The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘stanculescu’

Romania December 1989. ‘Mos G(h)erila’: Nicolae Ceausescu’s Final and Lasting ‘Christmas Gift’ to His Romanian Subjects

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 1, 2010


(like me…and perhaps even you)

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process. [Submitted for clearance 22 April 2008, approved 22 May 2008]

I have been researching the Revolution for the better part of the past 18 years. I first visited Romania in 1987 while backpacking through Europe, and I spent a total of about 20 months in the country during the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993-1994, and 1997, when I conducted pre-dissertation, dissertation, and post-dissertation research on the Revolution.

I have written on the topic of the Revolution, voluminously some might say, publishing in 1996, 1999, and 2000 before joining the Agency, and since I entered the Agency in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

It will and should be hard to believe for the outsider to this problem, but my work has been essentially the only systematic, ongoing investigation of the ballistics evidence—such are the shortcomings of small “communities of interest” investigating a peripheral historical topic and the perils of “group think.”

This article is, for lack of a better description, about “connecting the dots.”

–The story of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 since December 1989 has been the struggle of disparate voices who share their memories, often with great frustration and a sense of resignation. They are hardly a unified chorus.

The accounts of ideologues seek to suggest to us that “the truth” miraculously is the province of people of this or that particular political persuasion in post-communist Romania. That is morality play and fairy tale; it is not the work of the serious historian. Would that history were so neat and tidy! It is not.

Instead, what one finds is that the people with the details that matter most are spread across the ideological and political spectrum—including people with what many of us might term distasteful, illiberal, ultranationalist, and nostalgic views.

There are those who relate these details in a narrative consistent with where those details lead.

There are those who relate these details even though it contradicts their narrative and ultimate conclusions about December 1989.

Finally, there are those—and there are many of them—who just know they experienced what they experienced. They aren’t sure exactly how it fits in with a larger narrative: they merely want to tell their story.

Together, they relate these details in the face of cynicism, indifference, and an often stunning intellectual conceit and deaf ear.

Theirs, however, and not the ideologues’, is the story of December 1989.

There was a lot of talk during the crimes of December ’89 about the special bullets with which the young and old alike were killed, bullets which—it is said were not in the arsenal of our military units. There was so much talk that there was no more to say and after there was no more to say for a sufficient amount of time the discussion was reopened with the line “such things don’t exist!” The special bullets didn’t exist!—our highest authorities hurried to tell us…In order to search for proof a little work is necessary by our legal organs that they are not terribly inclined to take….

[Dan Badea, “Gloante speciale sau ce s-a mai gasit in cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 April 1991]



The Internet allows the researcher to piece together history as never before. That’s a pretty bland statement, but the reality of it never ceases to amaze me. Take the case of those killed in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (officially 1,104 people perished in those events). Scroll through the list of those killed on the procesulcomunismului (“the trial of communism”) and portalulrevolutiei (“the portal to the revolution”) websites. For most, there is only limited information about the circumstances in which they died. For others, however, there is greater detail. As one scrolls through the names and photos, one of the similarities that begins to become apparent is that in cases where there is more information about the circumstances of the death, dum-dum bullets are mentioned. Thus, for example, we find the following five cases:

BUTIRI Florin, born in Joia Mare, 11 April 1969, he was living in Bucharest and was employed by the Bucharest Metro. He played rugby. On 22 December he participated in the demonstration at Sala Dalles [next to University Square]. On 23 December he went to defend the Radio Broadcast center on str. Nuferilor, and while he was saving some old people from a burning building he was shot. Brought to the Military Hospital because of a wound to his hip, caused by a dum-dum cartridge, they tried to ampute a leg. His stomach was also ravaged by a bullet. On 26 December 1989 he died. (

FILOTI Claudiu
Profession: Lieutenant major UM 01171 Buzau, post-mortem Captain
Born: 30 July 1964
Birthplace: Vaslui
Date of death: 22 December 1989
Place of death: Bucharest, in the area of the Defense Ministry
Cause of death: Shot in the chest with dum-dum bullets (

LUPEA Ion- Gabriel from Hunedoara, born in 1970…In 1989 he was sent from Bucharest to Anina [Resita], then to UM 01929. On 9 December 1989, he went on leave, but he was recalled. On the evening of 23 December he was on duty defending the unit [Anina-Resita], at the checkpoint, when around 11 pm they were attacked from the front and from the left flank. While crawling on hands and knees to bring more ammunition he was hit by a dum-dum bullet that entered above his left leg and exited through his left hand. Brought to the hospital he died Christmas Eve, making him the unit’s first hero; he was posthumously awarded the rank of sub-lieutenant. (

MANESCU Dan, born 25 March 1964, a student in the Transportation Department, he joined with the other young people on 21 December and participated in the demonstrations in the center of the town [Bucharest]. Friday morning he went with his brother to the demonstrations and he returned after the flight of the dictator. He changed his clothes and returned for good, when on the night of 22/23 December a dum-dum bullet punctured his stomach in Palace Square. Brought to the Emergency hospital, he could not be saved. (

POPTEAN Petre, born 27 December 1965, in Margau near Huedin, living in Bucharest…he worked as a driver for the Bucharest Transportation Department. On 21 December he went into town to protect his sister on her way home from work. The two of them left on Calea Victoriei and arrived at [Sala] Dalles, where in horror they watched…Petre called to his sister to aid the wounded. While on the ground, he was hit in the abdomen and left hip by dum-dum cartridges that caused him major wounds. His sister, Monica, was able to stop an ambulance with a Targoviste license number, but he didn’t make it to Hospital 9. At around 6 pm Petre passed away. (

Let me draw the attention of the reader to two important details here. First, the use of dum-dum munitions was not confined to Bucharest (multiple locations), but includes the southwestern city of Resita (the case of Ion Lupea). Second, the use of dum-dum munitions occurred not just after communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu fled at midday on 22 December 1989, but also before, on the evening of 21 December (the case of Petre Poptean).

Dum-dum bullets—which fragment and cause substantially more and more lethal damage to the organs of those who are hit—are outlawed by international convention (see more below). Moreover—or perhaps better-put, officially—no Romanian institution had them in their arsenal in December 1989. Yet, as we can see, almost two decades after the events, the obituaries of those gunned down in December 1989 include references to those munitions as having played a role not only in the wounding of people, but also in their deaths.

Despite the claims above attesting to not just the wounding, but the death of several people (civilians and soldiers) over several days in several locations from dum-dum bullets in December 1989, what did General Dan Voinea—removed from his post in December 2007 by Attorney General Laura Codruta Kovesi for violating basic judicial norms in another case[1]—who headed the investigations into December 1989 for well over a decade, have to say about them in late 2005? “Such things didn’t exist!”:

Romulus Cristea: “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims? The press of the time was filled with such claims…”

Dan Voinea: There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets. During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently.[2] (Emphasis added)

So, there is no wiggle room here, no room for misinterpretation: according to Prosecutor Voinea , nobody was killed by dum-dum bullets in December 1989.

That’s a common claim among officials of the former communist regime—Voinea was a military prosecutor since 1982 and he was directly involved in the trial of the Ceausescus. Such conclusions were also repeated in late 2005 by Dr. Vladimir Belis, who was the head of the Medical Forensics Institute (IML) in Bucharest in December 1989: asked if other than the standard 7.62 mm caliber weapons belonging to the Army were used, he did not know and couldn’t say because he claimed no autopsies were ever performed.[3] The apparent official disinterest in munitions and autopsies is—ahem—shall we say “interesting” given the comments attributed to Belis’ subordinates and to doctors at Bucharest’s main hospitals—comments made in the early 1990s, but also made well over a decade later, in the mid 2000s.[4]

General Dan Voinea spoke in late 2005. Voinea’s argument that there were no dum-dum bullets, that there were no atypical munitions used, is directly linked to his contention that there were therefore “no terrorists” in December 1989. It has been routinely repeated in various forms by the media for well over a decade and by his supporters in intellectual circles at home and abroad. The encomia for General Voinea before and since that December 2005 interview by noted Romanian intellectuals and Romanianists are breathtaking. Tom Gallagher refers to him as the “indefatigable General Voinea”[5] and Western journalists have described him as “a one-man mission to uncover the truth about exactly what happened during those days.”[6] Sorin Iliesiu justifies his claims about the Revolution squarely on Voinea’s words:

General Dan Voinea has said clearly: The terrorists did not exist. Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead[7], wounded[8] or arrested[9].”[10][11]

Highly problematic and damning for General Dan Voinea, Dr. Vladimir Belis, and fellow deniers are the following, detailed written testimonies of Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea presented by Dan Badea in April 1991, attesting to what they had found in December 1989 in the headquarters of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate:

Balasa Gheorghe: From [Securitate] Directorate V-a, from the weapons depot, on 23-24 December 1989, DUM-DUM cartridges, special cartridges that did not fit any arm in the arsenal of the Defense Ministry were retrieved. Three or four boxes with these kinds of cartridges were found. The special bullets were 5-6 cm. in length and less thick than a pencil. Such a cartridge had a white stone tip that was transparent. All of these cartridges I personally presented to be filmed by Mr. Spiru Zeres. All the special cartridges, other than the DUM-DUM [ones] were of West German [FRG] make. From Directorate V-a we brought these to the former CC building, and on 23-24 December ’89 they were surrendered to U.M. 01305. Captain Dr. Panait, who told us that he had never seen such ammunition before, Major Puiu and Captain Visinescu know about [what was turned over].

In the former CC of the PCR, all of those shot on the night of 23-24 December ’89 were shot with special bullets. It is absurd to search for the bullet in a corpse that can penetrate a wall…

[of course, V-a worked hand-in-hand with the USLA, or the Securitate’s “special unit for anti-terrorist warfare,” and thus it was not suprising that in Directorate V-a’s headquarters…] Among things we also found were:…the training manual for the USLA. It was about 25 cm thick, and while there, I leafed through about half of it…[and I also came across] a file in which lots of different people under the surveillance of USLA officers were listed…

(Interviewed by Dan Badea, “Gloante speciale sau ce s-a mai gasit in cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 April 1991.)

