Dezinformare despre Cazul M.Ap.N. 23-24 decembrie 1989…dejucata de catre uslasii ei insusi
pe pagina 116 Ardeleanu admite ca el insusi–nici vorba de Militaru sau altcineva–l-a nominalizat pe Trosca pentru misiunea faimoasa…
pe pagina 153 uslas-ul Soldea admite ca dupa incidentul sangeros, el a fost anchetat pentru informatii despre subunitatea lui…si pe pagina 155 ca i s-a supus o analiza de urina…ca sa verifice daca el a fost drogat…
What we know is that this requested “fall-out” of USLA cadre never took place. We also know from the mouth (Romanian Television, 1991) and hand (a directed report dated 8 January 1990) of USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu himself that, on that evening of 23 December 1989, Army General Ion Hortopan broke into a meeting of Ardeleanu with generals and other officials of the Front leadership and announced that “Near a military objective, on the outskirts of the capital, that was being fired upon, an armed Plutonier Major Popa Ion Stefan from the USLA was captured.”[123] Clearly, it would appear, based on this, that this USLA member was not part of some team dispatched in the “defense of the Revolution.” According to Mihai Floca writing in August 1990, the objective in question outside the capital was the CITc (?), the USLA member claimed he was coming to the military unit to “surrender,” and Ardeleanu, “upon receiving the news played dumb, [saying] ‘I think it is [USLA] Chief of Staff Trosca’s doing, he did this to me’.”[124]
Floca and others have maintained that at this point, late on the night of 23 December 1989, while at the Defense Ministry, General Militaru called upon Ardeleanu to bring the entire personnel of the USLA (757 officers and ncos) to the Defense Ministry to root out the “terrorists” who were firing upon it. As “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’,” this left 647. Of these, Militaru supposedly wanted 600 to report. Instead, only 18 came in 3 ABIs.[125]
It has always seemed unusual, and this has been highlighted by others, in the serious situation that prevailed on the night of 23-24 December 1989, that in order to clear these blocs of “terrorists,” the units that came were led by the Chief of Staff Gheorghe Trosca. Why send your leadership out to do this job?
The Securitate apologists and conspiratorialists have, of course, sought to suggest that General Nicolae Militaru nominated them because precisely these individuals had surveilled him for alleged links to Soviet intelligence. But, as I have written elsewhere, Ardeleanu himself, upends all of this when he freely admits that it was he who selected Trosca for this mission.[126] It, of course, seems to make a lot sense when one considers his apparent attempt to lay what was happening at the feet of Trosca. That he ordered Trosca and the others to the scene, under absurd circumstances, and they ended up getting killed, appears to be something for which many former USLA personnel—some of whom appear to have genuinely resented the boorish and vindictive Ardeleanu for his slavish behavior toward Elena Ceausescu and Tudor Postelnicu—were never able to forgive Ardeleanu.
I won’t tax the patience of my readers with another rehash here of what happened when two of three USLA ABIs arrived out front of M.Ap.N. headquarters (Defense Ministry). I have previously discussed it extensively elsewhere.[127] It is important to note, however, that the USLA officers who survived the incident admit that they were beaten up, interrogated about the makeup and duties of their unit, and forced to take urinalysis tests to determine if they were drugged—all things which suggest they were hardly considered the innocent victims of an unfortunate accident at the time it occurred. Army officers involved in the confrontation who were interviewed in spring 1990 maintained that they witnessed gunfire from the guns on the USLA vehicles, three of the machine guns recovered from the USLA vehicles showed signs of having been fired, the gun barrel of one the tanks had been blocked, and on the top of another tank a machine gun and signal lantern were found.[128] These officers then claimed that after their recollections were published in June 1990, they were “warned to think long and hard since they have families and to stay on their own turf if they do not want to have problems.”[129]
Residents of the apartment blocs surrounding the Defense Ministry also claimed harassment and intimidation. One family maintained that they had been visited in May 1990 by two individuals flashing “Militia” identity cards, inquiring what had happened in December 1989 in that location, and insisting that different parts of the Army had merely fired at one another—there had been no “terrorists.” Another resident who requested anonymity since he had “had enough problems in the past with the Securitate” said he was visited on 21 May by a “police major who called himself Popescu [a common Romanian last name, commonly used as a cover by Securitate personnel]” and wanted to talk about the “terrorists,” but that the resident should not inform the Army of his visit. Some residents maintained that a neighbor suspected of being a Securitate collaborator had been going around suggesting “how to ‘correctly’ interpret the incident with the two armored personnel vehicles [i.e. the USLA unit] on the night of 23/24 December.” The Army journalists concluded in June 1990 based on these interviews that “therefore, ‘the boys’ [a common euphemism for the Securitate] are [still] at work.”[130] It has been particularly frustrating that neither Siani-Davies nor Dennis Deletant—both of whom have written on this key episode—has apparently ever taken the time to read the disclosures in Armata Poporului, and hence completely ignore the descriptions of what happened and claims of harassment and intimidation of citizens from these blocs.
Mihai Floca’s credibility on the issue of what happened on the night of 23-24 December with the USLA units at the Defense Ministry, what happened on the other nights of the period of the Revolution in the same location, and on the claims of residents of these blocs—as noted, witness accounts that other publications simply ignored—is enhanced by the fact that his articles from late December 1989 through 1990 clearly do not show someone out “to get” the USLA or tarnish their reputation.
What is particularly notable is that after writing the (in)famous 26 December 1989 Romania Libera article (“Ucigasii de meserie al teroristului nr. 1,” p. 3) claiming that these USLA personnel in the Defense Ministry incident were “terrorists,” Floca wrote articles demonstrating how the USLA collaborated with the Army in certain actions during December 1989, at the CC building (“Actiune concertata impotriva pericolului,” Romania Libera 29 December 1989, p. 4) and at the Television Station (“Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p.4). Only in June 1990, did he begin publishing interviews with the Army soldiers involved in the 23-24 December incident with the USLA at the Defense Ministry and with the residents of the surrounding blocs. These articles were as he noted prompted by two developments: the articles in the opposition publication Zig-Zag rehabilitating the USLA and claiming they were innocent victims in the Defense Ministry incident (authored by the Securitate’s number one cheerleader, Angela Bacescu), and articles in the French press arguing that the “terrorists” had not existed. It was thus not as Siani-Davies suggests a response prompted first by a letter from the widows of the dead USLA officers.[131]
Crima ? [Adevarul, Cazul MApN 23-24 decembrie ’89 si sosirea uslasilor…] Maior Mihai Floca, Armata Poporului, 6 iunie 1990, p. 3
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 17, 2010
http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Ziaristii_Revolutiei-20_de_ani_fara_regrete_0_245375855.html
si totusi…
Faptul ca, de la Revolutie incoace, armata este tinta unor atacuri bine dirijate si din ce in ce mai insistente, il poate constata oricine. Prea putini dintre ziaristii care isi pun semnatura sub articolele defaimatoare care apar in unele publicatii, mai sint interesati de aportul armatei la apararea Revolutiei, la victorie. Jertfa celor 267 de ofiteri, maistri militari, subofiteri, elevi si soldati, nu mai are, acum, nico o importanta! Tot ce-i preocupa pe respectivii “oameni de bine” este sa arate ca armata a contribuit la genocid, eventual sa demonstreze ca aceasta contributie a fost cit mai mare.
