioan Todericiu, confirms here (in Romanian) that the Hungarian Chief of Staff notified him of the penetration of Hungarian airspace of the same number of helicopters–five–and that they were within range of anti-aircraft missile defense at Szolnok.  Todericiu was asked what the Hungarians should do.  His answer is revealing:  he left it up to the Hungarians.  Would he have done that if there were even the slightest chance that these had been helicopters of the Romanian military?  NO!  His answer–politically incorrect and dangerous after 1990 in Romania–confirms Karpati’s claim above, as clear as day.

Todericiu supported his answers in the above videos here:

 

 

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25-27 December 1989

Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.  (Gheorghe Ratiu, interview by Ilie Neacsu (episode 17), Europa, 7-22 March 1995, cited in Hall 1997, p. 366.)

Gheorghe Ratiu (fost sef al Directiei I a Securitatii):  “La ordinul generalului Vlad, in zilele de 25-27 decembrie 1989, am coordonat o investigatie in spitalele si morgile Capitalei pentru a stabili care este adevarul in legatura cu ‘teroristii straini’ despre care se tot relata la televiziune si in presa.  Toate unitatiile spitalicesti si morga de la Institutul Medico-Legal, fusesera preluate in paza de catre armata.  La inceput, ofiterilor trimisi de mine nu li s-a permis intrarea in nici unul din aceste obiective, cu toate ca, oficial, de la data de 23 decembrie devenisem seful Directiei de Infromatii Interne a Armatei.  Pentru a strapunge acest baraj instituit, de forte oculte, am apelat si am primit sprijinul procurorului general Popovici, a ministrului adjunct dr. Iacob de la Ministerul Sanatatii, si a generalului Vasile, inca sef al Directiei de contrainformatii militare.  Am format astfel, patru echipe conduse de cate un procuror si din care mai faceau parte, cate un ofiter de contrainformatii cu uniforma al legitimatii cu uniforma si legitimatie de la Ministerul Apararii  Nationale [!!!], un ofiter de la directia mea si un inspector de la Directia sanitara a Municipului Bucuresti.  Aceste echipe au reusit sa patrunda peste tot [!!!], mai putin la Spitalul Militar Central…Rezultatul a fost ca in tara murisera in acea perioada doar patru cetateni straini…Deci, nici un terorist strain [!!!]“

Gheorghe Ratiu, interviu luat de Ilie Neacsu, Europa, episoade XVII si XVIII, martie-aprilie 1995.

“Misterele revolutiei, la Brasov. Dupa nopti de groaza si tortura, toti teroristii sint liberi.” Adrian Socaciu, Cuvintul, nr. 1-2 ianuarie 1991image0-005

In perioada 23-25 decembrie 1989, Brasovul a fost un oras in stare de razboi.  Nu vom incerca sa dam raspunsuri definitive in privinta evenimentelor din acele zile, ci vom prezenta doar o serie de aspecte ciudate.  Pe 16 decembrie 1989 este vazut in oras Ion Dinca.  Il insoseste comandantul trupelor terestre din China.  Era vorba de a se perfecta o tranzactie cu masini de lupta blindate.  Evenimentele din Timisoara anuntau schimbari exceptionale.  Brasovul era pregatit pentru ceva asemanator.  Doua personaje cheie se ocupau de aceste planuri.  Primul, generalul Zagoneanu, sef al Inspectoratului judetean al M.I., venit pe 19 noiembrie 1987 la Brasov.  Daogaru Gheorghe, in fapt eminenta cenusie a judetului, secretar cu problemele economice, a venit pe 19 noiembrie 1987.  Cei doi erau numiti de Ceausescu pentru a face in asa fel ca revolta din noiembrie 1987 sa nu se mai repete.  Pentru demonstratia de la 23 august 1989 a fost pregatit planul “Victoria”.  Pe cladirile din jurul tribunei oficiale au fost plasati lunetisti.  Alte echipe care filmau cu camere video erau amplasate in balcoane.  Echipe USLA erau in alarma de lupta.  O varianta imbunatatita si mult mai ampla a fost gata pe 21 decembrie 1989.  Pe 18 decembrie 1989 la ora 9 dimineata s-a intrunit in sedinta Consilul Apararii.  Zagoneanu a prezentat planul de interventie.  Acest plan prevedea ca, daca vor fi mai mult de 400 de manifestanti, Securitatea va interveni numai la cooperare cu armata si garzile patriotice.  In seara de 18 decembrie 1989 planul a fost materializat pina la ultimele amanunte la comandamentul Brigazii de vinatori de munte.  Au participat generalul Florea, sef de stat major, lt. colonel Dumitru Popescu, maiorul Oprea, reprezentantul si Zagoneanu, un delegat al Scolii militare de ofiteri, un delegat de la apararea civila si un anume Dragnea de la garzile patriotice.

Pe 19 si 20 decembrie 1989 acest plan a fost pus pe curat in cinci exemplare pe harta orasului Brasov.  Pe 7 februarie 1990 aceste planuri i-au parvenit generalului Florea din partea lui Zagoneanu.  Urmau sa fie distruse.  Pe 18 decembrie avea loc o intilnire intre Gheorghe Pana, delegat al CC al PCR Petre Preoteasa, prim-secretar, si Zagoneanu, in care se discuta planul de interventie.  In cladirea “Modaromului” s-au dispus tragatori de elita la mai multe niveluri.  Pe 21 decembrie echicpele de interventie au ocupat posturile de lupta obligatorii.  Au fost adusi in oras palestinieni.  Au fost cazati in oras in trei hoteluri, “Aro”, “Postavarul” si “Capitol”, in urma interventiei Securitatii.  Iata ce declara generalul Florea pe 27 decembrie 1989 in sedinta CFSN.  “Sa dam dovada de vigilenta deosebita.  La ora actuala la Procuratura sint retinuti libieni si palestinieni care sint interogati de procurorul militar sef Centiu Ioan, dar trebuie sa mai cautam si altii.”  Exista si se poate verifica stenograma sedintei.  Ce dorea sa spuna generalul Florea?  Pe 25 decembrie 1989, noaptea, au fost expediati la Bucuresti cetateni straini (arabi) in doua vagoane speciale.  Se vorbeste despre o tabara de antrenament pentru arabi la Dumbravita Birsei.  O alta tabara de antrenament pentru arabi se afla intre Fagaras si Brasov, la poalele muntilor.  Prin Brasov circula uneori un autobuz pe care erau niste incriptii in limba araba.  Implicarea unor indivizi de origine araba in lupte este certa….

 

image0-007

In luna iunie, anul trecut [1990], s-a deplasat la Brasov domnul general Nicolae Constantin Spiroiu insotit de cinci ofiteri.  Au contactat grupul “Opinia” si alte persoane pentru a alfa cine ancheteaza evenimentele din decembrie 1989.  La sediul grupului “Opinia” domnul general Spiroiu a discutat mai bine de cinci ore cu Adrian Moruzi, Viorel Boeru, Viorel Nitescu, Alexandru Popescu si Katarina Peter.

Pe 14 iunie 1990 seara, generalul Spiroiu l-a sunat pe Adrian Moruzi interesindu-se ce se intimpla la Brasov.  S-a procedat la o deshumare a mortilor din decembrie 1989.  Totul s-a facut cu participarea Procuraturii care a prelevat gloantele ucigase.  S-au gasit in special gloante de calibrul 5,6 mm care nu sint in dotarea armatei.  Recent la sediul Procuraturii din Brasov s-a produs un incendiu devastator.  Au ars mai multe documente legate de Revolutie.  Incendiul a fost atit de puternic incit s-a calcinat peretii.  Ar fi interesant de aflat ce material inflamabil a putut produce o astfel de putere calorica.  –Romulus Nicolae

Origin 8102014 41827 PM

Origin 8102014 41914 PM

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27 December 1989 BBC

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/05/15/lets-go-to-the-videotape-iii-bbc1-december-1989-a-labyrinth-of-lies/

I know of no better metaphor for what has happened to research on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 than Ted Koppel’s surreal experience in Bucharest in early 1990 recounted below.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.

Monday, March 5 (1990). 

Bucharest.  Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling.  Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied.  Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.

We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest.  An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over.  I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs.  “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel.  I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels.  The colonel went off to consult with his man.  When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.”  “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described.  “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.

Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook.  The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.

According to former Military Prosecutor, General Dan Voinea, whose claims form the foundation of the Chapter on December 1989 in the Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (CPADCR), also known as the Tismaneanu Commission after its president Vladimir Tismaneanu, there was nothing special about the tunnels found beneath Bucharest in December 1989–they were merely for sewage, water supply, and electricity, and could not have been used by “the terrorists” since, just like unusual munitions (for example, explosive dum-dum bullets), these most definitely did not exist….

However, according to videotape from December 1989, ventilation/oxygen filtration systems (not to mention an elevator to a bunker, fully-stocked refrigerators, gas masks, etc. see below screen captures from French TV–seems those may have been taken from BBC1 Michael Stewart’s report from 27 December 1989 below) happened to turn up in what Voinea claims are the typical underground tunnels that span beneath any large city…

Tunelurile secrete ale mincinosilor
– Ani de zile s-a tot vorbit despre tunelurile secrete pline de teroristi care ieseau si ucideau oamenii de pe strada sau din diverse institutii… Exista vreo marturie credibila, vreun document?
– Nu putem califica aceste informatii nici macar ca tinand de domeniul legendei. E o minciuna! O alta minciuna! Bucurestiul, ca de altfel toate marile orase, e brazdat subteran de tot felul de tuneluri, unele pentru canalizare, gospodarirea apei, electricitate si alte scopuri. De altfel, Capitala are in subteran tuneluri realizate in urma cu sute de ani. Aceste tuneluri nu au constituit adaposturi pentru teroristi. Recent, am participat la o reconstituire pe teren, la asemenea asa-zise tuneluri secrete folosite de teroristi. Era un simplu canal pentru distribuirea apei potabile. Deci am constatat ca a fost vorba de o minciuna.

http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/04/subteranele-oraului.html

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The press of 1990 and later has told us of these tunnels and their features–including the ventilation/oxygen filtration systems–now confirmed by video, for many years.

“Echipa lui Gh. Grigoras “curata” in continuare subsolul ajungind la alta instalatie de aerisire.  Filtre de aer ultramoderne, oxigen din belsug, ba chiar o mica… fabrica de oxigen, aflata la perfecta stare de functionare.  Instalatia de ventilatie e super-sofisticata, iar dubla ei functionalitate consta in posibilitatea folosirii traseului secret pe care il ofera.  Prin tunelele de ventilatie…”

“Labirintul subteran vechi al orasului pare neinsemnat pe langa cel construit din ordinul lui Ceausescu. Datele mi-au parvenit de la militarii care au intrat in subteranele fostului Comitet Central, actualul Senat la Romaniei, respectiv de la maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista. Ei au intrat in aceste catacombe chiar pe 25 decembrie 1989, impreuna cu un grup de genisti si pirotehnisti”, explica muzeograful Dan Falcan. Conform relatarii militarilor, la subsolul cladirii au gasit un tunel, nu prea lung, care coboara intr-un fel de cazarma. Opt camere cu paturi pliante. Din aceste camere pornesc mai multe culoare, unul ducand chiar pana la etajul II al cladirii. Pe un alt culoar se poate ajunge la un buncar mai larg, la 7 metri adancime. Se trece apoi de o usa blindata si se ajunge la un apartament spatios, la adancimea de 9 metri. Militarii au cautat apoi camera in care se afla sistemul de ventilatie si s-au trezit pe un nou culoar.”

Sorin Golea (Libertatea 2005)

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for older posts on this topic, see for example…

decembrie 1989: Doar despre CC-ul, tuneluri, subterane, “trupa speciala” (MI-securisti), si “sportivi” la Clubul Dinamo (dinamovisti)

O minciuna dejucata de o jumatate de adevar…(lipseste adevarul despre teroristii)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/20/doar-despre-tuneluri-buncare-ziduri-duble-si-subterane-decembrie-1989/

“O reţea de tuneluri, considerată ultra-secretă, străbate Capitala şi uneşte puncte strategice din oraş.”

http://www.tvr.ro/articol.php?id=96287

Mirel Curea, nr. 317, 9 iulie 1993, p. 3

WHY, OF WHY SO MANY YEARS AFTER DO WE NOT KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEMBER 1989 (DE CE NU STIM ADEVARUL DESPRE DECEMBRIE 1989?)

THE ANSWER CAN BE FOUND IN A PASSING COMMENT OF MIREL CUREA’S IN THIS JULY 1993 ARTICLE:

“Pentru a nu se crea probleme cu implicatii diplomatice internationale, nu insistam asupra acestei ultime etape.”

(In order not create any problems with international diplomatic implications, we won’t insist [upon discussing] this final stage [involving the role of foreign states]”

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:” PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 (Part Seven, Foreign Involvement)

(Romania decembrie 1989) “Asta nu este pentru urechile publicului…”: despre teroristii, Planul Z-Z, si arme Stecikin

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/21/marturii-intre-1990-si-1992-din-zilele-fierbinte-in-cc-ul-decembrie-1989-doru-teodor-maries-mircea-boaba-sergiu-tanasescu-si-ernest-maftei/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/23/joc-pe-calculator-versiunea-lui-dan-voinea-a-durat-pana-in-mijlocul-ianuariei-1990-despre-razboiul-radio-electronic-autohton-din-decembrie-1989-bonus-les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/12/constantin-isac-intre-14-si-22-decembrie-dinamovist-de-judo-la-iasi-prezent-in-zona-crematoriului-cenusa-si-martor-in-piata-universitatii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/10/dinamoviada-iasi-decembrie-1989-si-sportivi-in-treninguri-cu-acelasi-de-tip-geanta-cazati-la-unirea-traian-si-moldova/

http://www.ina.fr/histoire-et-conflits/revolutions-et-coups-d-etat/video/CAB89054565/les-souterrains-de-bucarest.fr.html

Les souterrains de Bucarest

JA2 20H – 27/12/1989 – 01min55s
385 vues

Reportage sur le réseau souterrain de Bucarest, véritable ville parallèle créee par Ceausescu pour assurer sa défense et où se sont réfugiés les rebelles de la Securitate, la police secrète du régime, après la chute du dictateur. – Soldat roumain explorant un souterrain l’arme au poing. Soldat ouvrant une porte d’un coup de botte. GP Visage du soldat tendu par la peur de se trouver face à face avec un agent de la Securitate. Soldat prenant un ascenseur qui les ammène dans le bunker personnel du dictateur Ceausescu. Restes d’un repas sur la table. Réfrigérateur plein de viande. Soldat fouillant un agent de la Securitate qui vient d’être arrêté dans un tunnel du réseau souterrain. On examine ses papiers. GP Oranges découvertes sur lui, indice supplémentaire confirmant son appartenance à la Securitate. Soldat explorant un tunnel le long duquel s’écoule une rigole d’eau.

…dar ce spune Dan Voinea http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/11/nici-simulatoare-de-tragere-nici.html:

(pentru mai multe minciuni ale lui Dan Voinea va rog sa consultati capitolul despre “decembrie 1989” din Raportul Comisiei Prezidențiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România–scris de catre Vladimir Tismaneanu, Ruxandru Cesereanu, Sorin Iliesiu, si altii…despre Voinea si Raportul Final sunt multe de spus https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/18/raport-final-si-revolutia-reciclare-sau-rotatia-de-texte/ , https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-one-groundhog-day/ , https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-2/ )

Arhitectul bucurestean Camil Roguski, fost angajat al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, dar si la Unitatea de întretinere si decorare a palatelor prezidentiale din perioada ceausista a fost unul dintre putinii civili care au avut privilegiul sa vada si sa participe la cartografierea, la construirea si decorarea unor tuneluri secrete din mai multe localitati

Cum se „teleporta” Ceausescu

În perioada 1970-1975, Calea Victoriei a fost blocata. Se efectuau lucrari la un tunel care facea legatura între Comitetul Central, Muzeul de Arta si Sala Palatului. Arhitectul Roguski isi aminteste ca : „Era un tunel elegant, foarte bine realizat, cu toate dotarile necesare. Era astfel construit, cu sursa de apa proprie, încât în cazuri de urgenta, se putea ramâne la interior cel putin trei zile fara interventii exterioare. Ceusescu venea de la CC, direct în loja de la Sala Palatului, prin tunel, fara paza, lucru care îi contraria pe multi care nu îl vedeau traversând Calea Victoriei. La Revolutie, soldatii consemnati aici au început sa iasa la suprafata si au fost luati drept teroristi. Trebuie cunoscut faptul ca toate clsdirile catalogate strategice din Bucuresti aveau buncare antiatomice sau antiaeriene construite foarte bine (chiar placate cu placi de plumb)”. Buncare de acest gen exista la Ministerul Afacerilor Externe (folosit pâna prin anii 1950 ca depozit de valori, pentru decoratii nemtesti si românesti), Ministerul Apararii Na]ionale, Palatul Victoria, Palatul Cotroceni, fostul Comitet Central etc. La Casa Poporului au fost construite doar doua masive buncare antiatomice si exista o retea de legaturi prin tuneluri spre anumite zone. Arhitectul a refuzat sa ofere alte amanunte, argumentând ca „anumite persoane ar fi deranjate”, multe constituie secrete de stat dar, subliniind ca exista foarte multe legende, fara fundament, legate de aceasta constructie.

„Sub fostul CC exista mai multe cai de acces, la nivelul subsolului doi. In decembrie 1989, tunelul care era liber, accesat cu un lift personal ,si care ar fi trebuit sa-i asigure iesirea lui Ceusescu trecea pe sub CC, CC-UTC, Bdul Magheru, Intercontinental si facea legatura cu tunelurile tehnice de langa statia de metrou <<Universitate>>. Nu este un secret ca majoritatea statiilor de metrou au fost astfel construite încât sa poata fi folosite ca adaposturi antiatomice. Sub tunelul propriu – zis exista o retea de buncare si tuneluri mai mici, tehnice, care sunt ca un paienjenis sub Bucuresti. Prin aceste tuneluri se poate circula comod cu un anumit mijloc de transport electric. Se putea ajunge, urmând paralel traseul metroului, pâna la Palatul Primaverii unde exista un buncar central, de coordonare strategica . Din acest buncar, legatura era un tunel secret la care a lucrat, timp de trei ani, prin anii 80, o echipa de mineri de la Petrila. Legatura subterana ajungea la o amenajare de la Lacul Herastrau unde exista permanent o salupa rapida pregatita sa-l transporte pe un alt mal si unde astepta o masina cu destinatia Clinceni – aerodrom. Daca Ceausescu ajungea în subteranele de sub CC, avea posibilitea sa ajunga, foarte usor si rapid, în orice punct de la periferia Capitalei”, a precizat Roguski. Conform documentelor de arhiva si a marturiilor militarilor, de asigurarea securitatii la tunelurile din zona CC (adapost pentru conducerea PCR) se pare ca se ocupa direct, in acea perioada, generalul Ioan Geoana, seful Apararii Civile, tatal lui Mircea Geoana, actualul presedinte PSD.

buncarele au fost descoperite “destul de tirziu…dupa 24 decembrie”

image-5image-3

U.S.L.A.C.

Sergiu Tanasescu (medicul echipei de fotbal Rapid Bucuresti) = S.T.
Ion K. Ion (ziarist, Cuvintul) = I.I.

I.I.: S-a vinturat prin presa ideea prezente unor teroristi straini…

S.T.: Imi veti ingadui sa nu ma priveasca aceasta problema ea tine de competenta
istoriei. De acord?

I.I.: O.K.

S.T.: Pe un terorist l-am prins chiar eu, mina mea. Avea 26 de ani si doua
legitimatii, una de student in anul IV la Drept si alta data de Directia a V-a
U.S.L.A.C. Unitati Speciale de Lupta Antiterorista si Comando. Era drogat. Am
gasit asupra lui si a altor teroristi un fel de cicolata, tipul “Pasuma” si
“Gripha”. Era un drog extraordinar de puternic ce dadea o stare de euforie,
axata insa pe agresivitate si distrugere, si o independenta fata de somn de cel
putin 10 zile. Aveau un armament supersofisticat, cu infrarosii, cu sistem de
auzire la distanta etc. Am capturat o arma din asta si am tras trei gloante
intr-o tinta aflata la vreo suta de metri. Arma n-avea nici un recul si,
controlind apoi, am constatat ca toate cele trei gloante se infipsesera unul in celalalt. Ne-am facut si
noi treaba apoi cu pusca asta pina s-a terminat munitia.

I.I. : Ce se intimpla cu teroristii prinsi?

S.T.: Noi i-am predat organelor de procuratura militara. Pe foarte multi i-am
prins in primele zile, identitatea lor fiind stabilita de mai multi, de
colonelul Octavian Nae, Constantin Dinescu (unchiul lui Mircea), Guse, dar mai
ales Vlad care strig la prinsii astia ca de ce nu i-au ascultat ordinul sa se
predea, ei faceau pe sfintii, dar teava armei era inca destul de calda de la
ispravile lor. Dupa ce suportau interogatoriul acesta sumar, celor mai multi li
se dadea drumul.

I.I.: De ce?

S.T. Asa ordona Vlad. Pe 22 decembrie am prins un maior de securitate care a
fost dezarmat si pus in libertate, a doua zi l-am prins din nou, i-am luat
armamentul si munitia si iarasi Vlad a garantat pentru el, numai ca a treia zi
l-am prins din nou. Ne-am enervat si atunci i-am arestat pe toti, inclusiv pe
Vlad si pe colonelul Nae, cu atit mai mult cu cit pe ultimul il surprinsese o fata de a noastra la subsol I,
unde era Termoficarea, transmitind nu stiu ce la un aparat de emisie-receptie.

I.I.: Cum si cind au fost descoperite buncarele?

S.T.: Destul de tirziu, in orice caz dupa 24 decembrie. Unele intimplator, cele
mai multe insa datorita insa a doi indivizi….

(Sergiu Tanasescu, cu Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera
roz!” Cuvintul, nr. 9 29 martie 1990, p. 15.)

se pare ca acesti doi indivizi au fost “maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista”…

Cai de navigatie secrete sub Bucuresti

La 12 metri sub platoul Pietei Revolutiei exista o retea de catacombe prin care se circula cu barca

La 12 metri sub platoul Pietei Revolutiei exista o retea de catacombe prin care se circula cu barca. E vorba de culoare betonate, cu latimea de aproximativ doi metri, prin care curge un rau subteran adanc de un metru. Cu apa curata. Debitul raului secret e aproximat la 1,5 metri cubi pe secunda. La intrare, aceste cai navigabile care stabat Capitala sunt utilate cu barci pneumatice. Informatiile ne-au fost furnizate de Dan Falcan, seful sectiei de istorie a Muzeului Municipiului Bucuresti. Istoricul a cules toate datele existente despre catacombele Bucurestilor, mai vechi si mai noi, si le-a pus cap la cap pentru a-si face o imagine asupra istoriei orasului.

(IMG:http://news.softpedia.com/images//news/1913_6.jpg)

Capitala Romaniei are o traditie de secole in materie de tainite si coridoare secrete. Din datele pe care le detin istoricii, primele coridoare subterane demne de luat in seama au fost beciurile producatorilor de vinuri. Acestea aveau zeci de metri si erau atat de largi incat se circula cu carele. In secolul al XIX-lea au aparut edificiile care aveau tuneluri de refugiu, cum e tunelul care leaga Palatul Ghica Tei de Manastirea Plumbuita, lung de mai bine de un kilometru. In nordul Parcului Cismigiu, Biserica Schitu Magureanu e legata prin subterane de Palatul Cretzulescu .

Sub Palatul Golescu, situat langa stadionul Giulesti, a fost depistat un coridor subteran care da inspre lunca Dambovitei . Coridorul a fost folosit si de Tudor Vladimirescu. “De pe la 1826 ne-au ramas
cateva relatari care ne dau o imagine asupra catacombelor de sub capitala Tarii Romanesti. La acea vreme haiduceau in zona vestitii Tunsu si Grozea. Timp de multi ani, ei au bagat spaima in boierii din Bucuresti, in special in cei care aveau casele in zona actualei sosele Panduri. Ii calcau mereu, iar poterele nu puteau face nimic. Desi reuseau sa ii localizeze si sa-i incercuiasca, cand sa puna mana pe ei haiducii dispareau “intrand in pamant”, adica coborau in subteran. Astazi putem afirma ca sub aceasta sosea erau o multime de coridoare subterane, late de trei metri si inalte de doi metri. Dar toate datele acestea au palit atunci cand am intrat in contact cu alte informatii recente. Labirintul subteran vechi al orasului pare neinsemnat pe langa cel construit din ordinul lui Ceausescu. Datele mi-au parvenit de la militarii care au intrat in subteranele fostului Comitet Central, actualul Senat la Romaniei, respectiv de la maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista. Ei au intrat in aceste catacombe chiar pe 25 decembrie 1989, impreuna cu un grup de genisti si pirotehnisti”, explica muzeograful Dan Falcan.

Conform relatarii militarilor, la subsolul cladirii au gasit un tunel, nu prea lung, care coboara intr-un fel de cazarma. Opt camere cu paturi pliante. Din aceste camere pornesc mai multe culoare, unul ducand chiar pana la etajul II al cladirii. Pe un alt culoar se poate ajunge la un buncar mai larg, la 7 metri adancime. Se trece apoi de o usa blindata si se ajunge la un apartament spatios, la adancimea de 9 metri. Militarii au cautat apoi camera in care se afla sistemul de ventilatie si s-au trezit pe un nou culoar. Dupa ce au strabatut aproximativ 30 de metri au gasit o nisa cu o lada mare, in care erau 16 barci din cauciuc, cu pompe de umflare. Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie. Albia amenajata are pe lateral bare metalice facute pentru oprirea sau impulsionarea barcilor. “In opinia militarilor, raul secret duce catre un lacurile din afara orasului, in nord, si Dambovita, in sud-est” , subliniaza Falcan. Ofiterii au vorbit insa de existenta unui alt canal similar, la capatul unui alt tunel, precum si de un sistem de inundare a labirintului, pe sectiuni. In cazul in care un eventual fugar e urmarit, el poate inunda portiuni de tunel in spatele lui pentru a opri urmaritorii. A mai fost gasita o gura de iesire din labirint in curtea interioara a fostului CC, de unde, printr-o retea de canale, se poate intra in canalizarea orasului, de unde se poate iesi catre Dambovita. Reteaua are guri de iesire in Palatul Regal, Biserica Cretzulescu si magazinul Muzica. “In urma unor cercetari ulterioare a reiesit ca ramificatiile subterane au corespondenta cu circa 80 de obiective din Bucuresti, cum ar fi cladirea ASE, Casa Enescu, Opera Romana etc. Subliniez, relatari sunt ale unor ofiteri din cadrul armatei. Lucru foarte interesant, nimeni nu neaga existenta acestor cai de navigatie secrete, dar cand am incercat sa le exploram, nu ni s-a permis pe motiv ca… nu se poate”. Despre aceste galerii ale lui Ceausescu ne-a vorbit si Radulescu Dobrogea, presedintele asociatiei Ecocivica, fost inspector de mediu in Primaria Capitalei, omul care s-a ocupat multi ani de panza freatica a orasului. El sustine ca stie de aceste galerii ale lui Ceausescu si ca apa limpede care curge prin ele este panza freatica de sub oras.

Administratorii Senatului au vazut numai intrarea in catacombe

“Pot sa va spun ca am auzit despre aceste lucruri, dar nu le-am vazut. Exista o cale de comunicatie subterana care pleaca din Senat catre Piata Revolutiei, o cale care pleaca de la Palatul Regal catre Piata si inca una, tot din Palatul Regal, catre Biserica Cretzulescu. Intrarile in aceste cai de acces le-am vazut, dar unde se opresc, nu stiu, nu este treaba noastra sa cotrobaim pe acolo”, ne-a declarat inginer Constantin Bratu, directorul tehnic al administratiai cladirii Senatului Romaniei.

Sorin Golea (Libertatea 2005)

Actorul Ernest Maftei a avut de a face cu tuneluri…si teroristi…

Dan Badea:  Cine erau cei pe care i-a impuscat Dan Iosif?

Ernest Maftei:  USLA!  Venisera sa ne ajute si a venit sa ne’mpuste, dom’le!  Ce dracu’, nu stiu?  Au venit sa ne ajute.  La demisol erau niste oameni de ai nostri, ca acolo erau niste usi blindate ca nu stiu ce-i.  Si unui o deschis o usa dina asta si umbla la becuri.  Si nu-am speriat ca ce-o fi fost acolo.  Atunci vine USLA sa ne ajute.  Vin 15 insi si 4 colonel, dom’le.  Da!  Si cind se duc jos, i-au impuscat pe toti ai nostri.  Doi dintre ai nostri acolo au fost omoriti, erau revolutionari, oameni necajiti care s-au dus acolo sa moara.  Si atunci ne-am dat seama ca astia ne omoara.  Dar apoi vin sus.  Au avut si ei 3 morti.  Si-atunci i-am inconjurat:  “Dezbracarea!”  Pai da’ ce dracu’ dom’le?

Dan Badea:  Atunci i-au dezbracat?

Ernest Maftei:  Pai dar cum dom’le?  I-au impuscat pe loc!  Pai dar ne impuscau ei pe noi…

Dan Badea:  Dan Iosif a spus ca nu i-a impuscat pe cei 15 USLASI…

Ernest Maftei:  Da’ nu te lua cu el!  A fost necesar de i-a’mpuscat acolo!  Dar nu-i voie sa zica, fiindca nu vrea sa se afle.  nu-i voie din cauza ca acu’ne conduce Securitatea.  Chiar aia care au tras in noi sint pe posturi de conducere.  Asculta ce spun!  Ca USLA, coloana a 5-a, a fost cu Ceausescu.  Nu ne-ar fi omorit?  Vai de mine!…

Dan Badea:  Despre teroristi ce ne puteti spune?

Ernest Maftei:  Atunci cind s-au deschis usile, d-a intrat toata lumea, atunci au existat si asa-zisii teroristi.  Cu salopete, cu arme ascunse. … Au intrat printre noi.  Se de-aia, incepind cu 11 noaptea [23 decembrie 1989], acolo a fost razboi civil….Fug astia repede sa-l prinda si atunci am descoperit ca in fostul CC, intre ziduri, se circula.  Era un culoar.  In zid.  Pai cum? …

Dan Badea:  Pe unde credeti ca veneau teroristii?

Ernest Maftei:  Eu ma miram asa, la un moment dat:  cum dom’le, se trage, trag o jumatate de ora in plin si pe urma stau?  Si zic:  ba, baieti, de unde dracu vin?  Era pe 23, de-acuma.  Zic:  de unde vin si unde se duc?  de unde iau astia arme si inca nu-i videm?  Ce crezi?  Mi-am adus aminte, eu fiind batrin, ca la vila asta, care e a artistilor acuma, linga Biserica Alba, c-a fost vila lu’ Lupeasca.  Si de-acolo, Carol al II-lea a facut tunel pa sub pamint pina la palat, ca sa duca la el.  Venea cu masina, ca sa nu se vada lumea.  Si la palatul regal trageau tare.  Pai acolo, la vila aia, a fost armament mult.  Stai sa vezi ce se intimpla.  Era 1 noaptea, pe 23.  Zic:  ma copii, mergeti voi cu mine?  Si ajung pina in dreptul blocului aia, cu astia….

(Ernest Maftei cu Dan Badea, “‘Iliescu putea sa fie eroul neamului, dar a pierdut ocazia!’,” Expres, nr. 36 (85), 10-16 septembrie 1991, pp. 10-11)

28 December 1989 ITN

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/05/11/lets-go-to-the-videotape-i-to-the-army-its-confirmation-that-theyve-been-dealing-with-a-specially-trained-force-because-its-the-type-of-bullet-theyve-never-seen-before-itn-uk-telev/


Penny Marshall, ITN correspondent:  “This is one of the thousands of bullets that’s been handed in or found on the streets here in Timisoara. 

