The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘ion iliescu’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #18 Iliescu and the Front Appeal for Soviet Help: The What and the Why

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 24, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications; please do not cite without prior author approval, thank you)

Imagini inedite si rare (ale lui Spiru Zeres si ale lui Dan Cioban): televiziune japoneza (NHK) si revolutia romana din decembrie 1989

On 23 December 1989 Leaders of the National Salvation Front Requested Soviet Military Assistance: Addressing the What and the Why (I)

On 23 December 1989 Leaders of the National Salvation Front Requested Soviet Military Assistance: Addressing the What and the Why (II)

Despite Ion Iliescu’s fervent and repeated denials to the contrary, leaders of the National Salvation Front, including apparently Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, panicked on 23 December 1989 and requested Soviet military assistance.  The reporting from the time seems pretty clear on this point, and what is significant is that it was the Soviets themselves who acknowledged the existence of the request.  Here, for example, is a Los Angeles Times report (available on the Internet) by Michael Parks from Sunday 24 December 1989 reporting from Moscow, the previous day’s statements by Soviet officials on Saturday 23 December 1989:

Upheaval In Romania : Moscow Pledges Aid but Rejects Troop Request : Soviet Union: Gorbachev says Romania’s new government can expect humanitarian help from the Warsaw Pact.

December 24, 1989|MICHAEL PARKS | TIMES STAFF WRITER

MOSCOW — The Soviet Union, affirming its support for the popular uprising that overthrew Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, pledged Saturday to provide “immediate and effective humanitarian aid” to the country but drew the line at military assistance….

Gorbachev told the deputies that the Kremlin had considered a request for military assistance by leaders of the Front of National Salvation, the provisional government established by former Communist Party and government officials, military commanders and intellectuals in Bucharest. But he said Moscow had decided against sending in forces as the fighting appeared to abate….

Gorbachev said the request for military assistance had come overnight when Romanian army units, apparently loyal to Ceausescu, “turned against the people” and were threatening to retake strategic positions in Bucharest–including the Communist Party’s headquarters, where the provisional government’s leaders were meeting. But the loyalists’ counterattack was “suppressed,” Gorbachev said, when more troops were brought in….

http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-24/news/mn-2156_1_warsaw-pact

—-

Nestor Ratesh noted in his 1991 The Entangled Revolution, notes the broadcast of this appeal as follows (commenters on online articles often express exasperation to denials of the appeal because personally they recall seeing or hearing it):

In any case, on December 23, 1989, between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M., Romanian television and Radio Bucharest in a joint broadcast carried the following announcement: 

“We are informed that the help of the Soviet army was requested through the Embassy of the USSR, due to the fact that the terrorists have resorted to helicopters through foreign interventionists.”

image0-001

As further confirmation, the Polish researcher Adam Burakowski unearthed a document from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is translated below by Tomasz Kluz:

http://www.revista22.ro/n-decembrie-1989-iliescu-si-brucan-au-cerut-ajutor-militar-de-la-sovietici-7557.html

Copies of the document were published here:  http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/un-adevar-crunt-iliescu-chemat-trupele-sovietice-1_50ad210e7c42d5a6638f368a/index.html

* * *

Ministerul Afacerilor Externe

După utilizare, mesajul cifrat trebuie distrus conform prevederilor referitoare la utilizarea documentelor secrete

SECRET
Exemplar 12

Mesaj cifrat nr. …
din Bucureşti 23.12.89

URGENT
Către dir. J. Mąkosa
Însărcinat cu afaceri, Bauer informează prin depeşa nr. 189 din data de 23 luna curentă:

Ora 15.00.

1. De la sovietici:
În numele Frontului Salvării Naţionale, I. Iliescu şi S. Brucan au solicitat ajutor militar Ambasadei URSS, pentru că singuri nu se vor descurca.
Fără să aştepte răspunsul, FSN a anunţat la TV că Ambasada a promis ajutorul.
Răspunsul URSS: sunt gata să acorde orice fel de ajutor cu excepţia intervenţiei trupelor.
2. Polonezii de la aeroport sunt deocamdată în siguranţă. Ne sună. Noi nu putem [să-i sunăm]. Au primit pături şi hrană. Nu există nicio posibilitate de a ajunge la aeroport şi
de a-i lua de acolo.
3. Sovieticii au probleme cu cetăţenii lor, care s-au adăpostit în ambasadă după distrugerea Biroului Consilierului Comercial şi a locuinţelor.
4. La radio s-a anunţat că trupe arabe atacă Televiziunea.
La ora 15.00 auzim de acolo împuşcături care devin din ce în ce mai intense.

Spre ştiinţă:
(nume – fiecare primeşte câte un exemplar, în ordinea dată)

Întocmit în 15 exemplare a câte o pagină.
Bătut la maşina de scris nr. 7157 de Kowalczyk

Army General Stefan Guse rejecting (if I recall correctly) Hungarian military’s offer of aid (conversation takes place through Russian translator since that was the assumed lingua franca)

Govoritz pa russkiy?

Dumitru Mazilu discussing terrorists in the service of the tyrant (Nicolae Ceausescu) and rejecting Soviet offers of help on 23 December 1989 (note reference to belief that Soviets were already entering the country…someone says at “Bacau”)

Despite Ion Iliescu’s fervent and repeated denials to the contrary, leaders of the National Salvation Front, including apparently Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, panicked on 23 December 1989 and requested Soviet military assistance, as verified by three accounts herehttps://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/10/on-23-december-1989-leaders-of-the-national-salvation-front-requested-soviet-military-assistance-addressing-the-what-and-the-why-i/How much of their unwillingness today to acknowledge that they made this request is dictated by embarrassment in such a Russophobic country over having made such a request and how much of it is dictated by the effort to erase the existence, actions, and culpability of the “terrorists” is unclear.

For many Romanians, that is all they need to know:  they don’t care about the context in which such a decision was made, that the Soviets appear to have for the most part turned down the request, and that the Front decision was dictated by the genuine confusion and fear that permeated the hours during which these appeals were made.  What then is the reality of the reasons Front officials gave for the request for Soviet assistance?  As Nestor Ratesh wrote in 1991 in The Entangled Revolution (p. 111):

In any case, on December 23, 1989, between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M., Romanian television and Radio Bucharest in a joint broadcast carried the following announcement:  “We are informed that the help of the Soviet army was requested through the Embassy of the USSR, due to the fact that the terrorists have resorted to helicopters through foreign interventionists.”

So we have two data points to investigate:

1) the existence of helicopters not under control of forces loyal to Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow, and 2) the existence of non-Romanians among the so-called “terrorists.”

We know that the claim of unidentified helicopters was an issue on the night of 22/23 December 1989, as this video makes clear.

[The following passage is indicative of Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s duplicity and lack of credibility.  Playing dumb about the report of unidentified helicopters, he responds to one of the revolutionary’s questions–suggesting that the helicopters belonged to Vlad’s Securitate–in a ridiculous and unserious manner,”perhaps they are yours?” he says to the man (!)]

1:32 Iulian Vlad: Dar eu nu-nţeleg de ce au plecat elicopterele.
1:34 Bărbat: Ale teroriştilor.
1:35 Iulian Vlad: Care terorişti, domnule, de unde au venit ăştia? Că n-au…
1:38 Bărbat: (neînţelegibil) speciale
1:40 Iulian Vlad: Păi de unde? Ori ale dînsului (arată spre Guşă), ori ale mele tre’ să fie. Altele nu sînt.
1:44 Bărbat: Ale dumneavoastră.
1:46 Iulian Vlad: Ale dumneavoastră, măi copii.
1:47 Bărbat: Au fost şi altele.
1:49 Iulian Vlad: Foarte curioasă treaba asta.
1:51 Bărbat: Sînt de la dumneavoastră cu alte ordine.

1:53 Iulian Vlad: Păi nu am decît trei elicoptere.

transcribed at http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2011/01/14/stefan-gusa-alerta-totala-peste-tot-astia-au-fost-niste-dementi-au-doborit-8-elicoptere-o-fi-avut-un-regiment-subteran-pe-undeva-video/

1) The question of unidentified HELICOPTERS:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/securitate-helicopters-transmitters-per-hungarian-defense-officials/

Hungarian defense officials related interesting and important information during the days of 23-26 December 1989.  (These are xeroxes from the Library of Congress of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations performed in December 1989.  Unfortunately, for some unknown reason, they were filed under Hungary and not Romania–unclear what the methodology for categorization was–meaning that they were easily missed by researchers, including myself, for many years.) Details include:

1) Not only did the Securitate have “a large number of helicopters” (Def. Min. Ferenc Karpati) but on Saturday 23 December 1989, two of them briefly violated Hungarian airspace near Battonya (which is not far from the Romanian city of Arad)

2) The Hungarian Army monitored and passed on to the Romanian Army locations of secret Securitate radio transmitters (in a later report, it is detailed that the number of active Securitate radio transmitters fell during these days from 31 to 19 to 5, concomitant with the decline in counter-revolutionary fighting).

3) Hungarian forces recognized “stories being spread by the Romanian security services and the forces loyal to Ceausescu,” including the reports that the Romanian Army was low on ammunition (a rumor designed to create panic and give the impression that the Romanian armed forces could be conquered) and that the Hungarians were to send planes into Romania (suggesting an effort to invade or take advantage of the chaos in Romania) which Col. Gyorgy Keleti of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense claimed he was asked about by Romanian Lt. Gen Eftimescu, whom he reassured it was an untrue rumor.

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/14/lying-in-wait-securitate-director-general-vlad-in-the-cc-building-i/

Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu admitted to journalist Dan Badea in 1991 that the USLA (special anti-terrorist unit) had its own helicopter force, thereby substantiating the suspicion of the unidentified revolutionary that the helicopters in question were “special”/”from a special unit.”  Thus, it is abundantly clear that Vlad’s claim that the Securitate had “just three helicopters” was a bald-faced lie.

image-12

2) Regarding the involvement of “foreign interventionists”–in particular, mercenaries from Arab countries (and Iran) with treaty obligations to Ceausescu and Romania–the per cost AFP archives are a bonanza.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/anatomy-of-a-cover-up-or-constanta-we-have-a-problem/

Note:  Not everything at this point had “disappeared”:  General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).

Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably:  The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.

———————————————————————————————-

©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 08:33 – Heure Paris (386 mots)
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
   ” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
   ” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
   Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
   Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
   En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
   Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
   Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
   Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
   Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
   nm/jga/vr.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
021851451DC1ED1D715E06849EA4C6E0F37C0C25ECE8D503
©AFP Général – Mercredi 27 Décembre 1989 – 18:14 – Heure Paris (671 mots)

Roumanie Sibiu
Sibiu, la ville ou les combats ont ete les plus violents de l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   SIBIU (Roumanie) 27 dec – Sibiu, dans le centre de la Roumanie, est indubitablement la ville ou les combats entre l armee et la Securitate, fidele a Nicolae Ceausescu, ont ete les plus violents. C est la que Nicu, fils du dictateur, etait chef du parti.
   Des maisons totalement detruites et calcinees dont il ne reste plus que les murs, des eclats de verre partout dans les rues, des toits eventres par des tirs de grenades et par les mitrailleuses des tanks, des voitures et blindes brulant encore en travers de la route: tel etait le spectacle de desolation qu offraient mercredi plusieurs quartiers de Sibiu, a constate un envoye special de l AFP.
   Du 22 au 25 decembre, les affrontements se sont concentres aux abords des trois ecoles militaires de Sibiu, du siege de la police et de celui de la Securitate. Il ne reste plus grand-chose des deux batiments a trois etages qui abritaient la police et les services secrets. Les fenetres ont vole en eclats. Toutes les maisons des alentours, ou s etaient retranches les agents de la police secrete, portent d innombrables traces, et, dans la cour de la police, un blinde leger calcine est observe avec curiosite par les passants.
   ” C etait la guerre ici, avec des tanks, des balles explosives et des unites de commando. C est ici que Nicu Ceausescu a essaye de lancer une contre-offensive contre nous ” , souligne un militaire qui garde maintenant les lieux.
   Lynchages.
   Devant cet immeuble, une centaine de personnes commentent a haute voix un extrait des archives qu elles viennent de decouvrir: les fiches de renseignements que la Securitate avait etablies sur chaque habitant de Sibiu. ” Ecrit a un cousin en Suisse. Propos sans importance. Pendant son service militaire, ne frequentait que des soldats d origine allemande comme lui ” , est-il indique sur une de ces fiches qui comportent de nombreux renseignements personnels, certaines remontant a 1958.
   Dans la foule, on raconte comment une dizaine de Securistes (agents de la Securitate) arretes pendant les affrontements de ces derniers jours ont ete lynches par la population qui les a tues a coups de pied et de poing: ” Nous n avons pas de mots pour qualifier ces gens de la Securitate, ils sont pires que des monstres ” , dit une dame d une cinquantaine d annees, qui s interrompt et fond en larmes. Certains ont reussi neanmoins a conserver un certain sens de l humour noir: ” Quand les voitures de la Securitate ont ete brulees devant chez moi, j ai pense que c etait bien la premiere fois qu il faisait chaud dans mon appartement ” , a declare a l AFP une habitante de Sibiu, en faisant allusion a l impossibilite pour les Roumains de se chauffer en raison des restrictions.
   Les combats ont egalement ete tres durs dans le centre de Sibiu. Le principal hotel de la ville, le ” Continental ” , n a plus de fenetres sur cinq etages, et des traces de balles sont visibles jusqu au 11eme etage.
   ” Les Securistes avait pris position dans l hotel et avaient rempli deux etages de munitions ” , explique un employe de l etablissement. Des incendies ont eclate dans certaines chambres, touchees par des balles incendiaires. Face a l hotel, un panneau est reste accroche a un lampadaire: ” Militaires, ne tirez pas sur nos freres et nos parents. L armee est avec nous ” .
   Dans les rues de Sibiu, ou de tres nombreuses vitrines sont recouvertes de carton, la population vaquait normalement a ses occupations mercredi soir. Patrouilles de militaires, blindes legers et ambulances croisaient des voitures portant des cercueils sur le toit et des camions apportant de l aide alimentaire et medicale de Hongrie, de Tchecoslovaquie et de RFA.
   Sibiu pense deja a renaitre de ses cendres: malgre le froid tres vif, des equipes de nettoyage et de vitriers travaillaient tard dans la soiree dans la ville.
   nm/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
BD17217619B14F18012007E4873636BFDDF186FE77CFAD4F
©AFP Général – Mardi 2 Janvier 1990 – 14:22 – Heure Paris (298 mots)

Roumanie Securitate
Il ne faut pas considerer les troupes de la Securitate comme des terroristes, selon le chef d etat-major roumain
   PARIS 2 jan – Les membres de la Securitate, la police politique de Nicolae Ceausescu, ne sont pas dans leur majorite des ” terroristes ” , ceux- ci se recrutant dans la garde personnelle de l ancien dictateur, a affirme mardi le general Vasile Ionel, chef d etat-major de l armee roumaine.
   ” On n a pas le droit de considerer les troupes de la Securitate comme des terroristes ” , a declare a Radio France Internationale M. Ionel, adjoint du ministre de la Defense le general Nicolae Militaru. Pour le general Ionel, ” la majorite de la Securitate est devouee au peuple ” .
   Il a ajoute que lorsque M. Ceausescu avait donne l ordre de tirer sur la foule a Bucarest, le 22 decembre, ” certaines unites de la Securitate ont tire, mais il y en a eu d autres qui n ont pas tire ” .
   Le lendemain, quand le chef de la Securitate a lance a la radio l ordre de ne plus participer aux combats, ” toutes les unites de la Securitate sont retournees dans les casernes ” , a declare le general Ionel, ajoutant que ce sont des membres de la garde personnelle de Ceausescu, evalues a ” plusieurs centaines ” qui ont poursuivi les combats.
   L armee, a-t-il dit ” ne soupconnait auparavant ni le nombre ni l efficacite de ses hommes – des tireurs d elite – ni la nature du materiel. “.
   Interroge sur la provenance de leurs armes, le general Ionel affirme qu elles ne viennent ” d aucun pays du Pacte de Varsovie ” , sans toutefois preciser leur origine. Il ajoute en revanche que les ” terroristes ” ont utilise certains types d armements interdits par les traites internationaux, des balles explosives par exemple.
   ps/af.
©AFP Général – Samedi 30 Décembre 1989 – 12:28 – Heure Paris (310 mots)

Roumanie mercenaires
Temoignages sur la presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie
   BUDAPEST 30 dec – La presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie, notamment de differents pays arabes et de l Iran, est hors de doute, selon le correspondant de l agence hongroise MTI a Bucarest largement cite dans la presse hongroise samedi.
   Toutefois, aucun ” mercenaire etranger ” n a jusqu a present ete identifie, presente a la television, ou interviewe a la radio.
   ” La participation d unites militaires etrangeres aux combats en Roumanie est un fait ” , selon le correspondant qui se refere aux temoignages de soldats roumains qui ont ” neutralise ” un groupe de 27 ” terroristes ” iraniens. Un des prisonniers a admis, selon le correspondant, que le commando ” etait venu directement de l Iran ” .
   Il etait connu, selon le correspondant de MTI, que quelque 12.000 etudiants etaient inscrits aux differentes hautes ecoles et universites roumaines et que des ” camps ont existe en Roumanie pour l entrainement d unites speciales au compte de differents pays arabes ” . Un de ces camps etait situe a proximite de Bucarest, dans la ville de Snagov, mais il en existait d autres un peu partout dans le pays, precise le correspondant toujours en reference a des recits de soldats roumains.
   Le correspondant de MTI revele egalement l existence d unites speciales de la Securitate nommees les ” Chemises Noirs ” qui fonctionnaient selon l exemple de la Loge P-2 (Loge maconnique clandestine italienne). Les plus hauts dirigeants roumains ont appartenu a cette loge clandestine dont notamment l ancien ministre de l Interieur, Tudor Postelnicu, un des chefs de la Securitate, le vice-premier ministre Ion Dinca et le fils du dictateur roumain dechu, Nicu Ceausescu. La Securitate etait divisee en 17 unites surveillant toute la Roumanie. Ses bases se trouvaient generalement dans des villas de luxe, precise le correspondant de MTI a Bucarest.
   ph-wb/nev/nl.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
CC12A16A1A31DB1EF1DA0D141071207DBFC664CE89959FCA
©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 19:13 – Heure Paris (679 mots)
Roumanie, prev Dans un train de Noel: psychose des tireurs isoles et chasse aux hommes de la Securitate de l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, Jean-Anne CHALET
   A BORD DU TRAIN TIMISOARA-BUCAREST 25 dec – Dans le premier train de Noel entre Timisoara (ouest de la Roumanie) et Bucarest, les voyageurs partagent le pain et le sel et sont deja entres dans l ere de l ” apres-Ceausescu ” .
   Malgre la psychose des tireurs isoles, ce sont les agents de l ancien regime, les hommes de la Securitate, qui sont devenus les pourchasses, apres avoir ete chasseurs pendant des annees.
   Ces hommes, les plus craints de l ancien appareil repressif de Nicolae Ceausescu, qui continuent a resister dans plusieurs villes de Roumanie, sont traques. Lundi, deux d entre eux ont ete arretes par une garde patriotique dans la gare de Timisoara, la cite martyre, ou l on a denombre, selon les dernieres estimations, pres de cinq mille morts.
   Mais ils continuent de faire peur. Toute la nuit de Noel, les tirs ont ete incessants dans le centre de Timisoara, et lundi matin, il etait pratiquement impossible de circuler a pied ou en voiture.
   Pour gagner la gare a pied, l envoye special de l AFP a essuye le feu de tireurs isoles et il a fallu que les soldats interviennent au fusil mitrailleur pour le couvrir. Le train est parti de Timisoara avec une demi-heure de retard, apres l arrestation des deux agents de la Securitate. En cours de route, une bombe a ete decouverte dans le convoi et tous les voyageurs invites a descendre. Le wagon ou se trouvait l engin a ete detache du train.
   Les nouvelles sur un transistor.
   Dans la plupart des gares traversees, les references a l ancien regime avaient ete effacees, les drapeaux bleu-jaune-rouge de la Roumanie comportaient un grand trou au milieu, la ou figuraient jadis les emblemes du communisme. Des inscriptions aussi un peu partout : ” Mort au tyran ” , ” Vive la Roumanie libre ” .
   Dans ce compartiment, voyagent ensemble un ingenieur de 60 ans, un ancien architecte devenu tanneur par la force des choses, un jeune garde patriotique, un camionneur et un paysan.
   Le pain et le sel ont ete partages entre tous dans cette journee de Noel, et les informations captees sur un transistor commentees en termes severes. Tous sont d accord pour estimer que Ceausescu et son clan s etaient rendus responsables de veritables atrocites durant les 25 ans ou ils ont ete au pouvoir. ” Notre pays etait une sorte de bagne. Non seulement nous n avions aucune liberte, mais en plus, le tyran a fait executer beaucoup de Roumains, uniquement parce qu ils avaient ose resister ou discuter les ordres ” , declare le tanneur. ” Il poursuit son action criminelle encore aujourd hui, alors qu il a ete arrete, a travers les activites de la Securitate, qui mettent le pays a feu et a sang ” , surencherit l ingenieur.
   Tout le monde sous les banquettes.
   A ce moment, comme pour donner plus de poids a ces propos, une rafale d arme automatique est tiree le long de la voie, obligeant tout le monde a se cacher sous les banquettes. Nouvelle alerte quelques kilometres plus loin, avec arret force, controle de toutes les identites, et cinq interpellations de voyageurs d origine arabe.
   La psychose des mercenaires qui seraient a la solde de l ancien dictateur, ajoutee a celle des hommes de la Securitate, a cree, dans toutes les regions traversees par le train, une nervosite tant dans les rangs de l armee que parmi les gardes patriotiques. Cette affaire de mercenaires evoquee dimanche soir a Timisoara, au cours d une conference de presse par le commandant local des gardes patriotiques, a pris de l ampleur au cours de la journee de lundi, et diverses radios ” libres ” locales, captees dans le train, y ont fait allusion.
   Apres plusieurs haltes de controle, le train de Noel de Timisoara est arrive a Bucarest avec deux heures de retard et les impacts des rafales tirees durant le voyage.
   JAC/PSR/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
7B1D215013513F163187079417E0D436F6A2635779EE100D
©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 20:10 – Heure Paris (191 mots)

Roumanie Securitate
Une grande base d helicopteres en Roumanie serait aux mains de la Securitate, selon Budapest
   BUDAPEST 25 dec – Une importante base d helicopteres en Roumanie serait aux mains de la Securitate, la police secrete de Ceausescu, a declare lundi le porte- parole du ministere hongrois de la Defense a la television hongroise.
   Le colonel Gyorgy Keleti n a pas precise le nom de cette base, indiquant seulement qu elle se trouvait en Roumanie, a une centaine de km de la frontiere hongroise.
   ” Il semble que cette base soit aux mains des terroristes ” (la Securitate), a declare le porte-parole en rappelant que des helicopteres roumains avaient viole l espace aerien hongrois plusieurs fois ces derniers jours.
   D autre part, le colonel Keleti a annonce que l organisation caritative de l ordre de Malte avait recu l autorisation exceptionnelle de monter une station de radio sur la base militaire hongroise de Szeged, toute proche de la Roumanie. Cette station vise a assurer les communications entre l organisation et son siege en RFA, afin de faciliter la logistique de l acheminement des dons vers la Roumanie.
   rb/ph/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 19:28 – Heure Paris (539 mots)
Roumanie Securitate, prev Les hommes de la Securitate attaquent encore l armee mais cherchent surtout a fuir De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, Nicolas MILETITCH
   MOLDOVA-NOUA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Des commandos de la Securitate ont attaque des unites militaires lundi, en fin de matinee, a Resica et Oravita, dans le sud du pays, mais divers indices indiquent que leur objectif reste principalement de quitter le pays.
   D autres affrontements armes ont ete egalement observes lundi a Tournu Sevrin, plus au sud, de l autre cote de la chaine des Carpates meridionales, et les routes de la region sont peu sures, a indique a l AFP un officier de l armee a Moldova-Noua.
   Selon des sources militaires, il y a eu d autres affrontements de l autre cote du pays, a Constanza, sur la Mer Noire.
   Sur les routes, les controles, souvent nerveux, effectues par les militaires et les patrouilles populaires, nombreux et minutieux, notamment a proximite de la frontiere, temoignent de la confusion qui regne encore dans plusieurs regions ou des commandos de la Securitate menent des actions isolees.
   La chasse a l homme se poursuit en Roumanie pour s emparer des derniers elements de la Securitate, qui tentent de fuir le pays, sans doute peu nombreux, mais bien equipes et entraines.
   Plusieurs d entre eux ont ete arretes en Yougoslavie, dans l apres- midi, pres de Klodovo, par les unites speciales de la police yougoslave envoyees sur place depuis quelques jours. Ces agents de la Securitate emportaient avec eux d importantes quantites d or.
   Dirigeants locaux elus.
   D autres se cachent encore dans les forets de la region, a-t-on indique a l AFP de source policiere. Sur la route qui longe le Danube entre Pojejenea et Macesti, des militaires, arme au poing, arretent les voitures.
   ” Beaucoup de terroristes (agents de la Securitate) tentent de passer de l autre cote en Yougoslavie ” , explique l un d eux. Juste retour des choses, l extraordinaire dispositif (barbeles, miradors, postes de garde tous les cent metres), mis en place par la police le long du Danube pour empecher les Roumains de fuir vers la Yougoslavie, est aujourd hui un obstacle supplementaire pour les agents de la police secrete aux abois.
   Il faudra sans doute encore attendre quelques jours pour que soient liquidees les dernieres poches de resistance, les agents de la Securitate risquant de manquer bientot de munitions, ont souligne a l AFP plusieurs officiers charges d assurer la securite dans la region.
   Si la situation n est pas encore completement sous le controle des nouvelles autorites et de l armee, sur la route (la circulation de nuit reste fortement deconseillee) et dans certaines villes, la vie semble revenir a la normale a peu pres partout ailleurs.
   ” Une nouvelle administration est deja mise en place dans notre region. Nous recevons nos instructions par la radio et la tele de Bucarest, et la vie a repris son cours ” , declare le directeur des Mines de Moldova-Noua, Ionec Danciu. Les nouveaux dirigeants de la ville ont ete elus librement par leurs citoyens . ” C est bien la premiere fois ” , releve Ionec Danciu, et parmi eux, se trouvent meme des membres du Parti communiste.
   NM/PSR/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
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©AFP Général – Mercredi 10 Janvier 1990 – 12:25 – Heure Paris (500 mots)
Roumanie medecine, lead Cinq jeunes Roumains, blesses durant les evenements, hospitalises a Marseille
   MARSEILLE 10 jan – Les premiers Roumains rapatries en France depuis les recents evenements, quatre hommes et une femme grievement blesses par balles a Bucarest et a Timisoara, sont arrives dans la nuit de mardi a mercredi, a Marseille, ou ils ont ete hospitalises.
   Ces personnes, rapatriees par un Transall de l armee francaise qui avait ete specialement affrete, ont ete admises dans cinq des onze etablissements de l Assistance publique de Marseille. Aucune indication n a ete fournie sur ces hopitaux, ni sur la nature precise des blessures.
   Selon le docteur Richard Domergue, responsable adjoint du SAMU de Marseille, qui a dirige ce rapatriement, la femme et ses quatre compatriotes, ” atteints par des projectiles de guerre dum-dum (NDLR: balles entaillees en croix, de maniere a provoquer de larges dechirures), souffrent de graves problemes fonctionnels mais nullement vitaux ” , a-t-il declare a l AFP.
   Le docteur avait ete avise de cette evacuation sanitaire, dans la nuit de lundi a mardi, par un telex de la cellule interministerielle de crise, mise en place par le gouvernement francais depuis des evenements en Roumanie.
   L equipe du SAMU, constituee de deux medecins et de deux infirmieres, a ete acheminee jusqu a Bucarest ou l attendait le Dr Lamare, de la cellule logistique en place a l ambassade de France.
   Quelques heures plus tard l avion, transportant les cinq blesses, places sous perfusion, se posait sur la base aerienne d Istres (Bouches-du-Rhone) ou attendaient des ambulances.
   Arrives a l hopital de la Timone, vers minuit, les Roumains, ages de 20 a 35 ans et parlant seulement leur langue natale, ont ete repartis dans divers etablissements, ” en fonction des places disponibles et des besoins medicaux : traumatologie, micro-chirurgie, orthopedie ” .
   ” Ces personnes ont ete atteintes lors de manifestations de rue pacifiques, par un ou deux projectiles, selon les cas, a explique le Dr Domergue. Elles presentent de grosses lesions pouvant entrainer la paralysie de membres ” . Elles vont subir un bilan de sante complet qui permettra notamment d etablir les risques eventuels de sequelles.
   Ambiance soixante-huitarde a Bucarest, selon le medecin marseillais.
   Il a precise que la femme a ete blessee lors de la manifestation de rue du 17 decembre a Timisoara. ” Elle a raconte avoir ete admise dans un hopital d ou elle a du etre evacuee apres que des tirs eurent ete entendus dans l etablissement ou des hommes de la Securitate achevaient des blesses ” , a rapporte le Dr Domergue.
   Il regne a Bucarest, selon le medecin marseillais, ” une ambiance soixante-huitarde, un peu revolutionnaire. On sent une certaine exhaltation et il y a beaucoup de mouvements dans les rues ” , a-t-il temoigne. Il a souligne ” la chaleur touchante ” manifestee par les Roumains a l equipe medicale francaise. ” Ils ont une confiance totale en nous. Nous ne pouvons pas les decevoir. Nous allons les dorloter, ca parait le minimun ” , a-t-il assure.
   JLL/dv.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
1A1E01C019D1F21A016E0F64596D317B0933F7131B5B1C34
©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
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©AFP Général – Jeudi 5 Avril 1990 – 17:27 – Heure Paris (504 mots)

Roumanie justice
La repression escamotee dans le proces du general Ceausescu
   BUCAREST 5 avr – Le proces du general Nicolae-Andruta Ceausescu, frere du dictateur roumain, continue a donner l impression que la repression qui a fait des dizaines de morts et des centaines de blesses le 21 decembre pres de l hotel Intercontinental a Bucarest etait le fait d un homme seul, tirant avec un pistolet.
   Oubliees les centaines de personnes touchees par balles, les blessures a la balle dum-dum, les manifestants abattus a bout portant, selon les expertises des medecins et chirurgiens de l hopital Coltea.
   Au quatrieme jour des debats, devant le tribunal militaire de Bucarest, un seul temoignage, aussitot interrompu par le procureur militaire, a fait etat de l utilisation de leurs armes par des ” hommes en civil venant du service d ordre ” .
   Apres une vingtaine de temoins interroges depuis mardi matin, tous membres de l Ecole de la Securitate que commandait le general Ceausescu et presentant la meme version monocorde qui vise a innocenter en bloc l Ecole a l exception du general, le colonel Teodor Amariucai, premier officier de l armee -et non de la police- appele a la barre a cree la surprise en donnant sa version des affrontements du 21.
   ” Vers 19H30, une deuxieme serie de rafales de sommation tirees en l air par l armee, pour faire reculer les manifestants boulevard Balcescu, a provoque la confusion dans la foule, de nombreux manifestants se couchant a terre pour se proteger ” , a-t-il dit.
   contrepartie.
   ” C est alors que de nombreux civils en manteau, surgissant de derriere le cordon des forces de l ordre ou j etais, l ont traverse pour se lancer vers les manifestants. Certains matraquaient ceux qui etaient a terre, d autres tiraient de dessous leur manteau sur ceux qui s enfuyaient, on voyait leur poche tressaillir a chaque coup. J ai vu des flaques de sang, et des morts qu on trainait vers une camionnette.. “.
   Double intervention du procureur et du president du tribunal: ” ces faits font l objet de poursuites judiciaires, et seront penalement sanctionnes. Revenons aux faits concernant l inculpe ” .
   Officiellement, dans le cadre de ce proces, les temoignages se concentrent donc sur un ” fait divers ” , celui d un general se jetant sur la foule avec son pistolet d ordonnance ” sous l emprise d une crise de diabete ” .
   Deux nouveaux temoignages ont ” confirme ” jeudi que le general Ceausescu avait ” perdu le controle de lui-meme ” , notamment celui de son chauffeur, l adjudant Ion Turcin, qui dit que le general a braque son arme sur lui.
   Le general ecoute les temoins, tantot avec agacement, tantot avec indifference, mais sans rien ajouter.
   Les observateurs en viennent a se demander si le general n a pas d avance accepte de ne mettre personne en cause, parmi les personnes qui ont participe avec lui a la repression, pour obtenir en contrepartie des garanties pour lui ou, plus vraisemblablement, pour son epouse malade, son fils, sa fille et ses petits-enfants.
   BAY/ccd.
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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #17 The Role of TVR (Televiziunea Romana, Romanian Television)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 24, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publication)

The Myths of a Revolution: “It is said that these enemy elements, the securisti, have poisoned the water in Sibiu, in Timisoara,…the water must be boiled before being consumed.” (Apa este otravita la Sibiu!)

Oh, how Romanians and Romanianists love to invoke or allude to the televised claim in December 1989 that the water had been posioned in Sibiu!

It precipitates laughter:  ah, the crude manipulation and naivete!

Predictably, this is a favorite of foreign sources on December 1989.

