The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘securitatea decembrie 1989’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #21 The “Bizarre” Tactics of the Terrorists

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 27, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

What would it have looked like if Nicolae Ceausescu’s Securitate executed a plan to counter an invasion…but the invaders never came?

Answer:  Well, you would have something that looked suspiciously similar to what actually happened in December 1989 in Romania…

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ )

A military aviation official, Colonel Mircea Budiaci, described the characteristics of the so-called “radio-electronic war” the armed forces faced, as follows:“…we were confronted with a powerful adversary which operated on the basis of long-prepared plans which were centrally directed and permanently adapted to changing conditions.  [They attacked] by radio-electronic means by creating signals on our radar identical to those which represented real targets.  When they reached a distance between 800 and 1500 meters from an object on the ground they would simulate gunfire of various types of weapons.  These two things created the image of an air attack.  They were combined with ground attacks, real or false, with various types of telephone calls by identified or unidentified callers, and with the spreading of rumors…on our operating frequencies there were conversations between what were presumed to be aircraft in flight and base command.  You didn’t know what to make of it, and the confusion was intensified by the fact that they were speaking not only in Romanian, but also in English, Turkish, and Arabic…You can imagine in what a situation we had to perform our duties…” (Colonel Mircea Budiaci, interview by Maior D. Amariei, “NU!  Teroristii n-au avut elicoptere,’ Armata Poporului, 21 March 1990, p. 4.) https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/04/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-8-usla-and-friends/

Questioned by a reporter in 1992 if the Television station had ever really been in danger, Militaru responded:

No….You see, not even those of our commanders who were responsible for the defense of such objectives thought through and analyzed well enough exactly whom they were confronting. Because the adversary did not have an extraordinary number of men with which to take an object such as the TV tower by assault. They [the Army commanders] did, however, have to face a very well-equipped, well-prepared, and perfidious enemy. Not having sufficient forces, they [the “terrorists”] resorted to “gunfire simulators” which caused extraordinary confusion. They thus sought to do something completely different: to infiltrate…They succeeded in infiltrating into the TV station…[69]
[69].. Nicolae Militaru, interview by Corneliu Antim, “Ordinul 2600 in Revolutia din decembrie,” Romania Libera, 17 December 1992, 2.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/

 

Through the years, the Romanian media–and especially former Securitate officers or collaborators in the Romanian media–have been very good about telling us the role of the Army in the event of a foreign invasion–but they have neglected to tell us about the planned role of Securitate units.

In fact, the tactics of the “terrorists” in December 1989 are strikingly similar to what was described in the journal of the Securitate (available on the CNSAS.ro site):

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Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

Actiunile de lupta desfasurate de formatiunile de rezistenta prezinta citeva caracteristici, altfel:  de regula, sint de scurta durata si violente, avind aspectul unor lovituri fulgeratoare; vizeaza in principal obiective ale inamicului de o dezvoltare mai redusa, dar de mare importanta pentru acesta; au un pronuntat caracter de independenta, ducindu-se in conditiile lipsei unor vecini apropriati si a sprijinului altor forte militare; se desfasoara cu forte relativ putin numeroase; necesita o minutioasa si, uneori, indelungata pregatire a luptatorilor participanti la actiune; impun cunoasterea amanuntita a particularitatilor terenului in care va avea loc actiunea, precum si elaborarea unui plan simplu, usor de aplicat; se desfasoara, de regula, noaptea si in conditii grele de stare a vremii, in momente si locuri in care sa se realizeze surprinderea inamicului…

Members of the Romanian Armed Forces have hinted at their suspicion that in December 1989 Securitate forces were executing attacks and disinformation in conformity with the “lupta de rezistenta” concept…

(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor.  Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), 30 mai 1990.  Xerox-ul facut in anul 1994 la Biblioteca Academiei Romane).

Mai mult decit atit, a fost cunoscut si folosit in scop de diversiune inclusiv sistemul de transmisiuni pentru conducerea si instiintarea trupelor de aparare antiaeriana a teritoriului.  In majoritatea cazurilor, pregatirea actiunilor de lupta, aeriana si terestre, s-a desfasurat pe timp de noapte, probabil cu forte si mijloace dispuse din timp in zonele respective, dar si cu altele redislocati pe parcurs.  In aceasta ordine de idei, exista suficiente date si informatii care ne indreptatesc sa afirmam ca toate actiunile aeriene au fost declansate–fie real (cu ajutorul unor mijloace si dispozitive adecvate de creare a tintelor aeriene false), fie imitate (cu o aparatura radioelectronica moderna)–din interiorul tarii si, de regula, din aceleasi zone in raionele unor localitatii pe care, din motive pe care nu este aici cauza sa le explicam, nu le vom divulga.

Am adauga ca, in conceptia doctrinara referitoare la apararea patriei de catre intregul popor, elaborata ‘sub obladuirea fostului comandant suprem’ a existat, atit sub aspect teoretic, metodologic, cit si practic, o sustinuta preocupare, mai ales in ultimii ani, pentru fundamentarea conceptului de ‘razboi de rezistenta’ si de pregatire, inca din timp de pace, a unor formatiuni ‘de rezistenta’ si a unor ‘zone libere’ si raioane de pe teritoriu in care, in cazul ocuparii unor parti din teritoriul national, vor actiona asa-zise ‘grupuri sau detasamente de rezistenta.’

Dar se parea ca ‘serialul nocturn’ al atacurilor teroriste incepe sa-si arate anumite ‘tipicuri’–daca le putem numi asa–care ar fi meritat sa fie mai judicios analizate si luate in calcul pentru luarea unor masuri mai eficiente de contracarare.  Toate atacurile terestre ale teroristilor erau executate exclusiv pe timp de noapte si, de regula, in doua ‘reprize’ a circa o jumatate de ora fiecare, una in prima parte a noptii (aproximativ intre orele 22-23) si alta spre ziua (in jurul 02-03).  Executate de grupuri mici de teroristi–dar niste profesionisti ai luptei de gherila avind un armament de inalta precizie, dotat cu sisteme optice de ochire pe timp de noapte–atacurile nu vizua insa altceva decit intretinirea unei atmosfere stresante, de tensiune, de amenintare permanenta, pentru mentinirea intregului efectiv (pe cit posibil!) in cazarma, intr-o permanenta stare de lupta, pentru a-l uza si a-l determina sa-si iroseasca o cantitate de mai mare din resursele de munitie.

Even the former head of the Securitate, General Iulian Vlad, admitted in a very judiciously worded declaration from 29 January 1990 that the “terrorists” were from the Securitate.  (Significantly, this declaration has never appeared in the Romanian press, and even since its revelation by General Ioan Dan it has been consistently ignored.  It is, to say the least, painful and difficult for the deniers to address.)

General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

  1. a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

  1. b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.
  2. c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.
  3. d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.
  4. e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

  1. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

  1. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);
  2. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;
  3. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

Generalul Mircea Mocanu, comandantul CAAT în 1989, declara în faţa Comisiei Senatoriale pentru Cercetarea Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989 că România s-a confruntat în mod cert, în timpul Revoluţiei, cu ceea ce se numeşte „război electronic”. El explică câteva dintre metodele unei astfel de operaţiuni. „Ulterior au fost găsite pe teritoriul ţării mai multe baloane tip meteo, cu materialul din plastic sfâşiat de schije; de baloane atârnau reflectoare poliedrice, adică un schelet de lemn cu foiţă de staniol în măsură să reflecte undele electromagnetice emise de staţiile de radio­­locaţie. Pe cutie – o brumă de aparatură, pe care scria în limba rusă «fabricat în URSS»; aveau şi o etichetă pe care scria în limba maghiară: «Cine aduce la organele locale un asemenea obiect primeşte 50 de forinţi»”Citeste mai mult: adevarul.ro/news/societate/video-misterele-revolutiei-diversiunea-radioelectronica-sovieticii-americaniii-1_50ad127b7c42d5a6638e4c95/index.html

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

In fact, the tactics of the “terrorists” in December 1989 are strikingly similar to what was described in the journal of the Securitate (available on the CNSAS.ro site):

Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

– desfasurarea unor activitati de dezinformare a inamicului cu privire la actiunile fortelor proprii…

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Let’s take a look at some of the claims made about the character and content of the disinformation–especially as pertains to the so-called “radioelectronic war”–as it transpired in December 1989:

volumul Armata romana in revolutia din decembrie 1989 (Editura Militara)

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Apreciem că, în acelaşi context, prezintă o oarecare importanţă şi aspectul semnalat în NOTA S.R.I. transmisă comisiei cu nr. S/9.022/1992 şi anume: „… În ziua de 2 ianuarie 1990 a fost reţinut la Unitatea militară 01929 Reşiţa, alături de alte cadre de securitate fostul şef al Serviciului „T”, cpt.(r.) Berinde Florin. Cu ocazia anchetelor la care a fost supus de către unele cadre militare ale M.Ap.N. şi organe ale procuraturii militare, acesta a relatat că, în ziua de 23 decembrie 1989, în jurul orelor 1500, pe când se efectuau acordurile pe scala staţiei R-105, pentru menţinerea legăturii, conform celor convenite anterior, s-au auzit convorbiri în limba rusă, ce aveau intonaţii puternice, de ordin. La auzul acestor mesaje lt.col. Măriuţa Gheorghe de la fostul organ de miliţie, cel mai mare în grad dintre cei prezenţi, a dat ordin să se închidă staţia pentru a nu afla şi alte cadre şi a nu crea o stare de panică în rândul efectivelor. Din cele relatate rezultă că aceste convorbiri se auzeau deosebit de clar se transmiteau de aproape, fără zgomot de fond fâsâit sau bruiaj. Acelaşi ofiţer a mai relatat că, în împrejurările de mai sus a discutat şi cu cpt.ing. Brencea Constantin, care i-a spus că începând cu 23 decembrie 1989 şi ei au fost bruiaţi pe sistemul de transmisiuni radioreleu pe unde scurte, pe toate canalele posibile cu semnale care emit fie convorbiri în limba rusă, fie un fel de triluri muzicale, iar pe radiolocatoare au fost bruiaţi prin generarea unui semnal care imita ţinte reale…”.

https://sites.google.com/site/problemeistorice/raport-final-comisia-senatoriala-decembrie-1989-sectiunea-5

Generalul Mircea Mocanu, comandantul CAAT în 1989, declara în faţa Comisiei Senatoriale pentru Cercetarea Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989 că România s-a confruntat în mod cert, în timpul Revoluţiei, cu ceea ce se numeşte „război electronic”. El explică câteva dintre metodele unei astfel de operaţiuni. „Ulterior au fost găsite pe teritoriul ţării mai multe baloane tip meteo, cu materialul din plastic sfâşiat de schije; de baloane atârnau reflectoare poliedrice, adică un schelet de lemn cu foiţă de staniol în măsură să reflecte undele electromagnetice emise de staţiile de radio­­locaţie. Pe cutie – o brumă de aparatură, pe care scria în limba rusă «fabricat în URSS»; aveau şi o etichetă pe care scria în limba maghiară: «Cine aduce la organele locale un asemenea obiect primeşte 50 de forinţi»”.

http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/video-misterele-revolutiei-diversiunea-radioelectronica-sovieticii-americaniii-1_50ad127b7c42d5a6638e4c95/index.html

Reflectori poliedrici cu marca “Fabricat in URSS”
Faptul ca pe langa tintele false au existat si tinte reale este sustinut in cadrul raportului MApN de gasirea, in diferite locuri, a unor baloane asemanatoare cu cele utilizate in meteorologie. Neobisnuit insa, aceste baloane aveau acrosati reflectori poliedrici  care puteau induce pe ecranele de radiolocatie semnale similare celor provenind de la o aeronava reala. Pe cutia aparaturii acrosata baloanelor distruse s-au gasit inscriptii in limba rusa sau engleza cu “Fabricat in URSS”. Raportul militar mai mentioneaza un aspect greu de crezut, un fel de fantezie, si care pare mai degraba o influenta a curentului antimaghiar dezvoltat preponderent in randurile cadrelor armatei, indoctrinate sub comunism, din acea perioada, si anume ca mai existau “atasate biletele in limba maghiara prin care se promiteau aducatorilor acestor obiecte recompense de 150 forinti”. Era si o perioada in care teoria conspiratiei incerca sa justifice evenimentele din perioada Revolutiei. Sa nu uitam ca si Ceausescu, la fel ca si cadrele Armatei si Securitatii, avea aceasta obsesie a “cetatenilor straini care vor sa destabilizeze tara si sa fure Transilvania”. Ceea ce militarii specializati si procurorii militari au denumit, la inceputul anilor ’90, razboiul radio-electronic a amplificat starea emotiva a unei parti din participantii la Revolutie, care faceau periodic trimiteri la eventuale forte straine, solicitand implicit interventii din partea Armatei si a grupurilor de civili inarmati.

Elicopterul rusesc a ramas in urma
Mai multi tanchisti din batalionul de tancuri de la Targoviste, dislocat pentru apararea Ministerului Apararii Nationale si pentru intarirea dispozitivelor de paza din zona, au sustinut ca, incercand sa-si racordeze frecventele radio, au surprins fragmente din conversatii in limba rusa identificate ca avand drept sursa o formatiune de elicoptere. Din convorbirile interceptate, traduse de inginerul Simion Barbu, rezulta ca era vorba de o formatiune de zbor careia ii ramasese in urma un elicopter, aparat ce ar fi fost pilotat de o femeie. In transmisiunea radio, pilotul isi justifica ramanerea in urma si desprinderea de formatie prin defectiuni survenite la aparat, iar comandantul formatiunii i-a transmis ordinul sa pastreze aceeasi altitudine si acelasi itinerar pana in momentul in care va reusi sa realizeze contactul cu formatiunea de care apartinea.

http://m.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/prigoana-vantului-diversiunea-elicopterelor-cu-teroristi-libieni-142385.html

Amiralul (r) Gheorghe Anghelescu*** rememorează la rândul său: „Acţiunile noastre au început să se desfăşoare atunci când ne aşteptăm mai puţin. În noaptea de 22-23 decembrie, pe ecranele
radiolocatoarelor sistemului de observare electronic al Marinei şi Apărării Antiaeriene a teritoriului au apărut nenumărate nave, avioane şi
elicoptere, care toate se îndreptau spre litoralul nostru. Prin reţelele radio se primeau cele mai diverse informaţii care confirmau această mare acţiune aeronavală ostilă. Totul părea incredibil. În portul Constanţa navele comerciale aveau indicii că sunt minate de scafandri inamici, de pe litoral, posturile de observare ne semnalau elicoptere, navele civile şi platformele petroliere marine descopereau şi informau despre ţinte aeriene, în reţelele radio se intensifica frecvenţa convorbirilor în limba rusă, arabă şi engleză; toate acestea ne-au făcut să percepem ca reală o agresiune aeronavală”.
Ţintele se îndreptau către plajele Mamaia, Mangalia, Sf. Gheorghe şi Sulina, zone propice efectuării de desantări de trupe. Rapoartele primite înştiinţau prezenţa elicopterelor în largul Mării Negre, în zona platformelor de foraj marin.

http://surrysipluta.blogspot.com/2010/12/decembrie-1989-si-caietele.html

Cine sunt agresorii din decembrie? Îi vom cunoaşte vreodată pe cei care au bântuit cerul în acele zile? Uimirea miltarilor a atins apogeul, când s-a constatat corelarea perfectă a evenimentelor din teren cu cele aeriene şi convorbirile radio: “04 către 34 … Staţia S, defectă … mergem numai 18 … unitatea de lângă noi a tras cu mitraliere, tunuri şi rachete”. Toate aceste convorbiri radio, se refereau la probleme concrete, la acţiuni reale; sau un alt caz: “se poate decola pentru că S.R.C. (staţia radiolocaţie cercetare) nu lucrează … aruncarea în aer a containerului …”Asemenea convorbiri se amestecau cu altele în limba rusă, arabă, engleză.

După data de 28 decembrie, atât numărul ţintelor reperate cât şi traficul radio, au căzut, ajungând la zero. Dealtfel şi fragmentele de conversaţii interceptate sugerau o retragere spre “bazele proprii”.  (Carol Roman, “Enigmele ale Revolutiei Romane din ’89”)

http://revista.balcanii.ro/index_html?editia=94-95&page=revolutia&nr=2

Simultan in circuitile telefonice, radio, si chiar de comanda (da, nu este o exagerare!) se inregistreaza o avalansa de ordine si informatii, atit in limba romana, cit si in engleza, araba, si turca.

Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bordea, “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor,” Armata Poporului, nr. 19 (9 mai 1990), p.2.

Convorbirile erau purtate in mai multe limbi, preponderent in engleza (cu un pronuntat accent arab), dar si in italiana, turca, bulgara, sirba, si romana…

Mai mult:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/razboiul-radio-electronic-noiembrie-1989-ianuarie-1990/

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (VI) plus BONUS: de ce a ocolit zona Moldovei razboiul radioelectornic?!!!

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (V)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (IV)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (III)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (II)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (I)

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ ; xeroxes below are from 1994 and 1997, Bucharest and Cluj)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

ALL THE RUSSIAN TOURISTS, WHERE DO THEY ALL COME FROM?…WHERE DO THEY ALL BELONG?

A modest proposal:  In order to operate in a country under foreign occupation and to confuse the foreign occupier, the “nuclee de rezistenta” would need equipment that could pass for that of the occupier.  In the previous episode, we saw this possibility with the weather balloon, with Russian writing, but a fictitious address in Budapest.  Since Nicolae Ceausescu was afraid most of all of a Soviet invasion, the “resistance fighters” would need to be able to appear or pass themselves off as Soviets/Russians themselves.  Is it then possible that the former Securitate’s insistence upon mentioning the presence of convoys of male Soviet tourists in Russian cars with Soviet plates is an admission–stripped out of context–that these cars and their occupants were part of the “resistance war” so long planned for and which we have seen awarded a critical, though until now not publicized, role to the Securitate?

Valer Marian’s revelations in September 1990 are VERY interesting in this regard…

Monica N. Marginean:  Sa revenim la datele concrete ale regiei de care vorbeam anterior.  Cum arata, de pilda, povestea atit de dezbatuta la procesul lui Nicu Ceausescu a cursei ROMBAC, daca o privim din perspectiva Comisiei de ancheta?

fostul procuror Marian Valer:  In mod normal, cursa de avion Bucuresti-Sibiu trebuia sa decoleze de pe aeroportul Baneasa, la orele 17,10 folosindu-se pe acest traseu avioane marca Antonov.  In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, insa, in jurul orelor 17, deci in apropierea orei prevazute pentru decolarea cursei obisnuite, pasagerii pentru Sibiu au fost invitati si dusi la Aeroportul Otopeni unde au fost imbarcati intr-un avion marca ROMBAC care a decolat in jurul orelor 18,30 si a aterizat pe aeroportul Sibiu in jur de ora 19.  Fac precizarea ca in dupa-amiaza aceleiasi zile, cu aproape 2 ore inaintea decolarii acestei curse, a aterizat pe aeroportul Otopeni avionul prezidential cu care Ceausescu s-a reintors din Iran. Conform datelor furnizate de agentia TAROM Bucuresti, in avionul respectiv spre Sibiu au fost imbarcati 81 pasageri.  In radiograma cursei sint consemnate domiciile doar la o parte din pasageri, cu mentiunea ca unele sint incomplete, lipsind fie localitatea, fie strada, fie numarul, iar la restul pasagerilor figureaza doar mentiunile ,rezervat’ sau Pasaport RSR.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, au putut fi identificati doar 44 de pasageri, majoritatea avind domiciliul in municipul si judetul Sibiu, stabilindu-se ca au fost persoane trimise in delegatie la foruri tutelare din capitala, sau studenti plecati in vacanta, iar citiva domiciliati in judetul Alba.  Mentionez ca asupra acestor persoane nu planeaza nici un dubiu.  Dubiile sint create insa in primul rind de faptul ca mai multi pasageri figureaza cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, dar in realitate nu domiciliaza la adresele consemnate, iar la unele adrese sint intreprinderi.  Un alt element creator de dubii il constituie prezenta in avionul respectiv a unui inspector de la Departmentul Aviatiei Civile, cu numele de Nevrozeanu, care nu figureaza pe lista pasagerilor si cu privire la care s-a stabilit ca, in trecut, se deplasa cu avionul in cazuri speciale doar pe relatia Moscova, fiind un bun cunoscator al limbii ruse.  Mai multi pasageri sustin ca in partea dreapta din fata a avionului au sesizat un grup de barbati, mai inalti, atletici, imbracati sportiv, multi dintre ei fiind blonzi, grup care li s-a parut suspect.  Aceste afirmatii se coroboreaza cu faptul ca in zona respectiva a avionului nu a stat nici unul din pasagerii identificati.  Mai mult, verificindu-se la hotelurile din municipiul Sibiu persoane care aveau numele celor 37 de persoane neidentificate, s-a constatat ca doar un pasager neidentificat care figureaza pe listele TAROM-ului cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, care nu exista la adresa respectiva din localitate, a fost cazat la hotelul Bulevard, dar in registrul de evidenta figureaza cu un alt domiciliu din Bucuresti.  Ambele domicilii, si cei din diagrama TAROM si cel de la hotel sint false.  Cu ocazia acelorasi verificari s-a constatat ca in perioada respectiva in hotelurile din Sibiu au fost cazati multi turisti sovietici, in special la Imparatul Romanilor, Continental, si Bulevard, situate in zona centrala a municipiului.  Fac mentiunea ca din hotelurile respective s-a tras asupra manifestantilor si a armatei. Am omis sa precizez ca pe aeroportul Otopeni, in avionul ROMBAC au fost incarcate sute de colete identice ca format, dimensiuni si culoare, de marime apropriata unei genti diplomat, precum si ca, cu citeva minute inaintea decolarii cursei spre Sibiu, de pe acelasi aeroport au decolat curse ROMBAC spre Timisoara si Arad.  Consider ca, in legatura cu pasagerii neidentificati, sint posibile doua versiuni, respectiv sa fie au fost luptatorii U.S.L.A. trimisi in sprijinul lui Nicu Ceausescu, fie au fost agenti sovietici trimisi sa actioneze in scopul rasturnarii regimului Ceausescu.

Monica N. Marginean:  Ce alte demersuri a facut Comisia de ancheta pentru elucidarea misterului celor 37 de pasageri neidentificati?

Marian Valer:  Am luat contact cu unul din loctiitorii comandamentului trupelor U.S.L.A. din capitala, caruia i-am solicitat sa-mi puna la dispozitie pe cei trei insotitori U.S.L.A. ai avionului ROMBAC.  Loctiitorul mi-a spus ca acestia au fost audiati de un procuror militar si nu mai este de acord sa fie audiati inca o data.

Monica M. Maginean:  “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html (Submitted via the CIA publication review process January 2002, cleared without changes March 2002)

Reports Archive

East European Perspectives: April 17, 2002

17 April 2002, Volume  4, Number  8

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

Part 2: ‘Tourists Are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns…’ *

HOW THE ‘TOURISTS’ ENTRY INTO THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989 PARALLELS THE EXIT OF THE SECURITATE
In commenting in August 1990 upon how the details of the state’s case against him had changed since early in the year, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, ironically highlighted how Securitate forces had begun to fade away from the historiography of the December 1989 events. In the August 1990 interview from his prison cell with Ion Cristoiu’s “Zig-Zag” (mentioned above), Nicu discusses the “tourists” for which he was asked to find accommodations in the context of a group of mysterious passengers who had arrived by plane from Bucharest on the evening of 20 December 1989. We know that in the period immediately following these events, the then-military prosecutor, Anton Socaciu, had alleged that these passengers from Bucharest were members of the Securitate’s elite USLA unit (Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare) and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred in Sibiu during the December events (for a discussion, see Hall, 1996). In August 1990, however, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

The impact of this “reconsideration” by the authorities could be seen in the comments of Socaciu’s successor as military prosecutor in charge of the Sibiu case, Marian Valer (see Hall 1997a, pp. 314-315). Valer commented in September 1990 that investigations yielded the fact that there were 37 unidentified passengers on board the 20 December flight from Bucharest and that many of the other passengers maintained that “on the right side of the plane there had been a group of tall, athletic men, dressed in sporting attire, many of them blond, who had raised their suspicions.” While investigations revealed that during this time there “were many Soviet tourists staying in Sibiu’s hotels,” they also established that “military units were fired upon from Securitate safehouses located around these units as of the afternoon of 22 December, after the overturning of the Ceausescu regime.” He thus carefully concludes:

“As far as the unidentified passengers are concerned, there are two possible variants: Either they were USLA fighters sent to defend Nicu Ceausescu, or they were Soviet agents sent to act with the intent of overthrowing the Ceausescu regime” (“Expres,” no. 33, September 1990).

Thus, as the “tourists” began to enter the historiography of the December 1989 events, so the Securitate — specifically the USLA — began to disappear.

http://portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=3.615

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #615 on: March 08, 2010, 15:31:24 PM »

Fac apel la oricine care a fost in seara de 21 spre 22 (ora 11,30-11,50) pe strada(actuala)Revolutiei, sau a vazut autoturismele parcate vis-sa vis de fosta Brutarie Nesciuc trei albe si una rosu inchis “Lada”. Va intreb daca cele 11 persoane imbracate cu scurta albastre tip jeans,  pantaloni deschisi la culoare, doi cu caciula de blana, trei cu caciula de lana impletita de culoare inchisa, si restul cu capul gol care au intors autoturismele parcate din capatul strazii si incendierea acestora? Statura lor era atletica? Cine a mai vazut apoi aceste persoane (acest gen) in afara de Piatza Mare din 21 decembrie ora 11,30 cand l-au protejat pe domnul care a iesit in fatza scutierilor cu copilul ridicat pe maini? (in dreptul Casei Albastre)
Aceleasi persoane au fost si in data de 21 decembrie la ora 9 in fata intrarii in magazinul Dumbrava, cand au “jenat” fara nici o teama scutierii si politistii care incercau sa prinda persoanele care fugeau prin magazin…Mai apelez la locatarii Blocului de garsoniere “turn” din coltul Calea Dumbravii-Milea, sa ne trimita o informatie cu intamplarile din 23-25 de la etajul 7-8, cu persoanele in combinezon de culoare inchisa care au coborat pe partea dinspre magazin din balcon in balcon, inclusiv despre persoana decedata, daca are legatura cu acel incident.O alta intrebare extrem de importanta: stie cineva cine a organizat “filtrele” de pe strazile Sibiului?Va multumesc
O precizare: Autoturismele erau parcate pe str Dobrun inspre str. Berariei Era pe trotoarul brutariei particulare (Nescuc sau Cibu, nu mai stiu cum se chema)

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #623 on: March 11, 2010, 14:16:55 PM »

Acesti emanati, aceste lichele, nu-si puteau face jocurile, acapararea puterii totale, precum si inaintasii lor Dej si Ceausescu, decat prin forta represiunii armate. Parte din armata a reactionat pasnic, datorita onor ofitzeri care au dovedit mai multa logica, parte din armata a jucat rolul de dusman al romanilor. La Sibiu, avem tot mai multe date care intaresc teoria ca Dragomir a fost teroristul Nr. 1 in acele zile, ajutat si de grupul USLA trimis de la Bucuresti la Sibiu, pentru protectia lui NC, si care s-au reantors la “locul faptei” dupa ce l-a pus pe Nicu in siguranta. Ei au fost aceia care au comis executiile din Piatza Mare in ziua de 21 decembrie ora 11,45 cu primele victime ucise sau ranite. Au fost repartizati in patru puncte ale pietii: In podul Casei Albastre, in podul actualei Primarii, in podul de deasupra Tunelului Generalului si in podul de deasupra magazinului Moda. De aici, au deschis foc inspre demonstranti. Au deschis foc si pe data de 22 decembrie inspre hotelul Imparatul Romanilor din acelasi pod de deasupra Tunelului Generalului care avea corespondent cu celelalte poduri dinspre magazinul Covorul. Aceste grupe ale USLA nu aveau insemne de grad sau arma, nu purtau boneta militara si aveau la dispozitie doua microbuze ale unitatii 01512 care i-a transportat in tot acest timp. Un grup al USLA era incepand din ziua de 21 decembrie ora 07 la sediul Judetenei de partid, ocupand garajul din curtea din sapate cu munitie si armament special. Se poate descoperi foarte repede, numele persoanelor care au fost trimise la SIBIU cu Rombacul in dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, ca urmare a convorbirilor indelungate purtate de Nicu si Bucuresti, despre demonstratia anuntata pentru dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie de la Mag Dumbrava. In timpul convorbirii telefonice, in biroul lui Nicu se afla Traian Popsa, fostul director de la IJIM Sibiu, maiorul Dragomir, seful Garzilor judetene Pescaru, secretar al CJPCR Sibiu si Niculae Hurubean, prim secretar la Alba care se afla in trecere prin Sibiu. Aceste trupe USLA au purtat alternativ, combinezoane negre, uniforma militara sau haine civile…

————————————————————————————————————————————

Perhaps it should thus no be so surprising, that of all the people to talk with a former “KGB agent” in Romania, it was Sorin Rosca Stanescu, former USLA collaborator:

HOW THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH NEVERTHELESS GAINED MAINSTREAM CREDIBILITY AND ACCEPTANCE
How, then, did the “tourist” myth gain credibility and acceptance in the Romanian press, given its rather obvious pedigree in the remnants of the Ceausescu regime, especially among former high-ranking Securitate officers and others most in need of an alibi/diversion to save their careers and avoid the possibility of going to jail? Although the reference to “tourists” during the December events probably entered the lexicon of mainstream reporting on the Revolution as early as April 1990 — not insignificantly, first in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s weekly “Zig-Zag,” it appears — it was in particular journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu who gave the theme legitimacy in the mainstream press.

Without specifying the term “tourists” — but clearly speaking in the same vein — Stanescu was probably the first to articulate the thesis most precisely and to tie the Soviet angle to it. In June 1990 in a piece entitled “Is The Conspiracy of Silence Breaking Down?” in the sharply anti-government daily “Romania libera,” Stanescu wrote:

“And still in connection with the breaking down of the conspiracy of silence, in the army there is more and more insistent talk about the over 4,000 Lada cars with two men per car that traveled many different roads in the days before the Revolution and then disappeared” (“Romania libera,” 14 June 1990).

Stanescu’s article was vigorously anti-FSN and anti-Iliescu and left little doubt that this thesis was part of the “unofficial” history of the December events, injurious to the new leaders, and something they did not wish to see published or wish to clarify.

But it was Stanescu’s April 1991 article in “Romania libera,” entitled “Is Iliescu Being Protected By The KGB?,” that truly gave impetus to the “tourist” thesis. Stanescu wrote:

“A KGB officer wanders in France. He is losing his patience and searching for a way to get to Latin America. Yesterday I met him in Paris. He talked to me after finding out that I was a Romanian journalist. He fears the French press. He knows Romanian and was in Timisoara in December 1989. As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania? Witness what the anonymous Soviet officer related to me in Paris:

‘There existed an intervention plan that for whatever reason was not activated. I received the order to enter Romania on 14 December and to head for Timisoara. Myself and my colleague were armed. During the events, we circulated in the military zone around Calea Girocului [Giriocul Road]. Those who headed toward Bucharest had the same mission. Several larger cities were targeted. We were to open fire in order to create a state of confusion. I never, however, received such an order. I left Romania on 26 December.’