To the Army it’s confirmation that they’ve been dealing with a specially-trained force…because it’s the type of bullet they’ve never seen before.”


Soldier speaking to Ms. Marshall:  “these are bullets…”

“…the explosive bullets”

Fullscreen capture 4152011 83429 PM

http://www.itnsource.com/compilations/regions/europe/?lr=S24090801

Clip 100 of 125

Clip Ref: S24090801 2 113478

Copyright: ITN

Duration:00:01:44

Timecode – In:

Out:

28th December 1989 – Timisoara search GRAPHIC Exit the secret police ROMANIA: Timisoara: EXT Soldiers standing outside Army HQ INT Camera goes inside HQ / Officer shows and explains weapons …
A1: Mix / A2: Mix

 

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28 December 1989

Constantin Catalin-Ceferistul:  “Pe 28 decembrie am predat patru cetateni de nationalitate araba.  Aveau pasaport, Republica Irak.” (Expres Magazin, nr. 22 (1991))

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30-31 December 1989

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Blaine Harden, “Doors Unlocked on Romania’s Secret Police,” The Washington Post, 30 December 1989, p. 1, 14A (sau cu alte cuvinte, despre USLAC in combinezoane negre)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h-27121989-01min55s/

(To my pleasant surprise, I discovered the AFP (Agence France Presse) Archive online.  I finally dug into my pocket and purchased for approximately 3 euros an article the following articles.)

Anatomy of a Cover-up (or Constanta, we have a problem…):  In the waning days of December 1989 following the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu on Christmas Day, several high-ranking officials from Romania’s military and commercial navy stationed in and around Constanta recounted to foreign reporters details of what had happened off the Black Sea Coast during the previous week and a half…That they spoke out of turn and were entirely too honest could be surmised by the effort of Bucharest–and those directly charged with the overall governance and defense of the country–to deny the revelations out of Constanta.  It was the beginning of the cover-up of the Counter-Revolution of December 1989 and it was done precisely because of the involvement of foreign mercenaries in fighting side by side with elements of the Securitate who opposed the ouster of Nicolae Ceausescu.  (So, indeed, the cover-up was initiated by Romania’s new civil and military leaders to avoid international ramifications (the ultimate state function, regardless of regime, in a world of nation-states)…it would be continued by others.)

One wonders what would have happened had this series of reports been laid out in sequence and analyzed as a sequence.  There seems to have been more coverage of them (abroad) in the Budapest (see below), rather than Bucharest, press.  One of the few references in the literature on December 1989 is on page 66 of Nestor Ratesh’s Romania: The Entangled Revolution (1991), where Ratesh notes a (31 December 1989) Agence France Presse dispatch citing the office of naval commander Constantin Iordache on Soviet and Bulgarian information that helicopters were being launched by suspicious ships approximately 60 miles off the coast, as well as a later denial by other Romanian authorities of the existence of these helicopters.  As one can see below, the five AFP reports on the subject, from 30 and 31 December 1989, and 2 and 3 January 1990, are far more detailed, diverse, and damning than Ratesh’s allusion would suggest.

Note:  Not everything at this point had “disappeared”:  General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).

Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably:  The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/27/dumitru-mazilu-si-mircea-dinescu-despre-revolutia-romana/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

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fotografiile lui Ion Laurentiu, CC-ul PCR-ului, in noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.

https://plus.google.com/photos/109794872578116972195/albums/5417438035204009089

Robert Cullen, “Report from Romania:  Down with the Tyrant,” The New Yorker, 2 April 1990.

Late the next night, Romanian television showed Ceausescu’s corpse, lying in a pool of blood.  After that, the Securitate resistance wilted, although sporadic sniping continued for a week or so.  It turned out that not all of the Securitate fighters were Romanian.  A ranking member of the National Salvation Front told me that about a hundred of them, including some who fought the longest, were from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries with histories of involvement in terrorism.  They had come to Romania ostensibly as exchange students, but had in fact received commando training.  In return, they agreed to serve the Securitate for several years.  As these foreigners were captured, and rumors–accurate ones–about their origins began to spread, the Front publicly denied that any Arabs had been involved with the Securitate.  It did so because it wished to avoid any trouble in relations with the Arab world, the Front official explained.  I asked what would become of the captured Arab commandos, and he responded by silently drawing his index finger across his throat.

CONTACT WITH QADDAFI Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland – A telephone contact took place between the brother leader of the revolution (Qaddafi) and Ion Iliescu, President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation in Rumania in order to set his mind at rest with regard to the progress of the popular revolution there. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation reassured the brother leader of the revolution regarding the successful progress of the popular revolution in Rumania. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation saluted the attitudes of the great Al-Fatih revolution and the Libyan Arab people to the people of Rumania and its revolution. President Iliescu informed the brother leader of the revolution that the popular revolutionary leadership does not believe the rumors about the participation of Arabs in the fighting against the popular revolution and said that those rumors were spread by enemies in order to influence our morale, the progress of the popular revolution, and our friendship with the Arabs. President Iliescu confirmed to the brother leader of the revolution that authority will be that of the people because the popular revolution was carried out by the whole Rumanian people. President Iliescu expressed his thanks for and appreciation of the Libyan Arab people for the urgent humanitarian assistance provided by air to the Rumanian people. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/29/world/upheaval-in-the-east-news-reports-excerpts-from-broadcasts-and-a-press-dispatch.html Angela Bacescu with the Libyan ambassador to Romania Abu Ghula, Europa (Est/Vest), no. 94, September 1992, pp. 14-15 The Libyan ambassador discusses how on 25 or 26 December 1989 the then Libyan ambassador went on Romanian television to deny the rumors of Libyans fighting.  “What is more, he called for the delivery of any Libyan terrorirsts [!]“  On 29 or 30 December, Colonel Khadaffi addressed the Romanian people by satellite.  “Libya sent 4 planes with humanitarian aid (food, beds, medicine) that landed at Otopeni airport, were unloaded and then returned empty to Libya [interesting that he should have to specify that they returned empty to Libya].”
Dinamica producerii victimelora fost următoarea:
– 22 decembrie – 6 răniţi;
– 23 decembrie – 6 morţi, 15 răniţi;
– 24 decembbrie – 11 morţi, 40 de răniţi;
– 25 decembrie – 2 morţi, 10 răniţi;
– 26 decembrie – 6 răniţi;
– 28 deecmbrie – 2 răniţi ;
– 29 decmbrie – 1 mort;
– 31 decembire – 1 mort. 3 răniţi;
– 01 ianuarie – 3 morţi, 2 răniţi;
– 02 ianuarie – 3 morţi, 2 răniţi;
– 03 ianuarie – 1 mort;
– 04 ianuarie – 1 rănit;
– 05 ianuarie – 1 mort, 1 rănit;
– 12 ianaurie – 1 mort.
Decesul sau rănirea victimelor s-a produs în 100 de cazuri noaptea şi în 18 cazuri ziua.

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1-2 January 1990

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.[9]

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea:  “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.

Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Screen Capture of a registry presented by Dr. Nicolae Nae Constantinescu in TVR documentary by Toma Roman Jr. mentioning an atypical bullet with cap (varf) retezat extracted from a patient on 23 December 1989 and later “collected” by Ghircoias.

Origin 7272014 112744 AM

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/07/26/nicolae-ghircoias-colonel-de-militie-director-al-institutului-de-criminalistica-din-inspectoratul-general-al-militiei-igm-decembrie-1989-ianuarie-1990/

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Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus-numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel Negoiu din Bucuresti.  Medicii de spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri.  Colonel Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii, i-a adunat pe toti indivizii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristii, facindu-i disparuti.

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Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera , 21 august 1992, p. 1, p. 3.

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7 January 1990

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Dessa Trevisan (Belgrade), “Securitate agents seek Yugoslav sanctuary,” The Times (London), 1 January 1990.

“Ten Romanians suspected of being Securitate agents have sought asylum in Yugoslavia, where the authorities are cooperating with the new Romanian government to check their identity.  Mr. Jovan Vuckovic, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, said that Yugoslavia was in touch with the Bucharest leadership after a warning that Securitate groups may be trying to escape.”

Ion Medoia, “Teroristi prinsi pe teritoriul Iugoslaviei,” Romania Libera, 10 ianuarie 1990.

d. Stire de senzatie
Autoritatile iugoslave au arestat ieri 63 de teroristi, care au participat la masacrele de la Timisoara, Sibiu si Bucuresti. Cand vor fi predati inapoi, vom releva detalii semnificative.
(publicat in ziarul Renasterea banateana, Timisoara, 07.01.1990,pe prima pagina, fara titlu si nesemnat, dar incadrat in chenar)
N.R. La vremea respectiva colonelul Nicolae Predonescu, reprezentant al conducerii Garnizoanei militare Timisoara la Consiliul judetean FSN Timis si totodata membru al respectivului Consiliu, a informat, inclusiv pe presedintele Consiliului judetean FSN Timis, Lorin Ioan Fortuna, ca va pleca, impreuna cu o delegatie militara, la solicitarea

http://lorin-fortuna.ro/reviste/politica_nationala/Trimestrul_1_din_2004/html/index.htm


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9 January 1990

FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62

According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].

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11 January 1990

Mai tirziu in 11 ianuarie [1990], cind toata lumea spunea iarasi ‘civili sa predea armele’ impreuna cu Cercel Doina Rebeca am intrat in buncarul subteran din CC si am mai prins inca opt insi.  Au tras–daca nu era Rebeca era a treia oara cind muream….

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9 January 1990; 11-17 January 1990

Lt. Col. Alexandru Bodea (no. 22 May 1990 Armata Poporului):On 9 January 1990, between the hours of 21:55 and 23:14, on the radar screens of the missile managers of one of the subordinate subunits there were detected signals coming from about 12 unidentified aircraft, that were deploying, at a height of 300 to 1800 meters, in the direction of a nearby locality.The following day, between the hours of 03:00 and 04:15 again were detected the signals of six airships, after which—the same—between 17:00-18:00 and 21:30—the same type of signals, several aerial targets hovering at altitudes between 300-3000 meters, in the same direction as the previous day.Then, as if to boost the belief of the missile officers that this was no accident, on the third day, 11 January, between the hours 0400-0500, again there appeared the signals of 7 unidentified aircraft, having essentially the same flight characteristics.  What is curious is that not a single one of these targets was observed visually and no characteristic engine sounds were heard in the respective locations.But even more curious is that, just then, from the central radio base of a nearby municipality, there arrived a communications unit that intercepted foreign signals on a particular bandwidth, in impulses, while on another frequency an intense traffic in Arabic or Turkish was noted.In light of this information, the commander of the unit organized a radio inspection of numerous areas, with the help of transmissions’ equipment.  Therefore, on 11 January 1990, between 1120 and 1130 on the respective frequency were received the code signs in English, 122 calling 49, 38, 89, 11, 82, 44, 38, 84, and asked if they “were doing well.”From the fragments of discussions it could be understood that they were making references to explosives, hospitals, medicines, and wounded “for the hours 1400.”  At 1330, on the same frequency, once again were intercepted conversations in which there was mention of wounded and requests for help.  The transmissions were received over this, in which a more feminine voice and a dog’s bark could be clearly heard.  References were made to the preceding conversations that were to follow at 1800, 1900, 2200, and then on 12 January 1990, at 0910.Chatting with some citizens from the local area where these targets and foreign radio traffic were intercepted, the commander of the anti-aircraft unit to whom we referred found out that nearby there exists a wooded road (author’s note: the locality is in a mountainous area), surrounded by two rows of barbed wire, a road on which in fact there is no lumber transport.  Not by chance, since before the Revolution, the road was off-limits and was under the strict guard of the Securitate.  [emphasis added]These same citizens further informed the unit’s commander, that after the Revolution, the road in question did not become a no-man’s land, remaining instead in the hands of people dressed as woodsmen but about whom those from the local lumber collective had no clue.Who could these unknown “woodsmen” be?  And what “affairs” did they have there?  Perhaps exactly…[article concludes]

“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor.  Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare.  Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122″ chema indicativele “49″, “38″, “89″, “11″, “82″, “44″, “38″, “84″, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00″.  La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare.  Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine.  S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere.  Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti?  Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo?  Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor.  Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?”
Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), mai 1990.)

asemenea actiuni de diversiune radio-electronica s-au mai inregistrat si in zilele de 11 si 17 ianuarie, deci aproape la o luna dupa Revolutie…

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16 January 1990:  (Date of film procured by Ted Koppel and ABC News showing underground tunnels used by the “terrorists”)

Monday, March 5 (1990). 

Bucharest.  Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling.  Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied.  Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.

We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest.  An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over.  I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs.  “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel.  I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels.  The colonel went off to consult with his man.  When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.”  “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described.  “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.

Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook.  The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.


Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.

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18 January 1990

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/21/radu-anton-roman-batalia-pentru-bucuresti-romania-literara-anul-23-nr-3-18-ianuarie-1990-pp-14-15/

Radu Anton Roman, “Batalia pentru Bucuresti” Romania Literara, anul 23, nr. 3, 18 ianuarie 1990, pp. 14-15.

There’s much to be said about this article.  My apologies for it’s quality:  it was xeroxed from the Library of Congress’s microfilm collection and then scanned in.  I wish I could say I came across this by myself, as I have so much of what I have found on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  Instead, I found reference to it in Aurel Perva and Carol Roman’s 1991 book, Misterele Revolutiei Romane (see below).

“Aveau un armament foarte divers.  Gloante 5, 6, N.A.T.O. lungi, cu cap de otel de foarte mare viteza si forta de penetratie ce provoaca dezastre anatomice.  Cartuse explozive Dum-Dum care n-au fost folosite impotriva oamenilor decit de fascisti in 1941 la Odessa.  Dar si ei au renuntat, cind rusii le-au raspuns cu acelasi calibru.  Lunete cu infrarosii, amortizor de zgomot si obturator de flacara la gura tevii.”

 

On Thursday morning [18 January 1990], for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.  In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.  This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television. [NYT 1/22/1990]

Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Rumanians Call for Freedom in Schools

By DAVID BINDER, Special to The New York Times
Published: January 22, 1990

BUCHAREST, Rumania, Jan. 21— Student leaders, addressing a crowd of about 3,000 of their classmates today, demanded far-reaching changes in the faculties of Bucharest University and other Rumanian institutions of higher learning.

The strongest demand, and the one cheered most loudly by the students, was for the ouster of professors most closely associated with the Communist dictatorship of the late Nicolae Ceausescu, particularly those working for the Securitate, or state security police.

”There are Securitate officers on the journalism faculty,” a student, Daniel Oghian, declared. He assailed Professor Radu Florian as a Ceausescu holdover whose advocacy of Communist ideology was particularly objectionable. Mr. Florian is a member of the Stefan Gheorgiu Academy, where Securitate officials were trained. The academy was grafted onto Bucharest University under the Ceausescu Government.

”Down with Florian!” the students chanted. ”Down with Stefan Gheorgiu! Depoliticize! Depoliticize!” ‘Militarized’ Classrooms Mihai Iliescu, a physics student, drew cheers when he declared that incompetent professors should be sent back to ”study their lessons over again” or be forced to resign. He also called for the ouster of the Ministry of Education’s inspector of universities.

Another speaker, from the Marine Sciences Institute in Constanta, said that his college had been ”militarized” and subjected to Securitate control under Mr. Ceausescu. Conditions were such that students were quartered 50 to a single room, he said, and buildings were unheated.

”Take it over!” the students shouted. ”Take it over!” It was the second rally in two weeks in the capital. The first was held at the Polytechnical Institute in western Bucharest. But this time the students gathered in University Square in the middle of the city under the auspices of a newly-formed Student League.

In passionate speeches commemorating classmates who were killed in the uprising that toppled the Ceausescu regime four weeks ago, the students said they wanted to create ”a new society” and ”a strong Rumania.”

”We speak from our hearts for those who were killed in the revolution,” said Mihai Gheorghiu, a third-year philosophy student. Dan Josif, another student, said, ”They fought with weapons, and we carried flowers.”

Government Is Silent on Protest

The students, many cradling lighted candles in their hands, bowed their heads in a minute of silence for their slain classmates, then raised their voices in four stanzas of the long-banned hymn ”Awake, Ye Rumanians,” which denounces ”barbarians and tyrants.”

There were no Government spokesmen at the rally. Nor was there any immediate reaction from the governing Council of National Salvation, although its President, Ion Iliescu, met with youth leaders today to discuss a future group for Rumanian young people to replace the Communist youth organization.

It has generally been impossible to obtain precise information about or reactions to daily events in Rumania from the Government, which closed its foreign press and telephone service on Saturday, even from its spokesman, although he holds periodic news conferences.

On Thursday morning, for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.

In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.

This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television.

Photos: Students in Bucharest demonstrating yesterday for far-reaching changes at universities, including the ouster of faculty members the students say were supporters of the deposed dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. (AP); A student at the rally mourning a relative killed in the revolution. (Reuters)

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24 January 1990

A cryptic message announcing the abrogation of unspecified secret accords with unspecified countries carried out by the Ceausescu regime, but not contained in the registries of the Foreign Ministry and in contravention of international law (in other words, Plan Z-Z, an accord with several Middle Eastern states, most importantly perhaps Qadhafi’s Libya)…24 January 1990 appears to have also been–not coincidentally–the last day “foreign terrorists” who had fought with the Securitate against Ceausescu’s downfall were exfiltrated from the country–reputedly following a threat to Romanian workers in Libya by Qadhafi if the remaining Arab mercenaries in Romanian custody were not allowed to leave the country…WHY OH WHY, WE ARE CONSTANTLY ASKED, DID ILIESCU, ROMAN, AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT NOT PUT THE “TERRORISTS” ON TRIAL:  HERE IS YOUR ANSWER, THEY WERE COMPLICIT IN ALLOWING THEM TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND THEREFORE LACKED A KEY ELEMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECEMBER BLOODSHED.  THE TRUTH ABOUT THE REVOLUTION WAS THUS COMPROMISED, BURIED ON THAT FATEFUL DAY OF 24 JANUARY 1990.

Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul Z-Z si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 septembrie 1990.

Dupa citeva saptamini presedintele unei tari direct implicate a amenintat guvernul roman ca va recurge la represalii impotriva celor citeva mii de cetateni romani aflati cu contract de munca in tara respectiva daca nu vor fi returnati teroristii straini, vii sau morti.  Santajul respectiv si-a facut efectul si un avion romanesc a efectuat o cursa mai putin obisnuita catre un aeroport polonez, de unde o “incarcatura” mai putin obisnuita constind in persoane valide, raniti si cosciuge a fost transferata pe un alt avion, plecand intr-o directie necunoscuta.  In ziua aceea se stergeau orice urme ale planului “Z-Z”

24 ianuarie 1990

Dr. Manuel Burzaco (Medecins sans frontieres, “Doctors without Borders)

3) Dr. Richard Domergue (Marseille)

In early March 1990, Agence France Presse reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  [Significantly, a slew of military prosecutors, among them General Dan Voinea, General Romeo Balan, and General Teodor Ungureanu have attempted to deceive Romanians in the years since by denying or avoiding mention of the existence and use of DUM-DUM munitions in December 1989.]

Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

 

 

©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
411FD1741841E311716203546AC34BEC9C6CF7F0A69644B4

 

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #23 Fighting after the 22nd (Bucuresti, Brasov, Sibiu, Craiova)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 30, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

BUCURESTI:

From Bullets, Lies, and Videotape by Richard Andrew Hall

(PERHAPS) ONLY IN ROMANIA!:  Twenty Years Later Romanianists and Romanians Continue to Deny the Existence of Atypical Munitions in December 1989…Even Though Clear Video Evidence Exists to Confirm Their Presence!

DUM-DUM MUNITIONS OF THE SECURITATE’S ELITE SNIPERS (above); VIDIA BULLETS (below)

Holland & Holland (London) magnum bullets found in Securitate V-a building

VIDIA bullets (Bucuresti, zona TVR) below– individual demonstrates how much smaller they are than Army’s standard 7,62 mm munitions

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xn2ggt_revolutia-romana-ccpcr-tvr-22-23-dec-1989-3_news

Bucuresti CC

Fullscreen capture 1292011 60804 PM

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/23/25-for-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-romanian-revolution-16-eyewitness-accounts-from-inside-the-central-committee-cc-ul-building/

image-11

Radu Anton Roman, “Batalia pentru Bucuresti,” Romania Literara, anul 23, nr. 3, 18 ianuarie 1990, pp. 14-15.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/21/radu-anton-roman-batalia-pentru-bucuresti-romania-literara-anul-23-nr-3-18-ianuarie-1990-pp-14-15/

“Aveau un armament foarte divers.  Gloante 5, 6, N.A.T.O. lungi, cu cap de otel de foarte mare viteza si forta de penetratie ce provoaca dezastre anatomice.  Cartuse explozive Dum-Dum care n-au fost folosite impotriva oamenilor decit de fascisti in 1941 la Odessa.  Dar si ei au renuntat, cind rusii le-au raspuns cu acelasi calibru.  Lunete cu infrarosii, amortizor de zgomot si obturator de flacara la gura tevii.”

image0-3

image-7

image-6

“In biroul domnului ministru al Apararii Nationale, generalul Victor Stanculescu, am avut ocazia sa vad cinci gloante extrase din corpul unor victime ale revolutiei.  ‘Armata romana nu are asemenea gloante in dotare’ mi-a spus domnia sa.”

“Am intrebat cu o naivitate din care eu insumi nu puteam sa inteleg decit doua lucruri:  ori a tras securitatea, ori a tras populatia.  ‘Inseamna ca a fost pus in aplicare planul ‘Z/Z’?’  Domnul general a raspuns:  ‘Nu am auzit niciodata de acest plan ‘Z/Z’.’

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2009/12/24/bullets-lies-and-videotape-the-amazing-disappearing-romanian-counter-revolution-of-december-1989-part-vii-conclusion-those-who-told-us-the-truth-by-richard-andrew-hall/

full pdf file

blv 111909tk6

din filmul lui Spiru Zeres (sau asa se pare, dupa un reportaj japonez nhk http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tXPr6bpekfw, din nenorocire care nu mai este disponsibil pe internet)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/december-1989-2009-bullets-lies-and-videotape/

Revolutia Romana 22 Dec 1989 cd5

(posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rojm_revolutia-romana-22-dec-1989-cd5_shortfilms) , the sequence from roughly 1:20 to 2:50 shows civilians in the bowels of the CC building in Bucharest—the focal point of the December events, from where Nicolae Ceausescu gave his famous “final speech” on 21 December and from which Front leaders addressed crowds on 22 December and after—showing the munitions found in the Archives of the PCR’s CC.  The “dum-dum” bullets of “the elite shooters/commandos”—he mentions they are of West German manufacture—are identified for the camera, as are smaller, special bullets—which appear, based on other video, photos, and accounts, to be “vidia” bullets.  [Following the two screen captures below is an article from 31 December 1989, “Cu ce trag teroristii?” (With What are the Terrorists Shooting), in which the journalist discusses having a West German-manufactured (RWS firm) “dum-dum” bullet in his hand, as well as the “unfortunately now-famous small bullets of 5,62 mm caliber” (vidia bullets). click to see in this version here:  Cu ce trag teroristii]

from Orwellian Positively Orwellian Part III a fistful of bullets

Bucharest: Stanculescu’s unexpected revelation prompted a participant in the Revolution to challenge Stanculescu’s claim to ignorance as to the source of the bullets.  Ironically, while this challenge suggests Stanculescu may have being playing coy and not telling everything he knew, it does not contradict Stanculescu’s claim that the ammunition was not the Army’s, but rather buttresses it:

Balasa Gheorghe:  I am very intrigued by the interview given by General Stanculescu to the newspaper ‘Tineretul Liber,’ an interview in which he avoids the truth.

From [Securitate] Directorate V-a, from the weapons depot, on 23-24 December 1989, DUM-DUM cartridges, special cartridges that did not fit any arm in the arsenal of the Defense Ministry were retrieved.  Three or four boxes with these kinds of cartridges were found.  The special bullets were 5-6 cm. in length and less thick than a pencil.  Such a cartridge had a white stone tip that was transparent.  All of these cartridges I personally presented to be filmed by Mr. Spiru Zeres.  All the special cartridges, other than the DUM-DUM [ones] were of West German [FRG] make. From Directorate V-a we brought these to the former CC building, and on 23-24 December ’89 they were surrendered to U.M. 01305.  Captain Dr. Panait, who told us that he had never seen such ammunition before, Major Puiu and Captain Visinescu know about [what was turned over].

In the former CC of the PCR, all of those shot on the night of 23-24 December ’89 were shot with special bullets.  It is absurd to search for the bullet in a corpse that can penetrate a wall….[44]

image-8image-7

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…

“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:

armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:

–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;

–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;

–statii de emisie-receptie;

–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;

–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;

–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;

–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;

–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;

–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;

–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.

–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.

“S-AU GASIT LAZI INTREGI, CONTININD DE LA GLOANTE SPECIALE, PINA LA GLOANTE DE VINATOARE”

Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):

“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:

–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;

–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;

–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;

–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;

–dozimetre, contoare Geiger, osciloscoape multispot, truse electronice de depanare, calculatoare, aparatura foto;

–truse chimice de teren;

–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);

–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;

–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;

codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;

–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;

–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;

–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;

–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;

–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;

–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:

–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….

Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.

Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.

[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

Trying to reconstruct the timeline of reporting on the use of exploding dum-dum bullets and other unusual munitions used solely by the Securitate “terrorists” during the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 is not easy.  Unfortunately, we must rely in the public domain on transcripts and diaries from the time, as demonstrated below.  Clearly, it is emerging:  there was discussion at the beginning.  A watershed event that should have then and should now spark great interest and further investigation–a press conference by surgeons (including military doctors) in early March 1990 that as far as I can tell was only ever reported on in depth in French by AFP (see below)–has all but been ignored and forgotten as if it had never taken place.  Highly damning too is the documentary evidence by the wounded themselves, relatives, army officers, and doctors in Timisoara (attesting to the use of these munitions both before and after 22 December 1989).  The overall evidence is overwhelming as to the use of exploding dum-dum bullets and other unusual munitions in December 1989; the alibis and mechanisms of denial are transparent:  just because they existed doesn’t mean they were used; perhaps the army had them too; perhaps the bullets ricocheted and split apart; doctors and army officers (even military doctors) what would they know about dum-dum bullets?; on and on, etc. etc.

http://elenatomaxxl.blogspot.com/2013/06/sorin-m-radulescu-revolutia-ca_24.html

 

Sâmbata 30 decembrie 1989

Reportaj la Spitalul Militar Central: se relateaza despre modul dramatic în care au fost efectuate operatiile (chirurgicale) din ziua de 22 decembrie 1989. „Noapte alba sau zi neagra” spune doctorul pe buna dreptate. Armele teroristilor, a securistilor au împroscat multimea cu gloante explozive, care au avut ca efect plagi si leziuni gigantice.  
Emotionant! Dramatic! Dureros!

 

luni, 24 iunie 2013

SORIN M. RĂDULESCU – REVOLUŢIA CA SPECTACOL, Miercuri 27 decembrie, 1989 – Revolutia -3 –

REVOLUŢIA CA SPECTACOL
(ÎNSEMNARILE UNUI SOCIOLOG ÎN PERIOADA SEPTEMBRIE 1988-IULIE 1992)
 

Miercuri 27 decembrie 1989
Primesc telefon de la Vasilica P., care îmi descrie cu lux de amanunte atmosfera din Centrul de Sociologie, care a devenit un fel de ,,dipecerat” al sociologilor bucuresteni. Ma deplasez imediat acolo ca sa fiu prezent la desfasurarea evenimentelor.

/ Teroriştii .Mărturii (22 27dec.’89 )

22 apr. Notez cu R –revoluţionarii, al căror nume nu-l pot şti

– R 1: Generalul Tudor, pe care aş vrea să nu-l mai văd!

 El a eliberat teroriştii suspecţi prinşi de noi!

– R 2: Asupra lor am găsit agende, bancnote însemnate.

 Ce a făcut g-ral Tudor cu ei, noi nu ştim!

– R 3 :Eu am păzit camera suspecţilor .Erau 9. Din ordinul g-ralului Tudor li s-a dat drumul

– R 4. Dorobanţu Marin: Un terorist trăgea dintr-o vilă vecină; o maşină cu copertină

din care cca 15 persoane au fugit din vila din faţă; am prins o salvare cu un terorist ;

era şi o maşină inflamabilă pe care am aprins-o; în spatele ei au ieşit 3 terorişti .

A fost un foc foarte puternic.

– Ofiţer paraşutist: aici se lupta, cum s-a spus …

– R 5: Teroriştii au atacat mult TVR. Pe 24 decembrie, din două taburi, cu steag,

 au coborît mulţi militari şi au deschis foc asupra noastră .

 S-au retras apoi pe străzi, în spatele maşinilor.

– R 6: Pe 24 decembrie s-a zvonit că mîncarea adusă este otrăvită. Am aruncat-o.

 Nu aveam nici lumină şi apă .

– R 7: Parola noastră – ” Cine eşti ?”

– Reporter: Cine a tras în voi?

– Ofiţer: G-ral Tudor a eliberat mulţi suspecţi. Nici atunci, nici pe urmă, n-am înţeles

 de ce a făcut-o

– R 2: Arestaţii terorişti aveau dolari, staţie de emisie, unul era chiar străin;

 au fost eliberaţi – nu ştiu de ce!

– R 6: Au fost şi zvonuri pentru a face panică. Unele au fost false. Altele reale .

 Pe 26 sau 27 decembrie a fost prins un civil ( ing. electronist la Tg. Mureş ). La control cpt. Epure i-a găsit o schiţă cu centrul Bucureştiului, pe care era marcat hotelul Modern. Aş vrea să ştiu ce este cu acest terorist?

– Reporter: Da, am vrea să ştim cine a tras în noi?

– Alt reporter ( arătînd la o uşă ): Cum a fost?

– Lct X: teroriştii trăgeau în balamale şi broaşte cu gloanţe cu cap vidia.

Asemenea arme nu sunt în dotarea armatei.

– Lct mj. Diţiu: invită la sediul clubului “TV’22 “, ca să mai afle cum a fost.

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/cdandara/agende/agenda4/docs/jurnal4_6.htm

In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania).  Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

This was also discussed by Bucharest medical personnel at a 1994 conference:

AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA

“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”

Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2

“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”.  Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat:  dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989.  “Documentatia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat.  “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina).  Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel.  Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate.  S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe.  Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta.  In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu:  “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit.  “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.

NOR WERE THESE THE ONLY DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL–FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC–WHO ATTESTED TO THE USE OF DUM-DUM EXPLODING AND OTHER ATYPICAL, UNUSUAL MUNITIONS USED DURING THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 1989

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/08/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-i-dr-manuel-burzaco-medecins-sans-frontieres/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/10/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-ii-trimisi-in-strainatate-italia-franta-austria-anglia-si-germania-pentru-tratament/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/11/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-iii-ce-spun-medici-romani/

Dr. Manuel Burzaco from “Doctors without Borders” was part of a team of doctors from that group who visited hospitals in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Brasov, Buzau and Braila in late December 1989 and early January 1990.  This report from the Madrid daily El Pais touches upon the women and children gravely injured by the exploding “dum dum bullets used by the Securitate.”

Other reports from Bucharest and Timisoara hospitals during the events:

“At Bucharest’s main emergency hospital, doctors said that Securitate snipers, apparently using infra-red telescopic sights and exploding dum-dum bullets, had been firing throughout Saturday night and they shot many civilians, with bullets striking foreheads and hearts.  The morgue at the hospital was stacked with 90 bodies at noon today, almost all of them civilians dead of gunshot wounds.”

Blaine Harden, “In Bucharest, Tears and Prayers for the Fallen,” The Washington Post, 25 December 1989, p. A1; A40.

