Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 26, 2014
(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications)
Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:
The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.
Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
[Submitted to CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) 19 November 2009; cleared without changes by PRB 15 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.
COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS
Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged. Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded afterNicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989. At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.
It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990. Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990. According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress. He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients. A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”! The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went. Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.” He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]
[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:
At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned. Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers. Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs. Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well. Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them. At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic. One of the injured responded to him perfectly. All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’ He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains. There were also two terrorists who were not wounded. One arrived at night, under some pretext. Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him. He had on three layers of clothing and several ids. They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]
[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004: From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]
–
Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:
I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.
To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?
Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution]. For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.
In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire. Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on. They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it. One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.” He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.
I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver. The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation! I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field. In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies. They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]
[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.
[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly: The terrorists did not exist. Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709). For a discussion, see Hall 2008.
[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.
[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.
It is virtually certain that the authors of the Chapter on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (pp. 620-627, especially p. 625 http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf ) had no knowledge of Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Declaration of 29 January 1990 … with predictable negative consequences for their understanding of what happened in December 1989.
And one wonders why I found (find) mainstream Romanian studies so unhelpful in trying to understand Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989? Read Vladimir Tismaneanu or Tom Gallagher (or in its 2014 variation, see Grigore Pop-Eleches in Bernhard and Kubik) on Romania in the early 1990s and one is presented with a world of good and evil, of angels and demons, with distance from former nomenklaturist and high-ranking communist Ion Iliescu and the core of the National Salvation Front being as being the simple formula for explaining and understanding any event or policy. As opposed to this highly–one might say blatantly–politically partisan [and bureaucratically ignorant] approach, on the other side stand functional or deconstructionist explanations–the kind favored by Peter Gross, Katherine Verdery, Peter Siani-Davies, or Ruxandra Cesereanu–which would explain the press of the time as the function of market pressures, sensationalist appetites, an anomic readership, poor journalistic training and professionalism, etc.
How then does one explain the following conundrum: the selective treatment of the letters and declarations of former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad? Oh, yes, the text of General Vlad’s letters which allege he was a stooge and victim of Ion Iliescu, etc. can be found in the Romanian press. No problem! But what about his declaration of 29 January 1990, where he deftly admits the responsibility of his institution for the bloodshed of December? What, that not sensationalist enough, different enough to sell papers? That’s not “anti-communist” enough for publication? Is it somehow less credible than the other letters whose text has been published without problem? 24 plus years later, the Romanian media has yet to publish this document! Could it be that the problem with this declaration is that it does not fit with and undermines the other popular narratives of December 1989 that minimize and even absolve the former Securitate of responsibility for the bloodshed of December 1989?
Ion Cristoiu’s Evenimentul Zilei debuted in June 1992 and was the flagship of opposition to the regime of Ion Iliescu. In the fall of 1992 it ran a zealous campaign opposed to Iliescu’s reelection. Here is the exculpatory letter from former Securitate General Iulian Vlad (dated 20 March 1990) that was published on 19 September 1992:
“Generalul IULIAN VLAD se adreseaza dlui Ion Iliescu: Am fost arestat pe nedrept (20 March 1990),” Evenimentul Zilei, 19 septembrie 1992, p. 3. “Intr-adevar pe dictatorul Ceausescu l-am tradat” “M-am integrat total Revolutiei” “Sint convins ca datele nu va erau cunoscute” I.V. Vlad 20 martie 1990
And, yet, what of General Iulian Vlad’s declaration of 29 January 1990. As far as I know, in 24 plus years, only this brief allusive mention on the 15th anniversary of the letter (although not mentioned or acknowledged in the article, and possibly accidental) has made its way into the Romanian press. Below it: the text of the statement of 29 January 1990!
It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan. (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie. If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media. Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)
Of Note: No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists: the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus. No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!
General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan
In aprilie 1990, generalul Gheorghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare. La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte. Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete. Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).
“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:
1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.
a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei. In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.
Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.
Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche). De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.
Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.
b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.
c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.
d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.
e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.). Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.
2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.
3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta. N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.
4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.
Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu. Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.
Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.
5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.
6) Straini:
a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:
– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);
– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).
b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);
c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;
d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).
7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”
Declaratia generalului colonel I. Hortopan, 16.02.1990 (din cate cunosc, pana publicarea cartii lui Dan Ioan, timp de 22 de ani, aceasta declaratie n-a aparut in presa romana)
“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta — in scopul de ne induce in eroare — a raspuns ca manifestantii patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra. In timpul actiunii, trupele noastre au prins un numar de teroristi care faceau din unitatile de Securitate, au cerut cuvantul si au prezentat numarul unitatilor din care faceau parte (UM-0672F, UM-0639, UM-0106, UM-0620), la care Vlad, tot pentru inducere in eroare, a afirmat ca acestia s-ar putea sa fie fanatici, care, chipurile, ar actiona pe cont propriu.”
I have attempted to trace Pacepa’s public discussion of Plan Z-Z to verify claims made by other actors (see below, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Giani Bucurescu/Virgil Lovescu) in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. All of these actors refer to Pacepa’s discussion on Radio Free Europe/Radio Europa Libera sometime apparently between 24 and 26 December 1989. Unfortunately, although there are a series of audio clips and transcripts from these days on the Europa Libera site http://www.europalibera.org/archive/1989/latest/452/982.html, there is no mention of the Pacepa intervention in question and no indication of record of its existence on the Internet.
La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…
Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L. Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.
Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi. Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…
Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…
Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu
This also seems to confirm the following (when adjusted for the corrected dates):
Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:
“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch. This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’ I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people. And I was told: Only you and two other people know this. I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]
[95] Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990. I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.
But it almost doesn’t matter when Pacepa first discussed this…because almost identical details were disclosed by Liviu Turcu, a DIE officer who had defected earlier in 1989 (thereby being far more knowledgeable of current plans/realities inside the Romanian security state), only without reference to a named plan, such as Plan Z-Z. It was thus Turcu on 23 December 1989 (within 24 hours of the outbreak of terrorist hostilities in Romania; the interview would have taken place on Saturday the 23rd) who first informed Western media of the existence of such a plan–although it appears Turcu’s disclosures were never relayed by Romanian media or by Radio Europa Libera.
Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces
The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.
Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.
The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.
The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.
The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.
The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.
As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5″ in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.
Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.
Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.
The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.
Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.
In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.
Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.
“They dress in black berets and black jumpsuits [combinezoane negre, salopete negre] with red silk stripes on their sleeves. They carry small two-way radios and speak into them in coded language. They are equipped with automatic rifles with infrared nightscopes for sniping.”
Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…
Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala
improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba
poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in
rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale
poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind
asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta
Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care
nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi
sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca
tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.
(capitanul Romanescu Marian, cu Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si
‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, 8-9)
(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)
COMANDOURILE USLAC
Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul. S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului. S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.
Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLAC erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului. Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania. Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane: unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.
Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89
Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive. In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”
Oh, how Romanians and Romanianists love to invoke or allude to the televised claim in December 1989 that the water had been posioned in Sibiu!
It precipitates laughter: ah, the crude manipulation and naivete!
Predictably, this is a favorite of foreign sources on December 1989.
Romanian emigre Andrei Codrescu tells us in his November 1990 article in Harper’s (“Big Chills”) about the wild rumors of December 1989, that the water in Sibiu had allegedly been poisoned, but as he found out at his 25th anniversary high school reunion, he learned how all the rumors had been false: and the water in Sibiu, it was just fine! http://alina_stefanescu.typepad.com/files/big-chills-my-high-school-reunion-in-romania-by-andrei-codrescu-1.pdf
John Feffer in Shock Waves (1992) invokes Codrescu’s claims that, “Contrary to earlier reports, there were no mass killings, no poisoned water in Sibiu, no terrorists–only the manufacturing of a revolutionary smokescreen to conceal pre-planned machinations that resulted in the creation of the National Salvation Front.” (p. 207)
Peter Siani-Davies quotes BBC journalist John Simpson, who had heard similar stories concerning poisoned water during the Iranian revolution of 1979, as noting that “certain ideas appeal forcibly to the self-dramatizing mind of the revolutionary,” to which Siani-Davies adds:
“Indeed, in Romania the wild storytelling to a certain extent was just another consequence of the tumult of the revolution. However, the imagery may have served another purpose….Now, through the tales of horror, they [Romanians] were able to place the evil forces of that [Ceausescu] regime so far beyond the bounds of ‘normal’ society that they were effectively able to distance themselves from the demons of the past. There was also a sense in which it was necessary for the securitate to be so terrible: How else could the years of mute suffering under an enfeebled old tyrant such as Ceausescu be explained and condoned?” (Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, p. 160.)
Underlying all of these interpretations and explanations is the assumption that the water never was poisoned, that it was all a baseless rumor.
Surely, one assumes, the rumor has been run to ground…but the truth is, as with so many things about December 1989, it hasn’t…
report from Sibiu starts at approximately 2:20 (Tagesschau 27.12.1989)
In fact, there was a basis in reality for what Teodor Brates was saying on TV on the afternoon of 22 December 1989 as the following toxicology report by the Belgian Dr. Aubin Heyndrickx makes clear:
Romania
On December 21, 1989, people drinking from water tank #4 in Sibiu experienced headache, visual disturbances, loss of consciousness, vomiting, etc. These symptoms are all compatible with organophosphate poisoning. The analysis of the water (by gas chromatography) and the determination of the cholinesterase activity of the blood was done in the University of Cluj. The conclusion was that an organophosphate had been used. Atropine sulfate and toxogonin were advised.
As soon as the symptoms appeared among the population, water tank #4 was shut off, rinsed, and cleaned. The people received water from army trucks.
A few days later, there was a fight in Timisoara between the army and Securitate over the water tanks. Poisoning was feared, as had occurred in Sibiu. According to witnesses, the Securitate possesses “all possible chemical warfare agents.”
Toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx supervised the chemical tests and interviewed the physicians at Central Hospital who treated the patients. From the tests and from the very high dose of atropine required to produce a response, he concluded that the tank was poisoned with sarin or VX (Report on the Humanitarian Mission to Romania, December 23-29, 1989, Laboratoria voor Toxicologie Criminalistiek, State University of Ghent).
Indeed, one can watch a brief discussion of the incident with Dr. Heyndrickx beginning at approximately the 40 second mark from an ITN broadcast of 27 December 1989
}T27128901 ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89 relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX to treat the people who were injured during the fight against
Securitate (secret police). Toxicologists have found evidence
that the security police poisoned the water supply. Injured
Securitate are being treated in hospitals alongside the people
they shot.
}T27128901 ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89 relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX to treat the ...
Duration: 00:01:44 |
Timecode – In: 00:00:00:00 Out: 00:01:44:00 |
Copyright: ITN / 3rd Party Copyright
I have found evidence of discussion of Heyndrickx and his toxicology report in the Hungarian press of the time, but significantly, to date, I have been unable to find discussion of it in the Romanian press!
Nepszabadsag, 30 December 1989, p. 3 citing a UPI dispatch, apparently P. Green, “French team confirms poison in water supply,” UPI, 29 December 1989.
Nagyszeben – ideggáz
Bukarest, 1989. december 29. péntek (UPI) – A Ceausescu-párti terrorosztagok ideggázt vegyítettek a romániai Nagyszeben víztárólóiba a forradalom első napjaiban – ezt egy francia-belga orvoscsoport egyik tagja mondotta el a UPI hírügynökség tudósítójának. Auvin Heyndrickx szerint a szennyezett ivóvíztól öten súlyos mérgezést szenvedtek.Mikor a felkelés vezetői felfedezték a szabotázst, azonnal
leengedték a mérgezett vizet a tárolóból – mondta a belga orvos, aki
az ,,Orvosok – határok nélkül,, nevű francia segélyszervezet
tagjaként utazott a városba. A toxikológus Heyndrickx
megállapította, hogy a vízkészletbe két súlyosan mérgező, folyékony
állapotú ideggázvegyületet öntöttek még december 20-án. Az orvos
elmondta azt is, hogy az eddig ismert öt sérült agykárosodást is
szenvedett a mérgektől. A megbetegedések ilyen viszonylag alacsony
számát a belga szakértő annnak tulajdonítja, hogy a víztárolóban a
mérgező anyagok szerencsére rendkívüli mértékben felhígultak.+++1989. december 29., péntek 07:57
It is thus with justification that in my dissertation in 1997 and in a reiteration of the dissertation views in 2007, I defended TVR personnel by pointing out the extent to which they went to intervene and inform the population when it was safe to drink the water again. (for a glimpse into the eternal “appreciation” I received for pointing out the latter, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/raport-final-cpadcr-iiccmer-si-revolutia-din-1989/)
In their discussion of the Romanian transition, Linz and Stepan note the “[r]umors of deliberately poisoned water supplies, of 10,000, 60,000, even 100,000 dead, filled the news channels and streets” and conclude that “disinformation played an important role in the events.”[45] They have in mind, however, the idea that this disinformation was disseminated in order to help the Front seize power. This, of course, echoes the dominant view on this theme. As we saw in the preceding chapter, both Securitate and opposition sources maintain that disinformation pervaded the December events, and they uniformly attribute it to the Front and the Front’s supporters at television, and, in some cases, to foreign actors such as the Soviet Union.
Yet there has been very little effort to investigate the context in which particular rumors originated and the relationship between actual events and those rumors. Take, for example, this rumor alleging the poisoning of the water supply which is so frequently invoked by both domestic and foreigner observers. To what are they referring? Around 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 22 December–therefore approximately three hours after the Ceausescus had fled Bucharest–television commentator Teodor Brates began to issue periodic, sometimes frantic reports about fighting between the Army and the Securitate in the city of Sibiu and about rumors that the water supply had been poisoned by the Securitate. Here are some excerpts of what Brates said on television on that afternoon:
One moment, please…from Sibiu it has been communicated to us that the army no longer has ammunition and the Securitate troops continue to attack military units….We want to inform you that in Sibiu, military units are urgently requesting help…We are constantly receiving communications…of course, we do not have the possibility to verify their authenticity…but we ask for your attention…It is said that these enemy elements, the securisti, have poisoned the water in Sibiu, in Timisoara,…the water must be boiled before being consumed.[46]
[45].. Linz and Stepan, “The Effects of Totalitarianism-cum-Sultanism,” 345-346.
[46].. See the text of the transcript, Revolutia Romana in Direct (Bucharest: Televiziunea Romana, 1990), 47, 48, 51.
2007: Linked to the allegations of supposedly intentionally hyping the threat posed by the “terrorists” is the certitude with which many Romanians and Romanianists assert that TV personnel (especially Teodor Brates) intentionally spread rumors about the water being poisioned and the army running out of ammunition in Sibiu etc.–rumors that proved to be unsubstantiated. Here is what they likely remember:
“One moment, please…from Sibiu it has been communicated that the army no longer has ammunition and the Securitate troops continue to attack mili tary units….We want to inform you that in Sibiu, military units are urgently requesting help…We are constantly receiving communications…of course, we do not have the possibility to verify their authenticity…but we ask for your attention…It is said that the enemy elements, the securisti, have poisoned the water in Sibiu, in Timisoara…the water must be boiled before being consumed.” (from the transcript of 22 December 1989 in “Revolutia Romana in Direct” (Bucharest: 1990), pp. 47, 48, 51, quoted p. 324, Richard Andrew Hall, 1997, Ph.D. Dissertation, “Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania”)
What they don’t remember is that Brates returned later to inform the audience a) when the fighting had ceased in Sibiu, b) when supplies of bottled water were on their way to Sibiu, and c) when the competent authorities verified that the water in Bucharest was safe to drink (“Revolutia Romana in Direct,” pp. 71, 72, 75, discussed p. 327 Hall, “Rewriting the Revolution”) This is there…in the transcript of what was said on Television…it is not a matter of a “difference of opinion” as the likes of Tismanenau and others in denial would have us believe. It is the old saw from American baseball: as the famous manager Casey Stengel used to say “You can look it up!” Once again: if your goal is “diversion,” intentional panic and manipulation, is it likely that you would return to the same subjects and say things designed to calm fears? Of course, not.