Moreover, we know from the 2005 publication of the testimony of a detained V-th Directorate officer dated 2 February 1990, that he must have been asked to comment specifically on the existence of dum-dum ammunition—since he makes a point of emphasizing that “we didn’t have dum-dum ammunition or weapons with special properties, of foreign origin.”[12] So, in other words, we know from this interrogation document that six weeks after the Revolution, those who had taken power or at least the military prosecutors of the time were still interested in the existence of these munitions—thereby suggesting that they must have had some reason for believing in their existence, say for example the character of the injuries suffered by those shot during the events, as well as perhaps recovered bullet fragments, the testimonies of the doctors who operated on those wounded, etc…

Voinea’s ceaseless interviews and revelations during this period have been reprinted repeatedly since they took place and his conclusions been given wide circulation by journalists and people such as Sorin Iliesiu. Yet those who just relate what happened in December 1989 continue to mention the existence of dum-dum munitions. Thus, if one turns to the tourism site for the western border town of Curtici (near Arad) one can read the following about the history of the city, including the events of December 1989:

The following night [at the train station], the first team of five doctors from the Austrian “Lorenz Bohler” Hospital , who arrived in Curtici with a “hospital-wagon” took 18 people in critical condition to Austria for special treatment that lasted two to three months. That is, they needed organ transplants or special care, because of the monstrous results of dum-dum bullets.[13]

Or take the case of a poster on the 18th anniversary of the Revolution, who begins:

The Romarta (central Bucharest) file? What about the file on those who fired at me at the Astronomical Observatory on Ana Ipatescu Boulevard or those who at 1700 on 24 December fired near Casa Scanteii [press building] where I found a dum-dum cartridge in my bed—us having had to sleep in the bathroom.[14]

Finally, there are the cynical comments of those—no matter what they believe about December 1989—who cannot help but remember the dum-dum munitions and the horrible pain and trauma they caused their victims, many still living with the consequences of those wounds today…and how nobody wishes to remember them; for them, this is essentially a cruel, open secret.[15]

Unfortunately, no one in Romania has tied together such claims and the evidence I present above. I do not know how many of these people are still alive, but if the Romanian media were interested, the names are there for them to contact in order to confirm the claims above: Gheorghe Balasa, Radu Minea, Spiru Zeres, Major Puiu, and Captain Visinescu.

D’oh…Dum-Dum…(Tweedle) Dumb and (Tweedle) Dumber: Dum-Dum=Vidia


When I first viewed the youtube video “Romanian Revolution USLA attack Dec 23 1989 Revolutia” ( ), what struck me was: here, finally, after a decade and a half of almost unopposed revisionist denial, here was someone who claims to have been an eyewitness and has photos and details of the incident, and who maintains the now almost heretical idea that the Securitate’s “Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare”(USLA for short) had indeed attempted to attack the heavily-guarded Defense Ministry Headquarters on Drumul Taberei in Bucharest on the night of 23-24 December 1989! But, in fact as we shall see, although important, that is actually not the most important thing about the one and only youtube video posted by “destituirea.”

For me the transcript of the USLA unit claiming to have witnessed army units attacking their own ministry and thus the supposed reason that the USLA men who witnessed it “had to be silenced by being killed”—a transcript leaked to the press in 1993 and which led scholars such as Denis Deletant and Peter Siani-Davies to consider this “case closed” essentially—was always highly problematic. It supplied what was said, but, if we are to believe the words of the USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu, speaking to the notorious Securitate cheerleader Angela Bacescu, it did not supply the much needed context: Ardeleanu claimed that he had been placed under arrest and that it was he who chose the names of the USLA officers who were to report to the Defense Ministry. The USLA units thus came in a situation in which those who had taken control of the country were in the Defense Ministry holding their commander under arrest.[16]

But more importantly, the transcript could not explain a) the lack of any corroboration since of these supposed Army units attacking the Defense Ministry on the night of 23-24 December 1989—truly hard to believe, given all the young recruits and given their comparative willingness to talk to the media after all these years, in comparison to the former Securitate, and b) the claims in summer 1990 by the Army cadre who had been involved in the firefight with the USLA and the interviews of civilians in the surrounding blocs of flats who had lived through the fighting in December 1989 and related what they had seen.[17] The interviewees had detailed the suspicious actions of the USLA convoy and made it clear that they came with less-than-friendly intentions.

Now, here, 17 years after those famous articles by Mihai Floca and Victor Stoica is a video supporting the claim that the USLA units attempted to force their way into the Defense Ministry. The photos of the inside of the USLA ABI vehicles and of the dead USLA men (wearing black jumpsuits underneath Army clothing) are perhaps the most extensive and detailed seen to date, and the anonymous poster plays coy as to where he got them from (he claims he does not want to reveal the source—something which, given the sensitivity of the issue, I am not surprised by).

But, as I mentioned previously, it is actually not the confirmation of this understanding of the Defense Ministry incident that is the most significant thing about this youtube video. It is at the 2:01-2:05 of 8:50 mark of this silent video that the poster makes the following interesting and critical insight/claim…

USLA’s bullets were called “vidia” or “dum-dum” were usually smaller than the regular army’s bullets…Most of the capital’s residents have found this type of bullets all around the military buildings near by. (at 2:01 of 8:50)[18]

And thus, it becomes clear that the discussion of “vidia” bullets and “dum-dum” bullets is interchangeable (or at least is treated as such)! (Hence, perhaps why Romulus Cristea asked his question of General Voinea as he did in December 2005: “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims? The press of the time was filled with such claims…”) “Vidia” translates as “grooved,” and thus describes the modified feature of the bullets which makes them so lethal, thereby making the treatment of vidia and dumdum as de facto synonyms understandable.

This is critical because as I have previously written in detail, citing interviews and reminiscences in the Romanian press…vidia bullets showed up across the country in December 1989. In “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea’s Campaign to Sanitize the Romanian Revolution of December 1989” ( I detail examples of vidia bullets showing up across the country—Brasov, Sibiu, Bucharest (multiple locations), Braila, Caransebes, Craiova, and Hunedoara—as recounted by civilians and Army personnel, at various times since the events—not just during or right after. Such wide dispersion of the use of officially non-existent munitions is critical too because it infirms the notion that somehow demonstrators or the Army put their hands on such “free floating weapons” and used them during the December 1989 events—that it would have happened in one or two places could be explained, but that the same thing would happen in so many geographic centers is scarcely plausible.

Recall from our earlier extract from Prosecutor Dan Voinea’s December 2005 interview, his unambiguous denial of the use of vidia munitions. Nevertheless, significantly, since that interview we continue to find people who remember what they remember and they remember the use of vidia munitions. I have found yet more references. Alexandru Stepanian, who writes under the motto “Dreptate si Onoare! (Justice and Honor!),” not only claims to still have a vidia bullet from 22-23 December 1989 in the area around the TV Station in Bucharest, but he has placed a photo of it on the portalulrevolutiei website.[19] In fall 2006, the daughter of a priest recalled:

In December ’89, after he arrived from Timisoara, my father stayed with me on Stefan Cel Mare Boulevard. When we returned to our home, on the corner of Admiral Balescu and Rosenthal. I found the cupboard of the dresser pure and simple riddled with bullets, about 8 to 10 of them. Someone who knew about such things told me they were vidia bullets. They were brought to a commission, but I don’t know what happened to them.[20]

In 2007 a book entitled The Tales of the Terrorists was published in Galati. In one section, a Eugen Stoleriu recounts his dispatch to Bucharest as a military recruit during the events and how for the first time in his life he came across vidia bullets that were shot at him.[21]

Another apparent synonym for “vidia” is “crestata” or “notched.” I take it that the reference is to the same type of munitions because the damage caused to those wounded by them was equally catastrophic. In December 2007, Alexandru Tudor, a soccer official famous apparently for his stern, unsmiling demeanor, who was shot on 23 December 1989 around 10 am in the area of Piata Aviatorilor near the TV studio, recounted the episode that ended his career:

They brought me to Colentina Hospital and there I had the great fortune of two great doctors. If they had operated on me, they would have to amputate both my legs beneath the knee, but instead they left the bullets in there 12 days. Their explanation was that the bullets were too close to arteries, and since they were gloante crestate (notched bullets), it was very dangerous. After they were removed, I kept the bullets, I have them at home. I was on crutches for six months, I went through therapy, but I had to give up soccer.[22]

Also on the 18th anniversary of the Revolution, a frustrated poster to another site asked pointedly:

Who in Romania in 1989 had 5.5 mm caliber NATO-type munition, that in addition was “notched”—something outlawed by the Geneva Convention, while it is known that the Romanian Army had only the caliber used by Warsaw Pact nations for their weapons, that is to say 7,62 mm….At that time even the Olympic speed shooting champion, Sorin Babii, expressed his surprise….I had in my hand several samples of this cartridge: small, black, with a spiral on the top, or with 4 cuts (those who know a little bit about ballistics and medical forensics can attest to the devastating role caused by these modifications). I await a response to my questions…perhaps someone will be willing to break the silence. I thank you in advance. [emphases added][23]

In other words, the existence of crestate/vidia/dum-dum bullets is known, and not everyone has so blithely forgotten their existence.

A Dum-Dum by Any Other Name: Gloante explosive (exploding bullets), gloante speciale (special bullets)

Crestate, vidia, dum-dum…by now we know: these are very dangerous munitions…

In the field of firearms, an expanding bullet is a bullet designed to expand on impact. Such bullets are often known as Dum-dum or dumdum bullets. There are several types of dum-dum designs. Two popular designs are the hollow point (made during the manufacturing phase) and X-ing made usually by the user by making two notches perpendicular to each other on the tip of the bullet, commonly with a knife. The effect is that the bullet deforms and sometimes fragments upon impact due to the indentations. This creates a larger wound channel or channels with greater blood loss and trauma.

