The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘timisoara’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Among those Ceausescu regime officials who were involved in the elimination of evidence of regime repression in Timisoara–and of the bodies of murdered Timisoara demonstrators–there are those whose names and roles are relatively well-known (Nicolae Ghircoias)…and those whose names and roles are lesser known (Dan Voinea).  Interestingly, a number of these officials found themselves in a position after 22 December 1989 where they could continue to cover up the role of Securitate and Militia units in December 1989, in Timisoara, Bucharest, and elsewhere.

The Case of Nicolae Ghircoias…before and after 22 December 1989

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/07/26/nicolae-ghircoias-colonel-de-militie-director-al-institutului-de-criminalistica-din-inspectoratul-general-al-militiei-igm-decembrie-1989-ianuarie-1990/

image0-001

Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus-numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel Negoiu din Bucuresti.  Medicii de spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri.  Colonel Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii, i-a adunat pe toti indivizii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristii, facindu-i disparuti.

image0-003

Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera , 21 august 1992, p. 1, p. 3.

for confirmation suggesting Cornel Tripon’s arrest under suspicion of being a “terrorist” (28 December 1989, Hotel Negoiu, Bucuresti) during the December 1989 events, see http://www.danbadea.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/img036.jpg ; for confirmation that Ghircoias himself was (later) (re-) arrested, see http://www.danbadea.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/img043.jpg .

for the suggestion that Tripon’s status as a member of the Militie was merely a cover mechanism see,

“La internarea in spital, militianul Cornel Tripon a prezentat un buletin pe care avea trecuta ca adresa de domiciliu str. Academiei 24. Aceeasi adresa de domiciliu (fictiv) era trecuta in buletinul mai multor ofiteri de la UM 0666. Militianul ranit a fost ridicat chiar a doua zi din spital si transportat, se pare, la o unitate spitaliceasca a Ministerului de Interne.”

from Romulus Cristea, 20 decembrie 2006, http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/reportaje/salvarile-nu-erau-pentru-raniti–80867

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1]

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process. [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

Part I

His name was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias.

And in Romania in December 1989 and January 1990, Nicolae Ghircoias was a very busy man.

We know, officially, of Nicolae Ghircoias’ actions in the last days leading up to the fall of the regime of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on 22 December 1989, as a result of what he and others said at a trial later in January 1990.  In bureaucratic parlance, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias, was the Director of the Criminalistic Institute of the Militia’s [Police’s] General Inspectorate.   In colloquial terms, in December 1989 it appears that this amounted to being something of a “cleaner,” or “fixer,” the kind of guy who could make unpleasant things—such as corpses—go away, without leaving a trace.

After regime forces opened fire on anti-regime protesters in the western city of Timisoara on 17 and 18 December 1989, Colonel Ghircoias was dispatched to recover the corpses of those with gunshot wounds from the city’s morgue.  The unautopsied cadavers of 43 demonstrators were stolen from the morgue in the dead of night and then transported to the outskirts of the capital Bucharest by refrigerated truck, where they were cremated.[2] Ghircoias was also in charge of collecting and destroying the hospital records and any other incriminating material that might indicate not just the death, but also the life of those who had perished—the official explanation for the disappearance of these citizens was to be that they had fled the country, thus taking their documents with them.  In other words, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias’ job was primarily, it seems, the destruction of evidence.[3]

[For a discussion of Ghircoias’s activities in Timisoara before 22 December, please see the following:

and in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1) 2010, Marius Rotar, “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania in December 1989.”  pp. 1- 17.]

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]


Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

(English) Cited in The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, surgeon at Coltea Hospital: “I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of a department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments. I didn’t hear anything back from Chircoias or any expert. Those who made the evidence disappear neglected the fact that there still exist x-rays and other military documents that I put at the disposition of the [Military] Prosecutor.”

( http://www.romanialibera.ro/a113826/revolutia-5-000-de-victime-nici-un-vinovat.html)

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea:  “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

Dosarele revolutiei -  "Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile"

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.

Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Procurori timorati

– Ati sesizat Parchetul Militar? Ati cerut sa se faca o ancheta in legatura cu cei impuscati la revolutie?
– Bineinteles, am anuntat Parchetul, am cerut o ancheta. De exemplu, cand le-am aratat apartamentul de unde s-a tras la revolutie, de la etajul 4, de la cinematograful “Luceafarul”, procurorii mi-au zis ca au facut verificarile si au depistat ca acolo era o locuinta conspirativa a Securitatii si atat. In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare. Neprimind nici un raspuns, dupa sase luni m-am dus la Parchet sa intreb ce se intampla. Mi s-a raspuns ca se lucreaza, mi-au aratat doua-trei avize puse pe colturile cererii si atat. Unul dintre procurori m-a luat cu el pe un coridor si mi-a spus ca “are copil, are nevasta, e foarte complicat…”. Ma intreba pe mine ce sa mai faca… Am izbucnit, le-am spus ca nu sunt un om care sa fie, asa, aburit cu una, cu doua. Le-am aratat radiografiile celor impuscati, le-am aratat gloante in ficat. Radiografiile existau, nu erau inventiile mele, nu mi se nazarise asa, dintr-o data sa cer ancheta! Le-am spus ca niste oameni doresc sa afle adevarul si ca cei care au semnat memoriul catre Parchet nu sunt niste persoane oarecare, ci medici cu experienta, somitati in materie. Degeaba am solicitat expertize balistice sau alte cercetari, degeaba am prezentat acte, documente, radiografii, lucrari. Nu se dorea sa se faca o ancheta serioasa.

extras din articolul lui Romulus Cristea
Miercuri, 20 Decembrie 2006 Romania Libera

Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile

Screen Capture of a registry presented by Dr. Nicolae Nae Constantinescu in TVR documentary by Toma Roman Jr. mentioning an atypical bullet with cap (varf) retezat extracted from a patient on 23 December 1989 and later “collected” by Ghircoias.

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In early March 1990, Agence France Presse reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  [Significantly, a slew of military prosecutors, among them General Dan Voinea, General Romeo Balan, and General Teodor Ungureanu have attempted to deceive Romanians in the years since by denying or avoiding mention of the existence and use of DUM-DUM munitions in December 1989.]

Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

 

 

©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
411FD1741841E311716203546AC34BEC9C6CF7F0A69644B4

 

[1]For some of my previous publications on this topic, see Richard Andrew Hall:

Hall 2008 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romrevfordumdums042108tk.html,

Hall 2006 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html,

Hall 2005 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.html,

Hall 2004 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/doublespeak%20romania%203-2004.html,

Hall 2002 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romania%20securitate%205-2002.html,

Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Action and Revolution:  Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989,” Europe-Asia Studies 2000, no. 6 (September 2000).

Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity:  The ‘Staged-War’ Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies vol 13, no. 3 (Fall 1999) (University of California Berkeley Press).

[2] For a good discussion of this in English, which explains how cremation practices were  at odds with Romanian burial traditions, see the article entitled “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania 1989,” in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1).

[3]For more information online, see, for example, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae_Ghircoia%C5%9F, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opera%C5%A3iunea_Trandafirul, http://www.romanialibera.ro/a51078/cine-a-organizat-furtul-cadavrelor-din-morga-spitalului-judetean.html, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/67.htm. Even the 1994 SRI report admits that confusion surrounding the identity of those who were cremated stems from Ghircoias’ burning—after the flight of the Ceausescus on 22 December—of all relevant documents he had seized from the Timisoara county hospital http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/raportul_sri11.htm.  Thus, it seems appropriate to say Ghircoias’ job involved making things disappear…

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

What evidence was Ghircoias so interested in collecting from the hospitals?

No researcher has previously attempted to track and aggregate the discussion of atypical ammunition, to include exploding dum-dum bullets, that were used in the maiming and killing of demonstrators in Romania in December 1989.  Here we talk about their use prior to the flight from power of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu at 12:09 on 22 December 1989.  Romanian prosecutors, mostly notably former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea, have refused to acknowledge the existence and use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989–and yet the documents of the military procuracy itself contradict them.  (Voinea’s “findings” are invoked as the basis for the chapter about December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Commission Final Report).  Below, evidence from the testimonies of demonstrators, next of kin, and doctors in Timisoara.

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989, regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina, , imaginea/camera – Doru Segal, Sahiafilm 1991

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Who has given evidence that exploding dum-dum bullets were used in the killing and maiming of people in Timisoara before and/or after 22 December 1989:

1) Doctors and medical personnel who operated on and/or treated, and/or saw those who died or were wounded

2) Military personnel, who were in the streets in these days, including military officers

3) Relatives of the dead and wounded, some of whom were in the streets themselves, in sworn declarations  for the Military Prosecutor immediately after the December 1989 events or in sworn testimony in the so-called Timisoara Trial of 1990-1991

4) People who were wounded in December 1989, some of whom were sent abroad for follow-up treatment and who were told by those foreign doctors what type of bullet they believed they had been shot with, in sworn declarations  for the Military Prosecutor immediately after the December 1989 events or in sworn testimony in the so-called Timisoara Trial of 1990-1991.

5) Civilians who overheard during 17-19 December the discussion among regime forces of the use of such bullets

6) A former Securitate officer who went public after 1989 (Roland Vasilevici) and an unnamed former USLA recruit

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/08/this-many-people-cant-be-wrong-the-six-categories-of-people-who-attest-to-the-use-of-exploding-dum-dum-bullets-in-timisoara-in-december-1989/

Ora 23.00: La morga Spitalului Judetean, sub comanda colonelului Ghircoias, incepe operatiunea de sustragere a cadavrelor. Au fost ridicate 43 de cadavre cu acordul conducerii spitalului si al procurorului general adjunct Gheorghe Diaconescu. Toate cadavrele fusesera “incizate” pentru a li se extrage gloantele. Au fost transportate apoi la Bucuresti, cu o autoizoterma, pentru a fi incinerate.

Dan Badea 1991 evz.ro Ceausescu ultimele zile 21 decembrie 1999

 

In nopţile dramatice ale lui Decembrie 1989, medicii de la spitalele din Bucureşti au extras sute de gloanţe din trupurile demonstranţilor care manifestau împotriva regimului totalitar din România. Firesc ar fi fost ca aceste probe şi dovezi ale represiunii sângeroase să fie preluate cu un proces verbal şi folosite pentru identificarea celor care au tras în ţintele umane.

Din nefericire aceste probe delicte au dispărut. Toate mărturiile medicilor, dar şi ale celor care au studiat fenomenul îl incriminează pe colonelul Nicolae Ghircoiaş, cel care a colindat prin spitalele din Capitală şi a preluat gloanţele extrase din răniţi sau morţi, devenite ulterior de negăsit.

De altfel, colonelul Ghircoiaş fusese însărcinat să facă dispărute şi cadavrele manifestanţilor ucişi la Timişoara după 16 decembrie 1989.

Toatei corpurile delicte au fost adunate si inventariate la Institutul de criminalistica din Bucuresti. Procurorii militari au venit si le-au luat. Au fost duse pe strada Alexandru Sahia, unde era sediul Procuraturii. Voinea care acum se face ca nu stie avea biroul acolo. Alo, se aude!?

Prancea Paul marți, 5 august 2014 at 23:41 http://romuluscristea.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/la-tvr-gloantele-disparute/

Scor impresionant din 1990: Col. Ghircoias 40 de gloante … Procuratura 4 gloante !

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 20, 2009

Aceasta situatie imposibila ridicola in care din mii de cartuse trase impotriva demonstrantilor, organele de cercetare recolteaza patru gloante , este consecinta logica a ingroparii mortilor fara autopsie. — Rasvan Popescu, Expres, “Patru Gloante dintr-o Tragedia,” toamna 1990.

Cum iese destul de clar din informatia despre cum a funcionat IML Mina Minovici in decembrie 1989–sub doctorului Vladimir Belis– IML Mina Minovici in decembrie 1989 institituile oficiale au fost compromise de la bun inceput in cautarea adevarului despre decembrie 1989… oficial n-au facut nici o autopsie !  deci oficial nu se stie cine a tras … si ca un rezultat trebuie sa avem incredere se pare cam exclusiv  in…marturii martorilor care vorbesc in anumite cazuri…dupa 15 de ani  (si deloc nesemnificativ dupa un potop al dezinformarii)!

Cit de grava a fost (si mai este) situatia?…la numai un singur spital bucurestean col. Ghircoias “de la Interne” a racolat 40 de gloante…fapt destul de interesant… fiindca in toamna 1990 la Procuratura…mai erau numai 4 gloante din tragedia din decembrie ’89 !  Ce credeti?…ca gloantele racolate de catre col. Ghircoias au sosit la Procuratura…sau au ramas mult acolo? !

VA CER SCUZE AICI DAR CAM ASA A FOST LA BIBLIOTECA ACADEMIEI ROMANE IN ANUL 1994…O SINGURA MASINA XEROX…SI CUM PUTETI OBSERVA USOR…N-A FOST INTR-O STARE PREA BUNA…Atentie la cazulului Tirgu Mures din 21 decembrie 1989:  un glont de 9 mm “tras probabil dintr-o arma de vinatoare” (numai securisti si militieni au avut la ei pusti de 9 mm in decembrie 1989).  In aceste alte trei cazuri in care au ramas gloante de identificare, doua din Timisoara, unul din Cluj, se pare ca e vorba de gloante de 7,62 mm, deci nu e deloc clar cine le-au tras, ori securisti si militieni, ori militari…probabil militari din armata.

image-16

image-15

 

http://www.banaterra.eu/biblioteca/sites/default/files/suciu_titus_revolutia_pe_intelesul_detractorilor.pdf

Procesul de la Timisoara (III): Audierea martorului Rodica Novac, directorul Direcţiei Sanitare Timiş (13 iunie 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 30, 2011

[as always, purely personal views based on purely personal research and publications over the past two decades]

Thanks to Miodrag Milin (and ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI 16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA), the tapes of the Timisoara trials of 1990-1991 have been transcribed and made available to the public.  These transcripts are highly valuable for the researcher of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution.  To my knowledge, much of this information has never made it into the public domain, and much of the most important information has definitely not.

Below, the witness Rodica Novac states that in the Morgue “there were several horror scenes, even for a medic such as myself…it will remain a nightmarish memory, the wounds of these explosive bullets [gloante explozive] have remained with me in particular…” (p. 653)

When reading the courtroom testimony below, keep in mind here the unambiguous rejection by military prosecutor Dan Voinea of the use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989:

Dan Voinea:  There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets.  During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry.  The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently. (General Dan Voinea, interview by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005, online edition.)

[Are these court documents available at the website of the IICCMER?  Or the website of Asociatia 21 decembrie 1989?  No!  Thankfully, however, they are available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_IV_cuprins_0.pdf ].  The following is from Volume IV.]

Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression.  First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot.  december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom

 

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opera%C8%9Biunea_Trandafirul

Operațiunea Trandafirul

De la Wikipedia, enciclopedia liberă

Operațiunea Trandafirul, devenită apoi Acțiunea Vama, s-a desfășurat în zilele de 18 și 20 decembrie 1989, în cadrul acțiunilor de reprimarea a revoluției din decembrie 1989.

43 de cadavre ale celor împușcați mortal la demonstrațiile din Timișoara în zilele de 16 și 18 decembrie, dar și ale unor răniți executați în Spitalul Județean Timiș (SJT), au fost ridicate de la morga acestui spital și transportate la București, unde au fost incinerate în Crematoriul Cenușa.

Scopul era ștergerea urmelor masacrului de la Timișoara. Dispariția cadavrelor urma să fie explicată susținând că persoanele respective au părăsit fraudulos țara, fugind în statele vecine.

Persoane implicate

Ordinul a venit din partea Elenei Ceaușescu, care era tot timpul în contact direct cu soțul ei aflat în vizită oficială în Iran. Din conducerea superioară de partid și de stat au mai contribuit Tudor Postelnicu și Emil Bobu.

Conducătorii operațiunii:

Alți ofițerii superiori de Securitate și Miliție implicați erau:

  • Filip Teodorescu, locțiitor al șefului Direcției contraspionaj din DSS,
  • Traian Sima, șef al Securității Timiș,
  • Nicolae Ghircoiaș, director al Institutului de Criminalistică al IGM, cu sediul la București,
  • Ion Deheleanu, șef al Miliției județene Timiș,
  • locotenent-colonel Ion Corpodeanu, locțiitor al șefului Miliției Județene Timiș,
  • Ion Baciu, șef al Direcției Economice din IGM,
  • col. Petre Moraru[1], locțiitor al șefului IGM,
  • col. Tudor Stănică (a fost de față la emiterea ordinelor, dar nu a participat personal în acțiune),
  • Un rol important a avut și medicul chirurg, general de Securitate Mircea Octavian Ignat, care lucra la SJT.

Din dispoziția procurorului general al RSR Nicolae Popovici, au fost trimiși la Timișoara adjunctul procurorului general Gheorghe Diaconescu. (A mai fost detașat și procurorul Ovidius Păun, dar el nu a mai ajuns în oraș.) Din partea Direcției Sanitare județene a fost implicată dr. Rodica Novac.