This has apparently been around for a few months, but I only discovered it recently:
Pe 24 decembrie 1989, fotograful Andrei Iliescu abia scapase de la Jilava, unde-l bagase militia pentru ca poza protestele, si umbla uimit pe strazile Bucurestiului revolutionar. Nu mai avea buletin, singurul lui act era camera video. El a filmat aceste secvente.
I draw attention to the sequence from approximately min. 3:37 to 3:53 in which the young soldier is asked about and discusses those whom they are fighting (this is in the vicinity of the TVR Television station). (My thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor, in particular, and Corneliu N. Vaida for clarifying the exchange for me.)
Soldier: “Au mitraliere, care sunt micute…Cum au astia…americanii” (They have small machine guns…like the Americans.)
Voice off camera: “Sunt mai bune ca ale voastre?” (Are they better than yours?)
Soldier: “Da, bine-nteles.” (Yes, of course.)
Soldier: “Sunt mai eficiente; consuma mai putin si distrug mai mult, in general asa” (They’re more efficient; they consume less and destroy more, generally speaking.)
That the “terrorists” had weapons different from and in addition to the standard ones the Army rank-and-file were equipped with is and should be beyond dispute by now, and yet another proof of their existence. We have, of course, multiple similar claims in the same Bucharest neighborhood, elsewhere in Bucharest, and indeed throughout the rest of the country.
From approximately min 0:45 to 1:10, also from the same day, 24 December 1989
Video No. 2: Bucharest, Piata Aviatorilor, near TVR (Romanian state Television) headquarters, “Vidia” Bullets
In the second video (posted by Alexandru2006 (Alexandru Stepanian) at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using. Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets.
Those who were in the CC building of the PCR during these days also know such weapons:
In aceea camera am inceput sa stringem toate obietele de valoare gasite prin celelalte incaperi. Asa a luat nastere primul “tezaur” din C.C. Inauntru s-a incuiat nea Tarchila cu un pistol mitraliera si sint sigur ca ar fi fost in stare sa impuste pe oricine ar fi incercat sa deschida usa daca n-ar fi fost insotit de noi. Noroc ca nu a fost cazul. Intre timp ni se aduceau de peste tot arme si munitii.
Armele erau de toate felurile: pistolete Carpati, Beretta, Makarov, T.T., Stecikin, unele mici si plate cum nu mai vazusem niciodata, in tocuri de piele special construite cu compartimente aparte pentru box si cutit cu buton, adevarate pumnale cu lama foarte subtire si fina, lunga de 15-20 ce tisnea din miner (nu erau in nici un caz destinate pentru curatatul cartofilor la popota); pistoale mitraliera AKM cu pat de lemn sau cu pat rabatabil…mitraliera, pusti semiautomate cu luneta de tipul celei cu care ma fuduleam eu; mitraliere de campanie, un aruncator de grenade antitanc; grenade de mina, munitie de toate tipurile si calibrele, ce mai nu ne lipsea decit un tun, in rest aveam de toate.
Venit din cabinetul 1, Doru Haraga isi da cu parerea ca ar trebui sa le transportam intr-un colt al incaperii si pentru a le separa de restul camerei incercam sa delimitam spatiul cu o canapea. Lunga de 2 m nu se lasa umita din loc, parca era batuta in cuie, inciduati, am inceput sa mesterim ia ea. Am desfacut-o si am ramas perplecsi. In cabinetul 2, in camera de lucru a tovarasei de viata a celui mai iubit fiu, in lada unei canapele era un adevarat arsenal: 24 pistoale mitraliera cu pat rabatabil si teava scurta, 22 pistolete Carpati, 2 Stecikin, 4 carabine cu luneta, semiautomate, doua pusti mitraliera, grenade de mina si la fund lazi metalice cu munitie de lupta–gloante incendiare, trasoare, perforante, explozive, numai din cele normale–nu. Si deasupra trona ca o culme a ridicolului o prastie cu cracan si linga ea o cutie cu bile de rulment. Pe capacul interior al canapelei era o list cu denumirea “lada de armament si munitii nr. 2″. Urma inventarul si continua cu–raspunde plt. adj.–cutare, nu am retinut numele. Deci lada nr. 2. Dar unde este nr. 1? Citiva metri mai incolo–o canapea asemanatoare. Ne-am repezit asupra ei si am deschis-o. Continutul era identic, mai putin prastia. Puteam inarma un regiment. Oare de ce tinea “savanta” in cabinetul ei atita armament si munitie? Dar prastia? Asta chiar ca punea capac la toate!
Mircea Boaba, “Gloante, nestemate si singe. Ziua I: Comoara lui Ali Baba,” Strict Secret, nr. 48 26 martie – 1 aprilie 1991, pp. 4-5.
In timp ce urcam scara, vrind sa incarc carabinaa, am avut surpriza sa descopar ca gloantele din cele doua incarcatoare erau cu virful bont.
Lt. mr. APOSTOL M. ANTON, fost ofiter in serviciul 1 declara:
In ziua de 29 decembrie 1989 a aflat de la vecinul PIPOI REMUS, care locuieste la etajul 2, sub apartamentul lui, ca a vazut mai multe persoane tragand spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, despre care era convins ca nu erau romani. I s-a parut ca ar fi arabi. Trageau cu niste pistoale automate mici.
Fiecare pluton din aceasta scoala de ofiteri de rezerva, avea alocata cate o sala de clasa, care era ca o sala de laborator-expozitie dotata cu o anumita baza materiala de instructie (in zilele de azi, se cheama training) aferenta unei anumite tematici. De exemplu, sala noastra continea materiale si planse despre armamentul individual de infanterie si balistica aferenta. Exact ca intr-un muzeu, aveam acolo vitrine cu exemplare sectionate de automat Kalashnikov, pusca mitraliera cu incarcator sector si tambur, pusca semiautomata cu luneta, pistolul TT model ’33 aflat in dotarea ofiterilor armatei si pistolul Carpati din dotarea militiei. De asemenea, imi amintesc ca era si un aruncator de grenade antitanc AG7 cu lovitura aferenta, si parca si un model imbunatatit de Kalasnikov cu teava scurta si pat rabatabil aflat in dotarea trupelor de securitate USLA (Unitati Specializate de Lupta Antiterorista)… si bineinteles toata gama de munitie, adica toate calibrele de cartuse complete, mai putin praful de pusca din tub. Era sa uit mitraliera de companie…
Toate armele erau sectionate in asa maniera incat sa se poata intelege principiul complet de functionare… daca puneai un cartus in incarcator si armai, se putea vedea traseul complet al sau din incarcator pana la expulzarea tubului dupa percutare. http://calinhera.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/servesc-patria-la-multi-ani/
–In afara de modul –interpretat ca suspect–, in care au patruns in dispozitivul dumneavoastra, ce dovezi mai aveti?
–Faptul ca, la teava unuia dintre tancuri, tabla de protectie a fost rupta in doua locuri, trei din pistoalele mitraliera pe care le-am “capturat” (cu teava scurta si incarcator de 20 cartuse) aveau tevile afumate, turela tancului de comandat de locotenentul maior Vasile Barbu a fost blocata, iar dimineata plutonierul Butoi a gasit pe tancul sau un pistol mitraliera si o lanterna de semnalizare…Cit despre dotare, sa nu-mi zica mie cum am citit intr-un ziar de mare tiraj– ca era jalnica, in nivelul armatei. A doua zi, am recuperat, din cele doua autoblindate, radiotelefoane Telefunken, veste antiglont, pistoale de 9 mm, pumnale, binoclu cu infrarosu — care pentru noi constituiau noutatii absolute. Si, pentru ca tot am fost provocati, sa va mai spun ceva. Dimineata, cind l-am intrebat “de ce ai tras, ma?” unul dintre cei trei supravietuitori, pe care i-am gasit in blocul de vizavi mi-a raspuns: “Ce p. mati, si eu execut acelasi ordin ca si tine!!!” E clar ca nu au venit ca prieteni!
Even some military prosecutors have been willing to admit the obvious:
CINE A TRAS ÎN NOI… DUPĂ 22?!
Interviu cu colonelul magistrat Ilina Radu – prim-procuror al Parchetului Militar Timişoara… la 20 de ani de la evenimente
A consemnat Liza Kratochwill
R.I.: – Nu. Ziua eram la serviciu. Ziua – program normal, seara cu familia, cu prietenii… ne reuneam trei, patru familii de vecini şi stăteam pe jos, pe covoare, pentru că se trăgea formidabil, uneori chiar la nivelul ferestrelor noastre, şi nu-ţi ardea să faci balet prin casă.
L.K.: – În blocuri?
R.I.: – În blocuri, da. În blocurile din, relativ, zona centrală a oraşului. A fost urât…
L.K.: – Asta în ce zi ?
R.I.: – Mi-amintesc de acea noapte cruntă de 23 spre 24 când s-a tras, ne găseam câţiva colegi într-un bloc din zona centrală şi s-a tras formidabil. De la nouă seara până la şase dimineaţa, continuu, cred că au fost zeci de mii de cartuşe şi am fost speriat. Şi chiar atunci am spus: dacă Dumnezeu ne iubeşte, vom prinde Ajunul serii următoare, ca să colindăm. Era Ajunul Crăciunului, însă, noaptea aia a fost furibundă. Şi nu eram de competenţă, de aia nu ne-am implicat profesional. Ca procuror civil nu puteai atunci să cercetezi faptele cu arme ale militarilor şi se ştiu foarte puţine lucruri. S-au găsit foarte puţine tuburi de cartuşe din cele care trebuiau să fie. S-au găsit, în schimb, repet, unele dispozitive care, ulterior, ar fi fost analizate şi ar fi putut constitui simulatoare de tragere sau ţinte false.
L.K.: – Dar dumneavoastră, acum, cred că sunteţi cel mai în măsură să-mi spuneţi care au fost tipurile, în afară de calibrul ăla obişnuit, 7,62, care au fost toate tipurile de gloanţe care au fost identificate, folosite în 1989 şi care au cauzat decese şi răni. Deci au fost o dată aceste 7,62, au fost acele dum-dum exploziveşi-n afară de…
R.I.: – 7,65-ul a fost, pistoale-mitraliere scurte…
L.K.: – Kalaşnikov, da, din acestea au fost folosite şi la… cred că şi la cazul Jubea…
R.I.: – …un tip care, atunci, erau doar în dotarea forţelor speciale, la acel moment. Pistoale cu pat scurt şi cu ţeavă scurtă.Mai erau pistoale-mitralieră, AKAEM-uri obişnuite. Au fost apoi, s-a tras chiar şi cu aruncător de grenade, cu AG 7 şi cu diverse tipuri de pistoale.s
L.K.: – Pistoale ale forţelor armate sau…?
R.I.: – Pistoale din dotare. E foarte greu de spus.
L.K.: – Păi, ce pistoale avea România, la acea oră?
R.I.: – TT şi Carpaţi-ul.
L.K.: – Carpaţi-ul, care era în dotarea Miliţiei, nu?
R.I.: – De regulă, era la Miliţie, forţe de Securitate… şi TT-urile, care erau, deopotrivă, şi aici şi acolo. La ofiţeri sau la…
L.K.: – Şi aici ce tipuri de calibru de gloanţe erau folosite, la tipurile astea de pistoale?
R.I.: – Păi, discutăm şi de calibru de 9 milimetri, cu tuburi specifice, cam de nouă milimetri.
L.K.: – Dar cele care se foloseau la lunetă, deci ţintă fixă?
(posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using. Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets.
“Despre existenta simulatoarele, senatorul Sergiu Nicolaescu a adresat o intrebare fostului sef al Departmamentului Securitatii Statului, gl. Vlad Iulian, care a raspuns…”Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea…” (declaratie Iulian Vlad, pag. 75).
In aceasta perioada, in zona Televiziunii au fost observate semnale luminoase ce prezentau imaginea unei balizari si care marcau inceputul sau incetarea atacurilor.
comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM
Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive. Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.
Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoara–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.
Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar. Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.
Romulus Cristea (ziarist, Romania Libera, 22 decembrie 2005): – Munitia speciala, gloantele cu cap vidia sau dum-dum, a provocat victime? Presa de la acea vreme a fost plina cu astfel de relatari…
General-magistrat Dan Voinea – Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia, nici de la dum-dum.Pe durata evenimentelor s-a folosit munitie de razboi, munitie normala care se gasea la vremea respectiva in dotarea Ministerului de Interne si a Ministerului Apararii Nationale. Confuzia si informatiile false au aparut de la faptul ca se foloseau calibre diferite si, deci, zgomotul produs era altfel perceput. http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/interviuri/toti-alergau-dupa-un-inamic-invizibil-58783.html
publicat pe internetul pana acum, in schimb apare Lt. Col. Vasiliu Constantin:
Valentin Gora: Au fost arestati oameni ai securitatii, teroristi. Astazi, nimeni nu stie ce s-a intimplat sa ce se intimpla in continuare cu ei. Dumneavoastra i-ati vazut? Ii cunoasteti?
Petre Constantin: Au fost arestati multi oameni, am mai spus-o, care aveau asupra lor arme de toate felurile, pe toti i-a preluat armata si nu stiu ce s-a intimplat mai departe cu ei. Adjunctul meu, Traian Puscasu, a fost injunghiat in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie, pe hol, la etajul 11. Agresorul, locotenent-colonelul Vasiliu, il viza pe generalul Tudor sau pe mine. Eu am lipsit citeva miunte, generalul Tudor s-a ferit in momentul atacului si a fost lovit Puscasu. Totul se intimpla in usa biroului. Militarii au sarit si l-au imobilizat imediat.
Valentin Gora cu Petre Constantin, “Petre Constantin: Cind a dictat decretul de instalare ? de asediu pe intreg teritoriul tarii, in biroul lui Ceausescu se afla si Eugen Florescu,” Cuvintul, nr. 12, 18 aprilie 1990, pp. 4-5.
425. Parte vătămată Puşcaşu Traian (Televiziune-Vol. 110)
Numitul Puşcaşu Traian, fiul lui Gheorghe şi Maria, născut la data de 01.03.1927, în Iaşi, domiciliat în Bucureşti (…) în noaptea de 22/23.12.1989, în timp ce se afla în incinta televiziunii, unde-şi desfăşura activitatea ca director adjunct al TVR, a fost înjunghiat în abdomen cu un cuţit de către lt. col. Vasiliu Cornel, care se afla în dispozitivul de pază al instituţiei respective.
Conform raportului medico-legal nr. A1/3409/1990, numitul Puşcaşu Traian a prezentat la data de 24.12.1989 o plagă abdominală penetrantă cu interesarea splinei şi arterei epigastrice. Leziunea a putut fi produsă prin lovire cu corp tăietor-înţepător (posibil cuţit). A necesitat circa 25 zile de îngrijiri medicale. Leziunea i-a pus viaţa în pericol.
Prin rezoluţia nr. 1411/P/1990, din data de 15.11.1990, Procuratura Militară Bucureşti a dispus neînceperea urmăririi penale faţă de lt. col. Vasiliu Constantin, sub aspectul infr. prev. de art. 20 rap. la art. 174 C.p., reţinându-se că, în urma expertizării sale psihiatrice, s-a stabilit că a acţionat fără discernământ.
Trying to reconstruct the timeline of reporting on the use of exploding dum-dum bullets and other unusual munitions used solely by the Securitate “terrorists” during the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 is not easy. Unfortunately, we must rely in the public domain on transcripts and diaries from the time, as demonstrated below. Clearly, it is emerging: there was discussion at the beginning. A watershed event that should have then and should now spark great interest and further investigation–a press conference by surgeons (including military doctors) in early March 1990 that as far as I can tell was only ever reported on in depth in French by AFP (see below)–has all but been ignored and forgotten as if it had never taken place. Highly damning too is the documentary evidence by the wounded themselves, relatives, army officers, and doctors in Timisoara (attesting to the use of these munitions both before and after 22 December 1989). The overall evidence is overwhelming as to the use of exploding dum-dum bullets and other unusual munitions in December 1989; the alibis and mechanisms of denial are transparent: just because they existed doesn’t mean they were used; perhaps the army had them too; perhaps the bullets ricocheted and split apart; doctors and army officers (even military doctors) what would they know about dum-dum bullets?; on and on, etc. etc.