Romanian emigre Andrei Codrescu tells us in his November 1990 article in Harper’s (“Big Chills”) about the wild rumors of December 1989, that the water in Sibiu had allegedly been poisoned, but as he found out at his 25th anniversary high school reunion, he learned how all the rumors had been false: and the water in Sibiu, it was just fine!  http://alina_stefanescu.typepad.com/files/big-chills-my-high-school-reunion-in-romania-by-andrei-codrescu-1.pdf

John Feffer in Shock Waves (1992) invokes Codrescu’s claims that, “Contrary to earlier reports, there were no mass killings, no poisoned water in Sibiu, no terrorists–only the manufacturing of a revolutionary smokescreen to conceal pre-planned machinations that resulted in the creation of the National Salvation Front.” (p. 207)

http://books.google.hu/books?id=u2l7b9gg28YC&pg=PA207&lpg=PA207&dq=romania+ceausescu+1989+water+poisoned+sibiu&source=bl&ots=P0pzR5YrIr&sig=ljCRYy27Lzsvh_HSxETfvz8SAH0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=buxwVNScFvPesASo0IHoAw&ved=0CDcQ6AEwBDhQ#v=onepage&q=romania%20ceausescu%201989%20water%20poisoned%20sibiu&f=false

Peter Siani-Davies quotes BBC journalist John Simpson, who had heard similar stories concerning poisoned water during the Iranian revolution of 1979, as noting that “certain ideas appeal forcibly  to the self-dramatizing mind of the revolutionary,” to which Siani-Davies adds:

“Indeed, in Romania the wild storytelling to a certain extent was just another consequence of the tumult of the revolution.  However, the imagery may have served another purpose….Now, through the tales of horror, they [Romanians] were able to place the evil forces of that [Ceausescu] regime so far beyond the bounds of ‘normal’ society that they were effectively able to distance themselves from the demons of the past.  There was also a sense in which it was necessary for the securitate to be so terrible:  How else could the years of mute suffering under an enfeebled old tyrant such as Ceausescu be explained and condoned?”   (Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, p. 160.)

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Underlying all of these interpretations and explanations is the assumption that the water never was poisoned, that it was all a baseless rumor.

Surely, one assumes, the rumor has been run to ground…but the truth is, as with so many things about December 1989, it hasn’t…

report from Sibiu starts at approximately 2:20 (Tagesschau 27.12.1989)

In fact, there was a basis in reality for what Teodor Brates was saying on TV on the afternoon of 22 December 1989 as the following toxicology report by the Belgian Dr. Aubin Heyndrickx makes clear:

Fullscreen capture 11222014 42152 PM

Romania

On December 21, 1989, people drinking from water tank #4 in Sibiu experienced headache, visual disturbances, loss of consciousness, vomiting, etc.  These symptoms are all compatible with organophosphate poisoning.  The analysis of the water (by gas chromatography) and the determination of the cholinesterase activity of the blood was done in the University of Cluj.  The conclusion was that an organophosphate had been used.  Atropine sulfate and toxogonin were advised.

As soon as the symptoms appeared among the population, water tank #4 was shut off, rinsed, and cleaned.  The people received water from army trucks.

A few days later, there was a fight in Timisoara between the army and Securitate over the water tanks.  Poisoning was feared, as had occurred in Sibiu.  According to witnesses, the Securitate possesses “all possible chemical warfare agents.”

Toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx supervised the chemical tests and interviewed the physicians at Central Hospital who treated the patients.  From the tests and from the very high dose of atropine required to produce a response, he concluded that the tank was poisoned with sarin or VX (Report on the Humanitarian Mission to Romania, December 23-29, 1989, Laboratoria voor Toxicologie Criminalistiek, State University of Ghent).

http://www.physiciansforcivildefense.org/cdp/jan90.htm

Indeed, one can watch a brief discussion of the incident with Dr. Heyndrickx beginning at approximately the 40 second mark from an ITN broadcast of 27 December 1989

http://www.itnsource.com/en/shotlist//ITN/1989/12/27/BSP271289002/?s=romania+sibiu+after+the+revolution+27+1989&st=0&pn=1

ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION:

}T27128901   ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89     relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX           to treat the people who were injured during the fight against
             Securitate (secret police). Toxicologists have found evidence
             that the security police poisoned the water supply. Injured
             Securitate are being treated in hospitals alongside the people
             they shot.
Clip Ref: BSP271289002 0

Clip 1of1

}T27128901   ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89     relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX           to treat the ...
  • Duration: 00:01:44 |
  • Timecode – In: 00:00:00:00  Out: 00:01:44:00 |
  • Copyright: ITN / 3rd Party Copyright

I have found evidence of discussion of Heyndrickx and his toxicology report in the Hungarian press of the time, but significantly, to date, I have been unable to find discussion of it in the Romanian press!

Nepszabadsag, 30 December 1989, p. 3 citing a UPI dispatch, apparently P. Green, “French team confirms poison in water supply,” UPI, 29 December 1989.


Nagyszeben – ideggáz

Bukarest, 1989. december 29. péntek (UPI) – A Ceausescu-párti terrorosztagok ideggázt vegyítettek a romániai Nagyszeben víztárólóiba a forradalom első napjaiban – ezt egy francia-belga orvoscsoport egyik tagja mondotta el a UPI hírügynökség tudósítójának. Auvin Heyndrickx szerint a szennyezett ivóvíztól öten súlyos mérgezést szenvedtek.Mikor a felkelés vezetői felfedezték a szabotázst, azonnal
leengedték a mérgezett vizet a tárolóból – mondta a belga orvos, aki
az ,,Orvosok – határok nélkül,, nevű francia segélyszervezet
tagjaként utazott a városba. A toxikológus Heyndrickx
megállapította, hogy a vízkészletbe két súlyosan mérgező, folyékony
állapotú ideggázvegyületet öntöttek még december 20-án. Az orvos
elmondta azt is, hogy az eddig ismert öt sérült agykárosodást is
szenvedett a mérgektől. A megbetegedések ilyen viszonylag alacsony
számát a belga szakértő annnak tulajdonítja, hogy a víztárolóban a
mérgező anyagok szerencsére rendkívüli mértékben felhígultak.+++1989. december 29., péntek 07:57

http://rendszervaltas.mti.hu/Pages/News.aspx?se=1&wo=nagyszeben&sd=19890101&ed=19901231&sp=0&ni=230929&ty=1

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/publications/reports/RSIS_Food%20Defence_170209.pdf See citations in fn#59 page 10.

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It is thus with justification that in my dissertation in 1997 and in a reiteration of the dissertation views in 2007, I defended TVR personnel by pointing out the extent to which they went to intervene and inform the population when it was safe to drink the water again.  (for a glimpse into the eternal “appreciation” I received for pointing out the latter, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/raport-final-cpadcr-iiccmer-si-revolutia-din-1989/)

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Excerpt from https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/

In their discussion of the Romanian transition, Linz and Stepan note the “[r]umors of deliberately poisoned water supplies, of 10,000, 60,000, even 100,000 dead, filled the news channels and streets” and conclude that “disinformation played an important role in the events.”[45] They have in mind, however, the idea that this disinformation was disseminated in order to help the Front seize power. This, of course, echoes the dominant view on this theme. As we saw in the preceding chapter, both Securitate and opposition sources maintain that disinformation pervaded the December events, and they uniformly attribute it to the Front and the Front’s supporters at television, and, in some cases, to foreign actors such as the Soviet Union.

Yet there has been very little effort to investigate the context in which particular rumors originated and the relationship between actual events and those rumors. Take, for example, this rumor alleging the poisoning of the water supply which is so frequently invoked by both domestic and foreigner observers. To what are they referring? Around 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 22 December–therefore approximately three hours after the Ceausescus had fled Bucharest–television commentator Teodor Brates began to issue periodic, sometimes frantic reports about fighting between the Army and the Securitate in the city of Sibiu and about rumors that the water supply had been poisoned by the Securitate. Here are some excerpts of what Brates said on television on that afternoon:

One moment, please…from Sibiu it has been communicated to us that the army no longer has ammunition and the Securitate troops continue to attack military units….We want to inform you that in Sibiu, military units are urgently requesting help…We are constantly receiving communications…of course, we do not have the possibility to verify their authenticity…but we ask for your attention…It is said that these enemy elements, the securisti, have poisoned the water in Sibiu, in Timisoara,…the water must be boiled before being consumed.[46]

[45].. Linz and Stepan, “The Effects of Totalitarianism-cum-Sultanism,” 345-346.

[46].. See the text of the transcript, Revolutia Romana in Direct (Bucharest: Televiziunea Romana, 1990), 47, 48, 51.

image0-001

2007:  Linked to the allegations of supposedly intentionally hyping the threat posed by the “terrorists” is the certitude with which many Romanians and Romanianists assert that TV personnel (especially Teodor Brates) intentionally spread rumors about the water being poisioned and the army running out of ammunition in Sibiu etc.–rumors that proved to be unsubstantiated. Here is what they likely remember:

“One moment, please…from Sibiu it has been communicated that the army no longer has ammunition and the Securitate troops continue to attack mili tary units….We want to inform you that in Sibiu, military units are urgently requesting help…We are constantly receiving communications…of course, we do not have the possibility to verify their authenticity…but we ask for your attention…It is said that the enemy elements, the securisti, have poisoned the water in Sibiu, in Timisoara…the water must be boiled before being consumed.” (from the transcript of 22 December 1989 in “Revolutia Romana in Direct” (Bucharest: 1990), pp. 47, 48, 51, quoted p. 324, Richard Andrew Hall, 1997, Ph.D. Dissertation, “Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania”)

image0-005

image0-003

What they don’t remember is that Brates returned later to inform the audience a) when the fighting had ceased in Sibiu, b) when supplies of bottled water were on their way to Sibiu, and c) when the competent authorities verified that the water in Bucharest was safe to drink (“Revolutia Romana in Direct,” pp. 71, 72, 75, discussed p. 327 Hall, “Rewriting the Revolution”) This is there…in the transcript of what was said on Television…it is not a matter of a “difference of opinion” as the likes of Tismanenau and others in denial would have us believe. It is the old saw from American baseball: as the famous manager Casey Stengel used to say “You can look it up!” Once again: if your goal is “diversion,” intentional panic and manipulation, is it likely that you would return to the same subjects and say things designed to calm fears? Of course, not.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/raport-final-cpadcr-iiccmer-si-revolutia-din-1989/

Fullscreen capture 12232014 70257 PM

The page from THE Report, a report which in the vision of its chairman–a highly disinterested and objective party, by definition, of course!–must be continuously praised and cannot be legitimately criticized (all criticisms are defined almost by definition as personally-motivated or personal attacks!):  http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/raportul-final-este-realizarea-mea-de-varf-atat-profesional-cat-si-moral/

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Un Craciun Revolutionar (15 minutes of Previously Unseen Footage from 24 December 1989 by Andrei Iliescu)

This has apparently been around for a few months, but I only discovered it recently:

Pe 24 decembrie 1989, fotograful Andrei Iliescu abia scapase de la Jilava, unde-l bagase militia pentru ca poza protestele, si umbla uimit pe strazile Bucurestiului revolutionar. Nu mai avea buletin, singurul lui act era camera video. El a filmat aceste secvente.

which comes from http://casajurnalistului.ro/revolutie/

I draw attention to the sequence from approximately min. 3:37 to 3:53 in which the young soldier is asked about and discusses those whom they are fighting (this is in the vicinity of the TVR Television station).  (My thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor, in particular, and Corneliu N. Vaida for clarifying the exchange for me.)

Soldier:  “Au mitraliere, care sunt micute…Cum au astia…americanii” (They have small machine guns…like the Americans.)

Voice off camera:  “Sunt mai bune ca ale voastre?” (Are they better than yours?)

Soldier:  “Da, bine-nteles.”  (Yes, of course.)

Soldier:  “Sunt mai eficiente; consuma mai putin si distrug mai mult, in general asa” (They’re more efficient; they consume less and destroy more, generally speaking.)

That the “terrorists” had weapons different from and in addition to the standard ones the Army rank-and-file were equipped with is and should be beyond dispute by now, and yet another proof of their existence.  We have, of course, multiple similar claims in the same Bucharest neighborhood, elsewhere in Bucharest, and indeed throughout the rest of the country.

Fullscreen capture 10182009 103639 AM

http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec-1989-cd4_shortfilms

From approximately min 0:45 to 1:10, also from the same day, 24 December 1989

Video No. 2: Bucharest, Piata Aviatorilor, near TVR (Romanian state Television) headquarters, “Vidia” Bullets

In the second video (posted by Alexandru2006 (Alexandru Stepanian) at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using.  Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets.

from https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/december-1989-2009-bullets-lies-and-videotape/  blv 111909tk6

Those who were in the CC building of the PCR during these days also know such weapons:

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In aceea camera am inceput sa stringem toate obietele de valoare gasite prin celelalte incaperi.  Asa a luat nastere primul “tezaur” din C.C.  Inauntru s-a incuiat nea Tarchila cu un pistol mitraliera si sint sigur ca ar fi fost in stare sa impuste pe oricine ar fi incercat sa deschida usa daca n-ar fi fost insotit de noi.  Noroc ca nu a fost cazul.  Intre timp ni se aduceau de peste tot arme si munitii.

Armele erau de toate felurile:  pistolete Carpati, Beretta, Makarov, T.T., Stecikin, unele mici si plate cum nu mai vazusem niciodata, in tocuri de piele special construite cu compartimente aparte pentru box si cutit cu buton, adevarate pumnale cu lama foarte subtire si fina, lunga de 15-20 ce tisnea din miner (nu erau in nici un caz destinate pentru curatatul cartofilor la popota); pistoale mitraliera AKM cu pat de lemn sau cu pat rabatabil…mitraliera, pusti semiautomate cu luneta de tipul celei cu care ma fuduleam eu; mitraliere de campanie, un aruncator de grenade antitanc; grenade de mina, munitie de toate tipurile si calibrele, ce mai nu ne lipsea decit un tun, in rest aveam de toate.

Venit din cabinetul 1, Doru Haraga isi da cu parerea ca ar trebui sa le transportam intr-un colt al incaperii si pentru a le separa de restul camerei incercam sa delimitam spatiul cu o canapea.  Lunga de 2 m nu se lasa umita din loc, parca era batuta in cuie, inciduati, am inceput sa mesterim ia ea.  Am desfacut-o si am ramas perplecsi.  In cabinetul 2, in camera de lucru a tovarasei de viata a celui mai iubit fiu, in lada unei canapele era un adevarat arsenal:  24 pistoale mitraliera cu pat rabatabil si teava scurta, 22 pistolete Carpati, 2 Stecikin, 4 carabine cu luneta, semiautomate, doua pusti mitraliera, grenade de mina si la fund lazi metalice cu munitie de lupta–gloante incendiare, trasoare, perforante, explozive, numai din cele normale–nu. Si deasupra trona ca o culme a ridicolului o prastie cu cracan si linga ea o cutie cu bile de rulment.  Pe capacul interior al canapelei era o list cu denumirea “lada de armament si munitii nr. 2″.  Urma inventarul si continua cu–raspunde plt. adj.–cutare, nu am retinut numele.  Deci lada nr. 2.  Dar unde este nr. 1?  Citiva metri mai incolo–o canapea asemanatoare.  Ne-am repezit asupra ei si am deschis-o.  Continutul era identic, mai putin prastia.  Puteam inarma un regiment.  Oare de ce tinea “savanta” in cabinetul ei atita armament si munitie?  Dar prastia?  Asta chiar ca punea capac la toate!

Mircea Boaba, “Gloante, nestemate si singe.  Ziua I:  Comoara lui Ali Baba,”  Strict Secret, nr. 48 26 martie – 1 aprilie 1991, pp. 4-5.

In timp ce urcam scara, vrind sa incarc carabinaa, am avut surpriza sa descopar ca gloantele din cele doua incarcatoare erau cu virful bont.

nr. 47 18-25 martie 1991, pp. 4-5.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/08/12/22-decembrie-1989-ce-s-a-gasit-in-cabinetul-unu-nicolae-ceausescu-si-cabinetul-doi-elena-ceausescu/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/21/marturii-intre-1990-si-1992-din-zilele-fierbinte-in-cc-ul-decembrie-1989-doru-teodor-maries-mircea-boaba-sergiu-tanasescu-si-ernest-maftei/

More testimonies:

http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/investigatii/marturii-despre-teatrele-de-razboi-ale-revolutiei-romane–18312

Lt. mr. APOSTOL M. ANTON, fost ofiter in serviciul 1 declara:

In ziua de 29 decembrie 1989 a aflat de la vecinul PIPOI REMUS, care locuieste la etajul 2, sub apartamentul lui, ca a vazut mai multe persoane tragand spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, despre care era convins ca nu erau romani. I s-a parut ca ar fi arabi. Trageau cu niste pistoale automate mici.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/07/27/arabesque-arab-terrorists-in-the-december-1989-romanian-revolution/

Fiecare pluton din aceasta scoala de ofiteri de rezerva, avea alocata cate o sala de clasa, care era ca o sala de laborator-expozitie dotata cu o anumita baza materiala de instructie (in zilele de azi, se cheama training) aferenta unei anumite tematici. De exemplu, sala noastra continea materiale si planse despre armamentul individual de infanterie si balistica aferenta. Exact ca intr-un muzeu, aveam acolo vitrine cu exemplare sectionate de automat Kalashnikov, pusca mitraliera cu incarcator sector si tambur, pusca semiautomata cu luneta, pistolul TT model ’33 aflat in dotarea ofiterilor armatei si pistolul Carpati din dotarea militiei. De asemenea, imi amintesc ca era si un aruncator de grenade antitanc AG7 cu lovitura aferenta, si parca si un model imbunatatit de Kalasnikov cu teava scurta si pat rabatabil aflat in dotarea trupelor de securitate USLA (Unitati Specializate de Lupta Antiterorista)… si bineinteles toata gama de munitie, adica toate calibrele de cartuse complete, mai putin praful de pusca din tub. Era sa uit mitraliera de companie…
Toate armele erau sectionate in asa maniera incat sa se poata intelege principiul complet de functionare… daca puneai un cartus in incarcator si armai, se putea vedea traseul complet al sau din incarcator pana la expulzarea tubului dupa percutare.  http://calinhera.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/servesc-patria-la-multi-ani/

–In afara de modul –interpretat ca suspect–, in care au patruns in dispozitivul dumneavoastra, ce dovezi mai aveti?

–Faptul ca, la teava unuia dintre tancuri, tabla de protectie a fost rupta in doua locuri, trei din pistoalele mitraliera pe care le-am “capturat” (cu teava scurta si incarcator de 20 cartuse)  aveau tevile afumate, turela tancului de comandat de locotenentul maior Vasile Barbu a fost blocata, iar dimineata plutonierul Butoi a gasit pe tancul sau un pistol mitraliera si o lanterna de semnalizare…Cit despre dotare, sa nu-mi zica mie cum am citit intr-un ziar de mare tiraj– ca era jalnica, in nivelul armatei.  A doua zi, am recuperat, din cele doua autoblindate, radiotelefoane Telefunken, veste antiglont, pistoale de 9 mm, pumnale, binoclu cu infrarosu — care pentru noi constituiau noutatii absolute.  Si, pentru ca tot am fost provocati, sa va mai spun ceva.  Dimineata, cind l-am intrebat “de ce ai tras, ma?” unul dintre cei trei supravietuitori, pe care i-am gasit in blocul de vizavi mi-a raspuns:  “Ce p. mati, si eu execut acelasi ordin ca si tine!!!”  E clar ca nu au venit ca prieteni!

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/04/17/crima-cazul-mapn-23-24-decembrie-89-si-sosirea-uslasilor-maior-mihai-floca-armata-poporului-6-iunie-1990-p-3/

Even some military prosecutors have been willing to admit the obvious:

CINE A TRAS ÎN NOI… DUPĂ 22?!

Interviu cu colonelul magistrat Ilina Radu – prim-procuror al Parchetului Militar Timişoara… la 20 de ani de la evenimente
A consemnat Liza Kratochwill

R.I.: – Nu. Ziua eram la serviciu. Ziua – program normal, seara cu familia, cu prietenii… ne reuneam trei, patru familii de vecini şi stăteam pe jos, pe covoare, pentru că se trăgea formidabil, uneori chiar la nivelul ferestrelor noastre, şi nu-ţi ardea să faci balet prin casă.

L.K.: – În blocuri?

R.I.: – În blocuri, da. În blocurile din, relativ, zona centrală a oraşului. A fost urât…

L.K.: – Asta în ce zi ?

R.I.: – Mi-amintesc de acea noapte cruntă de 23 spre 24 când s-a tras, ne găseam câţiva colegi într-un bloc din zona centrală şi s-a tras formidabil. De la nouă seara până la şase dimineaţa, continuu, cred că au fost zeci de mii de cartuşe şi am fost speriat. Şi chiar atunci am spus: dacă Dumnezeu ne iubeşte, vom prinde Ajunul serii următoare, ca să colindăm. Era Ajunul Crăciunului, însă, noaptea aia a fost furibundă. Şi nu eram de competenţă, de aia nu ne-am implicat profesional. Ca procuror civil nu puteai atunci să cercetezi faptele cu arme ale militarilor şi se ştiu foarte puţine lucruri. S-au găsit foarte puţine tuburi de cartuşe din cele care trebuiau să fie. S-au găsit, în schimb, repet, unele dispozitive care, ulterior, ar fi fost analizate şi ar fi putut constitui simulatoare de tragere sau ţinte false.

L.K.: – Dar dumneavoastră, acum, cred că sunteţi cel mai în măsură să-mi spuneţi care au fost tipurile, în afară de calibrul ăla obişnuit, 7,62, care au fost toate tipurile de gloanţe care au fost identificate, folosite în 1989 şi care au cauzat decese şi răni. Deci au fost o dată aceste 7,62, au fost acele dum-dum explozive şi-n afară de…

R.I.: – 7,65-ul a fost, pistoale-mitraliere scurte…

L.K.: – Kalaşnikov, da, din acestea au fost folosite şi la… cred că şi la cazul Jubea…

R.I.: – …un tip care, atunci, erau doar în dotarea forţelor speciale, la acel moment. Pistoale cu pat scurt şi cu ţeavă scurtă. Mai erau pistoale-mitralieră, AKAEM-uri obişnuite. Au fost apoi, s-a tras chiar şi cu aruncător de grenade, cu AG 7 şi cu diverse tipuri de pistoale.s

L.K.: – Pistoale ale forţelor armate sau…?
R.I.: – Pistoale din dotare. E foarte greu de spus.
L.K.: – Păi, ce pistoale avea România, la acea oră?
R.I.: – TT şi Carpaţi-ul.
L.K.: – Carpaţi-ul, care era în dotarea Miliţiei, nu?

R.I.: – De regulă, era la Miliţie, forţe de Securitate… şi TT-urile, care erau, deopotrivă, şi aici şi acolo. La ofiţeri sau la…

L.K.: – Şi aici ce tipuri de calibru de gloanţe erau folosite, la tipurile astea de pistoale?

R.I.: – Păi, discutăm şi de calibru de 9 milimetri, cu tuburi specifice, cam de nouă milimetri.

L.K.: – Dar cele care se foloseau la lunetă, deci ţintă fixă?

R.I.: – Carabine sau puşti-mitralieră cu tambur.
 
About the same area around the TV station during these days (Prosecutor General Ioan Dan):

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/01/29/pozefotofilmvideo-gloante-dum-dum-si-speciale-i-e-vidia-decembrie-1989/

(Bucuresti, zona TVR) below– individual demonstrates how much smaller they are than Army’s standard 7,62 mm munitions

Video No. 2: Bucharest, Piata Aviatorilor, near TVR (Romanian state Television) headquarters, Vidia Bullets

In the second video
Revolutia Romana 22 Dec.1989 – cd4

(posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using.  Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets.

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (I)

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Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (II)

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“Despre existenta simulatoarele, senatorul Sergiu Nicolaescu a adresat o intrebare fostului sef al Departmamentului Securitatii Statului, gl. Vlad Iulian, care a raspuns…”Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea…” (declaratie Iulian Vlad, pag. 75).

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In aceasta perioada, in zona Televiziunii au fost observate semnale luminoase ce prezentau imaginea unei balizari si care marcau inceputul sau incetarea atacurilor.

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Mai mult despre “semnale luminoase”:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/19/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-ii/

Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (III)

Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,

comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv.  Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoara–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/01/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribui-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/04/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-ii/

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/16/dosarele-revolutiei-si-expertize-balistice-cine-a-tras-in-voi-cu-gloante-explozive/

Romulus Cristea (ziarist, Romania Libera, 22 decembrie 2005):  – Munitia speciala, gloantele cu cap vidia sau dum-dum, a provocat victime? Presa de la acea vreme a fost plina cu astfel de relatari…

General-magistrat Dan Voinea – Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia, nici de la dum-dum. Pe durata evenimentelor s-a folosit munitie de razboi, munitie normala care se gasea la vremea respectiva in dotarea Ministerului de Interne si a Ministerului Apararii Nationale. Confuzia si informatiile false au aparut de la faptul ca se foloseau calibre diferite si, deci, zgomotul produs era altfel perceput.  http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/interviuri/toti-alergau-dupa-un-inamic-invizibil-58783.html

Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (IV)

Presa romaneasca din anii nouazeci despre cazul lui Silviu Dutu–suspectat de terorism la TVR

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Ioan Itu, “Si ei au luptat in Revolutie.  De partea cui?,” Tinerama, 10-16 septembrie 1993, p. 8.

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Maior Tudor Petrescu, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22, 30 mai 1990, p. 3.  (S.D. = Silviu Dutu)

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Aura Alexa Ioan (cu Adrian Popescu-Necsesti), “Teroristii Revolutiei au certificat de psihopati!” Tinerama, 8-14 octombrie 1996, p. 8

Presa romaneasca din anii nouazeci despre cazul lui Constantin Vasiliu–suspectat de terorism la TVR

publicat pe internetul pana acum, in schimb apare Lt. Col. Vasiliu Constantin:

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Valentin Gora:  Au fost arestati oameni ai securitatii, teroristi.  Astazi, nimeni nu stie ce s-a intimplat sa ce se intimpla in continuare cu ei.  Dumneavoastra i-ati vazut?  Ii cunoasteti?

Petre Constantin:  Au fost arestati multi oameni, am mai spus-o, care aveau asupra lor arme de toate felurile, pe toti i-a preluat armata si nu stiu ce s-a intimplat mai departe cu ei.  Adjunctul meu, Traian Puscasu, a fost injunghiat in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie, pe hol, la etajul 11.  Agresorul, locotenent-colonelul Vasiliu, il viza pe generalul Tudor sau pe mine.  Eu am lipsit citeva miunte, generalul Tudor s-a ferit in momentul atacului si a fost lovit Puscasu.  Totul se intimpla in usa biroului.  Militarii au sarit si l-au imobilizat imediat.

Valentin Gora cu Petre Constantin, “Petre Constantin:  Cind a dictat decretul de instalare ? de asediu pe intreg teritoriul tarii, in biroul lui Ceausescu se afla si Eugen Florescu,” Cuvintul, nr. 12, 18 aprilie 1990, pp. 4-5.

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http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2013/11/13/cercetarile-parchetului-in-dosarul-revolutiei-37-bucuresti-televiziune-raniti-si-ucisi-5/

425. Parte vătămată Puşcaşu Traian (Televiziune-Vol. 110)
Numitul Puşcaşu Traian, fiul lui Gheorghe şi Maria, născut la data de 01.03.1927, în Iaşi, domiciliat în Bucureşti (…) în noaptea de 22/23.12.1989, în timp ce se afla în incinta televiziunii, unde-şi desfăşura activitatea ca director adjunct al TVR, a fost înjunghiat în abdomen cu un cuţit de către lt. col. Vasiliu Cornel, care se afla în dispozitivul de pază al instituţiei respective.
Conform raportului medico-legal nr. A1/3409/1990, numitul Puşcaşu Traian a prezentat la data de 24.12.1989 o plagă abdominală penetrantă cu interesarea splinei şi arterei epigastrice. Leziunea a putut fi produsă prin lovire cu corp tăietor-înţepător (posibil cuţit). A necesitat circa 25 zile de îngrijiri medicale. Leziunea i-a pus viaţa în pericol.
Prin rezoluţia nr. 1411/P/1990, din data de 15.11.1990, Procuratura Militară Bucureşti a dispus neînceperea urmăririi penale faţă de lt. col. Vasiliu Constantin, sub aspectul infr. prev. de art. 20 rap. la art. 174 C.p., reţinându-se că, în urma expertizării sale psihiatrice, s-a stabilit că a acţionat fără discernământ.

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Tinerama 10-16 septembrie 1993. p. 9.

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Cazurile Mihai Stoica si Liliana Brebenea

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

Trying to reconstruct the timeline of reporting on the use of exploding dum-dum bullets and other unusual munitions used solely by the Securitate “terrorists” during the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 is not easy.  Unfortunately, we must rely in the public domain on transcripts and diaries from the time, as demonstrated below.  Clearly, it is emerging:  there was discussion at the beginning.  A watershed event that should have then and should now spark great interest and further investigation–a press conference by surgeons (including military doctors) in early March 1990 that as far as I can tell was only ever reported on in depth in French by AFP (see below)–has all but been ignored and forgotten as if it had never taken place.  Highly damning too is the documentary evidence by the wounded themselves, relatives, army officers, and doctors in Timisoara (attesting to the use of these munitions both before and after 22 December 1989).  The overall evidence is overwhelming as to the use of exploding dum-dum bullets and other unusual munitions in December 1989; the alibis and mechanisms of denial are transparent:  just because they existed doesn’t mean they were used; perhaps the army had them too; perhaps the bullets ricocheted and split apart; doctors and army officers (even military doctors) what would they know about dum-dum bullets?; on and on, etc. etc.

http://elenatomaxxl.blogspot.com/2013/06/sorin-m-radulescu-revolutia-ca_24.html

 

Sâmbata 30 decembrie 1989

Reportaj la Spitalul Militar Central: se relateaza despre modul dramatic în care au fost efectuate operatiile (chirurgicale) din ziua de 22 decembrie 1989. „Noapte alba sau zi neagra” spune doctorul pe buna dreptate. Armele teroristilor, a securistilor au împroscat multimea cu gloante explozive, care au avut ca efect plagi si leziuni gigantice.
Emotionant! Dramatic! Dureros!

 

luni, 24 iunie 2013

SORIN M. RĂDULESCU – REVOLUŢIA CA SPECTACOL, Miercuri 27 decembrie, 1989 – Revolutia -3 –

REVOLUŢIA CA SPECTACOL
(ÎNSEMNARILE UNUI SOCIOLOG ÎN PERIOADA SEPTEMBRIE 1988-IULIE 1992)
Miercuri 27 decembrie 1989
Primesc telefon de la Vasilica P., care îmi descrie cu lux de amanunte atmosfera din Centrul de Sociologie, care a devenit un fel de ,,dipecerat” al sociologilor bucuresteni. Ma deplasez imediat acolo ca sa fiu prezent la desfasurarea evenimentelor.

/ Teroriştii .Mărturii (22 27dec.’89 )

22 apr. Notez cu R –revoluţionarii, al căror nume nu-l pot şti

– R 1: Generalul Tudor, pe care aş vrea să nu-l mai văd!

El a eliberat teroriştii suspecţi prinşi de noi!

– R 2: Asupra lor am găsit agende, bancnote însemnate.

Ce a făcut g-ral Tudor cu ei, noi nu ştim!

– R 3 :Eu am păzit camera suspecţilor .Erau 9. Din ordinul g-ralului Tudor li s-a dat drumul

– R 4. Dorobanţu Marin: Un terorist trăgea dintr-o vilă vecină; o maşină cu copertină

din care cca 15 persoane au fugit din vila din faţă; am prins o salvare cu un terorist ;

era şi o maşină inflamabilă pe care am aprins-o; în spatele ei au ieşit 3 terorişti .

A fost un foc foarte puternic.

– Ofiţer paraşutist: aici se lupta, cum s-a spus …

– R 5: Teroriştii au atacat mult TVR. Pe 24 decembrie, din două taburi, cu steag,

au coborît mulţi militari şi au deschis foc asupra noastră .

S-au retras apoi pe străzi, în spatele maşinilor.

– R 6: Pe 24 decembrie s-a zvonit că mîncarea adusă este otrăvită. Am aruncat-o.

Nu aveam nici lumină şi apă .

– R 7: Parola noastră – ” Cine eşti ?”

– Reporter: Cine a tras în voi?

– Ofiţer: G-ral Tudor a eliberat mulţi suspecţi. Nici atunci, nici pe urmă, n-am înţeles

de ce a făcut-o

– R 2: Arestaţii terorişti aveau dolari, staţie de emisie, unul era chiar străin;

au fost eliberaţi – nu ştiu de ce!

– R 6: Au fost şi zvonuri pentru a face panică. Unele au fost false. Altele reale .

Pe 26 sau 27 decembrie a fost prins un civil ( ing. electronist la Tg. Mureş ). La control cpt. Epure i-a găsit o schiţă cu centrul Bucureştiului, pe care era marcat hotelul Modern. Aş vrea să ştiu ce este cu acest terorist?

– Reporter: Da, am vrea să ştim cine a tras în noi?

– Alt reporter ( arătînd la o uşă ): Cum a fost?

– Lct X: teroriştii trăgeau în balamale şi broaşte cu gloanţe cu cap vidia.

Asemenea arme nu sunt în dotarea armatei.

– Lct mj. Diţiu: invită la sediul clubului “TV’22 “, ca să mai afle cum a fost.

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/cdandara/agende/agenda4/docs/jurnal4_6.htm

In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania).  Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

This was also discussed by Bucharest medical personnel at a 1994 conference:

AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA

“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”

Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2

“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”.  Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat:  dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989.  “Documentatia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat.  “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina).  Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel.  Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate.  S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe.  Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta.  In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu:  “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit.  “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.

NOR WERE THESE THE ONLY DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL–FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC–WHO ATTESTED TO THE USE OF DUM-DUM EXPLODING AND OTHER ATYPICAL, UNUSUAL MUNITIONS USED DURING THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 1989

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/08/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-i-dr-manuel-burzaco-medecins-sans-frontieres/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/10/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-ii-trimisi-in-strainatate-italia-franta-austria-anglia-si-germania-pentru-tratament/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/11/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-iii-ce-spun-medici-romani/

Dr. Manuel Burzaco from “Doctors without Borders” was part of a team of doctors from that group who visited hospitals in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Brasov, Buzau and Braila in late December 1989 and early January 1990.  This report from the Madrid daily El Pais touches upon the women and children gravely injured by the exploding “dum dum bullets used by the Securitate.”

Other reports from Bucharest and Timisoara hospitals during the events:

“At Bucharest’s main emergency hospital, doctors said that Securitate snipers, apparently using infra-red telescopic sights and exploding dum-dum bullets, had been firing throughout Saturday night and they shot many civilians, with bullets striking foreheads and hearts.  The morgue at the hospital was stacked with 90 bodies at noon today, almost all of them civilians dead of gunshot wounds.”

Blaine Harden, “In Bucharest, Tears and Prayers for the Fallen,” The Washington Post, 25 December 1989, p. A1; A40.