The hollow-point bullet, and the soft-nosed bullet, are sometimes also referred to as the dum-dum, so named after the British arsenal at Dum-Dum, near Calcutta, India, where it is said that jacketed, expanding bullets were first developed. This term is rare among shooters, but can still be found in use, usually in the news media and sensational popular fiction. Recreational shooters sometimes refer to hollow points as “JHPs”, from the common manufacturer’s abbreviation for “Jacketed Hollow Point”.

To be most correct, the term “Dum Dum Bullet” refers only to soft point bullets, not to hollow points, though it is very common for it to be mistakenly used this way.

The Hague Convention of 1899, Declaration III, prohibits the use in warfare of bullets which easily expand or flatten in the body, and was an expansion of the Declaration of St Petersburg in 1868, which banned exploding projectiles of less than 400 grams. These treaties limited the use of “explosive” bullets in military use, defining illegal rounds as a jacketed bullet with an exposed lead tip (and, by implication, a jacketed base).[24]

Thus, under the synonym for dumdum/vidia/crestate bullets of “exploding bullets,” we find the following on the Internet:

On the evening of 27 December 1989, Eugen Maresi, 20 years old, a military draftee, was sent to organize a checkpoint on soseaua Chitilei, at the entrance to Bucharest….A group of 25 soldiers came under fire from the belltower of a church. Eugen was the first shot…. “The doctors told me my only child was shot with (gloante explosive) exploding bullets. The fragments shattered all of his internal organs,” says Dumitru Maresi, the father of the [Drobeta Turnu] Severin hero.


Gheorghe Nicolosu, was shot in the leg…After he was operated on, it was established that the bullet with which he was shot did not figure in [the arsenal of] the Romanian Army. Nicolosu was operated on in Hunedoara, then arrived in Italy, where he underwent another surgery…In the same area, on Lipscani, Cristea Valeria, 36 years old, was shot in the stomach by ammunition that did not belong to the army. He died a few hours later, the doctors trying to save his life, but the glontul exploziv (exploding bullet) perforated his intestines. Another youngster, 18 year old Ion Gherasim was shot in the back at the entrance to UM 01933 by munition that did not belong to the army. (Emphases added)

Once again, we are speaking here of far-flung locations across the country—Chitila (Bucharest) and Hunedoara—which makes the idea of accident and “free floating weapons” unlikely.

Ammunition…Consistent with the Confessions of Former Securitate Whistleblowers

And so, who was it, who has told us about “exploding bullets” and “special cartridges” like this, and who has it been said possessed them in December 1989?

For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).


Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989. What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridges which upon hitting their targets caused new explosions.”[25]


The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:

I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89. In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched. Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition. In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances. I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets. In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox. We had been drugged. We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us. Don’t publish my name. I fear for me and my parents. When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’ The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize. I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’. [emphases added]


As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention: the former Securitate. That is not accidental. [26]

With the advent of the Internet, unverifiable bulletin board postings also pop up. On 23 December 2003, under the name of “kodiak,” the following appeared:

In ’89 I was a major in the USLA…and I know enough things that it would be better I didn’t know…15, 16, 20, 30 years will pass and nothing will be known beyond what you need and have permission to know…” ([27]

Clearly, the legal constraints of security oaths and fear continue to cast a long shadow, long after the events of December 1989.

Si totusi…se stie [And nevertheless…it is known]

It took over three years into my research on the Revolution—and physically being in the Library of the Romanian Academy—before I came to the realization: oh yeah, that’s a good idea, yeah, I should systematically compare what the former Securitate have to say about December 1989 and compare it with what others are saying. It took a maddening additional half year before I came to the conclusion: oh yeah, and how about what the Army has to say? It may seem ridiculous—and it is in some ways indefensible from the perspective of performing historical research—but you have to understand how Romanian émigrés dominated early investigations of the Revolution, and how they divided the post-communist Romania media into the pro-regime (untrustworthy) press and the opposition (trustworthy) press, and the influence this “research frame” and methodology had at the time upon younger researchers such as myself.[28]

A more systematic mind probably would have come to these revelations long before I did. Instead, it took the accidental, simultaneous ordering of issues from 1990 and 1991 of the vigorous anti-Iliescu regime university publication NU (Cluj), the similarly oppositional Zig-Zag (Bucharest), and the former Securitate mouthpiece Europa to discover this. There I found Radu Nicolae making his way among diametrically opposed publications, saying the same things about December 1989. And it mattered: the source for example of Radu Portocala’s claim that there were “no terrorists” in December 1989 was Radu Nicolae. But more important still, was the discovery of Angela Bacescu revising the Defense Ministry incident, exonerating the USLA, and claiming there were no Securitate terrorists in Sibiu (only victims) in Zig-Zag…only to show up months later in Romania Mare and Europa months later writing the same stuff, and in the case of the Sibiu article republishing it verbatim. Nor was Bacescu alone among the former Securitate at Zig-Zag: she was for example joined by Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan, the first to pen revisionist articles about the Army’s DIA unit.[29]

But without a broader comparative framework and approach to the Romanian media, all of this eluded the highly partisan Romanian émigré writers on the events. Nestor Ratesh alone among this group did seem puzzled and bothered by the similarity of Romania Libera Petre Mihai Bacanu’s conclusions on the V-th Directorate and those of Bacescu (he only alluded to her dubious reputation, however, and did not name her.) But Bacanu was fallible: memorably, but also upstandingly, in December 1993, he admitted based on what he claimed were new revelations, that his previous three and a half years of exonerating the USLA had been in vain since they were erroneous: they had after all played a significant role in the repression and killing of demonstrators on the night of 21-22 December 1989 in University Square. That alone should have precipitated a rethinking about assumptions and approaches to investigating the December 1989 events and particularly the role of the Securitate and the USLA, but it did not, and has not to this day…


Romanians and Romanianists like to indulge in the reassuring myth that the “schools” of research on the Revolution were separate from the beginning—that the defining feature was the political orientation of the author and whether he or she viewed the events of December 1989 as a revolution or coup d’etat. To the extent they are willing to admit that discussions of the “terrorists” cross-pollinated and became intertwined across the borders of the political spectrum, they assume that this must have happened later, after views had become consolidated.[30] But such a view is simply ahistorical and wishful-thinking. It is simply impossible to defend honestly when you have Angela Bacescu who “showed up with lots of documents and didn’t need any money” and wrote her revisionist tracts in the oppositional Zig-Zag, when she and Olbojan were the first ones to voice theses that later became staples of the anti-Iliescu opposition—long after they had left its press.

It is indicative that Romanians still have yet to confront this methodological flaw that one of the few studies in the country to read Securitate and Army sources in addition to journalist and participant accounts, still failed to address the key similarities across the political spectrum regarding the existence and identity of the “terrorists.” Smaranda Vultur wrote in a review of Ruxandra Cesereanu’s (otherwise, groundbreaking in comparison to what had appeared before it in Romanian in book form) Decembrie ’89. Deconstructia unei revolutii (Iasi: Polirom 2004):

Beyond this, I would underscore however a deficit that results directly from the choice of the author to classify her sources based on how the source defines the events: as a revolution, a plot, or a hybrid of the two. Because of this one will thus find, contained in the same chapter, Securitate people and political analysts, revolutionaries and politicians of the old and new regimes, and journalists.[31]

In other words, my exact indictment of the approach inside and outside Romania to the study of the Revolution, and the reason why people are simply unable to acknowledge the similarity and even identicality of views of the “terrorists.”

After the aforementioned realizations in 1993-1994 about the need to be more comparative and systematic in investigating accounts of the Revolution, it took yet another two maddening years before I started to realize the significance of the ballistics evidence. It thus came comparatively late in the dissertation process. My timing was fortuitous, however. I wrote a short article in November 1996 that was published in two different forms in 22 and Sfera Politicii in December 1996—the mood in Romania was euphoric as seven years of the Iliescu regime had just come to an end through the ballot box. [32] True, it didn’t spark debate and loosen some lips as I had hoped, but it made my visit to Bucharest the following June —especially my interviews on one particular day with a journalist at Cotidianul and, several hours later, a member of the Gabrielescu Parliamentary Commission investigating the events (Adrian Popescu-Necsesti)—memorable to say the least….




Of course, not then, or even since, has anybody who has investigated the December 1989 events inside or outside Romania systematically attempted to replicate, test, or expand upon my earlier findings—other than myself. As I have noted elsewhere,[33] in Peter Siani-Davies’ otherwise excellent The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 he devotes essentially a paragraph to the ballistics’ topic in a 300 plus page book—and it is only in the context of addressing my own earlier research. Monica Ciobanu could thus not be more wrong in her declaration that Peter Siani-Davies’ 2005 volume had disproven the “myth of Securitate terrorists.”[34] Siani-Davies has nothing to say about dum-dum/vidia/exploding ammunition: hence why he does not believe in Securitate terrorists!

Since then, I have written on Securitate revisionism, “the terrorists,” and the ballistics evidence of Romanian Revolution of December 1989, in the words of one critic who seems unable to call things by their name “voluminously, although never exhaustively, elsewhere”—publishing in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. [35] Now, more than a decade after those original ballistics’ articles, I return here putting things together I should preferably have put together long before…

The high stakes of what was at play in late December 1989 become all the clearer here. Nicolae Ceausescu’s successors faced not only the dilemma of having foreign citizens arrested for firing at and killing in cold blood Romanian citizens[36], but members of a Romanian state institution—the Securitate—in addition to those foreign citizens, had injured, maimed, and killed Romanian citizens using munitions that were outlawed by international conventions to which Romania was a party. Thus, beyond the culpability of an institution that was key to the ability of the nomenklaturists who had seized power to continue in power—i.e. the Securitate—and who undoubtedly had compromising information on those leaders, the new potentates were faced with a problem of international dimensions and proportions.