Pentru ridicarea cadavrelor și încărcarea lor în autovehicul, Ion Corpodeanu i-a desemnat pe ofiterii și subofițerii de miliție: mr. Gheorghe Avram, mr. Iosif Veverca, cpt. Laurențiu Preda, cpt. Tiberiu Grui, cpt. Eugen Mișea și lt. major Eugen Peptan.

Colonelul Nicolae Ghircoiaș avea sarcina să coordoneze activitatea de selectare a cadavrelor în morga spitalului județean din Timișoara, întrucât el vizitase spitalul și mai înainte și avea informații despre cauzele morții. Scopul era selectarea cadavrelor celor care au participat la acțiunile de protest de cele ale bolnavilor care au murit din cauze patologice. După îmbarcarea celor 43 de cadavre, așezate în saci de plastic, în mașina autofrigorifică, colonelul Ghircoiaș a organizat și desăvârșit și furtul și distrugerea evidențelor compromițătoare ale spitalului.[2]

Conform planului, cadrele Miliției din Timișoara implicate in acțiune nu trebuiau să cunoască ordinul că morții transportați la București vor fi incinerați.

Unul dintre participanții la acțiunea Vama, maiorul de miliție Dumitru Sorescu, a fost înaintat după Revoluție la gradul de general și numit chestorul șef al Poliției române.[3]

Operațiunea „Trandafirul”

În seara zilei de 17 decembrie, col. Corpodeanu a fost chemat de gen. Nuță, care i-a ordonat să se ocupe de transportul unor cadavre împușcate de la morga Spitalului Județean Timiș, devenită neîncăpătoare, la Institutul Medico-Legal (IML) din București. La ora aceea erau 56 de cadavre în morgă și, deși alimentarea cu curent electric nu era întreruptă, se afirma că nu funcționează camerele frigorifice.

Col. Deheleanu, șeful lui Corpodeanu, a ordonat formarea unei echipe de la secția judiciară a Miliției județene, de supravegherea îndeplinirii ordinului urmând să se ocupe col. Ghircoiaș.

Cronologia evenimenelor din zilele de 18-19 decembrie în Timișoara

Ora 8:00: procurorul-șef adjunct Gheorghe Diaconescu era prezent la Direcția Sanitară, la dr. Rodica Novac, împreună cu col. Ghircoiaș.
Ora 9:00: În zona spitalului și în curtea acestuia a fost desfășurat un întreg dispozitiv de apărare format din securiști și milițieni sub comanda mr. Veverca și mr. Dragoș. În același timp, s-a interzis orice vizită în spital, fiind permisă numai intrarea personalului medico-sanitar pe bază de legitimație.
Ora 10:00: au sosit și generalii Nuță și Mihalea.
În urma vizitei la spital, procurorul general adjunct Gh. Diaconescu cere col. Ghircoiaș să trimită la SJT echipa pentru operațiunea de verificare a celor decedați.
Ora 14:00: autopsierul Traian Bodonea aduce la morgă saci de nailon.
Ora 17:00: procurorul Diaconescu se prezintă la Direcția Sanitară.
Ora 18:00: doctorul Ovidiu Sorin Golea, directorul Spitalului Județean, este vizitat de col. Sima Traian și col. Ghircoiaș.
Ora 19:00: Gen. Nuță vorbește la telefon cu col. Petre Moraru și cu col. Ion Baciu (care se aflau la București), și le ordonă să ia măsurile necesare pentru paza unui transport de la Timișoara la București. În termeni codificați, era vorba de „primirea unui camion de la Timișoara cu diferite colete sosite din străinătate ca ajutoare, și care trebuie distruse la București, la Vama Antrepozite”. Col. Ion Baciu se deplasează, tot din ordinul gen. Nuță, la procurorul general Nicolae Popovici, care îl aștepta, și l-a primit imediat, spunându-i că l-a sunat gen. Nuță și i-a cerut să-l sprijine în distrugerea unor colete ce urmau a fi trimise de la Timișoara.
Ora 19:00: dr. Golea a ridicat cheia de la morgă. Pe geamurile saloanelor sau camerelor spitalului cu orientare spre intrarea morgii au fost așezate pături, pentru a bloca vizibilitatea din interior.
Ora 23:00: la cererea col. Ghircoiaș și col. Corpodeanu, dr. Golea deschide morga. Cinci ofițeri de miliție conduși de col. Ghircoiaș, medicii legiști (prof. dr. Traian Crișan și conf. dr. Milan Dressler) și procurorii civili încep identificarea și selectarea cadavrelor. Cele selectate sunt introduse în saci de plastic.
Ora 23:30: Începând cu această oră circulația bolnavilor prin spital era totalmente interzisă.
Dorel Cioacă, șofer pe autoizoterma 21-TM-2701, angajat al Complexului de Creștere și Îngrășare a Porcilor COMTIM, este convocat din dispoziția inginerului Dan Rotariu, la sediul Miliției județene, unde căpitanul Valentin Ciucă[4] îl invită în birou, și îi spune că poate să doarmă până la noi ordine.
Ora 0:45: În jurul acestei ore, din ordinul lt. col. Corpodeanu, au fost îndepărtate din fața intrării și din curtea spitalului trupele, astfel autoizoterma (la volanul căreia era cpt. Valentin Ciucă) a putut intra până la ușa morgii. A mai sosit și o Dacia 1310 albă (nr. 1-TM-236, condusă de șoferul șefului Miliției Județene, plut. adj. Alexandru Kocic), în care erau doi milițieni de la Inspectoratul Județean Timiș.
Ora 1:00: luminile din curtea spitalului au fost stinse, pentru ca bolnavii din spital să nu poată observa acțiunea.
Ora 1:30: cei șase ofițeri desemnați de Corpodeanu – Iosif Veverca, Gheorghe Avram, Eugen Mișea, Laurențiu Preda, Tiberiu Grui și Eugen Peptan – au început încărcarea în autoizotermă a cadavrelor (denumite în continuare „colete”) indicate de Ghircoiaș.
Ora 4:15: A luat sfârșit operațiunea de îmbarcare a cadavrelor în autoizotermă, care părăsește curtea spitalului, însoțită de autoturismul Dacia amintit mai sus. Luminile din curtea spitalului au fost aprinse din nou, iar trupele ce asigurau dispozitivul de apărare și-au reluat pozițiile inițiale.
De la Spitalul Județean Timiș sunt ridicate registrele de consultații, de internări, procesele-verbale de constatare a decesului și fișele de mișcare ale bolnavilor, împachetate în două colete și predate col. Ghircoiaș. Ulterior, unele registre au fost înapoiate, din ele lipsind însă anumite file.
Ora 5:20: șoferul Dorel Cioacă, care dormea în biroul căpitanului Ciucă, este trezit.
Ora 5:45: autoizoterma pornește spre București pe ruta SibiuRâmnicu VâlceaPitești, fiind escortată de Dacia albă.[5]
Cele două autovehicule au fost așteptate la km 36 de pe autostrada București-Pitești de o echipă de ofițeri condusă de Ion Baciu. Din momentul preluării transportului, operațiunea primea indicativul „Acțiunea Vama”.

Acțiunea „Vama”

Conform ordinului gen. Nuță, autoizoterma cu „colete” a fost preluată pe 19 decembrie, la km 36, de o echipă condusă de col. Baciu și formată din lt.-col. Petre Marin, mr. Dumitru Sorescu[6], Teodor Bagu, Marin Șerban și subofițerii Valerică Gorgarea și Florin Stanciu. Această echipă a schimbat-o pe cea veche, din Timișoara, subofițerul Florin Stanciu preluând conducerea autoizotermei. Cei de la Timișoara și-au continuat drumul cu Dacia albă, și au fost cazați la hotelurile Astoria și Cerna, unde căpitanul Dan Fediuc le-a rezervat câte o cameră cu două paturi. Înainte de plecarea de la km 36, numerele de înmatriculare, atât al Daciei albă cât și al autoizotermei, au fost înlocuite cu număre de înmatriculare de București, primite de la Direcția Circulație (al cărei șef nu a fost inițiat în acțiune).

În jurul orei 17 autoizoterma și echipa de însoțitori din București au ajuns la crematoriul „Cenușa” din București, unde au fost primite de Gheorghe Ganciu, director al Administrației Cimitirelor din București (cu sediul la Cimitirul Belu),[7] colonel de Securitate în rezervă, fost subordonat al gen. Macri, și de administratorul Crematoriului Cenușa, Iosef Emilian Zamfir, care era de asemenea ofițer de Securitate trecut în rezervă.

Ei au întrerupt alte operații de incinerare care erau în curs, și au început incinerarea cadavrelor sosite de la Timișoara. Pentru reușita acțiunii, celor 5 fochiști[8] le-a fost dat câte un plic cu 2000 de lei, și aceștia au început lucrul imediat, fără obiecțiuni. Col. Moraru a trimis 6 ofițeri pentru asigurarea pazei.

În jurul orei 18:00 fost începută descărcarea cadavrelor, incinerarea începând aproape imediat și continuând toată noaptea. Ultimul cadavru a fost descărcat pe 20 decembrie în jurul orei 4:00, și atunci autoizoterma a părăsit crematoriul. Incinerarea a fost finalizată în jurul orei 8:30.

În jurul orei 10:00 col. Baciu a raportat col. Moraru încheierea acțiunii, care l-a trimis la crematoriu pe șoferul Nuțu Dorel Marian cu o autodubă, în care au fost încărcate cele 4 tomberoane cu cenușă și transportate pe raza localității Popești-Leordeni, Ilfov, unde conținutul lor a fost deversat într-o gură de canal.

După Revoluție, col. Baciu, lt.col. Petre Marin și mr. Dumitru Sorescu au făcut câte un raport despre acțiunea desfășurată de ei[9], și aceste rapoarte au fost prezentate în seara zilei de 24 decembrie inginerului Marian Gostin, reprezentantul CFSN, care se afla la IGM, apoi predate ministrului apărării naționale, gen. Nicolae Militaru.

Numele morților

În momentul operațiunii, la morga SJT se aflau 56 de cadavre, din care au fost sustrase 43. Din acestea 8 erau neidentificate, dar după Revoluție s-a reușit stabilirea identității a 4 dintre ele.

Lista morților:[10]

  1. Andrei Maria (muncitoare UMT, împușcată în SJT)
  2. Apró Mihai (lăcătuș auto)
  3. Balogh Pavel
  4. Balmus Vasile
  5. Bărbat Lepa
  6. Banciu Leontina (muncitoare la AEM)
  7. Belehuz Ioan
  8. Belici Radian
  9. Caceu (Kacsó?) Margareta (muncitoare la Institutul Politehnic)[11]
  10. Choroși (Kőrösi?) Alexandru
  11. Cruceru Gheorghe
  12. Carpin Dănuț
  13. Csizmarik Ladislau
  14. Ciobanu Constantin
  15. Wittman Petru
  16. Nagy Eugen
  17. Ferkel Șuteu Alexandru
  18. Florian Antoniu Tiberiu
  19. Gîrjoabă Dumitru Constantin (electrician, împușcat în SJT)[12]
  20. Hațegan Petru
  21. Iosub Constantin
  22. Iotcovici Gheorghe Nuțu
  23. Ewinger Slobodanca
  24. Ianoș Paris
  25. Luca Rodica (muncitoare la Coop. „Încălțămintea”)
  26. Lăcătuș Nicolae
  27. Munteanu Nicolae Ovidiu
  28. Miron Ioan (pensionar CFR, împușcat în SJT)
  29. Motohon Silviu
  30. Mardare Adrian
  31. Otelita Aurel
  32. Opre Gogu
  33. Osman Dumitru
  34. Radu Constantin
  35. Sporer Rudolf Herman
  36. Stanciu Ioan
  37. Sava Angela Elena
  38. Zăbulică Constantin
  39. Zornek Otto
  40. cadavru neidentificat
  41. cadavru neidentificat
  42. cadavru neidentificat
  43. cadavru neidentificat

Note

  1. ^ S-a sinucis în arest, la 31 ianuarie 1990.
  2. ^ România Liberă: Cine a organizat furtul cadavrelor din morga Spitalului Judetean?, 19 decembrie 2005.
  3. ^ Vezi știrea apărută în Jurnalul Național din 17 ianuarie 2005, și preluată de Hotnews.
  4. ^ El va însoți autoizoterma până la km 36, apoi va ajunge în București.
  5. ^ Șoferul său de schimb era cpt. Valentin Ciucă, care a rămas în cabină.
  6. ^ Mr. Dumitru Sorescu, ajuns chestor principal, a fost numit mai târziu șeful Inspectoratului General al Poliției Române. Vezi știrea din Jurnalul Național din 17 ianuarie 2005, preluată de Hotnews.ro.
  7. ^ Gheorghe Ganciu a fost asistat de subalternul său, Ciupagea Grigorie.
  8. ^ Întrucât la crematoriul Cenușa nu erau decât 3 fochiști – Mihai Mititelu, Ștefan Nicolae Bocioagă și Grigor Cîmpean -, doi muncitori – Gheorghe Zîmbroianu și Gheorghe Iordan – au fost trimiși de la alte două cimitire din București.
  9. ^ Col. Baciu pretinde că pe 22 decembrie și-a trimis raportul col. Moraru, dar acesta nu l-a primit.
  10. ^ Lista a fost publicată în Jurnalul National, 28 septembrie 2004, articol preluat de Hotnews.ro, dar ortografia numelor s-ar putea să conțină greșeli.
  11. ^ Împreună cu Caceu Margareta a fost împușcată și sora ei, Caceu Mariana Silvia, dar corpul ei nu a fost ars.
  12. ^ Vezi articolul din JN, preluat de Hotnews.

Surse

  • Gen. de brigada Gheorghe Florea, col. Ion Constantin, gen de brigada Marin Lazăr, col. Vasile Lepăduși, prof. Vladimir Alexandrescu și coordonator generalul de divizie Ion Pițulescu: „Șase zile care au zguduit România. Ministerul de Interne, decembrie 1989. Pledoarie pentru istorie”, vol. I., București, 1995.

Lectură suplimentară

  • Un risc asumat: Timișoara, decembrie 1989, Filip Teodorescu, Editura Viitorul Românesc, 1992
  • Timișoara în arhivele “Europei Libere”, Radio Free Europe, Editura Fundația Academia Civică, 1999

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0215cada.htm#_ftnref2

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/17/timisoara-17-decembrie/

In English and Romanian, see, for example, the following on the episode mentioned above

The mask of the red death: The evil politics of cremation in Romania in December 1989

Marius Rotar

Mortality: Promoting the interdisciplinary study of death and dying, 1469-9885, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1 – 17
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a919672850

From the past we must take the fire, not the ashes!Jean Jaures (1859-1914)This article presents an analysis of an episode which had great reverberations in Romanian society during the revolution of December 1989. It is focused on the cremation at the Cenuscedila Crematorium in Bucharest of 43 bodies belonging to people who were killed in Timiscediloara on the 17 December 1989 during the riots against the Communist regime. The Romanian communist authorities aimed to delete the traces of the repression in Timiscediloara. The explanation given to the families of the people cremated, namely that they had fled from communist Romania, also served this purpose. This incident reveals the ways in which politics and death merged in communist Romania, and it presents a typical case of what Douglas Davies calls the evil politics of cremation.