Other posts with documents from dosarele revolutiei…

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/16/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/19/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/20/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutie-de-la-timisoara-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/21/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/27/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-v/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/28/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-vi/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-iv-the-romanian-television-building-is-in-danger-bomba-in-subsolul-televiziunii/

Myth 3:  The Romanian Television building is in danger, danger of an explosion!   (TVR e in pericol–Pericol de explozie!)

This is part IV of a four part series.  For parts I, II, and III see

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/21/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-romanian-revolution-part-i-the-hegemony-of-conspiratorial-and-postmodernist-explanations/

Myth 1:  The “Timisoara Syndrome” or the “False Timisoara Grave (the Paupers Cemetery)/Massacre” https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/21/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-ii-the-timisoara-syndrome-or-the-false-timisoara-grave-the-paupers-cemeterymassacre/

Myth 2:  The water is posioned!  (Apa este otravita!) https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-iii-the-water-is-poisoned-apa-este-otravita-dr-heyndrickxs-toxicology-report/

Myth 3:  The Romanian Television building is in danger, danger of an explosion!   (TVR e in pericol–Pericol de explozie!)

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Like the “water is poisoned” episode discussed in part III of this series, the claims of TV announcers regarding the threat posed to the Television building is a favorite for Romanians and Romanianists to lampoon:

Once again, Andrei Codrescu captures a widely and wildly popular view of TVR’s alleged role during the December 1989 events:

The Romanian revolution was a complex affair. It was a dramatic triumph that had the whole world for its audience, a world that keeps wondering long after the final curtain how much of what it saw was real. If I hadn’t lost my normally skeptical head to the euphoria of December, I would have questioned the single most evident source of news about the revolution: television. But it was precisely television that seduced me during my visit and made me lose sight of things I already knew….Imagine the shock and dismay of our newsmakers and our idealists–including myself–when most of these horrible events we saw with our own eyes on television turned out not to have happened at all. How could the grizzled, experienced Western journalists who are sworn to hard facts have missed the many clues and glaring contradictions that pointed to artifice? The astounding truth of the matter is that much of the glorious Romanian “revolution” was, in fact, a staged play, a revolution between quotation marks….But it couldn’t have been long after, however, the young revolutionaries (if that’s who they were) started becoming “responsible,” and the “spontaneous” provisional government showed up with its own TV script. The television station then became the headquarters of the new government, which, as far as most people were concerned, was born out of video like Venus out of the seashell. And hats must be off to the producers of the exceedingly realistic docu-drama of the strategic military center from where, in a charged atmosphere reminiscent of Reds or Dr. Zhivago, generals with telephones on both ears shouted orders at troops on vast invisible battlefields in every part of the country. Today I stand abashed by my naivete. Much of that Romanian “spontaneity” was as slick and scripted as a Hollywood movie. If I were in charge of the Emmys, I’d give one to the Romanian directors of December 1989. 

SOURCE: The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile’s Story of Return and Revolution (Avon Books, 1991), by Andrei Codrescu, pp. 204-206. excerpted from http://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2004/12/06/the-romanian-revolution-was-televised/

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As with the “poisoned water” episode, so too with the claimed threats against Television, including the idea that a bomb had been found and disarmed in the basement of the Television building (as can be seen in the above video)…no researcher has attempted to verify the veracity of the claim, until now!

Recently, however, several sources have been unearthed/come to light that clarify what happened.  Here, Corneliu N. Vaida of Timisoara recounts how a Securitate member from Timisoara was convinced to call the Television Station in Bucharest to inform them that, as with many other highly strategic buildings in the country, TVR had been mined and an explosion could be set off.  It appears that the announcement above about a bomb having been disarmed in the basement of the TVR building, was as a result of this information from Timisoara:

Securistul trădat pentru binele TVR

În seara zilei de 22 decembrie şi-a vizitat mama, care locuia pe bulevardul 6 Martie, unde a găsit în apartament un vecin. Era vorba de Gheorghe Toader, un căpitan în rezervă la Securitate, care se refugiase de frică sa nu fie asasinat.

Urmărind programul “Revoluţiei în direct”, de la TVR, au observat la un moment dat o persoana care ţinea în mână un obiect care semăna cu o tastatură.

“Văzând tastatura, securistul a scos o exclamaţie de teamă: <Vor sări toţi în aer acolo! TVR e obiectiv strategic şi este minat, ca în cazuri extreme să poată fi aruncat în aer, tastând un cod pe aşa un detonator!>. A spus că a lucrat la aşa ceva în Bucureşti într-o intreprindere specială. La isistenţele mele a acceptat până la urmă să scrie o declaraţie anonimă pe care am dus-o personal la armată”, a mai declarat Corneliu Vaida.

Ajuns la Garnizoana Timişoara, Vaida a arătat scrisoarea colonelului Zeca, comandantul garnizoanei. “Acesta a pus mâna pe un telefon şi a sunat imediat la Bucureşti la o structură a armatei căreia i-a relatat continutul declaraţiei, dupa care mi-a cerut sa dezvalui identitatea semnatarului argumentând că acesta mai cunoaşte informaţii care ar ajuta la evitarea de victime”, a adaugat Vaida.

Neavând ce face, a trebuit să meargă cu armata să îl predea pe secursitul din casa mamei. “Înspre dimineaţă am văzut la televizor cum a venit cineva şi a declarat că explozibilul cu care era minată televiziunea a fost dezamorsat”, a mai spus timişoreanul.

http://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/foto-corneliu-vaida-purtator-cuvant-revolutiei-timisoara-s-au-luptat-grupari-securitate-armata-1_510985f54b62ed5875bbb81f/index.html

The event is also recounted by parachutists in this TVR video from 31 December 1989 that only recently appeared on the internet.

Parasutisti de la R. 64 Pst. Boteni la Televiziunea Romana in 31 decembrie 1989:
Lt. col. Ilie Croitoru, Mr. Chiranescu Ion, Cpt. Radulescu Aurelian, Cpt. Constantin Vlasceanu

Corneliu Vaida has been kind enough to share with me, the following additional confirmation of his actions in the document below:

HP0010

For more about Corneliu Vaida during the Revolution in Timisoara in December 1989, see his interview with ITN correspondent Penny Marshall on 27 December 1989:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/05/11/lets-go-to-the-videotape-i-to-the-army-its-confirmation-that-theyve-been-dealing-with-a-specially-trained-force-because-its-the-type-of-bullet-theyve-never-seen-before-itn-uk-telev/

Corneliu Vaida Timisoara December 1989

More on what transpired in and around the Television Station below:

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Related posts:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/10/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-iv/

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Ioan Itu, “Si ei au luptat in Revolutie.  De partea cui?,” Tinerama, 10-16 septembrie 1993, p. 8.

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Maior Tudor Petrescu, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22, 30 mai 1990, p. 3.  (S.D. = Silviu Dutu)

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Aura Alexa Ioan (cu Adrian Popescu-Necsesti), “Teroristii Revolutiei au certificat de psihopati!” Tinerama, 8-14 octombrie 1996, p. 8

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Valentin Gora:  Au fost arestati oameni ai securitatii, teroristi.  Astazi, nimeni nu stie ce s-a intimplat sa ce se intimpla in continuare cu ei.  Dumneavoastra i-ati vazut?  Ii cunoasteti?

Petre Constantin:  Au fost arestati multi oameni, am mai spus-o, care aveau asupra lor arme de toate felurile, pe toti i-a preluat armata si nu stiu ce s-a intimplat mai departe cu ei.  Adjunctul meu, Traian Puscasu, a fost injunghiat in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie, pe hol, la etajul 11.  Agresorul, locotenent-colonelul Vasiliu, il viza pe generalul Tudor sau pe mine.  Eu am lipsit citeva miunte, generalul Tudor s-a ferit in momentul atacului si a fost lovit Puscasu.  Totul se intimpla in usa biroului.  Militarii au sarit si l-au imobilizat imediat.

Valentin Gora cu Petre Constantin, “Petre Constantin:  Cind a dictat decretul de instalare ? de asediu pe intreg teritoriul tarii, in biroul lui Ceausescu se afla si Eugen Florescu,” Cuvintul, nr. 12, 18 aprilie 1990, pp. 4-5.

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http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2013/11/13/cercetarile-parchetului-in-dosarul-revolutiei-37-bucuresti-televiziune-raniti-si-ucisi-5/

425. Parte vătămată Puşcaşu Traian (Televiziune-Vol. 110)
Numitul Puşcaşu Traian, fiul lui Gheorghe şi Maria, născut la data de 01.03.1927, în Iaşi, domiciliat în Bucureşti (…) în noaptea de 22/23.12.1989, în timp ce se afla în incinta televiziunii, unde-şi desfăşura activitatea ca director adjunct al TVR, a fost înjunghiat în abdomen cu un cuţit de către lt. col. Vasiliu Cornel, care se afla în dispozitivul de pază al instituţiei respective.
Conform raportului medico-legal nr. A1/3409/1990, numitul Puşcaşu Traian a prezentat la data de 24.12.1989 o plagă abdominală penetrantă cu interesarea splinei şi arterei epigastrice. Leziunea a putut fi produsă prin lovire cu corp tăietor-înţepător (posibil cuţit). A necesitat circa 25 zile de îngrijiri medicale. Leziunea i-a pus viaţa în pericol.
Prin rezoluţia nr. 1411/P/1990, din data de 15.11.1990, Procuratura Militară Bucureşti a dispus neînceperea urmăririi penale faţă de lt. col. Vasiliu Constantin, sub aspectul infr. prev. de art. 20 rap. la art. 174 C.p., reţinându-se că, în urma expertizării sale psihiatrice, s-a stabilit că a acţionat fără discernământ.

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Fragmente din Revolutia Romana in Direct 22.08.1991 (Mostenirea Clandestina, Episodul 8): Gheorghe Trosca, USLA, si MApN

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on November 14, 2014

(punct de vedere strict personal)

EPISODUL 8 -“Episodul al optulea este dedicat evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 şi include un interviu în exclusivitate cu col.(r) Filip Teodorescu, fost locţiitor al şefului Direcţiei a III-a, Contraspionaj. Acesta dezvăluie aspecte controversate legate de izbucnirea Revoluţiei de la Timişoara, de culisele procesului ce a urmat şi de diversiunea “securişti-terorişti”, căreia i-a căzut victimă şi colonelul USLA Gheorghe Trosca, ucis în mod barbar în noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie în faţa Ministerului Apărării, spre avertizarea cadrelor Securităţii care i-au identificat şi urmărit pe agenţii KGB din România.”  [un film de Monica Ghiurco; postat de catre Remus Satala pe dailymotion 8.Moștenirea clandestină 10,463 views “România pentru Români” Published on Feb 26, 2015]

1) Gelu Voican Voiculescu, min. 41:59-42:24 si 44:32-46:02 (preluat de la Revolutia Romana in Direct 22 August 1991)

Gelu Voican Voiculescu memoriaza din Expres  (Brindusa Armanca). 17-23 septembrie 1991 (nr. 86)

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/cine-a-tras-dupa-22-cine-au-fost-teroristii-inca-o-dovada-de-adevar-ce-lipseste-din-cartea-lui-marian-romanescu-fost-uslas/

pentru articolul intreg:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/10/decembrie-1989-usla-bula-moise-teroristii-si-fratii-musulmani-dan-badea-marian-romanescu-expres-iulie-1991/

semnificativ, se pare ca Marian Romanescu era si el arestat/suspectat de a fi un terorist:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/12/u-s-l-a-in-stare-de-hipnoza-dan-badea-expres-1991/

2) Relatarea in presa romaneasca despre convorbirile intre Trosca si Bleort (de exemplu, de catre Dan Badea si Ioan Itu) este gresita.  Semnificativ,

NU Gheorghe Trosca la fata locului, ca martor ocular, a raportat lui Bleort (la dispeceratul) ca erau militari care trageau in sediului MApN-ului, dar in schimb Bleort care i-a raportat lui Bleort.  (de la bun inceput, mi s-a parut ca era vorba de o informare despre dispozitia fortelor armatei in zona MApN-ului fiindca nu exista nici o alta constatare despre militari care ar fi tras impotriva Ministerului zece minute)

27:10-28:33

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Gheorghe Trosca: Permiteţi să raportez.

Ion Bleorț: Da.

Trosca: Transmite prin stație lt. col Vânătă că la MApN a apărut o coloană de şapte-opt TAB-uri, două camioane cu militari şi două ARO, au tras circa zece minute asupra Ministerului şi s-au oprit acum…

Bleort: Cum, mă?!
Trosca: …asupra Ministerului.
Bleort: Cum au tras?
Trosca:Au tras asupra MANului!
Bleort: Nu se poate!
Trosca: Asta e.
Bleort: Asupra Ministerului, măi?
Trosca: Asupra Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, timp de zece minute, şi acum
s-au oprit.
Bleort: S-au oprit?
Trosca: Da.
Bleort: După ce opriţi în dreptul ultimului tanc, ne comunicaţi nouă, ca să luăm legătura cu Ministerul. (…)
 

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Ideea lui Constantin Isac (despre acest personaj vedeti aici: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/12/constantin-isac-intre-14-si-22-decembrie-dinamovist-de-judo-la-iasi-prezent-in-zona-crematoriului-cenusa-si-martor-in-piata-universitatii/ ) la 32:15 ca peste noapte, ABI-urile erau intoarse cu fata spre Minister, sugerind directia unui presupus atac!, este o minciuna ieftina (cititi mai jos cei spuneau militarii si civilii din blocurile in jur in 1990).

3) Mihai Lupoi 46:07 incearca sa nege existenta teroristilor arabi (degeaba, fiindca ei au existat: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/25/rebeca-doina-cercel-revolutionar-cc-pcr-decembrie-1989-erau-intr-adevar-dosare-pe-care-era-scris-strict-secret-si-in-care-am-vazut-ca-erau-mentionate-bazele-de-antrenament-antiterorist/ )

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alte detalii:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/usla-bula-trosca-militaru-m-ap-n/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/03/destituirea-romanian-revolution-usla-attack-vidia-bullets/

Incidentul M.Ap.N. (23/24 decembrie 1989): detalii importante

Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (II) (Romania, decembrie 1989)

Romania 1989: Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (I) 13 iunie 1990

Cine l-a nominalizat pe Trosca? (cazul MApN, 23-24 decembrie 1989)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 28, 2010

Dezinformare despre Cazul M.Ap.N. 23-24 decembrie 1989…dejucata de catre uslasii ei insusi

pe pagina 116 Ardeleanu admite ca el insusi–nici vorba de Militaru sau altcineva–l-a nominalizat pe Trosca pentru misiunea faimoasa…

pe pagina 153 uslas-ul Soldea admite ca dupa incidentul sangeros, el a fost anchetat pentru informatii despre subunitatea lui…si pe pagina 155 ca i s-a supus o analiza de urina…ca sa verifice daca el a fost drogat…

“Defense Ministry Incident” Redux:  the USLA on 23/24 December 1989

What we know is that this requested “fall-out” of USLA cadre never took place.  We also know from the mouth (Romanian Television, 1991) and hand (a directed report dated 8 January 1990) of USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu himself that, on that evening of 23 December 1989, Army General Ion Hortopan broke into a meeting of Ardeleanu with generals and other officials of the Front leadership and announced that “Near a military objective, on the outskirts of the capital, that was being fired upon, an armed Plutonier Major Popa Ion Stefan from the USLA was captured.”[123] Clearly, it would appear, based on this, that this USLA member was not part of some team dispatched in the “defense of the Revolution.”  According to Mihai Floca writing in August 1990, the objective in question outside the capital was the CITc (?), the USLA member claimed he was coming to the military unit to “surrender,” and Ardeleanu, “upon receiving the news played dumb, [saying] ‘I think it is [USLA] Chief of Staff Trosca’s doing, he did this to me’.”[124]

Floca and others have maintained that at this point, late on the night of 23 December 1989, while at the Defense Ministry, General Militaru called upon Ardeleanu to bring the entire personnel of the USLA (757 officers and ncos) to the Defense Ministry to root out the “terrorists” who were firing upon it.  As “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’,” this left 647.  Of these, Militaru supposedly wanted 600 to report.  Instead, only 18 came in 3 ABIs.[125]

It has always seemed unusual, and this has been highlighted by others, in the serious situation that prevailed on the night of 23-24 December 1989, that in order to clear these blocs of “terrorists,” the units that came were led by the Chief of Staff Gheorghe Trosca.  Why send your leadership out to do this job?

The Securitate apologists and conspiratorialists have, of course, sought to suggest that General Nicolae Militaru nominated them because precisely these individuals had surveilled him for alleged links to Soviet intelligence.  But, as I have written elsewhere, Ardeleanu himself, upends all of this when he freely admits that it was he who selected Trosca for this mission.[126] It, of course, seems to make a lot sense when one considers his apparent attempt to lay what was happening at the feet of Trosca.  That he ordered Trosca and the others to the scene, under absurd circumstances, and they ended up getting killed, appears to be something for which many former USLA personnel—some of whom appear to have genuinely resented the boorish and vindictive Ardeleanu for his slavish behavior toward Elena Ceausescu and Tudor Postelnicu—were never able to forgive Ardeleanu.

I won’t tax the patience of my readers with another rehash here of what happened when two of three USLA ABIs arrived out front of M.Ap.N. headquarters (Defense Ministry).  I have previously discussed it extensively elsewhere.[127] It is important to note, however, that the USLA officers who survived the incident admit that they were beaten up, interrogated about the makeup and duties of their unit, and forced to take urinalysis tests to determine if they were drugged—all things which suggest they were hardly considered the innocent victims of an unfortunate accident at the time it occurred.  Army officers involved in the confrontation who were interviewed in spring 1990 maintained that they witnessed gunfire from the guns on the USLA vehicles, three of the machine guns recovered from the USLA vehicles showed signs of having been fired, the gun barrel of one the tanks had been blocked, and on the top of another tank a machine gun and signal lantern were found.[128] These officers then claimed that after their recollections were published in June 1990, they were “warned to think long and hard since they have families and to stay on their own turf if they do not want to have problems.”[129]

Residents of the apartment blocs surrounding the Defense Ministry also claimed harassment and intimidation.  One family maintained that they had been visited in May 1990 by two individuals flashing “Militia” identity cards, inquiring what had happened in December 1989 in that location, and insisting that different parts of the Army had merely fired at one another—there had been no “terrorists.”  Another resident who requested anonymity since he had “had enough problems in the past with the Securitate” said he was visited on 21 May by a “police major who called himself Popescu [a common Romanian last name, commonly used as a cover by Securitate personnel]” and wanted to talk about the “terrorists,” but that the resident should not inform the Army of his visit.  Some residents maintained that a neighbor suspected of being a Securitate collaborator had been going around suggesting “how to ‘correctly’ interpret the incident with the two armored personnel vehicles [i.e. the USLA unit] on the night of 23/24 December.”  The Army journalists concluded in June 1990 based on these interviews that “therefore, ‘the boys’ [a common euphemism for the Securitate] are [still] at work.”[130] It has been particularly frustrating that neither Siani-Davies nor Dennis Deletant—both of whom have written on this key episode—has apparently ever taken the time to read the disclosures in Armata Poporului, and hence completely ignore the descriptions of what happened and claims of harassment and intimidation of citizens from these blocs.

Mihai Floca’s credibility on the issue of what happened on the night of 23-24 December with the USLA units at the Defense Ministry, what happened on the other nights of the period of the Revolution in the same location, and on the claims of residents of these blocs—as noted, witness accounts that other publications simply ignored—is enhanced by the fact that his articles from late December 1989 through 1990 clearly do not show someone out “to get” the USLA or tarnish their reputation.

What is particularly notable is that after writing the (in)famous 26 December 1989 Romania Libera article (“Ucigasii de meserie al teroristului nr. 1,” p. 3) claiming that these USLA personnel in the Defense Ministry incident were “terrorists,” Floca wrote articles demonstrating how the USLA collaborated with the Army in certain actions during December 1989, at the CC building (“Actiune concertata impotriva pericolului,” Romania Libera 29 December 1989, p. 4) and at the Television Station (“Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p.4).  Only in June 1990, did he begin publishing interviews with the Army soldiers involved in the 23-24 December incident with the USLA at the Defense Ministry and with the residents of the surrounding blocs.  These articles were as he noted prompted by two developments:  the articles in the opposition publication Zig-Zag rehabilitating the USLA and claiming they were innocent victims in the Defense Ministry incident (authored by the Securitate’s number one cheerleader, Angela Bacescu), and articles in the French press arguing that the “terrorists” had not existed.  It was thus not as Siani-Davies suggests a response prompted first by a letter from the widows of the dead USLA officers.[131]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/04/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-8-usla-and-friends/

Destituirea: “Romanian Revolution USLA Attack” (vidia bullets)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 3, 2011

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,343

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  • Evenimentul Zilei also conducted a poll about the worst Romanians and the results were:

    Ion Iliescu (the first president after 1989)

    Nicolae Ceauşescu (the last communist president before December 1989)

    Gigi Becali (controversial businessman, party leader and chairman of the football club Steaua Bucharest)

    Adrian Năstase (the Prime Minister of Romania between 2000 and 2004)

    sursa: wikipedia – 100 greatest romanians

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • – Armata le-a dat peste cap toate planurile si in loc sa-i aresteze ia lichidat pt ca au schimbat parola necomunicando la celor din FSN si pt ca USLA au inceput sa traga si disperati sa intre rapid in unitate. Pt ei nu conta viata ci “misiunea implinita”

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • – Trosca nu a avut legatura cu Moscow cum uni au dat din gura si au vorbit. Trosca venise in Unitate cu o zi in urma (el patrula in MAP zile si zile in urma si cunostea perfect tot echipajul) si stia foarte bine de legatura cu Moscow dar el se facea ca ploua si ca FSN e de partea lui – Iliescu a aflat si stia ca pt el Trosca nu era un om de incredere

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • – Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • – Trosca a mirosit de la bun inceput ca e o lovitura de stat si nici nu a vrut sa destainuie multe din unitatile secrete USLA unde stateau si comunicau in ascuns. USLA era ca o armata invisibila dar nu in volum ci in inteligenta si profesionalism technic de un grad foarte inalt (sa nu uitam ca Mossad era # 1 si USLA era pe locul…ghici: LOCUL 2)

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • – Trosca a mirosit totul si avea planul lui (2) sa intre in unitate si in loc sa distruga vezi Doamne agentii straini (care ambii FSN si Trosca stiau ca nu exista in unitate), sa puna stapanire pe intreaga unitate pt ca el era LOCOTENENT-COLONEL si stia ca la ordine ii se vor supune multi – regimul Ceausist inca era la putere si puterea de grade si ordine inca exista (uslasii de la ABI 3…si alte unitati secrete care existau si care Iliescu nu putea sa stie unde erau localizate inca DEJA STIAU)

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • sa recapitulez putin ca sa stie intreaga tara in 2 parti ce s-a intamplat. deja am primit warnings ca o sa fiu…

    – Trosca stia deja de documente si stia ca nu exista teroristi in unitate

    – USLA (nu toti) stiau ca teroristii trebuiesc expulzati si ca comunica cu “sovieticii” (agenti straini)

    – Iliescu + FSN vroia ca Trosca sa intre in Unitate ca sa-l aresteze si sa puna stapanire pe comunicatia secreta a USLA care avea frecventa radio total diferit de a armatei sau a organelor de militie

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • sarmanul PLOSCA a murit nevinovat si e inmormantat in cimitirul eroilor revolutiei

    thaminiclip 2 years ago
  • ai dreptate in felul tau sarcastic spus. dar asta denota ca Iliescu nea tras de 3 ori pe sfoara: 1) a omorat pe USLA 2) pe Trosca 3) a pacalit si folosit armata + lumea cum ca USLA sunt teroristii…ca sa iasa frumos din unitate cu tot ceea ce el vroia sa CHIPURILE DISTRUGA spundu-le USLAsilor ca SUNT TERORISTI IN UNITATE…DAR SPUNANDU-I LUI TROSCA…VEZI DOVEZILE ASTEA TREBUIESC DISTRUSE.DAR CATI DIN CE AM SPUS EU AICI O SA INTELEAGA: MOMEALA A FOST USLA…DAR ADEVARUL S-A PETRECUT IN UNITATE.

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • Nu vei fi uitat! Vei ramane pentru totdeauna in inimile noastre! Te iubim! You will not be forgotten! You will always be in our hearts! We love you! For always and forever. Odihneste-te in pace! Rest in peace! Viata ta frumoasa ce urma sa traiesti ti-a fost luata brusc. Your beautiful life whas taken away from you. Rusine tiganilor! Shame on gipsys!Condoleante familiei,prietenilor si iubitei lu Marian, Condoleances to Marian’s family,friends and Marian’s girlfriend.Imi pare foarte rau!I’m sorry!

    doru1coman 2 years ago
  • …nici teroristi n-au existat la rev..pt k e logic…a inceput totul spontan…cand ii aducea Ceausescu in tara imediat.?..cand el a fugit cu coada intre picioare…atunci au tras unii in altii…si de ce?…pt k s-a creat o mare dezinformare…evident tot din interesele unora…

    fideitos2003 2 years ago
  • deci…aveam 8 ani la rev, dar stiu mai mult decat credeti pt k m-am info…dar nu pot sa inghit asemenea kkturi…agigatori si pers care au schimbat realit. si cursul evenimentelor au fost si mai sunt inca dar sa nu invinuim niste persoane care nu aveau nicio treaba cu asta…cum sa-i faci pe cei din USLA “teroristi” cand treaba lor era sa previna si sa elimine terorismul

    fideitos2003 2 years ago
  • ce este interesant e ca o persona zice: CUM POATE O MANA DE OAMENI SA ATACE SEDIUL UNEI INSTITUTII?

    iar alta persoana zice: CUM SA II FACI TERORISTI DACA EI NE APARAU DE ANTI-TERORISM? Stai ca nu inteleg pai o mana de oameni ne aparau de TERORISTI…sau o mana de oameni care se credeau ZEI omorau pe ORICINE ca sa omore pe FALSII TERORISTI…armata ?!

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • Col Trosca, care era in A.B.I., inainte cu cativa ani de la tragicul eveniment, l-a avut in “lucru” pe gen. Militaru (care in acea noapte era la comanda armatei). vreti sa stiti de ce a fost chemat echipajul USLA la MApN? Trosca a fost tinta ! Dumnezeu sa-l odihneasca !

    catzaveicu 2 years ago
  • Dupa atata timp…iata un om care vorbeste adevarul. Ai dreptate. FOARTE MARE !

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • sustii ca au venit sa atace ministerul? cu doua aro? in fata ministerului erau tancuri. si inca ceva…unde sunt grenadele si tot ce inseamna armament?

    ser4all 2 years ago
  • da susin asta. cu 2 arouri. USLA erau dementi. nu le era frica de nimeni. nu tancurile au iesit in fara portilor dupa somatie. care grenade si ale cui…hai ca mai zapacit de cap…ori vrei sa faci spulberare de ideii ca sa creezi diversiune. lasa ca grenadele si armamentul numai traiesc…sau te referi cine le-a ridicat…pai…daca nu apar in poze inseamna ca au fost ridicate. normal ca nu lasi armament pe trotuar…cati ani ai ?

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • Si acum sa revenim la USLA. Si col. Trosca. asta era printre putinii care stia ca Militaru e agent sovietic si care avea legatura cu unitatea 0110 anti KGB a Securitatii..avand dosarul lu’ Militaru si probabil si pe a lu Ilici (ca agenti de influenta ai Moscovei) putea sa vorbeasca si sa deconspire usor operatiunea sovietica “revolutia” din Romania.

    liviums 2 years ago
  • pai se cam stie si ce-i cu astia..toata luna decembrie 89 prin Romanica au inceput sa curga coloane de turisti sovietici cate 3-4 in masini Lada..monitorizati “atent” de securitate.astia au stiut ce avea sa se intample, dar stiau ca nu se pot pune de-a curmezishul istoriei.

    liviums 2 years ago
  • Deci treaba cu revolutia se cam stie, a fost o lovitura de stat impotriva lui Ceausescu menita sa ne aduca si pe noi in randul noilor “democratii” gorbacioviste..Polonia, Cehoslovacia, Ungaria etc…ca noi ramasesem ultimii..schimbarea venea de la Moscova si se numea “glasnost” si “perestroika”..cum doctrina Brejnev evoluase si ea (adica schimbarea nu se mai facea cu tancul ca in cehoslavacia 68) uneltele erau mai perfectionate adica trupe speciale, diversionisti, razboi electronic, etc.

    liviums 2 years ago
  • Those poor USLA guys received and order and without any doubt they wanted to fallow it. But the army men who were inside the Ministry of Defense buildings had their orders too: “Protect the building!”. And that’s what they did. But i don’t feel sorry for USLA. Their role in the represive actions against the Revolution has been proved.Plus, soldiers died due to miss-informations too (remember the Otopeni episode). Anyway this happened almost 20 years now.How come u only post this now?

    haiducs 2 years ago
  • I cannot answer to you last question. Unfortunatelly I am not alone.

    At least now…than never.

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • Habar nu ai ce vorbesti destituirea , la pregatirea lor niciodata nu ar fi facut acea eraoare tactica de atac frontal cind erau tone de posibilitati sa ajunca inauntru fara batae de cap . daca ai vazut un ABI de aproape ai sti ca este cam greu sa deschizi focul din el inspre fata vehicolului si plus ca tre sa fi cam imbecil sa ataci cu un ABI blindate ,si trosca nu era imbecil. Trosca a participat la ancheta de spionaj impotriva lui Militaru cu 6 luni inainte sa fie revolutia

    Awalance 2 years ago
  • trebuie sa te educ putin aici. nu s-a tras din ABI. Al treilea ABI a ramas in urma cica defectiune..adica Trosca planuise un mic backup ca nu avea incredere in FSN. Un ABI s-a apropiat brusc sub tunul tancurilor..ATAT DE RAPID CA NU VEZI NICI IN FILME OMULE.

    lupta si trasul nu a luat mult timp

    Trosca avea harta intregii unitai. Cu o zi in urma el deja viztase unitatea.

    -end of part 1-

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • USLA AVEAU PLANUL SA INTRE IN UNITATE RAPID NU SA IASA DIN ABI si sa fie lichidati. EI STIAU CUM SI CARE SA SE APARE UNUL PE ALTUL.

    AU FOST NEVOITI SA IASA CA SA MENTINA CONTROLUL INTRARII. IAR SUB TANK..TANKUL E CA SI FACUT PT CA NU ARE TUN…NU ARE CUM SA DISTRUGA UN ABI BLINDAT DIN OTEL.

    –end part 2–

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • USLA MAI AVEAU 2 OAMENI LA BALCOANE IN FATA MAPN…CEL DE-AL DOILEA BACKUP…SI CARE COMUNICAU TOT CE SE INTAMPLA prin RADIO CU ABI 1 si 2. ARMATA A FACUT DE CAPUL EI..ADICA MILTARII AU GANDIT LOGIC SI AU INTORS TANCURILE SI AU STRIVIT ABI 1, ATUNCI BAIETII DIN ABI 2 AU IESIT CA SA TRAGA SI SA AJUTE ABI 1. AU FOST MACELARITI…MILITARII AVAND INFRA ROSU VEDEAU TOT DIN UNITATE

    –end of part 3–

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • trosca si adjunctul sau care se afla si el in ABI au facut parte in 87 dintr-o acheta despre spionaj pt rusi unde era implicat gen militaru , cel care i-a chemat la mapn .Cind au trecut de razoare militaru a dat ordin sa fie schimbata parola si au fost prinsi intre punctele de control .Trosca a ramas cu miina pe statie si toate unitatile USLA au auzit “” sariti sariti fratii nostrii ne omoara “.Au fost orice numai teroristi nu .Dumnezeu sa ii ierte

    Awalance 2 years ago
  • opa….cineva care stie. opa…fi atent….ca nu sunt singur aici. sunt perplex.

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • Mama a fost acolo! Au fost agitatori in multime! Oameni, cu geci de piele negre si foarte bine imbracati. A fost o mega regie, au fost agitatori si agitatia s-a imprastiat in multime, provocand haos. Tancurile erau chiar in spatele manifestantilor, nu au facut nimic. A FOST O REGIE!!! REGIZOR: Sergiu Nicolaescu, CAMERAMAN: Adrian Sarbu, PROTAGONISTI: Iliescu, Roman, Dinescu, Dan Iosif si toata sleahta de labagii! Trezirea fratzica, chiar nu v-ati dat seama??? Nici macar pana acum??? Yank’s hand!

    shockolanu 2 years ago
  • For people with interest. I recomand a documentary with I saw on ARTE. I saw the german version. The name is: “Schachmatt. Strategie einer Revolution” or french title “Échec et Mat. La révolution roumaine”

    There are maybe some answers to diferent questions. I don´t say that there in this film there is only truth, but if some things there are true, than maybe you see who is friend and who maybe “friend” :)

    I found the film on “veoh”

  • sa nu uitati!bucurestenii de a doua zi care au scris cu creta pe abi-uri “teroristi”,au dat foc soldatilor morti,au stins tigarile pe ei,i-au scuipat si s-au pisat pe aceasi soldati,au 100% vina ca si cei care au tras si i-au condamnat din umbra!asta-i romania !

    ceapadincarpati 2 years ago
  • uite ca am uitat de comentariul tau. cum de nu l-am citit. ok. nu vreau sa te supar dar nu e bine sa spui lucruri care nu s-au intamplat care de fapt sunt ZVONURI. Nu oamenii au scris cu creta. Asta vroia Iliescu sa faca la TV propaganda ca uite ei sunt Teroristi….si el sa vina de la F SALVARII NATIONALE .. VA SALVEZ EU (dupa ce v-am omorat).. SI DECI…EROUL MARE SI TARE RAMANE IN PICIOARE: ION CEL FARA DE TARA. Armata a scris cu creta. Din pacate nu oamenii au scris ci armata spre dimineata

    destituirea 2 years ago
  • asadar cei care se luptau cu armata noastra erau niste arabi care erau mercenarii luyi ceausescu? si USLA era cu noi romanii sau cu ei?? sincer eu nu pricep nimic…scz

    alexut576 3 years ago
  • pai cam asa ceva. a fost intr-adevar o unealta ruseasca si multa diversiune. deci: 1. aramata era controlata de armata si avea ordine de la iliescu (fsn). 2. arabii au fost angajati. de cine? asta e intrebare de baraj. uni zic de ceausu alti de rusi si americani. trbuie sa citesti ca sa afli adevarul. eu unul am vazut pe arab…asa ca asta pot sa o spun cu mana pe inima. 3. usla – am explicat in alt coment cu cine erau si ce tel aveau

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • USLA=Unitatea Speciala de Lupta Antiterorista=DIAS, brigada antitero SRI etc.