I don’t have any reason to suspect the validity of these revelations. This short confession is naturally incomplete, but not inconclusive. What purpose would this elaborate, but aborted, KGB plan have had? The only plausible explanation is that it wasn’t necessary for KGB agents to intervene. The events were unfolding in the desired direction without need for the direct intervention of the Soviets. But this leads to other questions: What did the Ceausescu couple know, but were not allowed to say [prior to their hurried execution]? Why is Securitate General Vlad being held in limbo? To what degree has President Iliescu maintained ties to the Soviets? What are the secret clauses of the Friendship Treaty recently signed in Moscow? Is Iliescu being protected by the KGB or not? Perhaps the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor, the Romanian Information Service] would like to respond to these questions?”

Stanescu’s April 1991 article did not go unnoticed — despite its nondescript placement on page eight — and has since received recognition and praise from what might seem unexpected corners. For example, previously-discussed former Securitate Colonel Filip Teodorescu cited extensive excerpts from Stanescu’s article in his 1992 book on the December events, and he added cryptically:

“Moreover, I don’t have any reason to suspect that the journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu would have invented a story in order to come to the aid of those accused, by the courts or by public opinion, for the results of the tragic events of December 1989” (Teodorescu, 1992, pp. 92-94).

Radu Balan, former Timis County party secretary, imprisoned for his role in the December events, has also invoked Stanescu’s April 1991 article as proof of his revisionist view that “tourists” rather than “non-existent ‘terrorists'” were to blame for the December 1989 bloodshed:

“…[W]hile at Jilava [the jail where he was imprisoned at the time of the interview, in October 1991], I read ‘Romania libera’ from 18 April. And Rosca Stanescu writes from Paris that a KGB agent who deserted the KGB and is in transit to the U.S. stated that on 18 December [1989] he had the mission to create panic on Calea Girocului [a thoroughfare in Timisoara]. What is more, on the 18th, these 11 cars were at the top of Calea Girocului, where I saw them. I was dumbfounded, I tell you. I didn’t tell anybody. Please study ‘Romania libera,’ the last page, from 18 April 1991” (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October1991).

In this regard, it would be irresponsible to totally discount the relevance of Rosca Stanescu’s past. Since December 1989, Stanescu has undeniably been a vigorous critic of, and made damaging revelations about, the Securitate’s institutional heir, the SRI, and the Iliescu regime, and he has frequently written ill of the former Securitate and the Ceausescu regime. Nevertheless, in 1992 it was leaked to the press — and Rosca Stanescu himself confirmed — that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s he was an informer for the Securitate (for a discussion, see Hall, 1997b, pp. 111-113). What was significant, however, was precisely for which branch of the Securitate Rosca Stanescu had been an informer: the USLA.

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html

BUT WAIT, THERE’S MORE…A “SOVIET TOURIST” ENCORE IN 1990

Add to all of this (!), the allegations that the “Soviet tourists” were seen again on the streets during major crises in 1990, such as the ethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 (for evidence of the reach of the allegation of KGB manipulation via the “tourist” mechanism both in December 1989 AND in March 1990, see Emil Hurezeanu, “Cotidianul,” 23 December 1999; according to Hurezeanu, “It appears they didn’t leave the country until 1991, following a visit by [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu to Moscow”!).  Then there is the famous April 1991 interview of an alleged KGB officer—who spoke flawless Romania and was in Romania during the December 1989 events—who the interviewer, the vigorous anti-Iliescu foe, Sorin Rosca Stanescu, claimed to have just stumbled into in Paris.  Of all the reporters who could have stumbled into a KGB officer present in Romania during the Revolution—the only such case I know of—it was Rosca Stanescu, who, it turned out later, had been an informer for the Securitate until the mid-1980s—but not just for anybody, but for the USLA.  Intererstingly, although the article appeared on the non-descript page 8 of the primary opposition daily at the time (“Romania Libera”), the aforementioned Filip Teodorescu and Radu Balan invoked it in support of their contentions regarding the the “tourists” (for a discussion of this, see Hall 2002).  Even more suprising, or not, depending on your point of view, in his April 1991 article, Stanescu attempted to tie together December 1989 with December 1990 (!):

“As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil [in December 1989] of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania?” (emphasis added) (“Romania Libera,” 18 April 1991)

(This points again to the idea that, to the extent the claim has any truth to it–and clearly, as always, there is an exaggeration of numbers–these “Soviet tourists” were of domestic manufacture.)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/

In addition, it is interesting to note that senior former Securitate officials like to point out that the cars being used were…”brand-new”…suggesting that they had not been used before…something you might expect for equipment to be used in a contingency plan.

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

Part 2: ‘Tourists Are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns…’ *

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html

Not to be out-done, Cluj Securitate chief Ion Serbanoiu claimed in a 1991 interview that, as of 21 December 1989, there were over 800 Russian and Hungarian tourists, mostly driving almost brand-new Lada automobiles (but also Dacia and Wartburg cars), in the city (interview with Angela Bacescu in “Europa,” no. 55, December 1991).

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In February 1991 during his trial, former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad, not surprisingly, also spoke of “massive groups of Soviet tourists…the majority were men…deploy[ing] in a coordinated manner in a convoy of brand-new Lada automobiles” (see Bunea, 1994, pp. 460-461),

Radu Balan, former Timis County party boss, picks up the story from there. While serving a prison sentence for his complicity in the Timisoara repression, in 1991 Balan told one of Ceausescu’s most famous “court poets,” Adrian Paunescu, that on the night of 18-19 December — during which in reality some 40 cadavers were secretly transported from Timisoara’s main hospital to Bucharest for cremation (reputedly on Elena Ceausescu’s personal order) — he too witnessed the role of these “foreign agents”:

“We had been receiving information, in daily bulletins, from the Securitate, that far more people were returning from Yugoslavia and Hungary than were going there and about the presence of Lada automobiles filled with Soviets. I saw them at the border and the border posts, and the cars were full. I wanted to know where and what they were eating and how they were crossing the border and going through cities and everywhere. More telling, on the night of 18-19 December, when I was at a fire at the I.A.M. factory, in front of the county hospital, I spotted 11 white ‘Lada’ automobiles at 1 a.m. in the morning. They pretended to ask me the road to Buzias�.The 11 white Ladas had Soviet plates, not Romanian ones, and were in front of the hospital” (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October 1991).

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/

[Timis County party boss] Radu Balan ‘remembers’ that on 18 December at midnight when he was heading toward IAEM, he passed a group of ten soviet cars stopped 100 meters from the county hospital. (It turns out that in this night, in the sight of the Soviets, the corpses were loaded!).” [emphasis in the original] (Flacara, no. 27, 1991, p. 9).

 

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ )

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

Efectivele care desfasoara actiuni in cadrul lupte de rezistenta se vor dota corespunzator misiunilor incredintate.  Materialele  necesare vor fi realizate din cele aflate in dotarea unitatilor sau din depozitele special create in locuri ascunse, din capturi de la inamic, trimitere pe calea aerului sau alte surse…

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The Securitate, in recounting their version of what happened in December 1989, love to point out how their official stockpiles of arms were sealed when the Ceausescus fled by helicopter at approximately 12:00 on 22 December 1989.  (Even this is only partially true.)  Military Prosecutor General Dan Voinea, and many researchers of December 1989–including some of the best among them, such as Peter Siani-Davies, repeat claims similar to this–or to the extent that they acknowledge Securitate weapons might have been used, they suggest, as does Siani-Davies, that we cannot just assume that the Securitate used them, but that they may have fallen into the hands of civilians, the Patriotic Guards, the Army, etc.  None of this, however, accounts for the fact that from injured civilians, to domestic and foreign doctors who operated on them, to military officers, have attested to the existence, use, and discovery of atypical munitions not in the Army’s arsenal–namely the use of exploding Dum-Dum bullets and/or “vidia” bullets.  The Securitate appear to be generally correct:  these weren’t in their normal stockpiles.  But they didn’t use those.  Naturally, in the context of an assumed foreign invasion and occupation, they could not bank on access to such stockpiles, which would probably have fallen into the hands of the enemy.  Instead, they would have to rely on hidden stockpiles, secret deposits strategically placed in major cities and outside of them, that only they knew about, and that could be accessed in the case of foreign occupation.  Also, one can assume the scruples that they might have had with regard to the use of such munitions against their own unarmed people–although given what happened, it turns out they didn’t have many scruples after all–did not apply to an invading and occupying foreign force–hence the preparation of such munitions.  Moreover, after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December, the character of the terrorist actions were very much in keeping with what we might expect from a “resistance war” (lupta de rezistenta):  as some have noted in recounting what happened, if they were unarmed they seemed to be able to move with reasonable ease and not great fear of being shot…however, if they were armed they became a target, and could receive a sniper shot to the head or chest (something of which a civilian with little familiarity with arms or access to them before 22 December 1989 would have been unlikely to be able to pull off).

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“Saptamina trecuta am incheiat un ciclu de 2 saptamini de pregatire si examinare, la Baneasa, pentru obtinerea gradului de subofiter.  Acest ciclu l-am efectuat la Baneasa, deoarece stagiul militar de 9 luni, l-am satisfacut intr-o unitate apartinind Securitatii Statului.

–Ce specific a avut pregatirea?

Am fost antrenati pentru lupta de gherila urbana, in caz de agresiune externa.  Eram organizati in grupuri mici care actionau pentru destabilizarea inamicului, pe teritoriul ocupat de el.

–S-au facut afirmatii in perioada revolutiei, ca nu exista trupe specializate in gherila urbana!  Este adevarat?

Nu!  In cazul in care se face exceptie de notiunea de inamic strain sau agresiune externa, pregatire multor generatii de militari au acest specific.

–Ati fi activat doar in termenul celor 9 luni?

Nu!  Noi sintem la dispozitia lor in permanenta.  Putem fi convocati telefonic sau printr-o alta modalitate conspirativa.  Existe case conspirative si depozite de munitie in plin Bucuresti, de unde ne-am fi aprovizionat cu armament si munitie pentru a efectua ambuscade, aruncari in aer si altele.

–Considerati ca dupa revolutie lucrurile s-au schimbat, cum apreciati ca ati fost chemat tot la o unitate fosta a Securitatii?

Am fost indignati si chiar ne-am manifestat in sensul acesta!  La toate intrebarile noastre n-am primit raspuns.  De abia la sfirsitul stagiului am aflat ca ne-am pregatit, de fapt, la trupele de jandarmi.

–Si pina atunci?

Col. Porumbelu ne-a tacut un mic istoric din care am sa citez:  “Din 22 dec. in 28 am fost teroristi!  Din 28 pina in martie am fost M.Ap.N.-isti.  Pina pe 5 iulie sintem trupe de jandarmi….

 [Dinu Ispas, “Baneasa–Comedie muta ’90” Expres, iulie? /august ? 1990, p. ?]

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Stiu ca in zilele de 23-25 XII 1989, din circa 150 sesizari facute de cetateni 48 s-au dovedit intemeiate in sensul ca, in punctele indicate, s-au gasit depozite de arme.  Deci nu exista “taina absoluta.”  Depozitul de arme gasit in blocul Scala, prabusit la cutremur, era tot al USLA, deci de mult a fost pregatita actiunea.  Avem de a face cu o organizatie criminala pregatita de un stat impotriva populatiei sale.  — N.F., pensionar, Bucuresti.  “Voi ati tras in noi, noi va salvam viata!” 22, nr. 5 (16 februarie 1990), p. 10.  Now available online at http://www.revista22.ro/nou/arhivapdf/5_1990.pdf .

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from Gardianul 16 December 2005

(Virgil Magureanu before the Parliamentary Commission investigating the events of December 1989):

Vreau sa va spun ca tot atunci a venit tot un subordonat de-al meu, locotenent-colonel Chilin, si era seful informatiilor la brigada antiterorista

Nicolaescu: Ati stat de vorba cu un general de Securitate, ati luat niste securisti cu dv., ati plecat la televiziune sa aparati televiziunea, impotriva cui? Cu cine credeati dv. ca luptati?

Magureanu: Dl, noi am presupus ca insurgentii erau cei care nu doreau prabusirea regimului; indiferent cine erau aceia; dar noi am vazut ca televiziunea era in primejdie de a scapa din mana celor care dadusera anatema regimului Ceausescu si erau vadit impotriva. Acolo taberele erau cei pro si impotriva regimului Ceausescu.

Asa am apreciat atunci.

Si asa imi mentin aprecierea si azi. De principiu.

Ma rog, aflasem mai multe lucruri. Despre niste depozite de armament (Chilin mi-a zis) de pe traseul de la Piata Palatului spre iesirea din Bucuresti de unde se aproviziona Securitatea atunci cand pazea traseul, despre niste subterane in care ar exista, de asemenea, armament si munitie, subterane care trebuiau luate in posesie si sa fie vazut ce e acolo. (In other words, an USLA official confirmed that the Securitate had deposits of arms and munitions along routes in Bucharest.)

(“If memory serves correct, years later in Curierul National, Andronic was to refer to finding out about the collapsing of the Ceausescu regime from USLA officer, Alexandru Ioan Kilin.”  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/05/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-9-orwellian-sanitywont-get-fooled-again/ , for a mention of Kilin see also  http://ohanesian.wordpress.com/2010/07/11/tiganul-din-dosarul-carlos-sacalul/)

Nicolaescu: De cine sa fie luate in posesie?

http://www.newspad.ro/Magureanu-In-decembrie-1989-TVR-nu-era-atacata-de-teroristi-ci-de-insurgenti,66491.html

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Magureanu: In decembrie 1989, TVR nu era atacata de «teroristi», ci de insurgenti

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Magureanu: In decembrie 1989, TVR nu era atacata de «teroristi», ci de insurgenti
16 decembrie 2005

Magureanu: Si am ajuns. Oamenii de acolo, cand am aparut eu, sigur ca s-au strans in jurul meu. Vreau sa va spun ca tot atunci a venit tot un subordonat de-al meu, locotenent-colonel Chilin, si era seful informatiilor la brigada antiterorista. S-au grupat pur si simplu in jurul meu ca nici ei nu aveau cu cine sta de vorba acolo. Militarii aveau sarcinile lor in dispozitiv, ceilalti, politicienii erau cu preocuparile lor si ingrijorarile lor, iar eu disponibil.

Nicolaescu: Ati plecat de la Eforie, cam la ce ora si cati insi?

Magureanu: Dl Nicolaescu deci toate acestea s-au petrecut pana in dupa-amiaza; ora nu o stiu cu precizie si traseul a fost dificil. Ca sa nu fim opriti, deci a fost o dubita si cateva masini cu toti astia. Cred ca nu erau in civili, cred ca erau totusi in kaki, dar trebuie sa-i intrebam chiar pe ei. Oamenii au venit cu automatele, s-au asezat in dispozitiv, in partea dinspre Dorobanti.

Nicolaescu: La cine v-ati prezentat cu ei la televiziune? La ce poarta?

Magureanu: Daca nu ma insel, era generalul Tudor care-i repartiza in dispozitiv de aparare. I-am dus acolo, i-am lasat si oamenii si-au vazut de treaba lor in continuare.

Nicolaescu: Si dv. ati plecat mai departe?

Magureanu: Pe urma ce-a fost? A venit, ca iarasi ma cunosteau, se lipise de mine un inginer de la un institut de cercetari, care a si ramas cu mine, a aparut acolo a fost o cunostinta de-a mea, altul care a incercat sa-l contactez, fara succes, fostul general la politie generalul Penciuc. A fost trecut in rezerva. Prin 1983-1984 i-am facut o vizita la Baneasa. Nu a percutat in nici un fel. Si el stie o multime de lucruri despre ce s-a intamplat in decembrie. Dumitru Penciuc. Nu mai stiu ce functie a avut. Dar a venit la mine in 23 la amiaza. Chilin a venit si au mai venit inca si ne-au spus o serie de lucruri pe care noi am socotit ca e bine sa le transmitem in forma aceea celor de la aparare si dlui Iliescu.

Nicolaescu: Ati stat de vorba cu un general de Securitate, ati luat niste securisti cu dv., ati plecat la televiziune sa aparati televiziunea, impotriva cui? Cu cine credeati dv. ca luptati?

Magureanu: Dl, noi am presupus ca insurgentii erau cei care nu doreau prabusirea regimului; indiferent cine erau aceia; dar noi am vazut ca televiziunea era in primejdie de a scapa din mana celor care dadusera anatema regimului Ceausescu si erau vadit impotriva. Acolo taberele erau cei pro si impotriva regimului Ceausescu.

Asa am apreciat atunci.

Si asa imi mentin aprecierea si azi. De principiu.

Ma rog, aflasem mai multe lucruri. Despre niste depozite de armament (Chilin mi-a zis) de pe traseul de la Piata Palatului spre iesirea din Bucuresti de unde se aproviziona Securitatea atunci cand pazea traseul, despre niste subterane in care ar exista, de asemenea, armament si munitie, subterane care trebuiau luate in posesie si sa fie vazut ce e acolo.

Nicolaescu: De cine sa fie luate in posesie?

Magureanu: De catre cei care-si asumasera noua putere. Totusi se infiripase acolo. Nu era la televiziune intr-un dispozitiv care se raliasera evenimentelor? Si intr-un fel sau altul cei care luptau pentru apararea televiziunii trebuiau sa stie si unde sunt punctele de rezistenta ale celor care se opuneau.

Nicolaescu: Nu va suparati pe mine pentru ca vreau sa lamuresc.

Magureanu: Dle Nicolaescu nu cred ca sunt aici pentru sentimente precum suparare sau altceva.

Deci, sa stiti, treaba cu depozitele s-a dovedit nereala ulterior. Era Penciuc, inginerul asta de care va spun.

A, era sa-mi scape un amanunt. Cand am ajuns acolo si am stat de vorba cu Mortoiu, mi-a zis: “Toti isi iau arme automate. Luati-va si dv. macar un pistol, un pistolet”. Eu nu am purtat in viata mea arma. Nici acum nu o port. Este o chestie de psihologie personala.

Insa atunci s-a insistat “ia-l ca nu se stie ce se poate intampla”. Nu-mi dadeam seama ce se poate intampla si nici ce as face eu cu o arma pentru ca nu sunt capabil sa traga cineva.

In fine, daca a insistat si ca sa scap de gura lui am zis “bine domnule”. S-a nimerit ca nu a fost magazionerul acolo si am plecat fara, mai tarziu.

Nicolaescu: Ceilalti cum au luat arme daca nu era magazionerul acolo?”

Magureanu: Automatele mari erau intr-un loc anume. Oamenii nu aveau arme asupra lor, dar atunci li s-au distribuit arme si munitie din dotarea unitatii.

Pistoletele aveau probabil un alt regim. In orice caz, omul care trebuia sa-mi dea nu era.

Ca sa nu fim banuiti de altceva s-a scris pe pancarte: “Noua securitate a poporului”. Pe la Universitate am fost oprit si inca in vreo doua locuri. Si oamenii bombaneau “bine, bine numai sa fie noua”.

Mergem cu masini. Am ajuns fara incidente la TV. S-au repartizat in dispozitiv, tirul era “in draci”.

Reconstituirea traseului, daca are vreo importanta pot s-o fac dupa ce stau de vorba cu cei care au fost acolo.

In sfarsit, ce vroia sa spun. Doua ore mai tarziu hotarasem sa ne ducem la armata sa le spunem alora de depozit, de subterane, imi facusera capul calendar. Dl Chilin poate sa vina sa depuna aici. Acum s-a privatizat.

Si aceasta problema este un capitol separat (cu privatizarea).

Cand am iesit din TV ca sa mergem la armata (eram Peciuc si altii, nu-mi aduc aminte, eram cu o masina. Erau doua grupuri; unul mai mare si unul mai mic in stari diferite de luciditate. In Piata Aviatorilor – grupuri care stateau pe margini in partea dinspre Arcul de Triumf. Primul grup era de 15-20, curios este ca desi nu aveau imbracaminte neobisnuita, toti au trecut, pe mine m-au oprit. Am trecut de primul grup la al doilea mi s-a infundat. M-au buzunarit, au confruntat actele; daca gasea si pistolul, eram terminat. Cred ca cu ala ma impuscau. Nu am mai putut trece de ei. S-a produs o busculada. Era o dunga de la caciula si au zis “asta avea cascheta aici, e securist, e terorist, puneti mana pe el. Mai aveam inca in buzunar si biletele de tren. M-au tot inghesuit ca nu puteau sa gaseasca ceva. Toti cu care eram plecasera, singurul care ramasese cu mine era inginerasul acela de la institutul de cercetari. Unul din grupul acela, mai lucid, mi-a zis: “Dle uite astia vor sa-ti faca ceva, mai bine te legam, te punem intr-o Raba si te ducem la militie sa te indentifice. Eu aveam acte la mine, dar actele alea nu le spuneau nimic. Ne-am dus la postul de militie din dreapta statuii Aviatorilor si am stat vreo trei orei. Deci legat la maini pe mine si pe inginerul de care v-am spus.

Raposatul Stark a dat telefon de la TV sa-mi dea drumul. Numai asa mi-au dat drumul. M-am intors la TV.

Hossu: De unde stiau sa sune la TV?

Magureanu: Eu le-am dat sugestia. Le-am spus: Sunati la TV” ca de acolo am venit, nu am venit din alta parte.

Sabin Ivan: Din tot grupul cum de v-a luat tocmai pe dv.?

Magureanu: Nici eu nu-mi pot explica. Probabil ca au intuit ce o sa ajung eu.

Sabin Ivan: Pai asta era ideea. Nu-i tineti minte pe aia?

Magureanu: Nu.

Nicolaescu: Nu cumva totusi cineva din aia v-a recunoscut?

Magureanu: Nu. In mod sigur, nu.

Daca incidentul prezinta importanta, in nume personal eu oricum puteam sa fiu terminat acolo. Daca as fi avut ceva de ascuns va dati seama ca nu-l reproduceam.

Ivan Sabin: De ce l-ati reprodus totusi, ca nu e asa important?

Magureanu: Ar trebui sa va decideti dl. Am remarcat ca nu aveti decat intepaturi pentru mine.

Deci dlor ne-am intors la televiziune.

In 23 seara la circa o ora-doua a venit dl Iliescu, abia atunci am putut sa stam de vorba si am plecat impreuna cu niste TAB-uri la Aparare. Era cu noi Voican. Motanu, Babone – care a si produs un incident in noaptea aceea, cred ca era securist, dar de proasta calitate. Dl Iliescu nu-i cunostea.

Vreau sa va spun un lucru, care cred ca ma disocia fata de ceilalti. Multi s-au bagat acolo, in grupul acela cam fara nici o legatura cu ceea ce se intamplase. Si multi au avut grija sa apara pe urma in umbra actualului presedinte (eventual barba, sa li se vada).

Sabin Ivan: Astia au ramas in continuare langa presedinte?

Magureanu: Dar dv. stiti aceste lucruri. In orice caz de aceea am intrebat pe dl Iliescu daca-i cunoaste pentru ca anturajul devenise incert, dupa parerea mea. Prea multa lume civila si intamplatoare in sediul Apararii. Si orice ar fi cand e vorba de armata si de militarie in actiuni de acest gen, multi incurca “batatura”.

Acolo erau perdelele trase, o canonada in draci. Se discuta “cam la podea”. Cand am intrat acolo, proaspatul numit ministru Militaru s-a apropiat de dl Iliescu si i-a spus ca situatia tinde sa scape de sub control. Si a inceput sa insire escadrile de elicoptere dinspre mare, desant aerian, coloane de blindate pe Oltenitei si inca vreo doua din astea.

Platica: Ati amintit adineauri de proaspat numitul ministru. Deci in seara de 23?

Magureanu: Deci Militaru era acolo in calitatea de care eu va vorbesc acum.

Platica: Din discutiile avute cu ceilalti, aceasta numire a fost plasata in ziua de 24 din punct de vedere sa-i spunem formal, iar de drept, din 25 sau 26.

Magureanu: E posibil ca semnarea acestei numiri sa fi fost ulterioara, insa Militaru era in tinuta militara. Oricum el a fost primul care s-a apropiat de Ion Iliescu si i-a prezentat ceea ce v-am spus. Nu stiu cata insemnatate are data, s-ar putea de vreme ce m-ati intrebat, dar efectiv eu asa tin minte; ca in seara de 23 el era deja ministrul apararii. Dar bineinteles se poate reconstitui. Poate fi intrebat si dl Iliescu, Stanculescu. Dragos Munteanu actual ambasador la Washington. M-as fi mirat sa nu fie asa pentru ca de un ministru al apararii in acel moment este evident ca era nevoie.

Platica: Este evident ca era, dar tocmai de atunci incolo se mai pun niste intrebari. Stiti cumva la sugestia cui s-a facut aceasta numire? Pentru ca era inca o situatie de provizorat. Chiar dv. mai adineauri ati spus ca ati ramas oarecum mirat de configuratia formulei care exista in cadrul ministerului. Cum de s-a ajuns la aceasta numire a dlui Militaru?

Magureanu: Nu sunt in masura sa va raspund eu. Eu v-am relatat situatia care am vazut-o acolo. Poate ca intrebati chiar pe impricinat.

Va rog permiteti sa derulez noaptea acea de 23-24, dupa care va rog foarte mult programati-ma la o data care o considerati dv. convenabila ca sa revin sa reluam amanuntit.

Deci in 23-24, lucrurile au mers ca asa. Pe un fond de razboi psihologic foarte dens, Militaru a spus atunci ceea ce v-am spus. Poate s-o confirme, poate ca a si comunicat-o. In acel moment, generalul Stanculescu, care era de fata, a zis ca “nu crede ca 95% pot fi adevarate”. Este mai degraba o alarma falsa. Deci cel care a incercat sa dea o imagine mai moderata a fost Stanculescu. Cu mai mult realism, mai multa luciditate.

Canonada era in toi. Si atunci s-a presupus ca MAN era inconjurat de profesionistii in terorism care intentioneau sa distruga creierul apararii militare. Si pe acest fond a aparut acolo un personaj, defunctul Ardeleanu, fostul sef al USLA, cu care regret ca nu am stat mai mult de vorba cu el.

Nu-mi aduc aminte daca Vlad era, in orice caz era in alta incapere daca era.

Mai era si cu cineva din fostii mai-marelui regim, un personaj de prim-rang langa Ardeleanu, pentru ca ei pe urma au fost izolati. In orice caz, incerc sa-mi aduc aminte pana data viitoare.

Sursa: Gardianul

destituirea 2 years ago

– Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,343

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/usla-bula-trosca-militaru-m-ap-n/

(Sergiu Nicolaescu, Cartea revolutiei romane.  Decembrie ’89, 1999, p. 217.)

Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,

comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv.  Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoara–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/01/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribui-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/04/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-ii/

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/16/dosarele-revolutiei-si-expertize-balistice-cine-a-tras-in-voi-cu-gloante-explozive/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/06/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-iii/

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/08/decembrie-1989-gloante-speciale-sau-ce-s-a-mai-gasit-in-cladirea-directiei-a-v-a/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/cine-a-tras-dupa-22-cine-au-fost-teroristii-inca-o-dovada-de-adevar-ce-lipseste-din-cartea-lui-marian-romanescu-fost-uslas/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/03/decembrie-1989-securitatea-si-lupta-pe-teritoriul-vremelnic-ocupat/

As I previously wrote here:  it appears the Securitate was accorded a critical, if rarely discussed role in contingency plans for a possible invasion and occupation of Romanian territory, the so-called lupta de rezistenta (“resistance war”) or lupta pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat (“war on temporarily occupied territory”)–which explains the “strange” and “anonmalous” characteristics of the “terrorists” after 22 December 1989.  (It is this which I believe also in part explains the refusal and reluctance of Romanian authorities to clarify the identity, intentions, and actions of the “terrorists” of December 1989.)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

This hypothesis gains confirmation from the following discussion found at http://fortespeciale.ro/securitatea-si-fortele-speciale/

– In 1989 USLA a avut mai multe interventii efectuate cu profesionalism, intre care una intr-un bloc dintr-un cartier bucurestean, interventie in urma careia au fost lichidati trei “teroristi” (dupa dotare -pistoale Makarov- probabil tot colegi de-ai lor, din alt compartiment, destinat luptei pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat).

This appears to be a reference to an incident that transpired at the Hotel Ambasador in Bucuresti, which was mentioned in the following interview with Army Col. Ilie Stoleru by Mihail Galatanu in Flacara in July 1992 (see bottom of column 3 second xerox).

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Indeed, the very clearly knowledgeable author of the above page(s) and information, came upon and used information from the internal “strict secret” Securitatea journal found on the site of the CNSAS (Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (C.N.S.A.S.)) a year and a half before I did independently (thanks to a tip to its existence).

5. Lupta in conditii de clandestinitate/ teritoriu vremelnic ocupat a constituit o preocupare deosebita a Securitatii dupa 1968, cu doua varfuri de activitate: 1969 si 1987. S-au creat structuri destinate acestei misiuni, o parte dintre ele constituind asa numita retea de rezerva- in Directia I, cunoscuta sub diverse denumiri (Reteaua S- confundata de altfel foarte competentul istoric Alex Mihai Stoenescu cu Unitatea Speciala S).

In afra de luptatorii din reteaua de rezistenta, toate unitatile si cadrele Securitatii erau pregatite pentru actiuni clandestine in teritoriul vremelnic ocupat (un fel de a doua specialitate).

 

 

6. Prin actiuni in adancimea strategica a teritoriului inamic intelegem o parte dintre misiunile paramilitare executate pe teritoriul unor state.

In aceasta categorie intra si UM o544/R din cadrul CIE, care se ocupa cu antiterorismul pe plan extern (“antiterorism” fiind un eufemism), dar si Brigada U (“Fantome”, “Ilegali” etc) unii dintre ofiterii infiltrati ar fi avut in caz de razboi printre misiuni si executarea unor sabotaje/diversiuni.

Este relevant ca o buna perioada de vreme toti ofiterii securitatii erau brevetati parasutisti, parasutarea fiind unul dintre mijloacele clasice de infiltrare, intre timp inlocuit de alte procedee mai putin romantice, dar mai eficiente.

 

 

NOTA * sursa CNSAS

Other interesting tidbits from this post, echo information found elsewhere:

– In afara de colaborarea cu GSG9, ofiteri ai USLA au fost trimisi in Liban unde au fost instruiti de membri Al Fatah. Au circulat si zvonuri legate de colaborari cu Israelul si de cadre USLA trimise la centrul sovietic de instructie spetsnaz de la Odesa, insa deocamdata n-au fost confirmate.