Keywords: communism; revolution; cremation; scandals

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/09/15/a-inceput-constructia-bisericii-popesti-leordeni/#more-8198
http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/12/08/tatulici-tatomir-povestea-timisorii-13-furtul-cadavrelor/

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Less well-known and certainly never acknowledged is the presence of military prosecutor Dan Voinea at the Popesti-Leordeni crematorium near Bucharest on the morning of 20 December 1989.  It has always been something of a mystery–and Voinea’s explanation of the timeline, how he learned of the incineration of demonstrators, etc. has always raised suspicions–why Voinea learned of this and came to investigate this.  It remains unclear why?  Although Baciu clearly had a motive to lie about Voinea, his claim not only that he saw Voinea on the morning of 20 December 1989–and attempted at his trial to address Voinea about it–but that he recognized Voinea precisely because of his previous Securitate service (a sort of unnecessary, stupid giveaway if he were lying), remains plausible.  In that case, it would explain how Voinea “knew” so early and so well about this issue.  I don’t know how to interpret Voinea’s behavior.  Did he feel guilty for his role and attempt to make the best of his presence there?  Did he realize that if he didn’t take control of this investigation that he would eventually be implicated and in a position of much less power to defend himself?  Some combination of both?  What is known, is that Voinea has been less than truthful about many things since, especially about the existence and use of internationally-sanctioned exploding dum-dum bullets…

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/06/15/oh-what-a-tangled-web-we-weave-secretele-din-crematoriul-cenusa/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/20/colonel-ion-baciu-pe-20-12-89-la-orele-1010-la-crematoriu-a-venit-lt-col-voinea-danpe-care-l-cunosc-intrucit-inaintea-lucrat-la-departmentul-securitatii-statului-directia-cercetar/

http://www.tvrplus.ro/editie-memorial-90-279224

(my notes of this film below)
19 dec 1991
2:15 Voinea, 20 dec incinerated; 12 january 1990 came there; Muitu Dorel, 4 tomberoanele (not fully truthful)
4:41 Operatiunea Coletele
5:00 clinica nr.1
6:00 from Postelnicu, 23 decembrie
7:22 Postelnicu v. El si Ea tradator, tradatoara?
9:10 Elena in charge
9:16 DIA Buzau involved
10:40 Diaconescu, on orders, not involved of course
11:11 10 of them where were shot, in the hospital?
11:54 Doru Gjraba (?) 12 witnessed things, only shot in foot at Catedrala, dr. Ignat
12:15 lucrator la morga Spitalul Judetean (before or after 22?)
14:00 2 with comsa si necherila two days later ?
15:20 Iosif Emilian (hurried there to cover up his own role? back to the scene of the crime, accidental “hero”)
17:00 Mititelele
20:45 56 corpses (3 not from), Gh. Diaconescu
21:19 Dressler
21:38 ages
23:23 Baciu, still in function after 22, even though sent to trial with Iosif, Ganciu/Bogdanciu?
24:50 Macri, coletele to Ganciu, send me 40
25:18 Ghircoias
26:00 Popovici may not have been informed, Coman and Stanculescu were informed
27:17 Km 36
29:15 Nuta request for new expertiza to be done
(Crematoriu Rotar)
33:40 partial autopsies to remove bullets, bullets missing
34:30 Alexandru Grama
35:00 fas negru
35:30 (tortures…made light re cimitirul saracilor mistakes)
36:30 Hotel Astoria near Gara de Nord
36:50 Led by Col. Baciu
37:45 went with criminalist (date of Baciu’s declaration)
40:00 Iosif Costinas (Freiburg…Slatina cu alti morti, 18-19 decembrie)
41:43 arma Calibru mic (paznici) CAP Freiburg
43:25 gen. napalm
45:00 Iliescu to blame…
46:19 Diaconescu advanced, in charge of investigations (and Voinea)

Colonel Ion Baciu: Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col Voinea Dan…pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte…a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2013

[documentary evidence in support of the publication entitled:  Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Counter-Revolution of December 1989,

strictly personal research, not for reproduction without prior author authorization]

unfortunately, the link is no longer operable here http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/volumul-203/

luckily, Claude 2.0 http://claude02.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-fost-oare-folosit-virf-impins-mai.html saved an image from my own initial post of this!

23.01.1990 Declaratie:  Colonel Ion Baciu, șef al Direcției Economice din IGM,

(my thanks to researcher Mircea Munteanu, formerly of the CWIHP at the Woodrow Wilson Center, for helping me with the following transcription)

Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col. Voinea Dan [[proc mil — procuror militar]] din D.P.M., pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte de activare, a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.

Era imbracat civil, insotit de un procuror militar in uniforma.  Au discutat cu o femeie, Geta, nu-i stiu numele care i-a spus:  “[[Bine]] ca ati venit.  Toata noaptea au ars aici si [[oamenilor]] le este teama.”  Nu am auzit alte vorbe.  Au discutat cu aceia femeie [[ca. –circa]] 15 minute dupa care au plecat.

Cred ca au fost trimisi acolo fie de Popovici, fie de Diaconescu, pentru a vedea cum decurge incinerarea.

Solicit sa fie audiati Popovici Nicolae, fost procuror general, Diaconescu Gh, adjunctul acestuia si cei doi procurori militari…

image0

image0-001

from Ion Baciu’s hearing 12 March 1990 http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_II.pdf

Baciu’s courtroom testimony (no reference made to his 23 January 1990 handwritten testimony above) was discussed by Vasile Surcel in the following article:

http://www.curentul.ro/2012/index.php/2012122081426/Actualitate/Ion-Baciu-in-procesul-Timisoara-procurorul-Dan-Voinea-a-verificat-personal-pe-20-decembrie-1989-incinerarea-mortilor-la-Crematoriul-Cenusa.html

Iosif Emilian’s lawyer (in September 1991) indeed suggested the involvement of the Prosecutor General in giving the cremations legal cover/legitimacy, hence explaining the presence of Dan Voinea and his colleague at Crematoriul Cenusa on 20 December 1989 (he also references Geta on p. 725).  This is from the seventh volume of “Procesul de la Timisoara” available on the banaterra site.

image0-001

image0

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/26/decembrie-1989-cc-ul-si-sibiu-dan-voinea-corneliu-pircalabescu-si-ilie-ceausescu-v-aurel-dragomir-si-victor-stanculescu/https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/21/orwellian-positively-orwellian-prosecutor-voineas-uncritical-reception-by-romanianists/

But my use of the term “Orwellian” in the title of this paper is not only designed to capture Voinea’s uncanny ability to make definitive statements that are demonstrably wrong, to argue that black is white and white is black—from his denial of the use of gunfire simulators in December 1989, to his claim that the only “lunetisti” who acted after 22 December were from the Army, to his denial of the existence of weapons and (especially “vidia”) bullets not in the arsenal of the Army, to his denial of the existence of “terrorists,” to his denial that any military unit was attacked during the events, to his denial of the role of foreigners in the events….

I use the term “Orwellian” here as much to describe the ease with which he has gotten and gets away with errors, misunderstandings, and falsehoods that could easily be challenged, if not combated by his interlocutors in the Romanian media and intelligentsia.  For it is the fact that he has been able and is able to get away with all this that is truly “Orwellian” and that is indeed a tragedy for Romania’s citizens.  The tragedy is thus less the predictable “supply side” of the post-authoritarian lie, than the enthusiastic consumption and appetite for it.  This is why I believe, accurately I would argue, that “December 1989” long ago became more about post-Ceausescu Romania than about what happened in December 1989.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/05/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-9-orwellian-sanitywont-get-fooled-again/

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

 

 

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Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

Colonel Ion Baciu: Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col Voinea Dan…pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte…a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2013

[documentary evidence in support of the publication entitled:  Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Counter-Revolution of December 1989,

strictly personal research, not for reproduction without prior author authorization]

unfortunately, the link is no longer operable here http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/volumul-203/

luckily, Claude 2.0 http://claude02.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-fost-oare-folosit-virf-impins-mai.html saved an image from my own initial post of this!

23.01.1990 Declaratie:  Colonel Ion Baciu, șef al Direcției Economice din IGM,

(my thanks to researcher Mircea Munteanu, formerly of the CWIHP at the Woodrow Wilson Center, for helping me with the following transcription)

Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col. Voinea Dan [[proc mil — procuror militar]] din D.P.M., pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte de activare, a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.

Era imbracat civil, insotit de un procuror militar in uniforma.  Au discutat cu o femeie, Geta, nu-i stiu numele care i-a spus:  “[[Bine]] ca ati venit.  Toata noaptea au ars aici si [[oamenilor]] le este teama.”  Nu am auzit alte vorbe.  Au discutat cu aceia femeie [[ca. –circa]] 15 minute dupa care au plecat.

Cred ca au fost trimisi acolo fie de Popovici, fie de Diaconescu, pentru a vedea cum decurge incinerarea.

Solicit sa fie audiati Popovici Nicolae, fost procuror general, Diaconescu Gh, adjunctul acestuia si cei doi procurori militari…

image0

image0-001

from Ion Baciu’s hearing 12 March 1990 http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_II.pdf

Baciu’s courtroom testimony (no reference made to his 23 January 1990 handwritten testimony above) was discussed by Vasile Surcel in the following article:

http://www.curentul.ro/2012/index.php/2012122081426/Actualitate/Ion-Baciu-in-procesul-Timisoara-procurorul-Dan-Voinea-a-verificat-personal-pe-20-decembrie-1989-incinerarea-mortilor-la-Crematoriul-Cenusa.html

Iosif Emilian’s lawyer (in September 1991) indeed suggested the involvement of the Prosecutor General in giving the cremations legal cover/legitimacy, hence explaining the presence of Dan Voinea and his colleague at Crematoriul Cenusa on 20 December 1989 (he also references Geta on p. 725).  This is from the seventh volume of “Procesul de la Timisoara” available on the banaterra site.

image0-001

image0

But my use of the term “Orwellian” in the title of this paper is not only designed to capture Voinea’s uncanny ability to make definitive statements that are demonstrably wrong, to argue that black is white and white is black—from his denial of the use of gunfire simulators in December 1989, to his claim that the only “lunetisti” who acted after 22 December were from the Army, to his denial of the existence of weapons and (especially “vidia”) bullets not in the arsenal of the Army, to his denial of the existence of “terrorists,” to his denial that any military unit was attacked during the events, to his denial of the role of foreigners in the events….

I use the term “Orwellian” here as much to describe the ease with which he has gotten and gets away with errors, misunderstandings, and falsehoods that could easily be challenged, if not combated by his interlocutors in the Romanian media and intelligentsia.  For it is the fact that he has been able and is able to get away with all this that is truly “Orwellian” and that is indeed a tragedy for Romania’s citizens.  The tragedy is thus less the predictable “supply side” of the post-authoritarian lie, than the enthusiastic consumption and appetite for it.  This is why I believe, accurately I would argue, that “December 1989” long ago became more about post-Ceausescu Romania than about what happened in December 1989.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/05/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-9-orwellian-sanitywont-get-fooled-again/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Romania December 1989. ‘Mos G(h)erila’: Nicolae Ceausescu’s Final and Lasting ‘Christmas Gift’ to His Romanian Subjects

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 1, 2010

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION FOR DUM-DUMS:

(like me…and perhaps even you)

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process. [Submitted for clearance 22 April 2008, approved 22 May 2008]


I have been researching the Revolution for the better part of the past 18 years. I first visited Romania in 1987 while backpacking through Europe, and I spent a total of about 20 months in the country during the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993-1994, and 1997, when I conducted pre-dissertation, dissertation, and post-dissertation research on the Revolution.

I have written on the topic of the Revolution, voluminously some might say, publishing in 1996, 1999, and 2000 before joining the Agency, and since I entered the Agency in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

It will and should be hard to believe for the outsider to this problem, but my work has been essentially the only systematic, ongoing investigation of the ballistics evidence—such are the shortcomings of small “communities of interest” investigating a peripheral historical topic and the perils of “group think.”

This article is, for lack of a better description, about “connecting the dots.”


–The story of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 since December 1989 has been the struggle of disparate voices who share their memories, often with great frustration and a sense of resignation. They are hardly a unified chorus.

The accounts of ideologues seek to suggest to us that “the truth” miraculously is the province of people of this or that particular political persuasion in post-communist Romania. That is morality play and fairy tale; it is not the work of the serious historian. Would that history were so neat and tidy! It is not.

Instead, what one finds is that the people with the details that matter most are spread across the ideological and political spectrum—including people with what many of us might term distasteful, illiberal, ultranationalist, and nostalgic views.

There are those who relate these details in a narrative consistent with where those details lead.

There are those who relate these details even though it contradicts their narrative and ultimate conclusions about December 1989.

Finally, there are those—and there are many of them—who just know they experienced what they experienced. They aren’t sure exactly how it fits in with a larger narrative: they merely want to tell their story.

Together, they relate these details in the face of cynicism, indifference, and an often stunning intellectual conceit and deaf ear.

Theirs, however, and not the ideologues’, is the story of December 1989.


There was a lot of talk during the crimes of December ’89 about the special bullets with which the young and old alike were killed, bullets which—it is said were not in the arsenal of our military units. There was so much talk that there was no more to say and after there was no more to say for a sufficient amount of time the discussion was reopened with the line “such things don’t exist!” The special bullets didn’t exist!—our highest authorities hurried to tell us…In order to search for proof a little work is necessary by our legal organs that they are not terribly inclined to take….

[Dan Badea, “Gloante speciale sau ce s-a mai gasit in cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 April 1991]

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image-7

The Internet allows the researcher to piece together history as never before. That’s a pretty bland statement, but the reality of it never ceases to amaze me. Take the case of those killed in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (officially 1,104 people perished in those events). Scroll through the list of those killed on the procesulcomunismului (“the trial of communism”) and portalulrevolutiei (“the portal to the revolution”) websites. For most, there is only limited information about the circumstances in which they died. For others, however, there is greater detail. As one scrolls through the names and photos, one of the similarities that begins to become apparent is that in cases where there is more information about the circumstances of the death, dum-dum bullets are mentioned. Thus, for example, we find the following five cases:

BUTIRI Florin, born in Joia Mare, 11 April 1969, he was living in Bucharest and was employed by the Bucharest Metro. He played rugby. On 22 December he participated in the demonstration at Sala Dalles [next to University Square]. On 23 December he went to defend the Radio Broadcast center on str. Nuferilor, and while he was saving some old people from a burning building he was shot. Brought to the Military Hospital because of a wound to his hip, caused by a dum-dum cartridge, they tried to ampute a leg. His stomach was also ravaged by a bullet. On 26 December 1989 he died. (http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/aeroi/docs/album_2.htm)

FILOTI Claudiu
Profession: Lieutenant major UM 01171 Buzau, post-mortem Captain
Born: 30 July 1964
Birthplace: Vaslui
Date of death: 22 December 1989
Place of death: Bucharest, in the area of the Defense Ministry
Cause of death: Shot in the chest with dum-dum bullets (http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?menu=1&jud=53)

LUPEA Ion- Gabriel from Hunedoara, born in 1970…In 1989 he was sent from Bucharest to Anina [Resita], then to UM 01929. On 9 December 1989, he went on leave, but he was recalled. On the evening of 23 December he was on duty defending the unit [Anina-Resita], at the checkpoint, when around 11 pm they were attacked from the front and from the left flank. While crawling on hands and knees to bring more ammunition he was hit by a dum-dum bullet that entered above his left leg and exited through his left hand. Brought to the hospital he died Christmas Eve, making him the unit’s first hero; he was posthumously awarded the rank of sub-lieutenant. (http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/aeroi/docs/album_5.htm)

MANESCU Dan, born 25 March 1964, a student in the Transportation Department, he joined with the other young people on 21 December and participated in the demonstrations in the center of the town [Bucharest]. Friday morning he went with his brother to the demonstrations and he returned after the flight of the dictator. He changed his clothes and returned for good, when on the night of 22/23 December a dum-dum bullet punctured his stomach in Palace Square. Brought to the Emergency hospital, he could not be saved. (http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/aeroi/docs/album_5.htm)

POPTEAN Petre, born 27 December 1965, in Margau near Huedin, living in Bucharest…he worked as a driver for the Bucharest Transportation Department. On 21 December he went into town to protect his sister on her way home from work. The two of them left on Calea Victoriei and arrived at [Sala] Dalles, where in horror they watched…Petre called to his sister to aid the wounded. While on the ground, he was hit in the abdomen and left hip by dum-dum cartridges that caused him major wounds. His sister, Monica, was able to stop an ambulance with a Targoviste license number, but he didn’t make it to Hospital 9. At around 6 pm Petre passed away. (http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/aeroi/docs/album_7.htm)

Let me draw the attention of the reader to two important details here. First, the use of dum-dum munitions was not confined to Bucharest (multiple locations), but includes the southwestern city of Resita (the case of Ion Lupea). Second, the use of dum-dum munitions occurred not just after communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu fled at midday on 22 December 1989, but also before, on the evening of 21 December (the case of Petre Poptean).

Dum-dum bullets—which fragment and cause substantially more and more lethal damage to the organs of those who are hit—are outlawed by international convention (see more below). Moreover—or perhaps better-put, officially—no Romanian institution had them in their arsenal in December 1989. Yet, as we can see, almost two decades after the events, the obituaries of those gunned down in December 1989 include references to those munitions as having played a role not only in the wounding of people, but also in their deaths.

Despite the claims above attesting to not just the wounding, but the death of several people (civilians and soldiers) over several days in several locations from dum-dum bullets in December 1989, what did General Dan Voinea—removed from his post in December 2007 by Attorney General Laura Codruta Kovesi for violating basic judicial norms in another case[1]—who headed the investigations into December 1989 for well over a decade, have to say about them in late 2005? “Such things didn’t exist!”:

Romulus Cristea: “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims? The press of the time was filled with such claims…”

Dan Voinea: There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets. During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently.[2] (Emphasis added)

So, there is no wiggle room here, no room for misinterpretation: according to Prosecutor Voinea , nobody was killed by dum-dum bullets in December 1989.