    Eu unul nu cred ca USLA a participat la revolutie pt ca era subordonata securitatii si, deci, nu a participat. Teroristii sunt de fapt agentii straini. “Straini” pt ca erau trimisi de alte state, ei fiind romani care au fugit din Romania si care voiau sa cada regimul comunist. Adevarul gol-golut il gasiti in cartea “Un risc asumat” de Filip Teodorescu(cmd. contraspionaj in acea vreme)

    oby115 3 years ago
  • —-partea a doua—

    Tata i-a dat o haina militara pt ca pe vremea aia era frig si ningea. Nu vorbea Romaneste dar avea accent si silabisea intr-o limba araba care nu am putut la vremea respectiva sa o descifrez a fiin Iraniana, Libaneza, Siriana sau Irakiana. L-am lasat in bloc pe scari singur. A doa zi nu l-am mai vazut. FSN nu era inca infiintat. Blocul era langa cimitirul de pe strada Antiaeriana (Calea Rahovei) ci nu langa MAPN

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • Aveam 4 ani atunci, dar am o poveste: in 22 sau 23 seara s-a intrerupt curentul in bloc(doar blocul si scara mea). A doua zi erau urme de sange in casa scarii pana in strada, usa de acces pe acoperis era deschisa. Curentul a fost intrerupt din tabloul de contoare sau cum ii zice, fara sa fie fortata usa. Intrebarea mea

    este cine l-ar fi vanat pe individul ala?

    Blackthorn2323 3 years ago
  • Am fost de asemenea intrebat daca stiu sau am dovezi mai clare despre Mercenarii lui Ceausescu.

    —partea intai—-

    Ce pot sa zic e ca personal nu am dovezi. Dar am vazut cu ochii mei impreuna cu tatal si fratele meu un mercenar ARAB ascunzanduse la bloc fara haine groase pe el.

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • pt ca cineva m-a intrebat prin mail cine e acel USLAS din Oradea am sa indic aici informatia respectiva:

    Nume: Filip Teodor.

    Carte/Articol: “secretele usla”

    Tiparit ca: ISBN 10: 9739778267 ISBN 13: 9789739778268

    Publicat de: Editura Obiectiv

    Scos pe piata: 1999

    Se gaseste pe internet mai peste tot. In special pe site-ul rapidshare unde are nr de file 24703033 si este de tip PDF

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • Intamplarea asta nu a fost cumva filmata ?? Am vazut in alta parte o galerie de vreo 5 poze pe care aparea un format de data tipic camerelor video de pe vremea aia.

    Bagacios 3 years ago
  • orice posibil. am vazut ca exista si alte poze din alte surse. considerand ca erau oameni la ora respectiva care se plimbau pe strazi. orice este posibil.

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • i wish i knew what you guys are sayin, i dont know how to speak romanian, but my

    ak-47 was made there : )

    treeisabeast 3 years ago
  • we’re just commenting pro and against our own thoughts. nothing really major. the movie is the major proof.

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • din surse sigure stiu ca O PARTE DIN USLA care detinea armament acasa permanent i-au fost retrase armele .asta a fost un semn dupa parerea celui care mi-a descris o parte din evenimente.ulterior ..parasind tara si facind anumite declaratii nu tocmai pe placul unora a scapat de la 2 atentate..politia locala si-a dat verdictul.. e calibrul .; preferat a l fostilor tai ‘angajatori’ ..

    fane5fast 3 years ago
  • orice se poate. exista un om care a scris un intreg articol – un USLAs din Oradea. Am pus link-ul in film asa ca poti sa da-i o fuga si sa-l citesti. E in Romaneste dar e cam lungusor. O sa-ti ia cam cateva ore bune. Dar e bun de citit. Omu nu minte. Dar ca oricine mai arunca si el cu cate o parere pe aici si pe acolo..asa ca nu 100% e adevarat.

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • Parerea mea e ca intreg teatrul asta grotesc de intamplari a fost orchestrat foarte bine de cateva figuri cheie ale asa zisei revolutii, care, spre nefericirea lor (si mai ales a noastra), s-au grabit sa puna mana pe putere si sa manipuleze in fel si chip informatii din cele mai bizare (ex. scenariilor cu terorirsti arabi) cu scopul de a se proteja sau a sterge urme compromitatoare (Stanculescu, Militaru, Gusa, si, cu voia dvs, ultimul pe lista, Ilies…)

    lucianghita 3 years ago
  • cu voia DVS fiind a cui? Poti sa vorbesti ca doar esti pe You TUbe. Cam ai dreptate zic eu dar nu uita ca a fost o lupta intre 3 forte: USLA, Iliescu+FSN, si mercenarii lui Ceausescu. Iliescu nu a planuit sa-i distruga pe USLAsi ci a avut nevoie de ei…dar datorita unor intorsaturi USLAsi au facut de capul lor si a lui Trosca. Ei au fost mai mult cu Ceausescu decat cu Iliescu. Ceausescu la acea ora era inca in viata. I-ti amintesti ?!

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • ce bah ti-e frica sa spui numele lu nenorocitu ala , comunist borat, iliescu baga-mi-as pula in masa si in tot neamu lui de gunoaie.el a planuit tot. sa ia locul lui ceausescu nu sa faca democratie.dar nu a iesit chiar cum a vrut…pe aproape. ce sa zic si de mineriade? l-as scuipa intre ochi daca as avea ocazia. mori in mortii matii odata ca la puscarie nu te baga astia ca sunt intr-o oala cu tine jegos nenorocit.mi se face greata cand il vad pe la TV. ION ILIESU MUIE!!

    keliosbox 3 years ago
  • Frumos, foarte frumos, nu as fi putut spune asta, mai bine decat tine!

    shockolanu 2 years ago
  • In comentariile mele de mai jos nu iau apararea nimanui. Sesizez doar penibilul unui “documentar” facut de un pustan care habar nu are in ce a fost implicat taica-sau (asta daca intr-adevar tatal lui e cine pretinde el ca e). E greu si ne-etic sa proiectezi vina celor intamplate in zilele de dupa 22 dec in corpore asupra undei singure institutii, fie aramata, fosta securitate sau mai stiu eu cine.

    lucianghita 3 years ago
  • Nimeni nu proiecteaza nici o vina…ci o realitate.Daca te supara faptul ca USLAsii au fost omorati – nu esti singurul. Daca te supara faptul ca USLAsii au incercat sa intre PRIN FORTA in unitate denota 2 adevaruri: asa erau ei (intrau si prin foc pt ca erau antrenati si capabili) si bineteles ca isi iubeau tara (nu Sovieticii) si vroiau sa distruga lagatura cu Moscova din MAPN. Imi pare rau ca ma numesti pustan. Dar eu nu ma supar. Iliescu m-a facut golan in 91. Eu imi voi iubii tara mereu!

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • Mie insa mi s-ar fi parut mult mai nimerit

    sa atace noaptea,prin surprindere. Aia erau profesionisti,nu amatori! Foarte dubioasa toata drama!!!!

    varain2 3 years ago
  • pai asa s-a intamplat. au atacat noaptea spre dimineata. era inca intuneric.

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • După film un tovarăş securist a luat cuvântul şi i-a asigurat pe cei prezenţi că “Mama Rusie” nu-i va uita niciodată.

    În acel moment am crezut că visez, refuzam să acept realitatea. Ulterior m-am convins pe propria piele de “profunzimea” vorbelor tovarăşului securist.

    securatu 3 years ago
  • Aşa cum au fost intoxicări în 1989, sunt intoxicări şi astăzi. Nu trebuie să puneţi botul chiar la toate… Adevărul este cunoscut doar de cei implicaţi direct în evenimente.

    Prin 2000 am văzut un film despre implicarea uslaşilor în revoluţie, conform căruia aceştia mai aveu puţin şi deveneau îngeraşi…

    securatu 3 years ago
  • mai “destituirea” uita te si tu la filmul Hartia Va Fi Albastra”. Ce a fost acolo ? Niste creteni au dat ordine ca sa vina USLA-si si amaratii de soldati nu stiu nici pe lume traiesc(nici unu nu cred ca trasese cu arma in toata armata lui)si daca nu au avut o convirmare de parola a iesit ce a iesit.Un colonel niciodata nu umbla in tanc,abi,tab(el este comandant de garnizoana,perimetru sau obiectiv)..

    mury1974 3 years ago
  • ce zici tu aici este tot ceea ce in acest filmulet cu exceptia ultimei propozitii. “Un colonel niciodata nu umbla in tanc,abi,tab(el este comandant de garnizoana,perimetru sau obiectiv)..” Din pacate un ex-colonel (facut colonel dupa moarte) a fost imbracat in haine de trening + militare si a avut ordin special. Din pacate…aste e realitatea.

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • O minciuna ordinara!Uslasii au fost chemati

    in ajutor si au fost macelariti.Nimeni nu ataca in plina zi,cu blindate usoare,o cladire aparata de tancuri si TAB-uri.Cretina idee,ca si cretinul care a pus clipul!

    varain2 3 years ago 3
  • imi pare rau ca esti suparat. dar iti raspund la cele afirmate: tatal meu a fost acolo.

    nu s-a tras in plina zi. evenimentul sa desfasurat in timpul noptii spre dimineata. Uslasii au fost chemati facandusi datoria ca USLASI: cred ca toata lumea stie asta. Ca au fost macelariti asta denota cauzei. Pe scurt: Au venit rapid langa tancuri crezand ca vor lua institutia pe de-antregul. Din pacate tancurile s-au intos si iau facut zob. Apoi a inceput tragerea. Have a nice day!

    destituirea 3 years ago
  • super tare!

    tovarasultau 3 years ago
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Crima ? [Adevarul, Cazul MApN 23-24 decembrie ’89 si sosirea uslasilor…] Maior Mihai Floca, Armata Poporului, 6 iunie 1990, p. 3

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 17, 2010

http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Ziaristii_Revolutiei-20_de_ani_fara_regrete_0_245375855.html

si totusi…

Faptul ca, de la Revolutie incoace, armata este tinta unor atacuri bine dirijate si din ce in ce mai insistente, il poate constata oricine.  Prea putini dintre ziaristii care isi pun semnatura sub articolele defaimatoare care apar in unele publicatii, mai sint interesati de aportul armatei la apararea Revolutiei, la victorie.  Jertfa celor 267 de ofiteri, maistri militari, subofiteri, elevi si soldati, nu mai are, acum, nico o importanta!  Tot ce-i preocupa pe respectivii “oameni de bine” este sa arate ca armata a contribuit la genocid, eventual sa demonstreze ca aceasta contributie a fost cit mai mare.

Iata, insa, ca, in ultima vreme, concertul dirijat impotriva ostirii si-a largit repertoriul.  Au aparut voci distincte–unele caracterizate prin tonalitatii foarte inalte.  Acum armata este acuzata, incriminata si pentru ce a facut dupa 22 decembrie.  In cadrul acestei orientari noi, in mod deosebit se remarca articolul “O crima ce trebuie neaparat dezvaluita” semnat de doamna Angela Bacescu in revista de actualitati si reportaje “ZIG-ZAG MAGAZIN” numarul 9, din 23-29 aprilie 1990.  Nu stim in ce redactie si-a facut doamna Bacescu ucenicia in ale scrisului.  Un gazetar oricit ar fi el de tinar, isi alege cu grija cuvintele, nu se joaca cu ele.  Or cuvintul “crima” — folosit cu atita nonsalanta, chiar in titlu, presupune si un subiect.  Pe cine acuza doamna ziarista, in ce directie trage?  Spre armata, bineinteles.  Insa autoarea merge mult mai departe cu insinuarile.  Acuza “populatia isterizata de pericolul terorist”,  sustine ca pe teroristi “nu-i vazuse nimeni…”.  “Daca acestia au fost”.  De unde este asa de bine (dez)informata?  Sau vrea sa strecoare subtil, ideea ca cei din sediul M.Ap.N. s-au luptat cu propriile inchipuiri, iar locatarii blocurilor din zona Orizont au fost bintuiti de halucinatii?  Numai ca toate argumentele pe care le aduce provin doar de la una din partile participante la ceea ce s-a intimplat in cumplita noapte de 23/24 decembrie.  Concret, aduce o singura marturie — a sergentului-major Stefan Soldea, unul dintre uslasii supravietuitori — restul informatiilor avind o provenienta dubioasa.  Ca doar n-a fost prezenta, in acea noapte, la sediul M.Ap.N.  (Eu, insa, am fost !)  Se pare ca dictonul latin “audeatur et altera pars” (asculta si partea cealalta) ii este strain.  Tocmai de aceea, in cele ce urmeaza, vom exprima punctul de vedere al militarilor care au urmarit sau au luat parte mijlocita la acel “macel stupid”  — ca o sa citam pe doamna Bacescu.  Am mai scris despre acest subiect.  De aceea m-am hotarit sa reiau firul evenimentelor.  N-am dreptul sa tac.

Au venit pe furis…

Capitan Victor Stoica:  Noi — cei care ne aflam in Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. — au putut urmari in intregime, ca dintr-un amfiteatru, acel spectacol zguduitor.  Pina acum, nu am luat atitudine, desi eram la curent cu stradaniile unor ziaristi de a-i face eroi pe cei de la U.S.L.A.  Am tacut deoarece ne-am gindit ca in urma celor cazuti au ramas sotii, copii –care nu au nici o vina.  Dar acum–pentru ca am fost acuzati de crima, sin in nici unul din ziarele civile nu s-a prezentat punctul nostru de vedere–avem obligatia sa spunem ce am vazut.  Observatorii nostri au fost contrariati de faptul ca cele doua A.B.I.-uri, venind de pe strada Ho Si Min, au stins farurile cu 20-30 metri inainte de a vira la dreapta, pe Drumul Taberei.  Nici o masina blindata–tanc sau T.A.B.–nu procedase, pina atunci astfel.  Eram la etajul intii.  Am vazut clar cum cele doua autovehicule blindate, s-au furisat intre tancuri, unde au stationat, pret de 20-30 minute.  Nici vorba de steagul alb, pomenit de doamna ziarista!  Daca au venit cu ginduri curate, de ce s-au oprit intre tancuri si nu s-au indreptat spre poarta ministerului?  Probabil din cauza ca — asa cum s-a constatat dimineata — nici un uslas nu avea asupra sa documente de identitate –iata un raspuns care contine alta intrebare!  De ce nu au incercat sa ia legatura cu noi?  (In A.B.I.-uri, dimineata s-au gasit doua portavoce).  Dar sa continuam cu faptele.  Am fugit repede la postul meu de lupta, schimbul de focuri incepuse si am vazut, cu ochii mei, cum mitraliera de pe un A.B.I. tragea spre unul din blindatele noastre.  Pe unul din tancuri am vazut o umbra — mi s-a parut ca cineva incearca sa foloseasca mitraliera a.a.  !!  Pentru mine nu este clar nici cum au ajuns cei trei supravietuitori in blocul A.1.  Probabil ca ei debarcasera inainte — focul nostru era prea dens ca sa mai scape cineva.  Oricum, din felul cum au actionat cele doua echipaje, este clar ca nu au avut intentii prietenesti…Si inca ceva.  La aproximativ o ora dupa incetarea focului am vazut vreo zece indivizi care au iesit — cu mare dexteritate — pe unul din geamurile de la parterul blocului B.3…

Colonel Romulus Antonescu:  Si eu vazut, pe unul din tancuri — inainte de a trage A.B.I.-ul din fata lui — o umbra:  mi-era chiar teama sa nu fie lovita de tragatorii nostri.  Afirmatia din Zig-Zag — ca cei de las U.S.L.A. “n-au tras nici un foc” — nu este adevarata.  Pe toti ne-a mirat lumina alba de la teava mitralierei de pe A.B.I. (ei trageau fara trasoare):  dovada ca se tragea, din turela tancului sareau scintei asemeni artificiilor de la pomul de iarna.

Capitan Mihai Munteanu:  Este oare, intimplator ca din echipajele respective faceau parte doi fost ceisti?  De unul dintre acestia destul de dur le era frica multora dintre ofiteri armatei din Bucuresti…iar faptul ca in noaptea respectiva, aceeasi persoana purta uniforma de -a noastra –avind la manta epoletii de locotenent-colonel de geniu si la vestonul de fresco (!) epoleti de maior inginer — cum poate fi interpretat?

Locotonent-major Cristian Costache:  Ca ofiter de control si comanduire, asiguram traficul in sediul ministerului.  Era acalmie, liniste deplina.  Nu fusesem preveniti de sosirea A.B.I.-urilor.  Primul care le-a zarit — “doua mogildete” intre tancuri — a fost colegul meu Radu Dragos, capitan post-mortem.  A fost impuscat in seara de 24 decembrie…

Ce zic tanchistii?

–Domnule capitan Gheorge Tanase, sinteti comandantul companiei de tancuri care, in acea noapte ocupa dispozitiv de lupta in fata Centrului de Calcul.  Ce s-a intimplat, de fapt?

–In primul rind, am fost total surprinsi de venirea — la orele 0,10 — si stationarea celor doua A.B.I.-uri intre tancurile noastre.  Incepind cu noi — cei din linia intii — si terminind cu grupa centrala, care conducea actiunile in sediul M.Ap.N. Nu am fost in nici un fel avertizati, nu ni s-a comunicat semnele de recunoastere si cooperare.  N-am deschis focu de indata ce i-am remarcat — cumne acuza doamna ziarista.  Intre venirea lor si deschiderea focului a trecut aproape o jumatate de ceas!  Initial ni s-a ordonat sa asteptam pina se vor face cercetari.  Prin statie am auzit ca cei din A.B.I.-uri au raportat ca sint trimisi de un oarecare maior Roman de la F.G.M.S. (Din cite am inteles acest ofiter nu exista).  Ni s-a cerut sa vedem ce-i cu ele si, la nevoie sa procedam conform situatiei in care ne aflam, adica de lupta.  Nu a fost nici eroare, nici crima.  Noi am tras fiind convinsi ca nu avem de-a face cu prieteni…

–In afara de modul –interpretat ca suspect–, in care au patruns in dispozitivul dumneavoastra, ce dovezi mai aveti?

–Faptul ca, la teava unuia dintre tancuri, tabla de protectie a fost rupta in doua locuri, trei din pistoalele mitraliera pe care le-am “capturat” (cu teava scurta si incarcator de 20 cartuse)  aveau tevile afumate, turela tancului de comandat de locotenentul maior Vasile Barbu a fost blocata, iar dimineata plutonierul Butoi a gasit pe tancul sau un pistol mitraliera si o lanterna de semnalizare…Cit despre dotare, sa nu-mi zica mie cum am citit intr-un ziar de mare tiraj– ca era jalnica, in nivelul armatei.  A doua zi, am recuperat, din cele doua autoblindate, radiotelefoane Telefunken, veste antiglont, pistoale de 9 mm, pumnale, binoclu cu infrarosu — care pentru noi constituiau noutatii absolute.  Si, pentru ca tot am fost provocati, sa va mai spun ceva.  Dimineata, cind l-am intrebat “de ce ai tras, ma?” unul dintre cei trei supravietuitori, pe care i-am gasit in blocul de vizavi mi-a raspuns:  “Ce p. mati, si eu execut acelasi ordin ca si tine!!!”  E clar ca nu au venit ca prieteni!

–In Zig-Zag, sub o poza, sta urmatoarea explicatie:  “A.B.I.-il dupa ce s-a tras in ei cu tunul”…

Locotenent Liviu Lita: Nu ma mai mira nimic, din moment ce o ziarista se amesteca in probleme de armament si munitie.  Noi o informam — daca vrea, intr-adevar, sa stie adevarul — ca greutatea unui proiectil nu este cu mult sub 20 kilograme, iar viteza cu care paraseste teava depaseste 800 pe secunda.  in asemenea conditii — avind in vedere si distanta mica de tragere — A.B.I.-ul ar fi fost facut praf.  Dar noi nu am folosit tunul pentru ca, la citiva pasi, erau blocul de locuinte…La fel de gogonata este si minciuna ca am fi tras cu mitraliera de 12,7 mm.  Folosirea acesteia presupune ridicarea deasupra turelei, ori nimeni nu era nebun sa puna in pericol viata servantiilor, atita vreme cit teroristii misunau prin blocurile de peste drum!

Partea civila

Trei din membrii celor doua echipaje, ramasi in viata s-au refugiat in blocul A.1., la scara B.  Redam mai jos ce ne-au declarat doua dintre locaterele imobilului:

Maria Sincai (apart. 34):  In jurul orei 02,00 am auzit ca in usa a batut cineva, nu tare, tare.  Apoi a sunat.  nu am raspuns.  Jos se tragea.  Numai cind a inceput sa piriieyala am deschis.  Pe prag — lac de singe:  erau trei oameni in niste uniforme mai deosebite, un fel de combinezoane kaki, unul singera la stomac si picior.  Am aflat ca a mai ramas unul ranit in mijlocul strazii, si carea ajutor, dar fiind mai corpolent, nu l-au putut trage.  Ne-au rugat sa stergem singele de pe scare spunind:  “astia de jos stiu ca sintem aici si ne iau ca din oala.”  Am intrebat daca exista posibilitati — pe la subsol sau prin pod — ca sa poata parasi blocul pe partea cealalta.  Nu stiu cind au ascuns pistolul sub covor.  Baiatului meu i-au cerut haine civile.  Unul din ei, Romica a telefonat de vreo doua ori, la seful lor, probabil.  Au si primit un telefon.  La un moment dat, spre dimineata, spune cam asa:  “Ce faceti, domnule, cum ne scoateti de aici, ca ne fac praf?  Ei ne-au luat drept altii”…  “Sa stit ca sint foarte bine pregatiti.  De la Favorit la poarta de intrare sint tancuri pe amindoua partile.  Ne-au facut zob”…

Stela Baila (apart. 25):  Dimineata, eu am cules doua pistoale de pe scari si le-am predat tanchistilor.  Cind baiatul doamnei Sincai a coborit (in pijama), eu am anuntat armata ca avem “oaspeti”.  Apoi, au venit militarii, i-au ridicat.  unul din cei trei ne-a zis rizind:  “O sa vedeti, sintem armata, sintem romani, nu teroristi.”

In loc de concluziile, sa redam si opinia unui alt martor ocular, locontenent-colonelul Vasile Tintas:  Stim acum, ca U.S.L.A. era o unitate formata in principal din cadre din foarte buni profesionisti.  Ei trebuiau sa-si dea seama ca aici vor intilni tot profesionisti.  Or, prin modul in care s-au comportat, chiar in varianta ca au fost chemati — si au facut dovada celui mai pur amatorism, daca nu este vorba de altceva.  Pentru ca toata conduita lor — incepind cu parasirea cazarmii de catre seful de stat major intr-un moment in care comandantul unitatii lipsea, apoi stingerea farurilor etc. –  a contrazis modul firesc de actiune.  Asa ca in nici un caz accidental nu a fost generat de trupele aflate in dispozitiv.

Deci lucrurile nu stau asa de simplu, pe cit incearca sa le prezinte doamna Bacescu.  Declaratiile redate mai sus isca o multime de intrebari.  Cei patru uslasi care au supravietuit — locotenent-major Romulus Girz, plutonierul Petre Gainescu, sergentii-majorit Stefan Soldea si Ionel Paduraru — speram sa ne fie in curind interlocutori.

Maior MIHAI FLOCA

“Crima?!” Armata Poporului, nr. 23 (6 iunie 1990), p. 3.

Romania 1989: Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (I) 13 iunie 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010

Ziarul armatei–deci al unei institutii situate, gratie Revolutiei din Decembrie, in afara politicii–nu este, in mod deliberat, o publicatie polemica. Asa cum este si organismul din care faceum parte, noi, ziaristii militari, am optat pentru o atitudine sobra, echilibrata, pe cit posibil obiectiva, constienti de faptul ca, prin lispa materialelor sezationale, de scandal vom avea, pentru inceput, o audienta mai redusa in rindul cititorilor. Fericiti ca, in sfirsit, ne putem vedea de treburile noastre–ca si armata in ansamblul el, de altfel–noi nu ne-am propus deci, in mod programatic, sa ne luam la harta cu diverse organe de presa din tari, nici vorba de cele din strainatate. Iata, insa, ca saptaminal independent “Expres”–nr. 18, mai 1990–ne pune la curent cu dezvaluirile senzationale ale revistei franceze “LE POINT”, din 21 mai 1990. Initial, ne-am gindit ca-i treaba politicienilor sa dezamorseze, sa combata continuntul incitantului articol, intitulat “In Romania, complotul iese la iveala.” Dar cind am aflat, de la niste ziaristi straini, ca armata noastra “a tras si asupra propriilor rinduri, astfel ca, in confuzia generala, au murit aproape la fel de multi ostasi si civili,” nu am putut ramine in expectativa. Pentru ca este vorba de o incalificabila ofensa adusa eroilor pe care armata i-a jertfit pe altarul Revolutiei. Noi nu cunoastem meseria armelor din carti, ci am deprins-o in poligoane, pe cimpurile de instructie. Daca accidentele se pot produce si pe timp de pace–lucru de care ne-au convins viata, practica militara pe care am trait-o, vreme de peste doua decenii–acestea au fost pe deplin posibile, si chiar s-au produs, si pe timpul Revolutiei, cind inamicul era peste tot si nicaieri. Dar de aici si pina a afirma ca cei 267 de morti si 674 raniti ai armatei s-au impuscat intre ei e o cale atit de lunga, pe care nici un om cu buna credinta n-ar face-o. Nu punem la indoiala buna credinta a jurnalistilor francezi, desi ideea promovata de ei convine de minune celor care se dau de ceasul mortii sa ne demonstreaza ca, de fapt, teroristii n-au existat. Fie-ne, insa, permis sa aratam ca documentarea celor de la “Le point” a fost, cel putin, incompleta. O spunem noi, care am fost tot timpul aici, reporteri printre gloante, in punctele fierbinti ale Revolutiei. O spunem si o argumentam, pentru inceput, cu fapte petrecute in zona sediului Ministerului Apararii Nationale.

DIVERSIUNE SI INTIMIDARE.

Nu ne vine sa credem! Desi a trecut peste o jumatate de an de la consumarea
evenimentelor, oamenii sint speriati. Este vorba de locatarii celor trei
blocuri–A1, A2, B3–dispuse in fata Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. In urma cu
citeva saptamini, erau deschisi, raspundeau la orice intrebare, relatau faptele,
imprejurarile extrem de grele prin care au trecut, iar acum sint prudenti, retinuti, tematori. Mai mult, o doamna–cu mina pe inima si vocea tremurinda–ne
sfatuieste sa o lasam balta, ca riscam prea mult…

Ce s-a intimplat de fapt? In ultima vreme, pe la usile unor apartamente, au
batut citeva…persoane de bine, care, cu destula discretie–si
subtitlitate–s-au straduit sa le explice oamenilor cum s-au petrecut, cu
adevarat, lucrurile in perioada 22-25 decembrie 1989. De exemplu, in blocul A.1,
apartamentul 27, o doamna–banuitaj de a fi avut, in trecut, relatii cu
securitatea de trist renume–le a sugerat gazdelor cum sa interpreteze ,corect’
incidentul cu cele doua A.B.I.-uri din noaptea de 23/24 decembrie.

Alti vizitatori n-au avut nici macar inspiratia de a-si disimula identitatea
(sau poate ca chiar asta au facut). Domnilor, mie sa nu-mi dati numele la ziar,
ne roaga alt locatar. Am avut destule necazuri cu securitatea. In 21 mai, a fost
la mine un maior de politie, Popescu zicea ca-l cheama. S-a interesat despre
teroristii care au tras din blocul nostru. I-am spus ca, daca vrea sa loveasca in armata, nu are nici o sansa: au tot adevarul ii voi
spune. In final mi-a adresat o rugaminte: sa nu stie cei de la armata de vizita
lui… A revenit peste 2-3 zile, dar mi-a fost frica sa-i mai deschid…”

Cine-o fi misteriosul maior si de ce pastreaza atita discretie? Se pare insa ca
persoanele cu pricina manifesta un mare interes pentru blocul B.3. Domnul Stancu
Varzan are mai mult curaj.

–Dumneavoastra nu stiti ce nopti de cosmar am trait noi: se tragea si din fata
si din spate, de la gunoaie. Totul a inceput in 22 decembrie, pe la orele 22.00:
la inceput sa auzeau focuri izolate. Apoi–ca la razboi. Numai in baie ne
simteam oarecum in siguranta. La un moment dat, am si ris. Fata mea a plecat
pina la bucatarie si, cind s-a intors, ne-a spus sa fim linistiti ca, de sus, de
pe bloc, trage o mitraliera si ne apara! Era vorba, de fapt, de o
pusca-mitraliera, care executa foc spre Centrul de Calcul…Si de pe casa
scarilor s-a tras, in aceasi directie. Teroristii au incercat sa intre la mine in apartament, dar noi avuseseram grija sa blocam usa cu un cuier
greu. Sint bolnavi astia care vor sa ne convinga ca a tras armata in noi si ca,
de fapt, nici nu au existat teroristi. Dar i-am auzit discutind precipitat,
tropaind: in jurul blocului, pe scari, pe acoperis.

In acelasi bloc, stam de vorba si cu sotii Florica si Gheorghe Petrut. Sint
revoltati.

–Au fost la noi doi civili, spune doamna. Ne-au fluturat pe sub nas niste
legitimatii, din care am retinut ca sint de la militia din Turnu-Severin. Cind
noi am intrebat cine a tras, ei ne-au informat: “armata a tras.” Bine, dar in
armata cine a tras?–am continuat noi–doar in parcul din fata blocului au fost
impuscati studenti militari. “Au tras unii in altii”–ni s-a raspuns.

Si in incheiere, gazdele noastre ne avertizeaza:

–Fiti cu mare bagare de seama, domnilor ofiteri. Astia au tot interesul sa va
compromita!!!

Deci ,baietii’ lucreaza. Fara voie ne gindim la povestea cu lupul care se
intoarce la locul unde a mincat o oaie. Si a criminalului care se intoarce la locul faptei…

(Maior Mihai Floca si Capitan Victor Stoica, Armata Poporului, 13 iunie 1990, p. 3)

Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (II) (Romania, decembrie 1989)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010

Armata Poporului, nr. 26, 27 iunie 1990

Mult incercatul bloc A1

Prinsi intre focuri–ale teroristilor, dintr-o parte, si cele ale militarilor aflati in dispozitivul de aparare al M.Ap.N., din cealalta parte–locatarii blocului A1 (Drumul Taberei, 16) au trait, in zilele Revolutiei din Decembrie, nopti de groaza.  Sa-i ascultam.

–Eu, pur si simplu, nu inteleg domnilor, cum unii ziaristi pot fi asa de rai si palavragii.  Distrug omul, nu alta!  S-au scris in presa fel de fel de minciuni despre ce s-a intimplat aici, in zilele si noptile ce au urmat fugii lui Ceausescu.  Unii s-au apucat sa arate–culmea nerusinarii!–ca nici n-au fost teroristi.  Pe noi, insa, nu ne-a intrebat nimeni:  ce am trait, ce am simtit atunci, cum am supravietuit…

Si spre a fi mai convingatoare, doamna Stela Baila (scara B, apart. 26) ne arata o cutie cu…gloante (18 la numar), pe care le-a strins din camere.

–Cum a inceput lupta?

–Era pe 22 decembrie.  In jurul orei 21,00 am vazut, aproape de poarta Centrului de Calcul, un TIR mare, un fel de sa lunga.  Soldatii nici nu apucasera sa ia pozitie de lupta.  De sub masina s-a deschis focul:  atit spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, cit si spre noi.  Tirul era foarte intens, cred ca de sub masina trageau peste 20 de indivizi.  Un glont mi-a trecut pe deasupra capului si s-a infipt, uitati-i urma, sub tavan.  Ce a urmat, nu va mai spun.  Ne-am refugiat in camera din spate, dar nici acolo n-am avut parte de liniste:  din parculet, se auzeau multe strigate, apoi a inceput rapaiala.  De pe toate blocurile se tragea!  Tocmai umblam la televizor, il reglam, cind un glont a lovit in perete, deasupra televizorului, la citeva zeci de centimetri de capul meu.  M-am ales doar cu o rana la mina stinga.  Dupa ce teroristii ne-au mai “onorat” cu un glont, am fugit in baie.  Dimineata, geamurile erau faramitate.

Din aceeasi directie, dinspre blocul B4, s-a tras si in apartamentul vecin.  Gaura din geam se afla la aceeasi inaltime cu cea de pe perete:  1,45 m.  Dat fiind ca apartamentul se gaseste la etajul 1, este evident ca teroristul a deschis foc dintr-un loc situat la aceeasi inaltime.  De la locatarii acestui apartament (27), aflam ca teroristii erau imbracati intr-un fel de salopete, probabil de culoare gri.

–Da, i-am vazut cu ochii nostri.  Alergau ca niste speriati prin parculet, de la un bloc la altul, isi aminteste doamna Maria Cotofana.  Dupa miezul noptii, in careul format din cele trei blocuri a avut locu un violent schimb de focuri.  Apoi, am auzit batai puternice in usa.  “Deschideti, sintem armata, avem raniti!”–auzeam de pe scari.  Am primit si noi un ranit–il cheama Cristian Popescu si niste student la Academia Tehnica Militara–impreuna cu un coleg.  Imedia cei doi tineri s-au repezit la balcon, sa traga in teroristii care le-au ucis colegii.  Foarte greu i-am determinat sa renunte, le-am explicat ca teroristii ne “avertizasera” deja si ne vor face zob apartamentul.  Ii vedeam cum se chinuiesc privind neputinciosi cum banditii scuipau moarte si foc de pe blocul B3…

“Au tras din blocul meu!!!”

Exista locatari care i-au vazut foarte de aproape pe teroristi, au discutat cu ei. Unul din acesti oameni a acceptat sa ne povesteasca patania sa, dar cu conditia sa nu-i precizam identitatea. Intimplarea a avut loc in aceeasi noapte: 22/23 decembrie 1989.