Rebeca Doina Cercel cu Traian Calin Uba, “1.500.000 dolari–C.C.–Emanatii ‘Revolutiei'” Contrast (Constanta), nr. 9 (49) 8-14 martie 1991, pp. 4-5.

image0-002

si Viorel Ringhilescu, prezent si el in cladirea CC PCR, spune ca el a vazut documente USLA in limba araba…

‘USLAT-externe’ (“Pe partea din stanga a hartiei era scris in limba araba, probabil echivalentul lingvistic al aceste nume de trupe.”…”Toate erau batute la masina de scris si numele care se aflau notate acolo erau numai de provenienta araba” O Revolutie Originala, Bucuresti 2008)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/image012.jpg

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/image012.jpg

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/06/misterele-revolutiei-la-bucuresti-planul-zz-intra-in-actiune-si-cazul-medias-istoria-unui-securist-care-a-antrenat-teroristi-palestinieni-in-romania-colonelul-iana-a-disparut-fara-urma-revista/

image0-001

Cezar Andreescu si Mircea Iovan, “Misterele revolutiei.  La Bucuresti.  Planul ZZ intra in actiune,” Cuvintul, nr. 1 (101) ianuarie 1992, p.3.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/27/dumitru-mazilu-si-mircea-dinescu-despre-revolutia-romana/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/

image0

fotografiile lui Ion Laurentiu, CC-ul PCR-ului, in noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.

https://plus.google.com/photos/109794872578116972195/albums/5417438035204009089

George Arun, “Cazul Medias–istoria unui securist care a antrenat teroristi palestinieni in Romania.  Colonelul Iana a disparut fara urma,” Cuvintul, nr. 7 (107), februarie 1992, p.3.

image0-003

image0-006

Afirmatiile sale (Dinca) din ultimul cuvint la care a avut dreptul, ne-au lasat cu gura cascata. Planul ,Zet-Zet’, care insemna de fapt ,sfirsitul sfisitului’ si reprezenta o intelegere intre ceausescu si sefii a cinci state de a interveni in caz de puci militar, ramine o enigma. Iar faptul ca ar mai fi vrut sa releve alte amanunte interesante, dar procurorii i-au interzis sa vorbeasca despre ele, intriga.
6 februarie 1990, Emil Munteanu, Romania Libera
image0-008
In discutie a intervenit frecvent si problema ,planului ZZ’ sau ‘sfirsitul sfirsitului.’ A existat sau nu un asemenea plan disperat de salvare in extremis a familiei dictatoriale prin reprimarea totala a unei revolte populare? La proces, I. Dinca a aruncat ,bomba’ existentei acestei diabolice conspiratii internationale, promitind dezvaluiri. Dar dezvaluirile nu s-au produs. Condamnatul ne-a relatat ca a aflat de existenta acestui plan la un interogatoriu la care a fost supus in miez de noapte de fostul procuror general N. Popovici si de un numar de alti sase anchetori, cind a fost intrebat despre ,ZZ’. Acest ,ZZ’–ne-a spus I. Dinca–reprezenta un acord incheiat de dictator cu cinci guverne, prin care acestea se obligau sa intervina reciproc cu trupe specializate in cazul unor tulburari care sa ameninte existenta guvernelor respective.
I. Socaciu, 3 martie 1990
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Dan Ioan (fost procuror militar), Teroristii din ’89Dan Ioan: Un militian care locuia in acelasi bloc cu mine mi-a spus ca, la Militia Capitalei, au fost retinuti ca teroristi si cetateni straini, pe care ii descria ca persoane atletice, si care erau siguri ca nu li se va intampla nimic. Mai retin ca, in fisetul fostului adjunct al procurorului general, au gasit si o lista care cuprindea cca 10 persoane cu nume araba, fara nicio explicatie. Daca ne amintim faptul ca primul avion strain de pasageri sosit la Otopeni a fost din Libia, care ar fi adus ajutoare, putem sa credem si varianta, care circula, ca acel avion i-a recuperat pe libienii vii sau morti si i-a dus in Libia. Putem, de asemenea, sa emitem versiunea ca cel mai bun prieten al lui Nicolae Ceausescu, in persoana fostului dictator libian Muammar Gaddafi, i-a trimis in ajutor luptatori de gherila sau ca acestia erau deja la studii, in special la Scoala Militara a Ministerului de Interne de la Baneasa. Dupa disparatia cuplului Ceausescu, luptatorii respectivi au trebuit sa fie retrasi, evident, cu ajutorul autoritatilor romane din acel moment. Departe de mine, insa, a crede ca teroristii au fost numai cetateni straini. Daca realmente au existat asemenea teroristi, aciea nu puteau actiona decat incadrati intr-un sistem organizat de acele structuri ale statului totalitar roman a caror singura ratiune de a fi consta in apararea regimului comunist si a conducatorilor lui.

image0-001

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

Revolutia ne-au furat-o altii. Noi generatia in blugi si adidasi am inceput aceasta revolutie impotriva tiranului am invins si am fost dati la o parte de altii. Unde sunt teroristii libieni? Eu personal am vazut doi prinsi dezarmati de arme necunoscute noua si arestati de militarii romani. Vorbeau stricat romaneste cu accent arab. Cui i-au fost predati?
Am fost la televiziune… Cine a tras asupra noastra si cine vroia sa cucereasca postul national de televiziune? De ce se spune acum ca nu au existat ofiteri de securitate fanatici care au luptat si au fost loiali dictatorului?
De ce se spune acum ca nu au existat teroristi? Nu contest ca au fost si situatii nefericite cand datorita dezinformarii militarii au tras unii in altii… Dar astea au fost cazuri izolate.
Am avut noroc ca Armata Romana ni s-a alaturat la indemnul nostru “ARMATA E CU NOI”, altfel varsarea de sange ar fi fost mai mare.
Si acum dupa 20 de ani se ascunde adevarul despre REVOLUTIA ROMANA…
Am fost acolo… am vazut tot… pe mine nu ma poate prosti nimeni…
DUMNEZEU SA-I ODIHNEASCA IN PACE PE TOTI EROII NOSTRII DIN 89…

http://www.ligamilitarilor.ro/eroii-neamului/recunostinta-eroilor-revolutiei-din-%E2%80%9989-timisoara/

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Au fost teroristi!!!!! 11:49:22, 22 Dec 2010

Stefan : Cateva intrebari: 1. Care a fost primul diplomat strain care a aparut la TVR, nu cumva ambasadorul libian….dupa aceasta interventie au disparut din spitale, etc toate persoanele care trebuiau sa dispara (au fost transportati cu masini utilizate pentru transportul painii) si dusi la Otopeni. Dupa aceasta data au incetat si luptele….O parte din teroristi ( in special libieni, palestinieni, etc.)erau din taberele de antrenament de la Cincu unde erau coordonati si antrenati de ofiteri romani contra cost in special pentru lupte de comando si in schimbul unoor tratate speciale cu tarile arabe.

http://www.cotidianul.ro/nu-au-existat-teroristi-in-decembrie-89-132724/

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“AM DAT NAS IN NAS CU ARABII”Si inainte de 1989 am fost un mare pasionat al muntelui. Asa i-am cunoscut pe cei de la statia meteo de pe Tarcu. Ei mi-au dat caseta cu inregistrarile acelea din zilele revolutiei. Am incercat o traducere cu studentii mei de la Facultatea de Medicina. In mare parte, am reusit sa dezleg misterul, dar, din pacate, mai exista pasaje pe care inca nu am reusit sa le deslusesc. Pot doar sa va spun, cu toata convingerea, ca teroristi arabi au existat, in Timisoara, in perioada decembrie 1989. I-am vazut cu ochii mei langa fosta Policlinica cu plata. In plus, imediat dupa evenimentele de atunci, in pasul Sercaia, in timp ce faceam fotografii, am dat nas in nas cu indivizi ce aveau alura de arabi, imbracati in haine militare romanesti. Cred ca acolo era o tabara de antrenamentdr. Adrian Siniteanu 

http://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/libienii-pe-frecventa-revolutiei-la-timisoara-53715.html

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02:23 Pompiliu Alămorean:  …Teroriştii libieni. Teroriştii libieni au plecat cu 2 avioane de pe Otopeni, în 27 decembrie 1989, ă, ’90. Teroriştii sirieni şi alţi arabi erau printre noi şi majoritatea au rămas printre noi. Erau studenţi, cum spunem noi, cu acoperire. Conserva. Teroriştii interni. Teroriştii interni au fost în primul rînd trupele speciale ale lui Ceauşescu, care îl şi purtau pe Ceauşescu la gît. Unul dintre ei este celebrul mort în revoluţie, care acuma îmi scapă numele, care pe masa de operaţie, sub narcoză spunea: “Unde-i tătucul să-mi dea gloanţe să trag?” Da, mă rog, acuma…

V.P. Spune:

august 5, 2010 at 1:33 pm Interesant ca langa cadavrul lui Iosif Costinas au gasit ambalaj de la diazepam, asa cum s-au gasit si in cazul enoriasului lui Tokes, a carui cadavru a fost descoperit intr-o padure de langa Timisoara, cu cateva luni inainte de decembrie 1989. Oare cu adevarat s-au sinucis amandoi, sau mai degraba au fost ‘sinucisi’? Iar despre teroristii libieni sau arabi care au plecat de la Otopeni, mai multi martori sustin ca asa a fost….Normal ca ambasadorul Siriei sau Libiei, sau al nu stiu carei tara a avut pe-acolo teroristi ar da in judecata Romania daca s-ar spune ceva oficial in legatura cu asta…Ca doar n-o fi prost ca sa sustina ca oamenii lor au fost implicati atat de bine in ‘evenimentele’ din Romania… http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/07/07/culisele-revolutiei-6/

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26 – In decembrie 1989, la Revolutie, in Brasov, unii dintre acesti libieni s-au aflat printre cei care au tras de la ultimele doua etaje ale hotelului Capitol in brasovenii manifestanti;

27 – Desi prinsi de catre Armata, acei tragatori libieni au fost uterior eliberati;

28 – Cetatenii brasoveni cunosc aceste situatii;

http://www.amosnews.ro/arhiva/ioan-ghise-contesta-decizia-lideralilor-ii-retrage-sprijinul-politic-29-08-2006

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61. teroristi la Focani in arest 10:16 | 20 Iulie
luul

teroristi in combinezon negru au fost retinuti inclusiv in arestul unuitatilor militare din Focsani. ne cereau tigari de dupa gratii si erau calmi si nu stiau limba romana. noi, simpli soldati le aratam cartusele din incarcator in locul tigarilor. asta e adevarul. apoi s-au volatilizat la ordin “de sus”.

http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/au-recunoscut-ca-au-tras-la-revolutie-142447.html

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Chiar erau terorişti?

M-am uitat la ei – da, erau… terorişti! Aveau tenul foarte măsliniu, nu vorbeau româneşte. Erau libieni – eu aşa cred. Şi îi legasem fedeleş şi îi păzeam cu coada de mătură. Le ziceam: „Dacă mişti, îţi dau cu asta în cap!” Ăia cu mătura… au dispărut a doua zi. I-a luat colonelul Oană pe toţi şi i-a dus, asta se ştie. Probabil că Gaddafi din Libia a zis că dacă mi-i împuşcaţi, vă împuşc şi eu vreo 300 de români în Libia, la mine! De-aia nici nu se putea spune nimic. Dar oamenii aceia au existat! Asta este teoria mea! Dacă lucrurile ar fi decurs altfel, dacă oamenii care aveau puterea ar fi decis să fie de partea lui Ceauşescu, eram oale şi ulcele, bătrâne! Păi, când a tras colonelul Oană salva de tun, am simţit că genunchii s-au tăiat şi am căzut la pământ imediat. Am ieşit în curte, era soare, frumos, şi deasupra – cu ochii mei, ţi-o spun, Andrei – am văzut, la o înălţime cam de o mie de metri, un elicopter şi unii cu o puşcă-mitralieră trăgeau în noi. Cum mă vezi şi cum te văd! Stupefiant! Cine era ăla? De ce trăgea în Televiziune? Incredibil! Erau atâtea evenimente că nu se poate spune, pe care să le ţii minte mai abitir?

http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/Dumitru_Graur_a_pazit_teroristi-_-Erau_libieni_0_607139601.html

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Căderea lui Gadaffi ar putea lămuri unele mistere din 1989

Întrebat ce părere are despre revoluționarii care cer indemnizații mai mari, Dinescu a spus tranșant că sunt niște profitori, la fel ca Grigore Cartianu. ”Acest individ trăiește din sângele Revoluției, ceea ce este tot o formă de a profita de sacrificiul unor oameni. Este o rușine pentru istorici, că nu s-a găsit altul care să lămurească lucrurile. Știm câte țiitoare a avut Ștefan cel Mare și  nu știm ce s-a întâmplat în 21-22 decembrie 1989… De pildă, s-a spus că au fost libieni, îmbrăcați în salopete. După căderea lui Gadaffi ar trebui să se solicite date din arhive. Erau sute de militari libieni la antrenament în România, exact cum s-au folosit, acum, mercenari străini în Libia. Și au fost răniți, există mărturii din spitalele de urgență. Gadaffi a amenințat că dacă nu le dă drumul, îi arestează pe cei 10.000 de români care lucrau în Libia, în acel moment. Așa că un avion cu soldați libieni a plecat în decembrie la Tripoli. Aștept ca istoricii să afle adevărul, să nu mai vină toți amatorii cu scorneli despre Revoluție”.

http://www.dcnews.ro/2011/12/dinescu-ii-cere-lui-patriciu-demiterea-lui-cartianu-%E2%80%9Dun-profitor-al-revolu%C8%9Biei%E2%80%9D/

O voce din sală: 

Dar despre împuşcarea în halul ăla a lui Ceauşescu, ce spuneţi?

 

Mircea Dinescu:

Păi cum!? O împuşcare mai suavă? (râsete ) Trebuia proces de-a adevăratelea, da, dar, s-a crezut, s-a spus că „n-o să mai tragă teroriştii” Şi italienii l-au spânzurat rapid pe Musolinni… Ce să cred? Din pricina lui Ceauşescu au murit mulţi, ei nu mai pot vorbi. Femei gravide, pe masa de operaţie, bătrâni care nu erau luaţi de salvare, că erau ca pe moarte, bestial, nu? Limita pentru asta era cea de 7o de ani, cea biblică, ce vreţi mai mare cinism? Au murit foarte-foarte mulţi oameni cu zile. Şi acum e aproape tot aşa. Dispreţul faţă de om, de semeni.

 

Altă voce din sală:

Dar terorişti au existat?

 

Mircea Dinescu:

Au existat, da! Există! Eu am văzut şi simulatoare electronice, astea erau împânzite în tot Bucureştiul, erau planuri vechi, pentru eventualitatea unor invazii, atacuri, etc.

 

Eugen Evu:

Acelaşi scenariu, peste tot unde s-a tras în oameni. Şi la Hunedoara, jur că s-a tras asupra mea, eram în faţa Poştei, cu o doamnă de la sindicate… Urma, gaura de glonţ vidia, alături de una normală, a stat mult timp în geamul intrării poştei, s-a tras asupra mea, eram de mult urmărit de securişti şi de unii de la miliţie, care mă arestau periodic, m-au anchetat şi penal, căci îi scrisesem lui Ceauşescu şi nu am vrut să recunosc! (ibidem,n.2006) În actuala Hunedoară, o biserică cu hramul martirilor prin împuşcare (şase la număr), stagnează de ani buni fără fonduri a se isprăvi. Pare un stigmat. Predicile se aud în oraş unele sunt de-a dreptul patetice, cu apeluri disperate, dar enoriaşii n-au bani, iar cei ce au nu prea se-apleacă. (ibid).

 

Mircea Dinescu:

De când erau în Cehoslovacia… Simulatoarele imitau mitralierele, soldaţii trăgeau uşurel, cu gloanţe în infraroşu, eu am văzut, erau împuşcaţi numai în frunte, aşa: în C.C., în întuneric! Numai acolo-ntr-o oră au fost împuşcaţi şaişpe inşi. Numai pe lumină stinsă, în frunte, doar erau profesionişti, erau băieţi care… aveau arme speciale cu lunetă! A existat şi o echipă specială care-l păzea pe Ceauşescu şi erau Arabi. Erau de-ai lui Araffat. Erau libieni, care au fost arestaţi de ai noştri, dar în acea vreme lucrau în Libia lui Gadaffi vreo zece mii de români. Ăla, terorist de rang mondial, a ameninţat că dacă nu li-se dă drumul imediat, ne împuşcă compatrioţii! A apărut şi la televiziunea lor, se ştie… Vă daşi seama ce ieşea? Şi le-a dat drumul înapoi, şi gata.

mai mult despre subiecte alaturate…

http://www.agero-stuttgart.de/REVISTA-AGERO/JURNALISTICA/Dialog%20Evu%20Dinescu%20de%20EE.htm

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revolutia mea (2) (Miercuri, 21 decembrie 2011, 21:09)

gigi marga [anonim]

(continuare)2 – Cred ca era pe 23… “teroristii straini activau”; Cineva m-a rugat sa merg sa-l intalnesc undeva in centru Brasovului, dincolo de primarie. Cand am ajuns langa un mic cimitir acolo (langa cimitirul actual al eroilor) soldatii tocmai reusisera sa prinda un individ care semanase panica in zona cu un PSL (pusca luneta) si se ascundea in cimitir. L-au scos de acolo si ii trageau bocanci peste tot pana cand a venit un ofiter/locotenent parca, moment in care eram si eu aproape. M-am uitat bine la “prizonier” – avea figura de arab, nu vorbea deloc desi cred ca stia/intelegea romaneste, era bine echipat, camuflaj, bine facut parea un mercenar. Ofiterul in cauza a incercat sa-l interogheze fara succes, dupa ce a anuntatse captura la superiori, dar in scurt timp a venit un camion in care s-au suit si l-au dus la “cazarma”; ei stiu unde.
In zilele urmatoare am tot asteptat sa vad/aud/citesc cine era individul/teroristul in cauza!? Am asteptat eu mult si bine pana mi s-au lungit urechile ca la iepuri si atunci m-am hotarat relativ subit ca e momentul sa trag cortina, sa ma duc si sa-mi traiesc viata in pace pe meleaguri mai “normale” (asa am visat eu mereu si visul nu ti-l poate lua nimeni!)Un Craciun Fericit!
la toata lumea (exclus teroristii, ucigasii, hotzii, pungashii si probabil politicienii)http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-10999290-.htm?nomobile

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5. Arabii- teroristii din crama cetate

Inainte de revolutie, se
sarbatorea Sf Nicolae si erau mese organizate la crama cetate. La una din mese
erau si niste arabi, mai multi care se antrenau la Cincu. La un moment dat a
izbucnit un scandal intre unii dintre romanii de la o masa si arabii respectivi.
Pentru asta puteti sa-i cereti detalii tot consilierului Contiu care a fost si
implicat in scandal fiind invitat la ziua d-nului Tibi Popa. Acolo la cheful
respectiv erau mai multe mese organizate si se aflau si alte persoane, inclusiv
politisti. Din cauza scandalului, arabilor li s-a ordonat de catre securitate sa
se retraga la cincu.

Ca garzile patriotice au primit si armament de la unitatea
militara ESTE O MINCIUNA SFRUNTATA!

Multi fac doar presupuneri sau bazandu-se
pe niste informatii eronate sau partiale, vin acum si fac pe eroii.
Ca povestea
in care teroristul arab se cinstea in crama de la cetate. :)) Pai daca era
terorist se ducea sa bea ca tampitul si sa faca scandal sa-l ia toti in vizor?

Sau ca militarul in termen care asculta convorbirile! :))

Adevarul il detin
insa oameni care au fost implicati direct atunci si inca mai traiesc!

Pentru
cei ce mint cu atata nerusinare, sa va fie rusine!

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Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de Palat:  Capii Complotului Se Dezvlauie,” Baricada, nr. 32, p. 3 Unii “teroristi” au fost evident straini.  Nu este intimplator ca pe 25 decembrie 1989, primul avion sosit cu ajutoare a venit din Libia.  El insa a plecat plin inapoi, incarcat cu persoane.  In haosul aproape total care domnea atunci, Noua Putere nu a stiut de incarcatura, spre Libia a avionului respectiv (care a decolat de pe Otopeni, cind inca aeroportul era inchis pentru trafic).”

Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul Z-Z si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 septembrie 1990. Dupa citeva saptamini presedintele unei tari direct implicate a amenintat guvernul roman ca va recurge la represalii impotriva celor citeva mii de cetateni romani aflati cu contract de munca in tara respectiva daca nu vor fi returnati teroristii straini, vii sau morti.  Santajul respectiv si-a facut efectul si un avion romanesc a efectuat o cursa mai putin obisnuita catre un aeroport polonez, de unde o “incarcatura” mai putin obisnuita constind in persoane valide, raniti si cosciuge a fost transferata pe un alt avion, plecand intr-o directie necunoscuta.  In ziua aceea se stergeau orice urme ale planului “Z-Z

More details emerged about this flight late in 1994.

Robert Cullen, “Report from Romania:  Down with the Tyrant,” The New Yorker, 2 April 1990. Late the next night, Romanian television showed Ceausescu’s corpse, lying in a pool of blood.  After that, the Securitate resistance wilted, although sporadic sniping continued for a week or so.  It turned out that not all of the Securitate fighters were Romanian.  A ranking member of the National Salvation Front told me that about a hundred of them, including some who fought the longest, were from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries with histories of involvement in terrorism.  They had come to Romania ostensibly as exchange students, but had in fact received commando training.  In return, they agreed to serve the Securitate for several years.  As these foreigners were captured, and rumors–accurate ones–about their origins began to spread, the Front publicly denied that any Arabs had been involved with the Securitate.  It did so because it wished to avoid any trouble in relations with the Arab world, the Front official explained.  I asked what would become of the captured Arab commandos, and he responded by silently drawing his index finger across his throat.

pasaport libian…

Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces

The Washington Post
December 24, 1989 | Dan Morgan

The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.

Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.

The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.

The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.

The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.

The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.

As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5″ in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.

Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.

Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.

The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.

Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.

In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.

Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.

For verification of some of Turcu’s claims (in particular, the less-discussed participation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, see here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/)

CONTACT WITH QADDAFI Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland – A telephone contact took place between the brother leader of the revolution (Qaddafi) and Ion Iliescu, President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation in Rumania in order to set his mind at rest with regard to the progress of the popular revolution there. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation reassured the brother leader of the revolution regarding the successful progress of the popular revolution in Rumania. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation saluted the attitudes of the great Al-Fatih revolution and the Libyan Arab people to the people of Rumania and its revolution. President Iliescu informed the brother leader of the revolution that the popular revolutionary leadership does not believe the rumors about the participation of Arabs in the fighting against the popular revolution and said that those rumors were spread by enemies in order to influence our morale, the progress of the popular revolution, and our friendship with the Arabs. President Iliescu confirmed to the brother leader of the revolution that authority will be that of the people because the popular revolution was carried out by the whole Rumanian people. President Iliescu expressed his thanks for and appreciation of the Libyan Arab people for the urgent humanitarian assistance provided by air to the Rumanian people. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/29/world/upheaval-in-the-east-news-reports-excerpts-from-broadcasts-and-a-press-dispatch.html Angela Bacescu with the Libyan ambassador to Romania Abu Ghula, Europa (Est/Vest), no. 94, September 1992, pp. 14-15 The Libyan ambassador discusses how on 25 or 26 December 1989 the then Libyan ambassador went on Romanian television to deny the rumors of Libyans fighting.  “What is more, he called for the delivery of any Libyan terrorirsts [!]“  On 29 or 30 December, Colonel Khadaffi addressed the Romanian people by satellite.  “Libya sent 4 planes with humanitarian aid (food, beds, medicine) that landed at Otopeni airport, were unloaded and then returned empty to Libya [interesting that he should have to specify that they returned empty to Libya].”
Former Securitate member and head of its successor agency, the Romanian Information Service (SRI) from 1990 to 1997 not only admits in this French documentary that Libyans and other “Arab insurgents,” including Palestinians, were trained at bases in Romania, but admits specifically that they were trained by the Securitate’s anti-terrorist unit, the USLA–just as former Securitate whistleblowers (including Roland Vasilevici and Marian Romanescu among others had told us)
image-18image-17image-16image-15
“Operatiunea ‘Deghizarea’ (IV),” Romania Libera, 19 martie 1992, p. 5a.  Generalul Militaru: “Va sfatuiesc sa cercetati un detaliu privind vizita lui Ceausescu in Iran:  colonelul Ardeleanu, seful de la USLA, i-a insotit la plecare.  La intoarcere a venit cu o zi mai tirziu, aterizind cu un avion, incarcat cu persoane pe aeroportul Kogalniceanu.  Pe de alta parte, in ziua de 29-30 decembrie, de pe aeroportul Baneasa s-au luat zborul mai multe avioane libiene.  Cu oameni imbarcati.!

We also know from Romanescu and a second source that USLA commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu (Bula Moise) addressed his troops as follows:

“On 25 December at around 8 pm, after the execution of the dictators, Colonel Ardeleanu gathered the unit’s members into an improvised room and said to them:

‘The Dictatorship has fallen!  The Unit’s members are in the service of the people.  The Romanian Communist Party [PCR] is not disbanding!  It is necessary for us to regroup in the democratic circles of the PCR—the inheritor of the noble ideas of the people of which we are a part!…Corpses were found, individuals with USLAC (Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare) identity cards and identifications with the 0620 stamp of the USLA, identity cards that they had no right to be in possession of when they were found…’  He instructed that the identity cards [of members of the unit] had to be turned in within 24 hours, at which time all of them would receive new ones with Defense Ministry markings.” [7] [8]

In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun.  In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed.  By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.[9]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/12/u-s-l-a-in-stare-de-hipnoza-dan-badea-expres-1991/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/10/decembrie-1989-usla-bula-moise-teroristii-si-fratii-musulmani-dan-badea-marian-romanescu-expres-iulie-1991/

Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…

Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala
improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba
poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in
rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale
poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind
asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta
Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care
nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi
sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca
tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.

(capitanul Romanescu Marian, cu Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si
‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, 8-9)

image-15

(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLAC erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

image-13

Further related reading:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/16/video-si-articole-despre-revolutia-din-decembrie-la-brasov/

BRASOV:

În revolutia din Brasov 22/23 Decembrie 1989, pe lângà cei ràpusi de gloante cu dublà explozie, a fost întreruptà si viata tânàrului Vasile Nedelcu, Sportiv de performantà, Student la a doua Facultate, Academia de Stiinte Economice Bucuresti. 

Ilieanna NedelcouIlieanna Nedelcou   BRASOV 22/23 Decembrie 1989

The late journalist Maria Petrascu also knew:

Acum 20 de ani, în 21 Decembrie, `89, braşovenii, câteva sute, au ieşit în stradă pentru că nu mai voiau comunism. În 22 Decembrie au prins curaj mult mai mulţi, zeci de mii, şi li s-au alăturat. Puterea a reacţionat, fără excepţie, în forţă, punând la “treabă” tot aparatul de represiune : activul PCR, Securitatea, Armata. La  Timişoara, şi apoi la Bucureşti, se “contabilizau” deja  morţi: împuşcaţi sau călcaţi de tab-uri. La Braşov, măcelul a început în noaptea de 22 spre 23 Decembrie. După ce cuplul dictatorial al Ceauşeştilor fugise! Au fost peste 300 de morţi! Statisticile oficiale consemnează însă doar vreo 70 de victime la Braşov… Bărbaţi şi femei în putere, vârstnici, tineri şi tinere, adolescenţi şi chiar copii au fost asasinaţi mişeleşte. Cu gloanţe normale, cu gloanţe cu cap vidia, cu gloanţe explozive. Mulţi au fost împuşcaţi in frunte, cu puşti cu lunetă. Unora, nu puţini, proiectilele criminale le-au sfârtecat picioarele şi abdomenele. Alte victime au supravieţuit şi au murit mai tîrziu iar cei care mai trăiesc astăzi sunt mutilati pe viaţă. Familiile şi-au recuperat morţii sau au ajuns la răniţii lor cu greu. Morgile erau încuiate! Spitalele inaccesibile! Asasinii, adică teroriştii, nu de afară, inventaţi,  ci autohtoni, dispăruseră! Iliescu şi  FSN-ul său au ieşit public cu MAREA MINCIUNĂ:  “ Românii s-au împuşcat între ei, ca proştii !”.  De atunci au trecut 20 de ani. Iar MAREA MINCIUNĂ s- a perpetuat.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/21/maria-petrascu-brasov-ireconciliere-cu-eroii-din-decembrie-89/

Vedeti si ascultati secventa 1:57 – 3:20–filmat pe 23 ianuarie 1990–in care vorbeste un medic brasovean despre cum au murit patru din sase soldati, impuscati cu gloante penetrante (cu alte cuvinte se pare:  gloante vidia)

Fullscreen capture 10182009 112904 AM

Fullscreen capture 10182009 113003 AM

un film de Maria Petrascu, Brasov partea 7-a Intervalul 1:58-3:17 gloante penetrante vidia

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/10/08/brasov-gloante-atipice-vidia-si-revolutia-romana-din-decembrie-1989/

“Misterele revolutiei, la Brasov. Dupa nopti de groaza si tortura, toti teroristii sint liberi.” Adrian Socaciu, Cuvintul, nr. 1-2 ianuarie 1991

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/08/02/misterele-revolutiei-la-brasov-dupa-nopti-de-groaza-si-tortura-toti-teroristii-sint-liberi-adrian-socaciu-cuvintul-nr-1-2-ianuarie-1991/

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Afirmatia ca in decembrie 1989 brasovenii ar fi tras unii in altii este atribuita de numerosi localnici generalului Florea:  se pare ca, intre timp, a intrat in folclorul local.  Dovedeste un umor macabru, in ton cu lozinca scandata prin Piata Universitatii:  21-22, noi am tras in noi!.  In realitate, afirmatia ar vrea sa insemne, de fapt, ca in orasul de sub Timpa n-au existat teroristi.  Cei 68 (cifra oficiala) sau peste o suta de morti, militari si civili, in majoritatea tineri, ar fi victima confuzilor sau a imprecisiei coordonari a operatiunilor.  Fireste, in asemena momente sint posibile si astfel de nefericite greseli.  S-au petrecut, si la Brasov, si prin alte parti.  Dar brasovenii nu se indoiesc ca, in orasul lor, cei pe care ne-am obisnuit sa-i numim teroristi au existat, au actionat dupa un plan dinainte pus la punct, au actionat in locuri bine alese, cu vizibilitate spre zonele cheie ale orasului.  Au existat acele arme speciale pe care unii le-au vazut, iar altii pastreaza si acum gloante inexistente in dotarea armatei romane, de calibru special, cu cap vidia sau exploziv.  In rindurile care urmeaza, vom incerca sa prezentam marturii ale unor localnici implicati in evenimente.  In jur de doua sute de persoane suspecte, unele capturate in lupta, cu arma asupra lor, au fost predate la fostul Consilu Judetean, la Politie, la Comisariat, la unele unitatii militare.  Nici macar unul nu a ajuns in fata instantei–sau daca totusi vor fi fost cazuri, au fost eliberati din lipsa de probe.  In Brasov, nimeni n-a fost condamnat pentru moartea atitor tineri si schilodirea altora.  Unii din cei contactati se tem inca, nu-s siguri ca fosta securitate a disparut cu adevarat….

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Intre orele 3,30-4,30, intr-un moment in care amindoi, Gheorghe Iosif si soldatul, aveau sub observatie fereastra, in cadrul aceasta au aparut doua miini, una purtind o arma care, in slaba lumina ce venea de-afara, parea scurta dar cu doua tevi, sau cu un tub de evacuare a gazelor, plasat lateral.  Apoi s-au ivit capul individului si umerii; era imbracat in negru si se pregatea sa sara inauntru.  Cum era clar ca nu-i militar si n-avea de ce sa intre cineva pe acolo in cladire, in vreme ce afara tirul era in toi, soldatul a tras doua focuri in plin, in fata individului….