Dan Badea’s April 1991 article with which I opened this paper concluded thusly:

There are in these two declarations above[–those of Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea–] sufficient elements for an investigation by the Police or Prosecutor’s Office. [Dan Badea, “Gloante speciale sau ce s-a mai gasit in cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 April 1991]

That, of course, never appears to have happened. I hope that the information I have supplied above—significantly, much of it new, much of it from the Internet in recent years—should at the very least encourage Romanians and Romanianists to reopen and reexamine the ballistics evidence. Let us hope that on the twentieth anniversary of the Revolution, we may be able to read serious investigations of the ballistics evidence, rather than be subjected to the false and jaded refrain… such things did not exist!

[1] See, for example, Dorin Petrisor, “Procurorul Voinea, acuzat ca a lucrat prost dosarul Iliescu 13 iunie 1990,” Cotidianul, 7 December 2007, online edition. Voinea’s removal generally went unpublicized abroad—it was understandably not a proud day for his supporters. Kovesi claimed to have been taken aback by Voinea’s inexplicable, seemingly incompetent handling of the June 1990 files.

[2] General Dan Voinea, interview by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005, online edition. Cristea’s apparent effort/belief—shared by many others—to suggest that it was only “the press of the time”—something I take to mean December 1989 and the immediate months after—that was filled with such claims and accusations is untrue. (The suggestion is to say that civilians with no knowledge of weapons and munitions repeated rumors spread out of fear and fueled by those who had seized power but needed to create an enemy to legitimize themselves and thus exploited those fears…) For examples of such claims “in the press of the time,” see the words of an employee of the Municipal Hospital (“In the room was a boy, very badly wounded by dum-dum bullets that had blown apart his diaphragm, his sacroiliac, and left an exit wound the size of a 5 lei coin,” Expres no. 10 (6-12 April 1990), p. 5) and the discussion of how Bogdan Stan died (“vidia bullets which explode when they hit their ‘target,’ entered into the bone marrow of his spine,” Adevarul, 13 January 1990). But such claims also appear long after the December 1989 events. Two and a half and three years after the December 1989 events, Army Colonel Ion Stoleru maintained in detail that the “terrorists” had “weapons with silencers, with scopes, for shooting at night time (in ‘infrared’), bullets with a ‘vidia’ tip [more on this and the relation to dum-dum munitions below]. Really modern weapons” and added, significantly, “The civilian and military commissions haven’t followed through in investigating this…” (see Army Colonel Ion Stoleru with Mihai Galatanu, “Din Celebra Galerie a Teroristilor,” Expres, no. 151 (22-28 December 1992), p. 4, and “Am vazut trei morti suspecti cu fata intoarsa spre caldarim,” Flacara, no. 29 (22 July 1992), p. 7.) Voinea’s steadfast denials would seem to validate Stoleru’s allegations more than a decade after he made them. Not surprisingly, but highly unfortunate, Cristea’s interview with Voinea forms the basis of conclusions about the terrorists on the Romanian-language Wikipedia webpage on the Revolution: see

[3] Laura Toma, Toma Roman Jr. , and Roxana Ioana Ancuta, “Belis nu a vazut cadavrele Ceausestilor,” Jurnalul National, 25 October 2005, “Frumos (Nice)…” as the Romanians say. Belis may not have interested himself in the ballistics evidence—but some of his employees apparently did (see IML Dr. Florin Stanescu’s comments in Ion Costin Grigore, Cucuveaua cu Pene Rosii (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), pp. 70-72). Moreover, there were exhumations. (“For a long time the Brasov Military Prosecutor didn’t do anything, even though there existed cases, declarations, documents, photos and even atypical unusual bullets brought in by the families of the deceased and wounded.” On 14 June 1990, General Nicolae Spiroiu, future Defense Minister (1991-1994), appears to have been in the city of Brasov, assisting at the exhumation of people killed there during the December 1989 Revolution. Such a step was a rarity, and apparently followed earlier talks between Spiroiu, five other officers, and the staff of the local newspaper Opinia, who were seeking clarification over who was responsible for the deaths of their fellow citizens. “They found in particular bullets of a 5.6 mm caliber that are not in the Army’s arsenal,” wrote the journalist Romulus Nicolae of the investigation. (Romulus Nicolae, “Au ars dosarele procuraturii despre evenimente din decembrie,” Cuvintul, no. 32 (August 1991), pp. 4-5, cited in Richard Andrew Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea’s Campaign to Sanitize the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,”

[4] Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, surgeon at Coltea Hospital: “I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of a department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments. I didn’t hear anything back from Chircoias or any expert. Those who made the evidence disappear neglected the fact that there still exist x-rays and other military documents that I put at the disposition of the [Military] Prosecutor.”


[5] Tom Gallagher, Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation, (NY: New York University Press, 2005), p. 190.

[6] Jeremy Bransten, “Romania: The Bloody Revolution in 1989: Chaos as the Ceausescus Are Executed,” RFE/RFL, 14 December 1999 at This unfortunate comment aside, Brantsen’s series is an excellent journalistic introduction to the December 1989 events.

[7] Iliesiu is dead wrong. See the signed testimony to the contrary by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi dated 26 December 1989, reproduced in Ioan Itu, “Mostenirea teroristilor,” Tinerama, no. 123 (9-15 April 1993), p. 7. I translated the important parts of this document in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” Significantly, according to this document, Dr. Belis had access to the dead terrorists:


Dead Terrorists. Although their existence is vehemently denied by all official institutions, we are able to prove that they existed and have sufficient details to identify them.…We continue with some excerpts of the declaration of Ion Lungu, head of the group of fighters who guarded the ‘Institute of Legal Medicine’ [IML, the main Bucharest morgue], beginning from the evening of 22 December 1989:

“Starting from the 23rd, there were brought, in succession, more ‘special’ corpses. They were brought only by military vehicles and were accompanied by officers. They were all dressed the same: kaki uniforms, with or without military insignia, fur-lined boots, cotton underwear. All the clothes were new. The established procedure at that point was that when the bodies were unloaded from the trucks, at the ramp to the back of the IML, to be disrobed and inspected. The documents found were released to Prosecutor Vasiliu and criminology officers. The weapons and munitions we found and surrendered—on the basis of a verbal procedure—to the officer on duty from UM 01046. Weapons and ammunition were found only on those ‘special’ corpses. Those who brought them said that they were terrorists. I turned over to this military unit five pistols (three Stecikin and two Makarov—all 9 mm caliber), two commando daggers and hundreds of 9 mm and 7.62 mm cartridges (compatible with the AKM machine gun). They were held separately from the other corpses, in a room—I believe that it used to be the coatroom—with a guard at the door.…

Access to the room with the terrorists was strictly forbidden. Only Prosecutor Vasiliu, criminologist officers, Dr. Belis, and the chief of autopsies could enter. On top of them, next to the arms, there were personal documents, passports (some blank), all types of identity cards—one of them was clearly false, it stated that the dead terrorist was the director at Laromet (at that plant no director died)—identity cards that were brand new, different service stamps in white. All had been shot by rifles (one was severed in two) and showed evidence of gunshots of large caliber. Some had tattoos (they had vultures on their chests), were young (around 30 years old), and were solidly built. I believe that their identity was known, since otherwise I can’t explain why their photographs were attached to those of unidentified corpses. They were brought to us in a single truck. In all, there were around 30 dead terrorists. [The document is signed by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi on 26 December 1989]”

[8] Once again Iliesiu is wrong. Professor Andrei Firica at the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” apparently also was paid a visit by Colonel Chircoias (aka Ghircoias), see fn. 4. He claims that he “made a small file of the medical situations of the 15-20 suspected terrorists from [i.e. interned at] the Emergency Hospital,” but as he adds “of course, all these files disappeared.” Firica reports that a Militia colonel, whom he later saw on TV in stripes as a defendant in the Timisoara trial [i.e. Ghircoias], came to the hospital and advised him “not to bring reporters to the beds of the terrorists, because these were just terrorist suspects and I didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone” (!) The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects into a bus and off they went. (Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.) Cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian”

[9] I don’t even know where to begin on this one. As I have written before, not all of those detained were terrorists, and many of the terrorists seemed to have eluded arrest, but there are so many accounts of people arrested as terrorists who legitimately fit that description that I don’t even know where to begin. See the multiple translations in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian”

[10] Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, found at (note: this is NOT the Romania Libera daily newspaper). One will find many well-known names in the West among those who signed this petition: Dragoş Paul Aligică, Matei Călinescu, Ruxandra Cesereanu, Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Tom Gallagher, Gabriel Liiceanu, Norman Manea, Nicolae Manolescu, Mircea Mihaies, Ion Mihai Pacepa, Horia-Roman Patapievici, Radu Portocală, Nestor Ratesh, Lavinia Stan, Stelian Tănase, Alin Teodorescu, and Vladimir Tismăneanu. Sorin Iliesiu, who is a filmmaker and Vice President of the “Civic Alliance” organization, has written that he was part of the “team” that “edited” the seven page chapter on the Romanian Revolution contained in the Report of the Presidential Commission to Analyze the Communist Dictatorship of Romania (PCACDR). He is not a scholar and most certainly not a scholar of the December 1989 events. A textual comparison of the Report’s chapter on the Revolution and Vladimir Tismaneanu’s chapter in a Dawisha and Parrott edited volume from 1997 is unambiguous: the introductory two paragraphs of the Report’s chapter are taken verbatim in translation from p. 414 of Tismaneanu’s 1997 chapter, and other verbatim paragraphs, sentences, and phrases from pp. 414-417 make up parts of the rest of the Report’s Revolution chapter without any reference to the 1997 chapter. As the author(s) of an earlier chapter in the Report cite(s) Tismaneanu’s 1997 chapter (see p. 376 fn. 55) correctly, this leaves really only two possible explanations for the failure of Iliesiu et. al. to cite that they have borrowed wholesale from Tismaneanu’s 1997 chapter: a) an absence of scholarly knowledge, or b) an attempt to mask their dependence upon and deference to Tismaneanu, the Chair of the Commission, since the citations that do appear are the exact citations from the 1997 chapter and claims are translated word-by-word, so much so that Iliesiu et. al. did not even bother to change verb tenses despite the passage of a decade. Iliesiu et. al. can attempt to avoid answering questions and attempt to change the subject, but the textual analysis is unambiguous: Tismaneanu’s unattributed 1997 chapter forms the bulk of the Report’s chapter on the Revolution. The only question that needs to be answered is: why and why are they unwilling to admit the textual identicality?