–Sa tot fi fost 12,30-1,00, cind am auzit “poc, poc, poc”–cineva umbla pe balcon. Fiindca am instalatie electrica acolo, am aprins lumina. Am deschis prima usa ce dadea spre balcon si am vazut un tinar de 24-25 de ani: brunetel, creol, cu parul andulat, slabut. Purta of gluga bej, iar pe deasupra un fel de veston kaki. Inapoi lui, pe lada mai era unul. Grozav m-am speriat: “Deschideti, deschideti”–mi-a strigat brunetul. Am raspuns instantaneu: “Nu se poate, e militia la mine, e militia la mine!” si am inchis usa la loc. El a scos ceva din buzunar–un corp rotund–si a spart geamul usii din exterior. Am fugit, iar in urma mea au rasunat focuri de arma.

Intr-adevar, pe peretele opus balconului sint citeva gauri: acestea nu puteau fi provocate decit de gloante trase din balcon. Din acest balcon–asa cum ne-a relatat locotenentul Marius Mitrofan–s-a tras si asupra studentilor de la Academia Tehnica Militara.

–L-ati recunoaste pe cel care a tras?

–L-am si recunoscut! Dar ma opresc aici, ca si asa am spus prea multe!

Sa mai adaugum ca, pe 23 decembrie, cind gazda noastra a povestit scena cu balconul, un vecin, “binevoitor,” i-a spus: “ti s-a nazarit.”

Foc concentrat asupra Centrului de calcul!

Spre Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. teroristii si-au indreptat cu predilectie armele. Oricine poate constata asta. Daca s-ar fi inarmat cu putina rabdare, gazetarii revistei “Le Point” ar fi putut numara, in peretele frontul al cladirii, circa 300 urme de gloante.  La care trebuie adaugate si gaurile care se mai vad, inca, in geamuri.  Sigur, geamurile ciuruite au fost schimbate, dar,–prevazatori si rigurosi–, cei din Centrul de Calcul, au avut grija sa le fotografieze.  Avem, la redactie, cliseele respective si le putem pune la dispozitia oricui.  Ne este imposibil sa credem ipoteza cu “confuzia generala” a confratilor francezi.  Pentru ca aici nu este vorba de doua, trei focuri–scapate, la un moment dat, intr-o directie gresita–, ci de sute de gloante trimise cu buna stiinta, nopti de-a rindul, asupra unui obiectiv militar.  Si vizind cu prioritate birourile cadrelor cu functii de raspundere.

S-a tras nu numai din strada, ci, in special, de la etajele superioare ale cladirilor de peste drum.

–Noi nu avem caderea sa acuzam pe nimeni–arata colonelul Marcel Dumitru.  Dar nu ne putem mira indeajuns de faptul ca nimeni din cei in drept nu a initiat pina acum o cercetare.  Nu stim cine a tras, dar stim, cu destula precizie, de unde s-a tras in noi.  Cind copacii erau desfunziti, privind prin gaurile produse de gloante in geamurile noastre–avem geamuri duble–vizam tocmai acoperisul, balconul, fereasta de unde s-a tras?

De altfel, cu pricepere de artilerist, pe baza observatiilor facute in acele vile de decembrie, maiorul Vasile Savu a intocmit o schema cu locurile de unde s-a tras asupra Centrului de Calcul.  Numaram pe schema peste 25 puncte de foc, citeva din acestea coincid cu cele indicate de studentii Academiei Tehnice Militare.  In “Le Point” se arata:  “Desigur, citiva securisti, infierbintati, au tras pe strada, de pe acoperisuri.  Dar nu era decit o mina de oameni, cei multi fiind falsii “teroristi”…armata a amplificat roulu securistilor si a plasat ea insasi falsi teroristi in diferite cartiere ale capitalei.”  Ce om cu mintea intreaga poate accepta ideea ca armata a ordonat unor membri ai ei sa traga asupra proprilului minister?!!

Centrul de Calcul este doar una din cladirile aflate in localul M.Ap.N.  Nu vom sti niciodata, cu exactitate cite gloante s-au tras asupra integrului complex.  Oricum, in comparatie cu cele ce au tintit Centrul de Calcul, acestea sint mult mai multe, ele producind victime mai ales in rindurile personalului neadapostit.

Sa mai amintim ca in 22/23 decembrie, tot inainte de a intra in sediul M.Ap.N.–deci in aceleasi conditii, ca si cei cinci studenti–au cazut un ofiter, un subofiter, si doi soldati dint-o unitate de parasutisti.  Tot aici Regimentul de Garda a avut 9 mortii–doi ofiteri si sapte soldati–toti impuscate dupa ce intrasera in dispozitivul de aparare constituit in curtea ministerului.  Deci au cazut, in total, 18 eroi.  Vom afla, vreodata, cine-i are pe constiinta?

(Maior Mihai Floca si Capitan Victor Stoica, “Unde sint teroristii?  PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (II), Armata Poporului, 27 iunie 1990, p. 3)

—————————————————————————————————————————————————

cateva articole mai vechi de catre Mihai Floca:

from https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/04/03/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-8-usla-and-friends/

Mihai Floca’s credibility on the issue of what happened on the night of 23-24 December with the USLA units at the Defense Ministry, what happened on the other nights of the period of the Revolution in the same location, and on the claims of residents of these blocs—as noted, witness accounts that other publications simply ignored—is enhanced by the fact that his articles from late December 1989 through 1990 clearly do not show someone out “to get” the USLA or tarnish their reputation.

What is particularly notable is that after writing the (in)famous 26 December 1989 Romania Libera article (“Ucigasii de meserie al teroristului nr. 1,” p. 3) claiming that these USLA personnel in the Defense Ministry incident were “terrorists,” Floca wrote articles demonstrating how the USLA collaborated with the Army in certain actions during December 1989, at the CC building (“Actiune concertata impotriva pericolului,” Romania Libera 29 December 1989, p. 4) and at the Television Station (“Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p.4).  Only in June 1990, did he begin publishing interviews with the Army soldiers involved in the 23-24 December incident with the USLA at the Defense Ministry and with the residents of the surrounding blocs.  These articles were as he noted prompted by two developments:  the articles in the opposition publication Zig-Zag rehabilitating the USLA and claiming they were innocent victims in the Defense Ministry incident (authored by the Securitate’s number one cheerleader, Angela Bacescu), and articles in the French press arguing that the “terrorists” had not existed.

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I.  Suspecting/Blaming the USLA:  Cloaking a Coup, Creating a Revolutionary Halo for a Bloodstained Army, or Accidental?

a) Where could the idea that the USLA was hostile to the Revolution have possibly come from?

To believe the revisionists, the idea that during the December events there existed “terrorists” and that the Securitate’s anti-terrorist special unit was behind the “terrorism” originated in the minds and announcements of Romanian Television reporters Teodor Brates and Alexandru Stark, General Nicolae Tudor and other military officials at the Television station, and/or General Nicolae Militaru, Silviu Brucan, Ion Iliescu and other members of the National Salvation Front.  A popular belief among revisionists is that they were all in on this deception, the new political officials and televsion personalities.  At their most charitable, revisionists will argue that the suspicion regarding the existence of “terrorists” and of the USLA specifically was based in an understandable and rational fear regarding the Ceausescu regime—but that ultimately these fears were misplaced, and that the suspicion of the USLA actually played a large role in contributing to needless bloodshed after Ceausescu fled.  As in so many controversies surrounding the Revolution, little effort has been made in “process tracing,” working backwards to find the roots of claims and ideas.

It is significant that in 1990, the infamous Securitate cheerleader, Angela Bacescu, blamed all of the above personalities for creating “imaginary terrorists,” but also added another culprit.

“Among those [who showed up at Television on the afternoon of 22 December after Ceausescu fled] was this Cirjan, an ordinary thief, who entered with a false ID.  He had been thrown out of the USLA, several years earlier, because he was stealing from passengers’ baggage, was dealing on the black market, and other such things, and [here] he is from the first moment shouting ‘Death to the Securitate’ and ‘The USLA are coming to shoot us’.” (Bacescu, “Romania Mare” 7 September 1990, p. 5a; see also her allegations against Cirjan in the 21 August 1990 edition)

A “Constantin Cirjan” appears on the list of the 38 “founding” members of the National Salvation Front read out on Television by Ion Iliescu.  And, although I cannot verify that they are one and the same, it is possible that this Constantin Cirjan is the same as a Captain Constantin Cirjan of Romania’s special “mountain hunter” forces, whose recent training exercises are discussed on a web page (see geocities.com/romanianspecialforces/vanatoridemunte).  It would certainly make sense, given that the “mountain hunter” forces were affiliated with the Securitate before the Revolution, and USLA training would likely have had many similarities with the current training of these “mountain hunter” forces.

This is signficant.  In other words, the point that so many revisionists highlight—how was it that even before the “terrorists” appeared, Television was warning about their appearance?—appears to have an explanation.  We must ask:  what would lead Cirjan to suspect this?  From where would he have such information?  Even if we assume for a minute that Bacescu has made up this episode, the question is why?  Afterall, she already targets Brates, Stark, etc. for this allegedly false, intentional “rumor” about the existence of “terrorists” and the USLA’s contribution to them.  True, Bacescu could be wrong, misinformed, or determined to find a scapegoat or settle scores with this individual.  But the point is that she identifies the source of the USLA rumor as a former member of the USLA—in other words, someone with access to such knowledge.  In other words, the “USLA rumor” appears to have originated not with Brates, Stark, or others, but from a former USLA member.

b) But what evidence exists to believe that Front officials at the time suspected the USLA?  Were the public statements that the USLA were involved merely for public consumption, and did not reflect their actual beliefs—particularly in the event that they were lying to begin with and knew the USLA was innocent?

Despite expressions of suspicion of the USLA on TV and elsewhere, regime forces followed the so-called “Special Action Plan” that called for the combined participation of Army units alongside USLA and other Securitate units.  In Bucharest and elsewhere, the USLA were sent out on patrol in pursuit of the “terrorists” (for example, Buzau and Arad, see Armata Romana in Revolutia din Decembrie 1989, p. 192, 209).  With USLA Commander Ardeleanu having “joined” the Revolution from early on, and with the appearance of USLA cooperation, Front officials found it hard to believe that the USLA were the “terrorists.”

Yet they kept on getting reports that something was not right.*  At the very least, Securitate Director General Vlad and USLA Commander Ardeleanu were not putting all their cards on the table, unwilling or “unable” to fulfill requests for maps of Securitate safehouses and architectural plans of key buildings that might have clarified from where the shooting was coming and what exactly was going on (Ardeleanu himself seems to have admitted this obliquely in a document drafted on 8 January 1990, see its reproduction in Dan Badea, “Cine au fost teroristii?,” “Expres,” 15-21 October 1991, p. 15).  In theory, the USLA had either surrendered their registered arms on the 22nd, and/or were performing joint missions with the Army to root out the “terrorists.”  The straw that appeared to break the camel’s back was the arrest of an armed USLA sergeant, Ion Popa Stefan, in the neighborhood of the Defense Ministry—he claimed he was on his way to the Defense Ministry to “surrender”.  Commander Ardeleanu is said to have played dumb upon being confronted with the news:  “I think it’s the hand of my chief of staff Trosca, he’s done this to me” (Lt. Col. Mihai Floca and a group of Army officers, “Eroi, victime sau teroristi?” “Adevarul,” 29 August 1990).  Senior Army officers and Front leaders had had enough.  They would try to call Ardeleanu’s bluff and give them a “loyalty test” of sorts.

One important admission from Commander Ardeleanu—one that has little alternative explanation given his accusations toward Army General Nicolae Militaru who instructed Ardeleanu to order USLA units to the building—severely undermines much that underlies revisionist accounts that Trosca and his men were intentionally lured into a diabolical ambush:

“…When I reported at the Defense Ministry [during the late evening of 23 December], I was asked to give details regarding the organization of the unit, its subdivisions, responsibilities, and attributes.  After this, I was told that the Defense Ministry was being attacked from all around…Then, General Militaru announced that in the “Orizont” building terrorists had barricaded themselves and were firing on the Defense Ministry, ordering me to transmit to my unit an order that 3 intervention groups come to annihilate the terrorists.  He warned me that the order I would transmit would be recorded and that I should proceed with this in mind. I transmitted the order to Colonel B.I. [Ion Bleort] who reported to me that by his side was Colonel Gheorghe Trosca, the unit’s chief of staff, who would take measures to execute the order.  Keeping in mind the importance of the mission I gave the order.  I know that I pronounced the name of Colonel Trosca, and therefore those present knew that he would lead the group.”  [interview from 1991, in Bacescu 1994, p. 116]

This passage is critical for two reasons in terms of the revisionist accounts:  a) it was Ardeleanu, not Militaru or anyone else, who chose Col. Trosca, and b) it was known that the USLA transmissions would be recorded.  Furthermore, the passage testifies to the suspicion of Front leaders:  why all the questions to Ardeleanu about the composition and activities of his unit?

The understanding of what followed, the famous so-called “Defense Ministry incident,” in which seven USLA members lost their lives after Army units out front of the building opened fire upon them, became even more confused after exchanges from the tape of USLA transmissions appeared in the press in early 1993 (Ioan Itu, “Armata Trage in Propriul Minister,” “Tinerama” 8-14 January 1993, p. 7—pretty much the entire article and discussion of this important incident shows up in Deletant, pp. 360-362).  Those exchanges show Trosca communicating to an uncomprehending Bleort back at USLA headquarters—Trosca repeated himself several times—that “a column of six-seven TABs, two trucks with soldiers and two ARO, fired for ten minutes on the Ministry and then stopped.”  In other words, Army units were firing on their own ministry.  A few minutes after Trosca’s announcement to headquarters, Trosca reported that Army tanks guarding the ministry had opened up fire on his USLA team’s armored personnel carriers (ABI).  The impression one gets after that is that the USLA personnel became tank fodder and that they never event fired a shot in response.  The journalist Ioan Itu concluded from this, and Deletant appears to accept, that the USLA detachment had been attacked “because they had to disappear, having accidentally witnessed one part of the Army at war with another part of the Army.”

Of course, there is more to this story.  It was not just a few minutes between the arrival of the USLA detachment at the scene, their report of what was going on, and their coming under attack.  Instead, they had stationed themselves in between tanks—as they had been instructed—for almost a half hour, without making contact with anyone among the Army personnel out front of the Ministry, a fact which caused obvious suspicion for those personnel.  Moreover, according to officers interviewed in spring 1990, they witnessed gunfire from the guns on the USLA vehicles, three of the machine guns recovered from the USLA vehicles showed signs of having been fired, the gunbarrell of one the tanks had been blocked, and on the top of another tank a machine gun and signal lantern were found (Major Mihai Floca, “Crima?” “Armata Poporului” 6 June 1990, p. 3).

What is amazing, of course, if we take Trosca’s transmission about the Army forces firing on their own ministry at face value, is that somehow this occurred “for ten minutes” and yet there is no report that the USLA detachment or the Army units defending the Ministry were hit or returned fire.  And when the USLA detachment is attacked it is from the units guarding the Ministry…because they are embarrassed ?, afraid ? that the USLA personnel witnessed something they should not have seen?  And why or how did these rebel Army units stop attacking the Ministry and what became of them? Furthermore, as Army General Tiberiu Udrareanu relates:

“Personally, I have serious doubts regarding the use of  ‘7-8 TAB-uri, two trucks of soldiers (two platoons) and two AROs’ in a mission of this type, to be able to operate in the center of the Capital and to not be seen by a single person.  And the survivors, because we are talking about hundreds of people, have kept this secret so tightly for over seven years?” (Udrareanu 1996, p. 143).

Indeed, the latter point is significant, as one could imagine how once the content of the tapes were made public, that some lips might have loosened.  And I ask the reader:  which is more plausible, that Trosca—knowing his words were being listened to—was lying or trying to communicate something in code to his headquarters, or that hundreds of soldiers—including draftees and students at the military academy—could or would keep quiet about Army units intentionally attacking their own Ministry?

What happened after the firefight is even more intriguing as evidence of the genuine suspicion of the USLA on the part of Front leaders.  USLA Lieutenant Stefan Soldea who survived the firefight outside the Defense Ministry relates what happened when he was taken to the building.  Remember, here is an USLA officer, who participated in this key incident and his clearly defending his own actions and those of his unit, talking about his experiences in the pages of the Securitate mouthpiece “Europa,” so hardly in a position to, as is soften alleged, be somehow serving the Front leadership:

“A civilian, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, was in the office surrounded by the other generals [Army General Nicolae Militaru, Militia General Cimpeanu, Securitate General Iulian Vlad, and Securitate Fifth Directorate General Neagoe]…he began to interrogate me, ordering that my USLA commander, Colonel Ardeleanu go outside.  He demanded information about the organization, make-up, and functioning of  the unit, its address, what the unit’s members were doing at that moment, my personal information, after which he confronted me with Colonel Ardeleanu and asked me to identify who he was…”(“Crime care nu se prescriu,” interview with Angela Bacescu, “Europa” 28 July-5 August 1992).

Among the many interesting details that come out of Soldea’s interview is his complaint that the next day of his detention he “was forced to take a urinalysis test to see if I was drugged.”  What does all this tell us?  At the very least, it tells us that Voiculescu and other Front officials suspected that the USLA were the terrorists and suspected that—as the rumor circulated at the time (it turned out to be correct, but that is an issue for a different discussion)—they were drugged.**

This was an incredible and inexplicable charade to go through at the time if Voiculescu, who is always portrayed as one of those at the center of the alleged Front “staged war,” was attempting to stage such a confrontation.  If the Front “controlled” the “terrorists,” why do this?  Who exactly were Front leaders trying to impress/convince with this incident?  Moreover, if this truly was a charade—such as is alleged of the Ceausescus’ trial and execution—why is there no record/tape of it?  Would not this have been a great bit of counter-propaganda to the revisionists that could have been given to the media to protect their reputations and credibility?

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/26/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-six/

Dupa 20 de ani: Adevarul vinde…minciuni…fabricate de catre fosta securitate (Angela Bacescu, aprilie 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010

Cazul Angela Bacescu

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Jocul dublu al securitatii: Stefan Kostyal–Generalul unei alte armate moarte (cu Ioan Buduca, Cuvintul, ianuarie 1991) (II)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 16, 2014

Jocul dublu al securitatii: Stefan Kostyal–Generalul unei alte armate moarte (cu Ioan Buduca, Cuvintul, ianuarie 1991) (I)

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Jocul dublu al securitatii: Stefan Kostyal–Generalul unei alte armate moarte (cu Ioan Buduca, Cuvintul, ianuarie 1991) (I)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 15, 2014

 

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25 Years Ago: Front du Salut National / Frontul Salvarii Nationale Gets International Press Coverage for the First Time

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 18, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

“Libertatea nu este un dar”  O convorbire cu Alexandru MELIAN (author of the “National Salvation Front” protest letters against Nicolae Ceausescu’s reelection as Communist Party General Secretary in 1989), Vlad Pavlovici, Contrapunct, 23 martie 1990, p. 3; 15.

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I recently came across the following below:  from Le Soir (Brussels), 18 September 1989.  In the days which followed, the French press relayed this news as well.  Although the letter signed Front du Salut National (Frontul Salvarii Nationale / National Salvation Front) according to this article had been broadcast on Radio Free Europe the previous month, this was apparently its first international press coverage.

http://archives.lesoir.be/amnesty-accuse_t-19890918-Z01ZL8.html?queryand=roumanie+front+1989+ceausescu&firstHit=30&by=10&when=-1&sort=datedesc&pos=30&all=32&nav=1

Amnesty accuse

AFP; ASSOCIATED PRESS

Page 5

Lundi 18 septembre 1989

Amnesty accuse: Bucarest torture

les réfugiés roumains «récupérés»

Des réfugiés roumains arrêtés alors qu’ils tentaient de franchir illégalement la frontière ont été maltraités et torturés par les autorités roumaines, provoquant la mort d’au moins une personne, selon un rapport du groupe de coordination pour la Roumanie de l’organisation Amnesty International parvenu à Vienne.

Certains Roumains, qui ont illégalement franchi la frontière avec la Hongrie, ont été renvoyés dans leur pays par les autorités hongroises, comme Adrian Staicu et Emilia Popescu, 34 ans tous les deux et originaires de Bucarest. Ils ont été livrés le 15 mai 1988 aux autorités roumaines et sévèrement battus alors qu’ils attendaient leur procès dans la prison d’Oradea, au nord-est de la Roumanie. Ils ont été condamnés à un an et quatre mois d’emprisonnement.

Un cas plus récent s’est produit le 14 mars 1989: un groupe de sept jeunes Roumains d’origine hongroise a été arrêté près de la rivière de Crasna. Une fausse frontière simulée par des fils de fer à une certaine distance de la vraie frontière avait fait croire à ce groupe qu’il se trouvait sur le sol hongrois. Un membre du groupe a été déchiqueté par le chien d’un garde-frontière, un autre a été frappé avec la crosse d’un fusil, mais le rapport ne précise pas les circonstances exactes de la mort du réfugié dont elle fait état.

Cette semaine enfin, alors que le régime de Nicolae Ceausescu attaque avec une virulence chaque jour plus forte les expériences réformistes en cours à Varsovie et à Budapest, un groupe d’une trentaine de touristes polonais a été sérieusement malmené et expulsé par des gardes-frontières roumains.

Le groupe de coordination pour la Roumanie a indiqué que, selon des chiffres officiels hongrois, trois mille Roumains se sont réfugiés en Hongrie au cours du premier semestre 1989. Et, pour la même période, ils étaient environ six mille à passer illégalement la frontière avec la Yougoslavie. On ignore toutefois combien de Roumains ont été arrêtés alors qu’ils tentaient de quitter illégalement leur pays. Seule certitude: le délit de fuite illégale est sanctionné d’une peine de prison de 6 mois à 3 ans.

Fronde dans le parti?

Par ailleurs, selon la section roumaine de l’Association internationale pour la défense des droits de l’homme, un mouvement né au sein même du parti communiste roumain demanderait désormais la destitution du président Nicolae Ceausescu. Dans une lettre adressée au responsable de l’organisation, le Dr Preda Mihailescu, il est en effet fait état d’un «appel parvenu récemment à l’Ouest et qui s’adresse aux participants du XIVe congrès du Parti qui aura lieu à Bucarest en novembre».

Selon le Dr Mihailescu, «il y a des raisons sérieuses de soupçonner que le groupement qui lance cet appel et qui se donne le nom de «Front de Salut National» émane du sein même du Parti.

«Faisant allusion à la situation catastrophique du pays et s’inquiétant pour le futur qui peut attendre la Roumanie, les signataires de l’appel demandent aux participants au Congrès de devenir pour une fois ce qu’ils sont de par leurs attributions mais qu’ils n’ont jamais été en réalité: de vrais représentants des intérêts du peuple», poursuit la lettre.

L’appel énumère ensuite les maux qui, selon ses auteurs, accablent la Roumanie et dénonce «le régime incompétent et mégalomane» de Ceausescu, le «dé-sastre de la vie sociale, économique et politique du pays», le «culte de la personnalité, dégoûtant et très nocif, qui dépasse même celui de Staline», l’élimination des cadres compétents, la mainmise du président Ceausescu et de son épouse sur tous les secteurs de l’économie, de l’industrie, de la politique, de l’enseignement, de la science, de l’urbanisme, de la santé publique «et même du sport». Il stigmatise également «les discriminations nationales qui résultent de la politique d’homogénéisation forcée de la population», «l’arrogance de la politique internationale» et «la campagne d’hostilité à l’égard de la Hongrie». (D’après AFP, AP.)

Professor Alexandru Melian of the University of Bucharest turns out to have been the author of the original appeal and a later one.

Marius Mioc posts a link to Melian’s http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/filologie/melian/48.htm for the text of the letters and a link to the Radio Free Europe audio from 29 August 1989 during which the letter was read out at http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2010/02/25/apelul-fsn-radio-europa-libera/#more-6536.
Alexandru Melian’s explanation of the timeline, content, and reactions to his letters (especially column 3 in the Contrapunct article above) seem genuine and the letters appear to have been his own work, without connection to the nomenklatura and officers linked to Ion Iliescu, who seized power on 22 December 1989 during the Romanian Revolution.

Scrisori cĂtre Europa LiberĂ


DRAGI PRIETENI
1

În oropsita şi de Dumnezeu uitată ţară a Românilor rânjesc semnele apocalipsului. Aici în sufletele celor născuţi sub zodia Mioriţei pasc turmele disperării mânate înspre pierzanie de către păcurarii fără de suflete şi de către lupii procopsiţi în dulăi de pază. Căci în fără de sufletele lor a încolţit şi dă rod floarea de mătrăgună, bălteşte otrava aducătorilor de suferinţă şi de moarte, a profanatorilor de lumină şi a uzurpatorilor de istorie.

Am devenit un popor de deţinuţi… fără haine vărgate şi fără de celule zăbrelite (acelea sunt ,,jucăriile” torturii doar pentru temerarii care îndrăznesc să spună NU mascaradei). Închisoarea noastră se întinde de la un hotar la altul şi e străjuită de mitraliere, iar în ultimul timp de garduri de sârmă şi gropi de pământ…

Suntem ,,liberi” să ne mişcăm şi… să fim ,mişcaţi, suntem ,,liberi” să ne adunăm şi… să fim adunaţi, să ne spargem plămânii de entuziasm şi să ne tăbăcim palmele de aplauze în cinstea celor care ne înfometează în frig şi întuneric, care ne umilesc până şi în sfinţenia iubirii… în cinstea celor care ne ucid monumentele istoriei şi ne profanează mormintele, ne terfelesc demnitatea prezentului şi ne ruinează speranţele viitorului…

Suntem ,,liberi” să preamărim dictatura unui clan în blazoanele căruia paranoia şi fudulia, viclenia şi cruzimea, incultura şi repulsia faţă de cultură se împletesc într-un simbolic contur de şarpe încolăcind harta nenorocitei noastre ţări.

Şi totuşi, umbrele disperării n-au devenit atotcuprinzătoare. Speranţa ne luminează încă dăinuirea. Ea este ca un foc sacru pe care îl întreţin mereu cei mai buni şi cei mai îndrăzneţi fii ai neamului nostru… uniţi în disperare, ca minerii de pe Valea Jiului sau ca muncitorii de la Braşov, ori izolaţi de poterele regimului, ca Doina Cornea, Mircea Dinescu, Dan Deşliu şi cei şase conducători ai partidului… pentru a-i aminti doar pe cei mai recenţi din cei mai cunoscuţi.

Rezistenţa românilor însă popor paşnic şi blând dar teribil când ajunge la capătul răbdării este astăzi asemenea unui aisberg… Nu i se vede decât partea de deasupra. Formele de rezistenţă sunt numeroase şi diverse, dar din cauza regimului de teroare şi a lipsei de mijloace, ele rămân în cea mai mare parte necunoscute şi necoordonate. Una e însă atotcuprinzătoare… Tirania îi simte efectele dar rămâne neputincioasă în faţa ei… Poporul român se află într-o grevă generală sui-generis. Eşecurile tuturor planurilor, mult mai profunde şi mai cuprinzătoare decât apar ele în lamentaţiile şi ameninţările dictatorului îşi au originea, fără îndoială, în falimentara strategie politică şi economică, dar într-o măsură foarte importantă în reacţia ostilă a întregului popor faţă de această politică şi faţă de autorii ei. O ostilitate concretizată în muncă puţină şi de proastă calitate, sustrageri multe şi de toate felurile (pentru a se compensa astfel, fie şi parţial, mizerabila salarizare), mistificări de jos şi până sus ale realităţii.

În rezistenţa şi tăriile poporului nostru ni se află speranţa… Dar ea ne este întărită mereu de dumneavoastră, cei care în fiecare seară şi dimineaţă spargeţi zidul minciunii, luminându-ne întunericul şi dăruindu-ne floarea încrederii că nu suntem singuri.

Ea ne este întărită de nenumăratele şi tulburătoarele semne de solidaritate, nu numai ale fraţilor care au luat calea exilului, dar ale atâtor conştiinţe individuale şi colective din întreaga Europă.

Cuvintele rămân foarte palizi mesageri ai mulţumirii şi recunoştinţei noastre faţă de dv., faţă de poporul belgian şi conducătorii lui faţă de Franţa şi Elveţia, Anglia şi Italia, faţă de S.U.A., faţă de solidaritatea poloneză şi forţele democratice ale poporului maghiar care au fost şi sunt alături de suferinţele noastre, care şi-au ridicat glasul împotriva unui regim medieval în toaletă de secol XX.

Vă mulţumim tuturor şi ne exprimăm speranţa că veţi face tot ce este posibil şi pe toate căile pentru a ne ajuta să readucem România în Europa şi în pragul sec. XXI!

Este bine să se ştie un adevăr fundamental: principiul neamestecului în treburile interne îşi pierde orice valabilitate atunci când el este invocat de o bandă de uzurpatori de tip mafiot care terorizează prin puterea armelor şi a tuturor pârghiilor economice un întreg popor, lipsit în această confruntare de alte mijloace în afara libertăţii şi a vieţii fiecăruia dintre indivizii ce-l compun.

România face parte din treburile interne ale Europei şi ale întregii lumi. Iar cine încalcă legile lumii civilizate şi chiar legile bolnave hotărâte de el însuşi, n-are dreptul să beneficieze de inviolabilitate.

Nu uitaţi strigătele de ajutor ale poporului maghiar din 1956 care, deşi au fost auzite pretutindeni, au rămas strigăte în pustiu stinse sub şenilele tancurilor! …

Din ţara Românilor, de peste 10 ani, se aude acelaşi strigăt! … Atâta doar că tancurile de atunci au devenit buldozere, iar agresorii n-au mai venit din afara, ci din lăuntrul ţării! …

Ascultaţi strigătele noastre de ajutor şi ajutaţi-ne înainte de a fi prea târziu! …

Acestor rânduri pe care vi le adresăm dv. şi întregii lumi, am dori să le alăturăm şi un mesaj către Congresul al XIV-lea al P.C.R., instanţa care ar trebui să fie forul suprem al celor peste 3 milioane de comunişti şi nu instrumentul de manevră al clanului Ceauşescu, interesat în primul rând să-şi menţină puterea, indiferent cu ce mijloace şi cu ce preţ.

Vă rugăm să-l transmiteţi la postul dv. de radio, periodic, până la începerea congresului şi în timpul desfăşurării lui!

Dacă nu ne declarăm identitatea, nici alte detalii despre noi, suntem convinşi că veţi înţelege perfect raţiunea unui astfel de comportament. Sperăm să vă putem transmite şi alte mesaje.

 

Frontul Salvării Naţionale

 

APEL

CONGRESULUI AL XIV-LEA AL P.C.R.

Deşi ,,alegerea” dv, la congres a fost regizată după tipicul ştiut în vederea asigurării acelei mase inerte de oameni chemaţi să mistifice şi să tămâieze, să asculte şi să aplaude în ovaţii, ştim că în adâncul conştiinţei celor mai mulţi dintre dv. mocneşte dezgustul, ruşinea şi îngrijorarea faţă de situaţia catastrofală în care a fost adusă ţara de dictatura Ceauşescu şi faţă de marile primejdii care ameninţă viitorul nostru.

Credem că am ajuns în ceasul al doisprezecelea al acestui tragic impas al istoriei româneşti. Credem că măcar în acest ceas aveţi datoria sfântă de a deveni, cu îndrăzneală şi spirit de sacrificiu, dacă e cazul ceea ce teoretic sunteţi, dar practic n-aţi fost niciodată: reprezentanţii unui partid de peste 3 milioane şi, în mod declarat, reprezentanţii unui popor întreg.

Credem că e ultimul ceas pentru a da glas şi a hotărî în spiritul acelei conştiinţe lucide şi temerare care s-a auzit prin vocea lui C. Pârvulescu la Congresul al XII-lea. Vocea singulară de atunci trebuie să devină vocea colectivă de acum! Vocile foştilor conducători ai partidului din scrisoarea deschisă adresată lui N. Ceauşescu, vocile Doinei Cornea, Dan Deşliu, Mircea Dinescu, toţi aceştia fiind în ultimă instanţă adevăraţii purtători de cuvânt ai poporului trebuie să se audă în congres şi să devină temei de analiză şi de hotărâre.

Imensa majoritate a poporului român vă cere, dacă aţi acceptat să deveniţi delegaţi la congres să reprezentaţi şi să apăraţi în mod autentic interesele lui:

1. Să aduceţi în dezbaterea congresului adevărul realităţilor noastre economice, sociale şi politice care să nu eludeze următoarele aspecte:

A. Întreaga viaţă economică este profund afectată de voluntarism şi incompetenţă, concretizată într-o politică economică falimentară, decisă aproape integral de N. Ceauşescu şi familia sa. Aceşti factori de decizie, fără nici o pregătire de specialitate care să le permită a înţelege mecanismele şi fenomenele economice în complexitatea dinamicii lor, n-aveau cum să ajungă la o strategie economică optimă de vreme ce intelectualitatea şi specialiştii de înaltă calificare au fost practic eliminaţi din actul deciziei, cu dispreţ şi cu ură.

Nepricepându-se la nimic, ,,conducerea superioară de partid” a decis că se pricepe la toate şi … a distrus economia.

S-au construit capacităţi de producţie care lucrează cu mult sub nivel proiectat.

S-au făcut investiţii iraţionale, risipindu-se miliardele împrumutate în obiective economice sau de altă natură, nerentabile şi niciodată amortizabile.

S-au hotărât planuri de producţie nerealiste care au ignorat mijloacele energetice, disponibilităţile de materii prime şi necesităţile de import.

S-au exportat produsele industriei noastre cu mult sub valoarea costurilor de producţie, ceea ce a însemnat, de fapt, risipirea averii naţionale şi dispreţ faţă de munca trudnică a clasei muncitoare.

Agricultura a fost distrusă prin distrugerea ţăranului. Exploatarea acestuia a căpătat proporţii mai grave decât sub regimul burghezo-moşieresc. Mărturiile sunt atât de numeroase şi atât de cunoscute încât ele se află la îndemâna fiecăruia.

Ce poate fi mai condamnabil şi mai compromiţător, din punct de vedere economic şi politic, decât faptul că agricultura se face cu studenţii şi elevii, cu militarii şi puşcăriaşii, iar când nici aceştia nu ajung, cu muncitorii din fabrici, şi că aproape în fiecare an o bună parte de recoltă rămâne pe câmp?