Gloante explozive sau de calibru special

Cornel Vasile Macrinean, care a condus impreuna cu un prieten operatiunile la o baricada pe strada Lunga, isi aminteste si el cite ceva din acele zile.  Intii, ca primii civili care au sosit la Comisariatul Militar pentru a solicita arme–toti aveau stagiul militar indeplinit–au primit ZB-uri, arme depasite inca de pe vremea celui de-al doilea razboi mondial.  Aceasta se petrecea in noaptea de 22-23 decembrie, pe la ora 4,00.  Mai tirziu, dupa ora 6,00, la baricada au aparut adolescenti, unii sub 18 ani, cu arme automate AKM.

In noaptea urmatoare, pe la ora 1,00-1,30 pe strada Lunga trecea o masina cu numar de Italia.  Inauntru, un domn mai in virsta, cu cei doi fii ai sai.  Aflat pe bancheta din spate, tatal a fost lovit de un glont care a ricosat in omoplat, sfisiindu-i carnea pina in dreptul gulerului, apoi s-a oprit in tavanul masinii. D-l Macrinean a cercetat glontul:  calibrul curent 7,62, dar mai scurt si “inflorit” la virf.  Dupa aspectul ranii si al glontului, domnia sa e de parere ca acesta a fost exploziv:  unul normal gaureste, nu sfisie, iar la ciocnirea cu un corp dur (tavanul masinii) se tur*este (?) sau se indoaie, nu plezneste in *vantai (?).  Spre norocul italianului, e de parere dl. Macrinean, glontul c-a explodat la contactul cu parbrizul.  Altfel, putin probabil ca acela sa fi scapat cu o simpla rana.

Pe 24 decembrie, in jurul prinzului (orele 12.00-13.00), dl Macrineanu se afla la Comisariat, dupa munitie.  A asistat la sosirea a patru teroristi, romani (unul injura cit se poate de neaos), tineri, in jur de 18-19 ani, imbracat in civil, cu caciuli de schi prinsi, dupa cum declarau militarii care i-au adus, la Fabrica de Piine, dupa lupte, cu arme asupra lor.

Tot pe 24, dar seara, domnia sa a condus un grup de militari la o locuinta de pe strada Horea, nr. 65, asupra careia s-a tras.  Au gasit in ferestre gauri mici, iar in zid gloantele:  subtiri, cam de grosimea unui creion, de culoarea aluminiului, usoare si scurte.  Pe cind isi satisfacea stagiul militar, dl. Macrineanu a facut trageri cam cu toate armele din dotarea infanteriei.  Nu-si aminteste sa fi vazut ceva care sa semene, macar, cu acele gloante.

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In aceeasi declaratie e consemnat momentul cind, de la Consilul Judetean, cinci suspecti (trei arabi si doi romani) au fost expediati spre Politie, unde n-au ajuns.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/08/09/misterele-revolutiei-la-brasov-au-ars-dosarele-procuraturii-despre-evenimentele-din-decembrie-romulus-nicolae-cuvintul-nr-32-august-1991/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/08/06/misterele-revolutiei-la-brasov-dupa-ce-au-tras-teroristii-au-abandonat-armele-adrian-socaciu-nr-4-ianuarie-1991/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/08/02/misterele-revolutiei-la-brasov-dupa-nopti-de-groaza-si-tortura-toti-teroristii-sint-liberi-adrian-socaciu-cuvintul-nr-1-2-ianuarie-1991/

http://www.mytex.ro/stiri-brasov/brasov-conducatorii-erau-de-cealalta-parte-a-baricadei-la-revolutie_337336.php

„Sunt foarte mulţi, chiar şi printre conducătorii ţării, care susţin că în 1989 în România nu a fost o Revoluţie îndreptată împotriva unui regim politic, ci doar o revoltă pornită nemulţumirile legate de nivelul de trai, ba chiar că ar fi fost o lovitură de stat. Probabil că ei erau atunci de cealaltă parte a baricadei!”, a acuzat Vasile Mardare, vicepreşedintele ALRUE Braşov.

200 de morţi, nici un vinovat

„Acum 23 de ani, pe 23 decembrie, chiar pe aceste locuri (Cimitirul Eroilor-Martiri, cuprins între Poştă, Prefectură, Teatru, dar şi porţiunea dintre Prefectură şi Modarom, Liceul Unirea – n.red) revoluţionarii au fost prinşi în mijlocul unui foc încrucişat. Atunci s-au înregistrat cei mai mulţi morţi şi răniţi. Vrem să spunem cu tărie că în 1989 în România a avut loc o revoluţie anticomunistă, împotriva dictaturii ceuşiste, pe care cei care îi erau fideli lui Ceauşescu au sperat s-o oprească, înăbuşind-o în sânge. S-a tras cu gloanţe dum-dum, care explodau după ce pătrundeau în corp, gloanţe interzise şi în război. La Braşov, din statisticile oficiale rezultă că au murit 87 de persoane, dar în mod real numărul morţilor de la Braşov se ridică la circa 200. Şi totuşi, nici un vinovat“, a mai spus Mardare.

The Dutch Nurse, Sister Roza, thinks Mr. Beres, who was shot in the foot on the night of 22 December 1989 in Brasov, was hit by a hollow-nosed dum dum bullet because of the nature of the wound (Harvey Morris, “When the workers of Romania said no,” The Independent (London), 13 January 1990)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/01/the-dutch-nurse-sister-roza-thinks-mr-beres-who-was-shot-in-the-foot-on-the-night-of-22-december-1989-in-brasov-was-hit-by-a-hollow-nosed-dum-dum-bullet-because-of-the-nature-of-the-wound-harvey/

Cine cunoaşte derularea evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din centrul Braşovului, mai ţine minte cum înregistrau securiştii din clădirea Modarom şi cum în mulţime se aflau securişti, la fel ca în noiembrie 1987.
MODAROM SI HOTEL CAPITOL

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/05/23/brasov-decembrie-1989-zona-modarom-hotel-capitol-in-decembrie-1989/

Brasov.

Cazul Cătălin Grigore Haidău

G.H.: Nu. Nici la această oră noi nu ştim unde a murit Cătălin. Ce ştim este doar că medicul a declarat că fiul nostru a fost împuşcat în cap cu glonţ dum-dum care la intrare a pătruns printr-un orificiu mic în tâmplă iar la ieşire a produs o gaură atât de mare că am fost nevoiţi să-l bandajăm cu tifon pentru a nu-i ieşi creierii prin ţeastă. În schimb asupra morţii lui Cătălin ni s-au servit mai multe variante. Că l-a împuşcat un coleg, atunci unde este colegul? Că a fost împuşcat pentru că nu a respectat un ordin, ce ordin? Că a fost împuşcat la consiliul popular pentru că plutonul lui a fost scos, din data de 20 până pe 23, pentru a păzi Consiliul Judeţean Braşov de elemente care ar fi vrut să destabilizeze ţara, alături de ei erau şi militarii de la vânătorii de munte. O variantă este că, pe data de 22, când a fugit Ceauşescu, Cătălin şi alţi doi colegi au ieşit să arboreze drapelul românesc, acela decupat, moment în care din Modarom s-a tras asupra lor şi au fost împuşcaţi mortal. Ultima variantă în ceea ce priveşte locul în care a fost împuşcat Cătălin a fost aceea că ar fi fost împuşcat în şcoală.

Adriana PERŞA
adriana.persa@graiu-gorjului.ro

http://www.graiu-gorjului.ro/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=719%3Agrigore-haidu-nu-mai-am-ateptri-dar-vreau-s-cred-c-fiul-meu-i-cei-asemenea-lui-nu-au-murit-in-van&Itemid=37

Cazul Dorin Gheorghe Mitroi

În tot acest timp, la mormintele eroilor au vegheat rudele lor. „Am fost alături de el pe 22 decembrie. Eram amândoi la Modarom, când deodată a dispărut. S-a tras de sus, de pe clădire. Când l-am găsit era mort. A fost împuşcat cu gloanţe explozive, care I-au ciopârţit corpul. A lăsat în urmă o soţie îndurerată şi o fetiţă care avea numai opt luni. A murit în floarea vârstei, avea numai 25 de ani. Era un tânăr dornic de libertate, dornic de o viaţă mai bună. De atunci, la noi sărbătorile vin cu durere şi suspine, pentru că ne plângem morţii” a mărturisit Victor Zoica, un pensionar venit cu familia la mormântul eroului Dorin Gheorghe Mitroi, ginerele acestuia.

http://www.bzb.ro/html/print.php?id_stire=11051

De cealaltă parte, rămân semnele de întrebare ale revoluţionarilor, legate de muniţia folosită şi de numărul mare de victime împuşcate cu precizie în cap. „Civilii primeau arme de proastă calitate, însă în morga spitalului Judeţean au fost găsite persoane ucise cu gloanţe Dum-Dum, care nu au fost distribuite revoluţionarilor”, a povestit Vasile Mardare.De altfel, el a reamintit şi de episodul petrecut la sfârşitul lunii decembrie, când în spatele actualului Grup Şcolar Industrial „Astra”, se pare că ar fi fost rănit un terorist. „Acolo am găsit urme de sânge, dar persoana împuşcată de noi a dispărut”, a mai spus acesta.

Radu COLŢEA

La 20 de ani de la Revoluţia din Decembrie 1989, braşovenii şi-au comemorat, marţi, eroii căzuţi începînd cu noaptea de 22/23 decembrie. Comemorarea a avut loc în Cimitirul Eroilor din faţa Prefecturii, oficialităţile, asociaţiile de revoluţionari şi partidele politice depunînd coroane de flori. Un sobor de preoţi militari a săvîrşit slujba de pomenire a eroilor. „Din păcate, nu avem o imagine clară a ceea ce s-a întîmplat în timpul Revoluţiei. Este de datoria noastră să rememorăm evenimentele din DEcembrie 1989, faptele eroilor căzuţi în acele zile nu trebuie să se piardă în ceaţa istoriei. În faţa Eroilor ne plecăm capetele şi pentru ei trebuie să dăm dovadă că sacrificiul lor nu a fost inutil“, a spus la coemmorare, prefectul Ioan Gonţea. Urmaşii eroilor căzuţi în decembrie ’89, îşi plîng şi azi morţii şi nu pot uita faptul că încă nu au aflat cine le-a ucis copiii, părinţii sau fraţii. Dacă în 20 de ani nu am aflat ce s-a întîmplat, nici nu mai sper ca cineva să-mi spună cine mi-a ucis soţul în 23 decembrie, el fiind unul dintre cei împuşcaţi cu gloanţe explozive. Am avut şansa să-l mai prind în viaţă, dar după zece zile s-a stins, iar eu, împreună cu cei doi copiii ai noştri am rămas să-l plîngem. Sper din tot sufletul că sacrificiul lui nu a fost inutil“, a spus soţia unuia dintre eroii căzuţi pentru victoria Revoluţiei.

de: H.O.

http://www.monitorulexpres.ro/?mod=ultima_ora&p=ultora_local&a=citeste&s_id=84036

http://www.monitorulexpres.ro/?mod=monitorulexpres&a=citeste&p=actualitate&s_id=84062

Procuratura Militara si Brasov…

“Misterele revolutiei, la Brasov. Au ars dosarele procuraturii despre evenimentele din decembrie.” Romulus Nicolae, Cuvintul nr. 32 august 1991

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In luna iunie, anul trecut [1990], s-a deplasat la Brasov domnul general Nicolae Constantin Spiroiu insotit de cinci ofiteri.  Au contactat grupul “Opinia” si alte persoane pentru a alfa cine ancheteaza evenimentele din decembrie 1989.  La sediul grupului “Opinia” domnul general Spiroiu a discutat mai bine de cinci ore cu Adrian Moruzi, Viorel Boeru, Viorel Nitescu, Alexandru Popescu si Katarina Peter.

Pe 14 iunie 1990 seara, generalul Spiroiu l-a sunat pe Adrian Moruzi interesindu-se ce se intimpla la Brasov.  S-a procedat la o deshumare a mortilor din decembrie 1989.  Totul s-a facut cu participarea Procuraturii care a prelevat gloantele ucigase.  S-au gasit in special gloante de calibrul 5,6 mm care nu sint in dotarea armatei.  Recent la sediul Procuraturii din Brasov s-a produs un incendiu devastator.  Au ars mai multe documente legate de Revolutie.  Incendiul a fost atit de puternic incit s-a calcinat peretii.  Ar fi interesant de aflat ce material inflamabil a putut produce o astfel de putere calorica.  –Romulus Nicolae

 

General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan, Teroristii din ’89 (Lucman, 2012)

In dosarele intocmite de comisia de ancheta condusa de colonelul magistrat Anton Socaciu, pe atunci sef adjunct al Procuraturii Militare Brasov, care, ulterior–la propunerea mea–a fost numit sef, in ciuda incercarilor disperate din partea celor de la Ministerul de Interne de a impiedica aceasta promovare, invocand chiar si originea lui etnica, nu tocmai ‘pur romaneasca.’

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[martie 1990] In realitate, masa a fost orgaizata de seful Militiei; au participat doi sau trei ofiteri de Militie din conducerea Inspectoratului.  Acestia, foarte direct, mi-au cerut ca nu cumva sa fie numit sef al Procuraturii Militare din Brasov colonelul Anton Socaciu.  Aceasta interventie mi-a intarit convingereaca Socaciu trebuie numit sef….

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La un moment dat, procurorul militar sef de la Brasov mi s-a plans ca ‘treaba nu merge’, pentru ca cei doi subalterni ai sai sunt ‘dinamovisti.’  Aceasta era expresia folosita in cazul celor cunoscuti ca sustinatori ai fostei Securitati.  Ulterior, s-a mai incadrat un procuror militar la Brasov si am incercat sa-l consolez pe sef ca macar va exista egalitate, doi dinamovisti si doi stelisti.  Nu a trecut multa vreme si acelasi procuror militar sef mi s-a plans ca atunci avea trei dinamovisti.  Cred ca aceasta era proportia, din trei procurori militari, cel putin doi erau ‘dinamovisti’.

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SIBIU:

decembrie 1989, CC-ul, si Sibiu: Dan Voinea, Corneliu Pircalabescu, si Ilie Ceausescu v. Aurel Dragomir si Victor Stanculescu

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/20/colonel-ion-baciu-pe-20-12-89-la-orele-1010-la-crematoriu-a-venit-lt-col-voinea-danpe-care-l-cunosc-intrucit-inaintea-lucrat-la-departmentul-securitatii-statului-directia-cercetar/

By far, some of the worst, most disgusting (Securitate-inspired or Securitate-serving) revisionism is in connection, not by accident, with Sibiu, Nicu Ceausescu’s fiefdom.  An admittedly, below, scattershot compendium of my previous writings/posts on Sibiu (apologies for the dezordine si haos!)!

Both of the previous two above videos posted on youtube by Tioluciano

“Cuvinte pentru Gloante III (Sibiu),” Colonel Gh. Vaduva,  nr. 21 (76) 22-28 mai 1991, “Armata Romaniei”

dupa 15:00 22 decembrie 1989

“S-a mai tras?”

Cpt. Cristian Teodorescu:

Nu.  Dar in momentul cind noi am tras focul de avertisment au fost raniti doi tinerei.  In nici un caz de focurile noastre.  Gloantele au venit din spate, nu din directia noastra si nici de sus.  Unuia dintre ei i-a explodat in umar.  Veneau oameni la mine si imi spuneau ‘La mine in pod este cineva de doua zile.  Mi-a fost frica sa urc sa vad ce-i acolo.”

Dan Mititi, elevul:

S-a tras din toate punctuale asupra scolii…Eu am adunat plutonul din coada care se retrasera in cazarma, au trecut pe platou (?) unde erau retinuti trei indivizi in salopete si cu cite doua pistole si mi-am dus cu elevii in dormitor.  Nu s-a tras intimplator, ci ochit si foarte precis.

In batalion am avut un mort si 14 raniti.  Din fericire, cei raniti au fost recuperati.  Se trageau cu un anumit fel de gloante.  Am adunat multe gloante din acelea.  Le-am dat comisi de procurori.  Au disparut.  Ca multe alte probe.

 

Dan Badea, “Secretele Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 22 (7-13 iunie 1994), pp. 8-9

“Secretele Revolutiei” (Dan Badea, Expres, 7-13 iunie 1994)

from Orwellian…Positively Orwellian (2006)

Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:

…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons.  I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits.  The Militia told me that they weren’t their people.  At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire.  I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?”  I told him we were being attacked.  He told me to cease fire.  Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender.  I slammed the telephone down.  Then [Army General] Stanculescu called.  I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me:  ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified:  they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]

Armata Poporului, “Sub tirul incrucisat…(II)” interviu cu Aurel Dragomir, nr. 46, noiembrie 1990 p. 3.

Finally, in this context, the comments of a Codrut H. in July 1990 about what he and other civilians found when they occupied Securitate headquarters in Brasov on the night of 22 December:  “What appeared suspicious to me was that the Securitate there appeared to have been prepared [for something]….  Out front of the building there was a white ARO [automobile] in which there were complete antiterrorist kits [emphasis added].” What else did the civilians find there?…combinezoane negre. [58]

Sibiu, 19-22 December 1989

In Sibiu, Siani-Davies tells us:

Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989.  It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[151]

From the standpoint of Siani-Davies’ unsuspecting reader such a conclusion may seem not only credible, but judicious.  But one of Siani-Davies’ habits—identified negatively by even those who praise the book—is his tendency to draw negative equivalencies:  i.e. there is about as much evidence to support x as there is to support y, in order to disprove or discount both propositions.  In a review, Doris Mironescu writes:

“Very common are claims such as the following:  ‘Finding the proof to sustain such an explanation of the events [that the Army’s Intelligence arm, the DIA simulated the “terrorist diversion,” to permit the Front’s takeover and a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of the country] is as difficult as proving that special units of the securitate took up arms against the revolution’ (p. 154).  Mutually contradictory hypotheses are invoked in order to negate each other, not so much because of the weight of the claims, but through the ideological similarity of both.”[152]

This tendency definitely affects Siani-Davies’ analysis of the “terrorists” and its accuracy.  To begin with, in the very book (Sandulescu) invoked by Siani-Davies, the head of the DIA (Battalion 404 Buzau), Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) that “we hardly had 80 fighters in this battalion.”[153] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[154] This makes it highly unlikely that they were on the 20 December TAROM flight to Sibiu that is in question.[155]

Contrast this with the signs that exist pointing to the mystery passengers as having been from the Securitate/Interior Ministry, in particular the USLA.  Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December 1989, in a crisis meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests.[156] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[157] If they were, indeed, DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and Postelnicu informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?

The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA.  Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ – after which one no longer heard anything of them – they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…”[158]

Beginning, at least as early as August 1990, with the allusions of Major Mihai Floca, and later seemingly indirectly confirmed by former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, it was suggested that when USLA Commander Ardeleanu was confronted at the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December 1989, Ardeleanu reportedly admitted that “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’.”[159] Finally, and along these lines, we bring things full circle—and recall our “phantoms in black” again in the process—with the testimony of Army officer Hortopan to the same Serban Sandulescu at the Gabrielescu Commission hearings:

Sandulescu:  About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?

 

Hortopan:  On the contrary.  These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu].  I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was:  out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders.  Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[160]

Bringing us up to the morning of 22 December 1989, and setting the stage for what was to come, Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:

Dragomir:  Events began to develop quickly on 22 December.  In the morning some of the students posted in different parts of the town began to observe some suspect individuals in black jumpsuits on the roofs in the lights of the attics of several buildings.

 

Reporter:  The same equipment as the USLAsi killed out front of the Defense Ministry…

 

Dragomir:  And on the roof of the Militia building there were three or four similar individuals…[161]

Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation.  Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[162]

Armata Romaniei, “N-am nimic de ascuns,” nr. 22 (233), 1-7 iunie 1994, p. 7.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h-27121989-01min55s/

 

related:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/22/the-myths-of-a-revolution-it-is-said-that-these-enemy-elements-the-securisti-have-poisoned-the-water-in-sibiu-in-timisoarathe-water-must-be-boiled-before-being-consumed-apa-este-o/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/16/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/14/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-ii-2/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/11/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/10/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-i/

 

IATA DE CE N-A INTELES GORBACIOV PROVOCAREA ‘SUBTILA’ SI ‘MINUNATA’ A LUI GRIGORE CARTIANU DE LA ADEVARUL…DOVADA CLAR CA HABAR N-ARE NICI NASUL DE LA BASE1TV RADU MORARU NICI GRIGORE CARTIANU DESPRE IDENTITATEA REALA A ‘TURISTILOR RUSI’ IN DECEMBRIE 1989

http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Nasul-_Intrebari_incomode_pentru_Gorbaciov_0_244176088.html

http://www.adevarul.ro/grigore_cartianu/Iliescu_si_Gorbaciov_7_244245575.html

http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/O_enigma-_-Avionul_ROMBAC_0_244176081.html

Revine in actualitate faimoasa, mult-vestita “geanta diplomat” cu pistolul gasita in Sibiu in decembrie 1989…ha ha ha, fraieri, spun majoritatea romanilor–sau asa se pare–TVR-ul, armata, si ziarele de atunci au facut mare caz de aceasta misterioasa “geanta diplomat” pentru a intari “dezinformarea” cruda despre “asa-zisii teroristi” care toata lumea cu bunul simt stie acum n-au existat deloc…totul a fost diversiune…si in plus “s-a dovedit” ca “pistolul din geanta diplomat” a fost tras numai o singura data si nu in decembrie 1989…si, in sfarsit, problema este ca nu mai exista “proba” aceasta la procuratura militara (nici documentele despre cazul)…care insemna ca nu exista oficial…si, de aceea, poate ca n-a existat niciodata, dle…

Bine, deci sa incepem cu cea mai noua mentiune a cazului de fata:

http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Revolutia_de_la_Sibiu-_goana_dupa_teroristi_0_240576502.html

Pentru a scăpa cu viaţă, cadrele MI rămase în cele două sedii se adăpostiseră la subsolul Miliţiei, ­abandonându-şi armamentul şi muniţia în fişetele din birouri. Imediat după încetarea focurilor (în jurul orei 16.30), mai mulţi civili aflaţi în zonă au pătruns în sediul Miliţiei, unde au devastat birourile şi ­s-au înarmat cu pistoalele-mitralieră pe care le-au găsit în res­pectivele încăperi. „Dintr-un dulap tip rastel eu am luat o geantă diplomat în care se afla un mecanism cu pistol”, a declarat Frohlich Adolf Horst, unul dintre civilii pătrunşi în incintă, atunci când a fost audiat de Procuratura Militară pentru „Dosarul Revoluţiei”.

http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-decembrie-89/enigmele-neelucidate-ale-revolutiei-sibiene-528001.html

ANCHETA
La scurt timp după restabilirea liniştii, cercetarea evenimentelor de la Sibiu a fost preluată de anchetatorii Parchetului Militar Braşov, conduşi de către procurorul Socaciu. Revoluţionarul Ioan Nemeş ne-a declarat că în acea perioadă a adunat tot felul de gloanţe din zidurile caselor în care s-a tras, precum şi părţi componente ale unor puşti cu lunetă, găsite prin poduri. Alţi localnici afirmă că mai multe simulatoare de foc, găsite în imobilele amplasate în jurul unor unităţi militare, au fost predate comisiei de anchetă, conduse de acelaşi Socaciu.

Tot acolo s-a predat şi o ciudată geantă diplomat în interiorul căreia era mascat un revolver cu care se putea deschide focul în mod discret. Imaginea acelui dispozitiv a apărut în mai multe ziare. După doi ani, anchetatorii au anunţat că toate aceste probe, alături de mai multe declaraţii de martor, au dispărut fără urmă şi nu au mai fost găsite niciodată.

NUMAI CA E FOARTE INTERESANT SA NE AMINTIM CINE AU CALATORIT CU SI AU ADUS IN SIBIU “GENTI DIPOMATI” IN ACESTE ZILE:  USLASII (“turisti rusi”) COMANDATI DE CATRE PRINTISORUL, NICU CEAUSESCU, CARE AU VENIT CU ROMBAC-UL IN SEARA DE 20 DECEMBRIE 1989:

Monica N. Marginean:  Sa revenim la datele concrete ale regiei de care vorbeam anterior.  Cum arata, de pilda, povestea atit de dezbatuta la procesul lui Nicu Ceausescu a cursei ROMBAC, daca o privim din perspectiva Comisiei de ancheta?

fostul procuror Marian Valer:  In mod normal, cursa de avion Bucuresti-Sibiu trebuia sa decoleze de pe aeroportul Baneasa, la orele 17,10 folosindu-se pe acest traseu avioane marca Antonov.  In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, insa, in jurul orelor 17, deci in apropierea orei prevazute pentru decolarea cursei obisnuite, pasagerii pentru Sibiu au fost invitati si dusi la Aeroportul Otopeni unde au fost imbarcati intr-un avion marca ROMBAC care a decolat in jurul orelor 18,30 si a aterizat pe aeroportul Sibiu in jur de ora 19.  Fac precizarea ca in dupa-amiaza aceleiasi zile, cu aproape 2 ore inaintea decolarii acestei curse, a aterizat pe aeroportul Otopeni avionul prezidential cu care Ceausescu s-a reintors din Iran. Conform datelor furnizate de agentia TAROM Bucuresti, in avionul respectiv spre Sibiu au fost imbarcati 81 pasageri.  In radiograma cursei sint consemnate domiciile doar la o parte din pasageri, cu mentiunea ca unele sint incomplete, lipsind fie localitatea, fie strada, fie numarul, iar la restul pasagerilor figureaza doar mentiunile ,rezervat’ sau Pasaport RSR.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, au putut fi identificati doar 44 de pasageri, majoritatea avind domiciliul in municipul si judetul Sibiu, stabilindu-se ca au fost persoane trimise in delegatie la foruri tutelare din capitala, sau studenti plecati in vacanta, iar citiva domiciliati in judetul Alba.  Mentionez ca asupra acestor persoane nu planeaza nici un dubiu.  Dubiile sint create insa in primul rind de faptul ca mai multi pasageri figureaza cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, dar in realitate nu domiciliaza la adresele consemnate, iar la unele adrese sint intreprinderi.  Un alt element creator de dubii il constituie prezenta in avionul respectiv a unui inspector de la Departmentul Aviatiei Civile, cu numele de Nevrozeanu, care nu figureaza pe lista pasagerilor si cu privire la care s-a stabilit ca, in trecut, se deplasa cu avionul in cazuri speciale doar pe relatia Moscova, fiind un bun cunoscator al limbii ruse.  Mai multi pasageri sustin ca in partea dreapta din fata a avionului au sesizat un grup de barbati, mai inalti, atletici, imbracati sportiv, multi dintre ei fiind blonzi, grup care li s-a parut suspect.  Aceste afirmatii se coroboreaza cu faptul ca in zona respectiva a avionului nu a stat nici unul din pasagerii identificati.  Mai mult, verificindu-se la hotelurile din municipiul Sibiu persoane care aveau numele celor 37 de persoane neidentificate, s-a constatat ca doar un pasager neidentificat care figureaza pe listele TAROM-ului cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, care nu exista la adresa respectiva din localitate, a fost cazat la hotelul Bulevard, dar in registrul de evidenta figureaza cu un alt domiciliu din Bucuresti.  Ambele domicilii, si cei din diagrama TAROM si cel de la hotel sint false.  Cu ocazia acelorasi verificari s-a constatat ca in perioada respectiva in hotelurile din Sibiu au fost cazati multi turisti sovietici, in special la Imparatul Romanilor, Continental, si Bulevard, situate in zona centrala a municipiului.  Fac mentiunea ca din hotelurile respective s-a tras asupra manifestantilor si a armatei. Am omis sa precizez ca pe aeroportul Otopeni, in avionul ROMBAC au fost incarcate sute de colete identice ca format, dimensiuni si culoare, de marime apropriata unei genti diplomat, precum si ca, cu citeva minute inaintea decolarii cursei spre Sibiu, de pe acelasi aeroport au decolat curse ROMBAC spre Timisoara si Arad. Consider ca, in legatura cu pasagerii neidentificati, sint posibile doua versiuni, respectiv sa fie au fost luptatorii U.S.L.A. trimisi in sprijinul lui Nicu Ceausescu, fie au fost agenti sovietici trimisi sa actioneze in scopul rasturnarii regimului Ceausescu.

Monica N. Marginean:  Ce alte demersuri a facut Comisia de ancheta pentru elucidarea misterului celor 37 de pasageri neidentificati?

Marian Valer:  Am luat contact cu unul din loctiitorii comandamentului trupelor U.S.L.A. din capitala, caruia i-am solicitat sa-mi puna la dispozitie pe cei trei insotitori U.S.L.A. ai avionului ROMBAC.  Loctiitorul mi-a spus ca acestia au fost audiati de un procuror militar si nu mai este de acord sa fie audiati inca o data.

Monica M. Maginean:  “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.


 

Monica N. Marginean, “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 33 (septembrie 1990), p. 2.

Sa continuam dialogul inceput acum citeva saptamini prin limpezirea unor aspecte din evenimentele lui decembrie 1989 la Sibiu, aspecte pe care dubla calitate de procuror si membru al Comisiei de ancheta va impiedicau sa le dati publicitatii.  Deci, de fapt, ce a putut afla, in ciuda obstructiilor si piedicilor de tot felul, fostul procuror Marian Valer, despre implicarea unor elemente ale fostei securitati si militii in evenimentele singeroase din Sibiu?

In urma anchetelor desfasurate la Sibiu, rezulta ca la data evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, organele Ministerului de Interne aveau adoptate doua planuri de actiune in cazul aparitiei unei defectiuni antiregim sub forma revoltei sau manifestatiei anti-ceausiste ale populatiei, ori sub forma unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara.  Astfel, in primul rind, pe baza ordinului ministrului de interne nr. 02600/1988, la data respectiva functia sus mentionata fiind detinuta de Tudor Postelnicu, ordin emis ca urmare a manifestatiilor anticeausiste de la Brasov, din 15 noiembrie 1987, s-a adoptat la nivelul Inspectoratului judetean Sibiu al M.I. un plan unic de actiune si interventie in cazul unor manifestatii, in care urmau sa fie implicate securitatea, militia, trupele de securitate si cele de pompieri din cadrul Ministerului de Interne.  Intr-o asemenea eventualitate, un rol deosebit urmau sa detina plutoane de interventie special constituite, respectiv plutoantele Scutul, Soimii si U.S.L.A.  In al doilea rind, in urma investigatiilor efectuate a rezultat ca organele M.I. mai aveau un plan secret de actiune impotriva unitatilor Ministerului Apararii in cazul unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara sau a altei atitudini antiregim a armatei.  Probabil ca acest plan era in conexiune cu planul Z-Z, la care facea referire Ion Dinca in cazul procesului sau si care consta in acorduri secrete incheiate de Ceausescu cu 5 state arabe pentru acordarea de asistenta militara directa in cazul unui puci militar in Romania.  In acest sens, in timpul evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din Sibiu, armata a gasit o harta cu casele conspirative ale Securitatii din jurul unitatilor militare din municipiu, in care urmau sa fie plasate cadre de securitate care sa actioneze impotriva  acestora, in eventualitatea dezicerii armatei de regimul ceausist.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, s-a constatat ca din asemenea case s-a actionat cu foc asupra unor unitati militare, incepind cu dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, deci dupa rasturnarea dictaturii.  S-a mai constatat ca, in general, in casele respective locuiau foste cadre de securitate sau militie, care se pensionsera sau trecusera in rezerva, sau informatori al securitatii, precum si ca, dupa inceperea manifestatiilor anticeausiste la Sibiu, la casele respective au intrat autoturisme care aveau numere de inmatriculare din alte judete, de exemplu Constanta, Iasi, Bacau.  Astfel asupra U.M. 01512, s-a tras din imobilul nr. 7 din str. Stefan cel Mare, situat vis-a-vis de pavilionul central ai acesteia, in care locuiau familii ale unui fost comandant al securitatii din Sibiu si un informator al securitatii, precum si din imobilele situate in str. Moscovei, paralela cu unitatea militara.  Asupra U.M. 1606, s-a tras din imobilul cu nr. 47 de pe str. Moldoveanu, in care locuiau un fost sef al militiei judetului Sibiu, iar asupra U.M. 01080 s-a tras din vila Branga, de pe Calea Dumbravii, in care locuia cu familia un mare crescator de oi, precum si din vila unui medic.  A mai rezultat ca locatarii imobilelor respective au lipsit de la domiciliu in timpul evenimentelor, parasindu-le cu citeva zile in prealabil, precum si ca in unele din aceste case nu s-au gasit urme de mobilier sau de obiecte casnice.  Harta caselor conspirative ale securitatii si militiei a ajuns in posesia locotenent-colonelului Dragomir, comandantul garnizoanei Sibiu, dar acesta, fiind solicitat sa o depuna la comisia de ancheta, a motivat ca nu o mai gaseste.