Fullscreen capture 10232009 82206 PM


[11] All of this eludes Charles King in his Winter 2007 Slavic Review essay “Remembering Romanian Communism.” In his five page essay, he pauses no less than four times to mention the Revolution, despite the fact that its coverage takes up barely one percent of the PCACDR report. He relates the most banal of conclusions—“The report thus repeats the common view (at least among western academics) of the revolution as having been hijacked…”—yet misses or avoids what Iliesiu clearly seems most proud of: having inserted the claim that Nicolae Ceausescu was responsible for “only 162 deaths,” thereby insinuating Ceausescu’s successors bear responsibility for the other 942, and the claim to which such a reckoning is intimately related, namely Voinea’s that there were “no terrorists.” (It is interesting to note how Iliesiu et. al., the eternally suspicious of the state, miraculously become assiduous promoters of “official” and “state” claims once they turn out to be their own, thereby suggesting that their skepticism of the state is primarily situational rather than inherent—these are not equal opportunity skeptical and critical intellectuals.) King’s treatment of the Report is overall insufficiently informed, and as a consequence contextually-wanting and one-sided. He cites a handful of Romanian reviews of the Report, but they are almost uniformly positive accounts, almost as if supplied by the Chair of the Commission himself (see fn. 1, p. 718). He pauses to cite the former head of Radio Free Europe’s Romanian Research Division Michael Shafir’s 1985 book, yet makes no mention of Shafir’s trenchant criticisms (he gave the report a 7 out of 10 and mixed the positive with the negative) in a 1/12/07 interview in Ziua de Cluj, his extended critique “RAPORTUL TISMĂNEANU: NOTE DIN PUBLIC ŞI DIN CULISE” available in spring 2007 at http:// (no. 11), or his “Scrisoare (ultra)deschisa” in Observator Cultural no. 382 (25 July-1 August 2007) [given the timeline of scholarly publication, I am attempting to give King the benefit of the doubt here …He would certainly do well to read Shafir’s most recent discussion in Observator Cultural NR. 148 (406) 17 – 23 ianuarie 2008, “Despre clarificari nebuloase, plagiate, imposturi si careerism,” to see what a venerable critic and serious scholar was subjected to as a result of deigning to not wholeheartedly embrace the Report. Shafir’s treatment by the Report’s zealots has little to do with the liberal democratic view of the open society the Report’s authors ceaselessly profess.] Finally, had Charles King bothered to read Ciprian Siulea’s “Tentatia unui nou absolutism moral: Cu cine si de ce polemizeaza Vladimir Tismaneanu?” (Observator Cultural, nr. 379, 5-11 iulie 2007, once again conceivably within the publishing timeline) he might have refrained from parrotting the polarizing and unhelpful plebiscitary logic applied to the Report when he closed “The question is now whether the commission’s report will be used as yet another opportunity to reject history or as a way of helping Romanians learn, at last, how to own it” (p. 723). This, of course, suggests a certain infallible quality to the Report—which is far from the case—a conclusion only enhanced by King’s willingness to focus on the “hate speech” directed against the Report, but yet failing to cite and discuss any of the Romanian scholarly criticism of it.

[12] “Aghiotantii lui Ceausescu povestesc minut cu minut: O zi din viata dictatorului,” Romania Libera, 2 December 2005, online at “Declaratie Subsemnatul TALPEANU ION, fiul lui Marin si Elena, nascut la 27 mai 1947 in comuna Baneasa, judetul Giurgiu, fost aghiotant prezidential cu grad de lt. col. in cadrul Directiei a V-a – Serviciul 1. Cu privire la armamentul din dotare arat ca, noi, aghiotantii aveam pistol “Makarov” cu 12 cartuse, iar sefii de grupa si ofiterii din grupa aveau pistolet “Makarov”, pistolet “Stecikin” si pistol-mitraliera AKM, cu munitie aferenta, care era cea obisnuita, in sensul ca nu aveam gloante dum-dum sau cu proprietati speciale, de provenienta straina.” (Dated 2 February 1990). His denial of dum-dum bullets is, of course, par for the course for former Securitate officers, who remember and thus “know nothing.”

[13] Quoted from This raises an interesting point: there were foreign doctors who participated in Romania or in their home country in the surgery, treatment, and rehabilitation of those wounded. It would be interesting to hear what they remember and what they have to say regarding the munitions.

[15]Adina Anghelescu-Stancu refers to the “crippled and handicapped by dum-dum bullets” who do not number among Romania’s celebrities and about whom no one wishes to remember in today’s Romania, “Dureri care nu trec! (despre decembrie ‘89),” Gardianul, 18 December 2007, online at

[16] I have examined the incident in detail several times, for the references to other works, see Richard Andrew Hall, “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,”, and Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,”

[17] Once again, see “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,”, and “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” The critical articles were authored by Mihai Floca and Victor Stoica, who interviewed the Army cadre who had been involved in the incident and the residents of the surrounding apartment blocs who survived the fighting of those days.

[18] destituirea “Romanian Revolution USLA attack Dec 23 1989 Revolutia,”

[19] For the photo see; for one of his posts see I cannot verify that this is indeed a “vidia” munition.

[20] Christian Levant, “Dacă tata nu-l salva pe Tokes, dacă nu salva biserici, tot se întâmpla ceva,” Adevarul, 30 September 2006, online at

[21] Cezar-Vladimir Rogoz, Povestirile teroristilor amintiri preluate si prelucrate de Cezar-Vladimir Rogoz, (Alma Print Galati 2007), p. 297, available online at,%20Cezar-Vladimir/povestirile_teroristilor.pdf.

[22]“A invatat sa zambeasca, [He learned how to smile],”

[25] Puspoki F., “Piramida Umbrelor (III),” Orizont (Timisoara), no. 11 (16 March 1990) p.4, and Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (Timisoara: Editura de Vest, 1991), p. 61.

[26] For the discussion of the former Securitate response to those who have violated the code of silence, see Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,”

[28] I refer here to, for example, the works of Vladimir Tismaneanu, Matei Calinescu, Andrei Codrescu, Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Radu Portocala, and Nestor Ratesh. Some, like Tismaneanu in a 1993 article in EEPS, “The Quasi-Revolution and its Discontents,” were more explicit about this rather rigid dichotomous approach to the Romanian media, but it also comes through clearly in the sourcing, citations, and footnotes/endnotes of the others. (It continues to haunt the historiography of post-communist Romania, as works such as Tom Gallagher’s aforementioned Modern Romania make clear). To say the least, the issue of ballistics evidence essentially goes unanalyzed in these accounts. Moreover, although as we have seen, these authors have no problem affixing their names to petitions and the like, none of them has published any research on the December 1989 events since the early 1990s. It should tell you something that they continue to rely on and repeat the accounts they wrote in 1990 and 1991…as if nothing had been discovered or written since. In that way, it is almost fitting that the Report of the PCADCR reproduced Tismaneanu’s 1997 Dawisha and Parrott chapter in some places verbatim, down to failing to even change verb tenses when it states that certain questions “remain to be clarified.” I deconstructed the methodological faults in source selection in these émigré accounts in “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game” at

[29] For earlier discussions of all of this, see Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged-War Theory of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies, vol. 13, no. 3, and Richard Andrew Hall, “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale,” Radio Free Europe East European Perspectives, April-May 2002, three part series, available at

[30] In “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,” I demonstrated how even the so-called French and German schools (really the schools of Romanian émigrés in those countries) in 1990 were not and could not be independent from accounts in Romania, and that the accounts fed into and reinforced one another. It is simply intellectual myth—and an all too convenient one—to argue the antisceptic separation of these accounts as independent.

[31] Smaranda Vultur, “Revolutia recitita,” 22 no. 787 (9-15 April 2005) online at

[32] Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adrian Bobeica, “Ce demonstreaza probele balistice dupa sapte ani?” 22, no. 51 (17-23 December 1996), p. 10, and Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Pop, “Dupa 7 ani,” Sfera Politicii no. 44 (1996), pp. 61-63.

[33] See my discussion in “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” at

[34] Monica Ciobanu’s review of Siani-Davies The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 and Tom Gallagher’s Modern Romania: Theft of a Nation is entitled “The Myth Factory” (found at

[35] Charles King, “Remembering Romanian Communism,” Slavic Review, Winter 2007, p 719. In King’s short article, he does not hesitate to make occasionally gratuitous citations for things he did not need to cite. Yet in discussing December 1989 and using the term “elsewhere”—which usually prefaces a description of “where else” one might find these things—there are no citations. “Although never exhaustively” is itself a gratuitous choice of words and far from accidental: in my last work on December 1989, I made light of how ridiculous it was for Daniel Chirot to claim that Peter Siani-Davies’ The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, an otherwise excellent work, was “near definitive” when so much was missing from Siani-Davies’ discussion—notably, for our purposes here, the question of dum-dum/vidia/exploding munitions. One could indeed be left with the impression that King intends to deliver a put-down, that some fellow Romanianists will no doubt catch, but yet deny the broader audience references to what he alludes and simultaneously protect his image from having delivered such a “palma” as the Romanians would say. It would appear that at least for readers of this paper, his goals won’t go completely fulfilled.

[36] See my discussion in “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” at

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Decembrie 1989, USLA la Timisoara

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 5, 2009

Virgil Burla
Marti, 06 Mai 2008

Generalul in rezerva Victor Stanculescu a depus la dosarul Revolutiei de la Timisoara mai multe documente declasificate care demonstreaza, in viziunea aparatorilor sai, ca, in urma
cu 19 ani, la Revolutie au participat persoane neidentificate, dotate cu echipamente de lupta sofisticate.