Iata, insa, ca, in ultima vreme, concertul dirijat impotriva ostirii si-a largit repertoriul. Au aparut voci distincte–unele caracterizate prin tonalitatii foarte inalte. Acum armata este acuzata, incriminata si pentru ce a facut dupa 22 decembrie. In cadrul acestei orientari noi, in mod deosebit se remarca articolul “O crima ce trebuie neaparat dezvaluita” semnat de doamna Angela Bacescu in revista de actualitati si reportaje “ZIG-ZAG MAGAZIN” numarul 9, din 23-29 aprilie 1990. Nu stim in ce redactie si-a facut doamna Bacescu ucenicia in ale scrisului. Un gazetar oricit ar fi el de tinar, isi alege cu grija cuvintele, nu se joaca cu ele. Or cuvintul “crima” — folosit cu atita nonsalanta, chiar in titlu, presupune si un subiect. Pe cine acuza doamna ziarista, in ce directie trage? Spre armata, bineinteles. Insa autoarea merge mult mai departe cu insinuarile. Acuza “populatia isterizata de pericolul terorist”, sustine ca pe teroristi “nu-i vazuse nimeni…”. “Daca acestia au fost”. De unde este asa de bine (dez)informata? Sau vrea sa strecoare subtil, ideea ca cei din sediul M.Ap.N. s-au luptat cu propriile inchipuiri, iar locatarii blocurilor din zona Orizont au fost bintuiti de halucinatii? Numai ca toate argumentele pe care le aduce provin doar de la una din partile participante la ceea ce s-a intimplat in cumplita noapte de 23/24 decembrie. Concret, aduce o singura marturie — a sergentului-major Stefan Soldea, unul dintre uslasii supravietuitori — restul informatiilor avind o provenienta dubioasa. Ca doar n-a fost prezenta, in acea noapte, la sediul M.Ap.N. (Eu, insa, am fost !) Se pare ca dictonul latin “audeatur et altera pars” (asculta si partea cealalta) ii este strain. Tocmai de aceea, in cele ce urmeaza, vom exprima punctul de vedere al militarilor care au urmarit sau au luat parte mijlocita la acel “macel stupid” — ca o sa citam pe doamna Bacescu. Am mai scris despre acest subiect. De aceea m-am hotarit sa reiau firul evenimentelor. N-am dreptul sa tac.
Au venit pe furis…
Capitan Victor Stoica: Noi — cei care ne aflam in Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. — au putut urmari in intregime, ca dintr-un amfiteatru, acel spectacol zguduitor. Pina acum, nu am luat atitudine, desi eram la curent cu stradaniile unor ziaristi de a-i face eroi pe cei de la U.S.L.A. Am tacut deoarece ne-am gindit ca in urma celor cazuti au ramas sotii, copii –care nu au nici o vina. Dar acum–pentru ca am fost acuzati de crima, sin in nici unul din ziarele civile nu s-a prezentat punctul nostru de vedere–avem obligatia sa spunem ce am vazut. Observatorii nostri au fost contrariati de faptul ca cele doua A.B.I.-uri, venind de pe strada Ho Si Min, au stins farurile cu 20-30 metri inainte de a vira la dreapta, pe Drumul Taberei. Nici o masina blindata–tanc sau T.A.B.–nu procedase, pina atunci astfel. Eram la etajul intii. Am vazut clar cum cele doua autovehicule blindate, s-au furisat intre tancuri, unde au stationat, pret de 20-30 minute. Nici vorba de steagul alb, pomenit de doamna ziarista! Daca au venit cu ginduri curate, de ce s-au oprit intre tancuri si nu s-au indreptat spre poarta ministerului? Probabil din cauza ca — asa cum s-a constatat dimineata — nici un uslas nu avea asupra sa documente de identitate –iata un raspuns care contine alta intrebare! De ce nu au incercat sa ia legatura cu noi? (In A.B.I.-uri, dimineata s-au gasit doua portavoce). Dar sa continuam cu faptele. Am fugit repede la postul meu de lupta, schimbul de focuri incepuse si am vazut, cu ochii mei, cum mitraliera de pe un A.B.I. tragea spre unul din blindatele noastre. Pe unul din tancuri am vazut o umbra — mi s-a parut ca cineva incearca sa foloseasca mitraliera a.a. !! Pentru mine nu este clar nici cum au ajuns cei trei supravietuitori in blocul A.1. Probabil ca ei debarcasera inainte — focul nostru era prea dens ca sa mai scape cineva. Oricum, din felul cum au actionat cele doua echipaje, este clar ca nu au avut intentii prietenesti…Si inca ceva. La aproximativ o ora dupa incetarea focului am vazut vreo zece indivizi care au iesit — cu mare dexteritate — pe unul din geamurile de la parterul blocului B.3…
Colonel Romulus Antonescu: Si eu vazut, pe unul din tancuri — inainte de a trage A.B.I.-ul din fata lui — o umbra: mi-era chiar teama sa nu fie lovita de tragatorii nostri. Afirmatia din Zig-Zag — ca cei de las U.S.L.A. “n-au tras nici un foc” — nu este adevarata. Pe toti ne-a mirat lumina alba de la teava mitralierei de pe A.B.I. (ei trageau fara trasoare): dovada ca se tragea, din turela tancului sareau scintei asemeni artificiilor de la pomul de iarna.
Capitan Mihai Munteanu: Este oare, intimplator ca din echipajele respective faceau parte doi fost ceisti? De unul dintre acestia destul de dur le era frica multora dintre ofiteri armatei din Bucuresti…iar faptul ca in noaptea respectiva, aceeasi persoana purta uniforma de -a noastra –avind la manta epoletii de locotenent-colonel de geniu si la vestonul de fresco (!) epoleti de maior inginer — cum poate fi interpretat?