– Dotarea USLA era unica la nivelul Romaniei: casti balistice sovietice K6-3 (din titan), pistoale mitraliera cu teava scurta, pistoale automate Stechkin, autovehicule blindate de interventie (ABI), carabine cu luneta model 44 cu amortizor de zgomot etc.

We have had other information suggesting precisely the involvement and role of the USLA in such a contingency:

destituirea 2 years ago

– Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,343

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/08/decembrie-1989-gloante-speciale-sau-ce-s-a-mai-gasit-in-cladirea-directiei-a-v-a/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/cine-a-tras-dupa-22-cine-au-fost-teroristii-inca-o-dovada-de-adevar-ce-lipseste-din-cartea-lui-marian-romanescu-fost-uslas/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/21/maracineni-securitatea-si-lupta-de-rezistenta-pe-teritoriul-vremelnic-ocupat-de-inamic-decembrie-89-soferii-iadului-in-varianta-autohtona-expres-19-25-ianuarie-1993/

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comuna_M%C4%83r%C4%83cineni,_Buz%C4%83u

Possibly linked to the Maracineni case is the following:   Securitatea: Lupta de rezistenta in cadrul razboiului de aparare a patriei. Particularitati ale participarii unitatilor centrale si teritoriale de securitate la organizarea si ducerea luptei de rezistenta pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat de inamic.  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

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Ioanesi Adrian ( 548 )
Profesie: Soldat in termen la UM 01027 Piatra-Neamt, sublocotenent post-mortem
Data nasteri: 24.09.1969
Locul nasterii: Vaslui
Calitate: Erou Martir
Data mortii: 24 decembrie 1989
Locul mortii: Maracineni, Buzau
Cauza: Impuscat in inima si cap
Vinovati:
Observatii:

http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?menu=1&jud=53

“In jurul orei 02,30 a fost impuscat, din spate, de 2 gloante de provenienta straina–unul in cap si unul in omoplatul sting.  Se presupune ca s-a tras cu arme de constructie speciala, foarte eficiente si pe timp de noapte.” Armata Poporului, p. 3, nr. 41 (44) Octombrie 1990.

Cazul Maracineni

Another small group of people wearing “black jumpsuits” held a military convoy under fire near the city of Buzau. On the evening of 23 December 1989, a military convoy from Piatra Neamt en route to Bucharest reached the community of Maracineni near Buzau.  Members of the local military unit told the soldiers from Piatra Neamt that

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…the unit had been attacked by two people, a civilian and Militia NCO, who disappeared with an Oltcit [car] and an ABI vehicle [an armored transport used exclusively by the Securitate’s USLA].  Shortly after [being told] this, gunfire opened on the convoy.  And gunfire reopened on the local military unit….those from the unit fired back with ordinance that lit the sky, in this way enabling them to observe a group of 3-4 armed people, wearing black jumpsuits (“salopete negre”) who were shooting while constantly changing position.  At the same time, on the radio frequencies of the convoy, they received messages about coming devastating attacks, and even Soviet intervention.  All of these proved to be simple disinformation.  The next day, in a moment of calm, villagers brought the soldiers food, and related how the terrorists had occupied attics of their houses.  They said they [the occupiers] were Romanians and that in a few words they had ordered [the villagers] to let them into the attics of their houses….In general, they shot at night, but on 25 December the cannonade continued during the day…. Curiously, the ‘fighting’ in Maracineni continued until 30 December.  Who and for whom were they trying to impress? [emphasis added][55]

Indeed, there are three key aspects here:  1) this was not a heavily populated area, thereby undermining arguments about “operetta-like” fake warfare to impress the population, 2) it is difficult to explain this episode as the result of “misunderstandings” between units, and 3) the gunfire lasted well over a week, a fact that is difficult to ascribe to confusion.

Ilie Stoian, Arta Diversiunii, 1993, pp. 55-57.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/25/teroristii-din-decembrie-1989-camasile-negre-a-fekete-ingesek-the-black-shirts-uslac/

http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/campaniile-rl/exclusiv-cum-au-disparut-gloantele-de-la-revolutie-si-despre-mortii-in-salopete-negre-247874.html

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-four-the-mysterious-men-in-black/

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #20 Identifying the Terrorists: Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Ignored Declaration and other Evidence

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 26, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:
The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
[Submitted to CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) 19 November 2009; cleared without changes by PRB 15 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

 

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]


Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/23/a-tale-of-two-letters-by-securitate-director-general-iulian-vlad-what-the-romanian-press-does-and-does-not-publish/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/20/when-a-truth-commission-misses-crucial-evidence-the-romanian-cpadcr-final-report-and-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-declaration/

It is virtually certain that the authors of the Chapter on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (pp. 620-627, especially p. 625 http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf ) had no knowledge of Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Declaration of 29 January 1990 … with predictable negative consequences for their understanding of what happened in December 1989.

And one wonders why I found (find) mainstream Romanian studies so unhelpful in trying to understand Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989?  Read Vladimir Tismaneanu or Tom Gallagher (or in its 2014 variation, see Grigore Pop-Eleches in Bernhard and Kubik) on Romania in the early 1990s and one is presented with a world of good and evil, of angels and demons, with distance from former nomenklaturist and high-ranking communist Ion Iliescu and the core of the National Salvation Front being as being the simple formula for explaining and understanding any event or policy.  As opposed to this highly–one might say blatantly–politically partisan [and bureaucratically ignorant] approach, on the other side stand functional or deconstructionist explanations–the kind favored by Peter Gross, Katherine Verdery, Peter Siani-Davies, or Ruxandra Cesereanu–which would explain the press of the time as the function of market pressures, sensationalist appetites, an anomic readership, poor journalistic training and professionalism, etc.

How then does one explain the following conundrum:  the selective treatment of the letters and declarations of former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad?  Oh, yes, the text of General Vlad’s letters which allege he was a stooge and victim of Ion Iliescu, etc. can be found in the Romanian press.  No problem!  But what about his declaration of 29 January 1990, where he deftly admits the responsibility of his institution for the bloodshed of December?  What, that not sensationalist enough, different enough to sell papers?  That’s not “anti-communist” enough for publication?  Is it somehow less credible than the other letters whose text has been published without problem?  24 plus years later, the Romanian media has yet to publish this document!  Could it be that the problem with this declaration is that it does not fit with and undermines the other popular narratives of December 1989 that minimize and even absolve the former Securitate of responsibility for the bloodshed of December 1989?

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Ion Cristoiu’s Evenimentul Zilei debuted in June 1992 and was the flagship of opposition to the regime of Ion Iliescu.  In the fall of 1992 it ran a zealous campaign opposed to Iliescu’s reelection.  Here is the exculpatory letter from former Securitate General Iulian Vlad (dated 20 March 1990) that was published on 19 September 1992:

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“Generalul IULIAN VLAD se adreseaza dlui Ion Iliescu:  Am fost arestat pe nedrept (20 March 1990),” Evenimentul Zilei, 19 septembrie 1992, p. 3.  “Intr-adevar pe dictatorul Ceausescu l-am tradat” “M-am integrat total Revolutiei” “Sint convins ca datele nu va erau cunoscute”  I.V. Vlad 20 martie 1990

And, yet, what of General Iulian Vlad’s declaration of 29 January 1990.  As far as I know, in 24 plus years, only this brief allusive mention on the 15th anniversary of the letter (although not mentioned or acknowledged in the article, and possibly accidental) has made its way into the Romanian press.  Below it:  the text of the statement of 29 January 1990!

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/text-of-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-29-january-1990-declaration-identifying-the-terrorists/

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Gheorghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/04/declaratia-generalului-ion-hortopan-cum-a-vazut-armata-colaborarea-generalului-iulian-vlad/

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Declaratia generalului colonel I. Hortopan, 16.02.1990 (din cate cunosc, pana publicarea cartii lui Dan Ioan, timp de 22 de ani, aceasta declaratie n-a aparut in presa romana)

“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta — in scopul de ne induce in eroare — a raspuns ca manifestantii patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra.  In timpul actiunii, trupele noastre au prins un numar de teroristi care faceau din unitatile de Securitate, au cerut cuvantul si au prezentat numarul unitatilor din care faceau parte (UM-0672F, UM-0639, UM-0106, UM-0620), la care Vlad, tot pentru inducere in eroare, a afirmat ca acestia s-ar putea sa fie fanatici, care, chipurile, ar actiona pe cont propriu.”

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/ 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/14/planul-z-z-ion-mihai-pacepa-si-liviu-turcu-in-decembrie-1989/

I have attempted to trace Pacepa’s public discussion of Plan Z-Z to verify claims made by other actors (see below, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Giani Bucurescu/Virgil Lovescu) in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  All of these actors refer to Pacepa’s discussion on Radio Free Europe/Radio Europa Libera sometime apparently between 24 and 26 December 1989.  Unfortunately, although there are a series of audio clips and transcripts from these days on the Europa Libera site http://www.europalibera.org/archive/1989/latest/452/982.html, there is no mention of the Pacepa intervention in question and no indication of record of its existence on the Internet.

0436

6 februarie 1990

Declaratie.  Subsemnatul Bucurescu Giani, general-maior [D.S.S.]

La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…

Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L.  Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.

Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi.  Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…

Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…

Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu

0437

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/28/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-vi/

We have two different accounts from Gheorghe Diaconescu, which roughly match:

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VI_continut.pdf

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This also seems to confirm the following (when adjusted for the corrected dates):

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch.  This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’  I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people.  And I was told:  Only you and two other people know this.  I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]

[95] Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990.  I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.

But it almost doesn’t matter when Pacepa first discussed this…because almost identical details were disclosed by Liviu Turcu, a DIE officer who had defected earlier in 1989 (thereby being far more knowledgeable of current plans/realities inside the Romanian security state), only without reference to a named plan, such as Plan Z-Z.  It was thus Turcu on 23 December 1989 (within 24 hours of the outbreak of terrorist hostilities in Romania; the interview would have taken place on Saturday the 23rd) who first informed Western media of the existence of such a plan–although it appears Turcu’s disclosures were never relayed by Romanian media or by Radio Europa Libera.

Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces

The Washington Post
December 24, 1989 | Dan Morgan

The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.

Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.

The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.

The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.

The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.

The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.

As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5″ in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.

Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.

Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.

The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.

Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.

In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.

Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.

For verification of some of Turcu’s claims (in particular, the less-discussed participation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, see here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/)

“They dress in black berets and black jumpsuits [combinezoane negre, salopete negre] with red silk stripes on their sleeves.  They carry small two-way radios and speak into them in coded language.  They are equipped with automatic rifles with infrared nightscopes for sniping.”

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h-27121989-01min55s/

Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…

Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala
improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba
poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in
rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale
poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind
asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta
Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care
nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi
sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca
tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.

(capitanul Romanescu Marian, cu Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si
‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, 8-9)

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(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLAC erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

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Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #12 Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: A Pro-Regime Rally, Televised Live

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 21, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/12/cine-a-avut-ideea-organizarii-mitingului-din-21-decembrie-1989/

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December

It is informative to look back upon how the disruption of the rally was reported by foreign correspondents in Bucharest just after it had taken place. Shortly after the rally disbanded, a Bulgarian correspondent related that the cause of the commotion had been the use of “tear gas grenades” by regime forces attempting to prevent demonstrators from entering the square and the ensuing panic this had unleashed among those who were already in the square.[67] The correspondent suggested that the demonstrators had originally gathered near the Roman Square on Magheru boulevard and numbered in the thousands by the time they reached Palace Square where the speech was taking place.Similar reports come from the Yugoslav TANJUG correspondent who transmitted that demonstrators had gathered in the northwest corner of Palace Square near the Athenee Palace Hotel and that when they “tried to approach the official meeting, tear gas was thrown at them.”[68] According to the same correspondent, young men had begun to shout anti-Ceausescu slogans, were chased away by the Militia, and then proceeded through the side streets in order to get around to the other side of the meeting.[69] The Militia then used tear gas to prevent these demonstrators from joining the official meeting and it was after the “tear-gas bombs exploded that the live relay of radio and television was disrupted for several minutes.”[70]

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image0-001

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2013/06/28/cercetarile-parchetului-in-dosarul-revolutiei-11-bucuresti-busculada-de-la-mitingul-lui-ceausescu/

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/01/13/rich-andrew-hall-rescrierea-istoriei-revolutiei-triumful-revizionismului-securist-in-romania-5-cine-a-aruncat-petarda/

Dar incidentul “petardei” şi tulburarea simultană ar putea avea o explicaţie mai simplă. Este folositor să revedem cum a fost raportată tulburarea mitingului de către corespondenţii de presă străini din Bucureşti, imediat după ce-a avut loc incidentul. Scurt timp după ce adunarea populară s-a destrămat, un ziarist bulgar a relatat că motivul tulburării a fost folosirea de grenade cu gaze lacrimogene de către forţele regimului pentru a împiedica demonstranţii să intre în piaţă şi panica pe care aceasta a dezlănţuit-o printre cei care erau deja în piaţă<Sofia Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 21 decembrie 1989, în FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 decembrie 1989, pag. 71>. Ziaristul sugerează că demonstranţii s-au adunat iniţial lîngă Piaţa Romană pe bulevardul Magheru şi erau de ordinul miilor cînd au ajuns în Piaţa Palatului unde avea loc discursul [lui Ceauşescu].

Relatări similare vin de la ziaristrul agenţiei iugoslave Tanjug care a transmis că demonstranţii s-au adunat în colţul din nord-vest al Pieţii Palatului lîngă hotelul Athenee Palace, şi cînd “au încercat să se apropie de mitingul oficial, s-a aruncat cu grenade de gaz lacrimogen asupra lor”<Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service, 1359 GMT 21 decembrie 1989, în FBIS-EEU-89-245, 22 decembrie 1989, pag. 77>. Conform aceluiaşi corespondent, bărbaţi tineri au început să strige lozinci anti-Ceauşescu şi cînd au fost alungaţi de miliţie au luat-o pe străzi laterale pentru a ajunge la o altă parte a mitingului<Belgrade Domestic Service, 1410 GMT 21 decembrie 1989, în FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 decembrie 1989, pag. 70-71>. Miliţia a folosit atunci gaze lacrimogene pentru a-i împiedica pe aceşti demonstranţi să ajungă la mitingul oficial şi după ce “au explodat grenadele cu gaze lacrimogene, transmisia directă la radio şi televiziune a fost tulburată pentru cîteva minute”<Ibidem>.

Este semnificativ că şi martori oculari ai confruntărilor dintre forţele regimului şi demonstranţi din după-masa şi seara de 21 decembrie se referă la forţele regimului folosind “petarde” împotriva demonstranţilor<Băcanu, “Intercontinental 21/22”, România Liberă 15 martie 1990; 5 aprilie 1990; 19 aprilie 1990>. Un martor ocular al întîmplărilor din Piaţa Universităţii din 21 decembrie povesteşte că “Securitatea fugea după ei [demonstranţi] în grupuri şi folosea petarde şi bastoane contra lor”<Vezi comentariile lui Marcel Constantinescu în Băcanu, “Intercontinental 21/22”, România Liberă 15 martie 1990, pag. 3>. Mai mult, Rady a observat că în noaptea de 21/22 decembrie Securitatea “a detonat bombe în cîteva locuri cu speranţa că va răspîndi panica”<Rady, Romania in Turmoil, pag. 104>.

Care forţe ar fi putut folosi “petarde” şi grenade cu gaze lacrimogene împotriva demonstranţilor? În procesul său de la începutul lui 1990, ministrul de interne din perioada evenimentelor, Tudor Postelnicu, a afirmat că “USLA aveau grenade cu gaze lacrimogene” la miting<Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neîntrebat”, România Liberă, 30 ianuarie 1990, pag. 3>.

©AFP Général – Jeudi 21 Décembre 1989 – 14:24 – Heure Paris (169 mots)
Roumanie Manifestations, lead.
    Manifestations de masse a Bucarest, selon Tanjug.
   BELGRADE, 21 dec (AFP – Des milliers de personnes manifestent a Bucarest dont le centre est bloque par d importantes forces militaires et policieres, a rapporte l agence Tanjug.
   Le ” meeting de soutien ” au president Ceausescu s est transforme en une manifestation d hostilite au regime, a indique le correspondant de l agence yougoslave.
   Des milliers de personnes scandent ” A bas Ceausescu ” et ” A bas les assassins ” .
   Le nombre de manifestants ne cesse de croitre, a indique l agence yougoslave.
   Selon le correspondant de l agence yougoslave, ces manifestations ont commence lors du meeting officiel lorsqu un groupe de jeunes a commence a temoigner son mecontement des le debut du discours de M. Ceausescu. La retransmission de ce discours a ete interrompue lorsque la police est intervenue au moyen de gaz lacrymogenes pour tenter d ecarter les jeunes gens. Le leader roumain a ete contraint de reduire la duree de son discours, ecrit l agence.
   HDP/MH/nl.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
E685C73DAC093F0DB6587F48B514C0AF33B78BAB
©AFP Général – Jeudi 21 Décembre 1989 – 16:38 – Heure Paris (348 mots)

Roumanie manifestation
La manifestation hostile au regime Ceausescu continue a Bucarest, selon la radio bulgare – SOFIA 21 dec (300 WORDS).
    La manifestation anti-gouvernementale continuait jeudi apres-midi a Bucarest ou des milliers de gens etaient toujours rassembles sur la place devant l hotel Intercontinental, selon des temoins oculaires cites par la radio bulgare.
   Un char et quatre vehicules blindes sont stationnes a cet endroit. La milice n est pas intervenue contre les personnes rassemblees pres de l hotel alors que les miliciens avaient attaque quelques heures plus tot les gens qui scandaient des slogans hostiles au chef du parti et de l Etat roumains, Nicolae Ceausescu, lors de la manifestation initialement organisee en soutien au ” Conducator ” , a-t-on precise de meme source.
   Les forces de l ordre avaient fait l usage de gaz lacrymogenes contre les manifestants qui avaient crie ” liberte ” et ” democratie ” lors du rassemblement qui s est transforme en manifestation hostile au regime, selon des employes de la compagnie bulgare Balkanair et l agence de voyage bulgare Balkantourist dont les bureaux sont a proximite de l hotel.
   L intervention des forces de l ordre a provoque un mouvement de panique au meeting officiel et le reportage en direct a ete interrompue pour cinq minutes a la television, selon ces memes sources. Les manifestants criaient ” assassins ” , ” a bas Ceausescu ” et ” nous ne sommes pas des fascistes ” .
   (Selon des informations anterieures donnees par les agences sovietique TASS et yougoslave Tanjug, la police et l armee ont ouvert le feu sur les manifestants dans le centre de Bucarest, faisant de nombreux blesses et probablement des morts, ont indique des temoins occulaires).
   Par ailleurs a Sofia, le personnel de l agence de presse bulgare BTA a proteste jeudi contre ” les repressions sanglantes par lesquelles le regime de Ceausescu essaie de prolonger son agonie politique. ” Dans une declaration, BTA demande a l assemblee nationale, au Conseil d Etat et au gouvernement de Bulgarie de tout faire ” pour aider les Roumains et garantir le respect de leurs droits conformement a l acte final d Helsinki. “.
   VS-STZ/jlb.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
4D05E2193CD5C0123E441166CFAE1FBCD3CACFD4

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December


By the morning of Thursday, 21 December 1989, the regime was no longer master of the situation in Timisoara. Moreover, it was rapidly losing control in several nearby cities: Lugoj and Cugir. Nevertheless, the regime might have withstood these challenges had it not been for Nicolae Ceausescu’s insistence on convoking a mass rally and addressing his “adoring” subjects in person. It was Nicolae Ceausescu’s delusion of his own invincibility which ensured that the regime would be unable to reestablish control. Ceausescu’s inflammatory, rambling tirade on national television on Wednesday evening had signalled panic to those who watched it. If Ceausescu was so worked up, they concluded, something serious must have occurred in Timisoara. Following his televised address, Ceausescu decided to hold an open-air, pro-regime rally the following day in the sprawling square in front of the Central Committee building in the center of Bucharest. The event was to be carried live over Romanian radio and television.

Precisely because this mass rally turned out to be the deathknell for the Ceausescu regime speculation has surrounded who “goaded” Ceausescu into making such a colossally-misguided decision. In January 1993, the opposition daily Romania Libera suggested that “the meeting was organized at the suggestion of [CPEx member] Gogu Radulescu.”[31] The same article maintained that Radulescu had been followed during these days and was “observed transmitting something abroad,” thereby once again insinuating the role of foreign powers in the Romanian events.[32]

Yet it is doubtful that Nicolae Ceausescu required Radulescu’s encouragement to convoke such a rally. It seems highly likely that the idea was Ceausescu’s own brainchild and that as usual the docile members of the CPEx did not dare contradict him. It was a typically instinctive, rash, and overconfident reaction to crisis on Ceausescu’s part. Moreover, as we have seen, for Nicolae Ceausescu the events confronting him in December 1989 were a replay of August 1968: not only was socialism at stake, but Romania’s national sovereignty and independence. Thus, in this crucial moment, he would appeal not primarily to the party’s political interests, but to what were the core institutional interests of the Securitate. And he would rely on a trusted totalitarian, mobilizational technique: the “spontaneous” mass rally of support for the regime.

The pro-regime rally began at midday on Thursday, 21 December 1989 as such events always had. Almost 100,000 workers, hand-picked from Bucharest’s major factories, had been herded into the center of Bucharest to await Ceausescu’s address from the balcony of the Central Committee building. There were the customary “spontaneous” chants in support of the dictator and his policies, and obsequious introductions by party underlings. Ceausescu had been speaking for only a few minutes when an unidentifiable disruption in the crowd forced him to pause in mid-sentence. It was now that the folly of his insistence that his address be broadcast live by television and radio was realized. Before the television and radio relays could be interrupted, a national audience was able to hear high-pitched screams and shouts of “Down with Ceausescu!” “Murderer!” and “Timisoara, Timisoara!” Even worse, television cameras had captured Ceausescu’s stunned and confused facial expression. About three minutes later, after some semblance of order had been restored in the square, the live broadcast resumed. Ceausescu announced that just that morning the CPEx had approved an increase in the minimum salary and pensions![33] Ceausescu was able to finish his speech, although shouting and commotion could still be heard sporadically in the background.

It is impossible to know how much the image of a frightened Ceausescu, futilely motioning to the crowd to quiet down, influenced those who saw it. However, the scope and boldness of protest against the regime clearly intensified after the broadcast of the dictator’s previously-unimaginable moment of weakness. Anti-regime demonstrations spread throughout the major cities of Transylvania–Brasov, Sibiu, Cluj, and Tirgu Mures–on the afternoon of 21 December. It did not matter that a sufficient degree of order had been reestablished such that Ceausescu was indeed able to finish his speech or that Romanian television would rebroadcast the same speech later that evening with pro-Ceausescu chants dubbed-in over the commotion. Irreparable damage had been done.

Observers have argued that those brief, but seemingly interminable seconds during which the television camera broadcast Nicolae Ceausescu’s disbelief and helplessness live to an entire nation, constituted a sort of “singular psychological moment,” something akin to a rock shattering a mirror. What had prompted Ceausescu’s reaction? Initially, most accounts stressed how several people in the crowd had begun shouting anti-Ceausescu slogans.[34] Fearing they would be caught, they then rushed through the crowd. The other members of the crowd were frightened by this unexpected act of courage and themselves attempted to flee. The great commotion which viewers had heard before the transmission had been cut, was the sound of these people trying to force their way out of the square. Many later explanations have maintained, however, that these events were merely a response to the initial act of defiance: the setting-off of firecrackers (”petarde” in Romanian) by someone in the crowd. Only then did demonstrators take advantage of the confusion and anonymity of the moment to shout down Ceausescu. In both cases, the spontaneity of the catalytic event has been drawn into question.

Nica Leon: The Strange Tale of the “Hero” of the 21 December Rally

Because the interruption of Ceausescu’s speech proved such a turning point in the December events, it was natural that in early 1990 the newly-liberated media should try to find the person or persons responsible for “unleashing the Bucharest revolution.” In a series of interviews during March and April 1990, Petre Mihai Bacanu, senior editor of Romania Libera, introduced the nation to a group of factory workers whom he presented as the “heroes” of the 21 December rally.[35] Bacanu was widely-viewed both at home and abroad as the “conscience” of the journalistic profession (a journalist for Romania Libera before the events, he had been imprisoned between January and December 1989 for his involvement with two other people in an attempt to print an illegal underground newspaper) and his newspaper was the hub of the growing political and social opposition to the National Salvation Front regime.

Thanks in large part to Bacanu, one of these workers in particular, Nica Leon, was to become identified as the man who had dared to shout down Ceausescu.[36] Leon was presented as having yelled out “Long live Timisoara, down with the butcher, down with Ceausescu!” and “Timisoara, Timisoara” at the crucial moment during Ceausescu’s speech. Highly-respectable foreign sources such as Ratesh credit Leon by name with having disrupted the 21 December rally.[37]

In the months immediately following December 1989, Nica Leon certainly appeared every bit the hero. It turned out that on 20 December 1989, the day before his historic shout, the Toronto daily The Globe and Mail had printed an open letter by Nica Leon criticizing Ceausescu’s rule.[38] This fact seemed confirmation of the courage of his action on 21 December. During 1990, Leon was the president of a small political party, a founding member of the Romanian branch of Amnesty International, and a prominent critic of the Iliescu regime.[39] During the chaotic and violent events of 13-15 June 1990 which brought an end to the two-month occupation of University Square by demonstrators, he was arrested and over the following month and a half was the object of an eventually-successful campaign spearheaded by Romania Libera to gain his release. The opposition embraced him with open arms and he regularly appeared in interviews with the opposition press.

Yet in the ensuing years, the opposition clearly soured on Nica Leon and he broke with them in as definitive a manner as imaginable. By 1992, one opposition publication was describing Nica Leon as “at war with the whole world” and it was clear from the questions and comments of opposition journalists that they no longer held him in the high esteem they once had.[40] Ilie Stoian’s 1993 description of Leon’s role at the 21 December rally reflects this changed perception of Leon: “Just then Nica Leon took advantage of the protection offered by the uproar and yelled ‘Timisoara’…after which he ran away out of fear.”[41] Leon’s heroism had apparently become contingent upon his relationship with the opposition.

On the surface, Leon himself appeared to have undergone a striking metamorphosis: from being a fixture of the opposition to granting interviews to the press of the Ceausescu nostalgics. In early 1994, the very same Nica Leon could be found in the pages of Europa praising the Securitate and virtually lamenting the overthrow of Ceausescu which his actions had hastened.[42] He strenuously defended the actions of the Securitate Director, General Iulian Vlad, in December 1989 as honest and patriotic. How had a person the opposition had presented as a dissident for a decade prior to the December events, an unrelenting foe of the Securitate, and the hero of the 21 December rally come to this?

What is interesting about Leon is that his views on certain key issues about the December 1989 have remained remarkably consistent in spite of his flip-flop from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Leon’s defense of–and sympathy for–General Vlad was not something which had suddenly appeared after he crossed over to the Ceausist camp. It appears in the interviews he gave the opposition press in 1990.[43] Moreover, Leon strenuously denied the existence of any “terrorists” during the December events. In April 1990, he told Expres that “the terrorists were invented.”[44] In September 1990, Leon told Liviu Valenas and Daniela Rainov at Baricada that “Everything [in December 1989] was a grand diversion! THERE WEREN’T ANY TERRORISTS!” and that Vlad had been arrested because he possessed damaging information against the Front.[45]

In his interviews with Petre Mihai Bacanu at Romania Libera in April 1990, Nica Leon also mentioned several episodes which placed the Securitate and Militia in a surprisingly positive light. He maintained that during the showdown between protesters and regime forces in University Square on the afternoon of 21 December, he had spoken with a Militia sergeant major who had “wished us [the protesters] success.”[46] He also claimed that he had helped an injured Militia man to safety on this evening.[47] Leon chatted with the USLA troops at University Square and characterized their actions as follows:

…the USLA were blocking the street leading to the American Embassy and the Israeli airline company El Al. The USLA did not attack the crowd, but rather stood chatting with the demonstrators and explaining to them that they could not join them because they had an order to stay between the French Bank and the Intercontinental Hotel.[48]

As we shall see, other eyewitness accounts of these events challenge Leon’s portrayal of the USLA.

But clearly the most damaging fact about Nica Leon was the one Petre Mihai Bacanu neglected to inform his audience of: the hero of the Bucharest Revolution had been arrested as a “terrorist” on 24 December 1989. Leon had been discovered in the basement of the Central Committee building, attempting to transmit something through a radio-transmitting device belonging to the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate.[49] One might be inclined to believe that Leon had been the victim of a tragic misunderstanding were it not for a series of articles written by a former officer of the Fifth Directorate in the Ceausist publication Timpul during early 1991.[50] The former Securitate officer presented the saga of a group of those arrested as “terrorists” during the December events: among them, other officers of the Fifth Directorate, USLA members, a Jordanian student, and Nica Leon. Leon is credited with having sustained the morale of the other prisoners. According to the Fifth Directorate officer: “Nica Leon encouraged us and frequently repeated that if he escaped, he would testify for us all the way to the UN.”[51] Moreover, Leon is praised for having contacted the wives of the Fifth Directorate officers–to tell them that their husbands were still alive–after he was released on 30 December 1989. Other Securitate officers confirm Nica Leon’s presence among the arrestees.[52]

Even prior to Bacanu’s interview with Leon, there were indications that Leon was a less than completely credible source. In February 1990, Leon had given an interview to Democratia, the publication of one of Ceausescu’s most notorious former speechwriters, Eugen Florescu.[53] Surprisingly, since this was one of Leon’s first interviews since the events, there was no mention of his famous shout at the 21 December rally. In its issue of 9 March 1990, the popular Expres had made a coy reference to Leon’s arrest (while using a radio-transmitting device) in the CC building.[54] Moreover, at a meeting of the ruling Provisional Council of National Unity in early 1990, Front official Dan Iosif is said to have referred to Leon’s arrest and called him either a “securist” or “terrorist.”[55]

Nica Leon remains an enigma. It is difficult to say exactly what he was really up to on 21 December 1989. People in the crowd did indeed shout “Timisoara, Timisoara,” for it could be heard on the television broadcast. If Leon did shout it, was he the first to do so? If not, what was his motivation for shouting it? Was his shout a genuine act of individual courage at the time? Was he perhaps acting as a Securitate provocateur–someone who wished to infiltrate the protesters’ ranks–on 21 December 1989? As with other aspects of the December events, the historiography of what happened is as important as–if not more important than–what actually happened. In the case of Nica Leon, the historiography at the very least suggests a highly-manipulative portrayal of his actions in December 1989.

Who Threw the “petarde”?