That’s a common claim among officials of the former communist regime—Voinea was a military prosecutor since 1982 and he was directly involved in the trial of the Ceausescus. Such conclusions were also repeated in late 2005 by Dr. Vladimir Belis, who was the head of the Medical Forensics Institute (IML) in Bucharest in December 1989: asked if other than the standard 7.62 mm caliber weapons belonging to the Army were used, he did not know and couldn’t say because he claimed no autopsies were ever performed.[3] The apparent official disinterest in munitions and autopsies is—ahem—shall we say “interesting” given the comments attributed to Belis’ subordinates and to doctors at Bucharest’s main hospitals—comments made in the early 1990s, but also made well over a decade later, in the mid 2000s.[4]

General Dan Voinea spoke in late 2005. Voinea’s argument that there were no dum-dum bullets, that there were no atypical munitions used, is directly linked to his contention that there were therefore “no terrorists” in December 1989. It has been routinely repeated in various forms by the media for well over a decade and by his supporters in intellectual circles at home and abroad. The encomia for General Voinea before and since that December 2005 interview by noted Romanian intellectuals and Romanianists are breathtaking. Tom Gallagher refers to him as the “indefatigable General Voinea”[5] and Western journalists have described him as “a one-man mission to uncover the truth about exactly what happened during those days.”[6] Sorin Iliesiu justifies his claims about the Revolution squarely on Voinea’s words:

General Dan Voinea has said clearly: The terrorists did not exist. Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead[7], wounded[8] or arrested[9].”[10][11]

Highly problematic and damning for General Dan Voinea, Dr. Vladimir Belis, and fellow deniers are the following, detailed written testimonies of Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea presented by Dan Badea in April 1991, attesting to what they had found in December 1989 in the headquarters of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate:

Balasa Gheorghe: From [Securitate] Directorate V-a, from the weapons depot, on 23-24 December 1989, DUM-DUM cartridges, special cartridges that did not fit any arm in the arsenal of the Defense Ministry were retrieved. Three or four boxes with these kinds of cartridges were found. The special bullets were 5-6 cm. in length and less thick than a pencil. Such a cartridge had a white stone tip that was transparent. All of these cartridges I personally presented to be filmed by Mr. Spiru Zeres. All the special cartridges, other than the DUM-DUM [ones] were of West German [FRG] make. From Directorate V-a we brought these to the former CC building, and on 23-24 December ’89 they were surrendered to U.M. 01305. Captain Dr. Panait, who told us that he had never seen such ammunition before, Major Puiu and Captain Visinescu know about [what was turned over].

In the former CC of the PCR, all of those shot on the night of 23-24 December ’89 were shot with special bullets. It is absurd to search for the bullet in a corpse that can penetrate a wall…

[of course, V-a worked hand-in-hand with the USLA, or the Securitate’s “special unit for anti-terrorist warfare,” and thus it was not suprising that in Directorate V-a’s headquarters…] Among things we also found were:…the training manual for the USLA. It was about 25 cm thick, and while there, I leafed through about half of it…[and I also came across] a file in which lots of different people under the surveillance of USLA officers were listed…

(Interviewed by Dan Badea, “Gloante speciale sau ce s-a mai gasit in cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 April 1991.)

Moreover, we know from the 2005 publication of the testimony of a detained V-th Directorate officer dated 2 February 1990, that he must have been asked to comment specifically on the existence of dum-dum ammunition—since he makes a point of emphasizing that “we didn’t have dum-dum ammunition or weapons with special properties, of foreign origin.”[12] So, in other words, we know from this interrogation document that six weeks after the Revolution, those who had taken power or at least the military prosecutors of the time were still interested in the existence of these munitions—thereby suggesting that they must have had some reason for believing in their existence, say for example the character of the injuries suffered by those shot during the events, as well as perhaps recovered bullet fragments, the testimonies of the doctors who operated on those wounded, etc…

Voinea’s ceaseless interviews and revelations during this period have been reprinted repeatedly since they took place and his conclusions been given wide circulation by journalists and people such as Sorin Iliesiu. Yet those who just relate what happened in December 1989 continue to mention the existence of dum-dum munitions. Thus, if one turns to the tourism site for the western border town of Curtici (near Arad) one can read the following about the history of the city, including the events of December 1989:

The following night [at the train station], the first team of five doctors from the Austrian “Lorenz Bohler” Hospital , who arrived in Curtici with a “hospital-wagon” took 18 people in critical condition to Austria for special treatment that lasted two to three months. That is, they needed organ transplants or special care, because of the monstrous results of dum-dum bullets.[13]

Or take the case of a poster on the 18th anniversary of the Revolution, who begins:

The Romarta (central Bucharest) file? What about the file on those who fired at me at the Astronomical Observatory on Ana Ipatescu Boulevard or those who at 1700 on 24 December fired near Casa Scanteii [press building] where I found a dum-dum cartridge in my bed—us having had to sleep in the bathroom.[14]

Finally, there are the cynical comments of those—no matter what they believe about December 1989—who cannot help but remember the dum-dum munitions and the horrible pain and trauma they caused their victims, many still living with the consequences of those wounds today…and how nobody wishes to remember them; for them, this is essentially a cruel, open secret.[15]

Unfortunately, no one in Romania has tied together such claims and the evidence I present above. I do not know how many of these people are still alive, but if the Romanian media were interested, the names are there for them to contact in order to confirm the claims above: Gheorghe Balasa, Radu Minea, Spiru Zeres, Major Puiu, and Captain Visinescu.

D’oh…Dum-Dum…(Tweedle) Dumb and (Tweedle) Dumber: Dum-Dum=Vidia

image-14

When I first viewed the youtube video “Romanian Revolution USLA attack Dec 23 1989 Revolutia” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlBRSxUVQ5E ), what struck me was: here, finally, after a decade and a half of almost unopposed revisionist denial, here was someone who claims to have been an eyewitness and has photos and details of the incident, and who maintains the now almost heretical idea that the Securitate’s “Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare”(USLA for short) had indeed attempted to attack the heavily-guarded Defense Ministry Headquarters on Drumul Taberei in Bucharest on the night of 23-24 December 1989! But, in fact as we shall see, although important, that is actually not the most important thing about the one and only youtube video posted by “destituirea.”

For me the transcript of the USLA unit claiming to have witnessed army units attacking their own ministry and thus the supposed reason that the USLA men who witnessed it “had to be silenced by being killed”—a transcript leaked to the press in 1993 and which led scholars such as Denis Deletant and Peter Siani-Davies to consider this “case closed” essentially—was always highly problematic. It supplied what was said, but, if we are to believe the words of the USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu, speaking to the notorious Securitate cheerleader Angela Bacescu, it did not supply the much needed context: Ardeleanu claimed that he had been placed under arrest and that it was he who chose the names of the USLA officers who were to report to the Defense Ministry. The USLA units thus came in a situation in which those who had taken control of the country were in the Defense Ministry holding their commander under arrest.[16]

But more importantly, the transcript could not explain a) the lack of any corroboration since of these supposed Army units attacking the Defense Ministry on the night of 23-24 December 1989—truly hard to believe, given all the young recruits and given their comparative willingness to talk to the media after all these years, in comparison to the former Securitate, and b) the claims in summer 1990 by the Army cadre who had been involved in the firefight with the USLA and the interviews of civilians in the surrounding blocs of flats who had lived through the fighting in December 1989 and related what they had seen.[17] The interviewees had detailed the suspicious actions of the USLA convoy and made it clear that they came with less-than-friendly intentions.

Now, here, 17 years after those famous articles by Mihai Floca and Victor Stoica is a video supporting the claim that the USLA units attempted to force their way into the Defense Ministry. The photos of the inside of the USLA ABI vehicles and of the dead USLA men (wearing black jumpsuits underneath Army clothing) are perhaps the most extensive and detailed seen to date, and the anonymous poster plays coy as to where he got them from (he claims he does not want to reveal the source—something which, given the sensitivity of the issue, I am not surprised by).

But, as I mentioned previously, it is actually not the confirmation of this understanding of the Defense Ministry incident that is the most significant thing about this youtube video. It is at the 2:01-2:05 of 8:50 mark of this silent video that the poster makes the following interesting and critical insight/claim…

USLA’s bullets were called “vidia” or “dum-dum” were usually smaller than the regular army’s bullets…Most of the capital’s residents have found this type of bullets all around the military buildings near by. (at 2:01 of 8:50)[18]

And thus, it becomes clear that the discussion of “vidia” bullets and “dum-dum” bullets is interchangeable (or at least is treated as such)! (Hence, perhaps why Romulus Cristea asked his question of General Voinea as he did in December 2005: “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims? The press of the time was filled with such claims…”) “Vidia” translates as “grooved,” and thus describes the modified feature of the bullets which makes them so lethal, thereby making the treatment of vidia and dumdum as de facto synonyms understandable.

This is critical because as I have previously written in detail, citing interviews and reminiscences in the Romanian press…vidia bullets showed up across the country in December 1989. In “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea’s Campaign to Sanitize the Romanian Revolution of December 1989” (http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html) I detail examples of vidia bullets showing up across the country—Brasov, Sibiu, Bucharest (multiple locations), Braila, Caransebes, Craiova, and Hunedoara—as recounted by civilians and Army personnel, at various times since the events—not just during or right after. Such wide dispersion of the use of officially non-existent munitions is critical too because it infirms the notion that somehow demonstrators or the Army put their hands on such “free floating weapons” and used them during the December 1989 events—that it would have happened in one or two places could be explained, but that the same thing would happen in so many geographic centers is scarcely plausible.

Recall from our earlier extract from Prosecutor Dan Voinea’s December 2005 interview, his unambiguous denial of the use of vidia munitions. Nevertheless, significantly, since that interview we continue to find people who remember what they remember and they remember the use of vidia munitions. I have found yet more references. Alexandru Stepanian, who writes under the motto “Dreptate si Onoare! (Justice and Honor!),” not only claims to still have a vidia bullet from 22-23 December 1989 in the area around the TV Station in Bucharest, but he has placed a photo of it on the portalulrevolutiei website.[19] In fall 2006, the daughter of a priest recalled:

In December ’89, after he arrived from Timisoara, my father stayed with me on Stefan Cel Mare Boulevard. When we returned to our home, on the corner of Admiral Balescu and Rosenthal. I found the cupboard of the dresser pure and simple riddled with bullets, about 8 to 10 of them. Someone who knew about such things told me they were vidia bullets. They were brought to a commission, but I don’t know what happened to them.[20]

In 2007 a book entitled The Tales of the Terrorists was published in Galati. In one section, a Eugen Stoleriu recounts his dispatch to Bucharest as a military recruit during the events and how for the first time in his life he came across vidia bullets that were shot at him.[21]

Another apparent synonym for “vidia” is “crestata” or “notched.” I take it that the reference is to the same type of munitions because the damage caused to those wounded by them was equally catastrophic. In December 2007, Alexandru Tudor, a soccer official famous apparently for his stern, unsmiling demeanor, who was shot on 23 December 1989 around 10 am in the area of Piata Aviatorilor near the TV studio, recounted the episode that ended his career:

They brought me to Colentina Hospital and there I had the great fortune of two great doctors. If they had operated on me, they would have to amputate both my legs beneath the knee, but instead they left the bullets in there 12 days. Their explanation was that the bullets were too close to arteries, and since they were gloante crestate (notched bullets), it was very dangerous. After they were removed, I kept the bullets, I have them at home. I was on crutches for six months, I went through therapy, but I had to give up soccer.[22]

Also on the 18th anniversary of the Revolution, a frustrated poster to another site asked pointedly:

Who in Romania in 1989 had 5.5 mm caliber NATO-type munition, that in addition was “notched”—something outlawed by the Geneva Convention, while it is known that the Romanian Army had only the caliber used by Warsaw Pact nations for their weapons, that is to say 7,62 mm….At that time even the Olympic speed shooting champion, Sorin Babii, expressed his surprise….I had in my hand several samples of this cartridge: small, black, with a spiral on the top, or with 4 cuts (those who know a little bit about ballistics and medical forensics can attest to the devastating role caused by these modifications). I await a response to my questions…perhaps someone will be willing to break the silence. I thank you in advance. [emphases added][23]

In other words, the existence of crestate/vidia/dum-dum bullets is known, and not everyone has so blithely forgotten their existence.

A Dum-Dum by Any Other Name: Gloante explosive (exploding bullets), gloante speciale (special bullets)

Crestate, vidia, dum-dum…by now we know: these are very dangerous munitions…

In the field of firearms, an expanding bullet is a bullet designed to expand on impact. Such bullets are often known as Dum-dum or dumdum bullets. There are several types of dum-dum designs. Two popular designs are the hollow point (made during the manufacturing phase) and X-ing made usually by the user by making two notches perpendicular to each other on the tip of the bullet, commonly with a knife. The effect is that the bullet deforms and sometimes fragments upon impact due to the indentations. This creates a larger wound channel or channels with greater blood loss and trauma.

The hollow-point bullet, and the soft-nosed bullet, are sometimes also referred to as the dum-dum, so named after the British arsenal at Dum-Dum, near Calcutta, India, where it is said that jacketed, expanding bullets were first developed. This term is rare among shooters, but can still be found in use, usually in the news media and sensational popular fiction. Recreational shooters sometimes refer to hollow points as “JHPs”, from the common manufacturer’s abbreviation for “Jacketed Hollow Point”.

To be most correct, the term “Dum Dum Bullet” refers only to soft point bullets, not to hollow points, though it is very common for it to be mistakenly used this way.

The Hague Convention of 1899, Declaration III, prohibits the use in warfare of bullets which easily expand or flatten in the body, and was an expansion of the Declaration of St Petersburg in 1868, which banned exploding projectiles of less than 400 grams. These treaties limited the use of “explosive” bullets in military use, defining illegal rounds as a jacketed bullet with an exposed lead tip (and, by implication, a jacketed base).[24]

Thus, under the synonym for dumdum/vidia/crestate bullets of “exploding bullets,” we find the following on the Internet:

On the evening of 27 December 1989, Eugen Maresi, 20 years old, a military draftee, was sent to organize a checkpoint on soseaua Chitilei, at the entrance to Bucharest….A group of 25 soldiers came under fire from the belltower of a church. Eugen was the first shot…. “The doctors told me my only child was shot with (gloante explosive) exploding bullets. The fragments shattered all of his internal organs,” says Dumitru Maresi, the father of the [Drobeta Turnu] Severin hero. http://2003.informatia.ro/Article42788.phtml

and

Gheorghe Nicolosu, was shot in the leg…After he was operated on, it was established that the bullet with which he was shot did not figure in [the arsenal of] the Romanian Army. Nicolosu was operated on in Hunedoara, then arrived in Italy, where he underwent another surgery…In the same area, on Lipscani, Cristea Valeria, 36 years old, was shot in the stomach by ammunition that did not belong to the army. He died a few hours later, the doctors trying to save his life, but the glontul exploziv (exploding bullet) perforated his intestines. Another youngster, 18 year old Ion Gherasim was shot in the back at the entrance to UM 01933 by munition that did not belong to the army. (Emphases added) http://www.replicahd.ro/images/replica216/special2.htm

Once again, we are speaking here of far-flung locations across the country—Chitila (Bucharest) and Hunedoara—which makes the idea of accident and “free floating weapons” unlikely.

Ammunition…Consistent with the Confessions of Former Securitate Whistleblowers

And so, who was it, who has told us about “exploding bullets” and “special cartridges” like this, and who has it been said possessed them in December 1989?

For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).

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Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989. What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridges which upon hitting their targets caused new explosions.”[25]

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The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:

I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89. In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched. Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition. In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances. I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets. In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox. We had been drugged. We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us. Don’t publish my name. I fear for me and my parents. When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’ The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize. I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’. [emphases added]

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As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention: the former Securitate. That is not accidental. [26]

With the advent of the Internet, unverifiable bulletin board postings also pop up. On 23 December 2003, under the name of “kodiak,” the following appeared:

In ’89 I was a major in the USLA…and I know enough things that it would be better I didn’t know…15, 16, 20, 30 years will pass and nothing will be known beyond what you need and have permission to know…” (http://www.cafeneaua.com)[27]

Clearly, the legal constraints of security oaths and fear continue to cast a long shadow, long after the events of December 1989.

Si totusi…se stie [And nevertheless…it is known]

It took over three years into my research on the Revolution—and physically being in the Library of the Romanian Academy—before I came to the realization: oh yeah, that’s a good idea, yeah, I should systematically compare what the former Securitate have to say about December 1989 and compare it with what others are saying. It took a maddening additional half year before I came to the conclusion: oh yeah, and how about what the Army has to say? It may seem ridiculous—and it is in some ways indefensible from the perspective of performing historical research—but you have to understand how Romanian émigrés dominated early investigations of the Revolution, and how they divided the post-communist Romania media into the pro-regime (untrustworthy) press and the opposition (trustworthy) press, and the influence this “research frame” and methodology had at the time upon younger researchers such as myself.[28]

A more systematic mind probably would have come to these revelations long before I did. Instead, it took the accidental, simultaneous ordering of issues from 1990 and 1991 of the vigorous anti-Iliescu regime university publication NU (Cluj), the similarly oppositional Zig-Zag (Bucharest), and the former Securitate mouthpiece Europa to discover this. There I found Radu Nicolae making his way among diametrically opposed publications, saying the same things about December 1989. And it mattered: the source for example of Radu Portocala’s claim that there were “no terrorists” in December 1989 was Radu Nicolae. But more important still, was the discovery of Angela Bacescu revising the Defense Ministry incident, exonerating the USLA, and claiming there were no Securitate terrorists in Sibiu (only victims) in Zig-Zag…only to show up months later in Romania Mare and Europa months later writing the same stuff, and in the case of the Sibiu article republishing it verbatim. Nor was Bacescu alone among the former Securitate at Zig-Zag: she was for example joined by Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan, the first to pen revisionist articles about the Army’s DIA unit.[29]

But without a broader comparative framework and approach to the Romanian media, all of this eluded the highly partisan Romanian émigré writers on the events. Nestor Ratesh alone among this group did seem puzzled and bothered by the similarity of Romania Libera Petre Mihai Bacanu’s conclusions on the V-th Directorate and those of Bacescu (he only alluded to her dubious reputation, however, and did not name her.) But Bacanu was fallible: memorably, but also upstandingly, in December 1993, he admitted based on what he claimed were new revelations, that his previous three and a half years of exonerating the USLA had been in vain since they were erroneous: they had after all played a significant role in the repression and killing of demonstrators on the night of 21-22 December 1989 in University Square. That alone should have precipitated a rethinking about assumptions and approaches to investigating the December 1989 events and particularly the role of the Securitate and the USLA, but it did not, and has not to this day…

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Romanians and Romanianists like to indulge in the reassuring myth that the “schools” of research on the Revolution were separate from the beginning—that the defining feature was the political orientation of the author and whether he or she viewed the events of December 1989 as a revolution or coup d’etat. To the extent they are willing to admit that discussions of the “terrorists” cross-pollinated and became intertwined across the borders of the political spectrum, they assume that this must have happened later, after views had become consolidated.[30] But such a view is simply ahistorical and wishful-thinking. It is simply impossible to defend honestly when you have Angela Bacescu who “showed up with lots of documents and didn’t need any money” and wrote her revisionist tracts in the oppositional Zig-Zag, when she and Olbojan were the first ones to voice theses that later became staples of the anti-Iliescu opposition—long after they had left its press.