Locotonent-major Cristian Costache: Ca ofiter de control si comanduire, asiguram traficul in sediul ministerului. Era acalmie, liniste deplina. Nu fusesem preveniti de sosirea A.B.I.-urilor. Primul care le-a zarit — “doua mogildete” intre tancuri — a fost colegul meu Radu Dragos, capitan post-mortem. A fost impuscat in seara de 24 decembrie…
Ce zic tanchistii?
–Domnule capitan Gheorge Tanase, sinteti comandantul companiei de tancuri care, in acea noapte ocupa dispozitiv de lupta in fata Centrului de Calcul. Ce s-a intimplat, de fapt?
–In primul rind, am fost total surprinsi de venirea — la orele 0,10 — si stationarea celor doua A.B.I.-uri intre tancurile noastre. Incepind cu noi — cei din linia intii — si terminind cu grupa centrala, care conducea actiunile in sediul M.Ap.N. Nu am fost in nici un fel avertizati, nu ni s-a comunicat semnele de recunoastere si cooperare. N-am deschis focu de indata ce i-am remarcat — cumne acuza doamna ziarista. Intre venirea lor si deschiderea focului a trecut aproape o jumatate de ceas! Initial ni s-a ordonat sa asteptam pina se vor face cercetari. Prin statie am auzit ca cei din A.B.I.-uri au raportat ca sint trimisi de un oarecare maior Roman de la F.G.M.S. (Din cite am inteles acest ofiter nu exista). Ni s-a cerut sa vedem ce-i cu ele si, la nevoie sa procedam conform situatiei in care ne aflam, adica de lupta. Nu a fost nici eroare, nici crima. Noi am tras fiind convinsi ca nu avem de-a face cu prieteni…
–In afara de modul –interpretat ca suspect–, in care au patruns in dispozitivul dumneavoastra, ce dovezi mai aveti?
–Faptul ca, la teava unuia dintre tancuri, tabla de protectie a fost rupta in doua locuri, trei din pistoalele mitraliera pe care le-am “capturat” (cu teava scurta si incarcator de 20 cartuse) aveau tevile afumate, turela tancului de comandat de locotenentul maior Vasile Barbu a fost blocata, iar dimineata plutonierul Butoi a gasit pe tancul sau un pistol mitraliera si o lanterna de semnalizare…Cit despre dotare, sa nu-mi zica mie cum am citit intr-un ziar de mare tiraj– ca era jalnica, in nivelul armatei. A doua zi, am recuperat, din cele doua autoblindate, radiotelefoane Telefunken, veste antiglont, pistoale de 9 mm, pumnale, binoclu cu infrarosu — care pentru noi constituiau noutatii absolute. Si, pentru ca tot am fost provocati, sa va mai spun ceva. Dimineata, cind l-am intrebat “de ce ai tras, ma?” unul dintre cei trei supravietuitori, pe care i-am gasit in blocul de vizavi mi-a raspuns: “Ce p. mati, si eu execut acelasi ordin ca si tine!!!” E clar ca nu au venit ca prieteni!
–In Zig-Zag, sub o poza, sta urmatoarea explicatie: “A.B.I.-il dupa ce s-a tras in ei cu tunul”…
Locotenent Liviu Lita: Nu ma mai mira nimic, din moment ce o ziarista se amesteca in probleme de armament si munitie. Noi o informam — daca vrea, intr-adevar, sa stie adevarul — ca greutatea unui proiectil nu este cu mult sub 20 kilograme, iar viteza cu care paraseste teava depaseste 800 pe secunda. in asemenea conditii — avind in vedere si distanta mica de tragere — A.B.I.-ul ar fi fost facut praf. Dar noi nu am folosit tunul pentru ca, la citiva pasi, erau blocul de locuinte…La fel de gogonata este si minciuna ca am fi tras cu mitraliera de 12,7 mm. Folosirea acesteia presupune ridicarea deasupra turelei, ori nimeni nu era nebun sa puna in pericol viata servantiilor, atita vreme cit teroristii misunau prin blocurile de peste drum!
Partea civila
Trei din membrii celor doua echipaje, ramasi in viata s-au refugiat in blocul A.1., la scara B. Redam mai jos ce ne-au declarat doua dintre locaterele imobilului:
Maria Sincai (apart. 34): In jurul orei 02,00 am auzit ca in usa a batut cineva, nu tare, tare. Apoi a sunat. nu am raspuns. Jos se tragea. Numai cind a inceput sa piriieyala am deschis. Pe prag — lac de singe: erau trei oameni in niste uniforme mai deosebite, un fel de combinezoane kaki, unul singera la stomac si picior. Am aflat ca a mai ramas unul ranit in mijlocul strazii, si carea ajutor, dar fiind mai corpolent, nu l-au putut trage. Ne-au rugat sa stergem singele de pe scare spunind: “astia de jos stiu ca sintem aici si ne iau ca din oala.” Am intrebat daca exista posibilitati — pe la subsol sau prin pod — ca sa poata parasi blocul pe partea cealalta. Nu stiu cind au ascuns pistolul sub covor. Baiatului meu i-au cerut haine civile. Unul din ei, Romica a telefonat de vreo doua ori, la seful lor, probabil. Au si primit un telefon. La un moment dat, spre dimineata, spune cam asa: “Ce faceti, domnule, cum ne scoateti de aici, ca ne fac praf? Ei ne-au luat drept altii”… “Sa stit ca sint foarte bine pregatiti. De la Favorit la poarta de intrare sint tancuri pe amindoua partile. Ne-au facut zob”…
Stela Baila (apart. 25): Dimineata, eu am cules doua pistoale de pe scari si le-am predat tanchistilor. Cind baiatul doamnei Sincai a coborit (in pijama), eu am anuntat armata ca avem “oaspeti”. Apoi, au venit militarii, i-au ridicat. unul din cei trei ne-a zis rizind: “O sa vedeti, sintem armata, sintem romani, nu teroristi.”
In loc de concluziile, sa redam si opinia unui alt martor ocular, locontenent-colonelul Vasile Tintas: Stim acum, ca U.S.L.A. era o unitate formata in principal din cadre din foarte buni profesionisti. Ei trebuiau sa-si dea seama ca aici vor intilni tot profesionisti. Or, prin modul in care s-au comportat, chiar in varianta ca au fost chemati — si au facut dovada celui mai pur amatorism, daca nu este vorba de altceva. Pentru ca toata conduita lor — incepind cu parasirea cazarmii de catre seful de stat major intr-un moment in care comandantul unitatii lipsea, apoi stingerea farurilor etc. – a contrazis modul firesc de actiune. Asa ca in nici un caz accidental nu a fost generat de trupele aflate in dispozitiv.