UN REVOLUTIONAR SIBIEN DESPRE ISPRAVA USLASILOR IN ZILELE ACESTE:

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #623 on: March 11, 2010, 14:16:55 PM »

Acesti emanati, aceste lichele, nu-si puteau face jocurile, acapararea puterii totale, precum si inaintasii lor Dej si Ceausescu, decat prin forta represiunii armate. Parte din armata a reactionat pasnic, datorita onor ofitzeri care au dovedit mai multa logica, parte din armata a jucat rolul de dusman al romanilor. La Sibiu, avem tot mai multe date care intaresc teoria ca Dragomir a fost teroristul Nr. 1 in acele zile, ajutat si de grupul USLA trimis de la Bucuresti la Sibiu, pentru protectia lui NC, si care s-au reantors la “locul faptei” dupa ce l-a pus pe Nicu in siguranta. Ei au fost aceia care au comis executiile din Piatza Mare in ziua de 21 decembrie ora 11,45 cu primele victime ucise sau ranite. Au fost repartizati in patru puncte ale pietii: In podul Casei Albastre, in podul actualei Primarii, in podul de deasupra Tunelului Generalului si in podul de deasupra magazinului Moda. De aici, au deschis foc inspre demonstranti. Au deschis foc si pe data de 22 decembrie inspre hotelul Imparatul Romanilor din acelasi pod de deasupra Tunelului Generalului care avea corespondent cu celelalte poduri dinspre magazinul Covorul. Aceste grupe ale USLA nu aveau insemne de grad sau arma, nu purtau boneta militara si aveau la dispozitie doua microbuze ale unitatii 01512 care i-a transportat in tot acest timp. Un grup al USLA era incepand din ziua de 21 decembrie ora 07 la sediul Judetenei de partid, ocupand garajul din curtea din sapate cu munitie si armament special. Se poate descoperi foarte repede, numele persoanelor care au fost trimise la SIBIU cu Rombacul in dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, ca urmare a convorbirilor indelungate purtate de Nicu si Bucuresti, despre demonstratia anuntata pentru dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie de la Mag Dumbrava. In timpul convorbirii telefonice, in biroul lui Nicu se afla Traian Popsa, fostul director de la IJIM Sibiu, maiorul Dragomir, seful Garzilor judetene Pescaru, secretar al CJPCR Sibiu si Niculae Hurubean, prim secretar la Alba care se afla in trecere prin Sibiu. Aceste trupe USLA au purtat alternativ, combinezoane negre, uniforma militara sau haine civile…
Lovitura de stat cu spectatori, cum zice Cornel Dinu, a functionat atata timp cat au avut nevoie pentru a pune mana pe putere acesti derbedei bolsevici-kaghebisti.
Interesant, si semnificativ, chiar daca saitul acesta (http://securitatea.100free.com/documente/diplomat.htm) incearca sa-i scapa pe securisti basme curate  , recunoaste ca geanta dipomat a fost…folosita de catre USLA “in misiune de insotire”:

Celebra “arma secreta” a securitatii din Sibiu, de care au facut atata caz inclusiv cei de la procuratura militara, era de fapt un simplu pistolet introdus intr-o geanta tip diplomat, folosit de catre cei de la USLA in misiuni de insotire. “Inventie” pur romaneasca, pistoletul avea adaptat un mecanism, care il facea utilizabil printr-o simpla apasare intr-un anume loc al manerului.

 

Cazul SIBIU

Monica N. Marginean, “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 33 (septembrie 1990), p. 2.

Sa continuam dialogul inceput acum citeva saptamini prin limpezirea unor aspecte din evenimentele lui decembrie 1989 la Sibiu, aspecte pe care dubla calitate de procuror si membru al Comisiei de ancheta va impiedicau sa le dati publicitatii.  Deci, de fapt, ce a putut afla, in ciuda obstructiilor si piedicilor de tot felul, fostul procuror Marian Valer, despre implicarea unor elemente ale fostei securitati si militii in evenimentele singeroase din Sibiu?

In urma anchetelor desfasurate la Sibiu, rezulta ca la data evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, organele Ministerului de Interne aveau adoptate doua planuri de actiune in cazul aparitiei unei defectiuni antiregim sub forma revoltei sau manifestatiei anti-ceausiste ale populatiei, ori sub forma unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara.  Astfel, in primul rind, pe baza ordinului ministrului de interne nr. 02600/1988, la data respectiva functia sus mentionata fiind detinuta de Tudor Postelnicu, ordin emis ca urmare a manifestatiilor anticeausiste de la Brasov, din 15 noiembrie 1987, s-a adoptat la nivelul Inspectoratului judetean Sibiu al M.I. un plan unic de actiune si interventie in cazul unor manifestatii, in care urmau sa fie implicate securitatea, militia, trupele de securitate si cele de pompieri din cadrul Ministerului de Interne.  Intr-o asemenea eventualitate, un rol deosebit urmau sa detina plutoane de interventie special constituite, respectiv plutoantele Scutul, Soimii si U.S.L.A.  In al doilea rind, in urma investigatiilor efectuate a rezultat ca organele M.I. mai aveau un plan secret de actiune impotriva unitatilor Ministerului Apararii in cazul unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara sau a altei atitudini antiregim a armatei.  Probabil ca acest plan era in conexiune cu planul Z-Z, la care facea referire Ion Dinca in cazul procesului sau si care consta in acorduri secrete incheiate de Ceausescu cu 5 state arabe pentru acordarea de asistenta militara directa in cazul unui puci militar in Romania.  In acest sens, in timpul evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din Sibiu, armata a gasit o harta cu casele conspirative ale Securitatii din jurul unitatilor militare din municipiu, in care urmau sa fie plasate cadre de securitate care sa actioneze impotriva  acestora, in eventualitatea dezicerii armatei de regimul ceausist.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, s-a constatat ca din asemenea case s-a actionat cu foc asupra unor unitati militare, incepind cu dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, deci dupa rasturnarea dictaturii.  S-a mai constatat ca, in general, in casele respective locuiau foste cadre de securitate sau militie, care se pensionsera sau trecusera in rezerva, sau informatori al securitatii, precum si ca, dupa inceperea manifestatiilor anticeausiste la Sibiu, la casele respective au intrat autoturisme care aveau numere de inmatriculare din alte judete, de exemplu Constanta, Iasi, Bacau.  Astfel asupra U.M. 01512, s-a tras din imobilul nr. 7 din str. Stefan cel Mare, situat vis-a-vis de pavilionul central ai acesteia, in care locuiau familii ale unui fost comandant al securitatii din Sibiu si un informator al securitatii, precum si din imobilele situate in str. Moscovei, paralela cu unitatea militara.  Asupra U.M. 1606, s-a tras din imobilul cu nr. 47 de pe str. Moldoveanu, in care locuiau un fost sef al militiei judetului Sibiu, iar asupra U.M. 01080 s-a tras din vila Branga, de pe Calea Dumbravii, in care locuia cu familia un mare crescator de oi, precum si din vila unui medic.  A mai rezultat ca locatarii imobilelor respective au lipsit de la domiciliu in timpul evenimentelor, parasindu-le cu citeva zile in prealabil, precum si ca in unele din aceste case nu s-au gasit urme de mobilier sau de obiecte casnice.  Harta caselor conspirative ale securitatii si militiei a ajuns in posesia locotenent-colonelului Dragomir, comandantul garnizoanei Sibiu, dar acesta, fiind solicitat sa o depuna la comisia de ancheta, a motivat ca nu o mai gaseste.

Monica Marginean: Intr-o convorbire telefonica de saptamina trecuta, va plingeati de unele afecte nedorite ale demisiei dumneavoastra. De fapt, despre ce este vorba?

Marian Valer: Am simtit la scurt timp dupa publicarea demisiei ca beneficiez de serviciile organizatiei domnului Virgil Magureanu….Revin ca sa arat ca la Satu Mare am fost urmarit in modalitati mai mult sau mai putin insidioase, de asemenea, in primele zile, la domiciliul parintilor mei s-au deplasat in mai multe rinduri indivizi care s-au interesat de soarta mea.

(”Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei” Expres, nr. 33 septembrie 1990, p. 2)

“Dupa evenimente au disparut niste declaratii date la comisiile de ancheta, au disparut caietele brute de inregistrare de la ofiterii de serviciu, plus o harta in care am insemnat casele de unde s-a tras.  Mortii care erau in combinezoane si aveau mai multe haine dedesubt i-am identificat:  erau cadre ale M.I. din Sibiu (Militie si Securitate)….S-au gasit arme si munitii care nu sint in dotarea armatei, s-au gasit pistoale cu amortizor, care nu sint in dotarea noastra etc.”

(Aurel Dragomir cu Dan Badea, “Secretele Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 22 ( 7-13 iunie 1994), pp. 8-9.)

SIBIU, 21 decembrie 1989

Doua autoturisme ARO si un autoturism Dacia au inconjurat grupul Piata Mare, facand arestari. Militienii din ARO albastru au facut 3 arestari, placand in viteza. Autoturismul 1-SB-3634 a demarat in viteza printre oameni, solicitand respectarea linistii si ordinei publice. ARO cu numarul 1-SB-1425 a fost intors cu rotile in sus si a fost incendiat de o tanara.

http://apcemrdec1989sb.portalulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?cat=1989.

SIBIU

PROCESUL DE LA SIBIU

La locuinta lui Nicu Ceausescu din Sibiu

Astfel, din adresele numărul 68 000 07 din 7 ianuarie 1990 şi numărul 68000171 din 28 februarie 1990 ale Serviciului Independent Arme-Muniţie şi Substanţe Toxice din cadrul Inspectoratului general al Poliţiei rezultă că, inculpatul figurează în evidenţa deţinătorilor legali de arme, cu pistolul marca STAR calibrul 7,85mm şi 12 cartuşe acelaşi calibru. Pentru celelalte arme găsite în locuinţa din Sibiu şi anume:pistolul mitralieră AKM , calibrul 5,6 mm, pistolul SCHMIDT, carabină automatic marca G ARM, calibrul 5,5mm, carabina 7 x 64 SAKO, carabină BROWING şi puşcă de vânătoare cu alice, semiautomată,calibrul 12 mm, cât şi pentru muniţia:6 cartuşe –357 MAGNUM, 214 cartuşe calibul 12 mm , 66 cartuşe-300 V.I.N. , 140 cartuşe-7×64mm şi 506 cartuşe.

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/baza_de_date/procese/sibiu/Sedinta%201.doc

23 decembrie 1989

Ion Neata:  “…Avea cartus inauntru, l-am extras imediat si am inceput sa studiez arma, stiti, eu sint la maistri militari, specialitatea armament.  Mi-au trecut multe pusti prin mina, dar asa ,bijuterie’ inca nu am vazut.  Este vorba de un Browning de mare precizie, calibru 5,6 mm de productie belgiana….Controlindu-l am gasit asupra sa urmatoarele:  buletin de identitate pe numele Fanea Nicolae, legitimatie de serviciu, pe acelasi nume, din care rezulta ca este inginer la I.P.A.S….si o statie de emisie-receptie de tipul celor de la militie.”

[“On 23 December 1989 in Sibiu, a soldier participated in the capture of one Fanea Nicolae who was carrying a Belgian-made 5.6 mm Browning and “a radio transmitter-receiver of the type used by the Romanian ‘Militia’.

Ion Neata, interview by Major Mihai Floca, “Unde sint teroristii?,” Armata Poporului, no. 30 (25 July 1990), p. 3.”

http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.]

BUCURESTI

PROCESUL DE LA SIBIU

La locuinta lui Nicu Ceausescu din Bucuresti

De asemenea, la locuinţa inculpatului situată în Bucureşti,strada Cosmonauţilor nr.2-4, a fost găsit un pistol cu aer comprimat calibrul 4,5 mm , 23 cartuşe calibrul 7×64mm, un cartuş 300 V.I.N., 44cartuşe-357 MAGNUM, 3 cartuşe calibrul 12 mm, 498 cartuşe-calibrul 5,6mm, 50 cartuşe-calibrul 9mm lung, 27 cartuşe-calibrul 6,35mm, două cutii cu diaboluri –calibrul 4,5mm pentru care nu a posedat autorizaţie legală, aşa cum prevede articolul 2,litera f din decretul numărul 367/1971.

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/baza_de_date/procese/sibiu/Sedinta%201.doc

La locuinta lui Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu din Bucuresti

“arma cu luneta si 695 gloante calibru 5,6 mm”

[Victor Dinu, Romania Libera, 12 April 1990, p. 2.

During the trial of Nicolae Ceausescu’s brother, Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu, head of the Securitate’s Baneasa training academy, it was disclosed that at his home “a gun with an infra-red scope and 695 cartridges of 5.6 mm bullets were found.”

http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. ]

Nicu Ceausescu, Arme de 5,6 mm, Directia V-a a Securitatii, si Decembrie 1989

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on January 5, 2009

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/baza_de_date/procese/sibiu/Sedinta%202.doc.

Şedinţa a doua

Continuare –declaraţia inculpatului Nicu Ceauşescu

Pr.-În legătură cu cea de a doua învinuire şi anume deţinerea, fără drept sau în condiţii nelegale, a mai multor arme de foc şi a muniţiei aferente acestora, a muniţiei în general, ce aveţi de spus? Deci aţi deţinut, şi câte astfel de arme, în ce condiţii?

In.-Da.

Pr.-Ce aveţi de relatat vizavi de această învinuire ?Deci, în primul rând, ce arme aţi deţinut la locuinţele dumneavoastră?

In.-Domnule preşedinte , acuma trebuie, ţin să specific acelaşi lucru-armele nu au fost găsite la locuinţa mea din Sibiu.Nici armele, nici muniţia. Armele au fost găsite la Centrul de Dresaj-Câini.

Pr.-Da.

In.-Armele erau proprietatea tatălui meu pe care le foloseam şi eu.

Pr.-Deci, care sunt aceste arme?

In.-Poftiţi?

Pr.-Care sunt aceste arme? Să-ncepem unde le-aţi deţinut şi cu ce titlu, să ne spuneţi.

In.-Aşa. Aceste  arme, deci-nu ştiu exact denumirile…

Pr.-Citind rechizitoriul, aţi citit rechizitoriul?

In.-Da.

Pr.-Cele din rechizitoriu corespundeau, ca să putem să vă facilităm…

In.-Da,da,da.

Pr.-Atunci aţi posedat un pistol mitralieră,fără serie, confecţionat tip CUGIR…

In.-Da.

Pr.-de 5,6 calibru?

In.-Da.

Pr.-Unde s-a aflat acest …

In.-Acest pistol mitralieră s-a aflat o perioadă la taică-miu, o perioadă la mine, o perioadă la Şcoala de câini.

Pr.-Când anume, de ce a ajuns la Şcoala de Câini?

In.-Păi, la Şcoala de Câini a ajuns în ziua de 22, când am spus, existând pericolul…

Pr.-Deci, până în 22, unde a fost?

In.-Păi,la…depinde de când?

Pr.-Deci, de-atuncia…

In.-Bun. La Sibiu ,deci, de 2 ani de zile ca să nu mai…la mine!

Pr.-Era al dumneavoastră?

In.-Nu!

Pr.-Dar?

In.-Era al lui taică-miu, io-l foloseam. De fapt, ar…ăăă…regimul era în felul următor(puţin mai complicat),deci în fosta Direcţie 5 a fostului Departament al Securităţii Statului avea, din câte cunosc eu, toate armele înregistrate. Ea se ocupa de înregistrarea lor, deci,practic trecerea lor în registru sau în … asta de port-armă, muniţie, întreţinere, toate celelalte probleme. Am avut două discuţii, în legătură cu aceste arme, cu fostul şef al Direcţiei a 5-a ,respectiv fost general sau actual general-Marin Neagoe.

Şi l-am întrebat: toate armele sunt normale?(armele care erau în posesia mea). Mi-a spus:„Nu e nici o problemă, toate armele sunt trecute în evidenţa miliţiei şi există un permis general pe ele).

Pr.-Deci aţi auzit că există un permis general pe aceste arme?

In.-Pe fiecare, adică toate sunt trecute pă un singur permis.

Pr.-Aparţinând cui?

In.-Aşa.

Pr.-Deci există un permis ! Ce fel de permis?

In.-Un permis de arme în care sunt trecute toate armele care există în casă…

Pr.-Un permis pe numele cui? Sau pentru cine?Sau al cui?

In.-Această întrebare n-am pus-o.

Pr.-Nu vi se pare nefiresc că n-aţi pus-o?

In.-Nu!

Pr.-Şi că v-aţi mulţumit?…Da.

In.-Nu mi se … ştiţi de ce? Să vă spun foarte sincer –datorită faptului că era Departamentul Securităţii Statului.

Pr.-Acest pistol-mitralieră, de tip CUGIR, calibrul 5,6, de cât timp se află în detenţia dumnea, în deţinerea dumneavoastră?

In.-Doi ani jumate.

Pr.-„Am deţinut un pistol mitralieră-calibrul 5,6, tip Cugir, primit în  urmă cu circa doi ani, de la tatăl meu…”. Pistolul SCHMIDT,  unde l-aţi avut, tot la Sibiu? Pistol Schmidt?

In.-Pe care aveam permis de port-armă sau…?

Pr.-Pistolul SCHMIDT  ca atare, şi pe urmă cu permisul…

In.-Păi, nu ,dar nu ştiu care este, vă rog să mă scuzaţi, da’ io nu ştiu exact, după denumire, cum arată, asta e partea mai…ăăă…

Pr.-Problema aceasta de tip de arme militare sau nu şi de mărci , nici nouă nu ne este foarte familiară, dar…

In.-În rechizitoriu spune că io-am avut permis de port –armă cu un singur pistolet.

Pr.-Câte pistoale aţi avut atunci? Câte pistoale,pistolete aţi deţinut?

In.-SCHMIDT? Păi, dacă-i aici e…tot de 2 ani de zile.

Pr.-Ca număr vă întreb.

In.-Păi, câte sunt în rechizitoriu.

Pr.-Nu, nu! Câte aţi avut dumneavoastră? Nu ştiaţi câte arme?

In.-Nu!

Pr.-„Nu pot preciza câte pistolete am deţinut…”

Dar, la Bucureşti, câte v-au fost găsite în maşină?

„…dar,la Bucuresti, au fost găsite în maşina cu care călătoream 2 pistolete,…”. Vă aparţineau acestea ?

In..-Da.

Pr.-„…care îmi aparţineau .” Câte carabine aţi avut?

In.-Două.

Pr.-Două sau trei?

In.-Două puşti de vânătoare şi două de 5,6 fiindcă şi…

Pr.-Deci două? Două cu lunetă şi două fără?

In.-Da.

Pr.-„Am mai deţinut 2 carabine cu lunetă şi 2 puşti de vânătoare”. Toate acestea la Sibiu, ce-am discutat?…

Pr.-Toate acestea la Sibiu, ce-am discutat până acuma?

In.-Da.

Pr.-„Toate acestea în locuinţa mea, din Sibiu, până la data de 22 decembrie…”

Cine a dispus să fie duse la Şcoala de Câini? Când,înainte de a pleca spre aeroport?

In.-Nu! Dimineaţa la şapte.

Pr.-„…când, dimineaţa, eu am dispus să fie transportate la Şcoala de Creştere şi Dresaj-Câini”. În locuinţa din Cosmonauţilor aţi deţinut un pistol de tip aer comprimat?

In.-Cred că da. Da!

Pr.-„Am deţinut la locuinţa din Bucureşti, strada Cosmonauţilor, un pistol de tir, cu  aer comprimat, marcă germană”.

Contestaţi muniţia şi tipul de muniţie şi numărul din procesele verbale, care le-aţi văzut la dosar?

In.-Nu,păi…

Pr.-Că s-ar fi găsit la locuinţa dumneavoastră, că vă aparţineau?

In.-A, tot ce se poate! Acuma, singurul lucru, care pot să spun io , e că n-am văzut procesul verbal de percheziţie, da’, merg pe bună credinţă, înseamnă că aşa e.

Pr.-Da, atuncia ne puteţi dumneavoastră spune câte anume?

In.-Nu!Nu.

Pr.-„Am deţinut muniţie atât la locuinţa mea din Sibiu,…

In.-La Sibiu toată a fost dusă la…

Pr.-…care a fost, şi ea, transportată, la Centrul de Creştere şi Dresaj-Câini…”

La Bucureşti aţi avut muniţie? În Cosmonauţilor?

In.-Cred că da. Dacă spun c-am avut …

Pr.-„…şi cred c-am avut muniţie şi la locuinţa din Bucureşti”.

In.-Am înţeles că s-a găsit un cartuş, două cartuşe,mă rog.

Pr.- „Nu pot reda numeric şi, ca tip, muniţia deţinută , dar consider reale menţiunile din actele de la dosar”. Acestea v-au fost,în parte, date de tatăl dumneavoastră sau le-aţi primit dumneavoastră personal,sau cum? Aceste arme : carabine,  puşti cu lunetă,  pistoale?

In.-Da. Adică, am încercat de la început să explic un lucru. Deci nu numai astea le-aveam. Aveam la Direcţia 5-a mai multe.

Pr.-Nu. Asupra dumneavoastră şi-n locuinţele dumneavoastră?

In.-Bun!Asupra mea s-a găsit un pistol.

Pr.-Aşa.

In.-Dar…ăăă…problema care e – ei se ocupau de toate problemele astea.

Pr.-De unde aţi primit acestea despre care am vorbit?

In.-Aa, bun! O parte, de exemplu, o parte le-am primit şi eu, o parte erau de la tată-miu.

Pr.-„O parte din aceste arme le primisem de la tatăl meu , altele le primisem în mod direct.”

In.-Aşa. De exemplu, pistol…

Pr.-„Cert este că generalul Neagoe îmi comunicase că, pentru toate aceste arme există înregistrări legale , precum şi un permis general, iar eu nu am cerut alte precizări.”

Consideraţi că le deţineţi legal,practic?Consideraţi că sunteţi în deţinerea legală a acestor arme şi a acestor muniţii?

In.-Foarte greu de spus.Adică, domnule preşedinte, vă daţi seama că, în funcţia pe care o aveam io, ca să deţin permis, adică să obţin permis de port-armă şi muniţie aferentă era un lucru foarte simplu.Era, practic îl chemam pe cel de la…

Pr.-În funcţia în care…

In.-Era…

Pr.-…aţi deţinut-o, multe probleme le puteaţi rezolva foarte simplu,dar, aicea, este altă problemă.

In.-Bun, io-am…

Pr.-Tocmai în funcţia pe care o deţineaţi, eraţi dator să cunoaşteţi dispoziţiile legilor şi legislaţiei române.

In.-…am plecat de la buna…

Pr.-Vizavi de această legislaţie…

In.-Da?

Pr.-…dumneavoastră vă consideraţi un om cu studii superioare şi cu o anumită…deci, din acest punct de vedere consideraţi legală, privitor la legea română ?

In. -Am de făcut 2 precizări: nu cunosc legea din ` 71 privind regimul armelor …

Pr.-Deci  nu cunoaşteţi această lege?

In.-Da.Aşa.  Şi…ăăă…la momentul respectiv, consideram legal, dacă era vorba de…

Pr.-„Nu cunosc legea, actul normativ din 1971, privind regimul armelor şi muniţilor…”

In.-Da’ , acuma cunoscând, ştiu că nu-i legal.

Pr.-Şi deci, atunci, apreciaţi că sunteţi în cadrul unei deţineri legale?

In.-Nu,acuma…

Pr.-Nu acuma. Atunci ?

In.-Atuncia? Atuncia da, fiind…

Pr.-„…şi am considerat, în permanenţă, că mă aflu într-o deţinere legală a armamentului şi muniţiei, abia acum realizând că am încălcat dispoziţiile legale.”

Aţi avut,totuşi, un permis de port-armă ?

In.-Da.

Pr.-Şi la acest permis de port-armă, ce armă era trecută?

In.-Un pistol .

Pr.-Cine, de ce vi s-a dat? L-aţi solicitat dumneavoastră sau…?

In.-Nu! Era singura armă care nu provenea de la Direcţia 5.

Pr.-Da.

In.-Şi provenea direct de la Postelnicu. Şi-atuncia, când am zis , mi-au dat arma…

Pr.-Nu vi s-a părut normal că pentru acest pistol aveţi permis de port-armă, iar pentru toate celelalte-şi pe numele dumneavoastră categoric-?

In.-Dupa-ceea. Ăsta a fost şi motivul pentru care l-am întrebat pe Neagoe.

Pr.-E clar!

„Eu am primit un pistolet de la…direct de la Tudor Postelnicu şi un permis pentru acest pistolet, şi atunci  l-am întrebat pe generalul Neagoe despre situaţia celorlalte arme, aflând despre ceea ce am numit un permis general”. În legătură cu aceste probleme, legate de învinuirea , în legătură cu armamentul şi muniţia mai aveţi ceva de declarat?

In.-Nu. Nu.

Pr.-În conformitate cu dispoziţiile legale, dacă aţi relatat tot ceea ce-aţi avut de relatat în legătură cu învinuirea, Instanţa vă va adresa câteva întrebări.

Decembrie 1989, gloante de calibru 5, si teroristii: Dupa Sibiu si Bucuresti (Piata Palatului), astazi Brasov, Braila, si zona Televiziunii (Bucuresti)

Decembrie 1989: Si totusi forumistii stiu cite ceva. Sibiu, Bucuresti, munitie atipica, si teroristii

from “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian”

http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.pdf.

Did the black-suited ones have any affiliation to any institution? After all, is it not odd that so many of them would appear to be dressed in the same garb? In 1990, an engineer, Mircea Georgescu, expressed his frustration about the post-December disappearance of the “terrorists” in Sibiu, Nicu Ceausescu’s fiefdom, as follows:

“Who fired from the attics of Sibiu on 21-22 December 1989? Who are the so-called terrorists? Where are their guns with scopes and unmistakable cadence? Silence on all fronts:…

c) A fighter from the guards, along with his brother, captured in these days (23-25 dec.) some 8 securisti among whom: one about 45-50 years old, at the State Theater Sibiu, we surrendered him to the Commander at the Army House. He was taken under guard by 4 civilian fighters (one in front had a club in his hand) and by a soldier with a gun at his side. He was dressed in a vest (like a smith’s) and a pant-suit (combinezon) that was black or a very dark grey…brown with short hair, well-built and 1,70-1,75 m tall….What, nobody knows anything about this guy either?…[emphases added]”[56]

Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:

…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons. I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits. The Militia told me that they weren’t their people. At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire. I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?” I told him we were being attacked. He told me to cease fire. Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender. I slammed the telephone down. Then [Army General] Stanculescu called. I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me: ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified: they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]

According to the Army’s semi-official account of the December events, in the area of the Cernica and Pustnicu forests and the Brick Factory in Bucharest (apparently in the vicinity of vilas of Postelnicu and Valentin Ceausescu), a tank unit under the command of Captain Ion Anghel “engaged in battle with terrorist elements that were on foot and in ABIs,” the latter being a vehicle exclusively belonging to the USLA, as was noted earlier.[134]

Sibiu, 19-22 December 1989

In Sibiu, Siani-Davies tells us:

Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989. It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[151]

From the standpoint of Siani-Davies’ unsuspecting reader such a conclusion may seem not only credible, but judicious. But one of Siani-Davies’ habits—identified negatively by even those who praise the book—is his tendency to draw negative equivalencies: i.e. there is about as much evidence to support x as there is to support y, in order to disprove or discount both propositions. In a review, Doris Mironescu writes:

“Very common are claims such as the following: ‘Finding the proof to sustain such an explanation of the events [that the Army’s Intelligence arm, the DIA simulated the “terrorist diversion,” to permit the Front’s takeover and a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of the country] is as difficult as proving that special units of the securitate took up arms against the revolution’ (p. 154). Mutually contradictory hypotheses are invoked in order to negate each other, not so much because of the weight of the claims, but through the ideological similarity of both.”[152]

This tendency definitely affects Siani-Davies’ analysis of the “terrorists” and its accuracy. To begin with, in the very book (Sandulescu) invoked by Siani-Davies, the head of the DIA (Battalion 404 Buzau), Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) that “we hardly had 80 fighters in this battalion.”[153] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[154] This makes it highly unlikely that they were on the 20 December TAROM flight to Sibiu that is in question.[155]

Contrast this with the signs that exist pointing to the mystery passengers as having been from the Securitate/Interior Ministry, in particular the USLA. Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December 1989, in a crisis meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests.[156] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[157] If they were, indeed, DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and Postelnicu informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?

The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA. Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ – after which one no longer heard anything of them – they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…”[158]

Beginning, at least as early as August 1990, with the allusions of Major Mihai Floca, and later seemingly indirectly confirmed by former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, it was suggested that when USLA Commander Ardeleanu was confronted at the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December 1989, Ardeleanu reportedly admitted that “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’.”[159] Finally, and along these lines, we bring things full circle—and recall our “phantoms in black” again in the process—with the testimony of Army officer Hortopan to the same Serban Sandulescu at the Gabrielescu Commission hearings:

Sandulescu: About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?

Hortopan: On the contrary. These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu]. I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was: out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders. Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[160]

Bringing us up to the morning of 22 December 1989, and setting the stage for what was to come, Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:

Dragomir: Events began to develop quickly on 22 December. In the morning some of the students posted in different parts of the town began to observe some suspect individuals in black jumpsuits on the roofs in the lights of the attics of several buildings.

Reporter: The same equipment as the USLAsi killed out front of the Defense Ministry…

Dragomir: And on the roof of the Militia building there were three or four similar individuals…[161]

Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation. Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[162]

Gheorghe Cocos povesteste cum el si sotia sa au fost impuscati cu gloante DUM-DUM “care se spune ca nu exista, dar totusi exista”

Vedeti clip-ul 4:55-6:23

posted by tioluciano on youtube on 22 December 2009 cu cuvintele aceste

“Documentarul “SIBIU 1989” LDTV(comprimat 15,4 MB, format WMV, 212kbps, 384 x 288 pixels,13 fps)

Documentar lansat într-o proiectie publica in data de 21 decembrie 2009, de la ora 18.00, la Casa de Cultura a Sindicatelor Sibiu, Sala STUDIO
Producator versiune originala : Octavian Repede ( sibiuvideo@gmail.com , sau Octavian Repede-0747/990495)

———————————————————————-

mai mult despre gloantele DUM-DUM in decembrie 1989:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2009/12/24/bullets-lies-and-videotape-the-amazing-disappearing-romanian-counter-revolution-of-december-1989-part-vii-conclusion-those-who-told-us-the-truth-by-richard-andrew-hall/

full pdf file

blv 111909tk6

from Orwellian, Positively Orwellian (2006)

MEN IN BLACK:  The Recurring Theme of “Black Jumpsuits”

Part of the great riddle of the “terrorists” concerns their clothing.  In Brasov, it was noted the individual arrested on 23 December firing a 5.65 mm Thomson automatic was wearing a “black jumpsuit.”  The descriptions go by different names—“combinezoane negre,” “salopete negre,” or “de culor inchis,” for example—but they all note the black or dark outfits of many of those suspected of being “terrorists.”