Personajele misterioase, impreuna cu fosti ofiteri USLA, ar fi tras in demonstranti. Conform avocatilor, persoanele neidentificate ar fi folosit armament diferit de cel al soldatilor Ministerului Apararii, fapt ce rezulta din declasificarea

jurnalelor de lupta ale Ministerului Apararii. Cel care ar fi solicitat desecretizarea ar fi chiar Victor Stanculescu, pentru a demonstra ca nu se poate stabili clar cine e de vina pentru faptele petrecute la Timisoara. Senatorul Ioan Talpes, fost sef al Serviciului de Informatii Externe (SIE), argumenteaza ca la revolutia de la Timisoara au participat si cetateni straini care au creat diversiuni. “Din cunostintele mele, au existat straini care au fost prezenti la Timisoara. Daca s-ar desecretiza jurnalele Ministerului Apararii (MAp) si ale unitatilor Securitatii, s-ar vedea ca au fost consemnate acele situatii… Totul de acolo a fost organizat de personaje si de infiltrati”, crede fostul sef al spionajului autohton.
Procurorul Dan Voinea, cel care s-a ocupat ani de zile de dosarele Revolutiei, spune ca nu a intalnit niciodata un strain implicat in reprimarea demonstrantilor de la Timisoara. “Avocatii pot sa spuna ca au fost si martieni la Timisoara… Ne prostituam cu succes in aceasta poveste. Nu avem nici un document, nici un martor din depozitia caruia sa rezulte ca au existat straini care au deschis focul in 17 decembrie la Timisoara. De victime nu intreaba nimeni nimic si luam apararea infractorilor”, ne-a declarat Dan Voinea. Procurorul mai sustine ca jurnalele actiunilor de lupta s-au intocmit ulterior evenimentelor si, cel mai probabil, au fost clasificate chiar de generalul Stanculescu, ultimul ministru al Apararii numit de Nicolae Ceausescu. “Cu siguranta, tragatorii nu au fost straini. Este o incercare de mistificare”, completeaza magistratul.
Aparatorul victimelor de la Timisoara sustine ca a cerut aceste documente (depuse ieri de partea adversa) de nenumarate ori, dar judecatorii nu le-au considerat necesare pentru elucidarea acestui dosar. “Dupa ce au fost acceptate, am solicitat actul prin care au fost desecretizate aceste jurnale de lupta. Se pune problema: cine le-a secretizat in 1990, cand Ceausescu era mort, si din ordinul cui au fost desecretizate acum? La aceste acte nu a avut acces nici Parchetul, lucru care mi se pare foarte grav”, ne-a declarat avocata Liliana Poenaru.
Generalii (r) Victor Stanculescu si Mihai Chitac au fost condamnati de judecatorii instantei supreme la cate 15 ani de inchisoare si degradare militara pentru rolul jucat in evenimentele de la Timisoara. In urma macelului din decembrie 1989, au rezultat 72 de morti si 253 de raniti grav.

» MAPN tine la secret documentele Revolutiei
Avocatul lui Stanculescu sustine ca documentele depuse astazi la instanta provin de la Ministerul Apararii. “Am facut o cerere la MApN, am indicat documentele care ma intereseaza. Initial mi s-a spus ca sunt clasificate, dupa care am cerut sa fie facute publice. Dupa o luna, m-am dus si le-am ridicat”, ne-a declarat aparatorul Alice Draghici. Avocatul sustine ca in documentele respective apar persoane care nu au fost identificate sub aspectul numelui sau al provenientei. “Din documente nu rezulta ca ar fi romani sau straini”, sustine Draghici.

“Jurnalul de luptă” al Revoluţiei de la Timişoara, desecretizat (Galerie Foto)

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BUCUREŞTI / 23:23, 9.07.2008
Trupe de Securitate, Miliţia, Securitatea în civil şi Trupele USLA au acţionat, alături de militari, pentru oprirea manifestaţiilor de la Timişoara, din decembrie 1989, potrivit “Jurnalului de luptă” depus la dosarul Revoluţiei de la Timişoara de la instanţa supremă.

Jurnalul arată că regimul s-a folosit de ofiţeri de securitate şi de trupe speciale, infiltraţi printre manifestanţi, pentru a “arunca vina pe seama armatei”.


“Includerea în mai multe locuri fierbinţi a unităţilor militare în cadrul unor dispozitive mixte, împreună cu forţele de ordine (trupe de securitate, miliţie, USLA, grăniceri), specializate în acţiuni represive, de forţă, infiltrarea printre rândurile manifestanţilor a unor persoane, aparţinând Securităţii care acţionau cu deosebită abilitate, trăgând acoperit împotriva manifestanţilor, a fost deliberat folosită ca stabilirea responsabilităţii pentru împuşcarea unor oameni să devină practic imposibilă, şi a arunca pe seama armatei vina pentru o bună parte din tot ce s-a întâmplat în acele zile la Timişoara”, este una dintre concluziile unui raport înaintat Parlamentului României de Ministerul Apărării Naţionale, în 1990, inclus în Jurnalul depus la instanţa supremă.

Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

De asemenea, colonelul Nicolae Predonescu raporta că “oraşul Timişoara, în timpul revoluţiei, perioada 16-20 decembrie 1989, a fost caracterizat printr-o totală necunoştere a situaţiei reale, amplificată de o evidentă provocare a armatei, miliţiei şi securităţii, efectuată de forţe necunoscute nouă, concretizate în grupuri de turbulenţă cu atac direct la persoane“.

Nota cu privire la activitatea desfăşurată la Timişoara, în perioada 17- 22.12.1989, întocmită de generalul-maior Dumitru Ionescu, relevă aceeaşi stare de confuzie.

“Datorită acţiunilor unor grupuri de oameni drogaţi, organizate şi dotate cu mijloace incendiare, arme de foc, cuţite, pietre, mijloace de înjunghiere prin aruncare de la distanţă etc., şi conduse de indivizi cu deosebită autoritate şi pregătire în domeniu, au creat o situaţie ce cu greu poate fi descrisă şi tot atât de greu de înţeles: flăcările devastatoare, furturile, zvonurile, teroarea, haosul, anarhia, exploziile, avariile şi moartea aveau să stăpânească populaţia şi unităţile militare, cu unele intermitenţe, până în dimineaţa zilei de 19.12.”

Totodată, colonelul relatează în nota sa că în 17 decembrie, la ora 15.00, generalul Vasilea Milea i-a comunicat telefonic că are informaţii potrivit cărora “grupuri de indivizi înarmaţi ar intenţiona să atace unităţile militare.

“Ordonă să se ia măsuri de apărare cu orice preţ. Focul, dacă va fi nevoie, să fie executat, potrivit prevederilor legale: somare, foc în aer, foc la picioare”.

În “Jurnalul de luptă” există şi elemente care arată că “tulburările au fost provocate de elemente teroriste aservite intereselor ţărilor capitaliste”.

Astfel, în urma analizei felului în care s-au desfăşurat evenimentele din 16 şi 17 decembrie, s-a tras concluzia că, în Timişoara, “au acţionat numeroase elemente străine, specializate în acţiuni de diversiune şi terorism. Pentru a putea obţine mai multe informaţii despre aceste elemente s-au chemat grupe specializate din batalionul de cercetare şi al Direcţiei Informaţii din Marele Stat Major”.

Totodată, la Timişoara au fost chemate mii de persoane din Gărzile Patriotice din Olt şi Dolj. Cei care au ajuns cu trenul în gara Timişoara-Est nu au coborât din tren şi s-au întors, iar cei care au coborât în gara Timişoara Nord au fraternizat cu manifestanţii.

Astfel, la ora 10.30, în 21 decembrie, “căpitanul Benescu raportează că în gara Timişoara-Est a sosit un tren cu câteva mii de luptători din Gărzile Patriotice din judeţele Olt şi Dolj, aduşi la cererea organelor superioare de partid pentru a reprima «manifestările agresive» ale unor grupuri de cetăţeni din Timişoara. Luptătorii nu au coborât din tren, garniturile înapoindu-se în localităţile de unde au venit. Plutonierul major Bulgescu Stelian raportează că în gara Timişoara- Nord au sosit garnituri cu luptători din Gărzile Patriotice care au coborât din trenuri, au fraternizat cu manifestanţii şi s-au deplasat împreună spre Piaţa Operei”, se precizează în Jurnal.

O parte dintre ofiţerii de securitate infiltraţi în rândurile manifestanţilor au fost deconspiraţi. Este şi cazul de la Fabrica 6 Martie, unde un grup de muncitori tineri, cu vârste între 13-18 ani, au atacat militarii.

La 6 martie, plutonierul major Buligescu Stelian a fost deconspirat şi predat la Securitate de general major Macri, care, după ce l-a legitimat, i-a permis înapoierea la bază. La întreprinderea de autoturisme, soldatul Viorel T. a fost prins de muncitorii din incintă, predat ofiţerului de securitate care l-a trimis la bază, potrivit Jurnalului, la ora 9.00 în 19 decembrie.

Jurnalul cuprinzând toate operaţiunile militare desfăşurate în perioada 16-21 decembrie 1989 la Timişoara a fost depus la dosarul în care generalii Stănculescu şi Chiţac sunt judecaţi pentru genocid, la Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie.

În 4 aprilie 2007, un complet de trei judecători al instanţei supreme a hotărât condamnarea la câte 15 ani de închisoare a celor doi generali în rezervă şi degradarea militară a lor, pentru acuzaţiile de omor deosebit de grav, în dosarul revoluţiei de la Timişoara. Cei doi au făcut recurs împotriva hotărârii de condamnare a lor.

Magistraţii instanţei supreme l-au condamnat pe Victor Athanasie Stănculescu la 15 ani de închisoare pentru omor deosebit de grav şi la cinci ani de interzicere a unor drepturi. Totodată, el a mai primit şapte ani şi şase luni de detenţie pentru tentativă la omor deosebit de grav, pedeapsa fiind asociată cu patru ani de interzicere a unor drepturi. Prin contopire, Stănculescu va executa pedeapsa cea mai grea, de 15 ani, la care se va adăuga şi pedeapsa degradării militare.