Reportaj la Spitalul Militar Central: se relateaza despre modul dramatic în care au fost efectuate operatiile (chirurgicale) din ziua de 22 decembrie 1989. „Noapte alba sau zi neagra” spune doctorul pe buna dreptate. Armele teroristilor, a securistilor au împroscat multimea cu gloante explozive, care au avut ca efect plagi si leziuni gigantice.
Emotionant! Dramatic! Dureros!
luni, 24 iunie 2013
SORIN M. RĂDULESCU – REVOLUŢIA CA SPECTACOL, Miercuri 27 decembrie, 1989 – Revolutia -3 –
REVOLUŢIA CA SPECTACOL
(ÎNSEMNARILE UNUI SOCIOLOG ÎN PERIOADA SEPTEMBRIE 1988-IULIE 1992) Miercuri 27 decembrie 1989
Primesc telefon de la Vasilica P., care îmi descrie cu lux de amanunte atmosfera din Centrul de Sociologie, care a devenit un fel de ,,dipecerat” al sociologilor bucuresteni. Ma deplasez imediat acolo ca sa fiu prezent la desfasurarea evenimentelor.
/ Teroriştii .Mărturii (22 27dec.’89 )
22 apr. Notez cu R –revoluţionarii, al căror nume nu-l pot şti
– R 1: Generalul Tudor, pe care aş vrea să nu-l mai văd!
El a eliberat teroriştii suspecţi prinşi de noi!
– R 2: Asupra lor am găsit agende, bancnote însemnate.
Ce a făcut g-ral Tudor cu ei, noi nu ştim!
– R 3 :Eu am păzit camera suspecţilor .Erau 9. Din ordinul g-ralului Tudor li s-a dat drumul
– R 4. Dorobanţu Marin: Un terorist trăgea dintr-o vilă vecină; o maşină cu copertină
din care cca 15 persoane au fugit din vila din faţă; am prins o salvare cu un terorist ;
era şi o maşină inflamabilă pe care am aprins-o; în spatele ei au ieşit 3 terorişti .
A fost un foc foarte puternic.
– Ofiţer paraşutist: aici se lupta, cum s-a spus …
– R 5: Teroriştii au atacat mult TVR. Pe 24 decembrie, din două taburi, cu steag,
au coborît mulţi militari şi au deschis foc asupra noastră .
S-au retras apoi pe străzi, în spatele maşinilor.
– R 6: Pe 24 decembrie s-a zvonit că mîncarea adusă este otrăvită. Am aruncat-o.
Nu aveam nici lumină şi apă .
– R 7: Parola noastră – ” Cine eşti ?”
– Reporter: Cine a tras în voi?
– Ofiţer: G-ral Tudor a eliberat mulţi suspecţi. Nici atunci, nici pe urmă, n-am înţeles
de ce a făcut-o
– R 2: Arestaţii terorişti aveau dolari, staţie de emisie, unul era chiar străin;
au fost eliberaţi – nu ştiu de ce!
– R 6: Au fost şi zvonuri pentru a face panică. Unele au fost false. Altele reale .
Pe 26 sau 27 decembrie a fost prins un civil ( ing. electronist la Tg. Mureş ). La control cpt. Epure i-a găsit o schiţă cu centrul Bucureştiului, pe care era marcat hotelul Modern. Aş vrea să ştiu ce este cu acest terorist?
– Reporter: Da, am vrea să ştim cine a tras în noi?
– Alt reporter ( arătînd la o uşă ): Cum a fost?
– Lct X: teroriştii trăgeau în balamale şi broaşte cu gloanţe cu cap vidia.
. Asemenea arme nu sunt în dotarea armatei.
– Lct mj. Diţiu: invită la sediul clubului “TV’22 “, ca să mai afle cum a fost.
In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets. This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania). Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.
This was also discussed by Bucharest medical personnel at a 1994 conference:
AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA
“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”
Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2
“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”. Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat: dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989. “Documentatia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat. “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina). Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel. Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate. S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe. Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta. In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu: “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit. “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.
NOR WERE THESE THE ONLY DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL–FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC–WHO ATTESTED TO THE USE OF DUM-DUM EXPLODING AND OTHER ATYPICAL, UNUSUAL MUNITIONS USED DURING THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 1989
Dr. Manuel Burzaco from “Doctors without Borders” was part of a team of doctors from that group who visited hospitals in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Brasov, Buzau and Braila in late December 1989 and early January 1990. This report from the Madrid daily El Pais touches upon the women and children gravely injured by the exploding “dum dum bullets used by the Securitate.”
Other reports from Bucharest and Timisoara hospitals during the events:
“At Bucharest’s main emergency hospital, doctors said that Securitate snipers, apparently using infra-red telescopic sights and exploding dum-dum bullets, had been firing throughout Saturday night and they shot many civilians, with bullets striking foreheads and hearts. The morgue at the hospital was stacked with 90 bodies at noon today, almost all of them civilians dead of gunshot wounds.”
Blaine Harden, “In Bucharest, Tears and Prayers for the Fallen,” The Washington Post, 25 December 1989, p. A1; A40.
Other posts with documents from dosarele revolutiei…
Like the “water is poisoned” episode discussed in part III of this series, the claims of TV announcers regarding the threat posed to the Television building is a favorite for Romanians and Romanianists to lampoon:
Once again, Andrei Codrescu captures a widely and wildly popular view of TVR’s alleged role during the December 1989 events:
The Romanian revolution was a complex affair. It was a dramatic triumph that had the whole world for its audience, a world that keeps wondering long after the final curtain how much of what it saw was real. If I hadn’t lost my normally skeptical head to the euphoria of December, I would have questioned the single most evident source of news about the revolution: television. But it was precisely television that seduced me during my visit and made me lose sight of things I already knew….Imagine the shock and dismay of our newsmakers and our idealists–including myself–when most of these horrible events we saw with our own eyes on television turned out not to have happened at all. How could the grizzled, experienced Western journalists who are sworn to hard facts have missed the many clues and glaring contradictions that pointed to artifice? The astounding truth of the matter is that much of the glorious Romanian “revolution” was, in fact, a staged play, a revolution between quotation marks….But it couldn’t have been long after, however, the young revolutionaries (if that’s who they were) started becoming “responsible,” and the “spontaneous” provisional government showed up with its own TV script. The television station then became the headquarters of the new government, which, as far as most people were concerned, was born out of video like Venus out of the seashell. And hats must be off to the producers of the exceedingly realistic docu-drama of the strategic military center from where, in a charged atmosphere reminiscent of Reds or Dr. Zhivago, generals with telephones on both ears shouted orders at troops on vast invisible battlefields in every part of the country. Today I stand abashed by my naivete. Much of that Romanian “spontaneity” was as slick and scripted as a Hollywood movie. If I were in charge of the Emmys, I’d give one to the Romanian directors of December 1989.
As with the “poisoned water” episode, so too with the claimed threats against Television, including the idea that a bomb had been found and disarmed in the basement of the Television building (as can be seen in the above video)…no researcher has attempted to verify the veracity of the claim, until now!
Recently, however, several sources have been unearthed/come to light that clarify what happened. Here, Corneliu N. Vaida of Timisoara recounts how a Securitate member from Timisoara was convinced to call the Television Station in Bucharest to inform them that, as with many other highly strategic buildings in the country, TVR had been mined and an explosion could be set off. It appears that the announcement above about a bomb having been disarmed in the basement of the TVR building, was as a result of this information from Timisoara:
Securistul trădat pentru binele TVR
În seara zilei de 22 decembrie şi-a vizitat mama, care locuia pe bulevardul 6 Martie, unde a găsit în apartament un vecin. Era vorba de Gheorghe Toader, un căpitan în rezervă la Securitate, care se refugiase de frică sa nu fie asasinat.
Urmărind programul “Revoluţiei în direct”, de la TVR, au observat la un moment dat o persoana care ţinea în mână un obiect care semăna cu o tastatură.
“Văzând tastatura, securistul a scos o exclamaţie de teamă: <Vor sări toţi în aer acolo! TVR e obiectiv strategic şi este minat, ca în cazuri extreme să poată fi aruncat în aer, tastând un cod pe aşa un detonator!>. A spus că a lucrat la aşa ceva în Bucureşti într-o intreprindere specială. La isistenţele mele a acceptat până la urmă să scrie o declaraţie anonimă pe care am dus-o personal la armată”, a mai declarat Corneliu Vaida.
Ajuns la Garnizoana Timişoara, Vaida a arătat scrisoarea colonelului Zeca, comandantul garnizoanei. “Acesta a pus mâna pe un telefon şi a sunat imediat la Bucureşti la o structură a armatei căreia i-a relatat continutul declaraţiei, dupa care mi-a cerut sa dezvalui identitatea semnatarului argumentând că acesta mai cunoaşte informaţii care ar ajuta la evitarea de victime”, a adaugat Vaida.
Neavând ce face, a trebuit să meargă cu armata să îl predea pe secursitul din casa mamei. “Înspre dimineaţă am văzut la televizor cum a venit cineva şi a declarat că explozibilul cu care era minată televiziunea a fost dezamorsat”, a mai spus timişoreanul.
The event is also recounted by parachutists in this TVR video from 31 December 1989 that only recently appeared on the internet.
Parasutisti de la R. 64 Pst. Boteni la Televiziunea Romana in 31 decembrie 1989:
Lt. col. Ilie Croitoru, Mr. Chiranescu Ion, Cpt. Radulescu Aurelian, Cpt. Constantin Vlasceanu
Corneliu Vaida has been kind enough to share with me, the following additional confirmation of his actions in the document below:
For more about Corneliu Vaida during the Revolution in Timisoara in December 1989, see his interview with ITN correspondent Penny Marshall on 27 December 1989:
Ioan Itu, “Si ei au luptat in Revolutie. De partea cui?,” Tinerama, 10-16 septembrie 1993, p. 8.
Maior Tudor Petrescu, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22, 30 mai 1990, p. 3. (S.D. = Silviu Dutu)
Aura Alexa Ioan (cu Adrian Popescu-Necsesti), “Teroristii Revolutiei au certificat de psihopati!” Tinerama, 8-14 octombrie 1996, p. 8
Valentin Gora: Au fost arestati oameni ai securitatii, teroristi. Astazi, nimeni nu stie ce s-a intimplat sa ce se intimpla in continuare cu ei. Dumneavoastra i-ati vazut? Ii cunoasteti?
Petre Constantin: Au fost arestati multi oameni, am mai spus-o, care aveau asupra lor arme de toate felurile, pe toti i-a preluat armata si nu stiu ce s-a intimplat mai departe cu ei. Adjunctul meu, Traian Puscasu, a fost injunghiat in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie, pe hol, la etajul 11. Agresorul, locotenent-colonelul Vasiliu, il viza pe generalul Tudor sau pe mine. Eu am lipsit citeva miunte, generalul Tudor s-a ferit in momentul atacului si a fost lovit Puscasu. Totul se intimpla in usa biroului. Militarii au sarit si l-au imobilizat imediat.
Valentin Gora cu Petre Constantin, “Petre Constantin: Cind a dictat decretul de instalare ? de asediu pe intreg teritoriul tarii, in biroul lui Ceausescu se afla si Eugen Florescu,” Cuvintul, nr. 12, 18 aprilie 1990, pp. 4-5.
425. Parte vătămată Puşcaşu Traian (Televiziune-Vol. 110) Numitul Puşcaşu Traian, fiul lui Gheorghe şi Maria, născut la data de 01.03.1927, în Iaşi, domiciliat în Bucureşti (…) în noaptea de 22/23.12.1989, în timp ce se afla în incinta televiziunii, unde-şi desfăşura activitatea ca director adjunct al TVR, a fost înjunghiat în abdomen cu un cuţit de către lt. col. Vasiliu Cornel, care se afla în dispozitivul de pază al instituţiei respective. Conform raportului medico-legal nr. A1/3409/1990, numitul Puşcaşu Traian a prezentat la data de 24.12.1989 o plagă abdominală penetrantă cu interesarea splinei şi arterei epigastrice. Leziunea a putut fi produsă prin lovire cu corp tăietor-înţepător (posibil cuţit). A necesitat circa 25 zile de îngrijiri medicale. Leziunea i-a pus viaţa în pericol. Prin rezoluţia nr. 1411/P/1990, din data de 15.11.1990, Procuratura Militară Bucureşti a dispus neînceperea urmăririi penale faţă de lt. col. Vasiliu Constantin, sub aspectul infr. prev. de art. 20 rap. la art. 174 C.p., reţinându-se că, în urma expertizării sale psihiatrice, s-a stabilit că a acţionat fără discernământ.
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 23, 2014
(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)
And one wonders why I found (find) mainstream Romanian studies so unhelpful in trying to understand Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989? Read Vladimir Tismaneanu or Tom Gallagher (or in its 2014 variation, see Grigore Pop-Eleches in Bernhard and Kubik) on Romania in the early 1990s and one is presented with a world of good and evil, of angels and demons, with distance from former nomenklaturist and high-ranking communist Ion Iliescu and the core of the National Salvation Front being as being the simple formula for explaining and understanding any event or policy. As opposed to this highly–one might say blatantly–politically partisan [and bureaucratically ignorant] approach, on the other side stand functional or deconstructionist explanations–the kind favored by Peter Gross, Katherine Verdery, Peter Siani-Davies, or Ruxandra Cesereanu–which would explain the press of the time as the function of market pressures, sensationalist appetites, an anomic readership, poor journalistic training and professionalism, etc.
How then does one explain the following conundrum: the selective treatment of the letters and declarations of former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad? Oh, yes, the text of General Vlad’s letters which allege he was a stooge and victim of Ion Iliescu, etc. can be found in the Romanian press. No problem! But what about his declaration of 29 January 1990, where he deftly admits the responsibility of his institution for the bloodshed of December? What, that not sensationalist enough, different enough to sell papers? That’s not “anti-communist” enough for publication? Is it somehow less credible than the other letters whose text has been published without problem? 24 plus years later, the Romanian media has yet to publish this document! Could it be that the problem with this declaration is that it does not fit with and undermines the other popular narratives of December 1989 that minimize and even absolve the former Securitate of responsibility for the bloodshed of December 1989?
Ion Cristoiu’s Evenimentul Zilei debuted in June 1992 and was the flagship of opposition to the regime of Ion Iliescu. In the fall of 1992 it ran a zealous campaign opposed to Iliescu’s reelection. Here is the exculpatory letter from former Securitate General Iulian Vlad (dated 20 March 1990) that was published on 19 September 1992:
“Generalul IULIAN VLAD se adreseaza dlui Ion Iliescu: Am fost arestat pe nedrept (20 March 1990),” Evenimentul Zilei, 19 septembrie 1992, p. 3. “Intr-adevar pe dictatorul Ceausescu l-am tradat” “M-am integrat total Revolutiei” “Sint convins ca datele nu va erau cunoscute” I.V. Vlad 20 martie 1990
And, yet, what of General Iulian Vlad’s declaration of 29 January 1990. As far as I know, in 24 plus years, only this brief allusive mention on the 15th anniversary of the letter (although not mentioned or acknowledged in the article, and possibly accidental) has made its way into the Romanian press. Below it: the text of the statement of 29 January 1990!
It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan. (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie. If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media. Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)
Of Note: No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists: the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus. No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!
General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan
In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare. La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte. Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete. Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).
“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:
1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.
a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei. In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.
Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.
Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche). De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.
Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.
b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.
c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.
d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.
e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.). Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.
2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.
3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta. N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.
4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.
Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu. Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.
Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.
5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.
6) Straini:
a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:
– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);
– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).
b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);
c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;
d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).
7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 4, 2014
(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)
This has apparently been around for a few months, but I only discovered it recently:
Pe 24 decembrie 1989, fotograful Andrei Iliescu abia scapase de la Jilava, unde-l bagase militia pentru ca poza protestele, si umbla uimit pe strazile Bucurestiului revolutionar. Nu mai avea buletin, singurul lui act era camera video. El a filmat aceste secvente.
I draw attention to the sequence from approximately min. 3:37 to 3:53 in which the young soldier is asked about and discusses those whom they are fighting (this is in the vicinity of the TVR Television station). (My thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor, in particular, and Corneliu N. Vaida for clarifying the exchange for me.)
Soldier: “Au mitraliere, care sunt micute…Cum au astia…americanii” (They have small machine guns…like the Americans.)
Voice off camera: “Sunt mai bune ca ale voastre?” (Are they better than yours?)
Soldier: “Da, bine-nteles.” (Yes, of course.)
Soldier: “Sunt mai eficiente; consuma mai putin si distrug mai mult, in general asa” (They’re more efficient; they consume less and destroy more, generally speaking.)
That the “terrorists” had weapons different from and in addition to the standard ones the Army rank-and-file were equipped with is and should be beyond dispute by now, and yet another proof of their existence. We have, of course, multiple similar claims in the same Bucharest neighborhood, elsewhere in Bucharest, and indeed throughout the rest of the country.
From approximately min 0:45 to 1:10, also from the same day, 24 December 1989
Video No. 2: Bucharest, Piata Aviatorilor, near TVR (Romanian state Television) headquarters, “Vidia” Bullets
In the second video (posted by Alexandru2006 (Alexandru Stepanian) at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using. Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets.
Those who were in the CC building of the PCR during these days also know such weapons:
In aceea camera am inceput sa stringem toate obietele de valoare gasite prin celelalte incaperi. Asa a luat nastere primul “tezaur” din C.C. Inauntru s-a incuiat nea Tarchila cu un pistol mitraliera si sint sigur ca ar fi fost in stare sa impuste pe oricine ar fi incercat sa deschida usa daca n-ar fi fost insotit de noi. Noroc ca nu a fost cazul. Intre timp ni se aduceau de peste tot arme si munitii.
Armele erau de toate felurile: pistolete Carpati, Beretta, Makarov, T.T., Stecikin, unele mici si plate cum nu mai vazusem niciodata, in tocuri de piele special construite cu compartimente aparte pentru box si cutit cu buton, adevarate pumnale cu lama foarte subtire si fina, lunga de 15-20 ce tisnea din miner (nu erau in nici un caz destinate pentru curatatul cartofilor la popota); pistoale mitraliera AKM cu pat de lemn sau cu pat rabatabil…mitraliera, pusti semiautomate cu luneta de tipul celei cu care ma fuduleam eu; mitraliere de campanie, un aruncator de grenade antitanc; grenade de mina, munitie de toate tipurile si calibrele, ce mai nu ne lipsea decit un tun, in rest aveam de toate.
Venit din cabinetul 1, Doru Haraga isi da cu parerea ca ar trebui sa le transportam intr-un colt al incaperii si pentru a le separa de restul camerei incercam sa delimitam spatiul cu o canapea. Lunga de 2 m nu se lasa umita din loc, parca era batuta in cuie, inciduati, am inceput sa mesterim ia ea. Am desfacut-o si am ramas perplecsi. In cabinetul 2, in camera de lucru a tovarasei de viata a celui mai iubit fiu, in lada unei canapele era un adevarat arsenal: 24 pistoale mitraliera cu pat rabatabil si teava scurta, 22 pistolete Carpati, 2 Stecikin, 4 carabine cu luneta, semiautomate, doua pusti mitraliera, grenade de mina si la fund lazi metalice cu munitie de lupta–gloante incendiare, trasoare, perforante, explozive, numai din cele normale–nu. Si deasupra trona ca o culme a ridicolului o prastie cu cracan si linga ea o cutie cu bile de rulment. Pe capacul interior al canapelei era o list cu denumirea “lada de armament si munitii nr. 2″. Urma inventarul si continua cu–raspunde plt. adj.–cutare, nu am retinut numele. Deci lada nr. 2. Dar unde este nr. 1? Citiva metri mai incolo–o canapea asemanatoare. Ne-am repezit asupra ei si am deschis-o. Continutul era identic, mai putin prastia. Puteam inarma un regiment. Oare de ce tinea “savanta” in cabinetul ei atita armament si munitie? Dar prastia? Asta chiar ca punea capac la toate!
Mircea Boaba, “Gloante, nestemate si singe. Ziua I: Comoara lui Ali Baba,” Strict Secret, nr. 48 26 martie – 1 aprilie 1991, pp. 4-5.
In timp ce urcam scara, vrind sa incarc carabinaa, am avut surpriza sa descopar ca gloantele din cele doua incarcatoare erau cu virful bont.
Lt. mr. APOSTOL M. ANTON, fost ofiter in serviciul 1 declara:
In ziua de 29 decembrie 1989 a aflat de la vecinul PIPOI REMUS, care locuieste la etajul 2, sub apartamentul lui, ca a vazut mai multe persoane tragand spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, despre care era convins ca nu erau romani. I s-a parut ca ar fi arabi. Trageau cu niste pistoale automate mici.
Fiecare pluton din aceasta scoala de ofiteri de rezerva, avea alocata cate o sala de clasa, care era ca o sala de laborator-expozitie dotata cu o anumita baza materiala de instructie (in zilele de azi, se cheama training) aferenta unei anumite tematici. De exemplu, sala noastra continea materiale si planse despre armamentul individual de infanterie si balistica aferenta. Exact ca intr-un muzeu, aveam acolo vitrine cu exemplare sectionate de automat Kalashnikov, pusca mitraliera cu incarcator sector si tambur, pusca semiautomata cu luneta, pistolul TT model ’33 aflat in dotarea ofiterilor armatei si pistolul Carpati din dotarea militiei. De asemenea, imi amintesc ca era si un aruncator de grenade antitanc AG7 cu lovitura aferenta, si parca si un model imbunatatit de Kalasnikov cu teava scurta si pat rabatabil aflat in dotarea trupelor de securitate USLA (Unitati Specializate de Lupta Antiterorista)… si bineinteles toata gama de munitie, adica toate calibrele de cartuse complete, mai putin praful de pusca din tub. Era sa uit mitraliera de companie…
Toate armele erau sectionate in asa maniera incat sa se poata intelege principiul complet de functionare… daca puneai un cartus in incarcator si armai, se putea vedea traseul complet al sau din incarcator pana la expulzarea tubului dupa percutare. http://calinhera.wordpress.com/2010/10/24/servesc-patria-la-multi-ani/
–In afara de modul –interpretat ca suspect–, in care au patruns in dispozitivul dumneavoastra, ce dovezi mai aveti?
–Faptul ca, la teava unuia dintre tancuri, tabla de protectie a fost rupta in doua locuri, trei din pistoalele mitraliera pe care le-am “capturat” (cu teava scurta si incarcator de 20 cartuse) aveau tevile afumate, turela tancului de comandat de locotenentul maior Vasile Barbu a fost blocata, iar dimineata plutonierul Butoi a gasit pe tancul sau un pistol mitraliera si o lanterna de semnalizare…Cit despre dotare, sa nu-mi zica mie cum am citit intr-un ziar de mare tiraj– ca era jalnica, in nivelul armatei. A doua zi, am recuperat, din cele doua autoblindate, radiotelefoane Telefunken, veste antiglont, pistoale de 9 mm, pumnale, binoclu cu infrarosu — care pentru noi constituiau noutatii absolute. Si, pentru ca tot am fost provocati, sa va mai spun ceva. Dimineata, cind l-am intrebat “de ce ai tras, ma?” unul dintre cei trei supravietuitori, pe care i-am gasit in blocul de vizavi mi-a raspuns: “Ce p. mati, si eu execut acelasi ordin ca si tine!!!” E clar ca nu au venit ca prieteni!
Even some military prosecutors have been willing to admit the obvious:
CINE A TRAS ÎN NOI… DUPĂ 22?!
Interviu cu colonelul magistrat Ilina Radu – prim-procuror al Parchetului Militar Timişoara… la 20 de ani de la evenimente
A consemnat Liza Kratochwill
R.I.: – Nu. Ziua eram la serviciu. Ziua – program normal, seara cu familia, cu prietenii… ne reuneam trei, patru familii de vecini şi stăteam pe jos, pe covoare, pentru că se trăgea formidabil, uneori chiar la nivelul ferestrelor noastre, şi nu-ţi ardea să faci balet prin casă.
L.K.: – În blocuri?
R.I.: – În blocuri, da. În blocurile din, relativ, zona centrală a oraşului. A fost urât…
L.K.: – Asta în ce zi ?
R.I.: – Mi-amintesc de acea noapte cruntă de 23 spre 24 când s-a tras, ne găseam câţiva colegi într-un bloc din zona centrală şi s-a tras formidabil. De la nouă seara până la şase dimineaţa, continuu, cred că au fost zeci de mii de cartuşe şi am fost speriat. Şi chiar atunci am spus: dacă Dumnezeu ne iubeşte, vom prinde Ajunul serii următoare, ca să colindăm. Era Ajunul Crăciunului, însă, noaptea aia a fost furibundă. Şi nu eram de competenţă, de aia nu ne-am implicat profesional. Ca procuror civil nu puteai atunci să cercetezi faptele cu arme ale militarilor şi se ştiu foarte puţine lucruri. S-au găsit foarte puţine tuburi de cartuşe din cele care trebuiau să fie. S-au găsit, în schimb, repet, unele dispozitive care, ulterior, ar fi fost analizate şi ar fi putut constitui simulatoare de tragere sau ţinte false.
L.K.: – Dar dumneavoastră, acum, cred că sunteţi cel mai în măsură să-mi spuneţi care au fost tipurile, în afară de calibrul ăla obişnuit, 7,62, care au fost toate tipurile de gloanţe care au fost identificate, folosite în 1989 şi care au cauzat decese şi răni. Deci au fost o dată aceste 7,62, au fost acele dum-dum exploziveşi-n afară de…
R.I.: – 7,65-ul a fost, pistoale-mitraliere scurte…
L.K.: – Kalaşnikov, da, din acestea au fost folosite şi la… cred că şi la cazul Jubea…
R.I.: – …un tip care, atunci, erau doar în dotarea forţelor speciale, la acel moment. Pistoale cu pat scurt şi cu ţeavă scurtă.Mai erau pistoale-mitralieră, AKAEM-uri obişnuite. Au fost apoi, s-a tras chiar şi cu aruncător de grenade, cu AG 7 şi cu diverse tipuri de pistoale.s
L.K.: – Pistoale ale forţelor armate sau…?
R.I.: – Pistoale din dotare. E foarte greu de spus.
L.K.: – Păi, ce pistoale avea România, la acea oră?
R.I.: – TT şi Carpaţi-ul.
L.K.: – Carpaţi-ul, care era în dotarea Miliţiei, nu?
R.I.: – De regulă, era la Miliţie, forţe de Securitate… şi TT-urile, care erau, deopotrivă, şi aici şi acolo. La ofiţeri sau la…
L.K.: – Şi aici ce tipuri de calibru de gloanţe erau folosite, la tipurile astea de pistoale?
R.I.: – Păi, discutăm şi de calibru de 9 milimetri, cu tuburi specifice, cam de nouă milimetri.
L.K.: – Dar cele care se foloseau la lunetă, deci ţintă fixă?
Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1]
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D. (published December 2009)
Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information. I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.
…In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun. In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed. By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.[53]
COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS
Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged. Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded afterNicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989. At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.
It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990. Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990. According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress. He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients. A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”! The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went. Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.” He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]
At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned. Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers. Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs. Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well. Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them. At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic. One of the injured responded to him perfectly. All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’ He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains. There were also two terrorists who were not wounded. One arrived at night, under some pretext. Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him. He had on three layers of clothing and several ids. They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off. [Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.]
[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.
A Brief Timeline of the Counter-Revolutionary Coverup
26 December 1989
(Those who argue that there was no “other side” during the fighting of 22-25 December 1989–that the “terrorists” did not exist, that they were from the Army (in particular DIA), that it was all just “friendly fire,” misunderstanding, paranoia, fear, and suspicion (such post-modernist excess permeates the accounts of Peter Siani-Davies, Ruxandra Cesereanu , Adrian Cioflanca, to name a few of the more recent accounts, as well as reviews of films such as A Fost sau N-a Fost?/12:08 East of Bucharest)–have difficulty explaining how the Hungarian military maintains they were tracking Securitate radio transmitters/transmissions and relaying the information to the Romanian military leadership and that the operation of these Securitate transmitters dropped off in sync with the drop off in counter-revolutionary resistance posed by the Securitate…Then again they are not aware of this or most of the details/evidence presented for the period 26 December 1989 – 24 January 1990 below…)
Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, head of the Hungarian People’s Army Press Department: “…I would like to say that a progressive weakening of the Securitate has been experienced. We ourselves can see this, because our radio searching and locating units which were in Hungary a few days ago were monitoring broadcasts from 31 Securitate radio centers–yesterday 19, and today only 5. We of course put this data at the disposal of the Romanian military leadership.”
Ferenc Karpati: “A Securitate erői ellen hosszú, küzdelmes harcot folytattak a hadsereg és a forradalom más erői. Felszámolásuk érdekében a Magyar Honvédség speciális képzettségu rádióbemérő egységeinek egy részét átcsoportosítottuk a román államhatár közelébe, s így sikerült rádióállomásaikat bemérni, álláshelyeiket pontosan meghatározni. Az adatok átadásával jelentősen elősegítettük a Securitate-bázisok felszámolását.” KÁRPÁTI FERENC: A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése
1990. január 11., csütörtök 18:55
A Honvédelmi Minisztérium közleménye (4. rész) (OS)
A kezdeti időszakban, amikor a diktátorhoz hű Securitate a
forradalom vérbe fojtására jelentős erőket vetett be, a Magyar
Néphadsereg speciális képzettségű rádióbemérő alakulatainak egy
részét átcsoportosította a magyar-román államhatár közelébe a Securitate rádióállomásainak bemérésére, helyeinek meghatározására.
Ezeknek az adatoknak az átadásával, az adók bemért földrajzi
helyeinek megjelölésével feltehetően segítséget nyújtott a Magyar
Néphadsereg a Securitate-bázisok felszámolásában, megsemmisítésében.
Szinte napról napra érzékelhető volt ezek számának csökkenése, ami a
magyar szakértők szerint arról tanúskodott, hogy a diktátorhoz hű
erők törzseit a román hadsereg folyamatosan számolja fel. Ezt
példázza, hogy a december 26-án nyilvánosságra hozottak szerint
24-én még 31, 25-én már 19 és 26-án csupán öt Securitate-rádióközpont működését rögzítették és mérték be a magyar
rádiófelderítő és bemérő alegységek.
25-27 December 1989
Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance. (Gheorghe Ratiu, interview by Ilie Neacsu (episode 17), Europa, 7-22 March 1995, cited in Hall 1997, p. 366.)