It is critical to note that we have evidence that the focus on the black clothing of those identified as “terrorists” occurred among participants at the time, and is not merely some ex post facto artifact.  Major A.D. of Directorate V-a (probably Major Aurel David) recounted in early 1991 that while under arrest on 27 December 1989, the Army soldiers guarding him asked “If” as Major A.D. had sought to convince them, “it isn’t Ceausescu’s guard [i.e. V-a]” who was firing, “then who are the black-shirted ones [emphasis added]?”[52] The report of the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor] on Timisoara indirectly confirms Army suspicion when alleging that Army Colonel Constantin Zeca gave the order after 22 December 1989, to shoot at anybody “in a blue, navy blue, or black jumpsuit.”[53] Why this clothing in particular, and why the suspicion then?

Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.”  Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:

“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.

The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital.  It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route].  Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad.  Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note:  possible reference to 5 mm weapons].  Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic.  The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks.  They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out].  Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty.  A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area.  All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit.  At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes.  Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47.  One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit.  The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman.  All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic.  After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three.  After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened.  All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]

 

Another small group of people wearing “black jumpsuits” held a military convoy under fire near the city of Buzau. On the evening of 23 December 1989, a military convoy from Piatra Neamt en route to Bucharest reached the community of Maracineni near Buzau.  Members of the local military unit told the soldiers from Piatra Neamt that

…the unit had been attacked by two people, a civilian and Militia NCO, who disappeared with an Oltcit [car] and an ABI vehicle [an armored transport used exclusively by the Securitate’s USLA].  Shortly after [being told] this, gunfire opened on the convoy.  And gunfire reopened on the local military unit….those from the unit fired back with ordinance that lit the sky, in this way enabling them to observe a group of 3-4 armed people, wearing black jumpsuits (“salopete negre”) who were shooting while constantly changing position.  At the same time, on the radio frequencies of the convoy, they received messages about coming devastating attacks, and even Soviet intervention.  All of these proved to be simple disinformation.  The next day, in a moment of calm, villagers brought the soldiers food, and related how the terrorists had occupied attics of their houses.  They said they [the occupiers] were Romanians and that in a few words they had ordered [the villagers] to let them into the attics of their houses….In general, they shot at night, but on 25 December the cannonade continued during the day…. Curiously, the ‘fighting’ in Maracineni continued until 30 December.  Who and for whom were they trying to impress? [emphasis added][55]

Indeed, there are three key aspects here:  1) this was not a heavily populated area, thereby undermining arguments about “operetta-like” fake warfare to impress the population, 2) it is difficult to explain this episode as the result of “misunderstandings” between units, and 3) the gunfire lasted well over a week, a fact that is difficult to ascribe to confusion.

Did the black-suited ones have any affiliation to any institution?  After all, is it not odd that so many of them would appear to be dressed in the same garb?  In 1990, an engineer, Mircea Georgescu, expressed his frustration about the post-December disappearance of the “terrorists” in Sibiu, Nicu Ceausescu’s fiefdom, as follows:

“Who fired from the attics of Sibiu on 21-22 December 1989?  Who are the so-called terrorists?  Where are their guns with scopes and unmistakable cadence?  Silence on all fronts:…

c) A fighter from the guards, along with his brother, captured in these days (23-25 dec.) some 8 securisti among whom:  one about 45-50 years old, at the State Theater Sibiu, we surrendered him to the Commander at the Army House.  He was taken under guard by 4 civilian fighters (one in front had a club in his hand) and by a soldier with a gun at his side.  He was dressed in a vest (like a smith’s) and a pant-suit (combinezon) that was black or a very dark grey…brown with short hair, well-built and 1,70-1,75 m tall….What, nobody knows anything about this guy either?…[emphases added]”[56]

Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:

…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons.  I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits.  The Militia told me that they weren’t their people.  At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire.  I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?”  I told him we were being attacked.  He told me to cease fire.  Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender.  I slammed the telephone down.  Then [Army General] Stanculescu called.  I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me:  ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified:  they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]

 

Finally, in this context, the comments of a Codrut H. in July 1990 about what he and other civilians found when they occupied Securitate headquarters in Brasov on the night of 22 December:  “What appeared suspicious to me was that the Securitate there appeared to have been prepared [for something]….  Out front of the building there was a white ARO [automobile] in which there were complete antiterrorist kits [emphasis added].” What else did the civilians find there?…combinezoane negre. [58]

Sibiu, 19-22 December 1989

In Sibiu, Siani-Davies tells us:

Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989.  It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[151]

From the standpoint of Siani-Davies’ unsuspecting reader such a conclusion may seem not only credible, but judicious.  But one of Siani-Davies’ habits—identified negatively by even those who praise the book—is his tendency to draw negative equivalencies:  i.e. there is about as much evidence to support x as there is to support y, in order to disprove or discount both propositions.  In a review, Doris Mironescu writes:

“Very common are claims such as the following:  ‘Finding the proof to sustain such an explanation of the events [that the Army’s Intelligence arm, the DIA simulated the “terrorist diversion,” to permit the Front’s takeover and a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of the country] is as difficult as proving that special units of the securitate took up arms against the revolution’ (p. 154).  Mutually contradictory hypotheses are invoked in order to negate each other, not so much because of the weight of the claims, but through the ideological similarity of both.”[152]

This tendency definitely affects Siani-Davies’ analysis of the “terrorists” and its accuracy.  To begin with, in the very book (Sandulescu) invoked by Siani-Davies, the head of the DIA (Battalion 404 Buzau), Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) that “we hardly had 80 fighters in this battalion.”[153] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[154] This makes it highly unlikely that they were on the 20 December TAROM flight to Sibiu that is in question.[155]

Contrast this with the signs that exist pointing to the mystery passengers as having been from the Securitate/Interior Ministry, in particular the USLA.  Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December 1989, in a crisis meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests.[156] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[157] If they were, indeed, DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and Postelnicu informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?

The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA.  Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ – after which one no longer heard anything of them – they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…”[158]

Beginning, at least as early as August 1990, with the allusions of Major Mihai Floca, and later seemingly indirectly confirmed by former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, it was suggested that when USLA Commander Ardeleanu was confronted at the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December 1989, Ardeleanu reportedly admitted that “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’.”[159] Finally, and along these lines, we bring things full circle—and recall our “phantoms in black” again in the process—with the testimony of Army officer Hortopan to the same Serban Sandulescu at the Gabrielescu Commission hearings:

Sandulescu:  About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?

 

Hortopan:  On the contrary.  These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu].  I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was:  out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders.  Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[160]

Bringing us up to the morning of 22 December 1989, and setting the stage for what was to come, Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:

Dragomir:  Events began to develop quickly on 22 December.  In the morning some of the students posted in different parts of the town began to observe some suspect individuals in black jumpsuits on the roofs in the lights of the attics of several buildings.

 

Reporter:  The same equipment as the USLAsi killed out front of the Defense Ministry…

 

Dragomir:  And on the roof of the Militia building there were three or four similar individuals…[161]

Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation.  Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[162]

Specialistii lui Nicu…


Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December in a crisis meeting, Ceausescu’s son announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests (“Baricada,” no. 45, 1990).  Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request (“Romania Libera,” 30 January 1990.)

The rewriting of the story of the Revolution, the “tourists,” and the “terrorists” was already in full swing, when in August 1990, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #623 on: March 11, 2010, 14:16:55 PM »

Acesti emanati, aceste lichele, nu-si puteau face jocurile, acapararea puterii totale, precum si inaintasii lor Dej si Ceausescu, decat prin forta represiunii armate. Parte din armata a reactionat pasnic, datorita onor ofitzeri care au dovedit mai multa logica, parte din armata a jucat rolul de dusman al romanilor. La Sibiu, avem tot mai multe date care intaresc teoria ca Dragomir a fost teroristul Nr. 1 in acele zile, ajutat si de grupul USLA trimis de la Bucuresti la Sibiu, pentru protectia lui NC, si care s-au reantors la “locul faptei” dupa ce l-a pus pe Nicu in siguranta. Ei au fost aceia care au comis executiile din Piatza Mare in ziua de 21 decembrie ora 11,45 cu primele victime ucise sau ranite. Au fost repartizati in patru puncte ale pietii: In podul Casei Albastre, in podul actualei Primarii, in podul de deasupra Tunelului Generalului si in podul de deasupra magazinului Moda. De aici, au deschis foc inspre demonstranti. Au deschis foc si pe data de 22 decembrie inspre hotelul Imparatul Romanilor din acelasi pod de deasupra Tunelului Generalului care avea corespondent cu celelalte poduri dinspre magazinul Covorul. Aceste grupe ale USLA nu aveau insemne de grad sau arma, nu purtau boneta militara si aveau la dispozitie doua microbuze ale unitatii 01512 care i-a transportat in tot acest timp. Un grup al USLA era incepand din ziua de 21 decembrie ora 07 la sediul Judetenei de partid, ocupand garajul din curtea din sapate cu munitie si armament special. Se poate descoperi foarte repede, numele persoanelor care au fost trimise la SIBIU cu Rombacul in dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, ca urmare a convorbirilor indelungate purtate de Nicu si Bucuresti, despre demonstratia anuntata pentru dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie de la Mag Dumbrava. In timpul convorbirii telefonice, in biroul lui Nicu se afla Traian Popsa, fostul director de la IJIM Sibiu, maiorul Dragomir, seful Garzilor judetene Pescaru, secretar al CJPCR Sibiu si Niculae Hurubean, prim secretar la Alba care se afla in trecere prin Sibiu. Aceste trupe USLA au purtat alternativ, combinezoane negre, uniforma militara sau haine civile…

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #10 The Protesters Conquer Timisoara as the Army Withdraws to Maintain Institutional Command and Control

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #11 Ceausescu Returns from Iran…and Apparently Not Empty-Handed

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #12 Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: A Pro-Regime Rally, Televised Live

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #13 The Bloody Repression of Demonstrators at Piata Universitatii/Intercontinental

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #14 Flight of the Ceausescus

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/26/dinel-staciu-fost-usla-craiova-si-decembrie-1989/

CRAIOVA:

Ion Spanu, “Un ofiter de militie vorbeste despre ostateteci ai revolutionarilor,” Expres nr. 28 (179), 13-19 iulie 1993.

image0

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinel_Staicu

Dinel Staicu: „Misiunea mea a fost sa-l infiltrez pe Sandu in prefectura“

Ca fost comandant al grupei a II-a de patrundere si capturare din cadrul Militiei doljene, Dinel Staicu a fost bagat pina la briu in evenimentele din „22“. Cind a plecat din politie, in ’92, a luat cu el multe secrete. Dar nu a lepadat uniforma, pina nu a dezvaluit ce rol a avut el pe scena miscarilor revolutionare de la Craiova. Reproducem, mai jos, parte din marturiile livrate de ex-capitanul Dinel Staicu, pe 8 aprilie 1992, revistei craiovene Cartel.Dinel Staicu a circulat in zilele acelea fara oprelisti, intrind si iesind in prefectura, de fiecare data fiind inarmat, in ciuda perchezitiilor care i se faceau. Interesant daca in scriptele unitatii din acea perioada figureaza ridicarea armei sale, pentru ca, daca nu, inseamna ca, de acum, fostul ofiter poate sa posede si in prezent arme de foc. Dupa ce a fost consemnat la domiciliu timp de sase zile, pentru portul armei in evenimente, el si-a reluat misiunea: „… De data asta reusesc, il infiltrez atit de bine pe domnul Sandu, imi era doar sef si sefii trebuie sa stea in fata“.
Implicat si in cercetarea cauzelor din care se tragea in perioada aceea in Valea Rosie (cartier secerat metru cu metru de gloante), silit de catre fostul comandant al militiei, colonelul Langa, sa-i dau dreptate generalului Rosu, referitor la existenta unor gloante vidia in urma condamnarii la domiciliu, Dinel Staicu incearca o diversiune pentru inlaturarea celor care luasera conducerea (Nisipeanu, Popa), montind studentii aflati pe pozitii in Casa Studentilor. Actiunea lui de atunci a dat gres. La citva timp dupa aceasta, un alt grup de interes din prefectura n-a mai ratat. El poate fi admirat si astazi in fruntea judetului. La ora aceea, militia facea inca politica. Desi a stat inca in cazarma, securitatea (col. Gheorghe) „a imprumutat d-lui D. Staicu doua TAB-uri si citiva oameni din plutonul USLA al Securitatii (nu cel al militiei), desi cei de la Securitate primisera ordin sa nu mai ridice armament. Dar dl Staicu venea din partea Frontului…
In urma cercetarilor facute de el in Valea Rosie, Staicu sustine ca n-au fost teroristi (desi el insusi este un contraexemplu), pregatirea lui de baza (comandant al grupei a 2-a USLA) fiind si pentru diversiune, si pentru dezinformare. Parerea lui este ca armata a tras milioane de cartuse si ca, peste tot unde au fost unitati militare, pamintul s-a umplut de treburi. Numai ca il contrazice unitatea militara din Craiovita unde nu s-a tras. (…)
Dinel Staicu se considera singurul implicat cu adevarat in evenimentele din decembrie „singurul care-i capacitasem pe toti,… si totul a fost cum am vrut eu“. De aici sa intelegem ca artizanul „Revolutiei“ craiovene a fost un locotenent de militie?
Referitor la activitatea de atunci a sefilor lui, Staicu declara: „In zilele de dupa erau: Langa, Vaduva, Velicu, Sandu… Erau prezenti mai mult cu fizicul, in rest erau absenti total. Cam asta a fost aportul lor. Erau un fel de ostatici… Atunci, ceea ce puteai sa lucrezi era cam ceea ce am facut eu. Sa-i organizez pe studenti, sa linistesc starea de spirit“.
In ceea ce priveste vinovatii pentru victimele din decembrie ’89, pentru ca s-a tras in Craiova, Staicu e de parere ca „sint vinovati cu intentie si vinovati fara intentie, adica vinovati din culpa, asa-zisii incompetenti. Ca au fost generali sau au fost plutonieri, nu are importanta doar daca au avut capacitate de decizie“.
La intrebarea daca in Craiova evenimentele ar fi putut sa se desfasoare fara varsare de singe, ni se raspunde: „Cu o conditie, daca in Craiova n-ar fi existat unitati militare“.
Si iata ca, dupa atita osteneala, lt. maj. Staicu Dinel nici macar nu a fost avansat, de aceste binefaceri beneficiind „unii care n-au avut nici in clin, nici in mineca cu Revolutia“. Intr-un tirziu a fost totusi inaintat la gradul de capitan, ocazie cu care a avut urmatoarea conversatie cu colonelul (de-acum, generalul de miine? Asta ne-ar mai lipsi – n.r.) Sandu: „Ba, eu te-am facut capitan la exceptional. Imi pare rau, cam ai dreptate, dar de ce-mi strigi chestia asta? „…Dumneavoastra ati inceput“. In ceea ce priveste institutia in care a lucrat capitanul Staicu, relativ la „curatirea“ personalului, dl Staicu este drastic: „Este imposibil sa faca asa ceva, pentru ca ar trebui sa lichidezi 80-90% din efective, ceea ce nu se face peste noapte, se face in timp“.
Iata ca, pe masura ce trece timpul, capitanul isi pierde prietenii, care uita ca au fost avansati la exceptional datorita lui si incep sa-l marginalizeze. (Dl Sandu, pe care-l consideram… zice: „Mai putin Staicu – de la arme – referitor cu participarea la o sedinta“). Simtind aceasta marginalizare, Staicu, orientat deja spre zona afacerilor (deschisese chiar un gratar impreuna cu un amic de-ai sai, care i-a creat baza economica a „viitorului om de afaceri“, inca din anul 1990), ca orice politist care se respecta s-a apucat de cu totul altceva decit ii lasa dreptul legea, avind in vedere ca inca era functionar public. In virtutea experientei cu negustorii in general pentru ca „Eram anchetator la cercetare penala, in general lucram la dosare economice, de comert. D-aia ma pricep acum la afaceri, ca am invatat de la negustori“.
Si cum militia este „casa negustorilor“, a avut de unde invata.

http://www.gds.ro/print/13885

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/18/episodul-gloante-vidia-sau-uite-si-eu-am-o-mostra-din-martie-aprilie-1991/

from one of my publications, Hall 2006

Craiova: Finally, there is the case of one of the big personalities of the post-Ceausescu era, Dinel Staicu, a one-time soccer club mogul and owner of a kitschy Ceausescu nostalgic restaurant and park/museum.[48] Apparently, he “shot 63 bullets during the events,” but “according to him ‘only 11 to 13 stupid people died”[49]:

“Dinel Staicu moved about in those days unhindered, entering and exiting the prefecture, each time being armed, despite the interrogations to which he had been subject.  It would be interesting to know if the seizure of his weapons was recorded because, if not, it means, he still possesses them [the article dates from 1992].  After he was confined to his home for six days, for carrying an arm during the events, he resumed his mission:  ‘This time I succeeded to infiltrate Mr. Sandu, since he was my boss and bosses must stay at the helm.’  Implicated during this period in the policing of Valea Rosie (a neighborhood that had been raked by gunfire), forced by the former Militia commander, Colonel Langa, to verify to General Rosu [Army], the existence of vidia bullets following his confinement to his home, Dinel Staicu attempted a diversion in order to replace those who had seized power (Nisipeanu, Popa), …Although [technically-speaking] it was still confined to barracks, the Securitate (col. Gheorghe) ‘lent Mr. D. Staicu two TAB vehicles and some men from the Securitate’s USLA platoon (not from the Militia), even though the Securitate had been ordered not to carry arms.  But Mr. Staicu came on behalf of the Front…’

Following the inspection he performed in Valea Rosie, Staicu maintained that there were no terrorists (despite the fact that he himself is an example that contradicts such a denial), his basic training (Commander of Group 2-a USLA) being both for diversion and disinformation.  His opinion is that the Army fired millions of cartridges and that anywhere there was a military unit, the earth filled up with them.  Only that the military unit from Craiovita where there was no firing disputes this (…)[50]

In other words, a member of the USLA denies the existence of vidia bullets and “terrorists”….

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/29/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-iii-a-fistful-of-bullets-unregistered-atyp/

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“Antimafia”–un Armagedon de Craiova, Adevarul, 3 mai 2002

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http://statu.wordpress.com/2010/12/23/aniversare-speciala/

Aniversare specială

Posted by statu pe 23 decembrie 2010

Craiova, decembrie 1989, Infirmeria Regimentului 26 mecanizat „Rovine”, cartierul Valea Roşie. În confuzia creată de Ceauşeşti la Timişoara şi apoi în toată ţara, armata, securitatea şi miliţia se învrăjbiseră între ele. Preţ de câteva zile noi soldaţii eram duşmani cu toţi şi duşmanii tuturor. Lipsiţi de orice pregătire tactică şi fizică, soldaţii trăgeau la cel mai mic semn sau anunţ de „teroriştii ne atacă unitatea”. Câţiva camarazi au pierit din cauza focului deschis de tovarăşii lor pentru că nu au stat la consemn. Alţii au făcut pe Rambo şi i-am găsit după câteva zile cu creierii zburaţi pe caldarâm în oraş, unde ieşiseră să facă ei dreptate. Alţii au căzut loviţi de gloanţe DUM-DUM bine plasate prin cască, deşi stăteau liniştiţi în tranşeele dinspre Parcul Poporului. Pe toţi i-am avut la infirmerie şi i-am dus personal cu targa la morga Spitalului Militar din vecinătate. Pentru un raport venit din partea comandantului de atunci căpitan Constantin Neagoe vezi aici. Pentru un raport al acelor zile vezi şi aici.

Am fost privilegiat că eram sanitar la infirmeria Regimentului şi am fost scutit de săpat tranşee sau de acţiuni de luptă. Am fost privilegiat pentru că aici se deşertau desagii cu istorisiri din misiunile ofiţerilor. Am fost privilegiat pentru că aici se tratau emoţional şi fizic oamenii care se luptau cu necunoscutul şi cu necunoscuţii. Privilegiile nu s-au încheiat în noaptea de Ajun când din pricina focului deschis de camarazii noştri de la Divizie împotriva unor duşmani neidentificaţi ne-a sărit în aer depozitul de carburaţi din vecinătatea infirmeriei. Întrucât în apropiere se afla depozitul de materiale şi depozitul de muniţie, s-a decis evacuarea infirmeriei. În noaptea aceea am stat planton lângă materiale şi m-am rugat ca nicicând altcândva pentru viaţa mea. În eventualitatea morţii, mi se închideau toate perspectivele, nu prea multe şi nu prea senzaţionale oricum, dintre care revederea Corneliei (actuala soţie) era cea mai presantă. Am făcut jurăminte şi m-am lăsat pe mâna lui Dumnezeu.

Noaptea a trecut luminată de exploziile butoaielor cu carburanţi într-un schimb de focuri infernal între noi şi „ceilalţi”, despre care nici acum nu ştim cine sunt. Rachete erau lansate pe cer şi explodau întâlnind obiecte cu muniţie sau aparatura electronică la bord. Ofiţerii (cei care nu se ascunseseră pe sub paturi) îşi urlau comenzile către nişte soldaţi în termen cu priviri absente, care le preluau cu întârziere. Haosul începea de regulă dimineaţa pe la 3 când indivizi necunoscuţi deschideau focul soldaţilor din tranşee, lăsându-ne pe noi să ne luptăm cu umbrele lor. Abia difuzarea execuţiei lui Ceauşescu a oprit acest spectacol suprarealist şi lucrurile au început să reintre în normal.

Între timp „eroii” noştri reuşiseră să distrugă sala de operaţii din secţia de Chirurgie a Spitalului militar, în care au intrat literalmente cu tancul, au perforat blocurile din vecinătate, ne-am făcut inutilizabil parterul celor două blocuri ale cazarmei noastre, ne-am distrus depozitul de carburanţi şi ne-am irosit muniţia. Practic aproape ne-am scos singuri din luptă. Apoi au început să sosească ajutoarele în hrană şi medicamente. Ca singurul care ştiam franceză dintre infirmieri am fost obligat să mă reprofilez pe farmacie şi să pun la punct depozitul de medicamente al unităţii. Am început să mâncăm ceva mai bine. Ni s-a promis reducerea perioadei de stagiu militar. Aşa a fost, astfel încât până la urmă am fost eliberat la 12 luni. Cel mai mare lucru dintre toate era că am rămas în viaţa în ciuda confuziei existente atunci în armată şi ni se deschidea perspective mai bune decât sub dictatura lui Ceauşescu. Cel mai dulce dintre toate era că Dumnezeu îmi aducea la mâna mea pe toţi duşmanii: caporalii care îşi bătuseră joc de mine şi de ceilalţi „pufani” în perioada de instrucţie, caporalul de la Contra-informaţii care se jucase cu mine de-a şoarecele şi pisica, subofiţerii şi ofiţerii care încuviinţaseră un regim de prost tratament asupra soldaţilor din motive religioase. Mai devreme sau mai târziu toţi oamenii au nevoie de medicamente şi de îngrijiri medicale. Trebuie doar să aştepţi suficient.

Craiova, decembrie 2010, cartierul „Ethos” din Romaneşti. Locuiesc de şase luni la câteva sute de metri de poligonul de pregătire fizică şi de unitatea militară unde mi-am satisfăcut întreg stagiul militar. Câte o lună lună pentru fiecare dintre cele două petrecute în stagiu militar. Acum nu mai sunt singur, ci împreună cu Cornelia şi cu cele trei fiice pe care ni le-a dăruit Dumnezeu în cei 18 ani de căsnicie. Ca militar în termen nu mi s-au acordat ieşiri în oraş sau permisii acasă.  Acum am venit în Craiova să predic Evanghelia în oraş şi în Oltenia. Pot considera perioada petrecută acum o răscumpărare a timpului pierdut în 1989-90. Din păcate nu mai pot răscumpăra vieţile pierdute. Dumnezeu are şi un simţ al umorului, dar şi un perfect simţ al dreptăţii. După … 21 de ani. Mai sunt puţine zile şi voi face 40 de ani. Să fie un nou început?

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http://noradamian.wordpress.com/2010/12/21/gloante-lipsa-din-istoria-patriei/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #20 Identifying the Terrorists: Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Ignored Declaration and other Evidence

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 26, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:
The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
[Submitted to CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) 19 November 2009; cleared without changes by PRB 15 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

 

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]


Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/23/a-tale-of-two-letters-by-securitate-director-general-iulian-vlad-what-the-romanian-press-does-and-does-not-publish/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/20/when-a-truth-commission-misses-crucial-evidence-the-romanian-cpadcr-final-report-and-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-declaration/

It is virtually certain that the authors of the Chapter on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (pp. 620-627, especially p. 625 http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf ) had no knowledge of Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Declaration of 29 January 1990 … with predictable negative consequences for their understanding of what happened in December 1989.

And one wonders why I found (find) mainstream Romanian studies so unhelpful in trying to understand Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989?  Read Vladimir Tismaneanu or Tom Gallagher (or in its 2014 variation, see Grigore Pop-Eleches in Bernhard and Kubik) on Romania in the early 1990s and one is presented with a world of good and evil, of angels and demons, with distance from former nomenklaturist and high-ranking communist Ion Iliescu and the core of the National Salvation Front being as being the simple formula for explaining and understanding any event or policy.  As opposed to this highly–one might say blatantly–politically partisan [and bureaucratically ignorant] approach, on the other side stand functional or deconstructionist explanations–the kind favored by Peter Gross, Katherine Verdery, Peter Siani-Davies, or Ruxandra Cesereanu–which would explain the press of the time as the function of market pressures, sensationalist appetites, an anomic readership, poor journalistic training and professionalism, etc.

How then does one explain the following conundrum:  the selective treatment of the letters and declarations of former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad?  Oh, yes, the text of General Vlad’s letters which allege he was a stooge and victim of Ion Iliescu, etc. can be found in the Romanian press.  No problem!  But what about his declaration of 29 January 1990, where he deftly admits the responsibility of his institution for the bloodshed of December?  What, that not sensationalist enough, different enough to sell papers?  That’s not “anti-communist” enough for publication?  Is it somehow less credible than the other letters whose text has been published without problem?  24 plus years later, the Romanian media has yet to publish this document!  Could it be that the problem with this declaration is that it does not fit with and undermines the other popular narratives of December 1989 that minimize and even absolve the former Securitate of responsibility for the bloodshed of December 1989?

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Ion Cristoiu’s Evenimentul Zilei debuted in June 1992 and was the flagship of opposition to the regime of Ion Iliescu.  In the fall of 1992 it ran a zealous campaign opposed to Iliescu’s reelection.  Here is the exculpatory letter from former Securitate General Iulian Vlad (dated 20 March 1990) that was published on 19 September 1992:

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“Generalul IULIAN VLAD se adreseaza dlui Ion Iliescu:  Am fost arestat pe nedrept (20 March 1990),” Evenimentul Zilei, 19 septembrie 1992, p. 3.  “Intr-adevar pe dictatorul Ceausescu l-am tradat” “M-am integrat total Revolutiei” “Sint convins ca datele nu va erau cunoscute”  I.V. Vlad 20 martie 1990

And, yet, what of General Iulian Vlad’s declaration of 29 January 1990.  As far as I know, in 24 plus years, only this brief allusive mention on the 15th anniversary of the letter (although not mentioned or acknowledged in the article, and possibly accidental) has made its way into the Romanian press.  Below it:  the text of the statement of 29 January 1990!

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/text-of-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-29-january-1990-declaration-identifying-the-terrorists/

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Gheorghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/04/declaratia-generalului-ion-hortopan-cum-a-vazut-armata-colaborarea-generalului-iulian-vlad/

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Declaratia generalului colonel I. Hortopan, 16.02.1990 (din cate cunosc, pana publicarea cartii lui Dan Ioan, timp de 22 de ani, aceasta declaratie n-a aparut in presa romana)

“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta — in scopul de ne induce in eroare — a raspuns ca manifestantii patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra.  In timpul actiunii, trupele noastre au prins un numar de teroristi care faceau din unitatile de Securitate, au cerut cuvantul si au prezentat numarul unitatilor din care faceau parte (UM-0672F, UM-0639, UM-0106, UM-0620), la care Vlad, tot pentru inducere in eroare, a afirmat ca acestia s-ar putea sa fie fanatici, care, chipurile, ar actiona pe cont propriu.”

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/ 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/14/planul-z-z-ion-mihai-pacepa-si-liviu-turcu-in-decembrie-1989/

I have attempted to trace Pacepa’s public discussion of Plan Z-Z to verify claims made by other actors (see below, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Giani Bucurescu/Virgil Lovescu) in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  All of these actors refer to Pacepa’s discussion on Radio Free Europe/Radio Europa Libera sometime apparently between 24 and 26 December 1989.  Unfortunately, although there are a series of audio clips and transcripts from these days on the Europa Libera site http://www.europalibera.org/archive/1989/latest/452/982.html, there is no mention of the Pacepa intervention in question and no indication of record of its existence on the Internet.

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6 februarie 1990

Declaratie.  Subsemnatul Bucurescu Giani, general-maior [D.S.S.]

La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…

Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L.  Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.

Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi.  Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…

Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…

Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/28/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-vi/

We have two different accounts from Gheorghe Diaconescu, which roughly match:

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VI_continut.pdf

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This also seems to confirm the following (when adjusted for the corrected dates):

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch.  This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’  I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people.  And I was told:  Only you and two other people know this.  I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]

[95] Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990.  I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.

But it almost doesn’t matter when Pacepa first discussed this…because almost identical details were disclosed by Liviu Turcu, a DIE officer who had defected earlier in 1989 (thereby being far more knowledgeable of current plans/realities inside the Romanian security state), only without reference to a named plan, such as Plan Z-Z.  It was thus Turcu on 23 December 1989 (within 24 hours of the outbreak of terrorist hostilities in Romania; the interview would have taken place on Saturday the 23rd) who first informed Western media of the existence of such a plan–although it appears Turcu’s disclosures were never relayed by Romanian media or by Radio Europa Libera.

Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces

The Washington Post
December 24, 1989 | Dan Morgan

The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.

Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.

The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.

The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.

The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.

The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.

As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5″ in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.

Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.

Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.

The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.

Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.

In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.

Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.

For verification of some of Turcu’s claims (in particular, the less-discussed participation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, see here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/)

“They dress in black berets and black jumpsuits [combinezoane negre, salopete negre] with red silk stripes on their sleeves.  They carry small two-way radios and speak into them in coded language.  They are equipped with automatic rifles with infrared nightscopes for sniping.”

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h-27121989-01min55s/

Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…

Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala
improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba
poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in
rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale
poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind
asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta
Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care
nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi
sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca
tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.

(capitanul Romanescu Marian, cu Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si
‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, 8-9)

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(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLAC erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

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Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 18, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Romanian journalists and researchers, but perhaps in particular Timisoara journalists and researchers, have failed to systematically analyze the use of atypical munitions–most notably, exploding DUM-DUM bullets–in the wounding and killing of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989.  They invoke, for example, the claims of military prosecutors such as General Dan Voinea (http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/11/nici-simulatoare-de-tragere-nici.html), who outright denies their use, or General Romeo Balan ( https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/), who conveniently avoid mention of the type of bullets with which Timisoara demonstrators were wounded or killed. 

However, they suddenly are willing to countenance their use where demonstrators maintain they were shot by the Army.  But they fail to ask the critical question of what forces were present among those involved in firing on demonstrators and what evidence exists that the institution in question had access to and possessed such munitions?  The evidence is pretty clear:  even where demonstrators zealously maintain they were shot “by the Army,” Securitate forces were also present, and whereas there are multiple indications that the Securitate possessed and used such ammunition, there exists NOT a SINGLE piece of evidence that the Army did.  Until those who maintain this point of view can marshal evidence demonstrating that the Army possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets, logically one can only assume that it was the Securitate who possessed and used these vicious munitions.  To illustrate this, let us look at the tragedy at Podul Decebal in Timisoara on 17 December 1989.