It is indicative that Romanians still have yet to confront this methodological flaw that one of the few studies in the country to read Securitate and Army sources in addition to journalist and participant accounts, still failed to address the key similarities across the political spectrum regarding the existence and identity of the “terrorists.” Smaranda Vultur wrote in a review of Ruxandra Cesereanu’s (otherwise, groundbreaking in comparison to what had appeared before it in Romanian in book form) Decembrie ’89. Deconstructia unei revolutii (Iasi: Polirom 2004):

Beyond this, I would underscore however a deficit that results directly from the choice of the author to classify her sources based on how the source defines the events: as a revolution, a plot, or a hybrid of the two. Because of this one will thus find, contained in the same chapter, Securitate people and political analysts, revolutionaries and politicians of the old and new regimes, and journalists.[31]

In other words, my exact indictment of the approach inside and outside Romania to the study of the Revolution, and the reason why people are simply unable to acknowledge the similarity and even identicality of views of the “terrorists.”

After the aforementioned realizations in 1993-1994 about the need to be more comparative and systematic in investigating accounts of the Revolution, it took yet another two maddening years before I started to realize the significance of the ballistics evidence. It thus came comparatively late in the dissertation process. My timing was fortuitous, however. I wrote a short article in November 1996 that was published in two different forms in 22 and Sfera Politicii in December 1996—the mood in Romania was euphoric as seven years of the Iliescu regime had just come to an end through the ballot box. [32] True, it didn’t spark debate and loosen some lips as I had hoped, but it made my visit to Bucharest the following June —especially my interviews on one particular day with a journalist at Cotidianul and, several hours later, a member of the Gabrielescu Parliamentary Commission investigating the events (Adrian Popescu-Necsesti)—memorable to say the least….

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Of course, not then, or even since, has anybody who has investigated the December 1989 events inside or outside Romania systematically attempted to replicate, test, or expand upon my earlier findings—other than myself. As I have noted elsewhere,[33] in Peter Siani-Davies’ otherwise excellent The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 he devotes essentially a paragraph to the ballistics’ topic in a 300 plus page book—and it is only in the context of addressing my own earlier research. Monica Ciobanu could thus not be more wrong in her declaration that Peter Siani-Davies’ 2005 volume had disproven the “myth of Securitate terrorists.”[34] Siani-Davies has nothing to say about dum-dum/vidia/exploding ammunition: hence why he does not believe in Securitate terrorists!

Since then, I have written on Securitate revisionism, “the terrorists,” and the ballistics evidence of Romanian Revolution of December 1989, in the words of one critic who seems unable to call things by their name “voluminously, although never exhaustively, elsewhere”—publishing in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. [35] Now, more than a decade after those original ballistics’ articles, I return here putting things together I should preferably have put together long before…

The high stakes of what was at play in late December 1989 become all the clearer here. Nicolae Ceausescu’s successors faced not only the dilemma of having foreign citizens arrested for firing at and killing in cold blood Romanian citizens[36], but members of a Romanian state institution—the Securitate—in addition to those foreign citizens, had injured, maimed, and killed Romanian citizens using munitions that were outlawed by international conventions to which Romania was a party. Thus, beyond the culpability of an institution that was key to the ability of the nomenklaturists who had seized power to continue in power—i.e. the Securitate—and who undoubtedly had compromising information on those leaders, the new potentates were faced with a problem of international dimensions and proportions.

Dan Badea’s April 1991 article with which I opened this paper concluded thusly:

There are in these two declarations above[–those of Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea–] sufficient elements for an investigation by the Police or Prosecutor’s Office. [Dan Badea, “Gloante speciale sau ce s-a mai gasit in cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 April 1991]

That, of course, never appears to have happened. I hope that the information I have supplied above—significantly, much of it new, much of it from the Internet in recent years—should at the very least encourage Romanians and Romanianists to reopen and reexamine the ballistics evidence. Let us hope that on the twentieth anniversary of the Revolution, we may be able to read serious investigations of the ballistics evidence, rather than be subjected to the false and jaded refrain… such things did not exist!



[1] See, for example, Dorin Petrisor, “Procurorul Voinea, acuzat ca a lucrat prost dosarul Iliescu 13 iunie 1990,” Cotidianul, 7 December 2007, online edition. Voinea’s removal generally went unpublicized abroad—it was understandably not a proud day for his supporters. Kovesi claimed to have been taken aback by Voinea’s inexplicable, seemingly incompetent handling of the June 1990 files.

[2] General Dan Voinea, interview by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005, online edition. Cristea’s apparent effort/belief—shared by many others—to suggest that it was only “the press of the time”—something I take to mean December 1989 and the immediate months after—that was filled with such claims and accusations is untrue. (The suggestion is to say that civilians with no knowledge of weapons and munitions repeated rumors spread out of fear and fueled by those who had seized power but needed to create an enemy to legitimize themselves and thus exploited those fears…) For examples of such claims “in the press of the time,” see the words of an employee of the Municipal Hospital (“In the room was a boy, very badly wounded by dum-dum bullets that had blown apart his diaphragm, his sacroiliac, and left an exit wound the size of a 5 lei coin,” Expres no. 10 (6-12 April 1990), p. 5) and the discussion of how Bogdan Stan died (“vidia bullets which explode when they hit their ‘target,’ entered into the bone marrow of his spine,” Adevarul, 13 January 1990). But such claims also appear long after the December 1989 events. Two and a half and three years after the December 1989 events, Army Colonel Ion Stoleru maintained in detail that the “terrorists” had “weapons with silencers, with scopes, for shooting at night time (in ‘infrared’), bullets with a ‘vidia’ tip [more on this and the relation to dum-dum munitions below]. Really modern weapons” and added, significantly, “The civilian and military commissions haven’t followed through in investigating this…” (see Army Colonel Ion Stoleru with Mihai Galatanu, “Din Celebra Galerie a Teroristilor,” Expres, no. 151 (22-28 December 1992), p. 4, and “Am vazut trei morti suspecti cu fata intoarsa spre caldarim,” Flacara, no. 29 (22 July 1992), p. 7.) Voinea’s steadfast denials would seem to validate Stoleru’s allegations more than a decade after he made them. Not surprisingly, but highly unfortunate, Cristea’s interview with Voinea forms the basis of conclusions about the terrorists on the Romanian-language Wikipedia webpage on the Revolution: see http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolu%C5%A3ia_rom%C3%A2n%C4%83_din_1989.

[3] Laura Toma, Toma Roman Jr. , and Roxana Ioana Ancuta, “Belis nu a vazut cadavrele Ceausestilor,” Jurnalul National, 25 October 2005, http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/34668/belis-nu-a-vazut-cadavrele-ceausestilor. “Frumos (Nice)…” as the Romanians say. Belis may not have interested himself in the ballistics evidence—but some of his employees apparently did (see IML Dr. Florin Stanescu’s comments in Ion Costin Grigore, Cucuveaua cu Pene Rosii (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), pp. 70-72). Moreover, there were exhumations. (“For a long time the Brasov Military Prosecutor didn’t do anything, even though there existed cases, declarations, documents, photos and even atypical unusual bullets brought in by the families of the deceased and wounded.” http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=1.msg214) On 14 June 1990, General Nicolae Spiroiu, future Defense Minister (1991-1994), appears to have been in the city of Brasov, assisting at the exhumation of people killed there during the December 1989 Revolution. Such a step was a rarity, and apparently followed earlier talks between Spiroiu, five other officers, and the staff of the local newspaper Opinia, who were seeking clarification over who was responsible for the deaths of their fellow citizens. “They found in particular bullets of a 5.6 mm caliber that are not in the Army’s arsenal,” wrote the journalist Romulus Nicolae of the investigation. (Romulus Nicolae, “Au ars dosarele procuraturii despre evenimente din decembrie,” Cuvintul, no. 32 (August 1991), pp. 4-5, cited in Richard Andrew Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea’s Campaign to Sanitize the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.)

[4] Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, surgeon at Coltea Hospital: “I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of a department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments. I didn’t hear anything back from Chircoias or any expert. Those who made the evidence disappear neglected the fact that there still exist x-rays and other military documents that I put at the disposition of the [Military] Prosecutor.”

( http://www.romanialibera.ro/a113826/revolutia-5-000-de-victime-nici-un-vinovat.html)

[5] Tom Gallagher, Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation, (NY: New York University Press, 2005), p. 190.

[6] Jeremy Bransten, “Romania: The Bloody Revolution in 1989: Chaos as the Ceausescus Are Executed,” RFE/RFL, 14 December 1999 at http://www.rferl.org/specials/communism/10years/romania2.asp. This unfortunate comment aside, Brantsen’s series is an excellent journalistic introduction to the December 1989 events.

[7] Iliesiu is dead wrong. See the signed testimony to the contrary by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi dated 26 December 1989, reproduced in Ioan Itu, “Mostenirea teroristilor,” Tinerama, no. 123 (9-15 April 1993), p. 7. I translated the important parts of this document in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. Significantly, according to this document, Dr. Belis had access to the dead terrorists:

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Dead Terrorists. Although their existence is vehemently denied by all official institutions, we are able to prove that they existed and have sufficient details to identify them.…We continue with some excerpts of the declaration of Ion Lungu, head of the group of fighters who guarded the ‘Institute of Legal Medicine’ [IML, the main Bucharest morgue], beginning from the evening of 22 December 1989:

“Starting from the 23rd, there were brought, in succession, more ‘special’ corpses. They were brought only by military vehicles and were accompanied by officers. They were all dressed the same: kaki uniforms, with or without military insignia, fur-lined boots, cotton underwear. All the clothes were new. The established procedure at that point was that when the bodies were unloaded from the trucks, at the ramp to the back of the IML, to be disrobed and inspected. The documents found were released to Prosecutor Vasiliu and criminology officers. The weapons and munitions we found and surrendered—on the basis of a verbal procedure—to the officer on duty from UM 01046. Weapons and ammunition were found only on those ‘special’ corpses. Those who brought them said that they were terrorists. I turned over to this military unit five pistols (three Stecikin and two Makarov—all 9 mm caliber), two commando daggers and hundreds of 9 mm and 7.62 mm cartridges (compatible with the AKM machine gun). They were held separately from the other corpses, in a room—I believe that it used to be the coatroom—with a guard at the door.…

Access to the room with the terrorists was strictly forbidden. Only Prosecutor Vasiliu, criminologist officers, Dr. Belis, and the chief of autopsies could enter. On top of them, next to the arms, there were personal documents, passports (some blank), all types of identity cards—one of them was clearly false, it stated that the dead terrorist was the director at Laromet (at that plant no director died)—identity cards that were brand new, different service stamps in white. All had been shot by rifles (one was severed in two) and showed evidence of gunshots of large caliber. Some had tattoos (they had vultures on their chests), were young (around 30 years old), and were solidly built. I believe that their identity was known, since otherwise I can’t explain why their photographs were attached to those of unidentified corpses. They were brought to us in a single truck. In all, there were around 30 dead terrorists. [The document is signed by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi on 26 December 1989]”

[8] Once again Iliesiu is wrong. Professor Andrei Firica at the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” apparently also was paid a visit by Colonel Chircoias (aka Ghircoias), see fn. 4. He claims that he “made a small file of the medical situations of the 15-20 suspected terrorists from [i.e. interned at] the Emergency Hospital,” but as he adds “of course, all these files disappeared.” Firica reports that a Militia colonel, whom he later saw on TV in stripes as a defendant in the Timisoara trial [i.e. Ghircoias], came to the hospital and advised him “not to bring reporters to the beds of the terrorists, because these were just terrorist suspects and I didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone” (!) The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects into a bus and off they went. (Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.) Cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

[9] I don’t even know where to begin on this one. As I have written before, not all of those detained were terrorists, and many of the terrorists seemed to have eluded arrest, but there are so many accounts of people arrested as terrorists who legitimately fit that description that I don’t even know where to begin. See the multiple translations in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

[10] Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, found at http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709 (note: this is NOT the Romania Libera daily newspaper). One will find many well-known names in the West among those who signed this petition: Dragoş Paul Aligică, Matei Călinescu, Ruxandra Cesereanu, Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Tom Gallagher, Gabriel Liiceanu, Norman Manea, Nicolae Manolescu, Mircea Mihaies, Ion Mihai Pacepa, Horia-Roman Patapievici, Radu Portocală, Nestor Ratesh, Lavinia Stan, Stelian Tănase, Alin Teodorescu, and Vladimir Tismăneanu. Sorin Iliesiu, who is a filmmaker and Vice President of the “Civic Alliance” organization, has written that he was part of the “team” that “edited” the seven page chapter on the Romanian Revolution contained in the Report of the Presidential Commission to Analyze the Communist Dictatorship of Romania (PCACDR). He is not a scholar and most certainly not a scholar of the December 1989 events. A textual comparison of the Report’s chapter on the Revolution and Vladimir Tismaneanu’s chapter in a Dawisha and Parrott edited volume from 1997 is unambiguous: the introductory two paragraphs of the Report’s chapter are taken verbatim in translation from p. 414 of Tismaneanu’s 1997 chapter, and other verbatim paragraphs, sentences, and phrases from pp. 414-417 make up parts of the rest of the Report’s Revolution chapter without any reference to the 1997 chapter. As the author(s) of an earlier chapter in the Report cite(s) Tismaneanu’s 1997 chapter (see p. 376 fn. 55) correctly, this leaves really only two possible explanations for the failure of Iliesiu et. al. to cite that they have borrowed wholesale from Tismaneanu’s 1997 chapter: a) an absence of scholarly knowledge, or b) an attempt to mask their dependence upon and deference to Tismaneanu, the Chair of the Commission, since the citations that do appear are the exact citations from the 1997 chapter and claims are translated word-by-word, so much so that Iliesiu et. al. did not even bother to change verb tenses despite the passage of a decade. Iliesiu et. al. can attempt to avoid answering questions and attempt to change the subject, but the textual analysis is unambiguous: Tismaneanu’s unattributed 1997 chapter forms the bulk of the Report’s chapter on the Revolution. The only question that needs to be answered is: why and why are they unwilling to admit the textual identicality?

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[11] All of this eludes Charles King in his Winter 2007 Slavic Review essay “Remembering Romanian Communism.” In his five page essay, he pauses no less than four times to mention the Revolution, despite the fact that its coverage takes up barely one percent of the PCACDR report. He relates the most banal of conclusions—“The report thus repeats the common view (at least among western academics) of the revolution as having been hijacked…”—yet misses or avoids what Iliesiu clearly seems most proud of: having inserted the claim that Nicolae Ceausescu was responsible for “only 162 deaths,” thereby insinuating Ceausescu’s successors bear responsibility for the other 942, and the claim to which such a reckoning is intimately related, namely Voinea’s that there were “no terrorists.” (It is interesting to note how Iliesiu et. al., the eternally suspicious of the state, miraculously become assiduous promoters of “official” and “state” claims once they turn out to be their own, thereby suggesting that their skepticism of the state is primarily situational rather than inherent—these are not equal opportunity skeptical and critical intellectuals.) King’s treatment of the Report is overall insufficiently informed, and as a consequence contextually-wanting and one-sided. He cites a handful of Romanian reviews of the Report, but they are almost uniformly positive accounts, almost as if supplied by the Chair of the Commission himself (see fn. 1, p. 718). He pauses to cite the former head of Radio Free Europe’s Romanian Research Division Michael Shafir’s 1985 book, yet makes no mention of Shafir’s trenchant criticisms (he gave the report a 7 out of 10 and mixed the positive with the negative) in a 1/12/07 interview in Ziua de Cluj, his extended critique “RAPORTUL TISMĂNEANU: NOTE DIN PUBLIC ŞI DIN CULISE” available in spring 2007 at http:// www.eleonardo.tk/ (no. 11), or his “Scrisoare (ultra)deschisa” in Observator Cultural no. 382 (25 July-1 August 2007) [given the timeline of scholarly publication, I am attempting to give King the benefit of the doubt here …He would certainly do well to read Shafir’s most recent discussion in Observator Cultural NR. 148 (406) 17 – 23 ianuarie 2008, “Despre clarificari nebuloase, plagiate, imposturi si careerism,” to see what a venerable critic and serious scholar was subjected to as a result of deigning to not wholeheartedly embrace the Report. Shafir’s treatment by the Report’s zealots has little to do with the liberal democratic view of the open society the Report’s authors ceaselessly profess.] Finally, had Charles King bothered to read Ciprian Siulea’s “Tentatia unui nou absolutism moral: Cu cine si de ce polemizeaza Vladimir Tismaneanu?” (Observator Cultural, nr. 379, 5-11 iulie 2007, once again conceivably within the publishing timeline) he might have refrained from parrotting the polarizing and unhelpful plebiscitary logic applied to the Report when he closed “The question is now whether the commission’s report will be used as yet another opportunity to reject history or as a way of helping Romanians learn, at last, how to own it” (p. 723). This, of course, suggests a certain infallible quality to the Report—which is far from the case—a conclusion only enhanced by King’s willingness to focus on the “hate speech” directed against the Report, but yet failing to cite and discuss any of the Romanian scholarly criticism of it.