Gheorghe Ratiu (fost sef al Directiei I a Securitatii): “La ordinul generalului Vlad, in zilele de 25-27 decembrie 1989, am coordonat o investigatie in spitalele si morgile Capitalei pentru a stabili care este adevarul in legatura cu ‘teroristii straini’ despre care se tot relatala televiziune si in presa. Toate unitatiile spitalicesti si morga de la Institutul Medico-Legal, fusesera preluate in paza de catre armata. La inceput, ofiterilor trimisi de mine nu li s-a permis intrarea in nici unul din aceste obiective, cu toate ca, oficial, de la data de 23 decembrie devenisem seful Directiei de Infromatii Interne a Armatei. Pentru a strapunge acest baraj instituit, de forte oculte, am apelat si am primit sprijinul procurorului general Popovici, a ministrului adjunct dr. Iacob de la Ministerul Sanatatii, si a generalului Vasile, inca sef al Directiei de contrainformatii militare. Am format astfel, patru echipe conduse de cate un procuror si din care mai faceau parte, cate un ofiter de contrainformatii cu uniforma al legitimatii cu uniforma si legitimatie de la Ministerul Apararii Nationale [!!!], un ofiter de la directia mea si un inspector de la Directia sanitara a Municipului Bucuresti. Aceste echipe au reusit sa patrunda peste tot [!!!], mai putin la Spitalul Militar Central…Rezultatul a fost ca in tara murisera in acea perioada doar patru cetateni straini…Deci, nici un terorist strain [!!!]“
Gheorghe Ratiu, interviu luat de Ilie Neacsu, Europa, episoade XVII si XVIII, martie-aprilie 1995.
Constantin Catalin-Ceferistul: “Pe 28 decembrie am predat patru cetateni de nationalitate araba. Aveau pasaport, Republica Irak.” (Expres Magazin, nr. 22 (1991))
(To my pleasant surprise, I discovered the AFP (Agence France Presse) Archive online. I finally dug into my pocket and purchased for approximately 3 euros an article the following articles.)
Anatomy of a Cover-up (or Constanta, we have a problem…): In the waning days of December 1989 following the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu on Christmas Day, several high-ranking officials from Romania’s military and commercial navy stationed in and around Constanta recounted to foreign reporters details of what had happened off the Black Sea Coast during the previous week and a half…That they spoke out of turn and were entirely too honest could be surmised by the effort of Bucharest–and those directly charged with the overall governance and defense of the country–to deny the revelations out of Constanta. It was the beginning of the cover-up of the Counter-Revolution of December 1989 and it was done precisely because of the involvement of foreign mercenaries in fighting side by side with elements of the Securitate who opposed the ouster of Nicolae Ceausescu. (So, indeed, the cover-up was initiated by Romania’s new civil and military leaders to avoid international ramifications (the ultimate state function, regardless of regime, in a world of nation-states)…it would be continued by others.)
One wonders what would have happened had this series of reports been laid out in sequence and analyzed as a sequence. There seems to have been more coverage of them (abroad) in the Budapest (see below), rather than Bucharest, press. One of the few references in the literature on December 1989 is on page 66 of Nestor Ratesh’s Romania: The Entangled Revolution (1991), where Ratesh notes a (31 December 1989) Agence France Presse dispatch citing the office of naval commander Constantin Iordache on Soviet and Bulgarian information that helicopters were being launched by suspicious ships approximately 60 miles off the coast, as well as a later denial by other Romanian authorities of the existence of these helicopters. As one can see below, the five AFP reports on the subject, from 30 and 31 December 1989, and 2 and 3 January 1990, are far more detailed, diverse, and damning than Ratesh’s allusion would suggest.
Note: Not everything at this point had “disappeared”: General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).
Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably: The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.
Robert Cullen, “Report from Romania: Down with the Tyrant,” The New Yorker, 2 April 1990.
Late the next night, Romanian television showed Ceausescu’s corpse, lying in a pool of blood. After that, the Securitate resistance wilted, although sporadic sniping continued for a week or so. It turned out that not all of the Securitate fighters were Romanian. A ranking member of the National Salvation Front told me that about a hundred of them, including some who fought the longest, were from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries with histories of involvement in terrorism. They had come to Romania ostensibly as exchange students, but had in fact received commando training. In return, they agreed to serve the Securitate for several years. As these foreigners were captured, and rumors–accurate ones–about their origins began to spread, the Front publicly denied that any Arabs had been involved with the Securitate. It did so because it wished to avoid any trouble in relations with the Arab world, the Front official explained. I asked what would become of the captured Arab commandos, and he responded by silently drawing his index finger across his throat.
Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:
I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.[9]
[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.
Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea: “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”
Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.
– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
– Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.
Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.
Ion Medoia, “Teroristi prinsi pe teritoriul Iugoslaviei,” Romania Libera, 10 ianuarie 1990.
d. Stire de senzatie
Autoritatile iugoslave au arestat ieri 63 de teroristi, care au participat la masacrele de la Timisoara, Sibiu si
Bucuresti. Cand vor fi predati inapoi, vom releva detalii semnificative.
(publicat in ziarul Renasterea banateana, Timisoara, 07.01.1990,pe prima pagina, fara titlu si nesemnat, dar incadrat in chenar)
N.R. La vremea respectiva colonelul Nicolae Predonescu, reprezentant al conducerii Garnizoanei militare Timisoara la Consiliul judetean FSN Timis si totodata membru al respectivului Consiliu, a informat, inclusiv pe presedintele Consiliului judetean FSN Timis, Lorin Ioan Fortuna, ca va pleca, impreuna cu o delegatie militara, la solicitarea
FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62
According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].
Mai tirziu in 11 ianuarie [1990], cind toata lumea spunea iarasi ‘civili sa predea armele’ impreuna cu Cercel Doina Rebeca am intrat in buncarul subteran din CC si am mai prins inca opt insi. Au tras–daca nu era Rebeca era a treia oara cind muream….
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9 January 1990; 11-17 January 1990
Lt. Col. Alexandru Bodea (no. 22 May 1990 Armata Poporului):On 9 January 1990, between the hours of 21:55 and 23:14, on the radar screens of the missile managers of one of the subordinate subunits there were detected signals coming from about 12 unidentified aircraft, that were deploying, at a height of 300 to 1800 meters, in the direction of a nearby locality.The following day, between the hours of 03:00 and 04:15 again were detected the signals of six airships, after which—the same—between 17:00-18:00 and 21:30—the same type of signals, several aerial targets hovering at altitudes between 300-3000 meters, in the same direction as the previous day.Then, as if to boost the belief of the missile officers that this was no accident, on the third day, 11 January, between the hours 0400-0500, again there appeared the signals of 7 unidentified aircraft, having essentially the same flight characteristics. What is curious is that not a single one of these targets was observed visually and no characteristic engine sounds were heard in the respective locations.But even more curious is that, just then, from the central radio base of a nearby municipality, there arrived a communications unit that intercepted foreign signals on a particular bandwidth, in impulses, while on another frequency an intense traffic in Arabic or Turkish was noted.In light of this information, the commander of the unit organized a radio inspection of numerous areas, with the help of transmissions’ equipment. Therefore, on 11 January 1990, between 1120 and 1130 on the respective frequency were received the code signs in English, 122 calling 49, 38, 89, 11, 82, 44, 38, 84, and asked if they “were doing well.”From the fragments of discussions it could be understood that they were making references to explosives, hospitals, medicines, and wounded “for the hours 1400.” At 1330, on the same frequency, once again were intercepted conversations in which there was mention of wounded and requests for help. The transmissions were received over this, in which a more feminine voice and a dog’s bark could be clearly heard. References were made to the preceding conversations that were to follow at 1800, 1900, 2200, and then on 12 January 1990, at 0910.Chatting with some citizens from the local area where these targets and foreign radio traffic were intercepted, the commander of the anti-aircraft unit to whom we referred found out that nearby there exists a wooded road (author’s note: the locality is in a mountainous area), surrounded by two rows of barbed wire, a road on which in fact there is no lumber transport. Not by chance, since before the Revolution, the road was off-limits and was under the strict guard of the Securitate. [emphasis added]These same citizens further informed the unit’s commander, that after the Revolution, the road in question did not become a no-man’s land, remaining instead in the hands of people dressed as woodsmen but about whom those from the local lumber collective had no clue.Who could these unknown “woodsmen” be? And what “affairs” did they have there? Perhaps exactly…[article concludes]
“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor. Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare. Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122″ chema indicativele “49″, “38″, “89″, “11″, “82″, “44″, “38″, “84″, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00″. La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare. Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine. S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere. Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti? Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo? Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor. Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?”
Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), mai 1990.)
asemenea actiuni de diversiune radio-electronica s-au mai inregistrat si in zilele de 11 si 17 ianuarie, deci aproape la o luna dupa Revolutie…
16 January 1990: (Date of film procured by Ted Koppel and ABC News showing underground tunnels used by the “terrorists”)
Monday, March 5 (1990).
Bucharest. Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling. Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied. Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.
We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest. An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over. I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs. “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel. I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels. The colonel went off to consult with his man. When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.” “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described. “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.
Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook. The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
On Thursday morning [18 January 1990], for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising. In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving. This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television. [NYT 1/22/1990]
Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Rumanians Call for Freedom in Schools
By DAVID BINDER, Special to The New York Times
Published: January 22, 1990
BUCHAREST, Rumania, Jan. 21— Student leaders, addressing a crowd of about 3,000 of their classmates today, demanded far-reaching changes in the faculties of Bucharest University and other Rumanian institutions of higher learning.
The strongest demand, and the one cheered most loudly by the students, was for the ouster of professors most closely associated with the Communist dictatorship of the late Nicolae Ceausescu, particularly those working for the Securitate, or state security police.
”There are Securitate officers on the journalism faculty,” a student, Daniel Oghian, declared. He assailed Professor Radu Florian as a Ceausescu holdover whose advocacy of Communist ideology was particularly objectionable. Mr. Florian is a member of the Stefan Gheorgiu Academy, where Securitate officials were trained. The academy was grafted onto Bucharest University under the Ceausescu Government.
”Down with Florian!” the students chanted. ”Down with Stefan Gheorgiu! Depoliticize! Depoliticize!” ‘Militarized’ Classrooms Mihai Iliescu, a physics student, drew cheers when he declared that incompetent professors should be sent back to ”study their lessons over again” or be forced to resign. He also called for the ouster of the Ministry of Education’s inspector of universities.
Another speaker, from the Marine Sciences Institute in Constanta, said that his college had been ”militarized” and subjected to Securitate control under Mr. Ceausescu. Conditions were such that students were quartered 50 to a single room, he said, and buildings were unheated.
”Take it over!” the students shouted. ”Take it over!” It was the second rally in two weeks in the capital. The first was held at the Polytechnical Institute in western Bucharest. But this time the students gathered in University Square in the middle of the city under the auspices of a newly-formed Student League.
In passionate speeches commemorating classmates who were killed in the uprising that toppled the Ceausescu regime four weeks ago, the students said they wanted to create ”a new society” and ”a strong Rumania.”
”We speak from our hearts for those who were killed in the revolution,” said Mihai Gheorghiu, a third-year philosophy student. Dan Josif, another student, said, ”They fought with weapons, and we carried flowers.”
Government Is Silent on Protest
The students, many cradling lighted candles in their hands, bowed their heads in a minute of silence for their slain classmates, then raised their voices in four stanzas of the long-banned hymn ”Awake, Ye Rumanians,” which denounces ”barbarians and tyrants.”
There were no Government spokesmen at the rally. Nor was there any immediate reaction from the governing Council of National Salvation, although its President, Ion Iliescu, met with youth leaders today to discuss a future group for Rumanian young people to replace the Communist youth organization.
It has generally been impossible to obtain precise information about or reactions to daily events in Rumania from the Government, which closed its foreign press and telephone service on Saturday, even from its spokesman, although he holds periodic news conferences.
On Thursday morning, for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.
In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.
This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television.
Photos: Students in Bucharest demonstrating yesterday for far-reaching changes at universities, including the ouster of faculty members the students say were supporters of the deposed dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. (AP); A student at the rally mourning a relative killed in the revolution. (Reuters)
A cryptic message announcing the abrogation of unspecified secret accords with unspecified countries carried out by the Ceausescu regime, but not contained in the registries of the Foreign Ministry and in contravention of international law (in other words, Plan Z-Z, an accord with several Middle Eastern states, most importantly perhaps Qadhafi’s Libya)…24 January 1990 appears to have also been–not coincidentally–the last day “foreign terrorists” who had fought with the Securitate against Ceausescu’s downfall were exfiltrated from the country–reputedly following a threat to Romanian workers in Libya by Qadhafi if the remaining Arab mercenaries in Romanian custody were not allowed to leave the country…WHY OH WHY, WE ARE CONSTANTLY ASKED, DID ILIESCU, ROMAN, AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT NOT PUT THE “TERRORISTS” ON TRIAL: HERE IS YOUR ANSWER, THEY WERE COMPLICIT IN ALLOWING THEM TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND THEREFORE LACKED A KEY ELEMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECEMBER BLOODSHED. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE REVOLUTION WAS THUS COMPROMISED, BURIED ON THAT FATEFUL DAY OF 24 JANUARY 1990.
Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul Z-Z si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 septembrie 1990.
Dupa citeva saptamini presedintele unei tari direct implicate a amenintat guvernul roman ca va recurge la represalii impotriva celor citeva mii de cetateni romani aflati cu contract de munca in tara respectiva daca nu vor fi returnati teroristii straini, vii sau morti. Santajul respectiv si-a facut efectul si un avion romanesc a efectuat o cursa mai putin obisnuita catre un aeroport polonez, de unde o “incarcatura” mai putin obisnuita constind in persoane valide, raniti si cosciuge a fost transferata pe un alt avion, plecand intr-o directie necunoscuta. In ziua aceea se stergeau orice urme ale planului “Z-Z”
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 14, 2013
(strictly personal views based on two decades of prior research and publications; not for reproduction without prior authorization; thank you!)
I have previously written about former Securitate (DIE) General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s discussion of matters related to Plan Z-Z as follows in 2005:
Furthermore, there is his amazing about face on the question of the “terrorists”/Ceausescu loyalists during the Revolution. At the time, Pacepa spoke of “Plan M” as the source of the “terrorists” (see AP, Bryan Brumley, “Ceausescu Had Planned to Flee to China, Former Security Chief Says,” 5 January 1990). According to Pacepa, “Plan M” called for Securitate forces to “retreat to hidden bunkers and wage guerilla war.” He spoke about the use of safe houses and of a maze of secret tunnels, descriptions that were similar to what was being heard from Romanian during and immediately after the Revolution. Significantly, Pacepa’s details mirror many of the points in the so-called “Plan Z” for the event of an attempt to remove Ceausescu, the reputed 1987 copy of which was published in the daily “Evenimentul Zilei” in July 1993 and which apparently was still in effect in December 1989 (for a good discussion of the plan, see Deletant, 1995, pp. 84-88). [for a copy of the latter see: https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/11/planul-z-z-planul-zet-zet-in-presa-romana-din-anii-nouazeci/
I have attempted to trace Pacepa’s public discussion of Plan Z-Z to verify claims made by other actors (see below, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Giani Bucurescu/Virgil Lovescu) in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. All of these actors refer to Pacepa’s discussion on Radio Free Europe/Radio Europa Libera sometime apparently between 24 and 26 December 1989. Unfortunately, although there are a series of audio clips and transcripts from these days on the Europa Libera site http://www.europalibera.org/archive/1989/latest/452/982.html, there is no mention of the Pacepa intervention in question and no indication of record of its existence on the Internet.
La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…
Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L. Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.
Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi. Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…
Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…
Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu
This also seems to confirm the following (when adjusted for the corrected dates):
Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:
“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch. This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’ I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people. And I was told: Only you and two other people know this. I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]
[95] Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990. I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.
But it almost doesn’t matter when Pacepa first discussed this…because almost identical details were disclosed by Liviu Turcu, a DIE officer who had defected earlier in 1989 (thereby being far more knowledgeable of current plans/realities inside the Romanian security state), only without reference to a named plan, such as Plan Z-Z. It was thus Turcu on 23 December 1989 (within 24 hours of the outbreak of terrorist hostilities in Romania; the interview would have taken place on Saturday the 23rd) who first informed Western media of the existence of such a plan–although it appears Turcu’s disclosures were never relayed by Romanian media or by Radio Europa Libera.
Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces
The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.
Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.
The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.
The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.
The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.
The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.
As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5” in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.
Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.
Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.
The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.
Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.
In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.
Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.