Many sources have suggested that it was the explosion of a “petarde” (or firecracker) and a simultaneous commotion in the square which startled Ceausescu and made it possible for the demonstrators to yell the anti-Ceausescu slogans. Once again the discrepancy between the reporting on this incident and the reality of what appears to have happened is informative. The report of the first Senatorial commission investigating the December events (published in 1992) maintains that “while [Ceausescu] was speaking, an explosion was heard and caused substantial commotion. Shortly after this, the meeting disbanded in disorder.”[56] Stoian describes the “petarde” incident as follows:

…[then] Ceausescu took the floor. At that moment the thing which appears to us the most important event of this period occurred. It is not true that the crowd began to boo spontaneously. While Ceausescu was stumbling through a phrase up on the balcony, somewhere in the center of the Square, where there were mostly women, someone exploded a Christmas ‘petarde’ [o petarda de genul celor de Craciun]. The first reaction of these frightened women was to begin to scream. Then, all those around them began to boo.[57]

Romanians have occasionally referred to this as “the petarde of our happiness.”[58]

Part of the problem with the “petarde” scenario stems from the fact that there is no agreement upon who exploded it and no one has come forward to claim responsibility for this historic action. Nevertheless, many names have been put forward in connection with it.[59] Securitate sources clearly wish to suggest that the setting-off of this “petarde” and the causes of the commotion which ensued were part of a premeditated plan to disrupt the rally. Once again, they attempt to negate the spontaneity of the anti-Ceausescu uprising. A journalist for the Ceausist journal Democratia wrote in December 1990:

…It must be stressed that during this rally long-studied methods for the psychological manipulation of compact crowds–acoustic sounds with subliminal messages transmitted through the loudspeaker system (imitating the rumble of an earthquake, the noise of troops and tanks and gunfire); the movement of some groups through the square with the intention of dislocating the crowd; petardes–were applied.[60]

According to “a group of former Securitate officers,” the “tourists” and their domestic collaborators made their way from Timisoara to Bucharest and infiltrated the meeting. The “tourists” attempted to scare those in the crowd into believing that “they were under fire” by jabbing them in the back with “reinforced steel prongs…against the background of the noise of fire-crackers and the short-circuiting of the public address loudspeakers.”[61] Interestingly, this is how a former USLA officer has portrayed the event:

On 21 December 1989 I was taking part in the antiterrorist measures for the “goodbye” meeting. In the crowd, I identified and observed eight strange men: all were dressed approximately the same (knee-length woolen coats, hats), all were smoking at the same time, standing in a group. Some looked slavic, others asiatic. At a given moment, they took out from their pockets globe-shaped objects, lit them with their cigarettes, and threw them into the crowd; in the globes there were firecrackers which put the crowd to flight.[62]

The SRI’s 1994 report on the events suggests that the “powerful thunder claps” which were heard could have come from the detonation of a “petarde” and that the “sonic boom”-like sound which occurred came not from the crowd, but from the loudspeakers.[63] The panic among the crowd was caused by the transmission of high-pitched soundwaves (outside the range of human hearing) and by the fact that unidentified demonstrators were prodding the others with steel poles while shouting “Run away, they will kill us!” and “The tanks are coming!”[64]

Opposition accounts incorporate familiar elements. The influential journalist Cornel Nistorescu places the “petarde” incident in the context of a coup d’etat supported by a faction within the Securitate:

Simultaneously, at the meeting of 21 December, according to incontrovertible information, a Securitate officer launched the two petardes which provoked panic and unleashed the redemption of Bucharest’s citizens. Meanwhile, through the loudspeaker system controlled by the Securitate, boos and whistles were disseminated.[65]

Ecaterina Radoi of Zig-Zag suggests that the unbelievable panic which ensued was the result of the emission of sounds resembling the rumble of tanks and machine gun fire.[66]

But the “petarde” incident and the simultaneous commotion may have a simpler explanation. It is informative to look back upon how the disruption of the rally was reported by foreign correspondents in Bucharest just after it had taken place. Shortly after the rally disbanded, a Bulgarian correspondent related that the cause of the commotion had been the use of “tear gas grenades” by regime forces attempting to prevent demonstrators from entering the square and the ensuing panic this had unleashed among those who were already in the square.[67] The correspondent suggested that the demonstrators had originally gathered near the Roman Square on Magheru boulevard and numbered in the thousands by the time they reached Palace Square where the speech was taking place.

Similar reports come from the Yugoslav TANJUG correspondent who transmitted that demonstrators had gathered in the northwest corner of Palace Square near the Athenee Palace Hotel and that when they “tried to approach the official meeting, tear gas was thrown at them.”[68] According to the same correspondent, young men had begun to shout anti-Ceausescu slogans, were chased away by the Militia, and then proceeded through the side streets in order to get around to the other side of the meeting.[69] The Militia then used tear gas to prevent these demonstrators from joining the official meeting and it was after the “tear-gas bombs exploded that the live relay of radio and television was disrupted for several minutes.”[70]

Significantly, eyewitness accounts of the confrontations between regime forces and demonstrators on the afternoon and evening of 21 December refer to regime forces firing “petardes” at the demonstrators.[71] One eyewitness to the events in University Square on the afternoon of 21 December recounts that “the Securitate ran after them [the demonstrators] in groups and used ‘petardes’ and clubs against them.”[72] Moreover, Rady has observed that on the night of 21/22 December, the Securitate “[i]n a few places…detonated bombs in the hope of spreading panic.”[73]

Which forces would have used the “petardes” and tear-gas against the demonstrators? During his trial in early 1990, the Interior Minister at the time of the events, Tudor Postelnicu, stated that “the USLA were in charge of tear-gas” at the rally.[74] Stoian has noted the difference between the 21 December rally and past rallies in his typically colorful tone:

In the first place, how striking it was that if in the past at the meetings to which Bucharest’s citizens were all too well-accustomed, people were indifferent–indeed, some were even happy since they would get three or four hours of work off–now nobody was smiling. Almost everybody entered [the square] in an ill-omened silence. A completely new element was the verification of identity papers of most people on the streets on this occasion; those who did not belong to the groups of workers [chosen to participate] were politely made to exit the columns…After the Palace Square was full, something unexpected happened. If in the past, the ring of civilians (Securitate men, party activists) and Militia men [around the crowd at such an event] would not permit those bored of listening to Ceausescu’s idiocies to leave, this time things were completely the other way around….Anyone who wanted to leave could, but no one from outside the ring could enter the protected zone.[75]

Eyewitnesses have specifically identified the forces preventing their entrance into the square as “USLA troops.”[76]

The partial transcripts of communications among USLA and Militia units on 21 and 22 December in Bucharest were published in late January-early February 1990 in the daily Libertatea.[77] These transcripts suggest that even before the rally had begun, large groups of demonstrators had gathered at a number of the intersections leading onto Palace Square, were shouting anti-regime slogans, and were taxing the capacity of the regime forces to prevent them from entering the square.[78] The demonstrators apparently realized well the tremendous opportunity offered them by the live national broadcast of this rally. Thus, the impression left by most accounts–that it was a few, isolated, brave men, within a crowd of tens of thousands of automatons, who had dared to challenge Ceausescu–is simply romanticized. The actions of those prevented from entering the meeting probably emboldened those in the crowd to shout down Ceausescu.

The transcripts also show that on the order of Securitate Director General Vlad, the USLA used “gela” (the Securitate reference for “petardes”) against the demonstrators.[79] Ilie Stoian alleges that General Grigore Ghita, the commander of the Securitate’s uniformed troops, “violated his brief” when he incorporated units of the USLA, including a “geniu-chimic” unit (which would have been in charge of tear-gas), among the regime forces assigned to work the rally.[80] Yet such an action does seem in accordance with Interior Ministry Order No. 2600. Moreover, even the Senatorial commission’s report illustrates that the security for the rally of 21 December was left almost entirely in the hands of the Securitate, and that General Vlad’s deputy, General Gianu Bucurescu, was given personal charge of the rally.[81]

It appears then that a key factor contributing to the disruption of Ceausescu’s speech was the attempt by regime forces to hold off anti-Ceausescu demonstrators from entering Palace Square. This commotion and confusion so changed the complexion of the rally that those among the crowd handpicked to attend took advantage of the opportunity and suddenly switched from chanting pro-Ceausescu slogans to jeering and booing the dictator. It is possible that the “petarde” at the rally was launched by the Securitate, but it is unlikely it did so as an act of defiance against the dictator. The “petarde” may have been used to prevent protesters from entering the square or to disorient the crowd and mask the sound of the anti-Ceausescu slogans. The disruption of the rally may therefore have been far less “organized” than has commonly been presumed.

[31].. R.M., “Dezvaluiri [Revelations],” Romania Libera, 19 January 1993, 1. Radulescu died in 1994.

[32].. Ibid. Presumably that foreign power would have been the Soviet Union.

[33].. Nicolae was probably improvising. A tape of the rally broadcast on a Bucharest FM radio station in December 1993 recorded Elena yelling at her husband: “Promise them something! Promise them anything!”

[34].. Rates, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 39; Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 100.

[35].. See the series “Intercontinental 21/22″ in Romania Libera, especially for 31 March 1990, 1 April 1990, 2 April 1990, 5 April 1990, and 6 April 1990. There is no reason to believe that those Bacanu presented did not actually shout down Ceausescu at the rally. The issue is the context in which Bacanu chose to present their actions.

[36].. Leon’s notoriety also apparently stemmed from his exposure in a well-known documentary series entitled “Noaptea Generalilor” [The Night of the Generals] which appeared on Romanian television during 1990. This television series was also produced by Petre Mihai Bacanu.

[37].. Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 39.

[38].. Nicola Leon, “You took away our rights and gave us lice and fear,” The Globe and Mail, 20 December 1989, A7. In spite of the slight difference in name, Nica Leon has claimed that this is his letter and there seems little reason to doubt that this is the case. Nicola Leon is described as a “34-year old mechanical engineer living in Bucharest,” details which generally fit with Nica Leon’s background. It is unclear when this open letter arrived at the newspaper.

[39].. See, for example, his comments in Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Mai putine flori, mai multi participanti,” Romania Libera, 24 April 1990, 3.

[40].. Nica Leon, interview by editorial board, “Nica Leon in razboi cu toata lumea,” Flacara, no. 34 (26 August 1992), 4-5.

[41].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89, 23.

[42].. Nica Leon, interview by Angela Bacescu, Europa, March-April 1994, 2, 3. Bacescu introduced Leon as president of the Liberal Democratic Party and member of Amnesty International (!). Among the many dubious claims in this interview is the allegation that Elena Ceausescu had been plotting a coup d’etat against her husband set for 30 December 1989.

[43].. See, for example, Nica Leon, interview by Liviu Valenas and Daniela Rainov, “Lovitura de palat din Romania [The Palace Coup in Romania],” Baricada, no. 36 (18 September 1990), 3.

[44].. Rasvan Popescu, “Moda lui Jos,” Expres, no. 13 (27 April-3 May 1990), 2. For the significance of his denial of the existence of the “terrorists” see chapters seven and eight.

[45].. Leon, interview, “Lovitura de Palat.”

[46].. Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 5 April 1990, 3.

[47].. Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 6 April 1990.

[48].. Ibid.

[49].. Leon proudly admits to this in Leon, interview, “Lovitura de palat.”

[50].. See the six-part series by Maiorul A.D. (apparently Major Aurel David, who was one of four Fifth Directorate officers tried and acquitted in March 1990) entitled “Scenariile si Realitatea. Marturie la dosarul ‘Teroristi’,” which appeared between January and March 1991 in Timpul. It is significant to note that when this series appeared Nica Leon was still a welcome member of the opposition.

[51].. Maiorul A.D., “Scenariile si Realitatea (VI),” Timpul, 1 March 1991, 11.

[52].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 161. USLA officer Romulus Garz refers to “officer David (one of four officers from Ceausescu’s guard)” and to the presence of Nica Leon among the prisoners he was held together with. Garz was arrested after the famous incident in front of the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December–discussed in chapter seven.

[53].. See the interview with Nica Leon in Democratia, no. 4 (12 February 1990).

[54].. See Expres, 9 March 1990, 8.

[55].. Valenas and Rainov did raise this issue with Leon in Leon, “Lovitura de palat.” However, they refused to challenge his answers and almost appeared to embrace them. While Leon was still aligned with the opposition, the regime-supportive press alleged that he had been a Securitate informer code-name “Nelutu.” The allegation appeared in the Ceausist Romania Mare, and the daily Azi, closely-linked to then Prime Minister Petre Roman, see Expres Magazin, no. 32 (13-20 August 1991), 2. Nica Leon himself–almost proudly–lists all the allegations launched against him (including that he was related to the Ceausescus) in Leon, “Nica Leon in razboi cu toata lumea,” Flacara, no. 34 (26 August 1992), 4. He avoids commenting on their validity, however.

[56].. Raportul Comisei Senatoriale pentru cercetarea evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, “Cine a tras in noi, in 16-22?” Romania Libera, 27 May 1992, 5.

[57].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 23. It was only after this, Stoian maintains, that Nica Leon delivered his famous shout.

[58].. Tudorel Urian, “Cabala Teroristilor,” Cuvintul, no. 20 (13 June 1990), 4.

[59].. The suspects are legion: The dubious Nica Leon claims that a 60-year old man named Andrei Ilie, “who kissed Iliescu when he arrived at the CC [building on 22 December],” threw the petarde (Leon, interview, “Nica Leon in razboi.”). Opposition journalist A. Corneliu Giagim writes that the “author” of the petarde was Matei Ilie who had assembled it out of an aerosol can (A. Corneliu Giagim, “16-22, Cine-a tras in noi?!” Baricada, no. 49-50 (18 December 1990), 6.). In early 1990, Petre Mihai Bacanu confidentially stated that a young man named Adrian Constantin had thrown the petarde (Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 31 March 1990, 1.). Whereas Bacanu had been able to interview Nica Leon and the young aviation mechanics who had started the chants against Ceausescu, he had been unable to track down Constantin to speak with him. Dan Iosif, the Front official who accused Leon of being a “terrorist,” has also been proposed as the source of the petarde (Expres Magazin, no. 30 (20-26 February 1991), 8.). There are likely others who have been credited with this act.

[60].. C. Maltese Martine Ui (possibly a pseudonym), “De la ‘Jos Ceausescu!’ am ajuns la ‘Jos Romania!’ Dubla Lovitura impotriva Romaniei” Democratia, no. 48 (December 1990), 3.

[61].. A Group of Former Securitate Officers, “Asa va place revolutia! Asa a fost!” Democratia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4. Also, see a translation of this article in FBIS-EEU-90-207, 25 October 1990, 50-53.

[62].. “S.V., reserve USLA officer” (perhaps Strat Vintila, based on other accounts), in Pavel Corut, Floarea de Argint (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), 171. In fact, the description of these men as wearing knee-length woolen coats and hats makes them sound suspiciously like the Securitate and the USLA themselves, as we shall see later.

[63].. “Fapte care trimit la o actiune premeditata a unor ‘actori’ din afara (II),” Curierul National, 10 July 1994, 2.

[64].. Ibid. Former deputy prime minister and senator, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, makes similar allegations. He claims that the explosion was caused by a “handcrafted petarde” (”o petarda artizanala”) made from an aerosol can. He too suggests that the panic was intensified by the “perhaps purposeful” malfunction of the loudspeaker system and the emission of a terrifying sound which resembled the “rumbling of tanks.” Voiculescu adds that “it is also possible…that there was a type of ‘acoustic bomb.’” Gelu Voican Voiculescu, interview by Neti Luchian and Val. Voiculescu, “‘Haosul nostru i-a paralizat (I),” Libertatea, 16 July 1991.

[65].. Cornel Nistorescu, “Complot sau conspiratie cu pretentii la putere? [Plot or conspiracy with pretensions to power]” Cuvintul, no. 20 (13 June 1990), 5.

[66].. Ecaterin Radoi, “Remember 15 decembrie 1989 – 20 mai 1990,” Zig-Zag, no. 190 (23-31 December 1993), 4-7.

[67].. Sofia Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 21 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 December 1989, 71.

[68].. Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service, 1359 GMT 21 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-245, 22 December 1989, 77.

[69].. Belgrade Domestic Service, 1410 GMT 21 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 December 1989, 70-71.

[70].. Ibid.

[71].. See accounts in Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 15 March 1990; 5 April 1990; 19 April 1990.

[72].. See the comments of Marcel Constantinescu in Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 15 March 1990, 3.

[73].. Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 104.

[74].. Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neintrebat [Postelnicu spoke without being asked to],” Romania Libera, 30 January 1990, 3.

[75].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 22. Stoian’s “spin” on this event, however, is that people were not allowed to enter the square because “something was being awaited,” thus insinuating that the disruption of the rally was organized in advance.

[76].. See the comments of Nistor Ruxandoiu in Gheorghe Ionita, “Culcati-i la pamint!” Adevarul de Duminica, 14 January 1990, 2.

[77].. Published in Libertatea between 27 January and 15 February 1990 under the heading “Dintre sute de…catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie [From…hundreds of “masts” (radio identification for USLA officers conducting surveillance) Scanning the Revolution].” Such recordings could have come from only one source: the former Securitate. Interestingly, with the exception of one episode (3 February 1990), all of these communications come from the afternoon of 21 December or morning of 22 December. There are no communications for the USLA from 3:30 p.m. 21 December until 8 a.m. 22 December–the period during which regime forces opened fire on the demonstrators.

[78].. “Dintre sute de catarge,” 27 January 1990; 29 January 1990.

[79].. “Dintre sute de catarge,” 30 January 1990, 2. An anonymous editor defines the meaning of “gela” as “petarde” at the close of this episode. Stefanescu confirms the use of “petardes” in his statement that the USLA commander, Colonel Gheorghe Ardeleanu, was seen at the Central Committee building shouting to a subordinate “Give me ‘Gela’…Give me ‘Gela’.” According to Stefanescu, ‘Gela’ was the name of a “petarde” used by the USLA in the repression of demonstrators. Paul Stefanescu, Istoria Serviciilor Secrete Romanesti (Bucharest: Editura Divers Press, 1994), 287.

[80].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 21.

[81].. Raportul Comisiei Senatoriale, “Cine a tras in noi, in 16-22?”

Timisorenii au “stricat” mitingul din 21 decembrie
Marti, 15 decembrie 2009 Sursa: Romania Libera Autor: Petre Mihai Bacanu

Mult timp nu s-a stiut cine a “stricat” mitingul lui Ceausescu din 21 decembrie 1989. Au aparut fel si fel de personaje care si-au arogat acest merit. Acum se stie ca acest fapt se datoreaza unor grupuri de timisoreni care s-au deplasat la Bucuresti. Satui de lupta, nu mai aveau frica si, practic, au fost nevoiti sa plece din Timisoara ca sa anunte ce se petrece acolo. La Timisoara se strigase “Lasilor, veniti cu noi!”, timisorenii avand impresia ca romanii ies greu la Revolutie. Suntem in posesia unor
marturii despre implicarea timisorenilor in declansarea scanteii de la Bucuresti.

Acuza ca i-a fost ucis sotul la Timisoara
ION ION, prelucrator prin aschiere IEI Bucuresti, 19 ani (in 1989): “In dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie 1989, o mare parte din lucratori se aflau la miting in Piata Palatului. Dupa un timp, am plecat si eu in oras. In timp ce ma deplasam pe Calea Victoriei spre Piata Palatului, sa fi fost ora 12.00, am vazut ca strada era blocata de un cordon de militieni in dreptul Hotelului Bucuresti.


M-am alaturat unui grup de civili care doreau sa treaca de acest cordon, incercand sa discutam cu cei din dispozitiv. O femeie din grupul nostru a strigat disperata, acuzand ca i-a fost ucis sotul la Timisoara. A fost retinuta de un militian. In momentul in care acesta a inceput s-o loveasca cu bastonul, au intervenit mai multi civili, creandu-se astfel un conflict deschis intre noi si militieni. In scurt timp a luat amploare, implicandu-se mai multi civili, iar din partea fortelor de ordine facandu-si aparitia un cordon de militari ai Armatei care s-au postat in fata militienilor si ne-au somat spunand ca vor face uz de arma.



Dupa un timp, au tras cu armele in plan vertical. S-a creat o ambuscada, noi, civilii, alergand in directia opusa acestora. In dreptul coltului din dreapta hotelului si-au facut aparitia trei camioane militare cu prelata, din care au coborat soldati cu casti albe cu vizeta si arme automate cu pat rabatabil. Ne-au blocat retragerea. Am fost imobilizat de patru soldati care m-au lovit cu patul armei in zona occipitala, apoi cu bocancii in toate partile corpului. Tot timpul eram filmati de la o fereastra a hotelului – etajul doi sau trei. A aparut in zona Postelnicu, care i-a spus unui civil care-l insotea sa ma impuste, insa a intervenit unul dintre soldatii care ma retinuse. Am fost dusi la Circa 1 Militie, batuti din nou, in final transferati la Jilava”.

Timisorenii s-au pierdut printre cei adusi la miting
DUMITRU SMEDESCU, colonel, lucra la Serviciul asigurare tehnico-materiala si financiara la Militia Capitalei. Aflase despre evenimentele de la Timisoara de la colegii sai. In ziua de 21.12.1989, la ora 6.00, a primit un telefon sa se prezinte imediat la serviciu, deoarece urma sa aiba loc un miting in Piata Palatului. Era seful unui dispozitiv compus din 20 de ofiteri care au luat pozitie la aproximativ 270 metri de intrarea principala in CC, in apropierea actualei statui a lui Iuliu Maniu. De organizarea mitingului s-au ocupat cei de la Armata, colonelului Smedescu parandu-i-se curios, deoarece la alte mitinguri de organizare se ocupau cadre ale Securitatii si Militiei. Difuzoarele dispuse in Piata Palatului au fost aduse de cei de la Armata. Dispozitivul de comanda se afla amplasat in incinta Bibliotecii Universitare.



“In jurul orei 12.00, in timp ce Ceausescu facea referire la evenimentele de la Timisoara si la marirea salariilor, s-a auzit un zgomot puternic, iar lumea a intrat in panica. Initial, pentru mitingul ce urma sa inceapa la ora 8.00 au fost solicitate sa participe anumite persoane, in special membri de partid. Amanandu-se pentru ora 10.00, nu au mai fost doar persoanele selectate initial. In spatele Palatului Regal au sosit mai multi cetateni de la Timisoara, care s-au pierdut printre cei ce participau la miting si au inceput sa scandeze lozinci anticomuniste si anticeausiste.”


S-a creat agitatie in multime
MIHAITA BALINT avea 19 ani in decembrie 1989 si era cioplitor la “Marmura”. La spargerea baricadei, in noaptea de 21 spre 22 decembrie, a fost impuscat in partea inferioara a tibiei piciorului drept.
“Cand am ajuns in Piata Palatului, mai exact in apropiere de Biblioteca Universitara, am vazut un grup de 30-40 de tineri care spuneau ca sunt din Timisoara. Venisera dinspre strada stirbei Voda, au intrat in multime si au inceput sa scandeze lozinci anticeausiste si despre victoria revolutiei de la Timisoara. Imediat, mai multi participanti au inceput sa-l huiduie pe Ceausescu, creandu-se agitatie in multime. In momentul in care au inceput sa se auda tipete si lumea se indrepta spre caile de iesire, am plecat si eu din piata, deplasandu-ma pe strada Onesti pana in zona Intercontinental, unde credeam ca suntem protejati de prezenta reporterilor straini. Am ramas pana dupa distrugerea baricadei, cand am fost impuscat.”

Studenta din Timisoara si-a cautat prietenul la morga Spitalului Coltea
MARIOARA TRONARU, lucratoare la bucataria Spitalului Coltea: “Pe 21 decembrie, in jurul orei 22.00, un tanar a fost impuscat in cap dupa ce s-a adapostit in curtea spitalului. Avea in jur de 20-23 de ani. Dupa aproximativ 30 de minute, o tanara cam de aceeasi varsta cu cel impuscat si care spunea ca este studenta la Timisoara a venit sa-l caute. Brancardierii au condus-o la morga, iar tanara l-a recunoscut pe cel decedat ca fiind prietenul ei, tot student la Timisoara. A declarat ca venisera mai multi din Timisoara pentru a-i mobiliza pe bucuresteni”.

Veneau din orasul inchis
PETRE CAPRARU, lucrator la Directia de Telecomunicatii: “Pe 21 decembrie, pe la pranz, am plecat spre Spitalul Coltea, sa-i duc un pachet surorii mele, internata. Grupuri de cetateni speriati veneau dinspre Sala Dalles. Mi-au spus ca mitingul oficial a fost spart. Au inceput repede sa protesteze la indemnul unor cetateni din tara. Un tanar de vreo 30 de ani, inalt, spunea ca era din Timisoara si a venit special la Bucuresti cu mai multi care scapasera din orasul inchis. Sa ne spuna si noua ce se intampla cu ei la Timisoara si ca au fost maltratati. Acestia strigau: «Nu va fie frica, Ceausescu pica!» si «Jos tiranul!». Indemnau trecatorii sa se solidarizeze, sa nu plece, ca sa nu mai fie chemati ciomagarii de la Timisoara”.

Tanarul din Timisoara avea in mana o cutie
ADRIAN UTALE lucra ca tehnolog productie la Combinatul Casa Scanteii. In dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie a fost scos, cu alti colegi, la ora 7.00, la mitingul din fata CC.
“Din ora in ora ne aliniau in fata intrarii principale a Casei Scanteii si apoi reveneau la directia luata. In jurul orei 11.00 ne-am indreptat pe jos catre Sala Palatului. Pe la ora 11.40, in timp ce ne aflam in centrul pietei, spre Biblioteca si Athenee am vazut langa mine un tanar care ne-a zis ca era din Timisoara si avea in mana o cutie. Ne-a zis: «O sa vedeti ce o sa se intample». Mitingul a inceput in jurul orei 12.00. Dupa ceva timp, tanarul a declansat o mica explozie, probabil o petarda; in jurul orei 12.30 s-a auzit o bubuitura in centrul manifestatiei, ceea ce a dus la haos total.”


Coloana stransa de manifestanti era din Timisoara
PETRU GIURA, strungar la IRA Grivita. Este victima a evenimentelor din decembrie: “Am ajuns la miting in tinuta civila, dupa ce in prealabil ni se spusese sa ne imbracam in cea a garzilor patriotice. Ne-au distribuit langa un sir de megafoane din care in timpul mitingului se auzeau aplauze inregistrate pe banda. In timpul discursului lui Ceusescu, cand s-a auzit o bubuitura, participantii la miting au fugit in toate directiile. Am luat-o spre strada Brezoianu. Am intalnit o coloana stransa de manifestanti, respectiv cate cinci in linie, care scandau lozinci anticeausiste. Acestia spuneau ca sunt de la Timisoara. Initial ne-am speriat si am fugit din calea lor, luand-o spre Romarta Copiilor. Am ramas insa la Intercontinental si am participat la toate evenimentele, pana am fost impuscat la Televiziune, pe 23 decembrie”.

“Nu cumva esti din Timisoara?”
GHEORGHE POPA era in decembrie 1989 sef de birou desfacere la Intreprinderea Poligrafica “Luceafarul”: “Am fost chemati la serviciu la ora 5.00 pentru mitingul din 21 decembrie. Noi am ocupat pozitia din dreptul restaurantului «Cina». Un activist de partid l-a controlat in geanta pe un coleg de-al meu, dar avea la el o sticla cu ceai si paine prajita. Am intervenit spunand ca este bolnav de ulcer, dar activistul a chemat un militian, care mi-a luat legitimatia de serviciu pe motiv ca produc agitatie. In timpul discursului lui Ceausescu s-a auzit un zgomot puternic in sistemul de sonorizare. Cand manifestantii s-au raspandit in toate directiile, am plecat cu mai multi colegi spre Bd. Magheru. In zona Hotelului Nehoiu am fost opriti de militieni si legitimati. Cum mie imi fusese confiscata legitimatia si nu aveam nici un act de identitate la mine, militianul m-a intrebat: «Nu cumva esti din grupul de la Timisoara?». Mi-a aplicat cateva lovituri cu bastonul, dupa care m-a lasat sa plec”.

“Fratilor, la Timisoara va mor copiii si fratii!”
IOAN PaUN lucra in decembrie 1989 ca laborant foto la Casa Scanteii: “La miting am fost pozitionati intre Palatul Regal si Biblioteca Universitara. Atmosfera era incordata. Am observat in coloana noastra multi civili pe care nu-i cunosteam. In timp ce Ceausescu se adresa multimii am vazut in apropierea noastra doi tineri care fluturau doua steaguri. Aveau accent ardelenesc. Unul dintre ei, de vreo 30 de ani, cu fata spre mine, a strigat: «Fratilor, la Timisoara va mor copiii si fratii!». Pe al doilea nu l-am vazut la fata. La scurt timp am auzit o bubuitura, o petarda, banuiesc, care a panicat multimea”.

Indemnau pasagerii sa li se alature
STEFAN DIMA, medic stomatolog: “Lucram ca medic la Calmatuiul de Sus si faceam naveta cu trenul pana la Rosiori. Pe 21 decembrie am vazut, pe la 16.00, in zona Piata Romana, cum fortele de ordine incercau cu disperare sa disperseze grupurile de manifestanti. Dimineata am plecat la serviciu cu trenul Bucuresti-Timisoara. Acesta a oprit neasteptat intre statii, concomitent cu aceeasi cursa care venea dinspre Timisoara. Intre pasagerii celor doua trenuri oprite paralel au avut loc discutii referitoare la evenimentele de la Timisoara. In trenul Timisoara-Bucuresti erau multi pasageri imbracati in doliu, avand steaguri si banderole tricolore. Scandau lozinci anticeausiste si indemnau pasagerii din trenul in care ma aflam sa li se alature”.

“Am intrat in multime strigand: «Timisoara, Timisoara!»”
LULCIUC CONSTANTIN, Timisoara: “In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20.12.1989, in timp ce ma aflam in filtrul ce se organizase langa gara din Timisoara, respectiv langa Militia TF, am fost chemati de Chira Vasile si Pantar Teodor, care mi-au spus sa ma deplasez in Piata Operei, deoarece, pe baza de voluntariat, se pleaca in Bucuresti, ca si in alte localitati – Brasov, Iasi, Sibiu, Ploiesti. Scopul principal era de a spune ce s-a intamplat in acele zile in Timisoara, dar si faptul ca se anuntase ca orasul Timisoara va deveni teren arabil, ca va fi exterminat. Am plecat aproximativ 30 de timisoreni, printre care Vasile Chira, Dumitru Pava, Teodor Pantar, Constantin Tataru, Dumitru Gherman, pentru a-i anunta si pe bucuresteni de cele intamplate la noi in oras. Am luat cu noi un steag cu stema decupata. Pe data de 21.12.1989, dimineata, in jurul orelor 6.30-7.00, am ajuns la Gara de Nord, ne-am deplasat pe jos, pe linia de tramvai, pana am ajuns in Parcul Cismigiu.


Ne-am continuat drumul pe jos pana in apropierea Bisericii Kretzulescu, unde am fost opriti de un cordon de militieni, deviindu-ne in partea stanga. Am incercat sa le explicam militienilor ca demonstram pasnic, dar intre noi si ei au intervenit divergente, moment in care steagul pe care noi il arborasem pe o creanga de copac ne-a fost luat, am fost imbranciti, moment in care am intrat in mijlocul multimii si am inceput sa strigam: «Timisoara, Timisoara!»”.