Ce poate fi mai antiuman, mai antisocialist, mai culpabil decât să vinzi peste graniţă, la preţuri derizorii, cea mai mare şi cea mai bună parte a producţiei agricole, într-un total dispreţ faţă de producătorii de bunuri materiale şi spirituale care au fost lăsaţi să flămânzească?

 

B. Erorile din economie şi-au avut reflexul lor în plan social-cultural.

I. A fost afectat profund nivelul de trai al populaţiei aducându-l la parametrii cunoscuţi doar în timpul războiului, uneori chiar sub aceştia:

lipsa alimentelor de strictă necesitate, a încălzirii şi luminării spaţiilor de muncă şi de locuit, a benzinei, a unor produse de strictă necesitate, de la pastă şi lame de ras, la piese de schimb pentru mai toate bunurile aflate în posesia unui cetăţean (ce ruşine mai mare poate cunoaşte un regim decât cartelizarea alimentelor şi benzinei, la sfârşitul sec. XX, într-o ţară atât de dăruită de natura ca ţara noastră?).

nivelul sub orice critică al asistenţei sanitare care a dus la creşterea îngrijorătoare a morbidităţii populaţiei, la reapariţia unor boli eradicate cu 20 de ani în urmă în urmă (sifilisul, tuberculoza, râia), la creşterea mortalităţii şi la nivelul scăzut al naşterilor în pofida ruşinosului şi abuzivului decret dat tocmai pentru a se asigura sporirea acestora; cauzele sunt multiple dar câteva se impun în primul rând:

· cele menţionate la punctul anterior cu privire la alimentaţie şi habitat;

· suprasolicitarea cotidiană a celor ce muncesc, fără compensarea materială şi morală corespunzătoare şi fără de nici o speranţă

· precaritatea actului medical datorat lipsei de medicamente şi a celorlalte mijloace elementare pentru îndeplinirea lui, suprasolicitarea medicilor, corupţia foarte răspândită ca urmare a lipsurilor de tot felul

· eliminarea practică de la asistenţa medicală a bătrânilor

nivelul sub orice critică al vieţii culturale, transformate de dictatură într-un act de perpetuă oficiere a cultului personalităţii lui N. Ceauşescu şi a soţiei sale;

· generalizarea atamorismului

· suprimarea subvenţiilor pentru toate instituţiile de cultură, dar limitarea drastică a oricărei libertăţi de opţiune culturală

· transformarea ridicolă a televiziunii în ceva de două ore imposibil de a fi definit

· paralizarea activităţii uniunii scriitorilor şi a altor uniuni de creaţie

· privarea tineretului, mai ales, de mijloacele de acces la valorile universale ale muzicii, cinematografiei, teatrului contemporan

· poluarea activităţii sportive, în special a fotbalului, prin imixtiunile puterii politice şi prin erorile de tot felul care afectează competiţiile şi participările la întrecerile internaţionale

 

II. Învăţământul a fost foarte grav afectat, ca urmare a faptului că organizarea şi desfăşurarea lui a fost decisă de acelaşi cuplu, cu aceeaşi incompetenţă şi cu acelaşi voluntarism. De altfel, cum ar fi putut să decidă optim în problemele şcolii cineva pentru care şcoala este o vagă amintire, iar studiile superioare nici măcar atât?

Ce poate fi mai insultător şi degradant pentru învăţământ şi ştiinţă decât asumarea frauduloasă de titluri ştiinţifice şi academice şi mai ales conducerea acestui sector vital pentru oricare societate sănătoasă de către cineva fără pregătire, fără cultură elementară, de fapt fără nici o competenţă?

Urmările celor de mai sus se găsesc în situaţia catastrofală a învăţământului românesc, unul din cele mai apreciate pe plan european între cele două războaie mondiale. Toate articulaţiile sistemului au fost afectate.

Au fost anulate motivaţiile pentru activitatea şcolară, precum şi pârghiile de stimulare ori de coerciţie la îndemâna corpului didactic.

Desfiinţarea repetenţiei la ciclul elementar, sancţionarea profesorilor exigenţi în numele statisticilor triumfaliste, transformarea mijloacelor de verificare, a principiilor docimologice şi a bacalaureatului în adevărate parodii, sistemele nestimulative ale repartizărilor absolvenţilor, dezvoltarea aberantă a învăţământului seral toate acestea au generat nu numai un dezinteres general pentru învăţătură dar şi o infirmizare morală a tinerelor generaţii care, începând de la grădiniţă şi până la facultate, sunt modelate sub semnul minciunii, al demagogiei, al făţărniciei şi parvenitismului.

Ideea integrării învăţământului cu cercetarea şi producţia, generoasă în sine a fost compromisă prin exces şi mai ales prin imposibilitatea ei de realizare propriu-zisă, în cadrele cerute şi în condiţiile date. Rezultatul îl constată orice conştiinţă onestă.

Redusă cu peste 47%, pregătirea generală, teoretică şi modelatoare sub raport intelectual, a fost profund afectată, fără ca în schimb să se realizeze o pregătire practică autentică. Intreprinderile şi instituţiile unde este planificată o asemenea activitate n-au nici mijloacele nici motivaţiile pentru a o asigura, aşa încât practica a devenit un factor de perturbare a învăţământului şi a producţiei şi un prilej instituţionalizat de pierdere a vremii.

Statutul social şi profesional al cadrului didactic a fost foarte grav degradat, atât prin salarizarea mizeră cât şi prin umilirea permanentă la care e supus. Devenit un fel de slugă bună la toate, cadrul didactic a început să înţeleagă, din păcate că supravieţuirea lui depinde nu de calitatea muncii didactice, ci de promtitudinea cu care răspunde chemărilor primăriei şi activiştilor, ,,Cântării României” şi ,,Daciadei”, asigurării planurilor economice, ieşirilor cu elevii la mitinguri, vizite şi alte asemenea deşertăciuni propagandistice.

În esenţă, învăţământul a devenit un oficiu de prestări servicii, de cele mai multe ori gratuit la dispoziţia primarilor şi a altor activişti, pentru strângerea recoltei, pentru curăţenia localităţilor şi instituţiilor, pentru încărcarea şi descărcarea mijloacelor de transport etc. etc. etc.

 

C. Sub raport politic situaţia este şi mai gravă. Esenţializând anomaliile, din care au generat, în ultimă instanţă toate cele anterior relevate şi multe altele (ar fi necesară o Carte Albă pentru a le cuprinde şi analiza) se impun în primul rând următoarele:

a) S-a concentrat în mod anormal întreaga putere executivă şi legislativă în mâna unui singur om, de fapt a unei singure familii, suprimându-se orice control asupra felului cum este ea exercitată

b) S-a instituit un dezgustător şi foarte nociv cult al personalităţii, depăşindu-l chiar pe cel al lui Stalin care a pus viaţa politică sub semnul misticismului, al idolatriei.

Consecinţele sunt multiple:

desfiinţarea practică a partidului care este redus de fapt la N. Ceauşescu şi la familia sa; ceilalţi peste 3 milioane sunt doar nişte cotizanţi care au obligaţia să aprobe, să aplaude şi să omagieze tot ce hotărăşte secretarul general, indiferent dacă e bine sau rău, să aplice în viaţă aceste hotărâri, indiferent dacă ele sunt benefice ori dăunătoare, dacă pot fi aplicate sau nu; anularea principiului organizatoric al partidului, din cele două componente ale lui nemaifuncţionând decât centralismul; obsesia unanimităţii este blazonul acestei amputări; atât de trâmbiţatul democratism este o simplă ficţiune, atât în partid, cât şi în stat; exemplul cel mai recent ,,propunerea” de realegere a lui N Ceauşescu în fruntea partidului care a fost îmbrăţişată cu o ,,deplină umanitate” evident de familia sa şi de slugile care o deservesc;

promovarea cadrelor în munci de răspundere pe linie de partid şi de stat doar pe criteriul fidelităţii faţă de familia Ceauşescu; de aici, succesul impostorilor, a incompetenţilor, a demagogilor care procopsesc întru ruină mai toate domeniile puşi să le conducă

sterilizarea şi prostituarea mai tuturor formelor de cultură obligate să-şi cîştige dreptul la existenţă doar prin participarea masivă la oficierea acestui cult:

c) Este refuzat orice dialog autentic cu ţara, cu cei care împărtăşesc alte opinii decât dictatura. Sunt reprimate cu violenţă orice încercări ale unui asemenea dialog, deşi el se înscrie perfect în legile şi în statutul partidului. Măsurile de reprimare luate împotriva celor 6 conducători ai partidului, împotriva scriitorilor N. Dinescu şi D. Deşliu, a celor care s-au solidarizat cu ei, barbaria cu care este tratată o femeie curajoasă şi demnă de peste 60 de ani ca Doina Cornea adevărat simbol al rezistenţei româneşti împotriva dictaturii sunt tot atâtea mărturii ale încălcării legilor ţării, statutului partidului, legilor şi reglementărilor internaţionale.

d) Aplicarea principiului eronat privind omogenizarea socială şi naţională are numeroase efecte dăunătoare sub raport social. Acest principiu anulează spiritul de competiţie, afirmarea şi împlinirea valorilor, aspiraţia individului de a-şi depăşi mereu condiţia, aşa precum generează fenomene de discriminare naţională atât de dăunătoare convieţuirii armonioase şi unităţii unui popor;

e) Derivată din primele patru, alături de ruinarea economiei şi a vieţii sociale este falimentara politică externă, dusă îndeosebi în ultimii ani şi care dovedeşte nu doar voluntarism şi incompetenţă, ci şi un ridicol, un periculos infantilism politico-diplomatic în stare să prejudicieze prestigiul şi interesele noastre pe plan mondial:

încălcarea legilor internaţionale

comportamentul impertinent, agresiv şi obstrucţionist în viaţa şi organismele internaţionale

sfidarea O.N.U. şi a mai tuturor ţărilor lumii în care se exprimă poziţii critice faţă de politica de încălcare a drepturilor omului de către dictatura Ceauşescu

organizarea de acţiuni teroriste în străinătate, vânzările clandestine de arme în zonele de conflict militar, manipularea propagandistică, pe valuta forte a ţării a presei străine şi a unor instituţii, în vederea oficierii cultului personalităţii şi dincolo de graniţele ţării

erijarea în unic posesor al adevărului despre construcţia socialistă, blamarea experienţelor şi eforturilor înnoitoare din celelalte ţări socialiste şi prezentarea experienţei falimentare a socialismului de la noi drept singura adevărată şi autentică

ignorarea semnificaţiilor foarte grave ale emigrărilor în masă din România, mai ales a emigărilor din ultimii ani în Ungaria şi transformarea acestui fapt, ale cărui cauze se află tragedia adusă în ţară de dictatura Ceauşescu, în pretext de campanii ostile împotriva ,,vecinilor noştri”. Este o atitudine care-şi are explicaţia şi în procesele înnoitoare din Ungaria unde adevărurile aduse la lumină sună a funie în casa spânzuratului pentru dictatura de la noi; ridicarea gardului de sârmă de-a lungul graniţei cu Ungaria este nu numai o mare stupizenie politică dar şi o ruşine imensă pentru ţara noastră, amintind de sârma ghimpată a lagărelor hitleriste.

2. În spiritul aceleiaşi necesităţi de a afirma şi de a dezbate adevărul, pentru ca plecând de la el să se poată lua hotărârile cele mai înţelepte, să cereţi discutarea în Congres a scrisorilor deschise trimise secretarului general de cei 6 foşti conducători ai partidului, de Doina Cornea şi Dan Deşliu şi să hotărâţi anularea tuturor măsurilor administrative şi poliţieneşti luate împotriva lor, ca şi împotriva tuturor celorlalţi oameni care şi-au exprimat deschis opinii critice, privind viaţa economică, socială şi politică a ţării. Toţi aceştia n-au făcut decât să uzeze de drepturile prevăzute în constituţia ţării, în tratatele şi legile internaţionale la care suntem cosemnatari, de statutul partidului. Ei au făcut chiar mai multe: cunoscând practica curentă a dictaturii de a încălca orice lege, dacă aceasta nu-i convine, cunoscând violenţa cu care înăbuşă orice încercare de a pune în discuţie politica elaborată de ea, aceşti oameni şi-au asumat riscul confruntării cu tirania în numele adevărului şi al dreptăţii, în numele unui popor îngenunchiat, terorizat şi dus în pragul pierzaniei.

3. Să supuneţi discuţiei şi să decideţi cu cea mai mare răspundere pentru prezentul şi viitorul ţării hotărârea privind sistematizarea satelor. Deşi în principiu aceasta pleacă de la o necesitate reală, ea a devenit prin felul în care a fost gândită şi aplicată un adevărat atentat la fiinţa noastră naţională, la trecutul şi la viitorul nostru, un atentat inadmisibil la adresa individului, transformat într-un simplu obiect pe care statul îl manevrează cum vrea.

Cine i-a dat lui N. Ceauşescu drept de viaţă şi de moarte asupra oamenilor, familiilor, satelor şi oraşelor? Cine-i dă dreptul lui şi uneltelor lui la cinismul de a-i obliga pe oameni să-şi dărâme casele cu propriile mâini sau să ceară în adunări regizate sub semnul terorii să fie sistematizate, de fapt ucise satele?

Ne aflăm în faţa uneia din cele mai grave şi perfide ameninţări la adresa poporului nostru. O ameninţare pe care n-au gândit-o nici măcar turcii, ruşii ori austro-ungarii în vremurile când au dorit pieirea noastră.

4. Pe baza unei analize, în spiritul adevărului, a realităţilor economice, sociale şi politice, a problemelor ridicate în scrisorile menţionate, plecând de la principiul rotirii cadrelor, atât de consecvent aplicată de dictatură de la ea în jos de la faptul că N. Ceauşescu în pofida unor merite reale dovedite mai ales în primii 5 ani din cei peste 20 de când se află în conducerea partidului, a comis numeroase şi grave greşeli, având în vedere starea precară a sănătăţii sale şi vârsta înaintată, Congresul să hotărască eliberarea lui din funcţie şi reînnoirea conducerii partidului. Să decidă, de asemenea ca, pe baza unui dialog deschis şi autentic cu ţara, să se fundamenteze o nouă strategie şi tactică politică, menită să scoată ţara din impasul în care se află şi să mobilizeze toate energiile naţionale în realizarea lor.

5. Plenara C.C. al P.C.R. din 27 iunie 1989, abordând, e adevărat cu vizibil dezgust din partea multor participanţi realegerea lui N. Ceauşescu ca secretar general, a dovedit nu doar imaturitate politică, ci şi o totală iresponsabilitate faţă de partid şi faţă de ţară, un adevărat act de trădare a acestora.

Decriptitudinea biologică şi intelectuală vădită chiar la acea plenară de N. Ceauşescu, promisiunea cinică că va continua aceeaşi politică falimentară dusă până acum, recunoaşterea greşelilor, dar neanalizarea lor şi mai ales neanalizarea autocritică a contribuţiei lui fundamentale în săvârşirea acestora, cuvântarea de a doua zi, lamentabilă prin agresivitate, dogmatism, scleroză a gândirii şi mai ales prin lipsa oricărei perspective de a depăşi tragedia noastră istorică, toate acestea sunt argumente zdrobitoare, alături de starea în care a fost adusă ţara şi partidul, pentru nealegerea lui în funcţia supremă a partidului, pentru înnoirea sănătoasă a conducerii acestuia.

5. Credem că este poate ultima ocazie de a se opera cu înţelepciune şi în mod paşnic schimbările esenţiale pe care starea de criză actuală le impune cu necesitate. Este poate ultima ocazie de a evita un conflict social major, de a evita vărsarea de sânge la care aproape totdeauna duce disperarea.

Aveţi misiunea istorică de a evita o asemenea tragedie, aşa după cum aveţi datoria să vă gândiţi la răspunderea nemiloasă nu doar în faţa istoriei, ci şi a judecăţii imediate care nu va întârzia să vină. Răbdarea românului e proverbială, dar nu e fără de margini!

Frontul Salvării Naţionale

1 Acest mesaj a fost transmis de Europa liberă, la 27.08.1989. Fotocopiile după care s-a transcris textul de faţă au fost obţinute de către generalul Militaru. După ce ne-am cunoscut în martie 1990, în urma scrisorii deschise publicate de mine în Adevărul şi după ce a aflat că rugămintea adresată d-lui Emil Hurezeanu de a-mi transmite copii după mesajele mele, a rămas fără răspuns, dumnealui, nu ştiu pe ce căi, le-a obţinut şi mi le-a înmânat. Cu acea ocazie i-am oferit şi proba că eu sunt autorul lor, aşa cum îi spusesem şi d-lui Hurezeanu atunci când a pus la îndoială paternitatea scrisorilor. Cifrele din josul siglei Frontul Salvării Naţionale sunt un cifru care dau Al. Melian.

For additional interesting details on Melian and his experiences see, for example, http://www.tismana.ro/semanatorul/articole/2011/alexandru-melian.htm and http://www.confidentialpress.ro/?p=409

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

On 23 December 1989 Leaders of the National Salvation Front Requested Soviet Military Assistance: Addressing the What and the Why (II)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 11, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications; please do not cite without prior author approval, thank you)

Despite Ion Iliescu’s fervent and repeated denials to the contrary, leaders of the National Salvation Front, including apparently Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, panicked on 23 December 1989 and requested Soviet military assistance, as verified by three accounts herehttps://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/10/on-23-december-1989-leaders-of-the-national-salvation-front-requested-soviet-military-assistance-addressing-the-what-and-the-why-i/How much of their unwillingness today to acknowledge that they made this request is dictated by embarrassment in such a Russophobic country over having made such a request and how much of it is dictated by the effort to erase the existence, actions, and culpability of the “terrorists” is unclear.

For many Romanians, that is all they need to know:  they don’t care about the context in which such a decision was made, that the Soviets appear to have for the most part turned down the request, and that the Front decision was dictated by the genuine confusion and fear that permeated the hours during which these appeals were made.  What then is the reality of the reasons Front officials gave for the request for Soviet assistance?  As Nestor Ratesh wrote in 1991 in The Entangled Revolution (p. 111):

In any case, on December 23, 1989, between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M., Romanian television and Radio Bucharest in a joint broadcast carried the following announcement:  “We are informed that the help of the Soviet army was requested through the Embassy of the USSR, due to the fact that the terrorists have resorted to helicopters through foreign interventionists.”

So we have two data points to investigate:

1) the existence of helicopters not under control of forces loyal to Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow, and 2) the existence of non-Romanians among the so-called “terrorists.”

We know that the claim of unidentified helicopters was an issue on the night of 22/23 December 1989, as this video makes clear.

[The following passage is indicative of Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s duplicity and lack of credibility.  Playing dumb about the report of unidentified helicopters, he responds to one of the revolutionary’s questions–suggesting that the helicopters belonged to Vlad’s Securitate–in a ridiculous and unserious manner,”perhaps they are yours?” he says to the man (!)]

1:32 Iulian Vlad: Dar eu nu-nţeleg de ce au plecat elicopterele.
1:34 Bărbat: Ale teroriştilor.
1:35 Iulian Vlad: Care terorişti, domnule, de unde au venit ăştia? Că n-au…
1:38 Bărbat: (neînţelegibil) speciale
1:40 Iulian Vlad: Păi de unde? Ori ale dînsului (arată spre Guşă), ori ale mele tre’ să fie. Altele nu sînt.
1:44 Bărbat: Ale dumneavoastră.
1:46 Iulian Vlad: Ale dumneavoastră, măi copii.
1:47 Bărbat: Au fost şi altele.
1:49 Iulian Vlad: Foarte curioasă treaba asta.
1:51 Bărbat: Sînt de la dumneavoastră cu alte ordine.

1:53 Iulian Vlad: Păi nu am decît trei elicoptere.

transcribed at http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2011/01/14/stefan-gusa-alerta-totala-peste-tot-astia-au-fost-niste-dementi-au-doborit-8-elicoptere-o-fi-avut-un-regiment-subteran-pe-undeva-video/

1) The question of unidentified HELICOPTERS:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/securitate-helicopters-transmitters-per-hungarian-defense-officials/

Hungarian defense officials related interesting and important information during the days of 23-26 December 1989.  (These are xeroxes from the Library of Congress of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations performed in December 1989.  Unfortunately, for some unknown reason, they were filed under Hungary and not Romania–unclear what the methodology for categorization was–meaning that they were easily missed by researchers, including myself, for many years.) Details include:

1) Not only did the Securitate have “a large number of helicopters” (Def. Min. Ferenc Karpati) but on Saturday 23 December 1989, two of them briefly violated Hungarian airspace near Battonya (which is not far from the Romanian city of Arad)

2) The Hungarian Army monitored and passed on to the Romanian Army locations of secret Securitate radio transmitters (in a later report, it is detailed that the number of active Securitate radio transmitters fell during these days from 31 to 19 to 5, concomitant with the decline in counter-revolutionary fighting).

3) Hungarian forces recognized “stories being spread by the Romanian security services and the forces loyal to Ceausescu,” including the reports that the Romanian Army was low on ammunition (a rumor designed to create panic and give the impression that the Romanian armed forces could be conquered) and that the Hungarians were to send planes into Romania (suggesting an effort to invade or take advantage of the chaos in Romania) which Col. Gyorgy Keleti of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense claimed he was asked about by Romanian Lt. Gen Eftimescu, whom he reassured it was an untrue rumor.

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/14/lying-in-wait-securitate-director-general-vlad-in-the-cc-building-i/

Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu admitted to journalist Dan Badea in 1991 that the USLA (special anti-terrorist unit) had its own helicopter force, thereby substantiating the suspicion of the unidentified revolutionary that the helicopters in question were “special”/”from a special unit.”  Thus, it is abundantly clear that Vlad’s claim that the Securitate had “just three helicopters” was a bald-faced lie.

image-12

2) Regarding the involvement of “foreign interventionists”–in particular, mercenaries from Arab countries (and Iran) with treaty obligations to Ceausescu and Romania–the per cost AFP archives are a bonanza.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/anatomy-of-a-cover-up-or-constanta-we-have-a-problem/

Note:  Not everything at this point had “disappeared”:  General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).

Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably:  The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.

———————————————————————————————-

©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 08:33 – Heure Paris (386 mots)
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
   ” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
   ” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
   Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
   Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
   En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
   Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
   Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
   Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
   Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
   nm/jga/vr.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
021851451DC1ED1D715E06849EA4C6E0F37C0C25ECE8D503
©AFP Général – Mercredi 27 Décembre 1989 – 18:14 – Heure Paris (671 mots)

Roumanie Sibiu
Sibiu, la ville ou les combats ont ete les plus violents de l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   SIBIU (Roumanie) 27 dec – Sibiu, dans le centre de la Roumanie, est indubitablement la ville ou les combats entre l armee et la Securitate, fidele a Nicolae Ceausescu, ont ete les plus violents. C est la que Nicu, fils du dictateur, etait chef du parti.
   Des maisons totalement detruites et calcinees dont il ne reste plus que les murs, des eclats de verre partout dans les rues, des toits eventres par des tirs de grenades et par les mitrailleuses des tanks, des voitures et blindes brulant encore en travers de la route: tel etait le spectacle de desolation qu offraient mercredi plusieurs quartiers de Sibiu, a constate un envoye special de l AFP.
   Du 22 au 25 decembre, les affrontements se sont concentres aux abords des trois ecoles militaires de Sibiu, du siege de la police et de celui de la Securitate. Il ne reste plus grand-chose des deux batiments a trois etages qui abritaient la police et les services secrets. Les fenetres ont vole en eclats. Toutes les maisons des alentours, ou s etaient retranches les agents de la police secrete, portent d innombrables traces, et, dans la cour de la police, un blinde leger calcine est observe avec curiosite par les passants.
   ” C etait la guerre ici, avec des tanks, des balles explosives et des unites de commando. C est ici que Nicu Ceausescu a essaye de lancer une contre-offensive contre nous ” , souligne un militaire qui garde maintenant les lieux.
   Lynchages.
   Devant cet immeuble, une centaine de personnes commentent a haute voix un extrait des archives qu elles viennent de decouvrir: les fiches de renseignements que la Securitate avait etablies sur chaque habitant de Sibiu. ” Ecrit a un cousin en Suisse. Propos sans importance. Pendant son service militaire, ne frequentait que des soldats d origine allemande comme lui ” , est-il indique sur une de ces fiches qui comportent de nombreux renseignements personnels, certaines remontant a 1958.
   Dans la foule, on raconte comment une dizaine de Securistes (agents de la Securitate) arretes pendant les affrontements de ces derniers jours ont ete lynches par la population qui les a tues a coups de pied et de poing: ” Nous n avons pas de mots pour qualifier ces gens de la Securitate, ils sont pires que des monstres ” , dit une dame d une cinquantaine d annees, qui s interrompt et fond en larmes. Certains ont reussi neanmoins a conserver un certain sens de l humour noir: ” Quand les voitures de la Securitate ont ete brulees devant chez moi, j ai pense que c etait bien la premiere fois qu il faisait chaud dans mon appartement ” , a declare a l AFP une habitante de Sibiu, en faisant allusion a l impossibilite pour les Roumains de se chauffer en raison des restrictions.
   Les combats ont egalement ete tres durs dans le centre de Sibiu. Le principal hotel de la ville, le ” Continental ” , n a plus de fenetres sur cinq etages, et des traces de balles sont visibles jusqu au 11eme etage.
   ” Les Securistes avait pris position dans l hotel et avaient rempli deux etages de munitions ” , explique un employe de l etablissement. Des incendies ont eclate dans certaines chambres, touchees par des balles incendiaires. Face a l hotel, un panneau est reste accroche a un lampadaire: ” Militaires, ne tirez pas sur nos freres et nos parents. L armee est avec nous ” .
   Dans les rues de Sibiu, ou de tres nombreuses vitrines sont recouvertes de carton, la population vaquait normalement a ses occupations mercredi soir. Patrouilles de militaires, blindes legers et ambulances croisaient des voitures portant des cercueils sur le toit et des camions apportant de l aide alimentaire et medicale de Hongrie, de Tchecoslovaquie et de RFA.
   Sibiu pense deja a renaitre de ses cendres: malgre le froid tres vif, des equipes de nettoyage et de vitriers travaillaient tard dans la soiree dans la ville.
   nm/chm.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
BD17217619B14F18012007E4873636BFDDF186FE77CFAD4F
©AFP Général – Mardi 2 Janvier 1990 – 14:22 – Heure Paris (298 mots)

Roumanie Securitate
Il ne faut pas considerer les troupes de la Securitate comme des terroristes, selon le chef d etat-major roumain
   PARIS 2 jan – Les membres de la Securitate, la police politique de Nicolae Ceausescu, ne sont pas dans leur majorite des ” terroristes ” , ceux- ci se recrutant dans la garde personnelle de l ancien dictateur, a affirme mardi le general Vasile Ionel, chef d etat-major de l armee roumaine.
   ” On n a pas le droit de considerer les troupes de la Securitate comme des terroristes ” , a declare a Radio France Internationale M. Ionel, adjoint du ministre de la Defense le general Nicolae Militaru. Pour le general Ionel, ” la majorite de la Securitate est devouee au peuple ” .
   Il a ajoute que lorsque M. Ceausescu avait donne l ordre de tirer sur la foule a Bucarest, le 22 decembre, ” certaines unites de la Securitate ont tire, mais il y en a eu d autres qui n ont pas tire ” .
   Le lendemain, quand le chef de la Securitate a lance a la radio l ordre de ne plus participer aux combats, ” toutes les unites de la Securitate sont retournees dans les casernes ” , a declare le general Ionel, ajoutant que ce sont des membres de la garde personnelle de Ceausescu, evalues a ” plusieurs centaines ” qui ont poursuivi les combats.
   L armee, a-t-il dit ” ne soupconnait auparavant ni le nombre ni l efficacite de ses hommes – des tireurs d elite – ni la nature du materiel. “.
   Interroge sur la provenance de leurs armes, le general Ionel affirme qu elles ne viennent ” d aucun pays du Pacte de Varsovie ” , sans toutefois preciser leur origine. Il ajoute en revanche que les ” terroristes ” ont utilise certains types d armements interdits par les traites internationaux, des balles explosives par exemple.
   ps/af.
©AFP Général – Samedi 30 Décembre 1989 – 12:28 – Heure Paris (310 mots)

Roumanie mercenaires
Temoignages sur la presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie
   BUDAPEST 30 dec – La presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie, notamment de differents pays arabes et de l Iran, est hors de doute, selon le correspondant de l agence hongroise MTI a Bucarest largement cite dans la presse hongroise samedi.
   Toutefois, aucun ” mercenaire etranger ” n a jusqu a present ete identifie, presente a la television, ou interviewe a la radio.
   ” La participation d unites militaires etrangeres aux combats en Roumanie est un fait ” , selon le correspondant qui se refere aux temoignages de soldats roumains qui ont ” neutralise ” un groupe de 27 ” terroristes ” iraniens. Un des prisonniers a admis, selon le correspondant, que le commando ” etait venu directement de l Iran ” .
   Il etait connu, selon le correspondant de MTI, que quelque 12.000 etudiants etaient inscrits aux differentes hautes ecoles et universites roumaines et que des ” camps ont existe en Roumanie pour l entrainement d unites speciales au compte de differents pays arabes ” . Un de ces camps etait situe a proximite de Bucarest, dans la ville de Snagov, mais il en existait d autres un peu partout dans le pays, precise le correspondant toujours en reference a des recits de soldats roumains.
   Le correspondant de MTI revele egalement l existence d unites speciales de la Securitate nommees les ” Chemises Noirs ” qui fonctionnaient selon l exemple de la Loge P-2 (Loge maconnique clandestine italienne). Les plus hauts dirigeants roumains ont appartenu a cette loge clandestine dont notamment l ancien ministre de l Interieur, Tudor Postelnicu, un des chefs de la Securitate, le vice-premier ministre Ion Dinca et le fils du dictateur roumain dechu, Nicu Ceausescu. La Securitate etait divisee en 17 unites surveillant toute la Roumanie. Ses bases se trouvaient generalement dans des villas de luxe, precise le correspondant de MTI a Bucarest.
   ph-wb/nev/nl.
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©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 19:13 – Heure Paris (679 mots)
Roumanie, prev Dans un train de Noel: psychose des tireurs isoles et chasse aux hommes de la Securitate de l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, Jean-Anne CHALET
   A BORD DU TRAIN TIMISOARA-BUCAREST 25 dec – Dans le premier train de Noel entre Timisoara (ouest de la Roumanie) et Bucarest, les voyageurs partagent le pain et le sel et sont deja entres dans l ere de l ” apres-Ceausescu ” .
   Malgre la psychose des tireurs isoles, ce sont les agents de l ancien regime, les hommes de la Securitate, qui sont devenus les pourchasses, apres avoir ete chasseurs pendant des annees.
   Ces hommes, les plus craints de l ancien appareil repressif de Nicolae Ceausescu, qui continuent a resister dans plusieurs villes de Roumanie, sont traques. Lundi, deux d entre eux ont ete arretes par une garde patriotique dans la gare de Timisoara, la cite martyre, ou l on a denombre, selon les dernieres estimations, pres de cinq mille morts.
   Mais ils continuent de faire peur. Toute la nuit de Noel, les tirs ont ete incessants dans le centre de Timisoara, et lundi matin, il etait pratiquement impossible de circuler a pied ou en voiture.
   Pour gagner la gare a pied, l envoye special de l AFP a essuye le feu de tireurs isoles et il a fallu que les soldats interviennent au fusil mitrailleur pour le couvrir. Le train est parti de Timisoara avec une demi-heure de retard, apres l arrestation des deux agents de la Securitate. En cours de route, une bombe a ete decouverte dans le convoi et tous les voyageurs invites a descendre. Le wagon ou se trouvait l engin a ete detache du train.
   Les nouvelles sur un transistor.
   Dans la plupart des gares traversees, les references a l ancien regime avaient ete effacees, les drapeaux bleu-jaune-rouge de la Roumanie comportaient un grand trou au milieu, la ou figuraient jadis les emblemes du communisme. Des inscriptions aussi un peu partout : ” Mort au tyran ” , ” Vive la Roumanie libre ” .
   Dans ce compartiment, voyagent ensemble un ingenieur de 60 ans, un ancien architecte devenu tanneur par la force des choses, un jeune garde patriotique, un camionneur et un paysan.
   Le pain et le sel ont ete partages entre tous dans cette journee de Noel, et les informations captees sur un transistor commentees en termes severes. Tous sont d accord pour estimer que Ceausescu et son clan s etaient rendus responsables de veritables atrocites durant les 25 ans ou ils ont ete au pouvoir. ” Notre pays etait une sorte de bagne. Non seulement nous n avions aucune liberte, mais en plus, le tyran a fait executer beaucoup de Roumains, uniquement parce qu ils avaient ose resister ou discuter les ordres ” , declare le tanneur. ” Il poursuit son action criminelle encore aujourd hui, alors qu il a ete arrete, a travers les activites de la Securitate, qui mettent le pays a feu et a sang ” , surencherit l ingenieur.
   Tout le monde sous les banquettes.
   A ce moment, comme pour donner plus de poids a ces propos, une rafale d arme automatique est tiree le long de la voie, obligeant tout le monde a se cacher sous les banquettes. Nouvelle alerte quelques kilometres plus loin, avec arret force, controle de toutes les identites, et cinq interpellations de voyageurs d origine arabe.
   La psychose des mercenaires qui seraient a la solde de l ancien dictateur, ajoutee a celle des hommes de la Securitate, a cree, dans toutes les regions traversees par le train, une nervosite tant dans les rangs de l armee que parmi les gardes patriotiques. Cette affaire de mercenaires evoquee dimanche soir a Timisoara, au cours d une conference de presse par le commandant local des gardes patriotiques, a pris de l ampleur au cours de la journee de lundi, et diverses radios ” libres ” locales, captees dans le train, y ont fait allusion.
   Apres plusieurs haltes de controle, le train de Noel de Timisoara est arrive a Bucarest avec deux heures de retard et les impacts des rafales tirees durant le voyage.
   JAC/PSR/chm.
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©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 20:10 – Heure Paris (191 mots)