Tot la 15 ani de detenţie şi cinci ani de interzicere a unor drepturi a fost condamnat şi generalul Mihai Chiţac, pentru săvârşirea infracţiunii de omor deosebit de grav. La această pedeapsă s-a adăugat şi cea privind degradarea militară.

Totodată, instanţa a admis în parte plata de către cei doi, în solidaritate cu Ministrerul Apărării Naţionale, de despăgubiri civile cerute de părţile civile din proces.

Instanţa supremă a decis, în 4 aprilie, ca peste 200 de persoane să fie despăgubite în total cu mai mult de un milion de euro, în procesul revoluţiei de la Timişoara.

Magistraţii Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie au decis despăgubirea, în parte, a 74 de părţi civile. Aceste persoane au primit în total aproximativ 700.000 de lei noi cu titul de daune morale, acelaşi cuantum fiind stabilit şi cu titlu de daune materiale. Astfel, instanţa a decis să despăgubească cele 74 de părţi civile în total cu peste 1,5 milioane de lei noi.

În procesul revoluţiei de la Timişoara, magistraţii Secţiei penale au decis despăgubirea, în totalitate, a 143 de părţi civile, cu aproximativ 2,5 milioane de lei noi. Astfel, cele 143 de persoane au primit în total aproximativ 1,15 milioane de lei noi cu titul de daune morale, iar cu titlu de daune materiale a fost acordată o sumă similară.

Concret, valoarea despăgubirilor acordate de magistraţi în procesul revoluţiei de la Timişoara este de aproximativ patru milioane de lei noi, adică peste un milion de euro, potrivit minutei de marţi seară a magistraţilor care au judecat acest dosar.

În acelaşi dosar, magistraţii Secţiei penale au respins acordarea de daune pentru peste 250 de persoane, instanţa constatând că sumele au fost plătite de către partea responsabilă civilmente -Ministerul Apărării.

Pentru alte 50 de persoane, instanţa a constatat că cererile de despăgubiri civile sunt nefondate sau inadmisibile. Cererile de despăgubiri pentru peste 70 de părţi civile au fost respinse de magistraţi ca tardive.

În 22 martie 2004, Secţiile Unite ale Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie au decis – la 14 ani de la revoluţie – rejudecarea generalilor Victor Athanasie Stănculescu şi Mihai Chiţac, acuzaţi de reprimarea timişorenilor. Instanţa supremă a motivat că nu a fost respectat dreptul la apărare, în 1999, atunci când cei doi au fost condamnaţi la câte 15 ani de detenţie.

Cei doi au obţinut rejudecarea după ce le-a fost admis, de către fostul procuror general al României, Joiţa Tănase, memoriul privind promovarea unui recurs în anulare. Fostul procuror general al României susţinea că hotărârile Curţii Supreme de Justiţie prin care generalii Victor Athanasie Stănculescu şi Mihai Chiţac au fost condamnaţi, în 15 iulie 1999, la câte 15 ani de închisoare pentru omor deosebit de grav şi la câte opt ani de detenţie pentru tentativă la omor deosebit de grav sunt netemeinice şi nelegale.

Acţiunea judiciară favorabilă generalilor era motivată, printre altele, prin faptul că expertiza medico-legală psihiatică privitoare la inculpatul Victor Atanasie Stănculescu nu a fost efectuată în condiţiile prevăzute de lege (deşi internarea celui în cauză era obligatorie, acest lucru nu a fost respectat); actele de constatare a serviciilor medico-legale nu au fost examinate şi avizate de Comisia de control şi avizare a actelor medico-legale, iar actele medico-legale privitoare la Stănculescu nu au fost efectuate în condiţiile prevăzute de lege.

În 2 noiembrie 2005, judecătorii instanţei supreme au admis efectuarea unei expertize psihiatrice cu internare a lui Victor Athanasie Stănculescu, fapt ce a stârnit reacţii negative din partea părţilor civile şi vătămate prezente în sala de şedinţă, care au susţinut că, după atâţia ani de la producerea evenimentelor, o astfel de probă nu ar mai fi utilă.

În 30 ianuarie 2006, expertiza medico-legală efectuată lui Athanasie Stănculescu, la Institutul Naţional de Medicină Legală “Mina Minovici” din Bucureşti, la cererea instanţei, arăta că generalul nu are tulburări de natură a-i modifica capacitatea psihică, situaţie în care acesta poate răspunde penal pentru faptele sale.

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Decembrie 1989, Medici, si Gloante Extrase (romana)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 2, 2009

“Imi aduc aminte ca in 1 sau 2 ianuarie ’90 a aparut la spital un colonel de la Ministerul de Interne, care s-a prezentat cu numele de Chircoias. Sustinea, destul de violent in limbaj, ca ar conduce o sectie din cadrul Directiei Securitatii Statului. A cerut sa-i predau toate gloantele extrase. Au fost predate acestuia 40 de gloante de diverse forme si dimensiuni, precum si fragmente de munitie. Nu am mai aflat nimic dupa aceea nici de Chircoias, nici de vreo expertiza. Cei care au facut pierdute probele au omis faptul ca mai exista radiografii si alte documente militare pe care le-am pus la dispozitia Parchetului”, a declarat dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chirurg la Spitalul Coltea.
Prima pagina » Campaniile Jurnalul » Decembrie 1989 – Revolutia Romana » Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta

Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta  Decembrie 1989 – Revolutia Romana Jurnalul RSS


“Unii nu vorbeau, iar altii povesteau fantasmagorii”

In zilele cu mister, gloante si sange ale Revolutiei, profesorul Andrei Firica era directorul singurului Spital de Urgenta din Bucuresti, cel din Calea Floreasca. In spital au fost adusi si raniti din randul populatiei iesita pe strazi, dar au fost internati si raniti suspecti, considerati la acea ora teroristi. FLORIN CONDURATEANU

Si ce s-a intamplat pana la urma cu acesti suspectati de terorism, legati cu catuse de paturile Spitalului de Urgenta?

Incepuse sa se si traga asupra spitalului. Nu mai vorbesc de invazia de reproteri straini, care vizau doua obiective: s-o vada pe mama Elenei Ceausescu, batrana fiind adusa in zilele Revolutiei la spital de ministrul Sanatatii, Ciobanu, si, in plus, curiozitatea ziaristilor se indrepta si spre acei teroristi prinsi cu catuse de pat. De altfel, imi amintesc o secventa: eu trebuiea sa fac si oficiile de gazda cu presa straina, fiind directorul spitalului, si ma aflam cu o echipa de jurnalisti straini la patul fetei aceleia care vorbea mult si zicea ca a incarcat arme din magazinul de stofe. In acel moment a aparut un colonel de militie, nu-i mai tin minte numele, au trecut 14 ani de-atunci, care mi-a dat un sfat ce la prima vedere parea logic: sa nu mai duc ziaristi la patul teroristilor, fiindca acestia sunt doar suspecti de terorism si s-ar putea sa ma trezesc mai tarziu dat in judecata ca am stricat imaginea unor oameni. Cum incepuse tirul asupra Spitalului de Urgenta, eu m-am aflat dand telefoane la Ministerul Sanatatii s-o ia pe mama Elenei Ceausescu, dar si pe teroristi. Credeam ca cei ce trag asupra spitalului vor s-o recupereze pe mama Elenei Ceausescu. Cu batrana s-a rezolvat mai repede si a fost mutata. Nici nu stiu unde. Dar, legat de teroristi, lucrurile s-au desfasurat astfel: a venit din nou colonelul acela de militie care ma indemnase sa nu mai duc ziaristii la patul teroristilor si i-a incarcat pe teroristi intr-un autobuz, plecand cu ei. Este exact ce eu doream, facand tot felul de demersuri pentru a fi preluati de Spitalul Jilava, fiindca ei nu aveau rani grave. Peste doua-trei zile am primit un telefon de la genelarul Chitac, deja ministru, care m-a intrebat ce e cu teroristii. I-am relatat cum ei au fost luati de acel colonel de militie si generalul Chitac n-a parut surprins. Chiar parea multumit ca au fost luati de acel colonel de militie. Marea mea surpirza a fost cand pe acel colonel de militie l-am revazut in zeghe, la televizor, in boxa acuzatilor, la procesul de la Timisoara. De altfel, l-am rugat pe fiul meu, care a facut Facultatea de Teatru si Film, sa-i filmeze pe acei teroristi prinsi cu catuse de paturile spitalului si am dat copii dupa aceasta caseta la Procuratura. Fiul meu filmase si desfasurarea Revolutiei pe strazi.

Inainte de asta era sa uit niste lucruri. Am facut cate un mic dosar cu situatia medicala a celor 15-20 de banuiti teroristi din Spitalul de Urgenta. Ei bine, toate aceste dosare au disparut.



--Doctorul Florin Stanescu, de la Institutul de Medicina Legala!…

--Ce vrea?

--Nu stiu! Va cauta pe dumneavoastra!…E pe linia doi!…

--Bine! Iau eu legatura!…Alo!…Procurorul Vasiliu!…

--Domnul Eugen Vasiliu?…Va salut!…


--Domnule procuror, vreau sa va aduc niste materiale!…

--Ce materiale?

--Stiti dumneavoastra!…Cu evenimentele din decembrie!…Dosarul…

--Care dosar, dom’le?

--Cel constituit pentru…

--Nu mai e nici un dosar dom’le doctor!…A fost inchis!…Din lipsa de probe!

--Da, dar vedeti, atunci s-a lucrat!…


--Pe 23 decembrie!…Nu a fost sambata libera!…Nu era…

--Se ce-i cu asta?