[12] “Aghiotantii lui Ceausescu povestesc minut cu minut: O zi din viata dictatorului,” Romania Libera, 2 December 2005, online at http://www.romanialibera.ro/a5040/o-zi-din-viata-dictatorului.html. “Declaratie Subsemnatul TALPEANU ION, fiul lui Marin si Elena, nascut la 27 mai 1947 in comuna Baneasa, judetul Giurgiu, fost aghiotant prezidential cu grad de lt. col. in cadrul Directiei a V-a – Serviciul 1. Cu privire la armamentul din dotare arat ca, noi, aghiotantii aveam pistol “Makarov” cu 12 cartuse, iar sefii de grupa si ofiterii din grupa aveau pistolet “Makarov”, pistolet “Stecikin” si pistol-mitraliera AKM, cu munitie aferenta, care era cea obisnuita, in sensul ca nu aveam gloante dum-dum sau cu proprietati speciale, de provenienta straina.” (Dated 2 February 1990). His denial of dum-dum bullets is, of course, par for the course for former Securitate officers, who remember and thus “know nothing.”

[13] Quoted from http://www.tourismguide.ro/html/orase/Arad/Curtici/istoric_curtici.php. This raises an interesting point: there were foreign doctors who participated in Romania or in their home country in the surgery, treatment, and rehabilitation of those wounded. It would be interesting to hear what they remember and what they have to say regarding the munitions.

[15]Adina Anghelescu-Stancu refers to the “crippled and handicapped by dum-dum bullets” who do not number among Romania’s celebrities and about whom no one wishes to remember in today’s Romania, “Dureri care nu trec! (despre decembrie ‘89),” Gardianul, 18 December 2007, online at http://www.gardianul.ro/2007/12/18/editorial-c27/dureri_care_nu_trec_despre_decembrie_89_-s106259.html.

[16] I have examined the incident in detail several times, for the references to other works, see Richard Andrew Hall, “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.pdf, and Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

[17] Once again, see “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.pdf, and “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. The critical articles were authored by Mihai Floca and Victor Stoica, who interviewed the Army cadre who had been involved in the incident and the residents of the surrounding apartment blocs who survived the fighting of those days.

[18] destituirea “Romanian Revolution USLA attack Dec 23 1989 Revolutia,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlBRSxUVQ5E

[19] For the photo see http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/documente/glont.htm; for one of his posts see http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?menu=6&pg=forum_thread.php&lnk=1&pagina=39. I cannot verify that this is indeed a “vidia” munition.

[20] Christian Levant, “Dacă tata nu-l salva pe Tokes, dacă nu salva biserici, tot se întâmpla ceva,” Adevarul, 30 September 2006, online at http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/dac-x103-tata-nu-l-salva-pe-tokes-dac-x103-nu-salva-biserici-tot-se-nt-mpla-ceva/200090.

[21] Cezar-Vladimir Rogoz, Povestirile teroristilor amintiri preluate si prelucrate de Cezar-Vladimir Rogoz, (Alma Print Galati 2007), p. 297, available online at http://www.bvau.ro/docs/e-books/2007/Rogoz,%20Cezar-Vladimir/povestirile_teroristilor.pdf.

[22]“A invatat sa zambeasca, [He learned how to smile],” http://marianmanescu.wordpress.com/2007/12/21/a-invatat-sa-zambeasca.

[25] Puspoki F., “Piramida Umbrelor (III),” Orizont (Timisoara), no. 11 (16 March 1990) p.4, and Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (Timisoara: Editura de Vest, 1991), p. 61.

[26] For the discussion of the former Securitate response to those who have violated the code of silence, see Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

[28] I refer here to, for example, the works of Vladimir Tismaneanu, Matei Calinescu, Andrei Codrescu, Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Radu Portocala, and Nestor Ratesh. Some, like Tismaneanu in a 1993 article in EEPS, “The Quasi-Revolution and its Discontents,” were more explicit about this rather rigid dichotomous approach to the Romanian media, but it also comes through clearly in the sourcing, citations, and footnotes/endnotes of the others. (It continues to haunt the historiography of post-communist Romania, as works such as Tom Gallagher’s aforementioned Modern Romania make clear). To say the least, the issue of ballistics evidence essentially goes unanalyzed in these accounts. Moreover, although as we have seen, these authors have no problem affixing their names to petitions and the like, none of them has published any research on the December 1989 events since the early 1990s. It should tell you something that they continue to rely on and repeat the accounts they wrote in 1990 and 1991…as if nothing had been discovered or written since. In that way, it is almost fitting that the Report of the PCADCR reproduced Tismaneanu’s 1997 Dawisha and Parrott chapter in some places verbatim, down to failing to even change verb tenses when it states that certain questions “remain to be clarified.” I deconstructed the methodological faults in source selection in these émigré accounts in “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game” at http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.html.

[29] For earlier discussions of all of this, see Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged-War Theory of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 13, no. 3, and Richard Andrew Hall, “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale,” Radio Free Europe East European Perspectives, April-May 2002, three part series, available at http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romania%20securitate%205-2002.html.

[30] In “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,” I demonstrated how even the so-called French and German schools (really the schools of Romanian émigrés in those countries) in 1990 were not and could not be independent from accounts in Romania, and that the accounts fed into and reinforced one another. It is simply intellectual myth—and an all too convenient one—to argue the antisceptic separation of these accounts as independent.

[31] Smaranda Vultur, “Revolutia recitita,” 22 no. 787 (9-15 April 2005) online at http://www.revista22.ro.

[32] Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adrian Bobeica, “Ce demonstreaza probele balistice dupa sapte ani?” 22, no. 51 (17-23 December 1996), p. 10, and Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Pop, “Dupa 7 ani,” Sfera Politicii no. 44 (1996), pp. 61-63.

[33] See my discussion in “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” at http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

[34] Monica Ciobanu’s review of Siani-Davies The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 and Tom Gallagher’s Modern Romania: Theft of a Nation is entitled “The Myth Factory” (found at http://www.tol.cz).

[35] Charles King, “Remembering Romanian Communism,” Slavic Review, Winter 2007, p 719. In King’s short article, he does not hesitate to make occasionally gratuitous citations for things he did not need to cite. Yet in discussing December 1989 and using the term “elsewhere”—which usually prefaces a description of “where else” one might find these things—there are no citations. “Although never exhaustively” is itself a gratuitous choice of words and far from accidental: in my last work on December 1989, I made light of how ridiculous it was for Daniel Chirot to claim that Peter Siani-Davies’ The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, an otherwise excellent work, was “near definitive” when so much was missing from Siani-Davies’ discussion—notably, for our purposes here, the question of dum-dum/vidia/exploding munitions. One could indeed be left with the impression that King intends to deliver a put-down, that some fellow Romanianists will no doubt catch, but yet deny the broader audience references to what he alludes and simultaneously protect his image from having delivered such a “palma” as the Romanians would say. It would appear that at least for readers of this paper, his goals won’t go completely fulfilled.

[36] See my discussion in “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” at http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

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Decembrie 1989, USLA la Timisoara

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 5, 2009

Virgil Burla
Marti, 06 Mai 2008

Generalul in rezerva Victor Stanculescu a depus la dosarul Revolutiei de la Timisoara mai multe documente declasificate care demonstreaza, in viziunea aparatorilor sai, ca, in urma
cu 19 ani, la Revolutie au participat persoane neidentificate, dotate cu echipamente de lupta sofisticate.

Personajele misterioase, impreuna cu fosti ofiteri USLA, ar fi tras in demonstranti. Conform avocatilor, persoanele neidentificate ar fi folosit armament diferit de cel al soldatilor Ministerului Apararii, fapt ce rezulta din declasificarea

jurnalelor de lupta ale Ministerului Apararii. Cel care ar fi solicitat desecretizarea ar fi chiar Victor Stanculescu, pentru a demonstra ca nu se poate stabili clar cine e de vina pentru faptele petrecute la Timisoara. Senatorul Ioan Talpes, fost sef al Serviciului de Informatii Externe (SIE), argumenteaza ca la revolutia de la Timisoara au participat si cetateni straini care au creat diversiuni. “Din cunostintele mele, au existat straini care au fost prezenti la Timisoara. Daca s-ar desecretiza jurnalele Ministerului Apararii (MAp) si ale unitatilor Securitatii, s-ar vedea ca au fost consemnate acele situatii… Totul de acolo a fost organizat de personaje si de infiltrati”, crede fostul sef al spionajului autohton.
Procurorul Dan Voinea, cel care s-a ocupat ani de zile de dosarele Revolutiei, spune ca nu a intalnit niciodata un strain implicat in reprimarea demonstrantilor de la Timisoara. “Avocatii pot sa spuna ca au fost si martieni la Timisoara… Ne prostituam cu succes in aceasta poveste. Nu avem nici un document, nici un martor din depozitia caruia sa rezulte ca au existat straini care au deschis focul in 17 decembrie la Timisoara. De victime nu intreaba nimeni nimic si luam apararea infractorilor”, ne-a declarat Dan Voinea. Procurorul mai sustine ca jurnalele actiunilor de lupta s-au intocmit ulterior evenimentelor si, cel mai probabil, au fost clasificate chiar de generalul Stanculescu, ultimul ministru al Apararii numit de Nicolae Ceausescu. “Cu siguranta, tragatorii nu au fost straini. Este o incercare de mistificare”, completeaza magistratul.
Aparatorul victimelor de la Timisoara sustine ca a cerut aceste documente (depuse ieri de partea adversa) de nenumarate ori, dar judecatorii nu le-au considerat necesare pentru elucidarea acestui dosar. “Dupa ce au fost acceptate, am solicitat actul prin care au fost desecretizate aceste jurnale de lupta. Se pune problema: cine le-a secretizat in 1990, cand Ceausescu era mort, si din ordinul cui au fost desecretizate acum? La aceste acte nu a avut acces nici Parchetul, lucru care mi se pare foarte grav”, ne-a declarat avocata Liliana Poenaru.
Generalii (r) Victor Stanculescu si Mihai Chitac au fost condamnati de judecatorii instantei supreme la cate 15 ani de inchisoare si degradare militara pentru rolul jucat in evenimentele de la Timisoara. In urma macelului din decembrie 1989, au rezultat 72 de morti si 253 de raniti grav.

SECRETOMANIE
» MAPN tine la secret documentele Revolutiei
Avocatul lui Stanculescu sustine ca documentele depuse astazi la instanta provin de la Ministerul Apararii. “Am facut o cerere la MApN, am indicat documentele care ma intereseaza. Initial mi s-a spus ca sunt clasificate, dupa care am cerut sa fie facute publice. Dupa o luna, m-am dus si le-am ridicat”, ne-a declarat aparatorul Alice Draghici. Avocatul sustine ca in documentele respective apar persoane care nu au fost identificate sub aspectul numelui sau al provenientei. “Din documente nu rezulta ca ar fi romani sau straini”, sustine Draghici.

“Jurnalul de luptă” al Revoluţiei de la Timişoara, desecretizat (Galerie Foto)


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BUCUREŞTI / 23:23, 9.07.2008
Trupe de Securitate, Miliţia, Securitatea în civil şi Trupele USLA au acţionat, alături de militari, pentru oprirea manifestaţiilor de la Timişoara, din decembrie 1989, potrivit “Jurnalului de luptă” depus la dosarul Revoluţiei de la Timişoara de la instanţa supremă.

Jurnalul arată că regimul s-a folosit de ofiţeri de securitate şi de trupe speciale, infiltraţi printre manifestanţi, pentru a “arunca vina pe seama armatei”.

GALERIE FOTO

“Includerea în mai multe locuri fierbinţi a unităţilor militare în cadrul unor dispozitive mixte, împreună cu forţele de ordine (trupe de securitate, miliţie, USLA, grăniceri), specializate în acţiuni represive, de forţă, infiltrarea printre rândurile manifestanţilor a unor persoane, aparţinând Securităţii care acţionau cu deosebită abilitate, trăgând acoperit împotriva manifestanţilor, a fost deliberat folosită ca stabilirea responsabilităţii pentru împuşcarea unor oameni să devină practic imposibilă, şi a arunca pe seama armatei vina pentru o bună parte din tot ce s-a întâmplat în acele zile la Timişoara”, este una dintre concluziile unui raport înaintat Parlamentului României de Ministerul Apărării Naţionale, în 1990, inclus în Jurnalul depus la instanţa supremă.

Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

De asemenea, colonelul Nicolae Predonescu raporta că “oraşul Timişoara, în timpul revoluţiei, perioada 16-20 decembrie 1989, a fost caracterizat printr-o totală necunoştere a situaţiei reale, amplificată de o evidentă provocare a armatei, miliţiei şi securităţii, efectuată de forţe necunoscute nouă, concretizate în grupuri de turbulenţă cu atac direct la persoane“.

Nota cu privire la activitatea desfăşurată la Timişoara, în perioada 17- 22.12.1989, întocmită de generalul-maior Dumitru Ionescu, relevă aceeaşi stare de confuzie.

“Datorită acţiunilor unor grupuri de oameni drogaţi, organizate şi dotate cu mijloace incendiare, arme de foc, cuţite, pietre, mijloace de înjunghiere prin aruncare de la distanţă etc., şi conduse de indivizi cu deosebită autoritate şi pregătire în domeniu, au creat o situaţie ce cu greu poate fi descrisă şi tot atât de greu de înţeles: flăcările devastatoare, furturile, zvonurile, teroarea, haosul, anarhia, exploziile, avariile şi moartea aveau să stăpânească populaţia şi unităţile militare, cu unele intermitenţe, până în dimineaţa zilei de 19.12.”

Totodată, colonelul relatează în nota sa că în 17 decembrie, la ora 15.00, generalul Vasilea Milea i-a comunicat telefonic că are informaţii potrivit cărora “grupuri de indivizi înarmaţi ar intenţiona să atace unităţile militare.

“Ordonă să se ia măsuri de apărare cu orice preţ. Focul, dacă va fi nevoie, să fie executat, potrivit prevederilor legale: somare, foc în aer, foc la picioare”.

În “Jurnalul de luptă” există şi elemente care arată că “tulburările au fost provocate de elemente teroriste aservite intereselor ţărilor capitaliste”.

Astfel, în urma analizei felului în care s-au desfăşurat evenimentele din 16 şi 17 decembrie, s-a tras concluzia că, în Timişoara, “au acţionat numeroase elemente străine, specializate în acţiuni de diversiune şi terorism. Pentru a putea obţine mai multe informaţii despre aceste elemente s-au chemat grupe specializate din batalionul de cercetare şi al Direcţiei Informaţii din Marele Stat Major”.

Totodată, la Timişoara au fost chemate mii de persoane din Gărzile Patriotice din Olt şi Dolj. Cei care au ajuns cu trenul în gara Timişoara-Est nu au coborât din tren şi s-au întors, iar cei care au coborât în gara Timişoara Nord au fraternizat cu manifestanţii.

Astfel, la ora 10.30, în 21 decembrie, “căpitanul Benescu raportează că în gara Timişoara-Est a sosit un tren cu câteva mii de luptători din Gărzile Patriotice din judeţele Olt şi Dolj, aduşi la cererea organelor superioare de partid pentru a reprima «manifestările agresive» ale unor grupuri de cetăţeni din Timişoara. Luptătorii nu au coborât din tren, garniturile înapoindu-se în localităţile de unde au venit. Plutonierul major Bulgescu Stelian raportează că în gara Timişoara- Nord au sosit garnituri cu luptători din Gărzile Patriotice care au coborât din trenuri, au fraternizat cu manifestanţii şi s-au deplasat împreună spre Piaţa Operei”, se precizează în Jurnal.