Roumanie Securitate
Une grande base d helicopteres en Roumanie serait aux mains de la Securitate, selon Budapest
   BUDAPEST 25 dec – Une importante base d helicopteres en Roumanie serait aux mains de la Securitate, la police secrete de Ceausescu, a declare lundi le porte- parole du ministere hongrois de la Defense a la television hongroise.
   Le colonel Gyorgy Keleti n a pas precise le nom de cette base, indiquant seulement qu elle se trouvait en Roumanie, a une centaine de km de la frontiere hongroise.
   ” Il semble que cette base soit aux mains des terroristes ” (la Securitate), a declare le porte-parole en rappelant que des helicopteres roumains avaient viole l espace aerien hongrois plusieurs fois ces derniers jours.
   D autre part, le colonel Keleti a annonce que l organisation caritative de l ordre de Malte avait recu l autorisation exceptionnelle de monter une station de radio sur la base militaire hongroise de Szeged, toute proche de la Roumanie. Cette station vise a assurer les communications entre l organisation et son siege en RFA, afin de faciliter la logistique de l acheminement des dons vers la Roumanie.
   rb/ph/chm.
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©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 19:28 – Heure Paris (539 mots)
Roumanie Securitate, prev Les hommes de la Securitate attaquent encore l armee mais cherchent surtout a fuir De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, Nicolas MILETITCH
   MOLDOVA-NOUA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Des commandos de la Securitate ont attaque des unites militaires lundi, en fin de matinee, a Resica et Oravita, dans le sud du pays, mais divers indices indiquent que leur objectif reste principalement de quitter le pays.
   D autres affrontements armes ont ete egalement observes lundi a Tournu Sevrin, plus au sud, de l autre cote de la chaine des Carpates meridionales, et les routes de la region sont peu sures, a indique a l AFP un officier de l armee a Moldova-Noua.
   Selon des sources militaires, il y a eu d autres affrontements de l autre cote du pays, a Constanza, sur la Mer Noire.
   Sur les routes, les controles, souvent nerveux, effectues par les militaires et les patrouilles populaires, nombreux et minutieux, notamment a proximite de la frontiere, temoignent de la confusion qui regne encore dans plusieurs regions ou des commandos de la Securitate menent des actions isolees.
   La chasse a l homme se poursuit en Roumanie pour s emparer des derniers elements de la Securitate, qui tentent de fuir le pays, sans doute peu nombreux, mais bien equipes et entraines.
   Plusieurs d entre eux ont ete arretes en Yougoslavie, dans l apres- midi, pres de Klodovo, par les unites speciales de la police yougoslave envoyees sur place depuis quelques jours. Ces agents de la Securitate emportaient avec eux d importantes quantites d or.
   Dirigeants locaux elus.
   D autres se cachent encore dans les forets de la region, a-t-on indique a l AFP de source policiere. Sur la route qui longe le Danube entre Pojejenea et Macesti, des militaires, arme au poing, arretent les voitures.
   ” Beaucoup de terroristes (agents de la Securitate) tentent de passer de l autre cote en Yougoslavie ” , explique l un d eux. Juste retour des choses, l extraordinaire dispositif (barbeles, miradors, postes de garde tous les cent metres), mis en place par la police le long du Danube pour empecher les Roumains de fuir vers la Yougoslavie, est aujourd hui un obstacle supplementaire pour les agents de la police secrete aux abois.
   Il faudra sans doute encore attendre quelques jours pour que soient liquidees les dernieres poches de resistance, les agents de la Securitate risquant de manquer bientot de munitions, ont souligne a l AFP plusieurs officiers charges d assurer la securite dans la region.
   Si la situation n est pas encore completement sous le controle des nouvelles autorites et de l armee, sur la route (la circulation de nuit reste fortement deconseillee) et dans certaines villes, la vie semble revenir a la normale a peu pres partout ailleurs.
   ” Une nouvelle administration est deja mise en place dans notre region. Nous recevons nos instructions par la radio et la tele de Bucarest, et la vie a repris son cours ” , declare le directeur des Mines de Moldova-Noua, Ionec Danciu. Les nouveaux dirigeants de la ville ont ete elus librement par leurs citoyens . ” C est bien la premiere fois ” , releve Ionec Danciu, et parmi eux, se trouvent meme des membres du Parti communiste.
   NM/PSR/chm.
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5D12E1C215A1BB1D91AF0A440D3A872011DC02101F7E8656

©AFP Général – Mercredi 10 Janvier 1990 – 12:25 – Heure Paris (500 mots)
Roumanie medecine, lead Cinq jeunes Roumains, blesses durant les evenements, hospitalises a Marseille
   MARSEILLE 10 jan – Les premiers Roumains rapatries en France depuis les recents evenements, quatre hommes et une femme grievement blesses par balles a Bucarest et a Timisoara, sont arrives dans la nuit de mardi a mercredi, a Marseille, ou ils ont ete hospitalises.
   Ces personnes, rapatriees par un Transall de l armee francaise qui avait ete specialement affrete, ont ete admises dans cinq des onze etablissements de l Assistance publique de Marseille. Aucune indication n a ete fournie sur ces hopitaux, ni sur la nature precise des blessures.
   Selon le docteur Richard Domergue, responsable adjoint du SAMU de Marseille, qui a dirige ce rapatriement, la femme et ses quatre compatriotes, ” atteints par des projectiles de guerre dum-dum (NDLR: balles entaillees en croix, de maniere a provoquer de larges dechirures), souffrent de graves problemes fonctionnels mais nullement vitaux ” , a-t-il declare a l AFP.
   Le docteur avait ete avise de cette evacuation sanitaire, dans la nuit de lundi a mardi, par un telex de la cellule interministerielle de crise, mise en place par le gouvernement francais depuis des evenements en Roumanie.
   L equipe du SAMU, constituee de deux medecins et de deux infirmieres, a ete acheminee jusqu a Bucarest ou l attendait le Dr Lamare, de la cellule logistique en place a l ambassade de France.
   Quelques heures plus tard l avion, transportant les cinq blesses, places sous perfusion, se posait sur la base aerienne d Istres (Bouches-du-Rhone) ou attendaient des ambulances.
   Arrives a l hopital de la Timone, vers minuit, les Roumains, ages de 20 a 35 ans et parlant seulement leur langue natale, ont ete repartis dans divers etablissements, ” en fonction des places disponibles et des besoins medicaux : traumatologie, micro-chirurgie, orthopedie ” .
   ” Ces personnes ont ete atteintes lors de manifestations de rue pacifiques, par un ou deux projectiles, selon les cas, a explique le Dr Domergue. Elles presentent de grosses lesions pouvant entrainer la paralysie de membres ” . Elles vont subir un bilan de sante complet qui permettra notamment d etablir les risques eventuels de sequelles.
   Ambiance soixante-huitarde a Bucarest, selon le medecin marseillais.
   Il a precise que la femme a ete blessee lors de la manifestation de rue du 17 decembre a Timisoara. ” Elle a raconte avoir ete admise dans un hopital d ou elle a du etre evacuee apres que des tirs eurent ete entendus dans l etablissement ou des hommes de la Securitate achevaient des blesses ” , a rapporte le Dr Domergue.
   Il regne a Bucarest, selon le medecin marseillais, ” une ambiance soixante-huitarde, un peu revolutionnaire. On sent une certaine exhaltation et il y a beaucoup de mouvements dans les rues ” , a-t-il temoigne. Il a souligne ” la chaleur touchante ” manifestee par les Roumains a l equipe medicale francaise. ” Ils ont une confiance totale en nous. Nous ne pouvons pas les decevoir. Nous allons les dorloter, ca parait le minimun ” , a-t-il assure.
   JLL/dv.
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©AFP Général – Mardi 6 Mars 1990 – 13:52 – Heure Paris (482 mots)

Roumanie medecine
De nombreux blesses du 21 et 22 decembre ont ete touches dans le dos ou a bout portant
   BUCAREST 6 mars – De tres nombreux blesses lors des affrontements des 21 et 22 decembre a Bucarest ont ete touches par des balles qui ont ete tirees de dos, parfois a bout portant, ainsi que par des balles dum-dum, a constate la Societe de Chirurgie de la capitale roumaine.
   La societe s est reunie a deux reprises, les 15 fevrier et le 1er mars dernier, sous la presidence du lieutenant-general Traian Oancea, chef de la 2e section de chirurgie de l Hopital militaire central de Bucarest.
   Au cours de ces travaux, menes ” scientifiquement ” , a precise mardi a l AFP le chef du service de chirurgie de l hopital de Colcea (centre de la ville) le dr Nicolae Constantinescu, les experts en balistique ont pu determiner qu un pourcentage important de blessures par balles avaient ete causees non par des balles de guerre mais par des balles coupees ou trafiquees.
   Les blessures observees etaient en effet non pas des trajectoires rectilignes, comme c est le cas en general pour les balles de guerre normales, mais des cavites creusees dans les tissus par l eclatement du projectile a son impact, resultant d une balle aplatie ou cisaillee s ecrasant sur le corps au lieu de le penetrer. ” Nous avons effectue 930 interventions dans la capitale sur des blessures par balle ” , a precise le docteur Constantinescu.
   la peur.
   ” Apres discussion entre nous, nous sommes en mesure de dire qu il ne s agit pas d affrontements mais d un crime organise contre le peuple. D autant, ajoute-t-il en parlant des cas qu il a traites lui-meme a l hopital Colcea, que 60% des plaies etaient dans le dos ou sur le flanc, et non de face, et que 10 a 15% des coups avaient ete tires a bout portant, avec des calibres 9 et 6,35mm ” .
   Le premier jour des affrontements, le 21, la majorite des blesses etaient des jeunes. ” Ils avaient tellement peur qu ils ne demandaient meme pas des calmants apres l anesthesie ” , ajoute le docteur qui cite le cas du danseur roumain de l Opera de Paris Vlad Stoinescu, blesse devant l hotel intercontinental : ” une balle l a touche au flanc, lui traversant l abdomen. La peur lui a fait parcourir tout seul les 300 metres le separant de notre hopital, ou il a donne son nom avant de s evanouir ” .
   Par ailleurs, les analyses de sang effectuees sur ces jeunes blesses ont fait decouvrir un taux anormalement bas de proteines dans le sang : 5 a 6 grammes pour cent au lieu de 7,3. ” C est la preuve de leur malnutrition, ils n avaient pas du manger de viande et de fromage depuis six mois pour la plupart ” , a ajoute le medecin.
   BAY/ave.
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©AFP Général – Jeudi 5 Avril 1990 – 17:27 – Heure Paris (504 mots)

Roumanie justice
La repression escamotee dans le proces du general Ceausescu
   BUCAREST 5 avr – Le proces du general Nicolae-Andruta Ceausescu, frere du dictateur roumain, continue a donner l impression que la repression qui a fait des dizaines de morts et des centaines de blesses le 21 decembre pres de l hotel Intercontinental a Bucarest etait le fait d un homme seul, tirant avec un pistolet.
   Oubliees les centaines de personnes touchees par balles, les blessures a la balle dum-dum, les manifestants abattus a bout portant, selon les expertises des medecins et chirurgiens de l hopital Coltea.
   Au quatrieme jour des debats, devant le tribunal militaire de Bucarest, un seul temoignage, aussitot interrompu par le procureur militaire, a fait etat de l utilisation de leurs armes par des ” hommes en civil venant du service d ordre ” .
   Apres une vingtaine de temoins interroges depuis mardi matin, tous membres de l Ecole de la Securitate que commandait le general Ceausescu et presentant la meme version monocorde qui vise a innocenter en bloc l Ecole a l exception du general, le colonel Teodor Amariucai, premier officier de l armee -et non de la police- appele a la barre a cree la surprise en donnant sa version des affrontements du 21.
   ” Vers 19H30, une deuxieme serie de rafales de sommation tirees en l air par l armee, pour faire reculer les manifestants boulevard Balcescu, a provoque la confusion dans la foule, de nombreux manifestants se couchant a terre pour se proteger ” , a-t-il dit.
   contrepartie.
   ” C est alors que de nombreux civils en manteau, surgissant de derriere le cordon des forces de l ordre ou j etais, l ont traverse pour se lancer vers les manifestants. Certains matraquaient ceux qui etaient a terre, d autres tiraient de dessous leur manteau sur ceux qui s enfuyaient, on voyait leur poche tressaillir a chaque coup. J ai vu des flaques de sang, et des morts qu on trainait vers une camionnette.. “.
   Double intervention du procureur et du president du tribunal: ” ces faits font l objet de poursuites judiciaires, et seront penalement sanctionnes. Revenons aux faits concernant l inculpe ” .
   Officiellement, dans le cadre de ce proces, les temoignages se concentrent donc sur un ” fait divers ” , celui d un general se jetant sur la foule avec son pistolet d ordonnance ” sous l emprise d une crise de diabete ” .
   Deux nouveaux temoignages ont ” confirme ” jeudi que le general Ceausescu avait ” perdu le controle de lui-meme ” , notamment celui de son chauffeur, l adjudant Ion Turcin, qui dit que le general a braque son arme sur lui.
   Le general ecoute les temoins, tantot avec agacement, tantot avec indifference, mais sans rien ajouter.
   Les observateurs en viennent a se demander si le general n a pas d avance accepte de ne mettre personne en cause, parmi les personnes qui ont participe avec lui a la repression, pour obtenir en contrepartie des garanties pour lui ou, plus vraisemblablement, pour son epouse malade, son fils, sa fille et ses petits-enfants.
   BAY/ccd.
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AE1FA1E713113F1AE1BE0C848578C928046086B100BBDC48 https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/10/nicolae-ceausescu-securitatea-libieni-cincufagarasbrasov-si-revolutia-romana/

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On 23 December 1989 Leaders of the National Salvation Front Requested Soviet Military Assistance: Addressing the What and the Why (I)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 10, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications; please do not cite without prior author approval, thank you)

Despite Ion Iliescu’s fervent and repeated denials to the contrary, leaders of the National Salvation Front, including apparently Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, panicked on 23 December 1989 and requested Soviet military assistance.  The reporting from the time seems pretty clear on this point, and what is significant is that it was the Soviets themselves who acknowledged the existence of the request.  Here, for example, is a Los Angeles Times report (available on the Internet) by Michael Parks from Sunday 24 December 1989 reporting from Moscow, the previous day’s statements by Soviet officials on Saturday 23 December 1989:

Upheaval In Romania : Moscow Pledges Aid but Rejects Troop Request : Soviet Union: Gorbachev says Romania’s new government can expect humanitarian help from the Warsaw Pact.

December 24, 1989|MICHAEL PARKS | TIMES STAFF WRITER

MOSCOW — The Soviet Union, affirming its support for the popular uprising that overthrew Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, pledged Saturday to provide “immediate and effective humanitarian aid” to the country but drew the line at military assistance….

Gorbachev told the deputies that the Kremlin had considered a request for military assistance by leaders of the Front of National Salvation, the provisional government established by former Communist Party and government officials, military commanders and intellectuals in Bucharest. But he said Moscow had decided against sending in forces as the fighting appeared to abate….

Gorbachev said the request for military assistance had come overnight when Romanian army units, apparently loyal to Ceausescu, “turned against the people” and were threatening to retake strategic positions in Bucharest–including the Communist Party’s headquarters, where the provisional government’s leaders were meeting. But the loyalists’ counterattack was “suppressed,” Gorbachev said, when more troops were brought in….

http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-24/news/mn-2156_1_warsaw-pact

—-

Nestor Ratesh noted in his 1991 The Entangled Revolution, notes the broadcast of this appeal as follows (commenters on online articles often express exasperation to denials of the appeal because personally they recall seeing or hearing it):

In any case, on December 23, 1989, between 10:00 and 11:00 A.M., Romanian television and Radio Bucharest in a joint broadcast carried the following announcement: 

“We are informed that the help of the Soviet army was requested through the Embassy of the USSR, due to the fact that the terrorists have resorted to helicopters through foreign interventionists.”

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As further confirmation, the Polish researcher Adam Burakowski unearthed a document from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is translated below by Tomasz Kluz:

http://www.revista22.ro/n-decembrie-1989-iliescu-si-brucan-au-cerut-ajutor-militar-de-la-sovietici-7557.html

Copies of the document were published here:  http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/un-adevar-crunt-iliescu-chemat-trupele-sovietice-1_50ad210e7c42d5a6638f368a/index.html

* * *

Ministerul Afacerilor Externe

După utilizare, mesajul cifrat trebuie distrus conform prevederilor referitoare la utilizarea documentelor secrete

SECRET
Exemplar 12

Mesaj cifrat nr. …
din Bucureşti 23.12.89

URGENT
Către dir. J. Mąkosa
Însărcinat cu afaceri, Bauer informează prin depeşa nr. 189 din data de 23 luna curentă:

Ora 15.00.

1. De la sovietici:
În numele Frontului Salvării Naţionale, I. Iliescu şi S. Brucan au solicitat ajutor militar Ambasadei URSS, pentru că singuri nu se vor descurca.
Fără să aştepte răspunsul, FSN a anunţat la TV că Ambasada a promis ajutorul.
Răspunsul URSS: sunt gata să acorde orice fel de ajutor cu excepţia intervenţiei trupelor.
2. Polonezii de la aeroport sunt deocamdată în siguranţă. Ne sună. Noi nu putem [să-i sunăm]. Au primit pături şi hrană. Nu există nicio posibilitate de a ajunge la aeroport şi
de a-i lua de acolo.
3. Sovieticii au probleme cu cetăţenii lor, care s-au adăpostit în ambasadă după distrugerea Biroului Consilierului Comercial şi a locuinţelor.
4. La radio s-a anunţat că trupe arabe atacă Televiziunea.
La ora 15.00 auzim de acolo împuşcături care devin din ce în ce mai intense.

Spre ştiinţă:
(nume – fiecare primeşte câte un exemplar, în ordinea dată)

Întocmit în 15 exemplare a câte o pagină.
Bătut la maşina de scris nr. 7157 de Kowalczyk

 

 

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Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (I)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 1, 2013

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Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments »

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (by Richard Andrew Hall)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 8, 2010

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1]

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.  [Submitted 19 November 2009; cleared by PRB 15 December 2009]  I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

(PERHAPS) ONLY IN ROMANIA!:  Twenty Years Later Romanianists and Romanians Continue to Deny the Existence of Atypical Munitions in December 1989…Even Though Clear Video Evidence Exists to Confirm Their Presence!

DUM-DUM MUNITIONS OF THE SECURITATE’S ELITE SNIPERS (above); VIDIA BULLETS (below)

Holland & Holland (London) magnum bullets found in Securitate V-a building

VIDIA bullets (Bucuresti, zona TVR) below– individual demonstrates how much smaller they are than Army’s standard 7,62 mm munitions

VIDIA bullet

Possible VIDIA bullets (Brasov) below; doctor describing wounds to the head caused by these munitions

for full PDF file see here:

blv 111909tk6

blv 111909tk6 97 compat (for earlier versions of word)

His name was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias.

And in Romania in December 1989 and January 1990, Nicolae Ghircoias was a very busy man.

We know, officially, of Nicolae Ghircoias’ actions in the last days leading up to the fall of the regime of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on 22 December 1989, as a result of what he and others said at a trial later in January 1990.  In bureaucratic parlance, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias, was the Director of the Criminalistic Institute of the Militia’s [Police’s] General Inspectorate.   In colloquial terms, in December 1989 it appears that this amounted to being something of a “cleaner,” or “fixer,” the kind of guy who could make unpleasant things—such as corpses—go away, without leaving a trace.

After regime forces opened fire on anti-regime protesters in the western city of Timisoara on 17 and 18 December 1989, Colonel Ghircoias was dispatched to recover the corpses of those with gunshot wounds from the city’s morgue.  The unautopsied cadavers of 43 demonstrators were stolen from the morgue in the dead of night and then transported to the outskirts of the capital Bucharest by refrigerated truck , where they were cremated.[2] Ghircoias was also in charge of collecting and destroying the hospital records and any other incriminating material that might indicate not just the death, but also the life of those who had perished—the official explanation for the disappearance of these citizens was to be that they had fled the country, thus taking their documents with them.  In other words, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias’ job was primarily, it seems, the destruction of evidence.[3]

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

Romania, December 1989:   a Revolution, a Coup d’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

This December marks twenty years since the implosion of the communist regimeof Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. [10] It is well-known, but bears repeating:  Romania not only came late in the wave of communist regime collapse in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact in the fall of 1989 (Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria), it came last—and inevitably that was significant.[11] Despite the more highly personalist (vs. corporate) nature of the Ceausescu regime, the higher level of fear and deprivation that characterized society, and the comparative insulation from the rest of the East European Warsaw Pact states, Romania could not escape the implications of the collapse of the other communist party-states.[12] Despite the differences, there simply were too many institutional and ideological similarities, or as is often most importantly the case, that is how members of both the state and society interpreted matters.   “Going last” [in turn, in show] almost inevitably implies that the opportunities for mimicry, for opportunism, for simulation[13] on the one hand and dissimulation[14] on the other, are greater than for the predecessors…and, indeed, one can argue that some of what we saw in Romania in December 1989 reflects this.

Much of the debate about what happened in December 1989 has revolved around how to define those events…and their consequences.[15] [These can be analytically distinct categories and depending on how one defines things, solely by focusing on the events themselves or the consequences, or some combination thereof, will inevitably shape the answer one gets].  The primary fulcrum or axis of the definitional debate has been between whether December 1989 and its aftermath were/have been a revolution or a coup d’etat.  But Romanian citizens and foreign observers have long since improvised linguistically to capture the hybrid and unclear nature of the events and their consequences.  Perhaps the most neutral, cynical, and fatalistic is the common “evenimentele din decembrie 1989”—the events of December 1989—but it should also be pointed out that the former Securitate and Ceausescu nostalgics have also embraced, incorporated and promoted, such terminology.  More innovative are terms such as rivolutie (an apparent invocation of or allusion to the famous Romanian satirist Ion Luca Caragiale’s 1880 play Conu Leonida fata cu reactiunea[16] , where he used the older colloquial spelling revulutie) or lovilutie (a term apparently coined by the humorists at Academia Catavencu, and combining the Romanian for coup d’etat, lovitura de stat, and the Romanian for revolution, revolutie).

The following characterization of what happened in December 1989 comes from an online poster, Florentin, who was stationed at the Targoviste barracks—the exact location where Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu would be summarily tried and executed on 25 December 1989.  Although his definitions may be too economically-based for my taste—authoritarianism/dictatorship vs. democracy would be preferable—and the picture he presents may be oversimplified at points, the poster’s characterization shows that sometimes the unadorned straighttalk of the plainspoken citizen can cut to the chase better than many an academic tome:

I did my military service, in Targoviste, in fact in the barracks at which the Ceausescu couple were executed…It appears that a coup d’etat was organized and executed to its final step, the proof being how the President of the R.S.R. (Romanian Socialist Republic) died, but in parallel a revolution took place.  Out of this situation has transpired all the confusion.   As far as I know this might be a unique historical case, if I am not mistaken.  People went into the streets, calling not just for the downfall of the president then, but for the change of the political regime, and that is what we call a revolution. This revolution triumphed, because today we have neither communism, nor even neocommunism with a human face.  The European Union would not have accepted a communist state among its ranks.  The organizers of the coup d’etat foresaw only the replacement of the dictator and the maintenance of a communist/neocommunist system, in which they did not succeed, although there are those who still hope that it would have succeeded.  Some talk about the stealing of the revolution, but the reality is that we live in capitalism, even if what we have experienced in these years has been more an attempt at capitalism, orchestrated by an oligarchy with diverse interests…[17]

This is indeed the great and perhaps tragic irony of what happened in December 1989 in Romania:  without the Revolution, the Coup might well have failed,[18] but without the Coup, neither would the Revolution have succeeded.   The latter is particularly difficult for the rigidly ideological and politically partisan to accept; yet it is more than merely a talking point and legitimating alibi of the second-rung nomenklatura who seized power (although it is that too).  The very atomization of Romanian society[19] that had been fueled and exploited by the Ceausescu regime explained why Romania came last in the wave of Fall 1989, but also why it was and would have been virtually impossible for genuine representatives of society—led by dissidents and protesters—to form an alternative governing body on 22 December whose decisions would have been accepted as sufficiently authoritative to be respected and implemented by the rump party-state bureaucracy, especially the armed forces and security and police structures.  The chaos that would have ensued—with likely multiple alternative power centers, including geographically—would have likely led to a far greater death toll and could have enabled those still betting on the return of the Ceausescus to after a time reconquer power or seriously impede the functioning of any new government for an extended period.

The fact that the Revolution enabled the coup plotters to seize power, and that the coup enabled the Revolution to triumph should be identified as yet another version—one particular to the idiosyncracies of the Romanian communist regime—of what Linz and Stepan have identified as the costs or compromises of the transition from authoritarian rule.  In Poland, for example, this meant that 65 percent of the Sejm was elected in non-competitive elections, but given co-equal authority with the Senate implying that “a body with nondemocratic origins was given an important role in the drafting of a democratic constitution”; in fact, Poland’s first completely competitive elections to both houses of Parliament occurred only in October 1991, fully two years after the formation of the first Solidarity government in August 1989.[20] In Romania, this meant that second-rung nomenklaturists—a displaced generation of elites eager to finally have their day in the sun—who to a large extent still harbored only Gorbachevian perestroikist views of the changes in the system as being necessary, were able to consolidate power following the elimination of the ruling Ceausescu couple.

The self-description by senior Front officials (Ion Iliescu) and media promoters (such as Darie Novaceanu in Adevarul) of the FSN (National Salvation Front) as the “emanation of the Revolution” does not seem justified. [21] It seems directly tied to two late January 1990 events—the decision of the Front’s leaders to run as a political party in the first post-Ceausescu elections and the contestation from the street of the Front’s leaders’ legitimacy to rule and to run in those elections.  It also seems difficult to defend objectively as a legitimate description, since even according to their own accounts, senior Front officials had been in contact with one another and discussed overthrowing the Ceausescus prior to the Revolution, since there had existed no real competing non-Ceausescu regime alternative on 22 December 1989 (an argument they themselves make), and since they had clearly not been elected to office.   Moreover, when senior former Front officials, Iliescu among them, point to their winning of two-thirds of the votes for the new parliament in May 1990 and Iliescu’s 85 percent vote for the presidency, the numbers in and of themselves—even beyond the by now pretty obvious and substantiated manipulation, surveillance, and intimidation of opposition parties, candidates, movements and civil society/non-governmental organizations that characterized the election campaign—are a red flag to the tainted and only partly free and fair character of those founding elections.

But if the FSN and Ion Iliescu cannot be accurately and legitimately described as the “emanation of the Revolution,” it also seems reasonable to suggest that the term “stolen revolution”[22] is somewhat unfair.  The term “stolen revolution” inevitably suggests a central, identifiable, and sufficiently coherent ideological character of the revolution and the presence of an alternative non-Ceausescu, non-Front leadership that could have ensured the retreat of Ceausescu forces and been able to govern and administer the country in the days and weeks that followed.  The absence of the latter was pretty clear on 22 December 1989—Iasi, Timisoara, and Arad among others, had local, authentic nuclei leading local movements (for example, the FDR, Frontul Democrat Roman), but no direct presence in Bucharest—and the so-called Dide and Verdet “22 minute” alternative governments were even more heavily compromised by former high-ranking communist dignitary inclusion than the FSN was (the one with the least, headed by Dumitru Mazilu, was rapidly overtaken and incorporated into the FSN).

As to the question of the ideological character of the revolt against Ceausescu, it is once again instructive to turn to what a direct participant, in this case in the Timisoara protests, has to say about it.  Marius Mioc[23], who participated in the defense of Pastor Tokes’ residence and in the street demonstrations that grew out of it, was arrested, interrogated, and beaten from the 16th until his release with other detainees on the 22nd and who has written with longstanding hostility toward former Securitate and party officials, IIiescu, the FSN, and their successors, gives a refreshingly honest account of those demonstrations that is in stark contrast to the often hyperpoliticized, post-facto interpretations of December 1989 prefered by ideologues:

I don’t know if the 1989 revolution was as solidly anticommunist as is the fashion to say today.  Among the declarations from the balcony of the Opera in Timisoara were some such as “we don’t want capitalism, we want democratic socialism,” and at the same time the names of some local PCR [communist] dignitaries were shouted.  These things shouldn’t be generalized, they could have been tactical declarations, and there existed at the same time the slogans “Down with communism!” and flags with the [communist] emblem cut out, which implicitly signified a break from communism.  [But] the Revolution did not have a clear ideological orientation, but rather demanded free elections and the right to free speech.[24]

Romania December 1989 was thus both revolution and coup, but its primary definitive characteristic was that of revolution, as outlined by “Florentin” and Marius Mioc above.  To this must be added what is little talked about or acknowledged as such today:  the counter-revolution of December 1989.  Prior to 22 December 1989, the primary target of this repression was society, peaceful demonstrators—although the Army itself was both perpetrator of this repression but also the target of Securitate forces attempting to ensure their loyalty to the regime and their direct participation and culpabilization in the repression of demonstrators.  After 22 December 1989, the primary target of this violence was the Army and civilians who had picked up weapons, rather than citizens at large.  It is probably justified to say that in terms of tactics, after 22 December 1989, the actions of Ceausist forces were counter-coup in nature, contingencies prepared in the event of an Army defection and the possibility of foreign intervention in support of such a defection.  However, precisely because of what occurred prior to 22 December 1989, the brutal, bloody repression of peaceful demonstrators, and because the success of the coup was necessary for the success of the revolution already underway, it is probably accurate to say that the Ceausescu regime’s actions as a whole constituted a counter-revolution.  If indeed the plotters had not been able to effectively seize power after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December 1989 and Ceausescu or his direct acolytes had been able to recapture power, we would be talking of the success not of a counter-coup, but of the counter-revolution.

A key component of the counter-revolution of December 1989 concerns the, as they were christened at the time, so-called “terrorists,” those who were believed then to be fighting in defense of the Ceausescu couple.  It is indeed true as Siani-Davies has written that the Revolution is about so much more than “the Front” and “the terrorists.”[25] True enough, but the outstanding and most vexing question about December 1989—one that resulted in 942 killed and 2,251 injured after 22 December 1989—is nevertheless the question of “the terrorists.”  Finding out if they existed, who they were, and who they were defending remains the key unclarified question of December 1989 two decades later:  that much is inescapable.

“LOST”…DURING INVESTIGATION:  WHEN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE IS NOT EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE.[26]

From early in 1990, those who participated in or were directly affected by the December 1989 events have attested to efforts to cover-up what happened.  Significantly, and enhancing the credibility of these accusations, those who claim such things come from diverse backgrounds, different cities, and from across the post-Ceausescu political spectrum.  Further enhancing their credibility, in many cases, they do not attempt to place these incidents into larger narratives about what happened in December 1989, but merely note it as a fact in relating their own personal experiences.

Let’s take the case of Simion Cherla, a participant in the December 1989 events in Timisoara.  Here is how Radu Ciobotea recounted Cherla’s story in May 1991:

Simion Cherlea also arrives, agitated.  He received a death threat, wrapped in a newspaper.  Next to it, in his mailbox, a bullet cartridge was also found.  To suggest to him that that is how he would end up if…

–If I talk.  Or if I have a copy of the file that I removed on 22 December 1989 from the office of the head of the county Securitate.  There was a map of the 8 Interior Ministry formations from Timisoara and “registry-journal of unique ordered operational activities.”  I gave them to Constantin Grecu (since transferred to the reserves), who gave them to Colonel Zeca and General Gheorghe Popescu.  These documents were of great use…in the Army’s fight against the terrorists.

–Do you know what the deal is with such formations?…When I looked at the map, my eyes glazed over.  Their formations were for entire zones where 10 to 12 nests of gunfire were programmed to shoot at a precise hour and minute!  Can you imagine!  And I, because I was trying to help in the fight against the terrorists, I turned it over to them!  So now I asked for it to be used at the trial.  In the registry everything was written:  who ordered, who executed the mission, the place, the hour, how long it last, the impact.  Great, all these documents are now said to have disappeared.  And I am threatened that I too will disappear like them.[27]

The discovery and then disappearances of such maps showing the placement and actions of Interior Ministry units—in particular, the Securitate—was recounted by others in the early 1990s.[28]

Nor, as we saw earlier from Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu’s testimony above, could one count on the military prosecutor’s office.  Jean Constantinescu [no apparent relation], who was shot in the CC building on 23 December 1989, stated the following in a declaration he gave just last year (as recounted by the investigative journalist Romulus Cristea):

I had two encounters with representatives from the prosecutor’s office.  The first prosecutor visited me at home, around two months after the events, he listened and noted my account, and as a conclusion, informally, he said something to me such as “we already know a good part of the shooters, they can be charged and pay civil damages, you can be part of the lawsuit and request appropriate damages.”  After hesitating, I added such a request, at the end of my written declaration, which I signed….

The second prosecutor, who later came to head the institution [the procuracy], invited me after several months to the office near Rosetti Square.  At the end of the conversation, he attempted to convince me that we shot amongst ourselves [ie there was no real enemy, no terrorists].[29]

The second prosecutor’s actions, according to Constantinescu’s recounting, are very familiar.  Already in mid-January 1990, participants in the gunfights of Brasov were telling the press that important evidence was missing and that the former Securitate were attempting to change the story of December 1989:

Florin Crisbasan:  Now the securisti are spreading their version:  “You guys shot into one another like a bunch of idiots.”…About 100 people were arrested as terrorists, but now they tell us they no longer have them…documents are missing, they don’t know how or what type:  a video cassette that I wished to access, with film from the events, can no longer be found….