Deci lucrurile nu stau asa de simplu, pe cit incearca sa le prezinte doamna Bacescu. Declaratiile redate mai sus isca o multime de intrebari. Cei patru uslasi care au supravietuit — locotenent-major Romulus Girz, plutonierul Petre Gainescu, sergentii-majorit Stefan Soldea si Ionel Paduraru — speram sa ne fie in curind interlocutori.
Maior MIHAI FLOCA
“Crima?!” Armata Poporului, nr. 23 (6 iunie 1990), p. 3.
Romania 1989: Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (I) 13 iunie 1990
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010
Ziarul armatei–deci al unei institutii situate, gratie Revolutiei din Decembrie, in afara politicii–nu este, in mod deliberat, o publicatie polemica. Asa cum este si organismul din care faceum parte, noi, ziaristii militari, am optat pentru o atitudine sobra, echilibrata, pe cit posibil obiectiva, constienti de faptul ca, prin lispa materialelor sezationale, de scandal vom avea, pentru inceput, o audienta mai redusa in rindul cititorilor. Fericiti ca, in sfirsit, ne putem vedea de treburile noastre–ca si armata in ansamblul el, de altfel–noi nu ne-am propus deci, in mod programatic, sa ne luam la harta cu diverse organe de presa din tari, nici vorba de cele din strainatate. Iata, insa, ca saptaminal independent “Expres”–nr. 18, mai 1990–ne pune la curent cu dezvaluirile senzationale ale revistei franceze “LE POINT”, din 21 mai 1990. Initial, ne-am gindit ca-i treaba politicienilor sa dezamorseze, sa combata continuntul incitantului articol, intitulat “In Romania, complotul iese la iveala.” Dar cind am aflat, de la niste ziaristi straini, ca armata noastra “a tras si asupra propriilor rinduri, astfel ca, in confuzia generala, au murit aproape la fel de multi ostasi si civili,” nu am putut ramine in expectativa. Pentru ca este vorba de o incalificabila ofensa adusa eroilor pe care armata i-a jertfit pe altarul Revolutiei. Noi nu cunoastem meseria armelor din carti, ci am deprins-o in poligoane, pe cimpurile de instructie. Daca accidentele se pot produce si pe timp de pace–lucru de care ne-au convins viata, practica militara pe care am trait-o, vreme de peste doua decenii–acestea au fost pe deplin posibile, si chiar s-au produs, si pe timpul Revolutiei, cind inamicul era peste tot si nicaieri. Dar de aici si pina a afirma ca cei 267 de morti si 674 raniti ai armatei s-au impuscat intre ei e o cale atit de lunga, pe care nici un om cu buna credinta n-ar face-o. Nu punem la indoiala buna credinta a jurnalistilor francezi, desi ideea promovata de ei convine de minune celor care se dau de ceasul mortii sa ne demonstreaza ca, de fapt, teroristii n-au existat. Fie-ne, insa, permis sa aratam ca documentarea celor de la “Le point” a fost, cel putin, incompleta. O spunem noi, care am fost tot timpul aici, reporteri printre gloante, in punctele fierbinti ale Revolutiei. O spunem si o argumentam, pentru inceput, cu fapte petrecute in zona sediului Ministerului Apararii Nationale.
DIVERSIUNE SI INTIMIDARE.
Nu ne vine sa credem! Desi a trecut peste o jumatate de an de la consumarea
evenimentelor, oamenii sint speriati. Este vorba de locatarii celor trei
blocuri–A1, A2, B3–dispuse in fata Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. In urma cu
citeva saptamini, erau deschisi, raspundeau la orice intrebare, relatau faptele,
imprejurarile extrem de grele prin care au trecut, iar acum sint prudenti, retinuti, tematori. Mai mult, o doamna–cu mina pe inima si vocea tremurinda–ne
sfatuieste sa o lasam balta, ca riscam prea mult…
Ce s-a intimplat de fapt? In ultima vreme, pe la usile unor apartamente, au
batut citeva…persoane de bine, care, cu destula discretie–si
subtitlitate–s-au straduit sa le explice oamenilor cum s-au petrecut, cu
adevarat, lucrurile in perioada 22-25 decembrie 1989. De exemplu, in blocul A.1,
apartamentul 27, o doamna–banuitaj de a fi avut, in trecut, relatii cu
securitatea de trist renume–le a sugerat gazdelor cum sa interpreteze ,corect’
incidentul cu cele doua A.B.I.-uri din noaptea de 23/24 decembrie.
Alti vizitatori n-au avut nici macar inspiratia de a-si disimula identitatea
(sau poate ca chiar asta au facut). Domnilor, mie sa nu-mi dati numele la ziar,
ne roaga alt locatar. Am avut destule necazuri cu securitatea. In 21 mai, a fost
la mine un maior de politie, Popescu zicea ca-l cheama. S-a interesat despre
teroristii care au tras din blocul nostru. I-am spus ca, daca vrea sa loveasca in armata, nu are nici o sansa: au tot adevarul ii voi
spune. In final mi-a adresat o rugaminte: sa nu stie cei de la armata de vizita
lui… A revenit peste 2-3 zile, dar mi-a fost frica sa-i mai deschid…”
Cine-o fi misteriosul maior si de ce pastreaza atita discretie? Se pare insa ca
persoanele cu pricina manifesta un mare interes pentru blocul B.3. Domnul Stancu
Varzan are mai mult curaj.
–Dumneavoastra nu stiti ce nopti de cosmar am trait noi: se tragea si din fata
si din spate, de la gunoaie. Totul a inceput in 22 decembrie, pe la orele 22.00:
la inceput sa auzeau focuri izolate. Apoi–ca la razboi. Numai in baie ne
simteam oarecum in siguranta. La un moment dat, am si ris. Fata mea a plecat
pina la bucatarie si, cind s-a intors, ne-a spus sa fim linistiti ca, de sus, de
pe bloc, trage o mitraliera si ne apara! Era vorba, de fapt, de o
pusca-mitraliera, care executa foc spre Centrul de Calcul…Si de pe casa
scarilor s-a tras, in aceasi directie. Teroristii au incercat sa intre la mine in apartament, dar noi avuseseram grija sa blocam usa cu un cuier
greu. Sint bolnavi astia care vor sa ne convinga ca a tras armata in noi si ca,
de fapt, nici nu au existat teroristi. Dar i-am auzit discutind precipitat,
tropaind: in jurul blocului, pe scari, pe acoperis.