“Timisorenii ne explicau ca ei sunt liberi”
MARIANA SCHICHT, secretara ASE: “Pe 21 decembrie ne uitam obligatoriu la televizor la serviciu. Dupa intreruperea emisiunii, cu mai multi colegi si studenti, am plecat in Piata, alaturandu-ne altor manifestanti. Doi insi inalti, imbracati in negru, au tras la foc automat spre noi. Ranitii au fost dusi la Coltea, iar mortii au ramas pe loc. In fata Salii Dalles, sapte-opt morti erau aranjati in cerc. Cand s-a spart baricada, am luat-o spre magazinul Unirea, dar a venit o duba a Militiei in care au fost urcati mai multi manifestanti. Am fost luata in acel grup, insa un ofiter de armata m-a tras jos, intrucat tipam cat ma tinea gura. Impreuna cu alti manifestanti am ramas pana dimineata pe strazi laturalnice. Printre acestia erau si din Timisoara si ne explicau ca ei sunt liberi si ca bucurestenii trebuie sa se uneasca pentru a-l da jos pe dictator.

In noaptea de 22.12.1989, pe cand ma aflam in sediul CC, la parter, am observat o fata de aproximativ 16 ani, slaba, cu parul tuns scurt, care incerca sa intre in sediul CC. Pe data de 23 decembrie, dimineata, am aflat de la colegii fetei, care erau veniti de la Timisoara, ca aceasta a fost impuscata mortal in timp ce incerca sa escaladeze balconul. Unuia dintre baieti i se spunea «Lerurduzel» si era suparat ca murisera multi timisoreni.”

Au dat tonul protestelor
EUGENIU STAICU, electromecanic la MTTC: “La miting am ocupat zona din fata Hotelului Athenee Palace impreuna cu muncitorii din CFR care erau coordonati de secretarul de partid Teodor Carbunaru. Discursul lui Ceausescu a fost intrerupt de cateva ori de participantii la miting, care au inceput sa strige lozinci impotriva sa. Am aflat de la secretarul de partid Carbunaru ca un grup de tineri veniti de la Timisoara cu drapelul cu stema inlaturata a dat tonul acestor lozinci”.

Ei au scandat primii la Bucuresti: “Azi la Timisoara, maine in toata tara!”
CONSTANTIN MEDREGA, maistru montaj la Intreprinderea de Avioane Baneasa: “Eram acasa la televizor cand s-a intrerupt transmisia mitingului din Piata. Cum cei trei copii ai nostri se aflau la miting, am plecat sa vedem ce se intampla acolo. La Universitate, grupuri de manifestanti scandau lozinci anticeausiste. In fata Hotelului Intercontinental, un grup de aproximativ zece persoane, care au spus ca sunt de la Timisoara, scandau: «Azi in Timisoara, maine in toata tara!». Faceau apel sa ne alaturam lor.”

Grupul scanda: “Timisoara, Timisoara!”
TINCA CERNEA, casnica: “Pe data de 21 decembrie sotul meu a plecat in oras pentru a cumpara cadouri de Craciun
. La Izvor a aflat ca urma sa se organizeze un miting in Piata Palatului si din proprie initiativa a mers acolo. Mi-a povestit ca in timpul mitingului a intalnit un grup de manifestanti care scandau: «Timisoara, Timisoara!». S-a alaturat acestui grup si au plecat spre Comitetul Central, insa fortele de ordine i-au impiedicat sa ajunga in acea zona. Au coborat pe Calea Victoriei pana la CCA. Fiind mai in varsta, sotul meu s-a oprit sa se odihneasca, fiind retinut de trei indivizi in civil. A fost tarat in restaurantul Bulevard, fiind dus apoi la subsol si legat de maini si de picioare, impreuna cu alti demonstranti. Iar au fost batuti. In final, au ajuns la Jilava, unde au avut acelasi tratament
“.

“Sa povestim ce s-a intamplat la Timisoara”
CONSTANTIN TaTARU, Timisoara: “Pe data de 20.12.1989 ma aflam in Piata Operei. Aparusera zvonurile cu exterminarea Timisoarei. Cineva din multime ne-a sugerat sa ne deplasam in tara, dar mai ales la Bucuresti, sa povestim ce s-a intamplat in acele zile in oras, pentru a-i mobiliza pe bucuresteni sa ni se alature. Din Timisoara am plecat cu o coada de matura pe care am arborat un steag cu stema decupata”.

O timisoreanca, cu buletinul in mana, se ruga de lume sa reziste
SANDA MARIN, gestionara la un magazin din Bucuresti: “Cand am vazut la televizor cum s-a intrerupt transmisia la mitingul din Piata Palatului, am mers cu o colega in Piata Operetei, apoi in Piata Universitatii, unde tinerii demonstrau pe carosabil. Tinerii strigau lozinci anticeausiste. O tanara blonda a fost arestata de militieni. Am fost atacati si udati de fortele de represiune. Am vazut oameni cazand. Am vazut o femeie in jur de 50 de ani, cu buletinul in mana, care statea in genunchi pe carosabil si spunea ca a venit de la Timisoara, unde erau morti, si se ruga la lume sa reziste”.

Un video postat de catre tioluciano pe youtube

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-6-18-22-december-1989/

“Interceptarile si transcrierile pe foile de goniometrare au fost efectuate de radiotelegrafisti si alti angajati de la Centrul de Control al Radiocomunicatiilor din Strada Oltenitei nr. 103, Bucuresti. Inregistrarile au fost facute din propria initiativa a unor salariati, care si-au asumat riscurile de rigoare, in acea perioada fiind interzisa ascultarea frecventelor alocate organelor de Militie si Securitate.” — Romulus Cristea http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/huliganii-astia-trebuie-anihilati-71726.html

“Dintre sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 27 ianuarie 1990 – 15 februarie 1990

  1. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 27 ianuarie 1990, p.2″INCEPIND DIN 21 DECEMBRIE 1989, ORA 11.00Intre 11,00-12,00 I.M.B.
    –Tovarasul BRINZEI, va rog luati dv. acolo masuri, ca sa zic asa, organizatorice si tot efectivul care nu este bagat in misiune se se gaseste in unitate sa fie imediat imbracat “civil” si in frunte cu dv. va deplasati ugrent la Separatiune 1, dar in 5 momente imi comunicati prin acest sistem citi sint, normal. Tabel nominal cu dinsii.
    –Am inteles !
    –Indiferent de la formatiune este, circa cercetari penale, judiciar s.a.m.d.
    –Multi sint imbracati in uniforma. Se schimba in civil?
    –Pai, care au sa se schimbe in civil, care au intr-o jumatate de ora sa se schimbe si deplasarea urgent la Separatiune 1 si sa ramineti acolo pina primiti ordin de la mine.
    –Am inteles !
    11,55 C.P.M.B.–Bucur 9 sint Bucur 1 am primit telefon sa incepeti agitatia in piata (! –N.R.)
    12,10–146475 Intr. civil.–Oprea fa agitatie. Mai, terminati cu joaca la statie ca va ia dracu!
    (Se aude o voce care scandeaza “Ceausescu P.C.R.”).
    –Mai, nu mai strigati in statie!
    12,30 U.S.L.A.
    –Ati receptionat Catargul, Tridentul?
    –Tridentul, se pe Calea Victoriei, la Giocanda, iarasi este un grup care scandeaza lozinci.
    –Tridentul, Catargul, sint Catargul 5, la Muzica, aici in fata, a izbucnit scandal. Pe Victoriei, spre Posta scandeaza lozinci dar nu intervine nimeni. Militia se uita doar la ei.
    –Sint Catargul 5. Au fost indepartati pe Victoriei, spre C.C.A. incolo.
    –Catargul, Catargul 2. Sus, aproape de Comitetul Central, se afla un cetatean. E de-al nostru sau nu este? Sus pe bloc,pe blocul de vizavi. Pe Boteanu, se afla sus de tot un cetatean.
    –Tridentul si Catargul, sint Catargul 5. Continua sa fie la intersectia 13 Decembrie cu Victoriei, la Continental acolo, un grup mare care scandeaza.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 2. Deasupra magazinul Muzica, vizavi de C.I.D., se pare ca este o persoana acolo.
    –Da este. E de-al nostru.
    I.M.B.–Vezi ce poti. Pe care poti sa-i temperezi, ca nu sint multi. Trebuie o forta mai dura un pic.
    –Toate fortele sa intervina sa-i imprastie.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–
    In zona Catargul 2 este liniste.
    –La fel in zona Catargului 1.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au indepartat pe Victoriei. Nu mai sint in aproprierea mea.
    –Sint Catargul 3. Au ramas la Gioconda in fata. Vad ca s-au potolit.
    I.S.M.B.–Mai, transmite la mine. Doua unitati de-ale lui Popa sa mearga la Calea Victoriei la…si doua sa vina la Onesti imediat.
    –Am inteles!
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul. Ai receptionat mesajul de la Catargul 3?
    –Da, a fost receptionat.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4. Va rog, repetati.
    -D-ta ai probleme deosebite?
    –Nu, deocamdata.
    –Nici sa nu ai.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–Manifestantii de la Gioconda incearca sa sparga zidul de la militie.
    –Sint Catargul 1.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste aici la Catargul 1. Defluire in ordine.
    –Sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –Da, bine, multumesc.
    –La intersectia 13 Dec., Calea Victoriei este blocata de ai nostri. Nu mai e nici o problema acolo.
    –Catargul 3, Tridentul.
    –La Catargul 3 situatia este inca incordata. Se scandeaza si militienii nu pot sa-i imprastie.
    –La Catargul 2, liniste. Defluire in liniste.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Publicul se retrage in liniste.
    I.S.M.B.–Sala Dalles, (lociitor sef securitate municipului Bucuresti). In fata la Sala Dalles sa vina aici forte.
    –Da, s-au trimis, draga, s-au trimis.
    –Sa-i scoata de aici pe astia care instiga.
    12,00-14 I.S.M.B.–Am trimis, am trimis forte.
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)
  2. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 29 ianuarie 1990, p.2–Aici s-au concentrat, la Sala Dalles, colt cu Batistei.
    –Am inteles !
    12-14 U.S.L.A.–Ma receptionezi, sint Catargul. Tridentul confirma, te rog.
    –Te retragi si supraveghezi.
    –Supraveghezi si ma tineti la curent.
    —Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati in primul rind. Nu sint hotariti astia. Ar trebui sa-i ia repede. Restul sint sovaitori.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –La Catargul 3, in fata hotelului Bucuresti, se scandeaza.
    –Da, s-au luat masuri.
    –Catargul ? Tridentul. (nu raspunde).
    –Catargul 1.
    –La Catargul 1, liniste.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 3. Tridentul. Situatia.
    –Aceeasi. Se scandeaza si se string foarte multi.
    –Circa 200. Daca impresureaza anexa si ii scoate din zona ii termina repede.
    –Nu sint fortele de ordine acolo, d-le?
    –Sint doar in fata, un aliniament si in spate nimic.
    –Las’ ca vin acolo…
    12,30-14 I.S.M.B.–(sefi servicii, birouri, securitatea municipului Bucuresti), (loctiitor seful Securitatii). Arunca cu niste portret. Probabil Doina Cornea. Invoca personalitati!
    –Da, da…
    –Sint vreo 5, care sint mai ai dracu’ si tipa.
    –Fara incidente, pentru ca ii provocam mai mult.
    –Am inteles. Imi pare rau ca de la hotel intercontinental ii filmeaza si de la noi nu vine nimeni sa-i filmeze.
    –Sa-i identificam pe huliganii astia.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 1, liniste, Atheneu.
    –Catargul 2, liniste.
    –La 3 s-a format o hora si cinta Hora Unirii.
    I.M.B.–Aici la Steaua este retinut unul care, sustin tovarasii, ca a incitat sa dea foc.
    –Catargul, au venit fortele speciale de interventie.
    –Striga acum ca armata e cu ei.
    –Hai ma, lasa-i in pace nu mai…
    –Ar trebui sa vina mai repede sa-i ia odata de aici.
    –Vine, stai linistit acolo.
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunica, Catargul.
    –Parte din demonstranti au luat-o in stinga, spre Luterana, marea majoritate, ceilalti au luat-o spre Cosmonautilor. In fata hotelului Bucuresti nu sint probleme deosebite. S-au imprastiat. In schimb, in spate, in dreptul Giocondei au inceput sa se adune pina la nivelului C.S.P.-ului.
    –Cam citi sint?
    –Aproximativ 100. Cei mai multi sint pasnici.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Se pare ca spre Cismigiu se aud scandari. Populatie multa.
    –Deci Tridentul, ait receptionat ca la Cismigiu se pare ca s-a format din nou o grupare.
    –La Catargul 2 e liniste.
    –Catargul 4, raportez ca nu se mai aude nimic dinspre Cismigiu acum.
    –La Catargul 3 e liniste.
    –La Catargul 1 nimic deosebit, 2 nimic deosebit, la 3 se formeaza un dispozitiv cu virf inainte, care se lanseaza catre Luterana si se formeaza acum al doilea dispozitiv, probabil ca in spate. Nu am posibilitati de vedere.
    I.S.M.B.–Pentru /2 sa vina la baza sau ce face?
    –Da, sa vina urgent.
    –Da, da, vine imediat.
    –Putem trece cu escorta a doua si cu intiia?
    –Nu se poate. Sint deplasati tocmai la Comonauti, restaurantul Gradinita.
    –Pai, si-i indepartam.
    –(Da, sau am inteles).
    –Sint forte acuma?
    –Da, sint.
    –Sa-i indeparteze spre Romana incolo, dar cu grija sa n-o ia pe Dorobanti.
    –Am inteles !
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunicati.
    –La intersectia Luterana cu Stirbei Voda (intreruperi repetati).
    –Vad explozii la Union. Sint Catargul 2.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au auzit 4-5 explozii puternice!
    –De la Union, de acolo s-au auzit. Le-am vazut si noi explozile, de aici la Catargul 2, de la Athenee Palace.
    –Catargul 5, ai sa-mi comunici ceva?
    –Catargul sint Catargul 5. Undeva spre Continental, nu am vizibilitate, se mai aude strigind asa, ca un ecou (…)
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)

  1. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 27 ianuarie 1990, p.2″INCEPIND DIN 21 DECEMBRIE 1989, ORA 11.00Intre 11,00-12,00 I.M.B.
    –Tovarasul BRINZEI, va rog luati dv. acolo masuri, ca sa zic asa, organizatorice si tot efectivul care nu este bagat in misiune se se gaseste in unitate sa fie imediat imbracat “civil” si in frunte cu dv. va deplasati ugrent la Separatiune 1, dar in 5 momente imi comunicati prin acest sistem citi sint, normal. Tabel nominal cu dinsii.
    –Am inteles !
    –Indiferent de la formatiune este, circa cercetari penale, judiciar s.a.m.d.
    –Multi sint imbracati in uniforma. Se schimba in civil?
    –Pai, care au sa se schimbe in civil, care au intr-o jumatate de ora sa se schimbe si deplasarea urgent la Separatiune 1 si sa ramineti acolo pina primiti ordin de la mine.
    –Am inteles !
    11,55 C.P.M.B.–Bucur 9 sint Bucur 1 am primit telefon sa incepeti agitatia in piata (! –N.R.)
    12,10–146475 Intr. civil.–Oprea fa agitatie. Mai, terminati cu joaca la statie ca va ia dracu!
    (Se aude o voce care scandeaza “Ceausescu P.C.R.”).
    –Mai, nu mai strigati in statie!
    12,30 U.S.L.A.
    –Ati receptionat Catargul, Tridentul?
    –Tridentul, se pe Calea Victoriei, la Giocanda, iarasi este un grup care scandeaza lozinci.
    –Tridentul, Catargul, sint Catargul 5, la Muzica, aici in fata, a izbucnit scandal. Pe Victoriei, spre Posta scandeaza lozinci dar nu intervine nimeni. Militia se uita doar la ei.
    –Sint Catargul 5. Au fost indepartati pe Victoriei, spre C.C.A. incolo.
    –Catargul, Catargul 2. Sus, aproape de Comitetul Central, se afla un cetatean. E de-al nostru sau nu este? Sus pe bloc,pe blocul de vizavi. Pe Boteanu, se afla sus de tot un cetatean.
    –Tridentul si Catargul, sint Catargul 5. Continua sa fie la intersectia 13 Decembrie cu Victoriei, la Continental acolo, un grup mare care scandeaza.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 2. Deasupra magazinul Muzica, vizavi de C.I.D., se pare ca este o persoana acolo.
    –Da este. E de-al nostru.
    I.M.B.–Vezi ce poti. Pe care poti sa-i temperezi, ca nu sint multi. Trebuie o forta mai dura un pic.
    –Toate fortele sa intervina sa-i imprastie.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–
    In zona Catargul 2 este liniste.
    –La fel in zona Catargului 1.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au indepartat pe Victoriei. Nu mai sint in aproprierea mea.
    –Sint Catargul 3. Au ramas la Gioconda in fata. Vad ca s-au potolit.
    I.S.M.B.–Mai, transmite la mine. Doua unitati de-ale lui Popa sa mearga la Calea Victoriei la…si doua sa vina la Onesti imediat.
    –Am inteles!
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul. Ai receptionat mesajul de la Catargul 3?
    –Da, a fost receptionat.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4. Va rog, repetati.
    -D-ta ai probleme deosebite?
    –Nu, deocamdata.
    –Nici sa nu ai.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–Manifestantii de la Gioconda incearca sa sparga zidul de la militie.
    –Sint Catargul 1.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste aici la Catargul 1. Defluire in ordine.
    –Sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –Da, bine, multumesc.
    –La intersectia 13 Dec., Calea Victoriei este blocata de ai nostri. Nu mai e nici o problema acolo.
    –Catargul 3, Tridentul.
    –La Catargul 3 situatia este inca incordata. Se scandeaza si militienii nu pot sa-i imprastie.
    –La Catargul 2, liniste. Defluire in liniste.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Publicul se retrage in liniste.
    I.S.M.B.–Sala Dalles, (lociitor sef securitate municipului Bucuresti). In fata la Sala Dalles sa vina aici forte.
    –Da, s-au trimis, draga, s-au trimis.
    –Sa-i scoata de aici pe astia care instiga.
    12,00-14 I.S.M.B.–Am trimis, am trimis forte.
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)
  2. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 29 ianuarie 1990, p.2–Aici s-au concentrat, la Sala Dalles, colt cu Batistei.
    –Am inteles !
    12-14 U.S.L.A.–Ma receptionezi, sint Catargul. Tridentul confirma, te rog.
    –Te retragi si supraveghezi.
    –Supraveghezi si ma tineti la curent.
    —Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati in primul rind. Nu sint hotariti astia. Ar trebui sa-i ia repede. Restul sint sovaitori.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –La Catargul 3, in fata hotelului Bucuresti, se scandeaza.
    –Da, s-au luat masuri.
    –Catargul ? Tridentul. (nu raspunde).
    –Catargul 1.
    –La Catargul 1, liniste.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 3. Tridentul. Situatia.
    –Aceeasi. Se scandeaza si se string foarte multi.
    –Circa 200. Daca impresureaza anexa si ii scoate din zona ii termina repede.
    –Nu sint fortele de ordine acolo, d-le?
    –Sint doar in fata, un aliniament si in spate nimic.
    –Las’ ca vin acolo…
    12,30-14 I.S.M.B.–(sefi servicii, birouri, securitatea municipului Bucuresti), (loctiitor seful Securitatii). Arunca cu niste portret. Probabil Doina Cornea. Invoca personalitati!
    –Da, da…
    –Sint vreo 5, care sint mai ai dracu’ si tipa.
    –Fara incidente, pentru ca ii provocam mai mult.
    –Am inteles. Imi pare rau ca de la hotel intercontinental ii filmeaza si de la noi nu vine nimeni sa-i filmeze.
    –Sa-i identificam pe huliganii astia.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 1, liniste, Atheneu.
    –Catargul 2, liniste.
    –La 3 s-a format o hora si cinta Hora Unirii.
    I.M.B.–Aici la Steaua este retinut unul care, sustin tovarasii, ca a incitat sa dea foc.
    –Catargul, au venit fortele speciale de interventie.
    –Striga acum ca armata e cu ei.
    –Hai ma, lasa-i in pace nu mai…
    –Ar trebui sa vina mai repede sa-i ia odata de aici.
    –Vine, stai linistit acolo.
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunica, Catargul.
    –Parte din demonstranti au luat-o in stinga, spre Luterana, marea majoritate, ceilalti au luat-o spre Cosmonautilor. In fata hotelului Bucuresti nu sint probleme deosebite. S-au imprastiat. In schimb, in spate, in dreptul Giocondei au inceput sa se adune pina la nivelului C.S.P.-ului.
    –Cam citi sint?
    –Aproximativ 100. Cei mai multi sint pasnici.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Se pare ca spre Cismigiu se aud scandari. Populatie multa.
    –Deci Tridentul, ait receptionat ca la Cismigiu se pare ca s-a format din nou o grupare.
    –La Catargul 2 e liniste.
    –Catargul 4, raportez ca nu se mai aude nimic dinspre Cismigiu acum.
    –La Catargul 3 e liniste.
    –La Catargul 1 nimic deosebit, 2 nimic deosebit, la 3 se formeaza un dispozitiv cu virf inainte, care se lanseaza catre Luterana si se formeaza acum al doilea dispozitiv, probabil ca in spate. Nu am posibilitati de vedere.
    I.S.M.B.–Pentru /2 sa vina la baza sau ce face?
    –Da, sa vina urgent.
    –Da, da, vine imediat.
    –Putem trece cu escorta a doua si cu intiia?
    –Nu se poate. Sint deplasati tocmai la Comonauti, restaurantul Gradinita.
    –Pai, si-i indepartam.
    –(Da, sau am inteles).
    –Sint forte acuma?
    –Da, sint.
    –Sa-i indeparteze spre Romana incolo, dar cu grija sa n-o ia pe Dorobanti.
    –Am inteles !
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunicati.
    –La intersectia Luterana cu Stirbei Voda (intreruperi repetati).
    –Vad explozii la Union. Sint Catargul 2.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au auzit 4-5 explozii puternice!
    –De la Union, de acolo s-au auzit. Le-am vazut si noi explozile, de aici la Catargul 2, de la Athenee Palace.
    –Catargul 5, ai sa-mi comunici ceva?
    –Catargul sint Catargul 5. Undeva spre Continental, nu am vizibilitate, se mai aude strigind asa, ca un ecou (…)
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)

despre “Granitul” cititi si povestea lui Nicu Leon aici… https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/24/cc-ul-in-zilele-fierbinte-decembrie-1989/

Dovada crimelor din decembrie ’89
“Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati”
28 Martie 2006
“Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati”
149 VIZUALIZARI | COMENTARII  0

Toate convorbirile din perioada 21-22 decembrie 1989 purtate de sefii Securitatii, Militiei, Armatei si conducerii de partid prin intermediul statiilor de transmisiuni radio au fost inregistrate pe banda audio si transcrise pe foile de interceptare-goniometrare. Ziarul “Romania libera” a intrat in posesia acestor documente, fragmentele cele mai relevante urmand sa fie publicate incepand cu acest numar. De asemenea, suntem si in posesia unor liste de coduri folosite in cadrul acestor transmisiuni radio.Interceptarile si transcrierile pe foile de goniometrare au fost efectuate de radiotelegrafisti si alti angajati de la Centrul de Control al Radiocomunicatiilor din Strada Oltenitei nr. 103, Bucuresti. Inregistrarile au fost facute din propria initiativa a unor salariati, care si-au asumat riscurile de rigoare, in acea perioada fiind interzisa ascultarea frecventelor alocate organelor de Militie si Securitate.
Comunicarea pe unde radio se realiza utilizand anumite coduri si indicative. Toate inregistrarile contin dovezi clare privind ordinele date de cei care conduceau Militia, Securitatea, Ministerul Apararii si PCR prin care se solicita reprimarea manifestatiei anticomuniste si anticeausiste. Inca din primele momente ale revoltei, cei care conduceau tara, serviciile de informatii si fortele de ordine au dat ordine de reprimare a manifestantilor. Cu toate ca periodic erau raportate catre sefi numeroase victime, morti, raniti, arestati ilegal, s-a considerat ca trebuie continuata represiunea pentru asigurarea ordinii, in spiritul cuvantarii lui Ceausescu, care ceruse “o riposta hotarata” impotriva celor care contestau “maretele realizari pentru faurirea societatii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate”.Militienii imbracati in civil faceau agitatieIn ziua de 21 decembrie 1989, incepand cu ora 11, in piata din fata CC-PCR (actuala cladire a Ministerului Administratiei si Internelor din Piata Revolutiei) se desfasura un miting organizat de Comitetul Municipal de Partid, cu participarea cuplului Elena si Nicolae Ceausescu. Totul a luat o intorsatura neasteptata. Manifestatia de condamnare a “huliganilor” de la Timisoara s-a transformat intr-o revolta impotriva lui Ceausescu si a regimului comunist.
Va prezentam in cele ce urmeaza fragmente din interceptarile realizate in acea zi, incepand cu ora 11.
Intre orele 11-11.50 – Inspectoratul Militiei Bucuresti.
– Tovarasul Brinzei, va rog luati dvs. masuri, ca sa fie asa, organizatorice, si tot efectivul care nu este bagat in misiune si se gaseste in Universitate sa fie imbracati civil si in frunte cu dvs. Va deplasati urgent in separatiune 1 (dispozitiv – n.n.), dar in 5 momente imi comunicati prin acest sistem cati sunt nominal. Tabel nominal cu dansii.
– 2056 (Am inteles! – n.n.)
– Indiferent de la ce formatiune este, circa, cercetari, penale, judiciar etc.
– Multi sunt imbracati in uniforma. Se schimba in civil?
– Pai, care au sa se schimbe in civil, care nu, intr-o jumatate de ora sa se schimbe si deplasarea urgent la separatiune 1 si raman acolo pana primiti ordin de la mine.
– 2056.
Ora 11.55 – Consiliul Popular al Municipiului Bucuresti
– Bucur 9 sunt Bucur 1 (secretar al Comitetului Municipal de Partid – n.n.). Am primit ordin sa incepeti agitatia in piata.”O forta mai dura un pic” impotriva demonstrantilorTrebuie sa mentionam ca militienii imbracati in civil si care trebuiau “sa faca agitatie” erau trimisi pentru tinerea sub supraveghere a masei de oameni din fata CC-PCR, contribuind in acelasi timp la bunul mers al evenimentelor, prin aplauze sustinute si lozinci in favoarea lui Ceausescu. La mitingul lui Ceausescu erau adunati 105 mii de muncitori de la principalele uzine bucurestene. Insa in fata Hotelului Bucuresti, pe Calea Victoriei a aparut, chiar in timp ce vorbea Ceausescu, un grup de protestatari care scandau lozinci anticeausiste. In zona CC-ului s-a auzit apoi un vuiet peste care s-au suprapus alte zgomote, ca de explozii, venite dinspre Ateneu si – se pare – Biserica Kretzulescu. S-a produs panica, lumea a devenit agitata.
La acel moment, au fost interceptate urmatoarele convorbiri:
Ora 12.10
– 146, 475. Introdu civilii Oprea, fa agitatie. Mai, terminati cu joaca la statie, ca va ia dracu’. (Se aude o voce care scandeaza “Ceausescu PCR”).
– Mai, nu mai strigati in statie.
Ora 12.30 – USLA
– Tridentul, si pe Calea Victoriei, la Gioconda (un magazin de confectii – n.n.), iarasi este un grup care scandeaza lozinci.
– Tridentul, Catargul, sunt Catargul 5, la “Muzica”, aici in fata a izbucnit scandal. Pe Victoriei, spre posta. Scandeaza lozinci, dar nu intervine nimeni. Militia se uita doar la ei.
– Sunt Catargul 5. Au fost imprastiati pe Victoriei, spre Casa Centrala a Armatei.
De la Inspectoratul Militiei Bucuresti intervine cineva care comunica:
– Vezi ce poti. Pe care poti sa-i temporizezi, ca nu sunt multi. Trebuie o forta mai dura un pic.
– Toate fortele sa intervina sa-i imprastie!
Interesant este ca in zona Hotelului Bucuresti, chiar inainte de spargerea mitingului de la CC-PCR, persoane imbracate in costume de culoare kaki, cu cizme si fara insemne militare, au coborat dintr-un autocar si au luat la bataie, cu batele din dotare, persoanele aflate in zona, dupa care au aruncat cateva petarde si grenade lacrimogene. S-au facut primele retineri. Se banuieste ca exploziile auzite dinspre Ateneu si Biserica Kretzulescu ar fi fost ecoul acestor actiuni de la Hotelul Bucuresti.USLA, deranjata de “huligani”Orele 12.30-14; USLA:
– In zona Catargului 2 este liniste.
– La fel in zona Catargului 1 (dispozitiv USLA – n.n.)
– Sunt Catargul 3. Au mai ramas la “Gioconda” in fata. Vad ca s-au potolit.
Intervine un ofiter de la Inspectoratul Securitatii Municipiului Bucuresti:
– Mai, transmite la mine. Doua unitati de la Popa sa mearga la Calea Victoriei si doua sa vina la Onesti (actuala str. Dem I. Dobrescu). Imediat!
– Am trimis forte.
– Aici s-au concentrat, la Sala Dalles, colt cu Batistei.
– 2056.
In acelasi interval de timp (12-14), discutie intre “Tridentul” si “Catargul” de la USLA:
– Da, receptionez, sunt Catargul. Tridentul, confirma, te rog.
– Te retragi? Sunt forte de ordine care trebuie sa actioneze.
– Te retragi si supraveghezi.
– Supraveghezi si ma tineti la curent.
– Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati in primul rand. Nu sunt hotarati astia. Ar trebui sa-i ia repede. Restul sunt sovaitori.
– La Catargul 3, in fata Hotelului Bucuresti se scandeaza.
– Da, s-au luat masuri.
Zona Hotelului Bucuresti, pe Calea Victoriei, a fost locul unde a existat un prim grup de demonstranti care au inceput sa strige impotriva regimului ceausisto-comunist chiar cand se desfasura mitingul din fata CC-PCR.
Aici au fost primele persoane retinute si batute de fortele de ordine. Conform cercetarilor efectuate de procurorii militari, in zona respectiva a activat si un grup de persoane venite de la Timisoara. La un moment dat acestia, sustinuti de cativa bucuresteni, au reusit sa treaca prin barajul format de fortele de ordine si sa se indrepte apoi spre Piata Palatului. Incidentul a fost consemnat si in Raportul Comisiei Parlamentare de ancheta privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989.
0541

Col. Dumitru Dumitrascu, sef al Inspectoratului Muncipiului Bucuresti al Ministerului de Interne, Declaratie, 19 martie 1990

“In seara de 20 dec. 1989 in jurul orelor 23:30-24:00 eu fiind la inspectoratului am fost informat de primul secretar Barbu Petrescu, care in mod confidential mi-a spus ca ceausescu nicolae l-a intrebat daca se poate organiza in ziua de 21 XII 89 un mare miting in piata palatului asa cum a fost cel din 1968–cu privire la evenimentele din Cehoslovacia.”