On 1 December 2012, Doru Teodor Maries and Asociatia 21 decembrie 1989 made images of many of the official files investigating the events of December 1989 in Timisoara available on the Internet at http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/ . Among the copies available are testimonies from victims of the repression of the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, witnesses of the repression, relatives of the victims of the repression, and members of regime forces that either participated in the repression or were witnesses to it. These documents allow researchers the ability to confirm or infirm claims made in the Romanian media or accounts published since December 1989.
[VA ROG, DACA VRETI, AJUTATI-MA CU TRANSCIERILE ILIZIBILE! VA MULTUMESC!!!]
Romulus Cristea (ziarist, Romania Libera, 22 decembrie 2005): – Munitia speciala, gloantele cu cap vidia sau dum-dum, a provocat victime? Presa de la acea vreme a fost plina cu astfel de relatari…
General-magistrat Dan Voinea – Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia, nici de la dum-dum.Pe durata evenimentelor s-a folosit munitie de razboi, munitie normala care se gasea la vremea respectiva in dotarea Ministerului de Interne si a Ministerului Apararii Nationale. Confuzia si informatiile false au aparut de la faptul ca se foloseau calibre diferite si, deci, zgomotul produs era altfel perceput. http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/interviuri/toti-alergau-dupa-un-inamic-invizibil-58783.html
Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990): “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat: “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”
Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990): “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim: “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>
(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)
Popovici: “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara. La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.” (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)
Popovici: “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison. At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming: You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.”
It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici: both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!
197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat. În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).
“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat: “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”
Popovici: “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara. La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.” (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)
Popovici: “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison. At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming: You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.”
Some excerpts: P.C.: Ati dat o declaratie? Po. I. : Da P.C.: O mentineti? Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.: “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da? V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste! “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)
Po. I.: …Da [am fost ranit]. Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica. M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap. Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana. La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu. Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica: “Luati-l si duceti-l la arest.” Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde. Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.” Asta tin minte precis. Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)
Doru Sciadei
“In urma radiografiei facute la Spitalul Judetean au spus ca am 2 schije in picior…consemnat de medicul radiolog si chirurg, care m-au consultat.
Convingerea mea este ca in acest atac (pe ?) Calea Girocului, asupra unor oameni pasnici si (?) s-au folosit cel putin doua tipuri de gloante, convingerea intirita de glontul scos din coapsa (?) si schijele din piciorul meu, care cred ca provin de un glonte exploziv.
Doina Gherasim glonte dum dum
Cristian Rusu “S-a tras cu gloante dum-dum”
SIX Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…
Doctors also reported on the wounds caused by explosive bullets (i.e. dum-dum bullets): In this dispatch from Agence France Presse, relayed by Radio Free Europe on 25 December 1989, Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, a medic in the intensive care unit of a Timisoara hospital, says based on his thirty years of experience, some of the wounds could only have been CAUSED by EXPLOSIVE BULLETS SHOT AT THE PROTESTERS”
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression. First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot. december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom
Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian
Barzeanu Atanasie, 65 anit, medic primar, doctor in stiinte, chirurg, Spitalul Judetean Timisoara
“…sintem deci in 18 decembrie…Pe la orele doua si patruzeci, cind inchideam o operatie–Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian, dintr-un ARO, pacienta prezentindu-se o echimoza cu distrugerea tesuturilor (plaga in diametru de 15 centimetri), a tesuturilor din regiunea epigastrica, inclusiv a muschilor drepti abdominali, cu ruptura a colonului ascendent transvers si a jejuno-ileonului, fiind in stare de soc grav traumatic, hemoragic–, fara sa-mi poti explica nici macar acum cu ce fel de gloante a putut fi lovita, pentru ca nu am identificat nici orificiul de iesire si nici pe cel de intrare, a venit o asistenta de la Chirurgie I, care mi-a spus sa merg la domnul Ignat.”
Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura, (Editura Facla 1990), pp. 133-134.
The following first appeared in Gyorgy Mandics’s Temesvari golgota (1991) pp. 348-349 and is reprinted in his A Manipulalt Forradalom (2009). [My guess is this is also the source for the reference to dum dum bullets in the German language wikipedia entry for http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum%C3%A4nische_Revolution_1989 — Hans Vastag, György Mandics, Manfred Engelmann: Temeswar. Symbol der Freiheit. Wien 1992. ]
pp. 348-349
Ket esetuk volt az elejen. Ezert is hivtak be oket. Egy 14 eves gyermeket a haz elott lottek le, szinte a szomszedban, egy golyoszoros ARO-rol talaltak el; egy oreg nenit a ter tuloldalon, az erkelyen ertek a golyok. A zarja ment ki, kicsit nagyott hallott mar, amire is csoda, 64 evesen, azt hirtelen ugy erezte, hogy labaibol kimegy minden ero es lecsusott az erholya. Na milyen gyonge lettem egyszeruen–mondotta maganak. de ahogyan fel akart tapaszkodni meg lepve tapasztalt, hogy vertocsa gyult alatta. Bekialtolt a vegenek aki egy szomszed segitsegevel athozta a nenit a legkozelebbi korhazba, itt a Marasti ter tuloldalan, az uj Klinikakba, avagy hivatalos neven a 2 szamu korhazba, ahol rogton osszecodult mindenki csodat latni. Ekkor hivtak be Baranziekat es minden mozgositato orvost, hiszen a fegyverek ropogatak. Azota is kisebb nagyobb megszakitasokkal, felfelecsapolt a gepfegyverek, golyoszorok, geppisztolyok langzivatarja, remulettel telitva az ejszaki eget.
p. 349
De azt a ket elso esett nem kovettek ujabbok. Igz aztan volt ido alaposan szemugyre venni a nenit akinek combjan elol egz akkora lyuk tatongott mint egy egy lejes, a comba hatso felen ahol eltavotott a golyo, ott viszont mar akkora mint egy otlejes. Fluture doktor, az egzik sebesz erosen kototte az ebet a korohoz, hogy ez egz specialis dum-dum robbanogolyo okozta seb, hiszen a szakirodalomban azt irjak, hogy csak ez a robbannolovedek-fajta-amelyet ugyan az ENSZ eltitott, am a nemzetkozi terrorizmusban kulonesen divatos ma is–okoz az izomszovetbol kijovet sokkal nagyobb roncsolasokat mint a bemenetnel. Az orvosok odazarandokoltak a sebesulthoz, mivel egzik sem latott semhogy dum-dum golyo utotte sebet, de egyaltalan lott sebet sem soha eleteben. Igz aztan csak szivtak a rangeletrahoz igazodva a sebesz foorvosok az amerikai Kentet, a foamnesztezialogus a holland pipadohanyt, az asztalyos orovosok a bolgar BT-t, a fonoverek a jugoslav Vikend-et, a noverek es helyapolok a roman Snagov-t, Golfot. Es vartak.
(Note: it is unclear who the 64 yr. old described was…there are several individuals without ages listed as injured or dead during the events, but I think it more likely the age of the woman is incorrect)
Jozsef Gazda Megvalto karacsony. Erdelyi magyar tulelok emlekeznek. (1990)
Ungor Csaba: Ket ora utan senkit be nem hoztak, senkit be nem engedtek, egyetlen sebesult sem. A korhazbol kikanyarado mentoautokra is lottek. Ket ora utan mindre, ami mozgott, jarokelo, auto, mindenre lottek, csak hogy ok tudjak begyujteni a sebesulteket s a halottakat. Kiderult az elso golyok utan, amiket a sebekbol gyujottek ossze, szedtek ki, hogy nem eles katonai toltenyekkel lottek, hanem dum-dum golyokkal, amik nagy rombolasokat okoztak. Egy 16 eves, ketszer sebesult gyermek meselte el, ok azt hittek, hogy hosok, azt hittek, hogy meg fogjak menteni a forradalmat, mert biztosra vettek, ha a felnottek sorfala ele allnak, nem fognak belejuk loni. Lottek rajuk is.
Goga Andras: A masodik izgalomkelto esemeny volt kedden delelott, hogy az osszes regiszterunk–mind a surgossegen, mind az osztalyon–, melyekre felirtuk a muteteinket, eltuntek, a mai napig sem talaltuk meg. Bennuk voltak az ev osszes mutetei[***]…En aznap kettot operaltam. Egy tuntetonek a bore alol vettem ki egy nagyon kulonleges golyok, nem is golyot, egy ilyen repeszdarabot, melyet a katonasag aztan megvizsgalt, s azt mondtak, nekik nincs tudmasuk, hogy ez mi lehet. Egy masiknak pedig fejserulese volt, persze abban nem talaltam golyot, atment rajta.
In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets. This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania). Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.
This was also discussed by Bucharest medical personnel at a 1994 conference:
AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA
“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”
Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2
“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”. Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat: dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989. “Documentatia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat. “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina). Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel. Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate. S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe. Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta. In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu: “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit. “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.
NOR WERE THESE THE ONLY DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL–FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC–WHO ATTESTED TO THE USE OF DUM-DUM EXPLODING AND OTHER ATYPICAL, UNUSUAL MUNITIONS USED DURING THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 1989
I know of no better metaphor for what has happened to research on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 than Ted Koppel’s surreal experience in Bucharest in early 1990 recounted below.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
Monday, March 5 (1990).
Bucharest. Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling. Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied. Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.
We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest. An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over. I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs. “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel. I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels. The colonel went off to consult with his man. When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.” “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described. “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.
Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook. The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.
Romania’s intellectuals and journalists–not to mention Romanianists abroad–repeat Voinea’s claim: “there were no unusual munitions, no explosive dum-dum bullets used in December 1989.”
DUM-DUM MUNITIONS OF THE SECURITATE’S ELITE SNIPERS (above)
Holland & Holland (London) magnum bullets found in Securitate V-a building
DOCTORS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ROMANIA TREATING THE WOUNDED FROM THE DECEMBER 1989 BLOODSHED ATTESTED TO THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE DUM-DUM MUNITIONS:
1) Romanian doctors, including surgeons Lt. Gen. Traian Oancea (Military Hospital) and Nicolae Constantinescu (Coltea Hospital)
2) Dr. Manuel Burzaco (Medecins sans frontieres, “Doctors without Borders)
Even while the cover-up of what had happened just a few days earlier was beginning, not everything had “disappeared” yet…:
General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).
Romania’s intellectuals and journalists–not to mention Romanianists abroad–repeat Voinea’s claim: “there were no terrorists and definitely no foreign terrorists in December 1989.”
Foto: Ion Laurenţiu Fotografia de mai sus este realizată de Ion Laurenţiu, în sediul CC -PCR, în noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.
Former Securitate member and head of its successor agency, the Romanian Information Service (SRI) from 1990 to 1997 not only admits in this French documentary that Libyans and other “Arab insurgents,” including Palestinians, were trained at bases in Romania, but admits specifically that they were trained by the Securitate’s anti-terrorist unit, the USLA–just as former Securitate whistleblowers (including Roland Vasilevici and Marian Romanescu among others had told us)
The former military prosecutor, General Dan Voinea, claims there was nothing unusual about the tunnels beneath Bucharest in December 1989–just what you would normally find, tunnels for sewage, water supply, and electricity and thus they couldn’t have been used by the non-existent “terrorists”–and yet when told that videotape exists to the contrary Let’s Go to the Videotape! (III) (BBC1 December 1989) A Labyrinth of Lies
Romania’s intellectuals and journalists–not to mention Romanianists abroad–repeat Voinea’s claim: “there were no secret tunnels beneath Bucharest, just the normal tunnels you would find under any large city, and so they couldn’t have been used by the “terrorists” because the “terrorists” didn’t exist.”
So can you imagine what Romania’s intellectuals and journalists–not to mention Romanianists abroad–would say about the claims made in an article from 1990 talking about a secret underground river in one tunnel and inflatable boats—oh, what cheap disinformation put out by TVR, by Ion Iliescu and those who seized power, how ridiculous, how gullible, how manipulative…of course, since the beginning of time the strategy of those thirsting for power is to create an imaginary enemy, then say he operates at night and operates beneath the earth, the epitome of evil…so would go the “sophisticated” postmodern deconstruction of such a claim…without any apparent need to confirm whether or not there was any basis to this “rumor”…instead just eliminate it out of hand…
After all, what had Dan Voinea said about such things: He had inspected the tunnels himself and could assure people that what was in question was a simple canal for drinking water! He thus could state unambiguously that other claims are a lie.
– Ani de zile s-a tot vorbit despre tunelurile secrete pline de teroristi care ieseau si ucideau oamenii de pe strada sau din diverse institutii… Exista vreo marturie credibila, vreun document?
– Nu putem califica aceste informatii nici macar ca tinand de domeniul legendei. E o minciuna! O alta minciuna! Bucurestiul, ca de altfel toate marile orase, e brazdat subteran de tot felul de tuneluri, unele pentru canalizare, gospodarirea apei, electricitate si alte scopuri. De altfel, Capitala are in subteran tuneluri realizate in urma cu sute de ani. Aceste tuneluri nu au constituit adaposturi pentru teroristi. Recent, am participat la o reconstituire pe teren, la asemenea asa-zise tuneluri secrete folosite de teroristi. Era un simplu canal pentru distribuirea apei potabile. Deci am constatat ca a fost vorba de o minciuna.
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
Let us return to the revelations of the group that explored those tunnels in December 1989, however:
Cai de navigatie secrete sub Bucuresti
La 12 metri sub platoul Pietei Revolutiei exista o retea de catacombe prin care se circula cu barca
La 12 metri sub platoul Pietei Revolutiei exista o retea de catacombe prin care se circula cu barca. E vorba de culoare betonate, cu latimea de aproximativ doi metri, prin care curge un rau subteran adanc de un metru. Cu apa curata. Debitul raului secret e aproximat la 1,5 metri cubi pe secunda. La intrare, aceste cai navigabile care stabat Capitala sunt utilate cu barci pneumatice. Informatiile ne-au fost furnizate de Dan Falcan, seful sectiei de istorie a Muzeului Municipiului Bucuresti. Istoricul a cules toate datele existente despre catacombele Bucurestilor, mai vechi si mai noi, si le-a pus cap la cap pentru a-si face o imagine asupra istoriei orasului.
Capitala Romaniei are o traditie de secole in materie de tainite si coridoare secrete. Din datele pe care le detin istoricii, primele coridoare subterane demne de luat in seama au fost beciurile producatorilor de vinuri. Acestea aveau zeci de metri si erau atat de largi incat se circula cu carele. In secolul al XIX-lea au aparut edificiile care aveau tuneluri de refugiu, cum e tunelul care leaga Palatul Ghica Tei de Manastirea Plumbuita, lung de mai bine de un kilometru. In nordul Parcului Cismigiu, Biserica Schitu Magureanu e legata prin subterane de Palatul Cretzulescu .
Sub Palatul Golescu, situat langa stadionul Giulesti, a fost depistat un coridor subteran care da inspre lunca Dambovitei . Coridorul a fost folosit si de Tudor Vladimirescu. “De pe la 1826 ne-au ramas
cateva relatari care ne dau o imagine asupra catacombelor de sub capitala Tarii Romanesti. La acea vreme haiduceau in zona vestitii Tunsu si Grozea. Timp de multi ani, ei au bagat spaima in boierii din Bucuresti, in special in cei care aveau casele in zona actualei sosele Panduri. Ii calcau mereu, iar poterele nu puteau face nimic. Desi reuseau sa ii localizeze si sa-i incercuiasca, cand sa puna mana pe ei haiducii dispareau “intrand in pamant”, adica coborau in subteran. Astazi putem afirma ca sub aceasta sosea erau o multime de coridoare subterane, late de trei metri si inalte de doi metri. Dar toate datele acestea au palit atunci cand am intrat in contact cu alte informatii recente. Labirintul subteran vechi al orasului pare neinsemnat pe langa cel construit din ordinul lui Ceausescu. Datele mi-au parvenit de la militarii care au intrat in subteranele fostului Comitet Central, actualul Senat la Romaniei, respectiv de la maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista. Ei au intrat in aceste catacombe chiar pe 25 decembrie 1989, impreuna cu un grup de genisti si pirotehnisti”, explica muzeograful Dan Falcan.