In acelasi bloc, stam de vorba si cu sotii Florica si Gheorghe Petrut. Sint
revoltati.
–Au fost la noi doi civili, spune doamna. Ne-au fluturat pe sub nas niste
legitimatii, din care am retinut ca sint de la militia din Turnu-Severin. Cind
noi am intrebat cine a tras, ei ne-au informat: “armata a tras.” Bine, dar in
armata cine a tras?–am continuat noi–doar in parcul din fata blocului au fost
impuscati studenti militari. “Au tras unii in altii”–ni s-a raspuns.
Si in incheiere, gazdele noastre ne avertizeaza:
–Fiti cu mare bagare de seama, domnilor ofiteri. Astia au tot interesul sa va
compromita!!!
Deci ,baietii’ lucreaza. Fara voie ne gindim la povestea cu lupul care se
intoarce la locul unde a mincat o oaie. Si a criminalului care se intoarce la locul faptei…
(Maior Mihai Floca si Capitan Victor Stoica, Armata Poporului, 13 iunie 1990, p. 3)
Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (II) (Romania, decembrie 1989)
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010
Armata Poporului, nr. 26, 27 iunie 1990
Mult incercatul bloc A1
Prinsi intre focuri–ale teroristilor, dintr-o parte, si cele ale militarilor aflati in dispozitivul de aparare al M.Ap.N., din cealalta parte–locatarii blocului A1 (Drumul Taberei, 16) au trait, in zilele Revolutiei din Decembrie, nopti de groaza. Sa-i ascultam.
–Eu, pur si simplu, nu inteleg domnilor, cum unii ziaristi pot fi asa de rai si palavragii. Distrug omul, nu alta! S-au scris in presa fel de fel de minciuni despre ce s-a intimplat aici, in zilele si noptile ce au urmat fugii lui Ceausescu. Unii s-au apucat sa arate–culmea nerusinarii!–ca nici n-au fost teroristi. Pe noi, insa, nu ne-a intrebat nimeni: ce am trait, ce am simtit atunci, cum am supravietuit…
Si spre a fi mai convingatoare, doamna Stela Baila (scara B, apart. 26) ne arata o cutie cu…gloante (18 la numar), pe care le-a strins din camere.
–Cum a inceput lupta?
–Era pe 22 decembrie. In jurul orei 21,00 am vazut, aproape de poarta Centrului de Calcul, un TIR mare, un fel de sa lunga. Soldatii nici nu apucasera sa ia pozitie de lupta. De sub masina s-a deschis focul: atit spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, cit si spre noi. Tirul era foarte intens, cred ca de sub masina trageau peste 20 de indivizi. Un glont mi-a trecut pe deasupra capului si s-a infipt, uitati-i urma, sub tavan. Ce a urmat, nu va mai spun. Ne-am refugiat in camera din spate, dar nici acolo n-am avut parte de liniste: din parculet, se auzeau multe strigate, apoi a inceput rapaiala. De pe toate blocurile se tragea! Tocmai umblam la televizor, il reglam, cind un glont a lovit in perete, deasupra televizorului, la citeva zeci de centimetri de capul meu. M-am ales doar cu o rana la mina stinga. Dupa ce teroristii ne-au mai “onorat” cu un glont, am fugit in baie. Dimineata, geamurile erau faramitate.
Din aceeasi directie, dinspre blocul B4, s-a tras si in apartamentul vecin. Gaura din geam se afla la aceeasi inaltime cu cea de pe perete: 1,45 m. Dat fiind ca apartamentul se gaseste la etajul 1, este evident ca teroristul a deschis foc dintr-un loc situat la aceeasi inaltime. De la locatarii acestui apartament (27), aflam ca teroristii erau imbracati intr-un fel de salopete, probabil de culoare gri.
–Da, i-am vazut cu ochii nostri. Alergau ca niste speriati prin parculet, de la un bloc la altul, isi aminteste doamna Maria Cotofana. Dupa miezul noptii, in careul format din cele trei blocuri a avut locu un violent schimb de focuri. Apoi, am auzit batai puternice in usa. “Deschideti, sintem armata, avem raniti!”–auzeam de pe scari. Am primit si noi un ranit–il cheama Cristian Popescu si niste student la Academia Tehnica Militara–impreuna cu un coleg. Imedia cei doi tineri s-au repezit la balcon, sa traga in teroristii care le-au ucis colegii. Foarte greu i-am determinat sa renunte, le-am explicat ca teroristii ne “avertizasera” deja si ne vor face zob apartamentul. Ii vedeam cum se chinuiesc privind neputinciosi cum banditii scuipau moarte si foc de pe blocul B3…
…
“Au tras din blocul meu!!!”
Exista locatari care i-au vazut foarte de aproape pe teroristi, au discutat cu ei. Unul din acesti oameni a acceptat sa ne povesteasca patania sa, dar cu conditia sa nu-i precizam identitatea. Intimplarea a avut loc in aceeasi noapte: 22/23 decembrie 1989.
–Sa tot fi fost 12,30-1,00, cind am auzit “poc, poc, poc”–cineva umbla pe balcon. Fiindca am instalatie electrica acolo, am aprins lumina. Am deschis prima usa ce dadea spre balcon si am vazut un tinar de 24-25 de ani: brunetel, creol, cu parul andulat, slabut. Purta of gluga bej, iar pe deasupra un fel de veston kaki. Inapoi lui, pe lada mai era unul. Grozav m-am speriat: “Deschideti, deschideti”–mi-a strigat brunetul. Am raspuns instantaneu: “Nu se poate, e militia la mine, e militia la mine!” si am inchis usa la loc. El a scos ceva din buzunar–un corp rotund–si a spart geamul usii din exterior. Am fugit, iar in urma mea au rasunat focuri de arma.
Intr-adevar, pe peretele opus balconului sint citeva gauri: acestea nu puteau fi provocate decit de gloante trase din balcon. Din acest balcon–asa cum ne-a relatat locotenentul Marius Mitrofan–s-a tras si asupra studentilor de la Academia Tehnica Militara.
–L-ati recunoaste pe cel care a tras?
–L-am si recunoscut! Dar ma opresc aici, ca si asa am spus prea multe!