(Dan Gavra has no doubt:  his foot was blown off by a double-explosion bullet, a DUM-DUM bullet.  Indeed, in this interview with Radio Timisoara Vocea Evangheliei, from approximately min. 20:45 he explains exactly why)

We know that at least four people and probably more were wounded or killed with exploding DUM-DUM bullets at Podul Decebal on 17 December 1989, including Ţînţaru Teodor Octavian (http://asociatia17decembrie1989timisoara.wordpress.com/in-memoriam/ “Octavian suferise o operaţie laborioasă condusă de Dr. Lazăr Fulger. Din cauza gloanţelor explozive i-au fost distruse un rinichi, jumătate din ficat şi artera femurală. Nu a supravieţuit pentru că nu erau rezerve de sânge pentru transfuzie.”) and  Banciu Leontina  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-4/masacrul-de-la-pod-i Pe certificatul medical de constatate a decesului soţiei scrie: plagă împuşcată torace, glonţ exploziv. Deci a explodat în inimă glonţul, iar Procuratura Militară, după declaraţiile care au fost, care le-am dat eu, mi-a dat alt certificat care zice că a fost în coloana de manifestanţi de la Podul Decebal din Timişoara şi a fost împuşcată în seara din 17 Decembrie.”)

Gavra continued:

D.G.: – Am rămas în picioare. Când am vrut să fug, a început, din nou, rafala. Iar am rămas în picioare. Iar s-a oprit. Şi atunci am vrut să fug. Şi-atunci a venit un cartuş, deci am luat-o spre stânga, direct din faţă a venit… deci eu am fost în mijloc, chiar în mijlocul şoselei. Când am vrut să fac stânga, a venit un cartuş şi m-a lovit în picior. Şi am zburat vreo doi, trei metri în aer. Am căzut pe marginea, pe pământ acolo, într-o baltă, într-o urmă de TAB, cred că acolo întorsese TAB-ul sau cine ştie, că eram parcă într-un tranşeu. Aşa am simţit, când am căzut jos, încă o rafală razantă cu pământul. Doar atât am apucat, să-mi pun mâinile după cap. Şi, când am vrut să mă ridic de acolo, din noroi – spun de noroi, pentru că am văzut că tot eram plin de noroi – nu mai reuşeam să-mi ridic piciorul. Piciorul meu parcă era bătut cu un ţăruş în pământ. Piciorul meu a dispărut de la genunchi şi până la talpă, pe o distanţă de douăzeci şi ceva de centimetri. A dispărut tibia, peroneul, tot. Au tras cu cartuşe cu dublă explozie.  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-5/masacrul-de-la-pod-ii 

Gavra has detailed whom he believes was involved in his wounding (and the death of his girlfriend at the time, 21 year old Ewinger Slobodanca) in the following interview.  His focus is on Army personnel who opened fire, commanded by Major Gheorghe Badea:

„Plutonul de execuţie era de la unitatea unde am făcut eu armata”

D.G.: – La Podul Decebal era un pluton de execuţie, o unitate militară… ironia sorţii, chiar cu câtva timp înainte fusesem concentrat la unitatea aceea militară.
L.K.: – Care unitate ?
D.G.: – 01185 de pe Chişodei. Era sub comanda maiorului Badea Gheorghe acel pluton. Ne-am apropiat de ei şi strigam: „Nu vă impacientaţi! Fără violenţă!”. Diferite lucruri. Şi ne-am apropiat la vreo 30 de metri de ei. Fără somaţie, fără nimic, s-a tras în plin în noi.

L.K.: – Până unde aţi ajuns? Până la colţ cu…
D.G.: – La vreo 30 de metri… Ei erau dispuşi în felul următor: un rând în genunchi, un rând în picioare. Între Parc şi Bega. Pe şoseaua aceea. La o distanţă de vreo cinci, zece metri de pod. Noi ne-am apropiat de ei, am zis 30 de metri, dar poate mai aproape, pentru că-i vedeam şi puteam să avem un dialog. De fapt, numai noi strigam: „Fără violenţă!”.

L.K.: – Erau luminile încă?
D.G.: – Nu. Nu erau. Şi s-a tras în plin în noi.
L.K.: – Aţi fost somaţi?
D.G.: – Nu, eu atâta mi s-a părut, că cel din dreapta plutonului fuma şi, când a aruncat ţigara, a început şi focul, dar poate-i doar închipuirea mea, n-a fost nicio somaţie, nici…

L.K: – Aţi văzut nişte siluete, practic? Un TAB aţi văzut? Erau în dispozitiv?

G.D.: – Nu. Erau… deci am spus că a fost o grupă. Vreo patru de tragere în genunchi şi vreo şase, şapte în picioare. Unii spun că au fost mai mulţi, dar eu cam aşa îmi aduc aminte. Pentru că eram chiar în faţă, am rămas, la un moment dat, toţi au fugit, au căzut, au murit, au fost răniţi. Eu am rămas în picioare, pentru că m-am şocat. Nu-mi venea să cred că se întâmplă. Patru bucăţi mi-au trecut, mi-au şuierat pe la urechea dreaptă. Am vrut să mă pun şi eu jos, au bătut în piatră cartuşele. Realmente nu mai ştiam ce să fac! Mă gândeam: acuma o să mor. Şi, când am simţit o ezitare între rafale, pentru că a fost o rafală… Eu am rămas şocat. S-a oprit.

„Am zburat vreo trei metri şi am căzut într-o baltă”

D.G.: – Am rămas în picioare. Când am vrut să fug, a început, din nou, rafala. Iar am rămas în picioare. Iar s-a oprit. Şi atunci am vrut să fug. Şi-atunci a venit un cartuş, deci am luat-o spre stânga, direct din faţă a venit… deci eu am fost în mijloc, chiar în mijlocul şoselei. Când am vrut să fac stânga, a venit un cartuş şi m-a lovit în picior. Şi am zburat vreo doi, trei metri în aer. Am căzut pe marginea, pe pământ acolo, într-o baltă, într-o urmă de TAB, cred că acolo întorsese TAB-ul sau cine ştie, că eram parcă într-un tranşeu. Aşa am simţit, când am căzut jos, încă o rafală razantă cu pământul. Doar atât am apucat, să-mi pun mâinile după cap. Şi, când am vrut să mă ridic de acolo, din noroi – spun de noroi, pentru că am văzut că tot eram plin de noroi – nu mai reuşeam să-mi ridic piciorul. Piciorul meu parcă era bătut cu un ţăruş în pământ. Piciorul meu a dispărut de la genunchi şi până la talpă, pe o distanţă de douăzeci şi ceva de centimetri. A dispărut tibia, peroneul, tot. Au tras cu cartuşe cu dublă explozie.

D.G: – Doar praf în ochi. Pentru că nu doar ei au fost cei arestaţi. Pentru că maiorul Badea Gheorghe, cel care a tras în noi, ulterior, din ordin prezidenţial al tovarăşului Ion Iliescu, a fost avansat de la gradul de maior sau ce-o fost la gradul de locotenent-colonel.

 http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-5/masacrul-de-la-pod-ii 

Even more convinced that he was shot by a DUM-DUM bullet shot by the Army is Adrian Kali.  Significantly, Kali talks about being shot by two distinct bullets, one a normal munition and one a DUM-DUM bullet, demonstrating that doctors and others involved in these events were able to distinguish between different types of munitions used.

Rănit în Revoluţie, cu gloanţe adevărate

Deşi este proprietarul celei mai numeroase armate paşnice din România, Adrian Kali a fost împuşcat de două ori. Întâi cu un glonte exploziv, aşa-numitele dum-dum, apoi cu un glonte de 7,62. Asta s-a întâmplat în timpul Revoluţiei din 1989, în 17 decembrie, pe Podul Decebal.

http://blog.kali.hi2.ro/

BUT DOES THE CONVICTION OR FOCUS OF THESE PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WERE “SHOT WITH DUM-DUM BULLETS FIRED BY THE ARMY” HOLD UPON FURTHER ANALYSIS.  DO THEY ACTUALLY KNOW THE MAKE-UP OF THE UNITS THAT FIRED AT THEM?  THE ANSWER IS NO:  BECAUSE THESE UNITS WERE MADE UP NOT ONLY OF ARMY PERSONNEL BUT…ALSO OF SECURITATE PERSONNEL AS WE LEARN FROM NICOLAE DURBAC BELOW:

(Anexa 3)

“ COMISIA GUVERNAMENTALĂ

JUDEŢUL TIMIŞ

REFERAT

(luna mai 1990)

Din datele culese până în prezent de Comisia Guvernamentală, instituită la nivelul judeţului Timiş, a reieşit că în zona podului Decebal, din Timişoara, în seara zilei de 17. 12 1989, s-a deschis foc împotriva demonstranţilor şi au rezultat mai mulţi morţi şi răniţi. În urma verificărilor făcute, s-au stabilit următoarele :

Din cadrul M.U., (Divizia 18 Mecanizată Timişoara, n.a.), în după amiaza zilei de 17.12 1989, în zona podului Decebal s-au dispus, în cordoane, militari de la U.M. 01185, de la U.M. 01008, ambele din Timişoara. În zonă erau dis-puşi, de asemenea, şi militari de la Brigada de securitate Timişoara.

Aceste forţe au avut misiunea de a împiedica acce-sul demonstranţilor spre Comitetul judeţean al P.C.R. Timiş. În jurul orelor 19.30-20.00, cordonul de militari, dispus în partea dreaptă a podului, a deschis focul de armă împotriva unei coloane de demonstranţi care se deplasa pe strada Splaiul Galaţi, dinspre Complexul studenţesc spre podul De-cebal.

Din audierile militarilor aflaţi în zonă, rezultă că dis-pozitivul care a deschis focul de armă era format din militari de la U.M. 01185 Timişoara, sub comanda căpitanului Ba-dea Gheorghe şi din militarii de la Brigada de securitate, sub comanda locotentului major Zepa Anbrozie. Acest aspect rezultă din declaraţiile locotenent-colonelului Andrei Ilie, ale maiorului Dragomir Marin, ambii din cadrul U.M. 01008 Timi-şoara, ale maiorului Ghibea Dorel, din U.M. 01115 Timi-şoara şi ale căpitanului Lăzăroiu Ioan de la U.M. 01024 Timişoara, filele 30-33 şi 3-12. Din declaraţiile locotenentului major Zepa Anbrozie şi ale soldaţilor Brâncoveanu Gheor-ghe şi Ţibocu Iulian, toţi din cadrul Brigăzii de securitate, reiese că ordinul de a se deschide foc spre demonstranţi a fost dat de căpitanul Badea Gheorghe.

Fiind audiat căpitanul Badea Gheorghe şi alte cadre de la U.M. 01185 Timişoara, rezultă că au deschis numai foc de avertisment, în plan vertical, însă, la faţa locului, s-au înregistrat morţi şi răniţi. Totodată, acesta susţine că s-a deschis focul din altă direcţie, aspect care este infirmat de declaraţiile date de maiorul Dima Viorel, din aceeaşi unitate, fila 28, de căpitanul Lăzăroiu Ioan, de la divizie, de căpitanul Ghibea Dorel, de la U.M. 01115, filele 3-12, precum şi de declaraţia numitului Bindeleu Gelu, persoană prezentă în rândul demonstranţilor, fila 1-2.

Faţă de cele mai sus, Comisia Guvernamentală pro-pune cercetarea penală, de către Procuratura Militară Timi-şoara, a căpitanului Badea Gheorghe.

Semnează şi ştampilează membrii comisiei “

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/cada/duracn/docs/docs_3.htm

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/27/orasul-martir-timisoara/

for “Orasul martir Bucuresti” see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/26/doru-teodor-maries-despre-decembrie-1989/

a few observations on “Orasul martir Timisoara” http://www.tvrplus.ro/editie-memorial-90-267738

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25:35 Ioan Bânciu begins discussing of his experience, and the death of his wife Leontina

26:33 An interesting admission others have made too:  despite the well-known and well-deserved reputation of the Ceausescu regime for its repression, Bânciu claims that no one could believe when regime forces, including the Army, opened fire with real bullets, that they were generally surprised and that rumors had circulated according to which the Army did not have real bullets (my note: thus a situation where positive misinformation actually emboldened demonstrators and gave them optimism and hope beyond what they realistically would have had).

29:09 Soldiers allow them to proceed by the Cathedral, the cry “God exists!” rang out.

30:25 Bânciu talks about the area near the river/canal Bega where there were no houses, no institutions

31:03 Toward Decebal Bridge, all lights are off

31:34 Soldiers open fire without giving a warning.

32:30-33:05 An important discussion in which Bânciu says they were shot by hidden regime forces, not just soldiers but also probably of the “Securitate-police type”

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/07/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-alte-marturii-v-procurorul-romeo-balan-10-cazuri/

Bânciu Leontina

Raportul medico-legal nr. 982/A din 18.12.1989 a fost întocmit pentru cadavrul neidentificat de sex feminin, cu numărul de ordine 10. Ca semn de violenţă este consemnată o plagă orificială anfractuoasă cu marginile de 2/2 cm, orificiu de intrare pe faţa posterioară a hemitoracelui stâng în 1/2 inferioară, fără a se putea decela orificiul de ieşire. S-a concluzionat că moartea violentă s-a datorat hemoragiei interne şi externe consecutivă leziunii de organe interne, prin proiectil de armă de foc, tragerea fiind efectuată de la distanţă dinapoi înainte. În baza portretului vorbit, consemnat în raport, a obiectelor de îmbrăcăminte şi a leziunii de violenţă prin împuşcare, victima Bânciu Leontina a fost identificată de soţul ei. Acesta a fost martor ocular al împuşcării soţiei sale la Podul Decebal din Timişoara în seara zilei de 17 decembrie 1989, şi a putut da relaţii cu privire la faptul că soţia sa a fost împuşcată, în spate. Personal a transportat-o la Spitalul Judeţean Timiş. Bânciu Ioan a relatat:

Văzând că începe să se tragă, noi, eu cu soţia am intenţionat să ne salvăm şi să fugim spre gardul Parcului Tineretului. În acel moment, soţia mea a fost împuşcată în spate, mai sus de coapsa stângă. Am luat măsuri şi am transportat-o pe soţia mea cu un autoturism proprietate personală la Spitalul Judeţean, unde când am ajuns un medic mi-a spus că soţia a decedat. Am lăsat-o pe soţia mea decedată la spital şi apoi am plecat acasă la copii. A doua zi, când am revenit nu am mai fost lăsat nici să intru în spital şi nici să văd cadavrul soţiei. De atunci până în prezent nu am mai văzut cadavrul soţiei şi acesta nu mi-a fost eliberat.[10]

Pentru cadavrul neidentificat de sex feminin, cu numărul de ordine 42 a fost întocmit raportul medico-legal nr. 1014/A din 18.12.1989. Sunt prezentate leziunile de violenţă, respectiv frontal în stâng orificiu rotund pergamentat de circa 7 mm (orificiu intrare) şi plagă occipitală cu multiple eschile şi hernie de substanţă cerebrală (orificiu ieşire). S-a concluzionat că moartea s-a datorat unei plăgi împuşcate craniene. Plecând de la descrierea fizică şi a obiectelor de îmbrăcăminte precum şi a leziunilor de violenţă descrise de martorii oculari, Radu Daniela-Oxana a identificat cadavrul sorei sale Sava Angela-Elena. Aceasta a fost împuşcată mortal în aceleaşi împrejurări ca şi surorile Caceu, în seara de 17 decembrie 1989, în apropierea Catedralei.

https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/

We know that at least four people and probably more were wounded or killed with exploding DUM-DUM bullets at Podul Decebal on 17 December 1989, including Ţînţaru Teodor Octavian (http://asociatia17decembrie1989timisoara.wordpress.com/in-memoriam/ “Octavian suferise o operaţie laborioasă condusă de Dr. Lazăr Fulger. Din cauza gloanţelor explozive i-au fost distruse un rinichi, jumătate din ficat şi artera femurală. Nu a supravieţuit pentru că nu erau rezerve de sânge pentru transfuzie.”) and  Banciu Leontina  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-4/masacrul-de-la-pod-i 

“Pe certificatul medical de constatate a decesului soţiei scrie: plagă împuşcată torace, glonţ exploziv. Deci a explodat în inimă glonţul, iar Procuratura Militară, după declaraţiile care au fost, care le-am dat eu, mi-a dat alt certificat care zice că a fost în coloana de manifestanţi de la Podul Decebal din Timişoara şi a fost împuşcată în seara din 17 Decembrie.”)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/04/13/25-for-2014-25-things-you-should-know-about-the-romanian-revolution-on-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-fall-of-nicolae-ceausescus-communist-regime-5-timisoara-podul-decebal-evidence-suggests/

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Miriana Mişcov

13. Mişcov Miriana, 15 ani, elev, plagă membru inferior, 17.12.89, împuşcată în Calea Girocului;

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-3/copiii-si-revolutia

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Maria(na) Mişcov recounts the tragic death of her daughter, Miriana (above), between approximately 14:50 and 22:05.  From 16:08 or so she talks about these military men definitely not being draftees because they were older, they had military vests, but no epaulets, and satchels or bags.

These “mystery men” are analyzed in the following posts, for example:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/20/procesul-de-la-timisoara-viii-cine-au-fost-cei-necunoscuti-mai-in-varsta-care-au-tras-inainte-de-22-decembrie-1989/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/21/procesul-de-la-timisoara-ix-cine-au-fost-cei-necunoscuti-mai-in-varsta-care-au-tras-inainte-de-22-decembrie-1989-2/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

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For example, in a 7 September 1995 interview, Dorina Aparaschivei told Marius Mioc about how her husband, Valentin Aparaschivei, was shot to death on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara ( “A luminat cu o lanterna si apoi a tras” http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT04~1.HTM ).  Among the details, she notes, “Cind militarii au ajuns in fata blocului unul dintre ei, mai batrin si cu mustata, a luminat cu o lanterna puternica si apoi a tras mai multe focuri spre noi. Sotul a fost impuscat in piept si a cazut pe spate.”

Thanks to the publication of Dosarele Revolutiei de la Timisoara, we can now confirm that was reported in the media in July 2008 is indeed the actual quote of Dumitru Marcu, commander of U.M. 01380 Arad, as recorded in his report dated 4 January 1990.  In this report, Marcu spoke of unidentified personnel infiltrated among the personnel of his military unit who used powerful flashlights (lanterns/lamps), and he suggests that these may have been Securitate/Militie personnel.

IMG_3084

Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

http://www.mediafax.ro/social/jurnalul-de-lupta-al-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-desecretizat-galerie-foto-2767638

Comandantul unitatii militare din Arad, martor al evenimentelor, a raportat ca “printre militarii care au actionat pe Calea Girocului s-au strecurat si persoane necunoscute, in uniforma, care aveau lanterne foarte puternice cu care luminau balcoanele blocurilor din apropiere, dupa care trageau asupra lor”.

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-3506099-jurnalul-revolutiei-timisoara-fost-desecretizat-securitatea-tras-manifestanti.htm

Internet posters claiming to have been in the military and on the streets of Timisoara in December 1989 have discussed the appearance of personnel in military uniforms who very clearly were not from the military (my thanks to Corneliu N. Vaida for bringing the following to my attention):

zainea

Am fost la Timisoara militar in termen in 89. In fata noastra la un moment dat a fost dizlocat un pluton cu militari in tinuta kaki, mai in varsta ca noi, la 30-35 de ani si care nu aveau petlite si nici insemne de arma. Ii intrebam de vorba si nu ne raspundeau ne ignorau… Au tras orizontal rafale de pistol automat… Noi pana atunci am tras in plan vertical. Cine erau acei “militari”?
Noi toti am banuit ca erau ofiteri din trupele de securitate imbracati in postav kaki nou de la stoc care mirosea a naftalina.
Dupa aceea toata revolutia am petrecut-o pe un bloc in fata unei mitraliere si cu un camarad cu care ma scimbam periodic. Am ramas de atunci bolnav cu “mijlocul” din cauza frigului pe care l-am suportat atunci pe acel nenorocit de bloc.
Dumnezeu sa-i ierte pe toti eroii revolutiei din 1989…

http://www.ligamilitarilor.ro/eroii-neamului/recunostinta-eroilor-revolutiei-din-%E2%80%9989-timisoara/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

So then the question becomes one of who would have possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets in Timisoara on 17 December 1989.  For one thing, we can almost automatically eliminate two hypotheses:  Peter Siani-Davies hypothesis used to cast doubt on the use of atypical munitions after 22 December 1989–i.e. that the revolutionaries/civilians could have themselves taken possession of the munitions and weapons of regime forces and used them–since it is clear from the events at Podul Decebal that the only ones who fired were from the regime forces.  Secondly, as part 1 of this series demonstrated, the Securitate themselves in their declarations immediately after the events denied the presence and involvement in the demonstrations of foreign agents, most notably the so-called “Soviet/Russian tourists.”

So what is the evidence that the Army would have possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara?  The answer is essentially NONE.  In more than two decades, not a single Army officer or even draftee has come forward and alleged/admitted that a) the Army had them, b) that those munitions were distributed to them, and c) that they fired them against demonstrators.  This is in stark contrast to the case of the Securitate, where we have demonstrators overhearing the Army complaining about being left out to dry so-to-speak by the Securitate who was using these munitions (see below).  But moreoever, we have the claims of former Securitate whistleblowers, multiple cases, admitting that they had these munitions and used them.  Any logical, evidentiary based analysis of December 1989 then can only conclude that it was the Securitate who had and used these munitions.

 

The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off> (my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0291

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

IMG_0290

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

Stoica Mircea, 40 ani, topometrist, Bd. Republicii, impuscat mina si picior http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT06~1.HTM

197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat.  În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0307pciv.htm

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

IMG_0330

intreaga declaratie e aici:

imaginea 330
imaginea 331
imaginea 332
imaginea 333
imaginea 334
imaginea 335
imaginea 336

It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici:  both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!

image0

Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,

comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoart–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

from Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

for Part I see PART I: His Name Was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias

for Part II see Part II: A Revolution, A Coup d\’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

for Part III see Part III: Lost…during Investigation

for Part IV see Part IV: The Good Sergeant Schultz or They Know Nothing

for Part V see Part V: Seeing is Believing Videos One and Two

for Part VI see Part VI: Seeing is Believing, Videos 3 and 4

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.  [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Those Who Have Told Us the Truth[1]

As opposed to the aforementioned Vladimir Belis, Pavel Corut, and Dan Voinea, all of whom who have strenuously and repeatedly denied the existence and use in December 1989 of atypical munitions of dum-dum bullets and vidia bullets, there exist those who have told us of the existence and use of these in December 1989.[2] They are essentially, for lack of a better term, former Securitate whistleblowers, who have admitted the Securitate’s role in providing the “terrorists” who caused so much destruction, mayhem, and loss of life in those days.

For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).

Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989.  What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding [dum-dum] bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridgeswhich upon hitting their targets caused new explosions” [emphasis added]—in other words, exploding or dum-dum bullets.[3]

The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:

I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89.  In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched.  Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition.  In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances.  I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets.  In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox.  We had been drugged.  We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us.  Don’t publish my name.  I fear for me and my parents.  When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’  The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize.  I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’.[4] [emphases added]

Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention:  the former Securitate.  That is not accidental.[5]

for full discussion of those who told us the truth (i.e. continuation of above), see discussion here:

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

 

from Orwellian Positively Orwellian Part III a fistful of bullets

Bucharest: Stanculescu’s unexpected revelation prompted a participant in the Revolution to challenge Stanculescu’s claim to ignorance as to the source of the bullets.  Ironically, while this challenge suggests Stanculescu may have being playing coy and not telling everything he knew, it does not contradict Stanculescu’s claim that the ammunition was not the Army’s, but rather buttresses it:

Balasa Gheorghe:  I am very intrigued by the interview given by General Stanculescu to the newspaper ‘Tineretul Liber,’ an interview in which he avoids the truth.

 

From [Securitate] Directorate V-a, from the weapons depot, on 23-24 December 1989, DUM-DUM cartridges, special cartridges that did not fit any arm in the arsenal of the Defense Ministry were retrieved.  Three or four boxes with these kinds of cartridges were found.  The special bullets were 5-6 cm. in length and less thick than a pencil.  Such a cartridge had a white stone tip that was transparent.  All of these cartridges I personally presented to be filmed by Mr. Spiru Zeres.  All the special cartridges, other than the DUM-DUM [ones] were of West German [FRG] make. From Directorate V-a we brought these to the former CC building, and on 23-24 December ’89 they were surrendered to U.M. 01305.  Captain Dr. Panait, who told us that he had never seen such ammunition before, Major Puiu and Captain Visinescu know about [what was turned over].

 

In the former CC of the PCR, all of those shot on the night of 23-24 December ’89 were shot with special bullets.  It is absurd to search for the bullet in a corpse that can penetrate a wall….[44]

image-8image-7

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…

“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:

armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:

–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;

–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;

–statii de emisie-receptie;

–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;

–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;

–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;

–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;

–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;

–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;

–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.

–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.

“S-AU GASIT LAZI INTREGI, CONTININD DE LA GLOANTE SPECIALE, PINA LA GLOANTE DE VINATOARE”

Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):

“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:

–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;

–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;

–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;

–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;

–dozimetre, contoare Geiger, osciloscoape multispot, truse electronice de depanare, calculatoare, aparatura foto;

–truse chimice de teren;

–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);

–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;

–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;

codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;

–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;

–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;

–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;

–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;

–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;

–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:

–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….

Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.

Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.

[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62

According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].

In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania).  Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 17, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  No researcher has previously attempted to track and aggregate the discussion of atypical ammunition, to include exploding dum-dum bullets, that were used in the maiming and killing of demonstrators in Romania in December 1989.  Here we talk about their use prior to the flight from power of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu at 12:09 on 22 December 1989.  Romanian prosecutors, mostly notably former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea, have refused to acknowledge the existence and use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989–and yet the documents of the military procuracy itself contradict them.  (Voinea’s “findings” are invoked as the basis for the chapter about December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Commission Final Report).  Below, evidence from the testimonies of demonstrators, next of kin, and doctors in Timisoara.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film may have to be rewound to its beginning.)  The sequence beginning at 50:20 has doctors/medical staff talking about the destruction of internal organs among the wounded brought to the hospital and at 51:02-51:06 the doctor mentions the use of “explosive bullets.” (Scroll down for testimonies by doctors and medical staff about the use of explosive bullets by the repressive forces.)

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

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This post has four sections, as follows:

1) The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

2) 7 Declarations and/or courtroom testimony about demonstrators injured or killed by dum-dum bullets:  Doina Gherasim, Cristian Rusu, Robert Buzatu, M. Csikos, Dobosan, Florin Nicoara, and Doru Sciadei.

3) 10 other testimonies from Victims or Relatives of Victims of Dum-Dum Bullets on 17-18 December 1989:  Valentin Aparashivei, Ioan Musca, Danut Gavra, Octavian Tintaru, Adrian Kali, Mariana Rodica Farcau, Leontina Banciu, Vasile Avram, Marius Ciopec, and Florica Sava.

4) 6 Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…:  Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, Rodica Novac, Dr. Fluture, Csaba Ungor, Goga Andras.

After reading these four sections, it should be pretty clear that anyone who denies the use of exploding dum-dum bullets in Timisoara is either uninformed, lying, or so in denial that they cannot bring themselves to admit reality.  This many people are simply not wrong…

————————————————————————————————————-

1) The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off> (my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0291

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

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Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

Stoica Mircea, 40 ani, topometrist, Bd. Republicii, impuscat mina si picior http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT06~1.HTM

197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat.  În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0307pciv.htm

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

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intreaga declaratie e aici:

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It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici:  both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!

———————————————————————————————————————————

2) Declarations and/or courtroom testimony about demonstrators injured or killed by dum-dum bullets:  Doina Gherasim, Cristian Rusu, Robert Buzatu, M. Csikos, Dobosan, Florin Nicoara, Doru Sciadei, and Valentin Aparaschivei.

Doina Gherasim

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Cristian Rusu:  Pe 8 ianuarie audiat de procuror:  …A venit o masina Dacia 1300 combi, culoare glabui, au coborat trei indivizi in civil, care au mers in spatele cordonului si au ordonat foc.  S-a tras cu gloante “dum-dum.”

Robert Buzatu “a fost lovit de un glont exploziv”

IMG_0045

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Csikos [?] “Cred dupa rana [?]  ca au fost gloante dum-dum”

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Dobosan “am fost ranit…cu gloante dum-dum”

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Florin Nicoara “Am fost lovit in soldul drept cu un glont dum-dum”

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Griga “civilii au fost impuscati cu gloante plate [?], care asa cum spuneau medicii cu rupt tesuturile”

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Doru Sciadei’s statement, 27 January 1990

IMG_0932

“In urma radiografiei facute la Spitalul Judetean au spus ca am 2 schije in picior…consemnat de medicul radiolog si chirurg, care m-au consultat.

Convingerea mea este ca in acest atac (pe ?) Calea Girocului, asupra unor oameni pasnici si (?) s-au folosit cel putin doua tipuri de gloante, convingerea intirita de glontul scos din coapsa (?) si schijele din piciorul meu, care cred ca provin de un glonte exploziv.

…Se trage sistematic si concomitent cu tragerea de lumina de catre unul din ei cu o lanterna.”

IMG_0929

3) Other testimonies from Victims or Relatives of Victims of Dum-Dum Bullets on 17-18 December 1989:  Valentin Aparashivei, Ioan Musca, Danut Gavra, Octavian Tintaru, Adrian Kali, Mariana Rodica Farcau, Leontina Banciu, Vasile Avram, Marius Ciopec, and Florica Sava.

Followed by 6 Medical Personnel Who Treated the Victims Attest to the Use of Dum-Dum Bullets

Cases available on the Internet mentioning the wounding or killing of demonstrators with dum-dum explosive bullets on 17-18 December 1989.  There are more than a dozen in all, many of whom we have seen were testified about during the Timisoara trials.

Doru Sciadei’s recollections are similar to those of Dorina Aparaschivei, whose husband, Valentin, was shot at the same location on Calea Girocului in Timisoara on 17 December 1989:

http://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/decembrie-89-manifestantii-ucisi-s-au-refugiat-casa-scarilor-1_50ad7b6a7c42d5a66395fbe7/index.html

Pe 17 decembrie 1989, duminică seara, toată Calea Girocului a fost cuprinsă de febra revoltei. Mii de locuitori au ieşit pe stradă să îşi arate nemulţumirea faţă de sistem. Pe fondul izbucnirii conflictelor între manifestanţi şi soldaţi, s-a format un grup de 40 de militari sub comanda lt.col. Constantin Caraivan, care aveau misiunea de a restabili ordinea. „În jurul orei 23, când au început să tragă, am decis să ne retragem spre casă. Am fost şi noi la baricade. Soţul meu spunea că se trage cu gloanţe de cauciuc, voia să mă liniştească”, a spus Dorina Aparaschivei.

Ca în filmele de acţiune

Cordoanele de militari înaintau pe de o parte şi de alta a trotuarului, iar în mijloc se deplasa un tanc. „Noi ne-am băgat în scara de bloc unde erau peste 20 de persoane. Valentin era de mână cu cei doi copii, care aveau 12 şi 15 ani. La un moment dat am văzut o lumină puternică, moment în care au început să tragă”, a mai adăugat femeia. Au fost cinci gloanţe trimise către casa scării, iar unul dintre ele a trecut prin geam şi l-a nimerit în piept pe Valentin Aparaschivei. În acel moment, un bătrân a ieşit în genunchi şi a strigat „Măi militarilor, de ce aţi împuşcat un om nevinovat?”. I s-a răspuns: „Bagă capul că te împuşc şi pe tine!”.