O parte dintre ofiţerii de securitate infiltraţi în rândurile manifestanţilor au fost deconspiraţi. Este şi cazul de la Fabrica 6 Martie, unde un grup de muncitori tineri, cu vârste între 13-18 ani, au atacat militarii.

La 6 martie, plutonierul major Buligescu Stelian a fost deconspirat şi predat la Securitate de general major Macri, care, după ce l-a legitimat, i-a permis înapoierea la bază. La întreprinderea de autoturisme, soldatul Viorel T. a fost prins de muncitorii din incintă, predat ofiţerului de securitate care l-a trimis la bază, potrivit Jurnalului, la ora 9.00 în 19 decembrie.

Jurnalul cuprinzând toate operaţiunile militare desfăşurate în perioada 16-21 decembrie 1989 la Timişoara a fost depus la dosarul în care generalii Stănculescu şi Chiţac sunt judecaţi pentru genocid, la Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie.

În 4 aprilie 2007, un complet de trei judecători al instanţei supreme a hotărât condamnarea la câte 15 ani de închisoare a celor doi generali în rezervă şi degradarea militară a lor, pentru acuzaţiile de omor deosebit de grav, în dosarul revoluţiei de la Timişoara. Cei doi au făcut recurs împotriva hotărârii de condamnare a lor.

Magistraţii instanţei supreme l-au condamnat pe Victor Athanasie Stănculescu la 15 ani de închisoare pentru omor deosebit de grav şi la cinci ani de interzicere a unor drepturi. Totodată, el a mai primit şapte ani şi şase luni de detenţie pentru tentativă la omor deosebit de grav, pedeapsa fiind asociată cu patru ani de interzicere a unor drepturi. Prin contopire, Stănculescu va executa pedeapsa cea mai grea, de 15 ani, la care se va adăuga şi pedeapsa degradării militare.

Tot la 15 ani de detenţie şi cinci ani de interzicere a unor drepturi a fost condamnat şi generalul Mihai Chiţac, pentru săvârşirea infracţiunii de omor deosebit de grav. La această pedeapsă s-a adăugat şi cea privind degradarea militară.

Totodată, instanţa a admis în parte plata de către cei doi, în solidaritate cu Ministrerul Apărării Naţionale, de despăgubiri civile cerute de părţile civile din proces.

Instanţa supremă a decis, în 4 aprilie, ca peste 200 de persoane să fie despăgubite în total cu mai mult de un milion de euro, în procesul revoluţiei de la Timişoara.

Magistraţii Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie au decis despăgubirea, în parte, a 74 de părţi civile. Aceste persoane au primit în total aproximativ 700.000 de lei noi cu titul de daune morale, acelaşi cuantum fiind stabilit şi cu titlu de daune materiale. Astfel, instanţa a decis să despăgubească cele 74 de părţi civile în total cu peste 1,5 milioane de lei noi.

În procesul revoluţiei de la Timişoara, magistraţii Secţiei penale au decis despăgubirea, în totalitate, a 143 de părţi civile, cu aproximativ 2,5 milioane de lei noi. Astfel, cele 143 de persoane au primit în total aproximativ 1,15 milioane de lei noi cu titul de daune morale, iar cu titlu de daune materiale a fost acordată o sumă similară.

Concret, valoarea despăgubirilor acordate de magistraţi în procesul revoluţiei de la Timişoara este de aproximativ patru milioane de lei noi, adică peste un milion de euro, potrivit minutei de marţi seară a magistraţilor care au judecat acest dosar.

În acelaşi dosar, magistraţii Secţiei penale au respins acordarea de daune pentru peste 250 de persoane, instanţa constatând că sumele au fost plătite de către partea responsabilă civilmente -Ministerul Apărării.

Pentru alte 50 de persoane, instanţa a constatat că cererile de despăgubiri civile sunt nefondate sau inadmisibile. Cererile de despăgubiri pentru peste 70 de părţi civile au fost respinse de magistraţi ca tardive.

În 22 martie 2004, Secţiile Unite ale Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie au decis – la 14 ani de la revoluţie – rejudecarea generalilor Victor Athanasie Stănculescu şi Mihai Chiţac, acuzaţi de reprimarea timişorenilor. Instanţa supremă a motivat că nu a fost respectat dreptul la apărare, în 1999, atunci când cei doi au fost condamnaţi la câte 15 ani de detenţie.

Cei doi au obţinut rejudecarea după ce le-a fost admis, de către fostul procuror general al României, Joiţa Tănase, memoriul privind promovarea unui recurs în anulare. Fostul procuror general al României susţinea că hotărârile Curţii Supreme de Justiţie prin care generalii Victor Athanasie Stănculescu şi Mihai Chiţac au fost condamnaţi, în 15 iulie 1999, la câte 15 ani de închisoare pentru omor deosebit de grav şi la câte opt ani de detenţie pentru tentativă la omor deosebit de grav sunt netemeinice şi nelegale.

Acţiunea judiciară favorabilă generalilor era motivată, printre altele, prin faptul că expertiza medico-legală psihiatică privitoare la inculpatul Victor Atanasie Stănculescu nu a fost efectuată în condiţiile prevăzute de lege (deşi internarea celui în cauză era obligatorie, acest lucru nu a fost respectat); actele de constatare a serviciilor medico-legale nu au fost examinate şi avizate de Comisia de control şi avizare a actelor medico-legale, iar actele medico-legale privitoare la Stănculescu nu au fost efectuate în condiţiile prevăzute de lege.

În 2 noiembrie 2005, judecătorii instanţei supreme au admis efectuarea unei expertize psihiatrice cu internare a lui Victor Athanasie Stănculescu, fapt ce a stârnit reacţii negative din partea părţilor civile şi vătămate prezente în sala de şedinţă, care au susţinut că, după atâţia ani de la producerea evenimentelor, o astfel de probă nu ar mai fi utilă.

În 30 ianuarie 2006, expertiza medico-legală efectuată lui Athanasie Stănculescu, la Institutul Naţional de Medicină Legală “Mina Minovici” din Bucureşti, la cererea instanţei, arăta că generalul nu are tulburări de natură a-i modifica capacitatea psihică, situaţie în care acesta poate răspunde penal pentru faptele sale.

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Decembrie 1989: gloante, teroristi, spitale, si medici

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 23, 2008

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
– Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.
Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Procurori timorati

– Ati sesizat Parchetul Militar? Ati cerut sa se faca o ancheta in legatura cu cei impuscati la revolutie?
– Bineinteles, am anuntat Parchetul, am cerut o ancheta. De exemplu, cand le-am aratat apartamentul de unde s-a tras la revolutie, de la etajul 4, de la cinematograful “Luceafarul”, procurorii mi-au zis ca au facut verificarile si au depistat ca acolo era o locuinta conspirativa a Securitatii si atat. In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare. Neprimind nici un raspuns, dupa sase luni m-am dus la Parchet sa intreb ce se intampla. Mi s-a raspuns ca se lucreaza, mi-au aratat doua-trei avize puse pe colturile cererii si atat. Unul dintre procurori m-a luat cu el pe un coridor si mi-a spus ca “are copil, are nevasta, e foarte complicat…”. Ma intreba pe mine ce sa mai faca… Am izbucnit, le-am spus ca nu sunt un om care sa fie, asa, aburit cu una, cu doua. Le-am aratat radiografiile celor impuscati, le-am aratat gloante in ficat. Radiografiile existau, nu erau inventiile mele, nu mi se nazarise asa, dintr-o data sa cer ancheta! Le-am spus ca niste oameni doresc sa afle adevarul si ca cei care au semnat memoriul catre Parchet nu sunt niste persoane oarecare, ci medici cu experienta, somitati in materie. Degeaba am solicitat expertize balistice sau alte cercetari, degeaba am prezentat acte, documente, radiografii, lucrari. Nu se dorea sa se faca o ancheta serioasa.

Interviu cu prof. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu

Romulus Cristea
Miercuri, 20 Decembrie 2006
Bucuresti, Spitalul de Urgenta Floreasca
Profesorul Andrei Firica, directorul Spitalului de Urgenta Floreasca in 1989, povesteste cum la camera de garda a spitalului au fost aduse, in zilele Revolutiei, mai multe persoane suspectate ca ar fi teroristi. Acestea au disparut apoi fara urma, luate de un colonel de la militie.
Dar, legat de teroristi, lucrurile s-au desfasurat astfel: a venit din nou colonelul acela de militie care ma indemnase sa nu mai duc ziaristii la patul teroristilor si i-a incarcat pe teroristi intr-un autobuz, plecand cu ei. Este exact ce eu doream, facand tot felul de demersuri pentru a fi preluati de Spitalul Jilava, fiindca ei nu aveau rani grave. Peste doua-trei zile am primit un telefon de la genelarul Chitac, deja ministru, care m-a intrebat ce e cu teroristii. I-am relatat cum ei au fost luati de acel colonel de militie si generalul Chitac n-a parut surprins. Chiar parea multumit ca au fost luati de acel colonel de militie. Marea mea surpirza a fost cand pe acel colonel de militie l-am revazut in zeghe, la televizor, in boxa acuzatilor, la procesul de la Timisoara. De altfel, l-am rugat pe fiul meu, care a facut Facultatea de Teatru si Film, sa-i filmeze pe acei teroristi prinsi cu catuse de paturile spitalului si am dat copii dupa aceasta caseta la Procuratura. Fiul meu filmase si desfasurarea Revolutiei pe strazi.
Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta
09/03/2004
FLORIN CONDURATEANU

Acelasi militian Ghircoias este mentionat si intr-un articol din 1992 (“Terorist ascuns in Apuseni” Romania Libera, 21 august 1992) in legatura cu spitalul Coltea, prezenta teroristilor internati acolo intre 21-26 decembrie si faptul ca dupa sosirea lui Ghircoias, toti teroristi au disparut…

in legatura cu ceea ce Ghircoias a facut la Timisoara, vezi de exemplu http://www.romanialibera.ro/a51078/cine-a-organizat-furtul-cadavrelor-din-morga-spitalului-judetean.html

Marius Mioc ne atrage atentia ca Ghircoias a fost gratiat de catre Ion Iliescu:

Nicolae Ghircoiaş, colonel de miliţie care a furat şi distrus evidenţele Spitalului judeţean Timiş cu privire la morţii şi răniţii din perioada revoluţiei[5], condamnat la 4 ani închisoare dar cu constatarea că pedeapsa este în întregime graţiată prin Decretul-Lege nr. 23/1990[6] (Ghircoiaş este şi beneficiar al amnistiei din Decretul 3/1990, pentru o altă infracţiune săvîrşită în perioada revoluţiei – favorizarea infractorului)

—————-

Bucuresti, Spitalul Municipal Rezerva nr. 3

“…O sa ne omoara pe toti, uite, asta de la mine din buzunar e primul glonte scos in spitalul nostru, dintr-o fetita de 12 ani. In salon e un baiat, foarte grav ranit, un glonte dum-dum, d-ala, i-a facut praf diafragma, creasta iliaca, la iesire perforatia era cit o moneda de 5 lei….”

Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, nr. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5.

“In noaptea de 23 se reintorc in framintate zona a fostului cc. In corpul A. Rebeca este impuscata in ambele picioare. Este transportata la Spitalul Municipal. I se extrase unul dintre gloante si revine in acele locuri tulburi. In fata Directii a 5-a. Eugen Cercel este impuscat cu doua gloante explozive care i-au zdrobit bazinul si picioarele. Este invalid pe viata, si in carutul sa, se afla la mama sa in Moldova...”

Emil Munteanu, “Doi revolutionari [Rebeca Doina Cercel si Cazimir Benedict Ionescu], doua destine…” Romania Libera, 20 februarie 1992, p. 1.

Cugir, 21-22 decembrie 1989

“CUGIR: Revolutionari achetati, criminali in libertate,” Expres, nr. 6, 9 martie 1990, p. 6.

“…Se tragea din birourile securistilor si s-a mai tras si cu o pusca de vinatoare si s-a mai tras cu gloante dum-dum si militia ardea ca o torta si oamenii au intrat in incendiu si atunci locotenentul major Mezei Dorin a sarit de la etaj cu pistolul mitraliera…Sint peste 40 de raniti si unii au primit gloante in cap dar cu totii sint in viata. Doi raniti sint in spitalele din RFG si unul este in Anglia. Cel din Anglia a fost impuscat cu dum-dum….UNDE SINT CEI CARE AU TRAS IN OAMENI?” –Vasile Neagoe

Curtici, dupa 22 decembrie 1989

La gara primim un grup de belgieni care insotesc un tren de 42 de vagoane cu marfuri trimise de Comunitatea Europeana, in cadrul actiunii Operation Villages Roumains . Seful lor, care rupe cateva cuvinte romanesti, ne spune ca totul a fost organizat de Crucea Rosie belgiana si service-cluburile care au adoptat in lunile anterioare sate din judetele Iasi, Botosani, Caras-Severin sau Mehedinti. In noaptea urmatoare, prima echipa de 5 medici de la spitalul austriac Lorenz Bohler, care au sosit la Curtici cu un vagon-spital preiau un numar de 18 bolnavi in stare grava pentru a li se acorda un tratament special de 2-3 luni in Austria. E vorba de unele transferuri de organe sau proteze speciale, datorate efectelor monstruoase ale gloantelor dum-dum . Victimele sosesc de la Timisoara cu cateva ambulante; la lumina becurilor si a farurilor zarim fete tinere transfigurate de durere – printre acestea femei, adolescenti, un soldat si o fetita cu cate un picior amputat.

http://www.tourismguide.ro/html/orase/Arad/Curtici/istoric_curtici.php

“Cine a tras gloante explozive?”

Revolutia din decembrie 1989 a lasat in urma ei foarte multe intrebari fara raspuns dintre care una destul de dureroasa este aceasta: cine a tras si mai ales cine a dat ordin sa se traga cu gloante explozive? Daca in rindurile care urmeaza nu putem raspunde acestor intrebari, cei putin vom reduce in actualitate o problema care este ignorata si trecuta sub tacere de cei care ar trebui s-o rezolve.

Inainte de toate, ce este un glont exploziv? Ca aspect si dimensiuni, nu se deosebeste de un glont obisnuit de calibrul 7,62 mm, deci poate fi folosit ca munitie pentru pistolul automat AKM. Ce il deosebeste de un glont obisnuit este faptul ca odata patruns in tinta, glontul “dum-dum” explodeaza, raspindind o puzderie de schije si producind distrugeri infioratoare in regiunea in care a intrat. Deci, daca cu un glont obisnuit se scoate adversarul din lupta, prin folosirea unui exploziv este sigur ca i se provoaca acestuia o rana care il va chinui toata viata, in cazul in care va supravietui leziunilor provocate de schije si puternicei hemoragii care insoteste de obicei o astfel de rana. Iata de ce acest tip de munitie a fost interzis de multi ani, prin tratate internationale.

Domnul profesor Nicolae Angelescu, seful Sectiei Chirurgie a Spitalului Coltea a avut amabilitatea sa ne explice citeva din aspectele tratamentului chirurgical al ranilor produse de gloante explozive:

–Sint mai multi factori, care contribuie la a face ca o plaga provocata de un astfel de glont sa fie greu de tratat si greu de vindecat. In primul rind prin explozia glontului se produc distrugeri masive de tesuturi in zona in care aceasta a patruns si uneori aceste tesuturi nu se mai pot reface. In al doilea rind, fragmentele metalice rezultate (?) in urma exploziei se raspindesc pe o intindere mare si de aceea nu pot fi extrase in totalitate, pentru ca extragerea lor ar provoca pacientului o rana mult mai mare decit cea produsa de glontul in sine. Deci, dupa operatie mai ramin in corpul pacientului destule fragmente metalice si acestea constituie surse de infectie care il agraveaza starea.

Pentru a va ajuta sa va dati seama cum arata si ce inseamna o rana produsa de un glont exploziv, va prezentam in continuarea diagnosticele de internare ale celor adusi in Spitalul Coltea, impuscati cu astfel de gloante:

1. Nicolae Lucian, adus pe data de 21 (?) decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: fractura cominutiva femur sting in treimea inferioara, cu leziune de artera si vena femurala si pierdere de substanta prin plaga impuscata.

2. Necunoscut, adus pe 22 decembrie, ora 1, decedat la ora 1.30. Diagnostic: hemoragie peritoneala cataclismica cu plage de vena porta, case splinice, zdrobire de pancreas prin plaga impuscata hipocondru sting. Plaga zdrobita de colon travers.

3. Radu Traian, adus pe data de 23 decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: plaga transfixianta glezna stinga cu fractura cominutiva tuberozitatea calcaneana. Sectinue artera si vena tibiala. Fractura deschisa cominutiva maleola interna dreapta.

4. Gherman Dumitru, adus pe 25 decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: plaga impuscata antrebat sting bipolara, cu explozie de ulna, in treimea distala si lipsa de substanta osoasa, sectiune de tendoane muschi flexori ai carpului si degetelor si sectiune de pachet vasculo-nervos ulnar.