Conform relatarii militarilor, la subsolul cladirii au gasit un tunel, nu prea lung, care coboara intr-un fel de cazarma. Opt camere cu paturi pliante. Din aceste camere pornesc mai multe culoare, unul ducand chiar pana la etajul II al cladirii. Pe un alt culoar se poate ajunge la un buncar mai larg, la 7 metri adancime. Se trece apoi de o usa blindata si se ajunge la un apartament spatios, la adancimea de 9 metri. Militarii au cautat apoi camera in care se afla sistemul de ventilatie si s-au trezit pe un nou culoar. Dupa ce au strabatut aproximativ 30 de metri au gasit o nisa cu o lada mare, in care erau 16 barci din cauciuc, cu pompe de umflare.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
Albia amenajata are pe lateral bare metalice facute pentru oprirea sau impulsionarea barcilor. “In opinia militarilor, raul secret duce catre un lacurile din afara orasului, in nord, si Dambovita, in sud-est” , subliniaza Falcan. Ofiterii au vorbit insa de existenta unui alt canal similar, la capatul unui alt tunel, precum si de un sistem de inundare a labirintului, pe sectiuni. In cazul in care un eventual fugar e urmarit, el poate inunda portiuni de tunel in spatele lui pentru a opri urmaritorii. A mai fost gasita o gura de iesire din labirint in curtea interioara a fostului CC, de unde, printr-o retea de canale, se poate intra in canalizarea orasului, de unde se poate iesi catre Dambovita. Reteaua are guri de iesire in Palatul Regal, Biserica Cretzulescu si magazinul Muzica. “In urma unor cercetari ulterioare a reiesit ca ramificatiile subterane au corespondenta cu circa 80 de obiective din Bucuresti, cum ar fi cladirea ASE, Casa Enescu, Opera Romana etc. Subliniez, relatari sunt ale unor ofiteri din cadrul armatei. Lucru foarte interesant, nimeni nu neaga existenta acestor cai de navigatie secrete, dar cand am incercat sa le exploram, nu ni s-a permis pe motiv ca… nu se poate”. Despre aceste galerii ale lui Ceausescu ne-a vorbit si Radulescu Dobrogea, presedintele asociatiei Ecocivica, fost inspector de mediu in Primaria Capitalei, omul care s-a ocupat multi ani de panza freatica a orasului. El sustine ca stie de aceste galerii ale lui Ceausescu si ca apa limpede care curge prin ele este panza freatica de sub oras.
Administratorii Senatului au vazut numai intrarea in catacombe
“Pot sa va spun ca am auzit despre aceste lucruri, dar nu le-am vazut. Exista o cale de comunicatie subterana care pleaca din Senat catre Piata Revolutiei, o cale care pleaca de la Palatul Regal catre Piata si inca una, tot din Palatul Regal, catre Biserica Cretzulescu. Intrarile in aceste cai de acces le-am vazut, dar unde se opresc, nu stiu, nu este treaba noastra sa cotrobaim pe acolo”, ne-a declarat inginer Constantin Bratu, directorul tehnic al administratiai cladirii Senatului Romaniei.
SorinGolea (Libertatea 2005)
——————————————————————————————————
Voinea’s conclusions have been enshrined, in fact sacralized, as the centerpiece of the Chapter on December 1989 of the Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, also known as the Tismaneanu commission after its chairman, Vladimir Tismaneanu, and they seem destined to serve as the primary source for the findings of the Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc (IICCMER), also headed by Tismaneanu (http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/nu-am-luat-locul-nimanui-este-o-viziune-total-falsa-888701.html.)
(Sorin Iliesiu, a member of the CPADCR who edited the chapter of the Raport Final entitled “Revolutia din 1989” (pp. 620-627) previously admitted the linkage between Voinea’s conclusions and the claims in that chapter: Justiţia română a dovedit diversiunea “teroriştii” şi nu a găsit nici un terorist printre morţi, răniţi sau arestaţi. D-l gen. Dan Voinea spune clar: “Teroriştii nu au existat. S-a minţit pentru a-i ascunde pe adevăraţii criminali”….Rechizitoriul Justiţiei române, spiritul acestora regăsindu-se în Raportul [Raport Final CPADCR]…http://www.acum.tv/articol/7423/)
Prin televiziune s-au făcut majoritatea diversiunilor, cea mai eficientă fiind reprezentată de „pericolul de moarte” omniprezent întruchipat de „teroriştii fideli dictatorului Ceauşescu”; acesta a fost arestat în 22 decembrie, într-o unitate militară din Târgovişte. Pericolul părea total credibil întrucât în perioada 22-27 decembrie au fost înregistraţi 942 de morţişi mii de răniţi. Majoritatea au fost ucişişi răniţi pe străzile din centrul capitaleişi al altor oraşe martirizate ca urmare a acestei diversiuni. Ulterior nu a fost acuzatşi judecat nici un terorist. (p. 625)
[42] According to Sorin Iliesiu, the filmmaker who claims to have edited the chapter on December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Raport Final, the “spirit of Voinea’s findings can be found in the Chapter.” Indeed, the chapter includes snippets from an interview between Dan Voinea and Andrei Badin (Adevarul , December 2006). The “indefatigable” Voinea, as Tom Gallagher has referred to him, continues to be defended by Vladimir Tismaneanu who has expressed support for Voinea’s investigations “from both a juridic and historic viewpoint” (see the entries for 21 September 2009 at http://tismaneanu.wordpress.com), avoiding any mention of the reasons for Voinea’s dismissal from the Military Procuracy, mistakes that Prosecutor General Laura Codruta Kovesi says “one wouldn’t expect even from a beginner” (for more on this and background, see Hall 2008):
Ce îi reproşaţi, totuşi, lui Voinea? Punctual, ce greşeli a făcut în instrumentarea cauzelor?
Sunt foarte multe greşeli, o să menţionez însă doar câteva. Spre exemplu, s-a început urmărirea penală faţă de persoane decedate. Poate îmi explică dumnealui cum poţi să faci cercetări faţă de o persoană decedată! Apoi, s-a început urmărirea penală pentru fapte care nu erau prevăzute în Codul Penal. În plus
, deşi nu a fost desemnat să lucreze, spre exemplu, într-un dosar privind mineriada (repartizat unui alt procuror), domnul procuror Dan Voinea a luat dosarul, a început urmărirea penală, după care l-a restituit procurorului de caz. Vă imaginaţi cum ar fi dacă eu, ca procuror general, aş lua dosarul unui coleg din subordine, aş începe urmărirea penală după care i l-aş înapoia. Cam aşa ceva s-a întâmplat şi aici.
Mai mult, a început urmărirea penală într-o cauză, deşi, potrivit unei decizii a Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie, era incompatibil să mai facă asta. E vorba despre dosarul 74/p/1998 (dosar în care Voinea l-a acuzat pe fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu că, în iunie 1990, a determinat cu intenţie intervenţia în forţă a militarilor împotriva manifestanţilor din Capitală – n.r.).
Apoi au fost situaţii în care s-a început urmărirea penală prin acte scrise de mână, care nu au fost înregistrate în registrul special de începere a urmăririi penale. Aceste documente, spre exemplu, nu prevedeau în ce constau faptele comise de presupuşii învinuiţi, nu conţin datele personale ale acestora. De exemplu, avem rezoluţii de începere a urmăririi penale care-l privesc pe Radu Ion sau pe Gheorghe Dumitru, ori nu ştim cine este Gheorghe Dumitru, nu ştim cine este Radu Ion.
„Parchetul să-şi asume tergiversarea anchetelor”
Credeţi că, în cazul lui Voinea, au fost doar greşeli sau că a fost vorba de intenţie, ştiind că acuzaţii vor scăpa?
Nu cunosc motivele care au stat la baza acestor decizii şi, prin urmare, nu le pot comenta.
Poate fi vorba şi despre complexitatea acestor dosare?
Când ai asemenea dosare în lucru, nu faci astfel de greşeli, de începător. Eşti mult mai atent când ai cauze de o asemenea importanţă pentru societatea românească.
(for the videos, screen captures, and scans of newspaper and weekly articles, you must use the links above)
Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:
The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1]
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.
Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information. [Submitted 19 November 2009; cleared 15 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.
His name was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias.
And in Romania in December 1989 and January 1990, Nicolae Ghircoias was a very busy man.
We know, officially, of Nicolae Ghircoias’ actions in the last days leading up to the fall of the regime of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on 22 December 1989, as a result of what he and others said at a trial later in January 1990. In bureaucratic parlance, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias, was the Director of the Criminalistic Institute of the Militia’s [Police’s] General Inspectorate. In colloquial terms, in December 1989 it appears that this amounted to being something of a “cleaner,” or “fixer,” the kind of guy who could make unpleasant things—such as corpses—go away, without leaving a trace.
After regime forces opened fire on anti-regime protesters in the western city of Timisoara on 17 and 18 December 1989, Colonel Ghircoias was dispatched to recover the corpses of those with gunshot wounds from the city’s morgue. The unautopsied cadavers of 43 demonstrators were stolen from the morgue in the dead of night and then transported to the outskirts of the capital Bucharest by refrigerated truck , where they were cremated.[2] Ghircoias was also in charge of collecting and destroying the hospital records and any other incriminating material that might indicate not just the death, but also the life of those who had perished—the official explanation for the disappearance of these citizens was to be that they had fled the country, thus taking their documents with them. In other words, Colonel Nicolae Ghircoias’ job was primarily, it seems, the destruction of evidence.[3]
COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS
Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged. Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded afterNicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989. At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.
It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990. Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990. According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress. He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients. A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”! The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went. Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.” He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]
[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:
At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned. Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers. Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs. Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well. Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them. At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic. One of the injured responded to him perfectly. All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’ He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains. There were also two terrorists who were not wounded. One arrived at night, under some pretext. Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him. He had on three layers of clothing and several ids. They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]
[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004: From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]
Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:
I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.
To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?
Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution]. For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.
In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire. Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on. They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it. One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.” He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.
I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver. The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation! I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field. In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies. They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]
Romania, December 1989: a Revolution, a Coup d’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution
This December marks twenty years since the implosion of the communist regimeof Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. [10] It is well-known, but bears repeating: Romania not only came late in the wave of communist regime collapse in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact in the fall of 1989 (Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria), it came last—and inevitably that was significant.[11] Despite the more highly personalist (vs. corporate) nature of the Ceausescu regime, the higher level of fear and deprivation that characterized society, and the comparative insulation from the rest of the East European Warsaw Pact states, Romania could not escape the implications of the collapse of the other communist party-states.[12] Despite the differences, there simply were too many institutional and ideological similarities, or as is often most importantly the case, that is how members of both the state and society interpreted matters. “Going last” [in turn, in show] almost inevitably implies that the opportunities for mimicry, for opportunism, for simulation[13] on the one hand and dissimulation[14] on the other, are greater than for the predecessors…and, indeed, one can argue that some of what we saw in Romania in December 1989 reflects this.
Much of the debate about what happened in December 1989 has revolved around how to define those events…and their consequences.[15] [These can be analytically distinct categories and depending on how one defines things, solely by focusing on the events themselves or the consequences, or some combination thereof, will inevitably shape the answer one gets]. The primary fulcrum or axis of the definitional debate has been between whether December 1989 and its aftermath were/have been a revolution or a coup d’etat. But Romanian citizens and foreign observers have long since improvised linguistically to capture the hybrid and unclear nature of the events and their consequences. Perhaps the most neutral, cynical, and fatalistic is the common “evenimentele din decembrie 1989”—the events of December 1989—but it should also be pointed out that the former Securitate and Ceausescu nostalgics have also embraced, incorporated and promoted, such terminology. More innovative are terms such as rivolutie (an apparent invocation of or allusion to the famous Romanian satirist Ion Luca Caragiale’s 1880 play Conu Leonida fata cu reactiunea[16] , where he used the older colloquial spelling revulutie) or lovilutie (a term apparently coined by the humorists at Academia Catavencu, and combining the Romanian for coup d’etat, lovitura de stat, and the Romanian for revolution, revolutie).
The following characterization of what happened in December 1989 comes from an online poster, Florentin, who was stationed at the Targoviste barracks—the exact location where Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu would be summarily tried and executed on 25 December 1989. Although his definitions may be too economically-based for my taste—authoritarianism/dictatorship vs. democracy would be preferable—and the picture he presents may be oversimplified at points, the poster’s characterization shows that sometimes the unadorned straighttalk of the plainspoken citizen can cut to the chase better than many an academic tome:
I did my military service, in Targoviste, in fact in the barracks at which the Ceausescu couple were executed…It appears that a coup d’etat was organized and executed to its final step, the proof being how the President of the R.S.R. (Romanian Socialist Republic) died, but in parallel a revolution took place. Out of this situation has transpired all the confusion. As far as I know this might be a unique historical case, if I am not mistaken. People went into the streets, calling not just for the downfall of the president then, but for the change of the political regime, and that is what we call a revolution. This revolution triumphed, because today we have neither communism, nor even neocommunism with a human face. The European Union would not have accepted a communist state among its ranks. The organizers of the coup d’etat foresaw only the replacement of the dictator and the maintenance of a communist/neocommunist system, in which they did not succeed, although there are those who still hope that it would have succeeded. Some talk about the stealing of the revolution, but the reality is that we live in capitalism, even if what we have experienced in these years has been more an attempt at capitalism, orchestrated by an oligarchy with diverse interests…[17]
This is indeed the great and perhaps tragic irony of what happened in December 1989 in Romania: without the Revolution, the Coup might well have failed,[18] but without the Coup, neither would the Revolution have succeeded. The latter is particularly difficult for the rigidly ideological and politically partisan to accept; yet it is more than merely a talking point and legitimating alibi of the second-rung nomenklatura who seized power (although it is that too). The very atomization of Romanian society[19] that had been fueled and exploited by the Ceausescu regime explained why Romania came last in the wave of Fall 1989, but also why it was and would have been virtually impossible for genuine representatives of society—led by dissidents and protesters—to form an alternative governing body on 22 December whose decisions would have been accepted as sufficiently authoritative to be respected and implemented by the rump party-state bureaucracy, especially the armed forces and security and police structures. The chaos that would have ensued—with likely multiple alternative power centers, including geographically—would have likely led to a far greater death toll and could have enabled those still betting on the return of the Ceausescus to after a time reconquer power or seriously impede the functioning of any new government for an extended period.
The fact that the Revolution enabled the coup plotters to seize power, and that the coup enabled the Revolution to triumph should be identified as yet another version—one particular to the idiosyncracies of the Romanian communist regime—of what Linz and Stepan have identified as the costs or compromises of the transition from authoritarian rule. In Poland, for example, this meant that 65 percent of the Sejm was elected in non-competitive elections, but given co-equal authority with the Senate implying that “a body with nondemocratic origins was given an important role in the drafting of a democratic constitution”; in fact, Poland’s first completely competitive elections to both houses of Parliament occurred only in October 1991, fully two years after the formation of the first Solidarity government in August 1989.[20] In Romania, this meant that second-rung nomenklaturists—a displaced generation of elites eager to finally have their day in the sun—who to a large extent still harbored only Gorbachevian perestroikist views of the changes in the system as being necessary, were able to consolidate power following the elimination of the ruling Ceausescu couple.