0536

0160

Tudor Postelnicu, Ministrul de Interne, Declaratie, 21 iunie 1991

“Asa se explica ca Ceausescu a fost cel care a initiat in seara de 20 dec. sa se organizeze pt. a doua zi in P-ta Palatului acel miting cu muncitorimea din Bucuresti, fiind convins ca asa va demonstra tuturor sprijinul populatiei de care s-ar fi bucurat el.”

0152

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-6-18-22-december-1989/ 

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December

By the morning of Thursday, 21 December 1989, the regime was no longer master of the situation in Timisoara. Moreover, it was rapidly losing control in several nearby cities: Lugoj and Cugir. Nevertheless, the regime might have withstood these challenges had it not been for Nicolae Ceausescu’s insistence on convoking a mass rally and addressing his “adoring” subjects in person. It was Nicolae Ceausescu’s delusion of his own invincibility which ensured that the regime would be unable to reestablish control. Ceausescu’s inflammatory, rambling tirade on national television on Wednesday evening had signalled panic to those who watched it. If Ceausescu was so worked up, they concluded, something serious must have occurred in Timisoara. Following his televised address, Ceausescu decided to hold an open-air, pro-regime rally the following day in the sprawling square in front of the Central Committee building in the center of Bucharest. The event was to be carried live over Romanian radio and television.

Precisely because this mass rally turned out to be the deathknell for the Ceausescu regime speculation has surrounded who “goaded” Ceausescu into making such a colossally-misguided decision. In January 1993, the opposition daily Romania Libera suggested that “the meeting was organized at the suggestion of [CPEx member] Gogu Radulescu.”[31] The same article maintained that Radulescu had been followed during these days and was “observed transmitting something abroad,” thereby once again insinuating the role of foreign powers in the Romanian events.[32]

Yet it is doubtful that Nicolae Ceausescu required Radulescu’s encouragement to convoke such a rally. It seems highly likely that the idea was Ceausescu’s own brainchild and that as usual the docile members of the CPEx did not dare contradict him. It was a typically instinctive, rash, and overconfident reaction to crisis on Ceausescu’s part. Moreover, as we have seen, for Nicolae Ceausescu the events confronting him in December 1989 were a replay of August 1968: not only was socialism at stake, but Romania’s national sovereignty and independence. Thus, in this crucial moment, he would appeal not primarily to the party’s political interests, but to what were the core institutional interests of the Securitate. And he would rely on a trusted totalitarian, mobilizational technique: the “spontaneous” mass rally of support for the regime.

[31].. R.M., “Dezvaluiri [Revelations],” Romania Libera, 19 January 1993, 1. Radulescu died in 1994.

[32].. Ibid. Presumably that foreign power would have been the Soviet Union.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #10 The Protesters Conquer Timisoara as the Army Withdraws to Maintain Institutional Command and Control

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #11 Ceausescu Returns from Iran…and Apparently Not Empty-Handed

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Among those Ceausescu regime officials who were involved in the elimination of evidence of regime repression in Timisoara–and of the bodies of murdered Timisoara demonstrators–there are those whose names and roles are relatively well-known (Nicolae Ghircoias)…and those whose names and roles are lesser known (Dan Voinea).  Interestingly, a number of these officials found themselves in a position after 22 December 1989 where they could continue to cover up the role of Securitate and Militia units in December 1989, in Timisoara, Bucharest, and elsewhere.

The Case of Nicolae Ghircoias…before and after 22 December 1989

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/07/26/nicolae-ghircoias-colonel-de-militie-director-al-institutului-de-criminalistica-din-inspectoratul-general-al-militiei-igm-decembrie-1989-ianuarie-1990/

image0-001

Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus-numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel Negoiu din Bucuresti.  Medicii de spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri.  Colonel Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii, i-a adunat pe toti indivizii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristii, facindu-i disparuti.

image0-003

Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera , 21 august 1992, p. 1, p. 3.

for confirmation suggesting Cornel Tripon’s arrest under suspicion of being a “terrorist” (28 December 1989, Hotel Negoiu, Bucuresti) during the December 1989 events, see http://www.danbadea.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/img036.jpg ; for confirmation that Ghircoias himself was (later) (re-) arrested, see http://www.danbadea.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/img043.jpg .

for the suggestion that Tripon’s status as a member of the Militie was merely a cover mechanism see,

“La internarea in spital, militianul Cornel Tripon a prezentat un buletin pe care avea trecuta ca adresa de domiciliu str. Academiei 24. Aceeasi adresa de domiciliu (fictiv) era trecuta in buletinul mai multor ofiteri de la UM 0666. Militianul ranit a fost ridicat chiar a doua zi din spital si transportat, se pare, la o unitate spitaliceasca a Ministerului de Interne.”

from Romulus Cristea, 20 decembrie 2006, http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/reportaje/salvarile-nu-erau-pentru-raniti–80867

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1]

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process. [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

Part I

His name was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias.

And in Romania in December 1989 and January 1990, Nicolae Ghircoias was a very busy man.

We know, officially, of Nicolae Ghircoias’ actions in the last days leading up to the fall of the regime of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on 22 December 1989, as a result of what he and others said at a trial later in January 1990.  In bureaucratic parlance, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias, was the Director of the Criminalistic Institute of the Militia’s [Police’s] General Inspectorate.   In colloquial terms, in December 1989 it appears that this amounted to being something of a “cleaner,” or “fixer,” the kind of guy who could make unpleasant things—such as corpses—go away, without leaving a trace.

After regime forces opened fire on anti-regime protesters in the western city of Timisoara on 17 and 18 December 1989, Colonel Ghircoias was dispatched to recover the corpses of those with gunshot wounds from the city’s morgue.  The unautopsied cadavers of 43 demonstrators were stolen from the morgue in the dead of night and then transported to the outskirts of the capital Bucharest by refrigerated truck, where they were cremated.[2] Ghircoias was also in charge of collecting and destroying the hospital records and any other incriminating material that might indicate not just the death, but also the life of those who had perished—the official explanation for the disappearance of these citizens was to be that they had fled the country, thus taking their documents with them.  In other words, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias’ job was primarily, it seems, the destruction of evidence.[3]

[For a discussion of Ghircoias’s activities in Timisoara before 22 December, please see the following:

and in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1) 2010, Marius Rotar, “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania in December 1989.”  pp. 1- 17.]

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]


Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

(English) Cited in The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, surgeon at Coltea Hospital: “I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of a department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments. I didn’t hear anything back from Chircoias or any expert. Those who made the evidence disappear neglected the fact that there still exist x-rays and other military documents that I put at the disposition of the [Military] Prosecutor.”

( http://www.romanialibera.ro/a113826/revolutia-5-000-de-victime-nici-un-vinovat.html)

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea:  “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

Dosarele revolutiei -  "Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile"

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.

Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Procurori timorati

– Ati sesizat Parchetul Militar? Ati cerut sa se faca o ancheta in legatura cu cei impuscati la revolutie?
– Bineinteles, am anuntat Parchetul, am cerut o ancheta. De exemplu, cand le-am aratat apartamentul de unde s-a tras la revolutie, de la etajul 4, de la cinematograful “Luceafarul”, procurorii mi-au zis ca au facut verificarile si au depistat ca acolo era o locuinta conspirativa a Securitatii si atat. In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare. Neprimind nici un raspuns, dupa sase luni m-am dus la Parchet sa intreb ce se intampla. Mi s-a raspuns ca se lucreaza, mi-au aratat doua-trei avize puse pe colturile cererii si atat. Unul dintre procurori m-a luat cu el pe un coridor si mi-a spus ca “are copil, are nevasta, e foarte complicat…”. Ma intreba pe mine ce sa mai faca… Am izbucnit, le-am spus ca nu sunt un om care sa fie, asa, aburit cu una, cu doua. Le-am aratat radiografiile celor impuscati, le-am aratat gloante in ficat. Radiografiile existau, nu erau inventiile mele, nu mi se nazarise asa, dintr-o data sa cer ancheta! Le-am spus ca niste oameni doresc sa afle adevarul si ca cei care au semnat memoriul catre Parchet nu sunt niste persoane oarecare, ci medici cu experienta, somitati in materie. Degeaba am solicitat expertize balistice sau alte cercetari, degeaba am prezentat acte, documente, radiografii, lucrari. Nu se dorea sa se faca o ancheta serioasa.

extras din articolul lui Romulus Cristea
Miercuri, 20 Decembrie 2006 Romania Libera

Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile

Screen Capture of a registry presented by Dr. Nicolae Nae Constantinescu in TVR documentary by Toma Roman Jr. mentioning an atypical bullet with cap (varf) retezat extracted from a patient on 23 December 1989 and later “collected” by Ghircoias.

Origin 7272014 112744 AM

In early March 1990, Agence France Presse reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  [Significantly, a slew of military prosecutors, among them General Dan Voinea, General Romeo Balan, and General Teodor Ungureanu have attempted to deceive Romanians in the years since by denying or avoiding mention of the existence and use of DUM-DUM munitions in December 1989.]

Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

 

 

©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
411FD1741841E311716203546AC34BEC9C6CF7F0A69644B4

 

[1]For some of my previous publications on this topic, see Richard Andrew Hall:

Hall 2008 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romrevfordumdums042108tk.html,

Hall 2006 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html,

Hall 2005 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.html,

Hall 2004 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/doublespeak%20romania%203-2004.html,

Hall 2002 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romania%20securitate%205-2002.html,

Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Action and Revolution:  Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989,” Europe-Asia Studies 2000, no. 6 (September 2000).

Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity:  The ‘Staged-War’ Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies vol 13, no. 3 (Fall 1999) (University of California Berkeley Press).

[2] For a good discussion of this in English, which explains how cremation practices were  at odds with Romanian burial traditions, see the article entitled “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania 1989,” in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1).

[3]For more information online, see, for example, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae_Ghircoia%C5%9F, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opera%C5%A3iunea_Trandafirul, http://www.romanialibera.ro/a51078/cine-a-organizat-furtul-cadavrelor-din-morga-spitalului-judetean.html, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/67.htm. Even the 1994 SRI report admits that confusion surrounding the identity of those who were cremated stems from Ghircoias’ burning—after the flight of the Ceausescus on 22 December—of all relevant documents he had seized from the Timisoara county hospital http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/raportul_sri11.htm.  Thus, it seems appropriate to say Ghircoias’ job involved making things disappear…

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

What evidence was Ghircoias so interested in collecting from the hospitals?

No researcher has previously attempted to track and aggregate the discussion of atypical ammunition, to include exploding dum-dum bullets, that were used in the maiming and killing of demonstrators in Romania in December 1989.  Here we talk about their use prior to the flight from power of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu at 12:09 on 22 December 1989.  Romanian prosecutors, mostly notably former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea, have refused to acknowledge the existence and use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989–and yet the documents of the military procuracy itself contradict them.  (Voinea’s “findings” are invoked as the basis for the chapter about December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Commission Final Report).  Below, evidence from the testimonies of demonstrators, next of kin, and doctors in Timisoara.

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989, regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina, , imaginea/camera – Doru Segal, Sahiafilm 1991

Fullscreen capture 1182014 81626 AM

Who has given evidence that exploding dum-dum bullets were used in the killing and maiming of people in Timisoara before and/or after 22 December 1989:

1) Doctors and medical personnel who operated on and/or treated, and/or saw those who died or were wounded

2) Military personnel, who were in the streets in these days, including military officers

3) Relatives of the dead and wounded, some of whom were in the streets themselves, in sworn declarations  for the Military Prosecutor immediately after the December 1989 events or in sworn testimony in the so-called Timisoara Trial of 1990-1991

4) People who were wounded in December 1989, some of whom were sent abroad for follow-up treatment and who were told by those foreign doctors what type of bullet they believed they had been shot with, in sworn declarations  for the Military Prosecutor immediately after the December 1989 events or in sworn testimony in the so-called Timisoara Trial of 1990-1991.

5) Civilians who overheard during 17-19 December the discussion among regime forces of the use of such bullets

6) A former Securitate officer who went public after 1989 (Roland Vasilevici) and an unnamed former USLA recruit

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/08/this-many-people-cant-be-wrong-the-six-categories-of-people-who-attest-to-the-use-of-exploding-dum-dum-bullets-in-timisoara-in-december-1989/

Ora 23.00: La morga Spitalului Judetean, sub comanda colonelului Ghircoias, incepe operatiunea de sustragere a cadavrelor. Au fost ridicate 43 de cadavre cu acordul conducerii spitalului si al procurorului general adjunct Gheorghe Diaconescu. Toate cadavrele fusesera “incizate” pentru a li se extrage gloantele. Au fost transportate apoi la Bucuresti, cu o autoizoterma, pentru a fi incinerate.

Dan Badea 1991 evz.ro Ceausescu ultimele zile 21 decembrie 1999

 

In nopţile dramatice ale lui Decembrie 1989, medicii de la spitalele din Bucureşti au extras sute de gloanţe din trupurile demonstranţilor care manifestau împotriva regimului totalitar din România. Firesc ar fi fost ca aceste probe şi dovezi ale represiunii sângeroase să fie preluate cu un proces verbal şi folosite pentru identificarea celor care au tras în ţintele umane.

Din nefericire aceste probe delicte au dispărut. Toate mărturiile medicilor, dar şi ale celor care au studiat fenomenul îl incriminează pe colonelul Nicolae Ghircoiaş, cel care a colindat prin spitalele din Capitală şi a preluat gloanţele extrase din răniţi sau morţi, devenite ulterior de negăsit.

De altfel, colonelul Ghircoiaş fusese însărcinat să facă dispărute şi cadavrele manifestanţilor ucişi la Timişoara după 16 decembrie 1989.

Toatei corpurile delicte au fost adunate si inventariate la Institutul de criminalistica din Bucuresti. Procurorii militari au venit si le-au luat. Au fost duse pe strada Alexandru Sahia, unde era sediul Procuraturii. Voinea care acum se face ca nu stie avea biroul acolo. Alo, se aude!?

Prancea Paul marți, 5 august 2014 at 23:41 http://romuluscristea.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/la-tvr-gloantele-disparute/

Scor impresionant din 1990: Col. Ghircoias 40 de gloante … Procuratura 4 gloante !

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 20, 2009

Aceasta situatie imposibila ridicola in care din mii de cartuse trase impotriva demonstrantilor, organele de cercetare recolteaza patru gloante , este consecinta logica a ingroparii mortilor fara autopsie. — Rasvan Popescu, Expres, “Patru Gloante dintr-o Tragedia,” toamna 1990.

Cum iese destul de clar din informatia despre cum a funcionat IML Mina Minovici in decembrie 1989–sub doctorului Vladimir Belis– IML Mina Minovici in decembrie 1989 institituile oficiale au fost compromise de la bun inceput in cautarea adevarului despre decembrie 1989… oficial n-au facut nici o autopsie !  deci oficial nu se stie cine a tras … si ca un rezultat trebuie sa avem incredere se pare cam exclusiv  in…marturii martorilor care vorbesc in anumite cazuri…dupa 15 de ani  (si deloc nesemnificativ dupa un potop al dezinformarii)!

Cit de grava a fost (si mai este) situatia?…la numai un singur spital bucurestean col. Ghircoias “de la Interne” a racolat 40 de gloante…fapt destul de interesant… fiindca in toamna 1990 la Procuratura…mai erau numai 4 gloante din tragedia din decembrie ’89 !  Ce credeti?…ca gloantele racolate de catre col. Ghircoias au sosit la Procuratura…sau au ramas mult acolo? !

VA CER SCUZE AICI DAR CAM ASA A FOST LA BIBLIOTECA ACADEMIEI ROMANE IN ANUL 1994…O SINGURA MASINA XEROX…SI CUM PUTETI OBSERVA USOR…N-A FOST INTR-O STARE PREA BUNA…Atentie la cazulului Tirgu Mures din 21 decembrie 1989:  un glont de 9 mm “tras probabil dintr-o arma de vinatoare” (numai securisti si militieni au avut la ei pusti de 9 mm in decembrie 1989).  In aceste alte trei cazuri in care au ramas gloante de identificare, doua din Timisoara, unul din Cluj, se pare ca e vorba de gloante de 7,62 mm, deci nu e deloc clar cine le-au tras, ori securisti si militieni, ori militari…probabil militari din armata.

image-16

image-15

 

http://www.banaterra.eu/biblioteca/sites/default/files/suciu_titus_revolutia_pe_intelesul_detractorilor.pdf

Procesul de la Timisoara (III): Audierea martorului Rodica Novac, directorul Direcţiei Sanitare Timiş (13 iunie 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 30, 2011

[as always, purely personal views based on purely personal research and publications over the past two decades]

Thanks to Miodrag Milin (and ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI 16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA), the tapes of the Timisoara trials of 1990-1991 have been transcribed and made available to the public.  These transcripts are highly valuable for the researcher of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution.  To my knowledge, much of this information has never made it into the public domain, and much of the most important information has definitely not.

Below, the witness Rodica Novac states that in the Morgue “there were several horror scenes, even for a medic such as myself…it will remain a nightmarish memory, the wounds of these explosive bullets [gloante explozive] have remained with me in particular…” (p. 653)

When reading the courtroom testimony below, keep in mind here the unambiguous rejection by military prosecutor Dan Voinea of the use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989:

Dan Voinea:  There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets.  During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry.  The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently. (General Dan Voinea, interview by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005, online edition.)

[Are these court documents available at the website of the IICCMER?  Or the website of Asociatia 21 decembrie 1989?  No!  Thankfully, however, they are available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_IV_cuprins_0.pdf ].  The following is from Volume IV.]

Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression.  First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot.  december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom

 

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opera%C8%9Biunea_Trandafirul

Operațiunea Trandafirul

De la Wikipedia, enciclopedia liberă

Operațiunea Trandafirul, devenită apoi Acțiunea Vama, s-a desfășurat în zilele de 18 și 20 decembrie 1989, în cadrul acțiunilor de reprimarea a revoluției din decembrie 1989.

43 de cadavre ale celor împușcați mortal la demonstrațiile din Timișoara în zilele de 16 și 18 decembrie, dar și ale unor răniți executați în Spitalul Județean Timiș (SJT), au fost ridicate de la morga acestui spital și transportate la București, unde au fost incinerate în Crematoriul Cenușa.

Scopul era ștergerea urmelor masacrului de la Timișoara. Dispariția cadavrelor urma să fie explicată susținând că persoanele respective au părăsit fraudulos țara, fugind în statele vecine.

Persoane implicate

Ordinul a venit din partea Elenei Ceaușescu, care era tot timpul în contact direct cu soțul ei aflat în vizită oficială în Iran. Din conducerea superioară de partid și de stat au mai contribuit Tudor Postelnicu și Emil Bobu.

Conducătorii operațiunii:

Alți ofițerii superiori de Securitate și Miliție implicați erau:

  • Filip Teodorescu, locțiitor al șefului Direcției contraspionaj din DSS,
  • Traian Sima, șef al Securității Timiș,
  • Nicolae Ghircoiaș, director al Institutului de Criminalistică al IGM, cu sediul la București,
  • Ion Deheleanu, șef al Miliției județene Timiș,
  • locotenent-colonel Ion Corpodeanu, locțiitor al șefului Miliției Județene Timiș,
  • Ion Baciu, șef al Direcției Economice din IGM,
  • col. Petre Moraru[1], locțiitor al șefului IGM,
  • col. Tudor Stănică (a fost de față la emiterea ordinelor, dar nu a participat personal în acțiune),
  • Un rol important a avut și medicul chirurg, general de Securitate Mircea Octavian Ignat, care lucra la SJT.

Din dispoziția procurorului general al RSR Nicolae Popovici, au fost trimiși la Timișoara adjunctul procurorului general Gheorghe Diaconescu. (A mai fost detașat și procurorul Ovidius Păun, dar el nu a mai ajuns în oraș.) Din partea Direcției Sanitare județene a fost implicată dr. Rodica Novac.

Pentru ridicarea cadavrelor și încărcarea lor în autovehicul, Ion Corpodeanu i-a desemnat pe ofiterii și subofițerii de miliție: mr. Gheorghe Avram, mr. Iosif Veverca, cpt. Laurențiu Preda, cpt. Tiberiu Grui, cpt. Eugen Mișea și lt. major Eugen Peptan.

Colonelul Nicolae Ghircoiaș avea sarcina să coordoneze activitatea de selectare a cadavrelor în morga spitalului județean din Timișoara, întrucât el vizitase spitalul și mai înainte și avea informații despre cauzele morții. Scopul era selectarea cadavrelor celor care au participat la acțiunile de protest de cele ale bolnavilor care au murit din cauze patologice. După îmbarcarea celor 43 de cadavre, așezate în saci de plastic, în mașina autofrigorifică, colonelul Ghircoiaș a organizat și desăvârșit și furtul și distrugerea evidențelor compromițătoare ale spitalului.[2]

Conform planului, cadrele Miliției din Timișoara implicate in acțiune nu trebuiau să cunoască ordinul că morții transportați la București vor fi incinerați.

Unul dintre participanții la acțiunea Vama, maiorul de miliție Dumitru Sorescu, a fost înaintat după Revoluție la gradul de general și numit chestorul șef al Poliției române.[3]

Operațiunea „Trandafirul”

În seara zilei de 17 decembrie, col. Corpodeanu a fost chemat de gen. Nuță, care i-a ordonat să se ocupe de transportul unor cadavre împușcate de la morga Spitalului Județean Timiș, devenită neîncăpătoare, la Institutul Medico-Legal (IML) din București. La ora aceea erau 56 de cadavre în morgă și, deși alimentarea cu curent electric nu era întreruptă, se afirma că nu funcționează camerele frigorifice.

Col. Deheleanu, șeful lui Corpodeanu, a ordonat formarea unei echipe de la secția judiciară a Miliției județene, de supravegherea îndeplinirii ordinului urmând să se ocupe col. Ghircoiaș.

Cronologia evenimenelor din zilele de 18-19 decembrie în Timișoara

Ora 8:00: procurorul-șef adjunct Gheorghe Diaconescu era prezent la Direcția Sanitară, la dr. Rodica Novac, împreună cu col. Ghircoiaș.
Ora 9:00: În zona spitalului și în curtea acestuia a fost desfășurat un întreg dispozitiv de apărare format din securiști și milițieni sub comanda mr. Veverca și mr. Dragoș. În același timp, s-a interzis orice vizită în spital, fiind permisă numai intrarea personalului medico-sanitar pe bază de legitimație.
Ora 10:00: au sosit și generalii Nuță și Mihalea.
În urma vizitei la spital, procurorul general adjunct Gh. Diaconescu cere col. Ghircoiaș să trimită la SJT echipa pentru operațiunea de verificare a celor decedați.
Ora 14:00: autopsierul Traian Bodonea aduce la morgă saci de nailon.
Ora 17:00: procurorul Diaconescu se prezintă la Direcția Sanitară.
Ora 18:00: doctorul Ovidiu Sorin Golea, directorul Spitalului Județean, este vizitat de col. Sima Traian și col. Ghircoiaș.
Ora 19:00: Gen. Nuță vorbește la telefon cu col. Petre Moraru și cu col. Ion Baciu (care se aflau la București), și le ordonă să ia măsurile necesare pentru paza unui transport de la Timișoara la București. În termeni codificați, era vorba de „primirea unui camion de la Timișoara cu diferite colete sosite din străinătate ca ajutoare, și care trebuie distruse la București, la Vama Antrepozite”. Col. Ion Baciu se deplasează, tot din ordinul gen. Nuță, la procurorul general Nicolae Popovici, care îl aștepta, și l-a primit imediat, spunându-i că l-a sunat gen. Nuță și i-a cerut să-l sprijine în distrugerea unor colete ce urmau a fi trimise de la Timișoara.
Ora 19:00: dr. Golea a ridicat cheia de la morgă. Pe geamurile saloanelor sau camerelor spitalului cu orientare spre intrarea morgii au fost așezate pături, pentru a bloca vizibilitatea din interior.
Ora 23:00: la cererea col. Ghircoiaș și col. Corpodeanu, dr. Golea deschide morga. Cinci ofițeri de miliție conduși de col. Ghircoiaș, medicii legiști (prof. dr. Traian Crișan și conf. dr. Milan Dressler) și procurorii civili încep identificarea și selectarea cadavrelor. Cele selectate sunt introduse în saci de plastic.
Ora 23:30: Începând cu această oră circulația bolnavilor prin spital era totalmente interzisă.
Dorel Cioacă, șofer pe autoizoterma 21-TM-2701, angajat al Complexului de Creștere și Îngrășare a Porcilor COMTIM, este convocat din dispoziția inginerului Dan Rotariu, la sediul Miliției județene, unde căpitanul Valentin Ciucă[4] îl invită în birou, și îi spune că poate să doarmă până la noi ordine.
Ora 0:45: În jurul acestei ore, din ordinul lt. col. Corpodeanu, au fost îndepărtate din fața intrării și din curtea spitalului trupele, astfel autoizoterma (la volanul căreia era cpt. Valentin Ciucă) a putut intra până la ușa morgii. A mai sosit și o Dacia 1310 albă (nr. 1-TM-236, condusă de șoferul șefului Miliției Județene, plut. adj. Alexandru Kocic), în care erau doi milițieni de la Inspectoratul Județean Timiș.
Ora 1:00: luminile din curtea spitalului au fost stinse, pentru ca bolnavii din spital să nu poată observa acțiunea.
Ora 1:30: cei șase ofițeri desemnați de Corpodeanu – Iosif Veverca, Gheorghe Avram, Eugen Mișea, Laurențiu Preda, Tiberiu Grui și Eugen Peptan – au început încărcarea în autoizotermă a cadavrelor (denumite în continuare „colete”) indicate de Ghircoiaș.
Ora 4:15: A luat sfârșit operațiunea de îmbarcare a cadavrelor în autoizotermă, care părăsește curtea spitalului, însoțită de autoturismul Dacia amintit mai sus. Luminile din curtea spitalului au fost aprinse din nou, iar trupele ce asigurau dispozitivul de apărare și-au reluat pozițiile inițiale.
De la Spitalul Județean Timiș sunt ridicate registrele de consultații, de internări, procesele-verbale de constatare a decesului și fișele de mișcare ale bolnavilor, împachetate în două colete și predate col. Ghircoiaș. Ulterior, unele registre au fost înapoiate, din ele lipsind însă anumite file.
Ora 5:20: șoferul Dorel Cioacă, care dormea în biroul căpitanului Ciucă, este trezit.
Ora 5:45: autoizoterma pornește spre București pe ruta SibiuRâmnicu VâlceaPitești, fiind escortată de Dacia albă.[5]
Cele două autovehicule au fost așteptate la km 36 de pe autostrada București-Pitești de o echipă de ofițeri condusă de Ion Baciu. Din momentul preluării transportului, operațiunea primea indicativul „Acțiunea Vama”.

Acțiunea „Vama”

Conform ordinului gen. Nuță, autoizoterma cu „colete” a fost preluată pe 19 decembrie, la km 36, de o echipă condusă de col. Baciu și formată din lt.-col. Petre Marin, mr. Dumitru Sorescu[6], Teodor Bagu, Marin Șerban și subofițerii Valerică Gorgarea și Florin Stanciu. Această echipă a schimbat-o pe cea veche, din Timișoara, subofițerul Florin Stanciu preluând conducerea autoizotermei. Cei de la Timișoara și-au continuat drumul cu Dacia albă, și au fost cazați la hotelurile Astoria și Cerna, unde căpitanul Dan Fediuc le-a rezervat câte o cameră cu două paturi. Înainte de plecarea de la km 36, numerele de înmatriculare, atât al Daciei albă cât și al autoizotermei, au fost înlocuite cu număre de înmatriculare de București, primite de la Direcția Circulație (al cărei șef nu a fost inițiat în acțiune).

În jurul orei 17 autoizoterma și echipa de însoțitori din București au ajuns la crematoriul „Cenușa” din București, unde au fost primite de Gheorghe Ganciu, director al Administrației Cimitirelor din București (cu sediul la Cimitirul Belu),[7] colonel de Securitate în rezervă, fost subordonat al gen. Macri, și de administratorul Crematoriului Cenușa, Iosef Emilian Zamfir, care era de asemenea ofițer de Securitate trecut în rezervă.

Ei au întrerupt alte operații de incinerare care erau în curs, și au început incinerarea cadavrelor sosite de la Timișoara. Pentru reușita acțiunii, celor 5 fochiști[8] le-a fost dat câte un plic cu 2000 de lei, și aceștia au început lucrul imediat, fără obiecțiuni. Col. Moraru a trimis 6 ofițeri pentru asigurarea pazei.

În jurul orei 18:00 fost începută descărcarea cadavrelor, incinerarea începând aproape imediat și continuând toată noaptea. Ultimul cadavru a fost descărcat pe 20 decembrie în jurul orei 4:00, și atunci autoizoterma a părăsit crematoriul. Incinerarea a fost finalizată în jurul orei 8:30.

În jurul orei 10:00 col. Baciu a raportat col. Moraru încheierea acțiunii, care l-a trimis la crematoriu pe șoferul Nuțu Dorel Marian cu o autodubă, în care au fost încărcate cele 4 tomberoane cu cenușă și transportate pe raza localității Popești-Leordeni, Ilfov, unde conținutul lor a fost deversat într-o gură de canal.

După Revoluție, col. Baciu, lt.col. Petre Marin și mr. Dumitru Sorescu au făcut câte un raport despre acțiunea desfășurată de ei[9], și aceste rapoarte au fost prezentate în seara zilei de 24 decembrie inginerului Marian Gostin, reprezentantul CFSN, care se afla la IGM, apoi predate ministrului apărării naționale, gen. Nicolae Militaru.

Numele morților

În momentul operațiunii, la morga SJT se aflau 56 de cadavre, din care au fost sustrase 43. Din acestea 8 erau neidentificate, dar după Revoluție s-a reușit stabilirea identității a 4 dintre ele.