Sa mai adaugum ca, pe 23 decembrie, cind gazda noastra a povestit scena cu balconul, un vecin, “binevoitor,” i-a spus: “ti s-a nazarit.”
Foc concentrat asupra Centrului de calcul!
Spre Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. teroristii si-au indreptat cu predilectie armele. Oricine poate constata asta. Daca s-ar fi inarmat cu putina rabdare, gazetarii revistei “Le Point” ar fi putut numara, in peretele frontul al cladirii, circa 300 urme de gloante. La care trebuie adaugate si gaurile care se mai vad, inca, in geamuri. Sigur, geamurile ciuruite au fost schimbate, dar,–prevazatori si rigurosi–, cei din Centrul de Calcul, au avut grija sa le fotografieze. Avem, la redactie, cliseele respective si le putem pune la dispozitia oricui. Ne este imposibil sa credem ipoteza cu “confuzia generala” a confratilor francezi. Pentru ca aici nu este vorba de doua, trei focuri–scapate, la un moment dat, intr-o directie gresita–, ci de sute de gloante trimise cu buna stiinta, nopti de-a rindul, asupra unui obiectiv militar. Si vizind cu prioritate birourile cadrelor cu functii de raspundere.
S-a tras nu numai din strada, ci, in special, de la etajele superioare ale cladirilor de peste drum.
–Noi nu avem caderea sa acuzam pe nimeni–arata colonelul Marcel Dumitru. Dar nu ne putem mira indeajuns de faptul ca nimeni din cei in drept nu a initiat pina acum o cercetare. Nu stim cine a tras, dar stim, cu destula precizie, de unde s-a tras in noi. Cind copacii erau desfunziti, privind prin gaurile produse de gloante in geamurile noastre–avem geamuri duble–vizam tocmai acoperisul, balconul, fereasta de unde s-a tras?
De altfel, cu pricepere de artilerist, pe baza observatiilor facute in acele vile de decembrie, maiorul Vasile Savu a intocmit o schema cu locurile de unde s-a tras asupra Centrului de Calcul. Numaram pe schema peste 25 puncte de foc, citeva din acestea coincid cu cele indicate de studentii Academiei Tehnice Militare. In “Le Point” se arata: “Desigur, citiva securisti, infierbintati, au tras pe strada, de pe acoperisuri. Dar nu era decit o mina de oameni, cei multi fiind falsii “teroristi”…armata a amplificat roulu securistilor si a plasat ea insasi falsi teroristi in diferite cartiere ale capitalei.” Ce om cu mintea intreaga poate accepta ideea ca armata a ordonat unor membri ai ei sa traga asupra proprilului minister?!!
Centrul de Calcul este doar una din cladirile aflate in localul M.Ap.N. Nu vom sti niciodata, cu exactitate cite gloante s-au tras asupra integrului complex. Oricum, in comparatie cu cele ce au tintit Centrul de Calcul, acestea sint mult mai multe, ele producind victime mai ales in rindurile personalului neadapostit.
Sa mai amintim ca in 22/23 decembrie, tot inainte de a intra in sediul M.Ap.N.–deci in aceleasi conditii, ca si cei cinci studenti–au cazut un ofiter, un subofiter, si doi soldati dint-o unitate de parasutisti. Tot aici Regimentul de Garda a avut 9 mortii–doi ofiteri si sapte soldati–toti impuscate dupa ce intrasera in dispozitivul de aparare constituit in curtea ministerului. Deci au cazut, in total, 18 eroi. Vom afla, vreodata, cine-i are pe constiinta?
(Maior Mihai Floca si Capitan Victor Stoica, “Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (II), Armata Poporului, 27 iunie 1990, p. 3)
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cateva articole mai vechi de catre Mihai Floca:
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Mihai Floca’s credibility on the issue of what happened on the night of 23-24 December with the USLA units at the Defense Ministry, what happened on the other nights of the period of the Revolution in the same location, and on the claims of residents of these blocs—as noted, witness accounts that other publications simply ignored—is enhanced by the fact that his articles from late December 1989 through 1990 clearly do not show someone out “to get” the USLA or tarnish their reputation.
What is particularly notable is that after writing the (in)famous 26 December 1989 Romania Libera article (“Ucigasii de meserie al teroristului nr. 1,” p. 3) claiming that these USLA personnel in the Defense Ministry incident were “terrorists,” Floca wrote articles demonstrating how the USLA collaborated with the Army in certain actions during December 1989, at the CC building (“Actiune concertata impotriva pericolului,” Romania Libera 29 December 1989, p. 4) and at the Television Station (“Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p.4). Only in June 1990, did he begin publishing interviews with the Army soldiers involved in the 23-24 December incident with the USLA at the Defense Ministry and with the residents of the surrounding blocs. These articles were as he noted prompted by two developments: the articles in the opposition publication Zig-Zag rehabilitating the USLA and claiming they were innocent victims in the Defense Ministry incident (authored by the Securitate’s number one cheerleader, Angela Bacescu), and articles in the French press arguing that the “terrorists” had not existed.
I. Suspecting/Blaming the USLA: Cloaking a Coup, Creating a Revolutionary Halo for a Bloodstained Army, or Accidental?
a) Where could the idea that the USLA was hostile to the Revolution have possibly come from?
To believe the revisionists, the idea that during the December events there existed “terrorists” and that the Securitate’s anti-terrorist special unit was behind the “terrorism” originated in the minds and announcements of Romanian Television reporters Teodor Brates and Alexandru Stark, General Nicolae Tudor and other military officials at the Television station, and/or General Nicolae Militaru, Silviu Brucan, Ion Iliescu and other members of the National Salvation Front. A popular belief among revisionists is that they were all in on this deception, the new political officials and televsion personalities. At their most charitable, revisionists will argue that the suspicion regarding the existence of “terrorists” and of the USLA specifically was based in an understandable and rational fear regarding the Ceausescu regime—but that ultimately these fears were misplaced, and that the suspicion of the USLA actually played a large role in contributing to needless bloodshed after Ceausescu fled. As in so many controversies surrounding the Revolution, little effort has been made in “process tracing,” working backwards to find the roots of claims and ideas.
It is significant that in 1990, the infamous Securitate cheerleader, Angela Bacescu, blamed all of the above personalities for creating “imaginary terrorists,” but also added another culprit.