Salvarea a sosit în scurt timp, însă medicii nu au putut să mai facă nimic. Avea o gaură mare în piept, cât o gură de pahar. Se spunea că erau gloanţe explozibile. L-am dus în casă cu pătura şi l-am pregătit pentru înmormântare. A doua zi au venit patru oameni în albastru, cu un sicriu şi l-au luat”, a mai povestit Dorina Aparaschivei. [my emphasis inserted in this sentence]

Criminali cu lanterne

În aceea seară şi în noaptea care a urmat, în zonă au acţionat pe lângă militari persoane necunoscute, care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice. Îndreptau fasciculul luminos către balcoane şi scări, după care trăgeau. Au acţionat de asemenea, şi securişti şi miliţieni în civil. Pe toată Calea Girocului, de la intersecţia cu strada Albac până la intersecţia cu Liviu Rebreanu au fost 11 victime prin împuşcare şi 26 de răniţi.

from Adevarul http://www.adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/DECEMBRIE_-89-_Si-a_pierdut_iubita_si_piciorul_stang_0_173982752.html author Stefan Both

Danut Gavra with his two daughters in the Heroes’ Cemetery in December 2009

Irish Television (RTE) captured what were apparently the last hours of Florica Sava’s  tragic end.  Warning:  the scene from 11:00 to 11:30 is graphic and unsettling.

posted by mikenork

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3A6IiaOWhs

Brendan O’Brien (reporter):  “Florica Sava, a 33 year old mother of two young sons, was shot from a car with a dum-dum bullet.  It caused massive internal injuries.  Doctors said she had just hours to live.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/lets-go-to-the-videotape-i-to-the-army-its-confirmation-that-theyve-been-dealing-with-a-specially-trained-force-because-its-the-type-of-bullet-theyve-never-seen-before-itn-uk-telev/

4) SIX Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…:  Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, Rodica Novac, Dr. Fluture, Csaba Ungor, Goga Andras

Doctors also reported on the wounds caused by explosive bullets (i.e. dum-dum bullets):  In this dispatch from Agence France Presse, relayed by Radio Free Europe on 25 December 1989, Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, a medic in the intensive care unit of a Timisoara hospital, says based on his thirty years of experience, some of the wounds could only have been CAUSED by EXPLOSIVE BULLETS SHOT AT THE PROTESTERS”

sursa (documentele Europa Libera disponibile la):  http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/generic_file-2009-12-22-6754154-0-radio-bucuresti-25-dec-pdf.pdf (p. 49 of 82)

©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 08:33 – Heure Paris (386 mots)
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
   ” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
   ” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
   Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
   Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
   En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
   Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
   Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
   Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
   Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
   nm/jga/vr.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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mai mult despre Dr. Aurel Mogosanu in decembrie 1989:  http://www.sorinbogdan.ro/2009/12/timisoara-18-decembrie-1989/.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/09/30/procesul-de-la-timisoara-iii-audierea-martorului-rodica-novac-directorul-directiei-sanitare-timis-13-iunie-1990/

Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression.  First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot.  december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom

Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian

Barzeanu Atanasie, 65 anit, medic primar, doctor in stiinte, chirurg, Spitalul Judetean Timisoara

“…sintem deci in 18 decembrie…Pe la orele doua si patruzeci, cind inchideam o operatie–Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian, dintr-un ARO, pacienta prezentindu-se o echimoza cu distrugerea tesuturilor (plaga in diametru de 15 centimetri), a tesuturilor din regiunea epigastrica, inclusiv a muschilor drepti abdominali, cu ruptura a colonului ascendent transvers si a jejuno-ileonului, fiind in stare de soc grav traumatic, hemoragic–, fara sa-mi poti explica nici macar acum cu ce fel de gloante a putut fi lovita, pentru ca nu am identificat nici orificiul de iesire si nici pe cel de intrare, a venit o asistenta de la Chirurgie I, care mi-a spus sa merg la domnul Ignat.”

Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura, (Editura Facla 1990), pp. 133-134.

The following first appeared in Gyorgy Mandics’s Temesvari golgota (1991) pp. 348-349 and is reprinted in his A Manipulalt Forradalom (2009).  [My guess is this is also the source for the reference to dum dum bullets in the German language wikipedia entry for http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum%C3%A4nische_Revolution_1989 — Hans Vastag, György Mandics, Manfred Engelmann: Temeswar. Symbol der Freiheit. Wien 1992. ]

pp. 348-349

Ket esetuk volt az elejen.  Ezert is hivtak be oket.  Egy 14 eves gyermeket a haz elott lottek le, szinte a szomszedban, egy golyoszoros ARO-rol talaltak el; egy oreg nenit a ter tuloldalon, az erkelyen ertek a golyok.  A zarja ment ki, kicsit nagyott hallott mar, amire is csoda, 64 evesen, azt hirtelen ugy erezte, hogy labaibol kimegy minden ero es lecsusott az erholya.  Na milyen gyonge lettem egyszeruen–mondotta maganak. de ahogyan fel akart tapaszkodni meg lepve tapasztalt, hogy vertocsa gyult alatta.  Bekialtolt a vegenek aki egy szomszed segitsegevel athozta a nenit a legkozelebbi korhazba, itt a Marasti ter tuloldalan, az uj Klinikakba, avagy hivatalos neven a 2 szamu korhazba, ahol rogton osszecodult mindenki csodat latni.  Ekkor hivtak be Baranziekat es minden mozgositato orvost, hiszen a fegyverek ropogatak.  Azota is kisebb nagyobb megszakitasokkal, felfelecsapolt a gepfegyverek, golyoszorok, geppisztolyok langzivatarja, remulettel telitva az ejszaki eget.

p. 349

De azt a ket elso esett nem kovettek ujabbok.  Igz aztan volt ido alaposan szemugyre venni a nenit akinek combjan elol egz akkora lyuk tatongott mint egy egy lejes, a comba hatso felen ahol eltavotott a golyo, ott viszont mar akkora mint egy otlejes.  Fluture doktor, az egzik sebesz erosen kototte az ebet a korohoz, hogy ez egz specialis dum-dum robbanogolyo okozta seb, hiszen a szakirodalomban azt irjak, hogy csak ez a robbannolovedek-fajta-amelyet ugyan az ENSZ eltitott, am a nemzetkozi terrorizmusban kulonesen divatos ma is–okoz az izomszovetbol kijovet sokkal nagyobb roncsolasokat mint a bemenetnel.  Az orvosok odazarandokoltak a sebesulthoz, mivel egzik sem latott semhogy dum-dum golyo utotte sebet, de egyaltalan lott sebet sem soha eleteben.  Igz aztan csak szivtak a rangeletrahoz igazodva a sebesz foorvosok az amerikai Kentet, a foamnesztezialogus a holland pipadohanyt, az asztalyos orovosok a bolgar BT-t, a fonoverek a jugoslav Vikend-et, a noverek es helyapolok a roman Snagov-t, Golfot.  Es vartak.

(Note: it is unclear who the 64 yr. old described was…there are several individuals without ages listed as injured or dead during the events, but I think it more likely the age of the woman is incorrect)

Jozsef Gazda Megvalto karacsonyErdelyi magyar tulelok emlekeznek. (1990)

Ungor Csaba:  Ket ora utan senkit be nem hoztak, senkit be nem engedtek, egyetlen sebesult sem.  A korhazbol kikanyarado  mentoautokra is lottek.  Ket ora utan mindre, ami mozgott, jarokelo, auto, mindenre lottek, csak hogy ok tudjak begyujteni a sebesulteket s a halottakat.  Kiderult az elso golyok utan, amiket a sebekbol gyujottek ossze, szedtek ki, hogy nem eles katonai toltenyekkel lottek, hanem dum-dum golyokkal, amik nagy rombolasokat okoztak.  Egy 16 eves, ketszer sebesult gyermek meselte el, ok azt hittek, hogy hosok, azt hittek, hogy meg fogjak menteni a forradalmat, mert biztosra vettek, ha a felnottek sorfala ele allnak, nem fognak belejuk loni.  Lottek rajuk is.

Goga Andras:  A masodik izgalomkelto esemeny volt kedden delelott, hogy az osszes regiszterunk–mind a surgossegen, mind az osztalyon–, melyekre felirtuk a muteteinket, eltuntek, a mai napig sem talaltuk meg.  Bennuk voltak az ev osszes mutetei[***]…En aznap kettot operaltam.  Egy tuntetonek a bore alol vettem ki egy nagyon kulonleges golyok, nem is golyot, egy ilyen repeszdarabot, melyet a katonasag aztan megvizsgalt, s azt mondtak, nekik nincs tudmasuk, hogy ez mi lehet.  Egy masiknak pedig fejserulese volt, persze abban nem talaltam golyot, atment rajta.

RELATED:

Procesul de la Timisoara (XII): Timisoara, the key to the Revolution then; the key now to the truth about the Counter-revolution

Procesul de la Timisoara (XI): Dupa 22 decembrie–teroristii. Martorii Alexandru Koos, Ion Flocioiu, si Herlea Floarea

Procesul de la Timisoara (X): Gloante explozive (dum-dum) dupa 22 decembrie 1989

Procesul de la Timisoara (IX): Cine au fost cei “necunoscuti,” mai in varsta, care au tras inainte de 22 decembrie 1989? (2)

Procesul de la Timisoara (VIII): Cine au fost cei “necunoscuti”, mai in varsta, care au tras inainte de 22 decembrie 1989?

Procesul de la Timisoara (VII): “La Timisoara cred ca si domnul procuror a vazut cartuse de acest calibru…Dar au existat in corpurile delicte ale procuraturii. Eu l-am vazut. Este un cartus ceva mai lung, negru, cu botul taiat. 5,56.”

Procesul de la Timisoara (VI): Impuscati dintr-un ARO…Al cui apartinea ARO-ul?

Procesul de la Timisoara (V): Martorii Cristian Rusu, Daniela Lengyel, si Aurica Rusu (mama lui Marius Ciopec)

Procesul de la Timisoara (IV): Martorii Adrian Kali, Ioan Musca, Traian Orban, si Alexandru Koos

Procesul de la Timisoara (III): Audierea martorului Rodica Novac, directorul Direcţiei Sanitare Timiş (13 iunie 1990)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

Procesul de la Timisoara (I): Missed Press Opportunities. The testimonies of Margaret Cacoceanu and Doina Gherasim (25-26 September 1990)

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/search/node/%22procesul%20de%20la%20timisoara%22
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. V
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Much of this has now been reposted or reproduced here:dosarelerevolutiei.ro

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 17, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  At one time the existence and importance of Interior Ministry Order 02600 (1988) in the regime repression from 16 to 22 December 1989 was essentially undisputed.  Indicative of the braziness of former Securitate revisionism is that by 2011, in the pages of what many regard as the most “anti-communist” Romanian daily, Evenimentul Zilei, Alex Mihai Stoenescu would argue the opposite, Loviturile Securităţii care i-au fost fatale lui Ceauşescu > EVZ.ro http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/operatiunea-voalul-negru-cum-l-a-lasat-securitatea-din-brate-pe-ceausescu-958514.html#ixzz2HEYADMSo.

In the previous episode, I examined the role of Securitate vandalism and attacks in justifying a legal pretext for regime repression (https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/16/25-for-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-romanian-revolution-2-shattered-glass-securitate-vandalism-to-justify-timisoara-crackdown/) .  In this episode, I examine one of the juridical bases for regime repression:  Ordinul 02600 (1988) al Ministerului de Interne.  Once it could be argued that “terrorst” or “extremist” actions had taken place, it stood to reason that “anti-terrorist” personnel (in Romania of the Ceausescu era, the USLA) could be deployed in accordance with the law as it existed at the time.  And so it was…

In Miodrag Milin’s compendium of the transcripts of the Timisoara trials http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_I.pdf , on 5 March 1990 defendant Ion Popescu (former chief inspector of the Militia) acknowledged the implementation of Order 2600 beginning on 16 December 1989 as follows.

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Acţiunile forţelor de represiune din Ministerul de Interne | 16-20 Decembrie 1989 |
16 Decembrie 1989
Activitatea pastorului László Tőkés era atent supravegheată de o echipă a Securităţii Timiş, condusă de maiorul Radu Tinu. Lucrătorii Securităţii urmăreau cu atenţie evenimentele care se derulau în faţa Bisericii Reformate. După ce tramvaiele din Piaţa Maria au fost oprite de către manifestanţi, protestul celor aflaţi acolo s-a transformat radical. Dacă iniţial timişorenii s-au adunat la Biserica Reformată pentru a se împotrivi evacuării pastorului László Tőkés, din acest moment protestul s-a radicalizat, cerându-se, pentru prima dată, schimbarea lui Ceauşescu, exprimată prin scandarea primei lozinci: „Jos Ceauşescu!”. În acel moment a avut loc şi prima altercaţie între manifestanţi şi efectivele Ministerului de Interne şi s-au făcut primele arestări.
Colonelul Popescu Ion, inspectorul-şef al Inspectoratului de Interne Timiş, în baza Ordinului 02600 din 1 iulie 1988, pune în aplicare planul unic de acţiune, desfăşurând în Timişoara trupele de intervenţie avute la dispoziţie. Astfel, au intrat în dispozitiv: 2 plutoane de intervenţie dotate cu căşti, scuturi şi bastoane, trei subunităţi de la Brigada de Securitate şi două subunităţi de la Trupele de Grăniceri. La Consiliul Judeţean au intervenit în forţă, bătând şi arestând o mare parte din manifestanţii aflaţi în zonă.
Gino RADO

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-6/actiunile-fortelor

from Expres, 1991, all but two parts compromising articles 15-21 of the order…

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ordinul-2600-1988-al-ministerului-de-interne/

LIPSESTE PAGINA CU ARTICOLE 44-49

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 16, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  I have essentially been the only researcher who has consistently advocated this understanding.  Most others–including Peter Siani-Davies–tended to dismiss it.  Now we have documentary evidence that it took place.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film seems to start at min. 19:00 and has to be rewound to its beginning.)  Here, I will focus on the claim beginning at approximately min. 17:40 that the destruction of Timisoara shops and storefronts was organized and a pretext to justify–including legally–the repression by the Ceausescu regime of Timisoara demonstrators.  Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu’s declaration of 17 March 1990 confirms this claim and the observations of eyewitnesses.

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

Tudor Postelnicu (Ministerul de Interne in decembrie 1989):  “Unii militari de la trupele de securitate ale brigazii Timisoara au facut unele provocari la unele magazine si vitrine spargind geamurile sa imprastie participantii de pe straziile din apropriere, apoi au intrat in altercatie cu ei, si acum (?) vor sa le faca militia ordine.  ‘Nu am aflat ca costa provocare a zis Gl. Nuta, am trimis pe …” (17.III.1990) 

http://sensidev.com/fc/dosare%20de%20urmarire%20penala/dosar%20%20de%20urmarire%20penala%20volumul%2011/IMG_2576.JPG (Dosarul de Urmarire Penala, Vol. 11, IMG 2576)

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Before we move on here, it is worth noting how this destruction was covered in Peter Siani-Davies’ 2005 volume The Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  As I have written on many occasions, Siani-Davies’ volume is wonderfully-written and is excellent, but the claim by Daniel Chirot that is a “near-definitive” account is far off the mark.  One of the negative characteristics of Siani-Davies’ work is the use of “filler” rational choice, cui bono arguments where he concludes there is not enough information to make a valid judgment.  The problem is the question is never one of “what was possible?” “what makes ‘sense’?” but rather what did happen?

Thus, for example in the case of the destruction of Timisoara Siani-Davies argues that there was already enough of a basis for the regime to crackdown, therefore why would they need to create a pretext for cracking down:  “Given the seriousness of the situation and the fact that shots had already been fired elsewhere, the security forces hardly needed to produce a further ‘excuse’ for the massacre which was to follow.” (p. 68)

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Back to exploring more of the evidence…

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997/

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Moldovan Fica (martor ocular)

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Andras Vasile (martor ocular)

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Ioan Savu discussed the windowbreakers as follows:

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Other depictions of this event available online:

Conducerea partidului, alarmată, a trimis în Piaţa Maria, conform Ordinului 02600, numeroşi miliţieni şi trupe speciale, pentru a lichida manifestaţia care luase amploare. Circulaţia în zonă se întrerupsese. În Piaţa Maria au fost trimişi aproximativ 200 de activişti de partid, miliţieni şi numeroşi ofiţeri de securitate, îmbrăcaţi în haine civile. Au urmat ciocniri violente, mai ales după ce manifestanţii s-au încolonat şi au pornit spre sediul CJ PCR, strigând “Libertate”, “Vrem pâine”, “Vrem căldură”, “Azi la Timişoara, mâine în toată ţara”.
În acea seară echipe de miliţie dinainte pregătite au spart vitrinele magazinelor din centrul oraşului, pentru a avea argumente pentru o intervenţie în forţă. Desigur, multe vitrine au fost sparte şi de derbedei, asupra cărora s-au găsit bunuri furate. În acea noapte au fost arestate aproape 5-600 de cetăţeni. Ei au fost duşi la Penitenciarul oraşului, unde au fost bătuţi în mod bestial. În zilele care au urmat arestării au fost anchetaţi în vederea trimiterii lor în judecată. Bineînţeles, dacă Revoluţia n-ar fi reuşit.

“Azi la Timişoara”
Ivan Sabin

http://revista.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=371

Totuşi, se ştie că în acele zile fierbinţi din Timişoara au existat „personaje neidentificate” care au acţionat în mai multe zone ale oraşului. Am să amintesc aici doar două aspecte concrete cu privire la implicarea acestora în evenimentele din Timişoara. În zilele de 16 şi 17 decembrie au fost sparte aproape toate vitrinele magazinelor din zona centrală a oraşului. Sunt zeci de declaraţii ale revoluţionarilor care fac o descriere clară a celor care au spart acele geamuri. Au fost oameni bine îmbrăcaţi, robuşti şi tunşi scurt. Aceştia erau dotaţi cu nişte beţe speciale cu care printr-un gest scurt şi foarte bine exersat loveau vitrinele, după care plecau fără a încerca să sustragă ceva din magazine. Aceste persoane au fost văzute chiar şi de forţele de ordine desfăşurate în acea zonă, care în mod ciudat nu au luat măsuri împotriva lor, ci au acţionat împotriva manifestanţilor ce demonstrau împotriva regimului ceauşist. Un alt aspect relatat de mulţi timişoreni se referă mai ales la zilele de 17-19 decembrie, când, în rândul cordoanelor militare din diferite dispozitive amplasate în zonele importante ale oraşului, între soldaţi, erau intercalate persoane mai în vârstă, nebărbierite îmbrăcate doar parţial în uniforme militare, care nu făceau parte din acele unităţi militare.

Cine au fost acele „persoane neidentificate”? De ce s-a dorit în unele cercuri, cu insistenţă chiar, acreditarea ideii că oamenii au fost scoşi în stradă de agenţi străini? De ce, chiar şi după 20 de ani, se fac afirmaţii de genul: cadavrele celor arşi la Crematoriul „Cenuşa” erau ale unor agenţi străini? Nu voi căuta acum răspunsuri la aceste întrebări, dar, cu siguranţă, ele există.

Kali Adrian Matei

nascut in 30 iulie 1968 la Timisoara, muncitor la IJPIPS (1989), profesor de istorie la Liceul de informatica (1998), impuscat in spate

La Bijuterii concetatenii nostri tigani carau ce puteau. Numai la “Modex” nu era spart. Un grup de oameni se uitau cum niste indivizi bine instruiti spargeau geamurile de linga restaurantul Bulevard. Am rugat oamenii sa apere Modexul, pentru ca era clar ca spargatorii n-aveau nimic comun cu revolta.  30 septembrie 1995  http://timisoara.com/newmioc/4.htm

“În data de 14 decembrie, securitatea a spart toate gemurile din partea străzii principale, iar clădirea arăta ca o cetate asediată. Fostul primar al Timişorei, Petre Moţ l-a vizitat pe Tokes şi a ieşit la geam pentru a vorbi mulţimii. Moţ a cerut să se pună geamuri noi. Erau foarte multe maşini ale securiştilor. Întreaga stradă era ocupată. Se făcea filaj. Eu locuiam acolo, ba intram, ba ieşeam. Nu se vorbea încă revoluţie. Era o solidaritatea faţă de pastor”, declarat Iosif Kabai (foto), care locuieşte şi acum în clădirea bisericii reformate.Citeste mai mult: adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/16-decembrie-1989-ziua-timisoara-s-a-strigat-data-democratie-jos-comunismul-1_50bd3d887c42d5a663c8e01f/index.html

Radu Tinu cu Angela Bacescu…

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

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RADU TINU:…SINGURLE COMPLEXE COMERCIALE RAMASE INTREGI AU FOST CELE DIN FATA MILITIEI JUDETENE SI CEL DE LANGA FABRICA “MODERN”…

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The significance of window-breaking as a justification for repression–something the Securitate would have realized–was outlined by Nicolae Ceausescu in his teleconference of 17 December 1989 as follows:

“Oricine intra intr-un Consiliu Popular, intr-un sediu de partid sau sparge un geam la un magazin trebuie sa primeasca riposta imediat.

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Col. Ion Popescu (sef IGM)’s defense lawyer appealed to Legea 21 and Decretul 121 specifically as obligating Interior Ministry (M.I.–Militia and Securitate) forces to intervene in response to the breaking of windows of commercial units…

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Thus, the breaking of windows, which according to Interior Minister was instigated and carried out in part by Securitate Brigade 30 under the command of Ion Bunoaica served a bureaucratic and legalistic function–a tactic not unknown in the annals of other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes…

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An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

“A group of former Securitate officers” wrote to the Ceausist Democratia in September 1990 that after the Militia and Securitate refused to respond to the demonstrations provoked by the “foreign tourists”: “they advance[d] to the next stage: the massive destruction of public property designed to provoke forcible interventions–human victims were needed.”[68]

Nevertheless, here is how one opposition journalist, Grid Modorcea, has described the strange character of Timisoara destruction:

For the first time in history, a revolution…was announced in a previously unknown and absolutely original manner, both literally and figuratively speaking: through the methodical breakage of thousands of windows. On 16 and 17 December 1989, Timisoara was the city of [glass] shards. Well-trained groups of athletes spread throughout the town, tactically, but energetically smashing to pieces hundreds of huge windows without apparently being interested in stealing from these stores…they were like mythical Magis coming to announce the end of one world and the beginning of another. And they gave it an apocalyptic quality: the sound produced by the breaking glass was infernal. The panic this caused was indescribable….Those who “executed” the windows did so with karate-like kicks while yelling “Liberty and Justice”!…The crowds of people who came out into the streets transformed spontaneously into columns of demonstrators, of authentic revolutionaries. The effect was therefore monumental: the breaking of the windows unleashed the popular revolt against the dictator.[69]

Modorcea is convinced that the Tokes case was “merely a pretext” and that “someone–perhaps those who planned the vandalizing of the windows–has an interest in preventing it from being known who broke the windows.” Although Modorcea maintains he is unsure who was responsible, he insists on observing that:

Only the Customs people know how many tourists there were. All were men and long-haired. Inside their cars they had canisters. This fits with the method of the breaking of the windows, with the Molotov cocktails, and the drums used as barricades–they were exactly of the same type….To what extent the new regime which came to power was implicated, we cannot say![70]

Many Timisoara protesters appear torn between wishing to rationalize the extensive destruction as the courageous response of an enraged, long-suffering population, and denying that the perpetrators could have come from among their ranks. Even those investigators attuned to the retroactive psychology of the protesters cannot help but admit that widespread destruction occurred and that it could not have been wholly spontaneous.[71] Furthermore, as Laszlo Tokes has observed in discussing the events at Piata Maria, manipulation and attempts to instigate the crowd to violence were constant features during these days.

Tokes maintains that Securitate provocateurs had tried to agitate the crowd by shouting things like, “Let’s break into the house. The Securitate are in there; they’re trying to kidnap Laszlo Tokes! Let’s rush them!” and by appealing for him to “Come down into the street and lead us!”[72] According to Tokes:

I was alarmed at the obvious provocation from individuals in the crowd clearly intent on making the situation uncontrollable….Later, thinking about the events of those two days, I realized that the authorities would have had a great deal to gain if the situation had become a riot.[73]

Mircea Balan questions whether the protesters would have set stores on fire which were located on the ground floor of the buildings in which the protesters themselves lived.[74] Moreover, he wonders how even the revolutionary fury of the crowd could drive protesters to break so many windows, particularly given the presence of repressive forces on the streets. It is what Balan has termed the “systematic devastation” of property which raises questions.

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

Mircea Balan has little doubt who committed this “systematic destruction”:

Demonstrators might have thrown rocks in windows, but the destruction of the entire store was not their work…Nobody need believe that for such a thing foreign intervention was necessary, seeing as there were enough first-class specialists in destruction and demolition right here at home. The Securitate could not have been foreign to what happened, no matter how much it fiercely attempts to deny this today. They were professionals in the art of destruction. They needed a justification for the bloody repression.[78]

In March 1990, Puspoki had been willing to identify the culprits more specifically. According to Puspoki, as the demonstrators began to gather to prevent Tokes’ eviction:

The USLA’s Sabotage and Diversion team was readied to break store windows, to devastate and set fires–to create the conditions necessary for mass repression: the existence of disorder in the streets and theft on the part of the demonstrators.[79]

Securitate Major Radu Tinu’s observation that the commercial complex “in front of the county Militia building” (i.e. the Inspectorate in which both the Securitate and Militia offices were located) was one of only two such complexes in the whole city to remain intact during these days may also be an indication of the source of the destruction.[80]

It is possible then that to the extent that this destruction did indeed contain an organized component, it was designed by the regime to subvert and cast suspicion upon the intentions of the protesters and to create a pretext for repression. To the extent that an organized component did contribute to the destruction, it was far more likely to have been regime forces attempting to undermine the protests than foreign agents attempting to provoke an uprising against the regime.

[65].. See, for example, Grid Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor [The Breaking of the Windows],” Expres Magazin, no. 49 (1991), 8-9; Mircea Bunea, “Eroii noi si vechi [New and old heroes],” Adevarul, 2 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 448-449; Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 57-58.

[66].. See, for example, the comments of Radu Tinu, the deputy director of the Timis County Securitate, in Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 67-85.

[67].. Mircea Bunea, “Ipse Dixit,” Adevarul, 21 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 463. Vlad’s determination to emphasize that these were “acts without precedent” makes one wonder if they were indeed without precedent.

[68].. A group of former Securitate officers, “Asa va place revolutia? Asa a fost! [You like the revolution? Here is how it was!],” Democratia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4. The lengthy defense by these officers of the Fifth Directorate in this letter suggests that they were members of this directorate.

[69].. Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” 8.

[70].. Ibid.

[71].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[72].. Tokes, With God, for the People, 153, 156.

[73].. Ibid., 156.

[74].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[75].. Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 96.

[76].. Ibid, 118. The fact that the two persons supervising the destruction are described as having worn “leather jackets” strongly suggests they may have been Securitate men. Mihai Decean claims that on a train headed for Bucharest on 25 December (therefore after Ceausescu’s flight), he helped in the arrest of two USLA officers whom he describes as “athletic, with shaved heads, and wearing leather jackets.” See Laura Ganea, “La Timisoara se mai trage inca” Tinerama, no. 77 (July 1991), 3.

[77].. Ibid., 71, 122. Some of the eyewitnesses cited in Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” say similar things; Modorcea, however, gives them a very different interpretation.

[78].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[79].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III).”

[80].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 80.

The following was added some years later as a footnote to the section above in republications of this chapter.  Badea says here “many years later” Postelnicu admitted this, but as we can now see from the Timisoara files, he wrote it in his declaration/statement dated 17 March 1990.

(In connection with the “window breakers” we do know a little more today than we did then back in 1996.  Dan Badea wrote in 1999 Bunoaica and the Window Breakers that “Tudor Postelnicu, the Interior Minister at the time, was to declare many years later that the “breaking of the windows” was a mission executed by personnel from the 30th Securitate Brigade led by col. Ion Bunoaica).  Orele 20.00 – 21.00: Sint sparte toate vitrinele magazinelor de pe Bulevardul 6 Martie (Tudor Postelnicu, ministru de interne la acea vreme, avea sa declare multi ani mai tirziu ca “spargerea vitrinelor” a fost o misiune executata de militari ai Brigazii 30 Securitate condusa de col. Ion Bunoaica).

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 16, 2014

(strictly personal views, based on more than two decades of prior research and publications)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/a-response-to-watts-ii-preliminary/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/a-response-to-watts-the-pitfalls-of-not-having-any-evidence/

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Looking through the Romanian media’s articles devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 that overthrew the communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, one cannot help but be reminded of Valentin Ceausescu’s 1997 claim according to which (paraphrased),

–“Have you noticed? All the heroes…now are the militia and the Securitate.” “The villains are now the heroes…and the heroes are now the villains!”

Until the documents [screen captures] below were made publicly available and I unearthed the following, we had to rely primarily on arguments emphasizing the Securitate roots of these claims and/or about the implausibility and often absurdity of these claims.  We now have documentary evidence that in the immediate wake of December 1989 not even the Securitate believed in the claims they would make so frequently later on according to which foreign agents were allegedly responsible for the Timisoara uprising.

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Back in 1997, the American novelist and Pulitzer Prize Winner William McPherson wrote of what Valentin Ceausescu, communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu’s eldest son, told him about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  Here are some excerpts:

  • Valentin and I were having coffee in the Vox Maris, the same grand casino where the funeral feast was held. It was morning, two days after the funeral [of Nicu Ceausescu], and the crowds had not yet arrived.
  • “Nicu was never groomed to be the successor. That was [only] the rumor.” He paused for a moment. “But rumors even become the reality.”
  • “Yes. Especially in Romania.”
  • “Maybe others in the party thought it would be a good idea. He could command a lot of sympathy. He always wanted to look tough and act strong, but he wasn’t. He was more like a child than anything else.”
  • “What about the 90 people killed in Sibiu?”
  • “He did not order the shooting. I know when he’s trying to lie, and he wasn’t lying. I knew immediately. That’s why I defended him so strongly.”
  • He paused and lit another Pall Mall. “Have you noticed? All the heroes in Sibiu now are the militia and the Securitate – all the dead people, and now they are the heroes of the revolution.”
  • “So the villains are now the heroes?”
  • “Yes.”
  • And the heroes are now the villains.
  • The official toll of the dead, revised frequently with a final version released three years after the events, is 1,104; only 160 were killed before the dictator fled.
  • Curious – if the figures are accurate – that the majority of them were killed in Sibiu. “A lot of effort,” Valentin once said, “to kill these two old people.”

William McPherson, “A Balkan Comedy,” The Wilson Quarterly, Volume 21, Issue 3 (Summer 1997)

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Thus it is that at Evenimentul Zilei, long hailed by Romania’s westward leaning intelligentsia and Romanianists in North America as the most authentically anti-communist and credible of Romania’s dailies, articles continue their reliance–very selectively–of recent years on the claims of senior former Securitate officers, Iulian Vlad, Emil Macri, Filip Teodorescu, Nicolae Mavru, etc., or on the research of Alex Mihai Stoenescu, whose work is detailed and meticulous and thus deserves to be read, but, who, it turns out, not accidentally, is also an acknowledged former Securitate collaborator.  (Not for nothing, the Evenimentul Zilei series is entitled “25 de ani de la evenimentele din decembrie ’89. Lumini si umbre” thus intentionally or unintentionally conjuring up the name, appropriately enough, of the current preferred vehicle of the former Securitate for discussing December 1989, http://www.acmrr-sri.ro/categorii/19/revista-vitralii–lumini-si-umbre.html )

(See, for example, http://www.evz.ro/document-strict-secret-1989-raportul-generalului-iulian-vlad-catre-nicolae-ceausescu.html or http://www.evz.ro/25de-ani-de-la-evenimentele-din-decembrie-1989-generalul-iulian-vlad-daca-oamenii-nu-erau-nemultumiti-strainatatea-nu-l-putea-rasturna-pe-ceausescu.html; http://www.evz.ro/timisoara-protestul-pentru-laszlo-tokes-si-povestea-agentilor-straini.html; http://www.evz.ro/dec-1989-cum-a-izbucnit-revolutia-romana-revolta-de-la-iasi-si-scanteia-maghiara-de-la-timisoara.html;