Lista morților:[10]

  1. Andrei Maria (muncitoare UMT, împușcată în SJT)
  2. Apró Mihai (lăcătuș auto)
  3. Balogh Pavel
  4. Balmus Vasile
  5. Bărbat Lepa
  6. Banciu Leontina (muncitoare la AEM)
  7. Belehuz Ioan
  8. Belici Radian
  9. Caceu (Kacsó?) Margareta (muncitoare la Institutul Politehnic)[11]
  10. Choroși (Kőrösi?) Alexandru
  11. Cruceru Gheorghe
  12. Carpin Dănuț
  13. Csizmarik Ladislau
  14. Ciobanu Constantin
  15. Wittman Petru
  16. Nagy Eugen
  17. Ferkel Șuteu Alexandru
  18. Florian Antoniu Tiberiu
  19. Gîrjoabă Dumitru Constantin (electrician, împușcat în SJT)[12]
  20. Hațegan Petru
  21. Iosub Constantin
  22. Iotcovici Gheorghe Nuțu
  23. Ewinger Slobodanca
  24. Ianoș Paris
  25. Luca Rodica (muncitoare la Coop. „Încălțămintea”)
  26. Lăcătuș Nicolae
  27. Munteanu Nicolae Ovidiu
  28. Miron Ioan (pensionar CFR, împușcat în SJT)
  29. Motohon Silviu
  30. Mardare Adrian
  31. Otelita Aurel
  32. Opre Gogu
  33. Osman Dumitru
  34. Radu Constantin
  35. Sporer Rudolf Herman
  36. Stanciu Ioan
  37. Sava Angela Elena
  38. Zăbulică Constantin
  39. Zornek Otto
  40. cadavru neidentificat
  41. cadavru neidentificat
  42. cadavru neidentificat
  43. cadavru neidentificat

Note

  1. ^ S-a sinucis în arest, la 31 ianuarie 1990.
  2. ^ România Liberă: Cine a organizat furtul cadavrelor din morga Spitalului Judetean?, 19 decembrie 2005.
  3. ^ Vezi știrea apărută în Jurnalul Național din 17 ianuarie 2005, și preluată de Hotnews.
  4. ^ El va însoți autoizoterma până la km 36, apoi va ajunge în București.
  5. ^ Șoferul său de schimb era cpt. Valentin Ciucă, care a rămas în cabină.
  6. ^ Mr. Dumitru Sorescu, ajuns chestor principal, a fost numit mai târziu șeful Inspectoratului General al Poliției Române. Vezi știrea din Jurnalul Național din 17 ianuarie 2005, preluată de Hotnews.ro.
  7. ^ Gheorghe Ganciu a fost asistat de subalternul său, Ciupagea Grigorie.
  8. ^ Întrucât la crematoriul Cenușa nu erau decât 3 fochiști – Mihai Mititelu, Ștefan Nicolae Bocioagă și Grigor Cîmpean -, doi muncitori – Gheorghe Zîmbroianu și Gheorghe Iordan – au fost trimiși de la alte două cimitire din București.
  9. ^ Col. Baciu pretinde că pe 22 decembrie și-a trimis raportul col. Moraru, dar acesta nu l-a primit.
  10. ^ Lista a fost publicată în Jurnalul National, 28 septembrie 2004, articol preluat de Hotnews.ro, dar ortografia numelor s-ar putea să conțină greșeli.
  11. ^ Împreună cu Caceu Margareta a fost împușcată și sora ei, Caceu Mariana Silvia, dar corpul ei nu a fost ars.
  12. ^ Vezi articolul din JN, preluat de Hotnews.

Surse

  • Gen. de brigada Gheorghe Florea, col. Ion Constantin, gen de brigada Marin Lazăr, col. Vasile Lepăduși, prof. Vladimir Alexandrescu și coordonator generalul de divizie Ion Pițulescu: „Șase zile care au zguduit România. Ministerul de Interne, decembrie 1989. Pledoarie pentru istorie”, vol. I., București, 1995.

Lectură suplimentară

  • Un risc asumat: Timișoara, decembrie 1989, Filip Teodorescu, Editura Viitorul Românesc, 1992
  • Timișoara în arhivele “Europei Libere”, Radio Free Europe, Editura Fundația Academia Civică, 1999

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0215cada.htm#_ftnref2

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/17/timisoara-17-decembrie/

In English and Romanian, see, for example, the following on the episode mentioned above

The mask of the red death: The evil politics of cremation in Romania in December 1989

Marius Rotar

Mortality: Promoting the interdisciplinary study of death and dying, 1469-9885, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1 – 17
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a919672850

From the past we must take the fire, not the ashes!Jean Jaures (1859-1914)This article presents an analysis of an episode which had great reverberations in Romanian society during the revolution of December 1989. It is focused on the cremation at the Cenuscedila Crematorium in Bucharest of 43 bodies belonging to people who were killed in Timiscediloara on the 17 December 1989 during the riots against the Communist regime. The Romanian communist authorities aimed to delete the traces of the repression in Timiscediloara. The explanation given to the families of the people cremated, namely that they had fled from communist Romania, also served this purpose. This incident reveals the ways in which politics and death merged in communist Romania, and it presents a typical case of what Douglas Davies calls the evil politics of cremation.

Keywords: communism; revolution; cremation; scandals

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/09/15/a-inceput-constructia-bisericii-popesti-leordeni/#more-8198
http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/12/08/tatulici-tatomir-povestea-timisorii-13-furtul-cadavrelor/

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Less well-known and certainly never acknowledged is the presence of military prosecutor Dan Voinea at the Popesti-Leordeni crematorium near Bucharest on the morning of 20 December 1989.  It has always been something of a mystery–and Voinea’s explanation of the timeline, how he learned of the incineration of demonstrators, etc. has always raised suspicions–why Voinea learned of this and came to investigate this.  It remains unclear why?  Although Baciu clearly had a motive to lie about Voinea, his claim not only that he saw Voinea on the morning of 20 December 1989–and attempted at his trial to address Voinea about it–but that he recognized Voinea precisely because of his previous Securitate service (a sort of unnecessary, stupid giveaway if he were lying), remains plausible.  In that case, it would explain how Voinea “knew” so early and so well about this issue.  I don’t know how to interpret Voinea’s behavior.  Did he feel guilty for his role and attempt to make the best of his presence there?  Did he realize that if he didn’t take control of this investigation that he would eventually be implicated and in a position of much less power to defend himself?  Some combination of both?  What is known, is that Voinea has been less than truthful about many things since, especially about the existence and use of internationally-sanctioned exploding dum-dum bullets…

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/06/15/oh-what-a-tangled-web-we-weave-secretele-din-crematoriul-cenusa/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/20/colonel-ion-baciu-pe-20-12-89-la-orele-1010-la-crematoriu-a-venit-lt-col-voinea-danpe-care-l-cunosc-intrucit-inaintea-lucrat-la-departmentul-securitatii-statului-directia-cercetar/

http://www.tvrplus.ro/editie-memorial-90-279224

(my notes of this film below)
19 dec 1991
2:15 Voinea, 20 dec incinerated; 12 january 1990 came there; Muitu Dorel, 4 tomberoanele (not fully truthful)
4:41 Operatiunea Coletele
5:00 clinica nr.1
6:00 from Postelnicu, 23 decembrie
7:22 Postelnicu v. El si Ea tradator, tradatoara?
9:10 Elena in charge
9:16 DIA Buzau involved
10:40 Diaconescu, on orders, not involved of course
11:11 10 of them where were shot, in the hospital?
11:54 Doru Gjraba (?) 12 witnessed things, only shot in foot at Catedrala, dr. Ignat
12:15 lucrator la morga Spitalul Judetean (before or after 22?)
14:00 2 with comsa si necherila two days later ?
15:20 Iosif Emilian (hurried there to cover up his own role? back to the scene of the crime, accidental “hero”)
17:00 Mititelele
20:45 56 corpses (3 not from), Gh. Diaconescu
21:19 Dressler
21:38 ages
23:23 Baciu, still in function after 22, even though sent to trial with Iosif, Ganciu/Bogdanciu?
24:50 Macri, coletele to Ganciu, send me 40
25:18 Ghircoias
26:00 Popovici may not have been informed, Coman and Stanculescu were informed
27:17 Km 36
29:15 Nuta request for new expertiza to be done
(Crematoriu Rotar)
33:40 partial autopsies to remove bullets, bullets missing
34:30 Alexandru Grama
35:00 fas negru
35:30 (tortures…made light re cimitirul saracilor mistakes)
36:30 Hotel Astoria near Gara de Nord
36:50 Led by Col. Baciu
37:45 went with criminalist (date of Baciu’s declaration)
40:00 Iosif Costinas (Freiburg…Slatina cu alti morti, 18-19 decembrie)
41:43 arma Calibru mic (paznici) CAP Freiburg
43:25 gen. napalm
45:00 Iliescu to blame…
46:19 Diaconescu advanced, in charge of investigations (and Voinea)

Colonel Ion Baciu: Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col Voinea Dan…pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte…a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2013

[documentary evidence in support of the publication entitled:  Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Counter-Revolution of December 1989,

strictly personal research, not for reproduction without prior author authorization]

unfortunately, the link is no longer operable here http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/volumul-203/

luckily, Claude 2.0 http://claude02.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-fost-oare-folosit-virf-impins-mai.html saved an image from my own initial post of this!

23.01.1990 Declaratie:  Colonel Ion Baciu, șef al Direcției Economice din IGM,

(my thanks to researcher Mircea Munteanu, formerly of the CWIHP at the Woodrow Wilson Center, for helping me with the following transcription)

Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col. Voinea Dan [[proc mil — procuror militar]] din D.P.M., pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte de activare, a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.

Era imbracat civil, insotit de un procuror militar in uniforma.  Au discutat cu o femeie, Geta, nu-i stiu numele care i-a spus:  “[[Bine]] ca ati venit.  Toata noaptea au ars aici si [[oamenilor]] le este teama.”  Nu am auzit alte vorbe.  Au discutat cu aceia femeie [[ca. –circa]] 15 minute dupa care au plecat.

Cred ca au fost trimisi acolo fie de Popovici, fie de Diaconescu, pentru a vedea cum decurge incinerarea.

Solicit sa fie audiati Popovici Nicolae, fost procuror general, Diaconescu Gh, adjunctul acestuia si cei doi procurori militari…

image0

image0-001

from Ion Baciu’s hearing 12 March 1990 http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_II.pdf

Baciu’s courtroom testimony (no reference made to his 23 January 1990 handwritten testimony above) was discussed by Vasile Surcel in the following article:

http://www.curentul.ro/2012/index.php/2012122081426/Actualitate/Ion-Baciu-in-procesul-Timisoara-procurorul-Dan-Voinea-a-verificat-personal-pe-20-decembrie-1989-incinerarea-mortilor-la-Crematoriul-Cenusa.html

Iosif Emilian’s lawyer (in September 1991) indeed suggested the involvement of the Prosecutor General in giving the cremations legal cover/legitimacy, hence explaining the presence of Dan Voinea and his colleague at Crematoriul Cenusa on 20 December 1989 (he also references Geta on p. 725).  This is from the seventh volume of “Procesul de la Timisoara” available on the banaterra site.

image0-001

image0

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/26/decembrie-1989-cc-ul-si-sibiu-dan-voinea-corneliu-pircalabescu-si-ilie-ceausescu-v-aurel-dragomir-si-victor-stanculescu/https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/21/orwellian-positively-orwellian-prosecutor-voineas-uncritical-reception-by-romanianists/

But my use of the term “Orwellian” in the title of this paper is not only designed to capture Voinea’s uncanny ability to make definitive statements that are demonstrably wrong, to argue that black is white and white is black—from his denial of the use of gunfire simulators in December 1989, to his claim that the only “lunetisti” who acted after 22 December were from the Army, to his denial of the existence of weapons and (especially “vidia”) bullets not in the arsenal of the Army, to his denial of the existence of “terrorists,” to his denial that any military unit was attacked during the events, to his denial of the role of foreigners in the events….

I use the term “Orwellian” here as much to describe the ease with which he has gotten and gets away with errors, misunderstandings, and falsehoods that could easily be challenged, if not combated by his interlocutors in the Romanian media and intelligentsia.  For it is the fact that he has been able and is able to get away with all this that is truly “Orwellian” and that is indeed a tragedy for Romania’s citizens.  The tragedy is thus less the predictable “supply side” of the post-authoritarian lie, than the enthusiastic consumption and appetite for it.  This is why I believe, accurately I would argue, that “December 1989” long ago became more about post-Ceausescu Romania than about what happened in December 1989.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/05/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-9-orwellian-sanitywont-get-fooled-again/

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

 

 

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 18, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Romanian journalists and researchers, but perhaps in particular Timisoara journalists and researchers, have failed to systematically analyze the use of atypical munitions–most notably, exploding DUM-DUM bullets–in the wounding and killing of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989.  They invoke, for example, the claims of military prosecutors such as General Dan Voinea (http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/11/nici-simulatoare-de-tragere-nici.html), who outright denies their use, or General Romeo Balan ( https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/), who conveniently avoid mention of the type of bullets with which Timisoara demonstrators were wounded or killed. 

However, they suddenly are willing to countenance their use where demonstrators maintain they were shot by the Army.  But they fail to ask the critical question of what forces were present among those involved in firing on demonstrators and what evidence exists that the institution in question had access to and possessed such munitions?  The evidence is pretty clear:  even where demonstrators zealously maintain they were shot “by the Army,” Securitate forces were also present, and whereas there are multiple indications that the Securitate possessed and used such ammunition, there exists NOT a SINGLE piece of evidence that the Army did.  Until those who maintain this point of view can marshal evidence demonstrating that the Army possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets, logically one can only assume that it was the Securitate who possessed and used these vicious munitions.  To illustrate this, let us look at the tragedy at Podul Decebal in Timisoara on 17 December 1989.

(Dan Gavra has no doubt:  his foot was blown off by a double-explosion bullet, a DUM-DUM bullet.  Indeed, in this interview with Radio Timisoara Vocea Evangheliei, from approximately min. 20:45 he explains exactly why)

We know that at least four people and probably more were wounded or killed with exploding DUM-DUM bullets at Podul Decebal on 17 December 1989, including Ţînţaru Teodor Octavian (http://asociatia17decembrie1989timisoara.wordpress.com/in-memoriam/ “Octavian suferise o operaţie laborioasă condusă de Dr. Lazăr Fulger. Din cauza gloanţelor explozive i-au fost distruse un rinichi, jumătate din ficat şi artera femurală. Nu a supravieţuit pentru că nu erau rezerve de sânge pentru transfuzie.”) and  Banciu Leontina  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-4/masacrul-de-la-pod-i Pe certificatul medical de constatate a decesului soţiei scrie: plagă împuşcată torace, glonţ exploziv. Deci a explodat în inimă glonţul, iar Procuratura Militară, după declaraţiile care au fost, care le-am dat eu, mi-a dat alt certificat care zice că a fost în coloana de manifestanţi de la Podul Decebal din Timişoara şi a fost împuşcată în seara din 17 Decembrie.”)

Gavra continued:

D.G.: – Am rămas în picioare. Când am vrut să fug, a început, din nou, rafala. Iar am rămas în picioare. Iar s-a oprit. Şi atunci am vrut să fug. Şi-atunci a venit un cartuş, deci am luat-o spre stânga, direct din faţă a venit… deci eu am fost în mijloc, chiar în mijlocul şoselei. Când am vrut să fac stânga, a venit un cartuş şi m-a lovit în picior. Şi am zburat vreo doi, trei metri în aer. Am căzut pe marginea, pe pământ acolo, într-o baltă, într-o urmă de TAB, cred că acolo întorsese TAB-ul sau cine ştie, că eram parcă într-un tranşeu. Aşa am simţit, când am căzut jos, încă o rafală razantă cu pământul. Doar atât am apucat, să-mi pun mâinile după cap. Şi, când am vrut să mă ridic de acolo, din noroi – spun de noroi, pentru că am văzut că tot eram plin de noroi – nu mai reuşeam să-mi ridic piciorul. Piciorul meu parcă era bătut cu un ţăruş în pământ. Piciorul meu a dispărut de la genunchi şi până la talpă, pe o distanţă de douăzeci şi ceva de centimetri. A dispărut tibia, peroneul, tot. Au tras cu cartuşe cu dublă explozie.  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-5/masacrul-de-la-pod-ii 

Gavra has detailed whom he believes was involved in his wounding (and the death of his girlfriend at the time, 21 year old Ewinger Slobodanca) in the following interview.  His focus is on Army personnel who opened fire, commanded by Major Gheorghe Badea:

„Plutonul de execuţie era de la unitatea unde am făcut eu armata”

D.G.: – La Podul Decebal era un pluton de execuţie, o unitate militară… ironia sorţii, chiar cu câtva timp înainte fusesem concentrat la unitatea aceea militară.
L.K.: – Care unitate ?
D.G.: – 01185 de pe Chişodei. Era sub comanda maiorului Badea Gheorghe acel pluton. Ne-am apropiat de ei şi strigam: „Nu vă impacientaţi! Fără violenţă!”. Diferite lucruri. Şi ne-am apropiat la vreo 30 de metri de ei. Fără somaţie, fără nimic, s-a tras în plin în noi.

L.K.: – Până unde aţi ajuns? Până la colţ cu…
D.G.: – La vreo 30 de metri… Ei erau dispuşi în felul următor: un rând în genunchi, un rând în picioare. Între Parc şi Bega. Pe şoseaua aceea. La o distanţă de vreo cinci, zece metri de pod. Noi ne-am apropiat de ei, am zis 30 de metri, dar poate mai aproape, pentru că-i vedeam şi puteam să avem un dialog. De fapt, numai noi strigam: „Fără violenţă!”.

L.K.: – Erau luminile încă?
D.G.: – Nu. Nu erau. Şi s-a tras în plin în noi.
L.K.: – Aţi fost somaţi?
D.G.: – Nu, eu atâta mi s-a părut, că cel din dreapta plutonului fuma şi, când a aruncat ţigara, a început şi focul, dar poate-i doar închipuirea mea, n-a fost nicio somaţie, nici…

L.K: – Aţi văzut nişte siluete, practic? Un TAB aţi văzut? Erau în dispozitiv?

G.D.: – Nu. Erau… deci am spus că a fost o grupă. Vreo patru de tragere în genunchi şi vreo şase, şapte în picioare. Unii spun că au fost mai mulţi, dar eu cam aşa îmi aduc aminte. Pentru că eram chiar în faţă, am rămas, la un moment dat, toţi au fugit, au căzut, au murit, au fost răniţi. Eu am rămas în picioare, pentru că m-am şocat. Nu-mi venea să cred că se întâmplă. Patru bucăţi mi-au trecut, mi-au şuierat pe la urechea dreaptă. Am vrut să mă pun şi eu jos, au bătut în piatră cartuşele. Realmente nu mai ştiam ce să fac! Mă gândeam: acuma o să mor. Şi, când am simţit o ezitare între rafale, pentru că a fost o rafală… Eu am rămas şocat. S-a oprit.

„Am zburat vreo trei metri şi am căzut într-o baltă”

D.G.: – Am rămas în picioare. Când am vrut să fug, a început, din nou, rafala. Iar am rămas în picioare. Iar s-a oprit. Şi atunci am vrut să fug. Şi-atunci a venit un cartuş, deci am luat-o spre stânga, direct din faţă a venit… deci eu am fost în mijloc, chiar în mijlocul şoselei. Când am vrut să fac stânga, a venit un cartuş şi m-a lovit în picior. Şi am zburat vreo doi, trei metri în aer. Am căzut pe marginea, pe pământ acolo, într-o baltă, într-o urmă de TAB, cred că acolo întorsese TAB-ul sau cine ştie, că eram parcă într-un tranşeu. Aşa am simţit, când am căzut jos, încă o rafală razantă cu pământul. Doar atât am apucat, să-mi pun mâinile după cap. Şi, când am vrut să mă ridic de acolo, din noroi – spun de noroi, pentru că am văzut că tot eram plin de noroi – nu mai reuşeam să-mi ridic piciorul. Piciorul meu parcă era bătut cu un ţăruş în pământ. Piciorul meu a dispărut de la genunchi şi până la talpă, pe o distanţă de douăzeci şi ceva de centimetri. A dispărut tibia, peroneul, tot. Au tras cu cartuşe cu dublă explozie.

D.G: – Doar praf în ochi. Pentru că nu doar ei au fost cei arestaţi. Pentru că maiorul Badea Gheorghe, cel care a tras în noi, ulterior, din ordin prezidenţial al tovarăşului Ion Iliescu, a fost avansat de la gradul de maior sau ce-o fost la gradul de locotenent-colonel.

 http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-5/masacrul-de-la-pod-ii 

Even more convinced that he was shot by a DUM-DUM bullet shot by the Army is Adrian Kali.  Significantly, Kali talks about being shot by two distinct bullets, one a normal munition and one a DUM-DUM bullet, demonstrating that doctors and others involved in these events were able to distinguish between different types of munitions used.

Rănit în Revoluţie, cu gloanţe adevărate

Deşi este proprietarul celei mai numeroase armate paşnice din România, Adrian Kali a fost împuşcat de două ori. Întâi cu un glonte exploziv, aşa-numitele dum-dum, apoi cu un glonte de 7,62. Asta s-a întâmplat în timpul Revoluţiei din 1989, în 17 decembrie, pe Podul Decebal.

http://blog.kali.hi2.ro/

BUT DOES THE CONVICTION OR FOCUS OF THESE PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WERE “SHOT WITH DUM-DUM BULLETS FIRED BY THE ARMY” HOLD UPON FURTHER ANALYSIS.  DO THEY ACTUALLY KNOW THE MAKE-UP OF THE UNITS THAT FIRED AT THEM?  THE ANSWER IS NO:  BECAUSE THESE UNITS WERE MADE UP NOT ONLY OF ARMY PERSONNEL BUT…ALSO OF SECURITATE PERSONNEL AS WE LEARN FROM NICOLAE DURBAC BELOW:

(Anexa 3)

“ COMISIA GUVERNAMENTALĂ

JUDEŢUL TIMIŞ

REFERAT

(luna mai 1990)

Din datele culese până în prezent de Comisia Guvernamentală, instituită la nivelul judeţului Timiş, a reieşit că în zona podului Decebal, din Timişoara, în seara zilei de 17. 12 1989, s-a deschis foc împotriva demonstranţilor şi au rezultat mai mulţi morţi şi răniţi. În urma verificărilor făcute, s-au stabilit următoarele :

Din cadrul M.U., (Divizia 18 Mecanizată Timişoara, n.a.), în după amiaza zilei de 17.12 1989, în zona podului Decebal s-au dispus, în cordoane, militari de la U.M. 01185, de la U.M. 01008, ambele din Timişoara. În zonă erau dis-puşi, de asemenea, şi militari de la Brigada de securitate Timişoara.

Aceste forţe au avut misiunea de a împiedica acce-sul demonstranţilor spre Comitetul judeţean al P.C.R. Timiş. În jurul orelor 19.30-20.00, cordonul de militari, dispus în partea dreaptă a podului, a deschis focul de armă împotriva unei coloane de demonstranţi care se deplasa pe strada Splaiul Galaţi, dinspre Complexul studenţesc spre podul De-cebal.

Din audierile militarilor aflaţi în zonă, rezultă că dis-pozitivul care a deschis focul de armă era format din militari de la U.M. 01185 Timişoara, sub comanda căpitanului Ba-dea Gheorghe şi din militarii de la Brigada de securitate, sub comanda locotentului major Zepa Anbrozie. Acest aspect rezultă din declaraţiile locotenent-colonelului Andrei Ilie, ale maiorului Dragomir Marin, ambii din cadrul U.M. 01008 Timi-şoara, ale maiorului Ghibea Dorel, din U.M. 01115 Timi-şoara şi ale căpitanului Lăzăroiu Ioan de la U.M. 01024 Timişoara, filele 30-33 şi 3-12. Din declaraţiile locotenentului major Zepa Anbrozie şi ale soldaţilor Brâncoveanu Gheor-ghe şi Ţibocu Iulian, toţi din cadrul Brigăzii de securitate, reiese că ordinul de a se deschide foc spre demonstranţi a fost dat de căpitanul Badea Gheorghe.

Fiind audiat căpitanul Badea Gheorghe şi alte cadre de la U.M. 01185 Timişoara, rezultă că au deschis numai foc de avertisment, în plan vertical, însă, la faţa locului, s-au înregistrat morţi şi răniţi. Totodată, acesta susţine că s-a deschis focul din altă direcţie, aspect care este infirmat de declaraţiile date de maiorul Dima Viorel, din aceeaşi unitate, fila 28, de căpitanul Lăzăroiu Ioan, de la divizie, de căpitanul Ghibea Dorel, de la U.M. 01115, filele 3-12, precum şi de declaraţia numitului Bindeleu Gelu, persoană prezentă în rândul demonstranţilor, fila 1-2.

Faţă de cele mai sus, Comisia Guvernamentală pro-pune cercetarea penală, de către Procuratura Militară Timi-şoara, a căpitanului Badea Gheorghe.

Semnează şi ştampilează membrii comisiei “

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/cada/duracn/docs/docs_3.htm

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/27/orasul-martir-timisoara/

for “Orasul martir Bucuresti” see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/26/doru-teodor-maries-despre-decembrie-1989/

a few observations on “Orasul martir Timisoara” http://www.tvrplus.ro/editie-memorial-90-267738

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25:35 Ioan Bânciu begins discussing of his experience, and the death of his wife Leontina

26:33 An interesting admission others have made too:  despite the well-known and well-deserved reputation of the Ceausescu regime for its repression, Bânciu claims that no one could believe when regime forces, including the Army, opened fire with real bullets, that they were generally surprised and that rumors had circulated according to which the Army did not have real bullets (my note: thus a situation where positive misinformation actually emboldened demonstrators and gave them optimism and hope beyond what they realistically would have had).

29:09 Soldiers allow them to proceed by the Cathedral, the cry “God exists!” rang out.

30:25 Bânciu talks about the area near the river/canal Bega where there were no houses, no institutions

31:03 Toward Decebal Bridge, all lights are off

31:34 Soldiers open fire without giving a warning.

32:30-33:05 An important discussion in which Bânciu says they were shot by hidden regime forces, not just soldiers but also probably of the “Securitate-police type”

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/07/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-alte-marturii-v-procurorul-romeo-balan-10-cazuri/

Bânciu Leontina

Raportul medico-legal nr. 982/A din 18.12.1989 a fost întocmit pentru cadavrul neidentificat de sex feminin, cu numărul de ordine 10. Ca semn de violenţă este consemnată o plagă orificială anfractuoasă cu marginile de 2/2 cm, orificiu de intrare pe faţa posterioară a hemitoracelui stâng în 1/2 inferioară, fără a se putea decela orificiul de ieşire. S-a concluzionat că moartea violentă s-a datorat hemoragiei interne şi externe consecutivă leziunii de organe interne, prin proiectil de armă de foc, tragerea fiind efectuată de la distanţă dinapoi înainte. În baza portretului vorbit, consemnat în raport, a obiectelor de îmbrăcăminte şi a leziunii de violenţă prin împuşcare, victima Bânciu Leontina a fost identificată de soţul ei. Acesta a fost martor ocular al împuşcării soţiei sale la Podul Decebal din Timişoara în seara zilei de 17 decembrie 1989, şi a putut da relaţii cu privire la faptul că soţia sa a fost împuşcată, în spate. Personal a transportat-o la Spitalul Judeţean Timiş. Bânciu Ioan a relatat:

Văzând că începe să se tragă, noi, eu cu soţia am intenţionat să ne salvăm şi să fugim spre gardul Parcului Tineretului. În acel moment, soţia mea a fost împuşcată în spate, mai sus de coapsa stângă. Am luat măsuri şi am transportat-o pe soţia mea cu un autoturism proprietate personală la Spitalul Judeţean, unde când am ajuns un medic mi-a spus că soţia a decedat. Am lăsat-o pe soţia mea decedată la spital şi apoi am plecat acasă la copii. A doua zi, când am revenit nu am mai fost lăsat nici să intru în spital şi nici să văd cadavrul soţiei. De atunci până în prezent nu am mai văzut cadavrul soţiei şi acesta nu mi-a fost eliberat.[10]

Pentru cadavrul neidentificat de sex feminin, cu numărul de ordine 42 a fost întocmit raportul medico-legal nr. 1014/A din 18.12.1989. Sunt prezentate leziunile de violenţă, respectiv frontal în stâng orificiu rotund pergamentat de circa 7 mm (orificiu intrare) şi plagă occipitală cu multiple eschile şi hernie de substanţă cerebrală (orificiu ieşire). S-a concluzionat că moartea s-a datorat unei plăgi împuşcate craniene. Plecând de la descrierea fizică şi a obiectelor de îmbrăcăminte precum şi a leziunilor de violenţă descrise de martorii oculari, Radu Daniela-Oxana a identificat cadavrul sorei sale Sava Angela-Elena. Aceasta a fost împuşcată mortal în aceleaşi împrejurări ca şi surorile Caceu, în seara de 17 decembrie 1989, în apropierea Catedralei.

https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/

We know that at least four people and probably more were wounded or killed with exploding DUM-DUM bullets at Podul Decebal on 17 December 1989, including Ţînţaru Teodor Octavian (http://asociatia17decembrie1989timisoara.wordpress.com/in-memoriam/ “Octavian suferise o operaţie laborioasă condusă de Dr. Lazăr Fulger. Din cauza gloanţelor explozive i-au fost distruse un rinichi, jumătate din ficat şi artera femurală. Nu a supravieţuit pentru că nu erau rezerve de sânge pentru transfuzie.”) and  Banciu Leontina  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-4/masacrul-de-la-pod-i 

“Pe certificatul medical de constatate a decesului soţiei scrie: plagă împuşcată torace, glonţ exploziv. Deci a explodat în inimă glonţul, iar Procuratura Militară, după declaraţiile care au fost, care le-am dat eu, mi-a dat alt certificat care zice că a fost în coloana de manifestanţi de la Podul Decebal din Timişoara şi a fost împuşcată în seara din 17 Decembrie.”)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/04/13/25-for-2014-25-things-you-should-know-about-the-romanian-revolution-on-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-fall-of-nicolae-ceausescus-communist-regime-5-timisoara-podul-decebal-evidence-suggests/

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Miriana Mişcov

13. Mişcov Miriana, 15 ani, elev, plagă membru inferior, 17.12.89, împuşcată în Calea Girocului;

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-3/copiii-si-revolutia

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Maria(na) Mişcov recounts the tragic death of her daughter, Miriana (above), between approximately 14:50 and 22:05.  From 16:08 or so she talks about these military men definitely not being draftees because they were older, they had military vests, but no epaulets, and satchels or bags.

These “mystery men” are analyzed in the following posts, for example:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/20/procesul-de-la-timisoara-viii-cine-au-fost-cei-necunoscuti-mai-in-varsta-care-au-tras-inainte-de-22-decembrie-1989/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/21/procesul-de-la-timisoara-ix-cine-au-fost-cei-necunoscuti-mai-in-varsta-care-au-tras-inainte-de-22-decembrie-1989-2/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

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For example, in a 7 September 1995 interview, Dorina Aparaschivei told Marius Mioc about how her husband, Valentin Aparaschivei, was shot to death on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara ( “A luminat cu o lanterna si apoi a tras” http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT04~1.HTM ).  Among the details, she notes, “Cind militarii au ajuns in fata blocului unul dintre ei, mai batrin si cu mustata, a luminat cu o lanterna puternica si apoi a tras mai multe focuri spre noi. Sotul a fost impuscat in piept si a cazut pe spate.”