“Among those [who showed up at Television on the afternoon of 22 December after Ceausescu fled] was this Cirjan, an ordinary thief, who entered with a false ID. He had been thrown out of the USLA, several years earlier, because he was stealing from passengers’ baggage, was dealing on the black market, and other such things, and [here] he is from the first moment shouting ‘Death to the Securitate’ and ‘The USLA are coming to shoot us’.” (Bacescu, “Romania Mare” 7 September 1990, p. 5a; see also her allegations against Cirjan in the 21 August 1990 edition)
A “Constantin Cirjan” appears on the list of the 38 “founding” members of the National Salvation Front read out on Television by Ion Iliescu. And, although I cannot verify that they are one and the same, it is possible that this Constantin Cirjan is the same as a Captain Constantin Cirjan of Romania’s special “mountain hunter” forces, whose recent training exercises are discussed on a web page (see geocities.com/romanianspecialforces/vanatoridemunte). It would certainly make sense, given that the “mountain hunter” forces were affiliated with the Securitate before the Revolution, and USLA training would likely have had many similarities with the current training of these “mountain hunter” forces.
This is signficant. In other words, the point that so many revisionists highlight—how was it that even before the “terrorists” appeared, Television was warning about their appearance?—appears to have an explanation. We must ask: what would lead Cirjan to suspect this? From where would he have such information? Even if we assume for a minute that Bacescu has made up this episode, the question is why? Afterall, she already targets Brates, Stark, etc. for this allegedly false, intentional “rumor” about the existence of “terrorists” and the USLA’s contribution to them. True, Bacescu could be wrong, misinformed, or determined to find a scapegoat or settle scores with this individual. But the point is that she identifies the source of the USLA rumor as a former member of the USLA—in other words, someone with access to such knowledge. In other words, the “USLA rumor” appears to have originated not with Brates, Stark, or others, but from a former USLA member.
b) But what evidence exists to believe that Front officials at the time suspected the USLA? Were the public statements that the USLA were involved merely for public consumption, and did not reflect their actual beliefs—particularly in the event that they were lying to begin with and knew the USLA was innocent?
Despite expressions of suspicion of the USLA on TV and elsewhere, regime forces followed the so-called “Special Action Plan” that called for the combined participation of Army units alongside USLA and other Securitate units. In Bucharest and elsewhere, the USLA were sent out on patrol in pursuit of the “terrorists” (for example, Buzau and Arad, see Armata Romana in Revolutia din Decembrie 1989, p. 192, 209). With USLA Commander Ardeleanu having “joined” the Revolution from early on, and with the appearance of USLA cooperation, Front officials found it hard to believe that the USLA were the “terrorists.”
Yet they kept on getting reports that something was not right.* At the very least, Securitate Director General Vlad and USLA Commander Ardeleanu were not putting all their cards on the table, unwilling or “unable” to fulfill requests for maps of Securitate safehouses and architectural plans of key buildings that might have clarified from where the shooting was coming and what exactly was going on (Ardeleanu himself seems to have admitted this obliquely in a document drafted on 8 January 1990, see its reproduction in Dan Badea, “Cine au fost teroristii?,” “Expres,” 15-21 October 1991, p. 15). In theory, the USLA had either surrendered their registered arms on the 22nd, and/or were performing joint missions with the Army to root out the “terrorists.” The straw that appeared to break the camel’s back was the arrest of an armed USLA sergeant, Ion Popa Stefan, in the neighborhood of the Defense Ministry—he claimed he was on his way to the Defense Ministry to “surrender”. Commander Ardeleanu is said to have played dumb upon being confronted with the news: “I think it’s the hand of my chief of staff Trosca, he’s done this to me” (Lt. Col. Mihai Floca and a group of Army officers, “Eroi, victime sau teroristi?” “Adevarul,” 29 August 1990). Senior Army officers and Front leaders had had enough. They would try to call Ardeleanu’s bluff and give them a “loyalty test” of sorts.
One important admission from Commander Ardeleanu—one that has little alternative explanation given his accusations toward Army General Nicolae Militaru who instructed Ardeleanu to order USLA units to the building—severely undermines much that underlies revisionist accounts that Trosca and his men were intentionally lured into a diabolical ambush:
“…When I reported at the Defense Ministry [during the late evening of 23 December], I was asked to give details regarding the organization of the unit, its subdivisions, responsibilities, and attributes. After this, I was told that the Defense Ministry was being attacked from all around…Then, General Militaru announced that in the “Orizont” building terrorists had barricaded themselves and were firing on the Defense Ministry, ordering me to transmit to my unit an order that 3 intervention groups come to annihilate the terrorists. He warned me that the order I would transmit would be recorded and that I should proceed with this in mind. I transmitted the order to Colonel B.I. [Ion Bleort] who reported to me that by his side was Colonel Gheorghe Trosca, the unit’s chief of staff, who would take measures to execute the order. Keeping in mind the importance of the mission I gave the order. I know that I pronounced the name of Colonel Trosca, and therefore those present knew that he would lead the group.” [interview from 1991, in Bacescu 1994, p. 116]
This passage is critical for two reasons in terms of the revisionist accounts: a) it was Ardeleanu, not Militaru or anyone else, who chose Col. Trosca, and b) it was known that the USLA transmissions would be recorded. Furthermore, the passage testifies to the suspicion of Front leaders: why all the questions to Ardeleanu about the composition and activities of his unit?
The understanding of what followed, the famous so-called “Defense Ministry incident,” in which seven USLA members lost their lives after Army units out front of the building opened fire upon them, became even more confused after exchanges from the tape of USLA transmissions appeared in the press in early 1993 (Ioan Itu, “Armata Trage in Propriul Minister,” “Tinerama” 8-14 January 1993, p. 7—pretty much the entire article and discussion of this important incident shows up in Deletant, pp. 360-362). Those exchanges show Trosca communicating to an uncomprehending Bleort back at USLA headquarters—Trosca repeated himself several times—that “a column of six-seven TABs, two trucks with soldiers and two ARO, fired for ten minutes on the Ministry and then stopped.” In other words, Army units were firing on their own ministry. A few minutes after Trosca’s announcement to headquarters, Trosca reported that Army tanks guarding the ministry had opened up fire on his USLA team’s armored personnel carriers (ABI). The impression one gets after that is that the USLA personnel became tank fodder and that they never event fired a shot in response. The journalist Ioan Itu concluded from this, and Deletant appears to accept, that the USLA detachment had been attacked “because they had to disappear, having accidentally witnessed one part of the Army at war with another part of the Army.”