Emil Ivascu:  If they tell us that “we shot among ourselves,” how the hell do you explain the ammunition with which they [the terrorists] fired? A bullet would rip your foot apart.  We saw for ourselves these type of arms.  Could just average civilians have been in possession of these?[30]

In May 1991, Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea described in detail for journalist Dan Badea the atypical ammunitions they found in the headquarters of the Securitate’s Vth Directorate (charged with Ceausescu’s personal security) building, including dum-dum bullets and special bullets (apparently vidia bullets).  They noted the civilians and soldiers who had witnessed this find, and mentioned that a certain Spiru Zeres had filmed the whole sequence, cassettes that were available for the military procuracy.[31]

Journalist and documentary-maker Maria Petrascu, who with her since deceased husband Marius, had for years investigated the Brasov events, also drew attention to the type of ammunition used in December 1989 when she recalled in 2007 that, “For a long time the Brasov Military Procuracy didn’t do anything, although they had evidence, statements, documents, photos and even the atypical bullets brought by the families of those killed or wounded.”[32] A soldier shot on 23 December 1989 in Buzau recently admitted that his doctors changed their declarations regarding the bullet with which he had been hit—identified by another soldier with whom he was interned as a ‘vidia’ bullet—to standard 7.62 mm ammunition.[33] In fall 2006, the daughter of a priest recalled:

In December ’89, after he arrived from Timisoara, my father stayed with me on Stefan Cel Mare Boulevard [in Bucharest].  We returned to our home, on the corner of Admiral Balescu and Rosenthal.  I found the cupboard of the dresser pure and simple riddled with bullets, about 8 to 10 of them. Someone who knew about such things told me they were vidia bullets. They were brought to a commission, but I don’t know what happened to them.[34]

This echoes something that Army Colonel Ion Stoleru was saying back in 1992:  that the “terrorists” had “weapons with silencers, with scopes, for shooting at night time (in ‘infrared’), bullets with a ‘vidia’ tip.  Really modern weapons,” to which he added, significantly, The civilian and military commissions haven’t followed through in investigating this…[35]

And yet, amazingly—despite all these testimonies regarding the existence and use of atypical munitions, or perhaps better put, precisely because of them—as of August 1991, Rasvan Popescu could report that “of the thousands of projectiles shot against the revolutionaries during  December 1989, the Prosecutor’s office has entered into the possession of…four bullets.  A ridiculous harvest.”[36]

BANKING ON THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE…

If Rasvan Popescu’s account is correct, it is understandable why functionaries of the Ceausescu regime have long banked on an absence of evidence.  For example, when asked if other than the standard 7.62 mm caliber weapons belonging to the Army were used in December 1989, Dr. Vladimir Belis, the head of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (IML) at the time, claims he doesn’t know and can’t say, because he claims no autopsies were ever performed—leading journalists to conclude that “therefore the tales of terrorists who shot with ‘dum-dum’ bullets, ‘bullets with vidia tips’ or bullets of large caliber, atypical for Romanian military units, will remain just stories that can neither be confirmed nor denied.”[37]

Former Securitate officer-turned journalist, novelist, and celebrity, Pavel Corut, has written alternatively derisively and sarcastically—well-nigh tauntingly—about the existence of such atypical ammunition and its use in December 1989:

“…Later I read fantastical and pathetic accounts according to which this [Army] officer died by being ‘hit by vidia and explosive [dum-dum] bullets.’  It isn’t the only case of a solider killed accidentally in warfare…”[38]

“Now we know that all the information…was false:  there did not exist a special guard unit that pledged an oath of (legionary-like) fealty to the dictator, there did not exist snipers with infrared sighting systems, no one shot vidia bullets…”[39]

“Vidia bullets don’t exist anywhere in the world.  And yet even the Army believed that the ‘Securitate-terrorists’ used vidia bullets….All this information was designed to create [the impression of] terrorists.  To show the people and the whole world fanatical terrorists.”[40]

Last, but hardly least, military prosecutors with roots in the Ceausescu era, have assimilated or mirror such arguments.  General Dan Voinea who headed the investigations from 1997-2001 and 2004-2008 said as much:

Romulus Cristea (journalist):  “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims?  The press of the time was filled with such claims…”

Dan Voinea:  There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets.  During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently.[41][42] (Emphasis added)

The wonderful legalistic (alibi-bestowing) logic for Voinea and his colleagues then goes something like this:   there exist victims requesting damages for injuries, loss of life, livelihood or property sustained during the violence of December 1989, their loss was real and deserves to be compensated by the Romanian state; but those initially considered guilty of causing much of this injury, loss of life, and damage and taken into custody in December 1989—the”terrorist” suspects—were released in January 1990, and so juridically there do not exist defendants; nor does there appear to still exist in the hands of the military procuracy much of the material evidence presented in 1990-1991—maps, videos, etc.—and, apparently, only four bullets; and no autopsies were officially performed on those shot in December 1989.  So in essence, the only things left are the crimes themselves and the testimonies of those interviewed over the past two decades:  no autopsy records, little material evidence, and the original suspects have gone missing…Conclusion:  no atypical munitions existed, were used, or maimed or killed anybody, and there were no terrorists, everyone shot into everyone else in the chaos of the moment—or in other words, the exact argument which as we have seen has been with us since Florin Crisbasan and Emil Ivascu of Brasov related the former Securitate’s “line of reasoning” in mid-January 1990.

VIDEO KILLED THE DICTATOR…AND EXPLODES THE LIES OF HIS  SUBORDINATES:

Four Videos in the Battle against Amnesia and Denial

For years, former Securitate and Militia personnel, and senior former communist party officials—in other words those most vested in the former Ceausescu regime and its legacy—have banked on the fact that the material evidence that could contradict their claims was absent, in fact did not and had never not existed.  As a result of the odd twists, turns, and vagaries of post-Ceausescu politics—combining rigidly partisan political narratives with a remarkable permeability to the arguments and information of “the enemy of my enemy”—it is also the case, ironically, that many on the liberal, anti-communist side of political spectrum, have become vested in this assumption too. [43]

Before the advent in the mid and late 2000s of user-generated content video sites, much of what had been seen of the Revolution came from the studios and cameras of Romanian Television or foreign networks.  The Internet and video sites such as Youtube, Daily Motion, and others have broken down the centralized control of other often individually-recorded images, ultimately challenging the sort of control over information exercised by a state agency such as, in this case, the military procuracy.

Video No. 1:  Bucharest, Securitate Archives in the Central Committee Building, Dum-Dum and Vidia Bullets

In the first video (posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rojm_revolutia-romana-22-dec-1989-cd5_shortfilms) , the sequence from roughly 1:20 to 2:50 shows civilians in the bowels of the CC building in Bucharest—the focal point of the December events, from where Nicolae Ceausescu gave his famous “final speech” on 21 December and from which Front leaders addressed crowds on 22 December and after—showing the munitions found in the Archives of the PCR’s CC.  The “dum-dum” bullets of “the elite shooters/commandos”—he mentions they are of West German manufacture—are identified for the camera, as are smaller, special bullets—which appear, based on other video, photos, and accounts, to be “vidia” bullets.  [Following the two screen captures below is an article from 31 December 1989, “Cu ce trag teroristii?” (With What are the Terrorists Shooting), in which the journalist discusses having a West German-manufactured (RWS firm) “dum-dum” bullet in his hand, as well as the “unfortunately now-famous small bullets of 5,62 mm caliber” (vidia bullets).]

DUM-DUM MUNITIONS OF THE SECURITATE’S ELITE SNIPERS (above); VIDIA BULLETS (below)

Video No. 2: Bucharest, Piata Aviatorilor, near TVR (Romanian state Television) headquarters, Vidia Bullets

In the second video (posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using.  Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets.  [Below the screen capture:   a photo posted on the Internet by Alexandru Stepanian, that he claims is a photo of one of these vidia bullets]

Imaginea a glontului vidia de 5,6 mm, tras la poarta din Pangrati a sediului TVR, in 22-23 decembrie 1989, de tineri vlajgani, in blugi, prinsi, dar eliberati de tov. General Tudor, activat de tov. Ion Iliescu.

Material primit de la dl. Alexandru Stepanian.

www.portalulrevolutiei.ro, glont vidia, zona TVR, Alexandru Stepanian

Video No. 3:  Bucharest, Soft-nosed (“Dum-Dum”) Bullets Found in the Headquarters of the Securitate’s V-th Directorate

The third video was found by the blogger who goes by the handle “Claude 2.0” (Claude 2.0 Dupa 19 ani – Gloante dum-dum ? postare din 14 aprilie 2009). It shows people going through material including bullets found in the headquarters building of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate (that charged with the personal protection of the Ceausescus).  An article from March 1990 appended below has a senior arms specialist discussing his being summoned during these days to the zone around the CC building (where the Vth Directorate building was located), where he verified that “soft-nosed” bullets (known colloquially as “dum-dum”) were discovered (he then goes into detail about their properties).  Discussion in the videotape about the box in which the bullets were discovered, as well as the comments of the arms specialist, suggest these were Kynoch-Magnum “soft-nosed” bullets—described in the article as “cartridges for [hunting] elephants.”

Video No. 4:  Brasov, Morgue, Atypical (“Vidia”) Bullets

Video 4 comes from part 7 of Maria Petrascu’s 2005 documentary film “Revolutionary Brasov” (Brasovul Revolutionar PARTEA 7 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9z4wLuma0Q).  It shows both the small, atypical, [“vidia”] bullets with which civilians and soldiers were killed, as well as an unidentified doctor speaking on 23 January 1990 in which he states that four of six soldiers he had looked at had been shot with great precision in the forehead with such bullets (film is also shown of their gruesome injuries).   Maria Petrascu has described elsewhere what she and her husband found on 29-30 December 1989 at the County Morgue:

Even the halls were filled with the dead, there were over 100.  They didn’t have any place to put them all, we walked through pools of blood, we saw the cadavers of children, young people, adults, shot in the forehead, in the heart, in the feet and abdomen with brains and intestines having exploded, nightmarish scenes that I shall never forget.  It was then that we decided we wouldn’t rest until we discovered who fired, because we had begun to understand that many of those killed had been shot by guns with infrared scopes, by some professionals.[44]

Those Who Have Told Us the Truth [45]

As opposed to the aforementioned Vladimir Belis, Pavel Corut, and Dan Voinea, all of whom who have strenuously and repeatedly denied the existence and use in December 1989 of atypical munitions of dum-dum bullets and vidia bullets, there exist those who have told us of the existence and use of these in December 1989.[46] They are essentially, for lack of a better term, former Securitate whistleblowers, who have admitted the Securitate’s role in providing the “terrorists” who caused so much destruction, mayhem, and loss of life in those days.

For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).

Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989.  What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding [dum-dum] bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridges which upon hitting their targets caused new explosions” [emphasis added]—in other words, exploding or dum-dum bullets.[47]

The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:

I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89.  In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched.  Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition.  In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances.  I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets.  In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox.  We had been drugged.  We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us.  Don’t publish my name.  I fear for me and my parents.  When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’  The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize.  I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’.[48] [emphases added]

As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention:  the former Securitate.  That is not accidental.[49]

Those discussed as alternatively “commandos” or “professionals” appear to have been members of the so-called USLAC—Special Unit for Anti-terrorist and Commando Warfare.  In 1991, Dan Badea summarized former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu’s description of the USLAC as follows:

THE USLAC COMMANDOS:

Those who had and have knowledge about the existence and activities of the shock troops subordinated directly to Ceausescu remained quiet and continue to do so out of fear or out of calculation.  Much has been said about individuals in black jumpsuits, with tattoos on their left hand and chest, mercenary fanatics who acted at night, killing with precision and withdrawing when they were encircled to the underground tunnels of Bucharest.  Much was said, then nobody said anything, as if nothing had ever happened.

Traversing the [Securitate’s] Fifth Directorate and the USLA, the USLAC commandos were made up of individuals who ‘worked’ undercover at different posts.  Many were foreign students, doctoral students and thugs committed with heart and soul to the dictator.  Many were Arabs who knew with precision the nooks and crannies of Bucharest, Brasov and other towns in Romania.  For training these had at their disposal several underground centers of instruction:  one was in an area near Brasov, while another—it appears—was right under the former headquarters of the PCR CC [communist party central committee building], a shooting range that was—discovered by accident by several revolutionaries during the events of December .”[50]

We also know from Romanescu and a second source that USLA commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu (Bula Moise) addressed his troops as follows:

“On 25 December at around 8 pm, after the execution of the dictators, Colonel Ardeleanu gathered the unit’s members into an improvised room and said to them:

‘The Dictatorship has fallen!  The Unit’s members are in the service of the people.  The Romanian Communist Party [PCR] is not disbanding!  It is necessary for us to regroup in the democratic circles of the PCR—the inheritor of the noble ideas of the people of which we are a part!…Corpses were found, individuals with USLAC (Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare) identity cards and identifications with the 0620 stamp of the USLA, identity cards that they had no right to be in possession of when they were found…’  He instructed that the identity cards [of members of the unit] had to be turned in within 24 hours, at which time all of them would receive new ones with Defense Ministry markings.” [51] [52]

In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun.  In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed.  By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.[53]

THE REVOLUTION WAS TELEVISED. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION WAS VIDEOTAPED.

Poet, essayist, and NPR contributor Andrei Codrescu memorably turned Gil Scott Heron’s famous social commentary—“The Revolution Will Not Be Televised”—on  its head, saying that contrary to what Heron’s song had led them to expect …in Romania, the revolution was televised!  But if you read on or listen to Codrescu closely, it would be more accurate to say that he, like many Romanians and Romanianists, believes that what happened in December 1989 was a coup d’etat—he talks about the“staging of the revolution” and how the coup plotters “seized the means of projection”—and thus what he really seems to intend to say is that “the coup d’etat was televised.”[54]

On the other hand, Vladimir Tismaneanu is quoted as once having memorably said:  ”The VCR killed Ceausescu even before his execution…It was the most important factor in terms of creating a mass consciousness.”[55] It is an important and insightful observation about the power of technology and the challenges it poses to centralized control, especially of the totalitarian state.

Ceausescu’s image and control was damaged by the video-player—to say nothing of, by live television, with the infamous “mirror-shattering” moment of 21 December 1989.  However, as this paper has demonstrated, it is the video-recorder that has undone his final and unfortunately (ever)lasting “Christmas gift” to his Romanian subjects, and that has undone the lies of those—including certain past military prosecutors with roots in the communist era—bent on covering this up.

[1]For some of my previous publications on this topic, see Richard Andrew Hall:

Hall 2008 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romrevfordumdums042108tk.html,

Hall 2006 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html,

Hall 2005 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/checkmate040405.html,

Hall 2004 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/doublespeak%20romania%203-2004.html,

Hall 2002 http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/romania%20securitate%205-2002.html,

Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Action and Revolution:  Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989,” Europe-Asia Studies 2000, no. 6 (September 2000).

Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity:  The ‘Staged-War’ Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies vol 13, no. 3 (Fall 1999) (University of California Berkeley Press).

[2] For a good discussion of this in English, which explains how cremation practices were  at odds with Romanian burial traditions, see the article entitled “The Red Mask of Death:  The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania 1989,” in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1).

[3]For more information online, see, for example, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolae_Ghircoia%C5%9F, http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opera%C5%A3iunea_Trandafirul, http://www.romanialibera.ro/a51078/cine-a-organizat-furtul-cadavrelor-din-morga-spitalului-judetean.html, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/67.htm. Even the 1994 SRI report admits that confusion surrounding the identity of those who were cremated stems from Ghircoias’ burning—after the flight of the Ceausescus on 22 December—of all relevant documents he had seized from the Timisoara county hospital http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/raportul_sri11.htm.  Thus, it seems appropriate to say Ghircoias’ job involved making things disappear…

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

[10]The hyperbolic and popular academic designation of the Ceausescu regime as Stalinist is not particularly helpful.  Totalitarian yes, Stalinist no.  Yes, Nicolae Ceausescu had a Stalinist-like personality cult, and yes he admired Stalin and his economic model, as he told interviewers as late as 1988, and we have been told ad nauseum since.  But this was also a strange regime, which as I have written elsewhere was almost characterized by a policy of “no public statues [of Ceausescu] and no (or at least as few as possible) public martyrs [inside or even outside the party]”—the first at odds with the ubiquity of Nicoale and Elena Ceausescus’ media presence, the second characterized by the “rotation of cadres” policy whereby senior party officials could never build a fiefdom and were sometimes banished to the provinces, but almost were never eliminated physically, and by Ceausescus’ general reluctance to “spoil” his carefully created “image” abroad by openly eliminating high-profile dissidents (one of the reasons Pastor Tokes was harassed and intimidated, but still alive in December 1989)  (see Richard Andrew Hall 2006, “Images of Hungarians and Romanians in Modern American Media and Popular Culture,” at http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/huroimages060207tk6.html). Ken Jowitt has characterized the organizational corruption and political routinization of the communist party as moving from the Stalinist era—whereby even being a high-level party official did not eliminate the fear or reality of imprisonment and death—to what he terms Khrushchev’s de facto maxim of “don’t kill the cadre” to Brezhnev’s of essentially “don’t fire the cadre” (see Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder:  The Leninist Extinction, especially pp. 233-234, and chapter 4 “Neotraditionalism,” p. 142).   The very fact that someone like Ion Iliescu could be around to seize power in December 1989 is fundamentally at odds with a Stalinist system:  being “purged” meant that he fulfilled secondary roles in secondary places, Iasi, Timisoara, the Water Works, a Technical Editing House, but “purged” did not threaten and put an end to his existence, as it did for a Kirov, Bukharin, and sadly a cast of millions of poor public souls caught up in the ideological maelstorm.  Charles King wrote in 2007 that “the Ceausescu era was the continuation of Stalinism by other means, substituting the insinuation of terror for its cruder variants and combining calculated cooptation with vicious attacks on any social actors who might represent a potential threat to the state” (Charles King, “Remembering Romanian Communism,” Slavic Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (Winter 2007), p. 720).  But at a certain point, a sufficient difference in quantity and quality—in this case, of life, fear, imprisonment, and death—translates into a difference of regime-type, and we are left with unhelpful hyperbole.  The level of fear to one’s personal existence in Ceausescu’s Romania—both inside and outside the party-state—simply was not credibly comparable to Stalin’s Soviet Union, or for that matter, even Dej’s Romania of the 1950s.  In the end, Ceausescu’s Romania was “Stalinist in form [personality cult, emphasis on heavy industry], but Brezhnevian in content [“don’t fire the cadres”…merely rotate them…privileges, not prison sentences for the nomenklatura].”

[11] For a recent discussion of the “diffusion” or “demonstration” effect and regime change, see, for example, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,”

Communist and Postcommunist Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (September 2006), pp. 283­304.

[12] For more discussion, see Hall 2000.

[13]For discussion of the term see Michael Shafir, Romania:  Politics, Economics, and Society (Boulder, 1985).

[14]For discussion of the term see Ken  Jowitt, New World Disorder (University of California Berkely Press, 1992).

[15] For earlier discussions of this topic from a theoretical perspective , see, for example, Peter Siani-Davies, “Romanian Revolution of Coup d’etat?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (December 1996), pp. 453-465; Stephen D. Roper, “The Romanian Revolution from a Theoretical Perspective,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 401-410; and Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 1-52 ff, but especially (chapter 7) pp. 267-286.  For a recent effort to deal with this question more broadly, see Timothy Garton Ash, “Velvet Revolution:  The Prospects, The New York Review of Books, Volume 56, Number 19 (December 3, 2009) at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23437. For a good comparison and analysis of public opinion polling performed in 2009 and 1999 about classifying what happened in December 1989, see Catalin Augustin Stoica in http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-special/a-fost-revolutie-sau-lovitura-de-stat-527645.html.

[16] http://ro.wikisource.org/wiki/Conu_Leonida_fa%C5%A3%C4%83_cu_reac%C5%A3iunea

[17] Entry from forum at http://www.gds.ro/Opinii/2007-12-20/Revolutia:+majoratul+rusinii!

[18]This is a point that was first made credibly by Michael Shafir in Michael Shafir, “Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past,” Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 1, no. 41 (12 October 1990).  It becomes all the clearer, however, when we consider that the XIV PCR Congress from 20-24 November 1989 went off without the slightest attempt at dissidence within the congress hall—a potential opportunity thereby missed—and that the plotters failed to act during what would have seemed like the golden moment to put an end to the “Golden Era,” the almost 48 hours that Nicolae Ceausescu was out of the country in Iran between 18 and 20 December 1989, after regime forces had already been placed in the position of confronting peaceful demonstrators and after they opened fire in Timisoara.  In other words, an anti-regime revolt was underway, and had the coup been so minutely prepared as critics allege, this would have been the perfect time to seize power, cut off the further anti-system evolution of protests, exile Ceausescu from the country, and cloak themselves in the legitimacy of a popular revolt.  What is significant is that the plotters did not act at this moment.  It took the almost complete collapse of state authority on the morning of 22 December 1989 for them to enter into action.  This is also why characterizations of the Front as the ‘counterstrike of the party-state bureaucracy’ or the like is only so much partisan rubbish, since far from being premised as something in the event of a popular revolt or as a way to counter an uprising, the plotters had assumed—erroneously as it turned out—that Romanian society would not rise up against the dictator, and thus that only they could or had to act.  It is true, however, that once having consolidated power, the plotters did try to slow, redirect, and even stifle the forward momentum of the revolution, and that the revolutionary push from below after December 1989 pushed them into reforms and measures opening politics and economics to competition that they probably would not have initiated on their own.

[19] I remain impressed here by something Linz and Stepan highlighted in 1996:  according to a Radio Free Europe study, as of June 1989 Bulgaria had thirteen independent organizations, all of which had leaders whose names were publicly known, whereas in Romania there were only two independent organizations with bases inside the country, neither of which had publicly known leaders (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 352).  For more discussion of this and related issues, see Hall 2000.

[20] The presidency was also an unelected communist holdover position until fall 1990.  See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, pp. 267-274.

[21] For a discussion of the roots and origins of these terms, see Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The 1989 Revolution and Romania’s Future,” Problems of Communism, vol. XL no. 1-2 (January-April 1991), p. 52, especially footnote no. 38.

[22] Stephen Kotkin associates the concept, accurately if incompletely, with Tom Gallagher and Vladimir Tismaneanu in Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society:  1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (Modern Library Chronicles, 2009), pp. 147-148 n. 1.  Similar concepts have taken other names, such as “operetta war” (proposed but not necessarily accepted) by Nestor Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution (Praeger, 1991) or “staging of [the] revolution” [advocated] by Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag (Morrow and Company, 1991).  Dumitru Mazilu’s 1991 book in Romanian was entitled precisely “The Stolen Revolution” [Revolutia Furata].  Charles King stated in 2007 that the CPADCR Report “repeats the common view (at least among western academics) of the revolution as being hijacked,” a term essentially equating to “stolen revolution,” but as Tismaneanu headed the commission and large sections of the Report’s chapter on December 1989 use previous writings by him (albeit without citing where they came from), it is hard to somehow treat the Report’s findings as independent of Tismaneanu’s identical view (for an earlier discussion of all this, see Hall 2008)

[23] Mioc does not talk a great deal about his personal story:  here is one of those few examples, http://www.timisoara.com/newmioc/5.htm.

[24] Quoted from http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/09/29/o-diferentiere-necesara-comunisti-si-criminali-comunisti/#more-4973

[25]Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 286.

[26] The origin of this phrase is apparently ascribed to the astronomer and scientist Carl Sagan, and only later became a favorite of former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

[27] Radu Ciobotea, “Spitalul groazei nu are amintiri,” Flacara, nr. 19 (8 mai 1991), p. 4.

[28] See the sources listed in endnote 59, Hall 2006.

[29] http://romuluscristea.wordpress.com/2009/04/21/cautari-dupa-20-de-ani/#more-2603 It would be interesting to say the least to know who the second prosecutor was, although I have my suspicions as to who it could have been.

[30] Mircea Florin Sandru, “Brasov:  Intrebari care asteapta raspuns (II),” Tineretul Liber, 17 ianuarie 1990, p. 1, p. III-a).

[31] I discussed all of this in detail, including a partial English translation of the article, in Hall 2008.

[32] http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=1.msg214 Reply #131.

[33] http://1989.jurnalul.ro/stire-special/baiete-ai-avut-zile-526579.html.

[34] Christian Levant, “Dacă tata nu-l salva pe Tokes, dacă nu salva biserici, tot se întâmpla ceva,” Adevarul, 30 September 2006, online at http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/dac-x103-tata-nu-l-salva-pe-tokes-dac-x103-nu-salva-biserici-tot-se-nt-mpla-ceva/200090.

[35] Army Colonel Ion Stoleru with Mihai Galatanu, “Din Celebra Galerie a Teroristilor,” Expres, no. 151 (22-28 December 1992), p. 4, and “Am vazut trei morti suspecti cu fata intoarsa spre caldarim,” Flacara, no. 29 (22 July 1992), p. 7.  Cited in Hall, 2008.

[36] Rasvan Popescu, “Patru gloante dintr-o tragedie,” Expres, nr. 32 (81) 13-19 August 1991, p. 10 (?).

[37] Laura Toma, Toma Roman Jr. , and Roxana Ioana Ancuta, “Belis nu a vazut cadavrele Ceausestilor,” Jurnalul National, 25 October 2005, http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/34668/belis-nu-a-vazut-cadavrele-ceausestilor, discussed in Hall 2008.

[38] Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 66 (43) 30 October-5 November 1991, p. 12.  Paul Cernescu is Pavel Corut’s acknowledged alias.  During his journalistic career at Ion Cristoiu’s Expres Magazin, he began by writing under this pseudonym.

[39] Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 65 (42) 23-29 October 1991, p. 12.

[40] Pavel Corut, Fulgerul Albastru (Bucuresti:  Editura Miracol, 1993), p. 177.  For background in English on Corut, see Michael Shafir, “Best Selling Spy Novels Seek To Rehabilitate Romanian ‘Securitate,'” in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, no. 45, pp. 14-18.

[41] General Dan Voinea, interview by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005, online edition.  Reproduced at, for example, http://asociatia21decembrie.ro/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=31&sid=f9403c7a52a7ac9c8b53b8042226f135.

See also the claims of former military prosecutor Teodor Ungureanu (Facultatea de Drept, 1978) also in December 2005, at, for example, http://www.piatauniversitatii.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=3912&sid=c76d79333718bc7fdfad0eb8e22eb913

and

http://www.piatauniversitatii.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=202&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0. Nor does Teodoru Ungureanu believe in terrorists, vidia bullets, dum-dum bullets, or atypical ammunition:

“La cele de mai sus va trebui să adăugăm fabulaţiile cu privire la celebrele “gloanţe-widia”. Prin lansarea acestei aberaţii, cei mai de seamă reprezentanţi ai Armatei s-au compromis lamentabil. Ceea ce prezentau în emisiuni tv ori în paginile unor ziare ca fiind teribilele instrumente ale morţii, nu erau nimic altceva decât miezurile din oţel care intrau în alcătuirea internă a proiectilului cal. 7,62 mm-scurt destinat armelor tip AKM. Tot aşa aveau să fie făcute speculaţii asupra folosirii muniţiei explozive (de tip dum-dum), de către persoane care erau fie străine de efectele povocate asupra corpului uman de proiectile cu diverse energii cinetice (la momentul străpungerii), ori de fragmente din proiectile dezmembrate la un anterior impact cu un corp dur, fie de cei angajaţi într-o reală acţiune de dezinformare….”

[42] According to Sorin Iliesiu, the filmmaker who claims to have edited the chapter on December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Raport Final, the “spirit of Voinea’s findings can be found in the Chapter.”  Indeed, the chapter includes snippets from an interview between Dan Voinea and Andrei Badin (Adevarul , December 2006).  The “indefatigable” Voinea, as Tom Gallagher has referred to him, continues to be defended by Vladimir Tismaneanu who has expressed support for Voinea’s investigations “from both a juridic and historic viewpoint” (see the entries for 21 September 2009 at http://tismaneanu.wordpress.com), avoiding any mention of the reasons for Voinea’s dismissal from the Military Procuracy, mistakes that Prosecutor General Laura Codruta Kovesi says “one wouldn’t expect even from a beginner” (for more on this and background, see Hall 2008):

Ce îi reproşaţi, totuşi, lui Voinea? Punctual, ce greşeli a făcut în instrumentarea cauzelor?

Sunt foarte multe greşeli, o să menţionez însă doar câteva. Spre exemplu, s-a început urmărirea penală faţă de persoane decedate. Poate îmi explică dumnealui cum poţi să faci cercetări faţă de o persoană decedată! Apoi, s-a început urmărirea penală pentru fapte care nu erau prevăzute în Codul Penal. În plus

, deşi nu a fost desemnat să lucreze, spre exemplu, într-un dosar privind mineriada (repartizat unui alt procuror), domnul procuror Dan Voinea a luat dosarul, a început urmărirea penală, după care l-a restituit procurorului de caz. Vă imaginaţi cum ar fi dacă eu, ca procuror general, aş lua dosarul unui coleg din subordine, aş începe urmărirea penală după care i l-aş înapoia. Cam aşa ceva s-a întâmplat şi aici.

Mai mult, a început urmărirea penală într-o cauză, deşi, potrivit unei decizii a Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie, era incompatibil să mai facă asta. E vorba despre dosarul 74/p/1998 (dosar în care Voinea l-a acuzat pe fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu că, în iunie 1990, a determinat cu intenţie intervenţia în forţă a militarilor împotriva manifestanţilor din Capitală – n.r.).

Apoi au fost situaţii în care s-a început urmărirea penală prin acte scrise de mână, care nu au fost înregistrate în registrul special de începere a urmăririi penale. Aceste documente, spre exemplu, nu prevedeau în ce constau faptele comise de presupuşii învinuiţi, nu conţin datele personale ale acestora. De exemplu, avem rezoluţii de începere a urmăririi penale care-l privesc pe Radu Ion sau pe Gheorghe Dumitru, ori nu ştim cine este Gheorghe Dumitru, nu ştim cine este Radu Ion.

„Parchetul să-şi asume tergiversarea anchetelor”

Credeţi că, în cazul lui Voinea, au fost doar greşeli sau că a fost vorba de intenţie, ştiind că acuzaţii vor scăpa?

Nu cunosc motivele care au stat la baza acestor decizii şi, prin urmare, nu le pot comenta.

Poate fi vorba şi despre complexitatea acestor dosare?

Când ai asemenea dosare în lucru, nu faci astfel de greşeli, de începător. Eşti mult mai atent când ai cauze de o asemenea importanţă pentru societatea românească.

Excerpted from http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/868918/Kovesi-despre-revolutia-ratata-a-lui-Voinea-A-gresit-ca-un-incepator/

[43] See, especially Hall 1999 and Hall 2002 for a discussion.

[44] Reproduced at http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=1.msg214.

[45] This section borrows heavily from Hall 2008 and Hall 2006.

[46] In addition to these videos, I have thus far accumulated 45 mentions/claims of use of dum-dum and/or vidia bullets in December 1989.  These include the testimonies of doctors who treated the wounded, but also military officers—not just recruits—who are familiar with ballistics.  Separately, I also have accumulated 36 mentions/claims of people who were either killed or wounded by such atypical munitions during the events.  Significantly, these include people killed or wounded prior to 22 December 1989 as well as after, and they are from multiple cities and a variety of locations for both periods—suggesting not accident, but a well-executed plan by the repressive forces of the Ceausescu regime, the Securitate and their foreign mercenary allies.  See Hall 2008 for some of these.

[47] Puspoki F., “Piramida Umbrelor (III),” Orizont (Timisoara), no. 11 (16 March 1990) p.4, and Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (Timisoara:  Editura de Vest, 1991), p. 61.

[48] “Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din decembrie ’89,” Romania Libera, 28 December 1994, p.3.

[49] For the discussion of the former Securitate response to those who have violated the code of silence, see Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian,” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html .

[50] Captain Marian Romanescu, with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres (2-8 July 1991), pp. 8-9.

[51] Captain Marian Romanescu, with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres (2-8 July 1991), pp. 8-9.

[52] What evidence do we have that the “USLAC”—a reference attributed to Ardeleanu, discussed by Romanescu, and alluded to by Vasilevici (“commandos,” he specified the involvement of Arabs in his book) and the anonymous recruit (the “professionals in black camouflage”)—in fact existed?  To me, the most convincing evidence comes from the comments of Dr. Sergiu Tanasescu, the medical trainer of the Rapid Bucharest soccer team, who was directly involved in the fighting at the Central Committee building.  One has to realize that until his comments in March 1990, the very acronym “USLAC” and its extension does not appear to have appeared in the Romanian media—and has very rarely appeared since.  Here is what he said:

Ion K. Ion (reporter at the weekly Cuvintul):  The idea that there were foreign terrorists has been circulating in the press.

Sergiu Tanasescu (trainer for the Bucharest Rapid soccer club):  I ask that you be so kind as to not ask me about the problem because it is a historical issue.  Are we in agreement?

I.I.:  O.K.

Tanasescu:  I caught a terrorist myself, with my own hands.  He was 26 years old and had two ID cards, one of a student in the fourth year of Law School, and another one of Directorate V-a U.S.L.A.C. Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare [emphasis added].  He was drugged.  I found on him a type of chocolate, “Pasuma” and “Gripha” brands.  It was an extraordinarily powerful drug that gave a state of euphoria encouraging aggression and destruction, and an ability to go without sleep for ten days.  He had a supersophisticated weapon, with nightsights [i.e. lunetisti], with a system for long-distance sound…

Ion K. Ion:  What happened to those terrorists who were caught?

S.T.:  We surrendered them to organs of the military prosecutor.  We caught many in the first days, their identity being confirmed by many, by Colonel Octavian Nae [Dir. V-a], Constantin Dinescu (Mircea’s uncle), [Army Chief of Staff, General] Guse, but especially by [Securitate Director] Vlad who shouted at those caught why they didn’t listen to his order to surrender, they would pretend to be innocent, but the gun barrels of their weapons were still warm from their exploits.  After they would undergo this summary interrogation, most of them were released.

I.I.:  Why?

S.T.:  Because that’s what Vlad ordered.  On 22 December we caught a Securitate major who was disarmed and let go, only to capture him again the next day, when we took his weapon and ammo and again Vlad vouched for him, only to capture him on the third day yet again.  We got annoyed and then arrested all of them, including Vlad and Colonel Nae, especially after a girl of ours on the first basement floor where the heating system is located found him transmitting I don’t know what on a walkie-talkie.

I.I.:  When and how were the bunkers discovered?

S.T.:  Pretty late in the game, in any case only after 24 December.  Some by accident, most thanks to two individuals [with a dog].

Sergiu Tanasescu, interview by Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera roz!” Cuvintul, no. 8-9, 28 March 1990, 15.  From Hall, 2006.

[53] For some of the discussion of how the problem was made to “go away,” see Hall 2006 and the section “Foreign Involvement.”

[54] Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag (Morrow and Company, 1991).  For a discussion of this Codrescu’s sources and arguments, including his allegations of a Yalta-Malta conspiracy, see Hall 2005.

[55] Quoted in Alexander Stille, “Cameras Shoot Where Uzis Can’t,” New York Times, 20 September 20 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/20/arts/cameras-shoot-where-uzis-can-t.html.

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