--Deci, se puteau face autopsii!…


--S-ar fi aflat cine a tras, cine sunt teroristii!…

--Lasati, dom’le, povestile!…N-au fost teroristi!…

--Ma rog, cei care au dat ordin sa se traga!…


--Fosta nomenclatura!…


--Tot ei au dat ordin sa nu se faca autopsii!…

--Baliverne!…Pai, dom’le doctor, aia erau nebuni sa dea un astfel de ordin? Doar
eu il cunosc de 25 de ani! Aia este o prostie, o minciuna, nu exista un asemenea


--Nici asa!…Ascultati-ma putin!…Eu, doctor, te tai pe tine, mort si scot un
glont de la tine. Pai, pana nu am arma, pot sa ma cac pe el de glont! Glontul nu
releva nimic! Eu am suficiente gloante din care sa inteleg ce s-a intamplat in

--Cred ca vorbiti despre proiectile si un despre gloante!…Banuiesc ca sunteti un
profesionist!…Dar, ma rog!…De ce nu continuati?…

--Pai, nu v-am spus ca dosarul e inchis? Din lipsa de probe! Cum dracu’sa
stabilesti care a tras, care a ucis, care a schilodit?…

--Simplu! Prin expertiza balistica corobata cu concluzile medicului legist!…

--Povesti!…Nu se poate asa ceva!…Fapta nu exista!…

--Ba da!…Cum nu exista doi oameni cu aceleasi amprente digitale, nu exista doua
arme de foc care sa creeze pe proiectile expulzat din teava urme identice!…

--Cand veti fi dumneavoastra sef in procuratura, asa sa faceti! Deocamdata, eu

--Se pare ca ati ignorat disparitia unui intreg carnet semnat in alb…

--Nu am fost sesizat!…

--Va sesizez eu, acum, desi sunt sigur ca stiti…

--Da, va rog!…Poftiti la registratura, cu buletinul de identitate sa depuneti o

--Adica, va faceti ca nu stiti ca doctorul Belis a sustras carnetul si l-a lasat
in birou la generalul Stanculescu?…

--Doctorul Belis este director! El nu poate fi acuat ca a sustras ceea ce avea
dreptul…Din punct de vedere juridic…

--Tara ma tem ca nu prea va cunoasteti meseria…

--Eu ma tem si mai tare in privinta dumitale!…

--Domnule Vasiliu, lumea vorbeste ca ati fost mana in mana cu colonelul Tudor
Stanica, seful anchetelor…

--Ce-i rau in asta? Caracterul activitatii…

--Lasati, lasati!…Activitatea nu va obliga sa impartiti ciubucurile obtinute de la carciumarii arestati, care stateau
mia mult acasa pe timpul arestului…

--Asta-i o calomnie ordinara!…

--Asa vorbeste lumea!…Iar procesele se terminau totdeauna in coada de peste!…Din
lipsa de probe!…Evident!…Ca si acum!…

--Nu permit sa fiu calomniat!…Va dau in judecata!

--Va rog!…Poate asa mai lamurim cate ceva!…Abia astept! Domnule procuror, exista
si proba veritatii!…Eu o pot trece cu brio!…V-am salutat!…

--Ordonati, dom’ procuror-sef!...

--Bai, fiti mai atenti! Nu mai imi dati legatura cu toti nebunii!…Notati
problemele!…De-astea sunteti acolo!…”

[Ion Costin Grigore, Cucuveaua cu Pene Rosii. Roman-gazeta., Bucuresti: Editura
Miracol, 1994, pp. 70-72.]

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Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 12, 2009

Un cititor al site-ului acesta alk, l-a postat pe site-ul lui un video foarte interesant de data 24.12.1989:

video datat 24.12.89 postat de catre alk

Cerem aici: exista vreo legatura intre filmul postat de catre alk si marturii din articolului lui Dan Badea, “Gloante Speciale Sau Ce S-a Mai Gasit in Cladirea Directiei a V-a,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991? Gloantele aratate in filmul postat de alk nu mi se pare gloantele DUM-DUM mentionate in articolul lui Badea, dar se poate totusi ca sint alte gloante speciale sau de vinatoare detaliate in articolul acela. Deci, cautam cineva specializat in domeniu expertizei balistice sau care a fost in zona aceasta (zona CCului, cladirii Directii V-a) in zilele fierbinte din decembrie ’89 care poate comenta despre videoul si articolul acesta. Va asteptam si va multumim.  (CA INTOTDEAUNA E VORBA AICI DE PUNCT MEU DE VEDERE STRICT PERSONAL)

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…


BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:

armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:

–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;

–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;

–statii de emisie-receptie;

–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;

–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;

–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;

–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;

–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;

–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;

–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.

–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.


Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):

“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:

–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;

–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;

–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;

–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;

–dozimetre, contoare Geiger, osciloscoape multispot, truse electronice de depanare, calculatoare, aparatura foto;

–truse chimice de teren;

–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);

–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;

–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;

codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;

–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;

–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;

–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;

–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;

–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;

–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:

–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….

Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.

Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.


…in legatura cu gloantele DUM-DUM mentionate de catre Gheorghe Balasa in marturia lui de mai sus ca de productie autohtona…

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoart–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

(Sergiu Nicolaescu, Cartea revolutiei romane.  Decembrie ’89, 1999, p. 217.)

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Decembrie 1989: Bucuresti, inainte si dupa 22, si gloante explozive ( dum-dum)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on November 25, 2008

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.” [Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

“In noaptea de 23 se reintorc in framintate zona a fostului cc. In corpul A. Rebeca este impuscata in ambele picioare. Este transportata la Spitalul Municipal. I se extrase unul dintre gloante si revine in acele locuri tulburi. In fata Directii a 5-a. Eugen Cercel este impuscat cu doua gloante explozive care i-au zdrobit bazinul si picioarele. Este invalid pe viata, si in carutul sa, se afla la mama sa in Moldova...”

Emil Munteanu, “Doi revolutionari [Rebeca Doina Cercel si Cazimir Benedict Ionescu], doua destine…” Romania Libera, 20 februarie 1992, p. 1.


“Cine a tras gloante explozive?”

Revolutia din decembrie 1989 a lasat in urma ei foarte multe intrebari fara raspuns dintre care una destul de dureroasa este aceasta: cine a tras si mai ales cine a dat ordin sa se traga cu gloante explozive? Daca in rindurile care urmeaza nu putem raspunde acestor intrebari, cei putin vom reduce in actualitate o problema care este ignorata si trecuta sub tacere de cei care ar trebui s-o rezolve.

Inainte de toate, ce este un glont exploziv? Ca aspect si dimensiuni, nu se deosebeste de un glont obisnuit de calibrul 7,62 mm, deci poate fi folosit ca munitie pentru pistolul automat AKM. Ce il deosebeste de un glont obisnuit este faptul ca odata patruns in tinta, glontul “dum-dum” explodeaza, raspindind o puzderie de schije si producind distrugeri infioratoare in regiunea in care a intrat. Deci, daca cu un glont obisnuit se scoate adversarul din lupta, prin folosirea unui exploziv este sigur ca i se provoaca acestuia o rana care il va chinui toata viata, in cazul in care va supravietui leziunilor provocate de schije si puternicei hemoragii care insoteste de obicei o astfel de rana. Iata de ce acest tip de munitie a fost interzis de multi ani, prin tratate internationale.

Domnul profesor Nicolae Angelescu, seful Sectiei Chirurgie a Spitalului Coltea a avut amabilitatea sa ne explice citeva din aspectele tratamentului chirurgical al ranilor produse de gloante explozive:

–Sint mai multi factori, care contribuie la a face ca o plaga provocata de un astfel de glont sa fie greu de tratat si greu de vindecat. In primul rind prin explozia glontului se produc distrugeri masive de tesuturi in zona in care aceasta a patruns si uneori aceste tesuturi nu se mai pot reface. In al doilea rind, fragmentele metalice rezultate (?) in urma exploziei se raspindesc pe o intindere mare si de aceea nu pot fi extrase in totalitate, pentru ca extragerea lor ar provoca pacientului o rana mult mai mare decit cea produsa de glontul in sine. Deci, dupa operatie mai ramin in corpul pacientului destule fragmente metalice si acestea constituie surse de infectie care il agraveaza starea.

Pentru a va ajuta sa va dati seama cum arata si ce inseamna o rana produsa de un glont exploziv, va prezentam in continuarea diagnosticele de internare ale celor adusi in Spitalul Coltea, impuscati cu astfel de gloante:

1. Nicolae Lucian, adus pe data de 21 (?) decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: fractura cominutiva femur sting in treimea inferioara, cu leziune de artera si vena femurala si pierdere de substanta prin plaga impuscata.

2. Necunoscut, adus pe 22 decembrie, ora 1, decedat la ora 1.30. Diagnostic: hemoragie peritoneala cataclismica cu plage de vena porta, case splinice, zdrobire de pancreas prin plaga impuscata hipocondru sting. Plaga zdrobita de colon travers.

3. Radu Traian, adus pe data de 23 decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: plaga transfixianta glezna stinga cu fractura cominutiva tuberozitatea calcaneana. Sectinue artera si vena tibiala. Fractura deschisa cominutiva maleola interna dreapta.

4. Gherman Dumitru, adus pe 25 decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: plaga impuscata antrebat sting bipolara, cu explozie de ulna, in treimea distala si lipsa de substanta osoasa, sectiune de tendoane muschi flexori ai carpului si degetelor si sectiune de pachet vasculo-nervos ulnar.

5. Astafei Petre, adus pe 22 decembrie 1989, decedat. Diagnostic: plaga impuscata toraco-abdominala cu ruptura de ficat si rinichi drept. Hemopneu-motorax drept, hematom intraperitoneal, stare de soc hemoragic, fractura cominutiva coastele 7,8, si 9 drepte.

6. Soldat Constantinoiu Vasile, adus la data de 24 decembrie 1989, decedat. Diagnostic: hemotorax sting masiv cu soc hemoragic prin plaga impuscata cervico-toracala cu ruptura vertebrelor toracale T2, T6, ruptura vaselor vertebrale si a vaselor de la baza gitului….

Cristian Calugar, Flacara, 13-19 februarie 1991 (nr. 6) , pp. 8-9.

Generalul Dan Voinea (interviu cu Romulus Cristea): “Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia, nici de la dum-dum.”

Cam interesant nu ?… ca aproape nimeni din Romania nu investigheaza sau nu incearca sa verifice existenta a gloantelor dum-dum / gloantelor explozive ? Intrebarea este DE CE?

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