Of course, there is more to this story. It was not just a few minutes between the arrival of the USLA detachment at the scene, their report of what was going on, and their coming under attack. Instead, they had stationed themselves in between tanks—as they had been instructed—for almost a half hour, without making contact with anyone among the Army personnel out front of the Ministry, a fact which caused obvious suspicion for those personnel. Moreover, according to officers interviewed in spring 1990, they witnessed gunfire from the guns on the USLA vehicles, three of the machine guns recovered from the USLA vehicles showed signs of having been fired, the gunbarrell of one the tanks had been blocked, and on the top of another tank a machine gun and signal lantern were found (Major Mihai Floca, “Crima?” “Armata Poporului” 6 June 1990, p. 3).
What is amazing, of course, if we take Trosca’s transmission about the Army forces firing on their own ministry at face value, is that somehow this occurred “for ten minutes” and yet there is no report that the USLA detachment or the Army units defending the Ministry were hit or returned fire. And when the USLA detachment is attacked it is from the units guarding the Ministry…because they are embarrassed ?, afraid ? that the USLA personnel witnessed something they should not have seen? And why or how did these rebel Army units stop attacking the Ministry and what became of them? Furthermore, as Army General Tiberiu Udrareanu relates:
“Personally, I have serious doubts regarding the use of ‘7-8 TAB-uri, two trucks of soldiers (two platoons) and two AROs’ in a mission of this type, to be able to operate in the center of the Capital and to not be seen by a single person. And the survivors, because we are talking about hundreds of people, have kept this secret so tightly for over seven years?” (Udrareanu 1996, p. 143).
Indeed, the latter point is significant, as one could imagine how once the content of the tapes were made public, that some lips might have loosened. And I ask the reader: which is more plausible, that Trosca—knowing his words were being listened to—was lying or trying to communicate something in code to his headquarters, or that hundreds of soldiers—including draftees and students at the military academy—could or would keep quiet about Army units intentionally attacking their own Ministry?
What happened after the firefight is even more intriguing as evidence of the genuine suspicion of the USLA on the part of Front leaders. USLA Lieutenant Stefan Soldea who survived the firefight outside the Defense Ministry relates what happened when he was taken to the building. Remember, here is an USLA officer, who participated in this key incident and his clearly defending his own actions and those of his unit, talking about his experiences in the pages of the Securitate mouthpiece “Europa,” so hardly in a position to, as is soften alleged, be somehow serving the Front leadership:
“A civilian, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, was in the office surrounded by the other generals [Army General Nicolae Militaru, Militia General Cimpeanu, Securitate General Iulian Vlad, and Securitate Fifth Directorate General Neagoe]…he began to interrogate me, ordering that my USLA commander, Colonel Ardeleanu go outside. He demanded information about the organization, make-up, and functioning of the unit, its address, what the unit’s members were doing at that moment, my personal information, after which he confronted me with Colonel Ardeleanu and asked me to identify who he was…”(“Crime care nu se prescriu,” interview with Angela Bacescu, “Europa” 28 July-5 August 1992).
Among the many interesting details that come out of Soldea’s interview is his complaint that the next day of his detention he “was forced to take a urinalysis test to see if I was drugged.” What does all this tell us? At the very least, it tells us that Voiculescu and other Front officials suspected that the USLA were the terrorists and suspected that—as the rumor circulated at the time (it turned out to be correct, but that is an issue for a different discussion)—they were drugged.**
This was an incredible and inexplicable charade to go through at the time if Voiculescu, who is always portrayed as one of those at the center of the alleged Front “staged war,” was attempting to stage such a confrontation. If the Front “controlled” the “terrorists,” why do this? Who exactly were Front leaders trying to impress/convince with this incident? Moreover, if this truly was a charade—such as is alleged of the Ceausescus’ trial and execution—why is there no record/tape of it? Would not this have been a great bit of counter-propaganda to the revisionists that could have been given to the media to protect their reputations and credibility?
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Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17. (syndicated copy above) WASHINGTON — Romanian despot Nicolae Ceausescu got some help last-minute help from a soul mate who is now embarrassed about coming to the aid of a loser. Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to prop up Ceausescu by sending Iranian security goons to Romania to protect him. Ceausescu’s three-day visit to Iran while his troops massacred dissidents at home contributed to the foment that eventually overthrew him. Rafsanjani’s embrace of the Romanian dictator on that trip has not helped his stock with the Western diplomatic community. Iranian and Romanian sources and intelligence sources now tell us what went on behind the scenes when Ceausescu was in Iran. He flew to Tehran on Dec 18 while his troops were brutally putting down a riot in the Romanian city of Timisoara. The day before, Ceausescu’s secret police had used tanks and machine guns to open fire on crowds of demonstrators. Hundreds of men women and children were murdered. The battle continued while Ceausescu was being welcomed by an elated Rafsanjani. In his first six months as president of Iran, no other head of state had bothered to visit. The two men openly conferred about trade issues. Romania has been a major trading partner with Iran, and their business amounted to about $1.8 billion last year. Ceausescu had become so enamored of Iran, according to Romanian sources, that in November he secretly deposited millions of dollars in gold for safekeeping in Iranian banks. He mistrusted Western banks after seeing some of them freeze the ill-gotten gain of another opportunist Ferdinand Marcos. On the second day of his visit to Tehran, Ceausescu placed a wreath on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini. In doing so, he became the only head of state to kiss up to Khomeini after death. In retrospect, it was a kiss of death back home. That night, with word that the demonstrations were out of control in Romania, Ceausescu begged Rajsanjani for help. Rafsanjani supplied some of his most loyal Iranian bodyguards to protect Ceausescu on his return. The next day, Dec 20, a contingent of Iranian Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard, secretly flew to Bucharest. Two days later, when the Romanian army turned against Ceausescu’s security police. the despot knew it was over. He and his wife Elena fled Bucharest but were captured by peasants. Meanwhile, Timisoara was still a battleground where eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed the forces were not all Romanians. According to some witnesses, Iranians or Libyans were doing some of the shooting. Similar reports of Iranian and Libyan snipers came from the industrial city of Craiova. In a two-hour secret trial on Christmas Day, the Ceausescus were convicted of genocide of 60,000 Romanians and theft of more than billion. “You should have stayed in Iran where you had flown to, the prosecutor told them. “We do not stay abroad,” Elena Ceausescu said. “This is our home.” The two were executed by firing squad. Rafsanjani was fit to be tied. He was embarrassed about helping Ceausescu at the end because he feared it would jeopardize trade arrangements with the new Romanian government. Rafsanjani dismissed his ambassador to Romania for not telling him about the power of the anti-Ceausescu forces in time to spare Iran the humiliation of hosting a has-been.
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