Thanks to the publication of Dosarele Revolutiei de la Timisoara, we can now confirm that was reported in the media in July 2008 is indeed the actual quote of Dumitru Marcu, commander of U.M. 01380 Arad, as recorded in his report dated 4 January 1990.  In this report, Marcu spoke of unidentified personnel infiltrated among the personnel of his military unit who used powerful flashlights (lanterns/lamps), and he suggests that these may have been Securitate/Militie personnel.

IMG_3084

Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

http://www.mediafax.ro/social/jurnalul-de-lupta-al-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-desecretizat-galerie-foto-2767638

Comandantul unitatii militare din Arad, martor al evenimentelor, a raportat ca “printre militarii care au actionat pe Calea Girocului s-au strecurat si persoane necunoscute, in uniforma, care aveau lanterne foarte puternice cu care luminau balcoanele blocurilor din apropiere, dupa care trageau asupra lor”.

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-3506099-jurnalul-revolutiei-timisoara-fost-desecretizat-securitatea-tras-manifestanti.htm

Internet posters claiming to have been in the military and on the streets of Timisoara in December 1989 have discussed the appearance of personnel in military uniforms who very clearly were not from the military (my thanks to Corneliu N. Vaida for bringing the following to my attention):

zainea

Am fost la Timisoara militar in termen in 89. In fata noastra la un moment dat a fost dizlocat un pluton cu militari in tinuta kaki, mai in varsta ca noi, la 30-35 de ani si care nu aveau petlite si nici insemne de arma. Ii intrebam de vorba si nu ne raspundeau ne ignorau… Au tras orizontal rafale de pistol automat… Noi pana atunci am tras in plan vertical. Cine erau acei “militari”?
Noi toti am banuit ca erau ofiteri din trupele de securitate imbracati in postav kaki nou de la stoc care mirosea a naftalina.
Dupa aceea toata revolutia am petrecut-o pe un bloc in fata unei mitraliere si cu un camarad cu care ma scimbam periodic. Am ramas de atunci bolnav cu “mijlocul” din cauza frigului pe care l-am suportat atunci pe acel nenorocit de bloc.
Dumnezeu sa-i ierte pe toti eroii revolutiei din 1989…

http://www.ligamilitarilor.ro/eroii-neamului/recunostinta-eroilor-revolutiei-din-%E2%80%9989-timisoara/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

So then the question becomes one of who would have possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets in Timisoara on 17 December 1989.  For one thing, we can almost automatically eliminate two hypotheses:  Peter Siani-Davies hypothesis used to cast doubt on the use of atypical munitions after 22 December 1989–i.e. that the revolutionaries/civilians could have themselves taken possession of the munitions and weapons of regime forces and used them–since it is clear from the events at Podul Decebal that the only ones who fired were from the regime forces.  Secondly, as part 1 of this series demonstrated, the Securitate themselves in their declarations immediately after the events denied the presence and involvement in the demonstrations of foreign agents, most notably the so-called “Soviet/Russian tourists.”

So what is the evidence that the Army would have possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara?  The answer is essentially NONE.  In more than two decades, not a single Army officer or even draftee has come forward and alleged/admitted that a) the Army had them, b) that those munitions were distributed to them, and c) that they fired them against demonstrators.  This is in stark contrast to the case of the Securitate, where we have demonstrators overhearing the Army complaining about being left out to dry so-to-speak by the Securitate who was using these munitions (see below).  But moreoever, we have the claims of former Securitate whistleblowers, multiple cases, admitting that they had these munitions and used them.  Any logical, evidentiary based analysis of December 1989 then can only conclude that it was the Securitate who had and used these munitions.

 

The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off> (my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0291

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

IMG_0290

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

Stoica Mircea, 40 ani, topometrist, Bd. Republicii, impuscat mina si picior http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT06~1.HTM

197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat.  În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0307pciv.htm

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

IMG_0330

intreaga declaratie e aici:

imaginea 330
imaginea 331
imaginea 332
imaginea 333
imaginea 334
imaginea 335
imaginea 336

It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici:  both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!

image0

Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,

comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoart–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

from Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

for Part I see PART I: His Name Was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias

for Part II see Part II: A Revolution, A Coup d\’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

for Part III see Part III: Lost…during Investigation

for Part IV see Part IV: The Good Sergeant Schultz or They Know Nothing

for Part V see Part V: Seeing is Believing Videos One and Two

for Part VI see Part VI: Seeing is Believing, Videos 3 and 4

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.  [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Those Who Have Told Us the Truth[1]

As opposed to the aforementioned Vladimir Belis, Pavel Corut, and Dan Voinea, all of whom who have strenuously and repeatedly denied the existence and use in December 1989 of atypical munitions of dum-dum bullets and vidia bullets, there exist those who have told us of the existence and use of these in December 1989.[2] They are essentially, for lack of a better term, former Securitate whistleblowers, who have admitted the Securitate’s role in providing the “terrorists” who caused so much destruction, mayhem, and loss of life in those days.

For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).

Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989.  What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding [dum-dum] bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridgeswhich upon hitting their targets caused new explosions” [emphasis added]—in other words, exploding or dum-dum bullets.[3]

The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:

I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89.  In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched.  Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition.  In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances.  I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets.  In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox.  We had been drugged.  We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us.  Don’t publish my name.  I fear for me and my parents.  When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’  The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize.  I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’.[4] [emphases added]

Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention:  the former Securitate.  That is not accidental.[5]

for full discussion of those who told us the truth (i.e. continuation of above), see discussion here:

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

 

from Orwellian Positively Orwellian Part III a fistful of bullets

Bucharest: Stanculescu’s unexpected revelation prompted a participant in the Revolution to challenge Stanculescu’s claim to ignorance as to the source of the bullets.  Ironically, while this challenge suggests Stanculescu may have being playing coy and not telling everything he knew, it does not contradict Stanculescu’s claim that the ammunition was not the Army’s, but rather buttresses it:

Balasa Gheorghe:  I am very intrigued by the interview given by General Stanculescu to the newspaper ‘Tineretul Liber,’ an interview in which he avoids the truth.

 

From [Securitate] Directorate V-a, from the weapons depot, on 23-24 December 1989, DUM-DUM cartridges, special cartridges that did not fit any arm in the arsenal of the Defense Ministry were retrieved.  Three or four boxes with these kinds of cartridges were found.  The special bullets were 5-6 cm. in length and less thick than a pencil.  Such a cartridge had a white stone tip that was transparent.  All of these cartridges I personally presented to be filmed by Mr. Spiru Zeres.  All the special cartridges, other than the DUM-DUM [ones] were of West German [FRG] make. From Directorate V-a we brought these to the former CC building, and on 23-24 December ’89 they were surrendered to U.M. 01305.  Captain Dr. Panait, who told us that he had never seen such ammunition before, Major Puiu and Captain Visinescu know about [what was turned over].

 

In the former CC of the PCR, all of those shot on the night of 23-24 December ’89 were shot with special bullets.  It is absurd to search for the bullet in a corpse that can penetrate a wall….[44]

image-8image-7

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…

“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:

armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:

–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;

–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;

–statii de emisie-receptie;

–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;

–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;

–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;

–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;

–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;

–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;

–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.

–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.

“S-AU GASIT LAZI INTREGI, CONTININD DE LA GLOANTE SPECIALE, PINA LA GLOANTE DE VINATOARE”

Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):

“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:

–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;

–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;

–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;

–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;

–dozimetre, contoare Geiger, osciloscoape multispot, truse electronice de depanare, calculatoare, aparatura foto;

–truse chimice de teren;

–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);

–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;

–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;

codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;

–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;

–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;

–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;

–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;

–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;

–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:

–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….

Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.

Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.

[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62

According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].

In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania).  Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 17, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  No researcher has previously attempted to track and aggregate the discussion of atypical ammunition, to include exploding dum-dum bullets, that were used in the maiming and killing of demonstrators in Romania in December 1989.  Here we talk about their use prior to the flight from power of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu at 12:09 on 22 December 1989.  Romanian prosecutors, mostly notably former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea, have refused to acknowledge the existence and use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989–and yet the documents of the military procuracy itself contradict them.  (Voinea’s “findings” are invoked as the basis for the chapter about December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Commission Final Report).  Below, evidence from the testimonies of demonstrators, next of kin, and doctors in Timisoara.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film may have to be rewound to its beginning.)  The sequence beginning at 50:20 has doctors/medical staff talking about the destruction of internal organs among the wounded brought to the hospital and at 51:02-51:06 the doctor mentions the use of “explosive bullets.” (Scroll down for testimonies by doctors and medical staff about the use of explosive bullets by the repressive forces.)

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

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This post has four sections, as follows:

1) The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

2) 7 Declarations and/or courtroom testimony about demonstrators injured or killed by dum-dum bullets:  Doina Gherasim, Cristian Rusu, Robert Buzatu, M. Csikos, Dobosan, Florin Nicoara, and Doru Sciadei.

3) 10 other testimonies from Victims or Relatives of Victims of Dum-Dum Bullets on 17-18 December 1989:  Valentin Aparashivei, Ioan Musca, Danut Gavra, Octavian Tintaru, Adrian Kali, Mariana Rodica Farcau, Leontina Banciu, Vasile Avram, Marius Ciopec, and Florica Sava.

4) 6 Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…:  Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, Rodica Novac, Dr. Fluture, Csaba Ungor, Goga Andras.

After reading these four sections, it should be pretty clear that anyone who denies the use of exploding dum-dum bullets in Timisoara is either uninformed, lying, or so in denial that they cannot bring themselves to admit reality.  This many people are simply not wrong…

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1) The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off> (my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0291

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

IMG_0290

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

Stoica Mircea, 40 ani, topometrist, Bd. Republicii, impuscat mina si picior http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT06~1.HTM

197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat.  În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0307pciv.htm

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

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intreaga declaratie e aici:

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imaginea 331
imaginea 332
imaginea 333
imaginea 334
imaginea 335
imaginea 336

It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici:  both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!

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2) Declarations and/or courtroom testimony about demonstrators injured or killed by dum-dum bullets:  Doina Gherasim, Cristian Rusu, Robert Buzatu, M. Csikos, Dobosan, Florin Nicoara, Doru Sciadei, and Valentin Aparaschivei.

Doina Gherasim

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Cristian Rusu:  Pe 8 ianuarie audiat de procuror:  …A venit o masina Dacia 1300 combi, culoare glabui, au coborat trei indivizi in civil, care au mers in spatele cordonului si au ordonat foc.  S-a tras cu gloante “dum-dum.”

Robert Buzatu “a fost lovit de un glont exploziv”

IMG_0045

imaginea 43
imaginea 44
imaginea 45
imaginea 46

Csikos [?] “Cred dupa rana [?]  ca au fost gloante dum-dum”

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Dobosan “am fost ranit…cu gloante dum-dum”

imaginea 127
imaginea 128

IMG_0128

Florin Nicoara “Am fost lovit in soldul drept cu un glont dum-dum”

IMG_0257

Griga “civilii au fost impuscati cu gloante plate [?], care asa cum spuneau medicii cu rupt tesuturile”

imaginea 170
imaginea 171

Doru Sciadei’s statement, 27 January 1990

IMG_0932

“In urma radiografiei facute la Spitalul Judetean au spus ca am 2 schije in picior…consemnat de medicul radiolog si chirurg, care m-au consultat.

Convingerea mea este ca in acest atac (pe ?) Calea Girocului, asupra unor oameni pasnici si (?) s-au folosit cel putin doua tipuri de gloante, convingerea intirita de glontul scos din coapsa (?) si schijele din piciorul meu, care cred ca provin de un glonte exploziv.

…Se trage sistematic si concomitent cu tragerea de lumina de catre unul din ei cu o lanterna.”

IMG_0929

3) Other testimonies from Victims or Relatives of Victims of Dum-Dum Bullets on 17-18 December 1989:  Valentin Aparashivei, Ioan Musca, Danut Gavra, Octavian Tintaru, Adrian Kali, Mariana Rodica Farcau, Leontina Banciu, Vasile Avram, Marius Ciopec, and Florica Sava.

Followed by 6 Medical Personnel Who Treated the Victims Attest to the Use of Dum-Dum Bullets

Cases available on the Internet mentioning the wounding or killing of demonstrators with dum-dum explosive bullets on 17-18 December 1989.  There are more than a dozen in all, many of whom we have seen were testified about during the Timisoara trials.

Doru Sciadei’s recollections are similar to those of Dorina Aparaschivei, whose husband, Valentin, was shot at the same location on Calea Girocului in Timisoara on 17 December 1989:

http://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/decembrie-89-manifestantii-ucisi-s-au-refugiat-casa-scarilor-1_50ad7b6a7c42d5a66395fbe7/index.html

Pe 17 decembrie 1989, duminică seara, toată Calea Girocului a fost cuprinsă de febra revoltei. Mii de locuitori au ieşit pe stradă să îşi arate nemulţumirea faţă de sistem. Pe fondul izbucnirii conflictelor între manifestanţi şi soldaţi, s-a format un grup de 40 de militari sub comanda lt.col. Constantin Caraivan, care aveau misiunea de a restabili ordinea. „În jurul orei 23, când au început să tragă, am decis să ne retragem spre casă. Am fost şi noi la baricade. Soţul meu spunea că se trage cu gloanţe de cauciuc, voia să mă liniştească”, a spus Dorina Aparaschivei.

Ca în filmele de acţiune

Cordoanele de militari înaintau pe de o parte şi de alta a trotuarului, iar în mijloc se deplasa un tanc. „Noi ne-am băgat în scara de bloc unde erau peste 20 de persoane. Valentin era de mână cu cei doi copii, care aveau 12 şi 15 ani. La un moment dat am văzut o lumină puternică, moment în care au început să tragă”, a mai adăugat femeia. Au fost cinci gloanţe trimise către casa scării, iar unul dintre ele a trecut prin geam şi l-a nimerit în piept pe Valentin Aparaschivei. În acel moment, un bătrân a ieşit în genunchi şi a strigat „Măi militarilor, de ce aţi împuşcat un om nevinovat?”. I s-a răspuns: „Bagă capul că te împuşc şi pe tine!”.

Salvarea a sosit în scurt timp, însă medicii nu au putut să mai facă nimic. Avea o gaură mare în piept, cât o gură de pahar. Se spunea că erau gloanţe explozibile. L-am dus în casă cu pătura şi l-am pregătit pentru înmormântare. A doua zi au venit patru oameni în albastru, cu un sicriu şi l-au luat”, a mai povestit Dorina Aparaschivei. [my emphasis inserted in this sentence]

Criminali cu lanterne

În aceea seară şi în noaptea care a urmat, în zonă au acţionat pe lângă militari persoane necunoscute, care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice. Îndreptau fasciculul luminos către balcoane şi scări, după care trăgeau. Au acţionat de asemenea, şi securişti şi miliţieni în civil. Pe toată Calea Girocului, de la intersecţia cu strada Albac până la intersecţia cu Liviu Rebreanu au fost 11 victime prin împuşcare şi 26 de răniţi.

from Adevarul http://www.adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/DECEMBRIE_-89-_Si-a_pierdut_iubita_si_piciorul_stang_0_173982752.html author Stefan Both

Danut Gavra with his two daughters in the Heroes’ Cemetery in December 2009

Irish Television (RTE) captured what were apparently the last hours of Florica Sava’s  tragic end.  Warning:  the scene from 11:00 to 11:30 is graphic and unsettling.

posted by mikenork

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3A6IiaOWhs

Brendan O’Brien (reporter):  “Florica Sava, a 33 year old mother of two young sons, was shot from a car with a dum-dum bullet.  It caused massive internal injuries.  Doctors said she had just hours to live.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/lets-go-to-the-videotape-i-to-the-army-its-confirmation-that-theyve-been-dealing-with-a-specially-trained-force-because-its-the-type-of-bullet-theyve-never-seen-before-itn-uk-telev/

4) SIX Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…:  Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, Rodica Novac, Dr. Fluture, Csaba Ungor, Goga Andras

Doctors also reported on the wounds caused by explosive bullets (i.e. dum-dum bullets):  In this dispatch from Agence France Presse, relayed by Radio Free Europe on 25 December 1989, Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, a medic in the intensive care unit of a Timisoara hospital, says based on his thirty years of experience, some of the wounds could only have been CAUSED by EXPLOSIVE BULLETS SHOT AT THE PROTESTERS”

sursa (documentele Europa Libera disponibile la):  http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/generic_file-2009-12-22-6754154-0-radio-bucuresti-25-dec-pdf.pdf (p. 49 of 82)

©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 08:33 – Heure Paris (386 mots)
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
   ” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
   ” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
   Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
   Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
   En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
   Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
   Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
   Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
   Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
   nm/jga/vr.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
021851451DC1ED1D715E06849EA4C6E0F37C0C25ECE8D503

mai mult despre Dr. Aurel Mogosanu in decembrie 1989:  http://www.sorinbogdan.ro/2009/12/timisoara-18-decembrie-1989/.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/09/30/procesul-de-la-timisoara-iii-audierea-martorului-rodica-novac-directorul-directiei-sanitare-timis-13-iunie-1990/

Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression.  First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot.  december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom

Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian

Barzeanu Atanasie, 65 anit, medic primar, doctor in stiinte, chirurg, Spitalul Judetean Timisoara

“…sintem deci in 18 decembrie…Pe la orele doua si patruzeci, cind inchideam o operatie–Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian, dintr-un ARO, pacienta prezentindu-se o echimoza cu distrugerea tesuturilor (plaga in diametru de 15 centimetri), a tesuturilor din regiunea epigastrica, inclusiv a muschilor drepti abdominali, cu ruptura a colonului ascendent transvers si a jejuno-ileonului, fiind in stare de soc grav traumatic, hemoragic–, fara sa-mi poti explica nici macar acum cu ce fel de gloante a putut fi lovita, pentru ca nu am identificat nici orificiul de iesire si nici pe cel de intrare, a venit o asistenta de la Chirurgie I, care mi-a spus sa merg la domnul Ignat.”

Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura, (Editura Facla 1990), pp. 133-134.

The following first appeared in Gyorgy Mandics’s Temesvari golgota (1991) pp. 348-349 and is reprinted in his A Manipulalt Forradalom (2009).  [My guess is this is also the source for the reference to dum dum bullets in the German language wikipedia entry for http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum%C3%A4nische_Revolution_1989 — Hans Vastag, György Mandics, Manfred Engelmann: Temeswar. Symbol der Freiheit. Wien 1992. ]

pp. 348-349

Ket esetuk volt az elejen.  Ezert is hivtak be oket.  Egy 14 eves gyermeket a haz elott lottek le, szinte a szomszedban, egy golyoszoros ARO-rol talaltak el; egy oreg nenit a ter tuloldalon, az erkelyen ertek a golyok.  A zarja ment ki, kicsit nagyott hallott mar, amire is csoda, 64 evesen, azt hirtelen ugy erezte, hogy labaibol kimegy minden ero es lecsusott az erholya.  Na milyen gyonge lettem egyszeruen–mondotta maganak. de ahogyan fel akart tapaszkodni meg lepve tapasztalt, hogy vertocsa gyult alatta.  Bekialtolt a vegenek aki egy szomszed segitsegevel athozta a nenit a legkozelebbi korhazba, itt a Marasti ter tuloldalan, az uj Klinikakba, avagy hivatalos neven a 2 szamu korhazba, ahol rogton osszecodult mindenki csodat latni.  Ekkor hivtak be Baranziekat es minden mozgositato orvost, hiszen a fegyverek ropogatak.  Azota is kisebb nagyobb megszakitasokkal, felfelecsapolt a gepfegyverek, golyoszorok, geppisztolyok langzivatarja, remulettel telitva az ejszaki eget.

p. 349

De azt a ket elso esett nem kovettek ujabbok.  Igz aztan volt ido alaposan szemugyre venni a nenit akinek combjan elol egz akkora lyuk tatongott mint egy egy lejes, a comba hatso felen ahol eltavotott a golyo, ott viszont mar akkora mint egy otlejes.  Fluture doktor, az egzik sebesz erosen kototte az ebet a korohoz, hogy ez egz specialis dum-dum robbanogolyo okozta seb, hiszen a szakirodalomban azt irjak, hogy csak ez a robbannolovedek-fajta-amelyet ugyan az ENSZ eltitott, am a nemzetkozi terrorizmusban kulonesen divatos ma is–okoz az izomszovetbol kijovet sokkal nagyobb roncsolasokat mint a bemenetnel.  Az orvosok odazarandokoltak a sebesulthoz, mivel egzik sem latott semhogy dum-dum golyo utotte sebet, de egyaltalan lott sebet sem soha eleteben.  Igz aztan csak szivtak a rangeletrahoz igazodva a sebesz foorvosok az amerikai Kentet, a foamnesztezialogus a holland pipadohanyt, az asztalyos orovosok a bolgar BT-t, a fonoverek a jugoslav Vikend-et, a noverek es helyapolok a roman Snagov-t, Golfot.  Es vartak.

(Note: it is unclear who the 64 yr. old described was…there are several individuals without ages listed as injured or dead during the events, but I think it more likely the age of the woman is incorrect)

Jozsef Gazda Megvalto karacsonyErdelyi magyar tulelok emlekeznek. (1990)

Ungor Csaba:  Ket ora utan senkit be nem hoztak, senkit be nem engedtek, egyetlen sebesult sem.  A korhazbol kikanyarado  mentoautokra is lottek.  Ket ora utan mindre, ami mozgott, jarokelo, auto, mindenre lottek, csak hogy ok tudjak begyujteni a sebesulteket s a halottakat.  Kiderult az elso golyok utan, amiket a sebekbol gyujottek ossze, szedtek ki, hogy nem eles katonai toltenyekkel lottek, hanem dum-dum golyokkal, amik nagy rombolasokat okoztak.  Egy 16 eves, ketszer sebesult gyermek meselte el, ok azt hittek, hogy hosok, azt hittek, hogy meg fogjak menteni a forradalmat, mert biztosra vettek, ha a felnottek sorfala ele allnak, nem fognak belejuk loni.  Lottek rajuk is.

Goga Andras:  A masodik izgalomkelto esemeny volt kedden delelott, hogy az osszes regiszterunk–mind a surgossegen, mind az osztalyon–, melyekre felirtuk a muteteinket, eltuntek, a mai napig sem talaltuk meg.  Bennuk voltak az ev osszes mutetei[***]…En aznap kettot operaltam.  Egy tuntetonek a bore alol vettem ki egy nagyon kulonleges golyok, nem is golyot, egy ilyen repeszdarabot, melyet a katonasag aztan megvizsgalt, s azt mondtak, nekik nincs tudmasuk, hogy ez mi lehet.  Egy masiknak pedig fejserulese volt, persze abban nem talaltam golyot, atment rajta.

RELATED:

Procesul de la Timisoara (XII): Timisoara, the key to the Revolution then; the key now to the truth about the Counter-revolution

Procesul de la Timisoara (XI): Dupa 22 decembrie–teroristii. Martorii Alexandru Koos, Ion Flocioiu, si Herlea Floarea

Procesul de la Timisoara (X): Gloante explozive (dum-dum) dupa 22 decembrie 1989

Procesul de la Timisoara (IX): Cine au fost cei “necunoscuti,” mai in varsta, care au tras inainte de 22 decembrie 1989? (2)

Procesul de la Timisoara (VIII): Cine au fost cei “necunoscuti”, mai in varsta, care au tras inainte de 22 decembrie 1989?

Procesul de la Timisoara (VII): “La Timisoara cred ca si domnul procuror a vazut cartuse de acest calibru…Dar au existat in corpurile delicte ale procuraturii. Eu l-am vazut. Este un cartus ceva mai lung, negru, cu botul taiat. 5,56.”

Procesul de la Timisoara (VI): Impuscati dintr-un ARO…Al cui apartinea ARO-ul?

Procesul de la Timisoara (V): Martorii Cristian Rusu, Daniela Lengyel, si Aurica Rusu (mama lui Marius Ciopec)

Procesul de la Timisoara (IV): Martorii Adrian Kali, Ioan Musca, Traian Orban, si Alexandru Koos

Procesul de la Timisoara (III): Audierea martorului Rodica Novac, directorul Direcţiei Sanitare Timiş (13 iunie 1990)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

Procesul de la Timisoara (I): Missed Press Opportunities. The testimonies of Margaret Cacoceanu and Doina Gherasim (25-26 September 1990)

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/search/node/%22procesul%20de%20la%20timisoara%22
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. V
 ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA     Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009   Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_V_final.pdf 4 …Articol – dbaiski – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:03 – 0 comentarii – 1 fişier ataşat
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. IV
 ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA     Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009   Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_IV_prefata.pdf …Articol – dbaiski – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:02 – 0 comentarii – 3 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. III
ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA   Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009 Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_III_prefata.pdf 126.6 KB proc …Articol – banaticus – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:01 – 0 comentarii – 4 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. I, II
ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA   Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009 Ataşament Mărime prefata.pdf 199.39 KB procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_I.pdf …Articol – banaticus – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:00 – 0 comentarii – 3 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. VII
 Postul teritorial de Radio Timişoara Asociaţia ALTAR 1989, Timişoara Editor: Miodrag Milin Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VII_nota_asupra_editiei.pdf 68.46 KB procesu …Articol – dbaiski – 20 Mai 2009 – 17:06 – 0 comentarii – 3 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. VI
  ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA   Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009 Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VI_nota_asupra_editiei …Articol – dbaiski – 20 Mai 2009 – 16:51 – 0 comentarii – 2 fişiere ataşate
Much of this has now been reposted or reproduced here:dosarelerevolutiei.ro

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

Declarations of Alexandru Kos (aka Alexandru Koos, aka Koos Sandor) from Timisoara in December 1989

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 12, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

From the 630 am broadcast of Kossuth Radio on 23 December 1989 (Hungarian Monitoring transcripts of Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany) http://storage.osaarchivum.org/low/c5/b8/c5b829b1-9021-414f-a83b-c90d3e5739c3_l.pdf :

Sandor Koos discusses in an interview (presumably performed on the evening of 22 December 1989 before nightfall based on the discussion of coming nightfall) from Timisoara how he and civilians found 9 Securitate members on the property of the Hotel Timisoara next to the Opera building in the center of Timisoara, took their guns and turned them over to the Timisoara military garrison. (p. 1752)

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

Alexandru Kos’s declaration for the military prosecutor, from 14 January 1990:

“[pe 23 decembrie 1989] am fost impuscat…cu o arma de calibru mare si probabil cu gloante dum-dum”

[on 23 December 1989 I was shot by a high caliber weapon probably with dum-dum bullets]

After discussing the exact incident mentioned above in the interview from 22 December 1989 about rounding up Securitate personnel on the grounds of Hotel Timisoara, where he says they had been for several days, he continues:  “I saw two of those who shot at me, one in a blue uniform with a white helmet, the other dressed in black with something white on his head.” [in other words, no stupidity here about the Army shooting into itself  and into civilians in the confusion of it all…]

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/25/procesul-de-la-timisoara-xi-dupa-22-decembrie-teroristii-martorii-alexandru-koos-ion-flocioiu-si-herlea-floarea/

From this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following are from Volume V.  Alexandru Koos’ courtroom testimony during the so-called Timisoara trial (date of his testimony appears to be 3 October 1990).  Koos discusses all of the above incidents in detail, and also the specifics of those detained during these days.

Alexandru Koos who was wounded on the night of 22-23 December 1989 also was treated in Austria however, where both doctors and experts confirmed that the bullet in question was a dum-dum bullet. (p. 600)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/02/procesul-de-la-timisoara-iv-martorii-adrian-kali-ioan-musca-traian-orban-si-alexandru-koos/

Alexandru Koos:

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

A Tale of Two Letters by Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad: What the Romanian Press Does and Does Not Publish

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 23, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

And one wonders why I found (find) mainstream Romanian studies so unhelpful in trying to understand Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989?  Read Vladimir Tismaneanu or Tom Gallagher (or in its 2014 variation, see Grigore Pop-Eleches in Bernhard and Kubik) on Romania in the early 1990s and one is presented with a world of good and evil, of angels and demons, with distance from former nomenklaturist and high-ranking communist Ion Iliescu and the core of the National Salvation Front being as being the simple formula for explaining and understanding any event or policy.  As opposed to this highly–one might say blatantly–politically partisan [and bureaucratically ignorant] approach, on the other side stand functional or deconstructionist explanations–the kind favored by Peter Gross, Katherine Verdery, Peter Siani-Davies, or Ruxandra Cesereanu–which would explain the press of the time as the function of market pressures, sensationalist appetites, an anomic readership, poor journalistic training and professionalism, etc.

How then does one explain the following conundrum:  the selective treatment of the letters and declarations of former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad?  Oh, yes, the text of General Vlad’s letters which allege he was a stooge and victim of Ion Iliescu, etc. can be found in the Romanian press.  No problem!  But what about his declaration of 29 January 1990, where he deftly admits the responsibility of his institution for the bloodshed of December?  What, that not sensationalist enough, different enough to sell papers?  That’s not “anti-communist” enough for publication?  Is it somehow less credible than the other letters whose text has been published without problem?  24 plus years later, the Romanian media has yet to publish this document!  Could it be that the problem with this declaration is that it does not fit with and undermines the other popular narratives of December 1989 that minimize and even absolve the former Securitate of responsibility for the bloodshed of December 1989?

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Ion Cristoiu’s Evenimentul Zilei debuted in June 1992 and was the flagship of opposition to the regime of Ion Iliescu.  In the fall of 1992 it ran a zealous campaign opposed to Iliescu’s reelection.  Here is the exculpatory letter from former Securitate General Iulian Vlad (dated 20 March 1990) that was published on 19 September 1992:

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“Generalul IULIAN VLAD se adreseaza dlui Ion Iliescu:  Am fost arestat pe nedrept (20 March 1990),” Evenimentul Zilei, 19 septembrie 1992, p. 3.  “Intr-adevar pe dictatorul Ceausescu l-am tradat” “M-am integrat total Revolutiei” “Sint convins ca datele nu va erau cunoscute”  I.V. Vlad 20 martie 1990

And, yet, what of General Iulian Vlad’s declaration of 29 January 1990.  As far as I know, in 24 plus years, only this brief allusive mention on the 15th anniversary of the letter (although not mentioned or acknowledged in the article, and possibly accidental) has made its way into the Romanian press.  Below it:  the text of the statement of 29 January 1990!

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/text-of-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-29-january-1990-declaration-identifying-the-terrorists/

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

 

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 13, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This (likely aperiodic) series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Romanian journalists and researchers, but perhaps in particular Timisoara journalists and researchers, have failed to systematically analyze the use of atypical munitions–most notably, exploding DUM-DUM bullets–in the wounding and killing of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989.  They invoke, for example, the claims of military prosecutors such as General Dan Voinea (http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/11/nici-simulatoare-de-tragere-nici.html), who outright denies their use, or General Romeo Balan ( https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/), who conveniently avoid mention of the type of bullets with which Timisoara demonstrators were wounded or killed. 

However, they suddenly are willing to countenance their use where demonstrators maintain they were shot by the Army.  But they fail to ask the critical question of what forces were present among thos