5. Astafei Petre, adus pe 22 decembrie 1989, decedat. Diagnostic: plaga impuscata toraco-abdominala cu ruptura de ficat si rinichi drept. Hemopneu-motorax drept, hematom intraperitoneal, stare de soc hemoragic, fractura cominutiva coastele 7,8, si 9 drepte.

6. Soldat Constantinoiu Vasile, adus la data de 24 decembrie 1989, decedat. Diagnostic: hemotorax sting masiv cu soc hemoragic prin plaga impuscata cervico-toracala cu ruptura vertebrelor toracale T2, T6, ruptura vaselor vertebrale si a vaselor de la baza gitului….

Cristian Calugar, Flacara, 13-19 februarie 1991 (nr. 6) , pp. 8-9.

Generalul Dan VOINEA despre decembrie 1989:

“Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia,

nici de la dum-dum.”

(cu Romulus Cristea, Romania Libera, 22 decembrie 2005)

http://www.romanialibera.ro/a58783/toti-alergau-dupa-un-inamic-invizibil.html

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stiri pentru (noi) dum-dum : revolutia romana din 1989 si teroristii (Cugir, Timisoara…)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 14, 2008

Cugir, 21 decembrie 1989

Dl. Alexandru Iosa, împuşcat în picior cu gloanţe “dum-dum” în 21 decembrie 1989

http://unirea.3x.ro/arhiva/2002/12/18/pag1.html

12/18/2002
Condamnaţii Revoluţiei
Generalii represivi – în libertate, plevuşca vânturată după gratii

Evenimentele din decembrie 1989 au fost rând pe rând fie subiect de tocat în campaniile electorale, fie motiv de dispută publică. La un moment dat, subiectul a devenit extrem de incomod pentru unii şi atunci vinovaţii au fost spălaţi de păcate, uneori în văzul lumii, fără nici o ruşine pentru memoria celor care au murit, fără nici o reţinere din partea celor care şi-au construit gloria politică pe jertfa lor. În prezent, în penitenciare mai sunt doar câţiva dintre cei care au linşat cadre ale Miliţiei. Toţi generalii care în decembrie 1989 au dat ordin sau au tras în manifestanţi sunt în prezent liberi: fie le-au fost amnistiate pedepsele, fie aşteaptă acasă pronunţarea instanţelor, cândva… Potrivit informaţiilor noastre, lucrătorii fostei securităţi şi reprezentanţi ai trupelor USLA, care au executat pedepse pentru că au tras în 1989 în populaţia ieşită în stradă, au cerut ulterior daune morale statului român. Unii dintre ei le-au şi primit…
Dacă generalii nu pot să facă închisoare pentru omor deosebit de grav, oamenii obişnuiţi, care s-au aflat pe stradă în decembrie 1989 şi cei care în zilele revoluţiei au ucis reprezentanţi ai Ministerului de Interne, fac închisoare pentru instigare la omor. Adrian Carica şi Aurel Mihu din Cugir au fost condamnaţi definitiv la 10 şi respectiv 13 ani închisoare, în 2000. Alte două persoane, condamnate la câte 10 ani închisoare, în acelaşi dosar, au făcut recurs, următorul termen urmând să se judece în 10 ianuarie 2003. Carica şi Mihu au fost condamnaţi definitiv şi trimişi după gratii la finele lunii iunie 2002, pentru că pe 21 decembrie 1989 au instigat mulţimea împotriva a doi miliţieni din Cugir – cpt. (post mortem) Valentin Pop şi plt.maj (post-mortem) Ilie Staicu, care au fost linşaţi. Cei doi trimişi în judecată sunt singurii care au fost deocamdată condamnaţi, deşi, iniţial, prin 1990, pe numele tuturor celor care au participat la crime au fost emise mandate de arest preventiv. Toată povestea a fost uitată, până prin 1993, când ancheta a fost reluată, în condiţiile în care unul dintre cei consideraţi instigatori- Alexandru Popa- s-a sinucis. În 22 decembrie, la Târgu-Secuiesc a fost linşat în stradă maiorul de miliţie Aurel Agache. La locul tragediei au fost mii de oameni, dintre aceştia fiind identificaţi cinci ca autori. Cei în cauză au fost identificaţi, anchetaţi şi condamnaţi la închisoare în 2001 printr-o sentinţă a Curţii Supreme de Justiţie. Pentru ca dosarul acestei crime să nu zacă în aşteptarea prescrierii, familia supravieţuitoare a maiorului de miliţie Agache a făcut în cei 13 ani scurşi de la revoluţie memorii peste memorii, solicitând organelor abilitate să facă dreptate în acest caz. Patru dintre cei cinci condamnaţi la închisoare de CSJ sunt în prezent în Ungaria.
Tot la solicitarea rudelor supravieţuitoare se judecă în prezent la Bucureşti şi cazul asasinării fostului comandant al Miliţiei Cugir, cpt. (post-mortem) Valentin Pop. Deoarece soluţia primită în 1995 de “încetare a urmăririi penale” împotriva cpt. Valentin Pop, prin decesul acestuia, lăsa o amintire neagră în sufletele soţiei şi fiicei supravieţuitoare, din iniţiativa acestora a fost deschis un nou proces, în 1999, la Tribunalul Militar Bucureşti. Au fost condamnate la închisoare două persoane iar alte două au făcut recurs la sentinţă. O iniţiativă asemănătoare, dar soldată deocamdată cu eşec, a avut şi soţia plt. maj. (post mortem) Ilie Staicu.
Dl. Alexandru Iosa, împuşcat în picior cu gloanţe “dum-dum” în 21 decembrie 1989 şi care a fost timp de aproape 10 ani şeful asociaţiei revoluţionarilor din Cugir ne-a declarat că cei care l-au linşat pe cpt. Valentin Pop şi i-au profanat cadavrul nu au intrat, sub nici o formă, în categoria revoluţionarilor. Dânsul ne-a explicat că, cel mai probabil, gestul comandantului de miliţie de a se bate cu mâna peste tocul pistolului i-a încitat pe oamenii din faţa miliţiei. Mai mult, Alexandru Iosa a precizat că mânia maselor s-a îndreptat asupra cpt. Pop mai mult pentru că simboliza un aparat al opresiunii comuniste decât din răzbunare personală, deoarece acesta era comandant în Cugir de doar 6 luni de zile.
În încercarea de a reabilita imaginea tatălui său, Valentina Pop a trimis în acest an un memoriu pe adresa preşedintelui Ion Iliescu. Memoriul a fost făcut public, în plenul Camerei Deputaţilor, de deputatul PRM de Alba, Emil Crişan.
În 21 decembrie, la 13 ani de la revoluţie, Cugirul îi va comemora pe cei care şi-au pierdut viaţa în acele zile. Deopotrivă, pe cele două cadre MI şi pe cei patru revoluţionari care au murit în misiune, în 23 decembrie: Emil Costinaş, Florin Teodorescu, Dorin Augustin (morţi în accident de maşină, în 23 decembrie, în timp ce se îndreptau spre depozitul de muniţie de la Vinerea) şi Nicolae Vântu, ucis în faţa Televiziunii Române.

Nicoleta TOMUŢA
Cine sunt teroriştii ? – Păreau pe atunci un fel de “bau-bau” cu cartuşe “dum-dum” – Securitatea era marele semn de întrebare – Miliţia de asemenea – Informaţii – zvonuri – spaimă – În două cuvinte: haos, degringoladă
Poligrafia Timişoara – 4 decembrie 1989
relatări telegrafice – delegaţie serviciu

– contact cu membrii opoziţiei ceauşiste – Tökes – totul este periculos – teamă de a nu eşua – se forţează evacuarea – să amână evacuarea – ieşim pe străzi se ne asigurăm documentarea externă, lăsând cel puţin o urmă în caz că dispărem – Informaţii de la Bucureşti: se duce lupta pentru putere în cadrul C.C. – Bucureştiul întârzie – Timişoara : să avem curaj, vom fi mai mulţi – Timişoara (delegaţie) studenţii, UMT-ul , revoluţionarii se formează – se discută când ? cine va avea curajul să înceapă ? – multe întrebări, suspiciuni, securitatea lucrează (bine) – unii dispar – se rup legături – Tökes, da – acolo vom începe – activez  prietenii –  suntem gând la gând, zilnic devenim mai mulţi – Bucureştiul – linişte – Timişoara – în clocot – clerul reformat împotriva nedreptăţirii lui Tökes – apel prin “Panorama” privind cauza preotului – s-a început  – în jurul clădirii tot mai mulţi stau şi se opun  – “ băieţii” bat şi arestează din nou – unii dispar – se ucide în Timişoara – pierd legătura (au fost ucişi) – am rămas izolaţi – cine, când şi cum va începe şi în Lugoj – Într-un târziu aflu … la 20 decembrie ora 18, se porneşte la Lugoj – Nu, în 21 decembrie ora 8 – Pornirea demonstraţiei paşnice I.U.R.T., I.U.P.S., I.P.C. – “Mondial”, I.T.L.  “A” şi “B”, Timişul – Vernisajul Galeriei PROARTE, aspect sumbru – Apar primele manifeste aruncate în centru – Tinerii răspund acţiunii – O scurtă discuţie în atelier – Vine ajutorul – aveam două arme : una găleată, una bidinea, de inscripţionat falezele de-a lungul Timişului – Ecouri – Ne tremurau mâinile, ne băteau inimile. Frică? – Demonstraţie în faţa consiliului municipal de partid – Triţoiu dorea parlamentare, culmea, după ce tinerii au fost ucişi şi răniţi – În consiliu se mişună – “potârnichile au fost speriate” – Nu intraţi ! – intrăm! – Dezastrul incendiului era de aşteptat – Păcat că au ars  unele urme – S-au dat telefoanele necesare pentru salvarea potârnichilor – Poporul a intrat prin faţă. Capii şi “căpiţele” au fugit prin uşa din dos şi chiar pe ferestre – Zaharia a plătit pentru Basica – Slugarii au fost pe fază. Au reuşit să-i salveze – Tineretul se răzbună … ora 21,40, zboară, zboară Ceauşescu (tabloul), zboară, zboară stema p.c.r., zboară televizoare, zboară tot ceea ce este semn şi însemn – Simultan ia foc totul – S-a ajutat la incendiere şi de către “slugari”  – în stânga consiliului , miliţia se retrage – Miliţia avea de lucru la U.M. – Lugoj şi Timişoara – Sarcină – fotografierea evenimentelor  – Execut clişeele, sânt atacat  – noroc în cel ce m-a apărat … El a fost … Bîrdan Ovidiu, arestat ulterior – Un elicopter în P.O. – Martirii sânt transportaţi la spital – Încercări de salvare a acestora – Oamenii se retrag cu violenţă – Valeriu Rosada este scos din spital – Intervenţie chirurgicală pentru salvarea lui Daniel Brocea – Rănit mai uşor, Stoica, de frica spitalului, se tratează singur – Erau clipe grele – Incendiul cuprinde clădirea primăriei – La locul revoluţiei apar pompierii şi armata – Aşteaptă … – Baioneta la armă – Cordon de soldaţi – Ameninţări de la distanţă – Fotografierea interzisă – În oraş miliţia arestează pe stradă – … chiar şi la domiciliu – Informatorii îşi făceau ultimele servicii – Cei arestaţi: maltrataţi, ameninţaţi … – … şi transportaţi spre destinaţie necunoscută – (mai târziu aflu spre Deva ) – Lovituri – Focuri de armă ( în aer ) – … pe când cei rămaşi în dubă tremurau de frică – Din declaraţiile celor arestaţi – Printre alţii, tinerii de la Căminul I.U.R.T. – Noapte albă şi fierbinte – Dimineaţa – 21 decembrie  1989 – Pregătesc DRAPELUL ţării – Ora 9 – Începe demonstraţia – I.U.R.T. – I.U.P.S. – I.P.C. Mondial – Coloane de oameni – Se scandează pentru Timişoara – Împotriva tiraniei – În faţa U.M., unde au căzut eroii noştri, s-a dat onorul noului drapel – Trecem prin Micro IV – Micro III – Micro I – şi Micro II – La podul de beton – joncţiunea cu textiliştii – El e român – celălalt german – eu maghiar – suntem lugojeni – bănăţeni … – Demonstraţia continuă -Tineri şi vârstnici se ataşează demonstranţilor – “Libertate !” – “Jos tiranul !” – “Clopote !” Incredibil, eram gând la gând – Coloana se-ndreaptă spre domiciliul eroilor noştri – Drapele îndoliate pentru Timişoara, pentru Lugoj – Lacrimi de durere şi de spaimă – Durerea părinţilor – cutremurătoare ! – Piaţa din faţa consiliului e plină – Se propagă ideile revoluţiei – Maiorul Căpăţînă, maiorul Grama se prezintă în ideea sprijinirii Revoluţiei – Spiritul ei intră în toate inimile (sufletele) – Ne cunoaştem, nu ne cunoaştem, suntem cu toţi revoluţionari – Frică şi suspiciune – Cine este el ? Cine este ea ? Cine sunt ceilalţi ? – “Rămâi cu noi” – A doua noapte fierbinte şi albă – Unde vom sta la noapte ? – Toţi se gândesc la familiile lor – După două zile aflu că am fost căutat acasă de 3 indivizi – Am rămas singuri – Nici nu ne cunoaştem – Săndulescu Mihai mă numesc. Îmi pare bine, Kovacs Iosif ; Cipi şi Adi – Unde dormim ? – Ce ne fac copiii ? – Întrebări simultane – La Valentin vom fi în siguranţă – Părinţi îndoliaţi, prieteni – Bucureştiul a pornit – Se ucide în toată ţara – Spaima este în toate familiile. – Un somn de  trei ore în zona Ţesătorilor – O dimineaţă de iarnă rece, însă fierbinte în suflete – Totul îndoliat, drapelul şi câţiva dintre noi – Ora 10 – Oameni în Piaţa Libertăţii – De la balcon se vorbeşte – Bune şi nebune – Pornim spre unităţile militare – Se scandează “Armata e cu noi !”; “Şi voi sunteţi români !” – Oprim demonstraţia înainte de a ajunge în faţa unităţi-lor – Delegaţie pentru tratative – Totul era pregătit – Se aştepta comunicatul de la Bucureşti – “Armata e cu noi ! “ – Victorie, dar nu deplină – Preaslăviţii nu erau încă arestaţi – Nici teroriştii – prinşi – Cine sunt teroriştii ? – Păreau pe atunci un fel de “bau-bau” cu cartuşe “dum-dum” – Securitatea era marele semn de întrebare – Miliţia de asemenea – Informaţii – zvonuri – spaimă – În două cuvinte: haos, degringoladă – A treia noapte albă şi fierbinte – Gărzile şi armata veghează pe străzi şi obiective – Comitetul ad hoc veghează şi coordonează situaţia – Prima legătură telefonică se obţine cu Caransebeşul – Apoi cu Deva – Radio Timişoara răspunde într-un târziu şi el – Se anunţă situaţia din Lugoj – Telefonul sună în permanenţă – Lumea fierbe – Diversiunea s-a înfiltrat şi între noi – Informaţiile şi dezinformaţiile propagate de unii făceau ca oamenii din oraş să trăiască o frică înspăimântătoare – Cutremurător zgomot se auzea la ora 2 (noaptea) dinspre sud-est – …

Aceste dezvăluiri au fost publicate în ziarul DRAPELUL: nr. 11 (sâmbătă 10 februarie 1990); nr.13 (sâmbătă 24 februarie 1990); nr. 17 (sâmbătă 24 martie 1990); nr. 19 (2-8 aprilie 1990).

Materialul utilizat este din cartile “Revolutia lugojeana” si “Lugojul al doilea oras liber” de Toma Trifon Nicolae
sublocotenentului Mihai Mihail, de 22 de ani, care a fost împuşcat în stomac la Revoluţia din decembrie 1989. Tînărul subofiţer post mortem îşi satisfăcea stagiul militar cînd un glonte cu vîrf dum-dum l-a ucis.
# Flori la mormîntul unui erou martir
Primul popas al vizitei preşedintelui PSD a fost în oraşul Topoloveni unde a fost primit de edilul Gheorghiţă Boţîrcă. Aici, Adrian Năstase a depus o coroană de flori la mormîntul sublocotenentului Mihai Mihail, de 22 de ani, care a fost împuşcat în stomac la Revoluţia din decembrie 1989. Tînărul subofiţer post mortem îşi satisfăcea stagiul militar cînd un glonte cu vîrf dum-dum l-a ucis. El nu era căsătorit. Mama lui, Gheorghiţa Mihai, a fost îmbărbătată de premier care i-a sărutat obrajii: “Aşa a fost voia lui Dumnezeu, îmi pare rău pentru dvs. şi sper ca cel de Sus să vă întărească. Sînt alături de dumneavoastră”. La mormîntul din marmură, Adrian Năstase în timp ce doi preoţi oficiau slujba de pomenire, a aprins o lumînare ca de altfel şi miniştrii Geoană şi Tănăsescu. Pe tot timpul slujbei, bătrîna mamă şi-a plîns fiul. Apoi, primul ministru a intrat în biserică, s-a închinat şi a aprins lumînări la vii şi la morţi.

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