The self-description by senior Front officials (Ion Iliescu) and media promoters (such as Darie Novaceanu in Adevarul) of the FSN (National Salvation Front) as the “emanation of the Revolution” does not seem justified. [21] It seems directly tied to two late January 1990 events—the decision of the Front’s leaders to run as a political party in the first post-Ceausescu elections and the contestation from the street of the Front’s leaders’ legitimacy to rule and to run in those elections. It also seems difficult to defend objectively as a legitimate description, since even according to their own accounts, senior Front officials had been in contact with one another and discussed overthrowing the Ceausescus prior to the Revolution, since there had existed no real competing non-Ceausescu regime alternative on 22 December 1989 (an argument they themselves make), and since they had clearly not been elected to office. Moreover, when senior former Front officials, Iliescu among them, point to their winning of two-thirds of the votes for the new parliament in May 1990 and Iliescu’s 85 percent vote for the presidency, the numbers in and of themselves—even beyond the by now pretty obvious and substantiated manipulation, surveillance, and intimidation of opposition parties, candidates, movements and civil society/non-governmental organizations that characterized the election campaign—are a red flag to the tainted and only partly free and fair character of those founding elections.
But if the FSN and Ion Iliescu cannot be accurately and legitimately described as the “emanation of the Revolution,” it also seems reasonable to suggest that the term “stolen revolution”[22] is somewhat unfair. The term “stolen revolution” inevitably suggests a central, identifiable, and sufficiently coherent ideological character of the revolution and the presence of an alternative non-Ceausescu, non-Front leadership that could have ensured the retreat of Ceausescu forces and been able to govern and administer the country in the days and weeks that followed. The absence of the latter was pretty clear on 22 December 1989—Iasi, Timisoara, and Arad among others, had local, authentic nuclei leading local movements (for example, the FDR, Frontul Democrat Roman), but no direct presence in Bucharest—and the so-called Dide and Verdet “22 minute” alternative governments were even more heavily compromised by former high-ranking communist dignitary inclusion than the FSN was (the one with the least, headed by Dumitru Mazilu, was rapidly overtaken and incorporated into the FSN).
As to the question of the ideological character of the revolt against Ceausescu, it is once again instructive to turn to what a direct participant, in this case in the Timisoara protests, has to say about it. Marius Mioc[23], who participated in the defense of Pastor Tokes’ residence and in the street demonstrations that grew out of it, was arrested, interrogated, and beaten from the 16th until his release with other detainees on the 22nd and who has written with longstanding hostility toward former Securitate and party officials, IIiescu, the FSN, and their successors, gives a refreshingly honest account of those demonstrations that is in stark contrast to the often hyperpoliticized, post-facto interpretations of December 1989 prefered by ideologues:
I don’t know if the 1989 revolution was as solidly anticommunist as is the fashion to say today. Among the declarations from the balcony of the Opera in Timisoara were some such as “we don’t want capitalism, we want democratic socialism,” and at the same time the names of some local PCR [communist] dignitaries were shouted. These things shouldn’t be generalized, they could have been tactical declarations, and there existed at the same time the slogans “Down with communism!” and flags with the [communist] emblem cut out, which implicitly signified a break from communism. [But] the Revolution did not have a clear ideological orientation, but rather demanded free elections and the right to free speech.[24]
Romania December 1989 was thus both revolution and coup, but its primary definitive characteristic was that of revolution, as outlined by “Florentin” and Marius Mioc above. To this must be added what is little talked about or acknowledged as such today: the counter-revolution of December 1989. Prior to 22 December 1989, the primary target of this repression was society, peaceful demonstrators—although the Army itself was both perpetrator of this repression but also the target of Securitate forces attempting to ensure their loyalty to the regime and their direct participation and culpabilization in the repression of demonstrators. After 22 December 1989, the primary target of this violence was the Army and civilians who had picked up weapons, rather than citizens at large. It is probably justified to say that in terms of tactics, after 22 December 1989, the actions of Ceausist forces were counter-coup in nature, contingencies prepared in the event of an Army defection and the possibility of foreign intervention in support of such a defection. However, precisely because of what occurred prior to 22 December 1989, the brutal, bloody repression of peaceful demonstrators, and because the success of the coup was necessary for the success of the revolution already underway, it is probably accurate to say that the Ceausescu regime’s actions as a whole constituted a counter-revolution. If indeed the plotters had not been able to effectively seize power after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December 1989 and Ceausescu or his direct acolytes had been able to recapture power, we would be talking of the success not of a counter-coup, but of the counter-revolution.
A key component of the counter-revolution of December 1989 concerns the, as they were christened at the time, so-called “terrorists,” those who were believed then to be fighting in defense of the Ceausescu couple. It is indeed true as Siani-Davies has written that the Revolution is about so much more than “the Front” and “the terrorists.”[25] True enough, but the outstanding and most vexing question about December 1989—one that resulted in 942 killed and 2,251 injured after 22 December 1989—is nevertheless the question of “the terrorists.” Finding out if they existed, who they were, and who they were defending remains the key unclarified question of December 1989 two decades later: that much is inescapable.
“LOST”…DURING INVESTIGATION: WHEN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE IS NOT EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE.[26]
From early in 1990, those who participated in or were directly affected by the December 1989 events have attested to efforts to cover-up what happened. Significantly, and enhancing the credibility of these accusations, those who claim such things come from diverse backgrounds, different cities, and from across the post-Ceausescu political spectrum. Further enhancing their credibility, in many cases, they do not attempt to place these incidents into larger narratives about what happened in December 1989, but merely note it as a fact in relating their own personal experiences.
Let’s take the case of Simion Cherla, a participant in the December 1989 events in Timisoara. Here is how Radu Ciobotea recounted Cherla’s story in May 1991:
Simion Cherlea also arrives, agitated. He received a death threat, wrapped in a newspaper. Next to it, in his mailbox, a bullet cartridge was also found. To suggest to him that that is how he would end up if…
–If I talk. Or if I have a copy of the file that I removed on 22 December 1989 from the office of the head of the county Securitate. There was a map of the 8 Interior Ministry formations from Timisoara and “registry-journal of unique ordered operational activities.” I gave them to Constantin Grecu (since transferred to the reserves), who gave them to Colonel Zeca and General Gheorghe Popescu. These documents were of great use…in the Army’s fight against the terrorists.
–Do you know what the deal is with such formations?…When I looked at the map, my eyes glazed over. Their formations were for entire zones where 10 to 12 nests of gunfire were programmed to shoot at a precise hour and minute! Can you imagine! And I, because I was trying to help in the fight against the terrorists, I turned it over to them! So now I asked for it to be used at the trial. In the registry everything was written: who ordered, who executed the mission, the place, the hour, how long it last, the impact. Great, all these documents are now said to have disappeared. And I am threatened that I too will disappear like them.[27]
The discovery and then disappearances of such maps showing the placement and actions of Interior Ministry units—in particular, the Securitate—was recounted by others in the early 1990s.[28]
Nor, as we saw earlier from Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu’s testimony above, could one count on the military prosecutor’s office. Jean Constantinescu [no apparent relation], who was shot in the CC building on 23 December 1989, stated the following in a declaration he gave just last year (as recounted by the investigative journalist Romulus Cristea):
I had two encounters with representatives from the prosecutor’s office. The first prosecutor visited me at home, around two months after the events, he listened and noted my account, and as a conclusion, informally, he said something to me such as “we already know a good part of the shooters, they can be charged and pay civil damages, you can be part of the lawsuit and request appropriate damages.” After hesitating, I added such a request, at the end of my written declaration, which I signed….
The second prosecutor, who later came to head the institution [the procuracy], invited me after several months to the office near Rosetti Square. At the end of the conversation, he attempted to convince me that we shot amongst ourselves [ie there was no real enemy, no terrorists].[29]
The second prosecutor’s actions, according to Constantinescu’s recounting, are very familiar. Already in mid-January 1990, participants in the gunfights of Brasov were telling the press that important evidence was missing and that the former Securitate were attempting to change the story of December 1989:
Florin Crisbasan: Now the securisti are spreading their version: “You guys shot into one another like a bunch of idiots.”…About 100 people were arrested as terrorists, but now they tell us they no longer have them…documents are missing, they don’t know how or what type: a video cassette that I wished to access, with film from the events, can no longer be found….
Emil Ivascu: If they tell us that “we shot among ourselves,” how the hell do you explain the ammunition with which they [the terrorists] fired? A bullet would rip your foot apart. We saw for ourselves these type of arms. Could just average civilians have been in possession of these?[30]
In May 1991, Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea described in detail for journalist Dan Badea the atypical ammunitions they found in the headquarters of the Securitate’s Vth Directorate (charged with Ceausescu’s personal security) building, including dum-dum bullets and special bullets (apparently vidia bullets). They noted the civilians and soldiers who had witnessed this find, and mentioned that a certain Spiru Zeres had filmed the whole sequence, cassettes that were available for the military procuracy.[31]
Journalist and documentary-maker Maria Petrascu, who with her since deceased husband Marius, had for years investigated the Brasov events, also drew attention to the type of ammunition used in December 1989 when she recalled in 2007 that, “For a long time the Brasov Military Procuracy didn’t do anything, although they had evidence, statements, documents, photos and even the atypical bullets brought by the families of those killed or wounded.”[32] A soldier shot on 23 December 1989 in Buzau recently admitted that his doctors changed their declarations regarding the bullet with which he had been hit—identified by another soldier with whom he was interned as a ‘vidia’ bullet—to standard 7.62 mm ammunition.[33] In fall 2006, the daughter of a priest recalled:
In December ’89, after he arrived from Timisoara, my father stayed with me on Stefan Cel Mare Boulevard [in Bucharest]. We returned to our home, on the corner of Admiral Balescu and Rosenthal. I found the cupboard of the dresser pure and simple riddled with bullets, about 8 to 10 of them. Someone who knew about such things told me they were vidia bullets. They were brought to a commission, but I don’t know what happened to them.[34]
This echoes something that Army Colonel Ion Stoleru was saying back in 1992: that the “terrorists” had “weapons with silencers, with scopes, for shooting at night time (in ‘infrared’), bullets with a ‘vidia’ tip. Really modern weapons,” to which he added, significantly, “The civilian and military commissions haven’t followed through in investigating this…”[35]
And yet, amazingly—despite all these testimonies regarding the existence and use of atypical munitions, or perhaps better put, precisely because of them—as of August 1991, Rasvan Popescu could report that “of the thousands of projectiles shot against the revolutionaries during December 1989, the Prosecutor’s office has entered into the possession of…four bullets. A ridiculous harvest.”[36]
BANKING ON THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE…
If Rasvan Popescu’s account is correct, it is understandable why functionaries of the Ceausescu regime have long banked on an absence of evidence. For example, when asked if other than the standard 7.62 mm caliber weapons belonging to the Army were used in December 1989, Dr. Vladimir Belis, the head of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (IML) at the time, claims he doesn’t know and can’t say, because he claims no autopsies were ever performed—leading journalists to conclude that “therefore the tales of terrorists who shot with ‘dum-dum’ bullets, ‘bullets with vidia tips’ or bullets of large caliber, atypical for Romanian military units, will remain just stories that can neither be confirmed nor denied.”[37]
Former Securitate officer-turned journalist, novelist, and celebrity, Pavel Corut, has written alternatively derisively and sarcastically—well-nigh tauntingly—about the existence of such atypical ammunition and its use in December 1989:
“…Later I read fantastical and pathetic accounts according to which this [Army] officer died by being ‘hit by vidia and explosive [dum-dum] bullets.’ It isn’t the only case of a solider killed accidentally in warfare…”[38]
“Now we know that all the information…was false: there did not exist a special guard unit that pledged an oath of (legionary-like) fealty to the dictator, there did not exist snipers with infrared sighting systems, no one shot vidia bullets…”[39]
“Vidia bullets don’t exist anywhere in the world. And yet even the Army believed that the ‘Securitate-terrorists’ used vidia bullets….All this information was designed to create [the impression of] terrorists. To show the people and the whole world fanatical terrorists.”[40]
Last, but hardly least, military prosecutors with roots in the Ceausescu era, have assimilated or mirror such arguments. General Dan Voinea who headed the investigations from 1997-2001 and 2004-2008 said as much:
Romulus Cristea (journalist): “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims? The press of the time was filled with such claims…”
Dan Voinea: There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets. During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently.[41][42] (Emphasis added)
The wonderful legalistic (alibi-bestowing) logic for Voinea and his colleagues then goes something like this: there exist victims requesting damages for injuries, loss of life, livelihood or property sustained during the violence of December 1989, their loss was real and deserves to be compensated by the Romanian state; but those initially considered guilty of causing much of this injury, loss of life, and damage and taken into custody in December 1989—the”terrorist” suspects—were released in January 1990, and so juridically there do not exist defendants; nor does there appear to still exist in the hands of the military procuracy much of the material evidence presented in 1990-1991—maps, videos, etc.—and, apparently, only four bullets; and no autopsies were officially performed on those shot in December 1989. So in essence, the only things left are the crimes themselves and the testimonies of those interviewed over the past two decades: no autopsy records, little material evidence, and the original suspects have gone missing…Conclusion: no atypical munitions existed, were used, or maimed or killed anybody, and there were no terrorists, everyone shot into everyone else in the chaos of the moment—or in other words, the exact argument which as we have seen has been with us since Florin Crisbasan and Emil Ivascu of Brasov related the former Securitate’s “line of reasoning” in mid-January 1990.
VIDEO KILLED THE DICTATOR…AND EXPLODES THE LIES OF HIS SUBORDINATES:
Four Videos in the Battle against Amnesia and Denial
For years, former Securitate and Militia personnel, and senior former communist party officials—in other words those most vested in the former Ceausescu regime and its legacy—have banked on the fact that the material evidence that could contradict their claims was absent, in fact did not and had never not existed. As a result of the odd twists, turns, and vagaries of post-Ceausescu politics—combining rigidly partisan political narratives with a remarkable permeability to the arguments and information of “the enemy of my enemy”—it is also the case, ironically, that many on the liberal, anti-communist side of political spectrum, have become vested in this assumption too. [43]
Before the advent in the mid and late 2000s of user-generated content video sites, much of what had been seen of the Revolution came from the studios and cameras of Romanian Television or foreign networks. The Internet and video sites such as Youtube, Daily Motion, and others have broken down the centralized control of other often individually-recorded images, ultimately challenging the sort of control over information exercised by a state agency such as, in this case, the military procuracy.
Video No. 1: Bucharest, Securitate Archives in the Central Committee Building, Dum-Dum and Vidia Bullets
In the first video (posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rojm_revolutia-romana-22-dec-1989-cd5_shortfilms) , the sequence from roughly 1:20 to 2:50 shows civilians in the bowels of the CC building in Bucharest—the focal point of the December events, from where Nicolae Ceausescu gave his famous “final speech” on 21 December and from which Front leaders addressed crowds on 22 December and after—showing the munitions found in the Archives of the PCR’s CC. The “dum-dum” bullets of “the elite shooters/commandos”—he mentions they are of West German manufacture—are identified for the camera, as are smaller, special bullets—which appear, based on other video, photos, and accounts, to be “vidia” bullets. [Following the two screen captures below is an article from 31 December 1989, “Cu ce trag teroristii?” (With What are the Terrorists Shooting), in which the journalist discusses having a West German-manufactured (RWS firm) “dum-dum” bullet in his hand, as well as the “unfortunately now-famous small bullets of 5,62 mm caliber” (vidia bullets).]
DUM-DUM MUNITIONS OF THE SECURITATE’S ELITE SNIPERS (above); VIDIA BULLETS (below)
Video No. 2: Bucharest, Piata Aviatorilor, near TVR (Romanian state Television) headquarters, Vidia Bullets
In the second video (posted by Alexandru2006 at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rob0_revolutia-romana-22-dec1989-cd4_shortfilms), a civilian shows how the bullets shot by “the enemy”—i.e. “the terrorists”—are different than the standard ammunition (7.62 mm) he and the others are using. Based on other video, photos, and accounts, these appear to be “vidia” bullets—there are many testimonies from those who fought in the area near the TV station regarding these bullets. [Below the screen capture: a photo posted on the Internet by Alexandru Stepanian, that he claims is a photo of one of these vidia bullets]
Imaginea a glontului vidia de 5,6 mm, tras la poarta din Pangrati a sediului TVR, in 22-23 decembrie 1989, de tineri vlajgani, in blugi, prinsi, dar eliberati de tov. General Tudor, activat de tov. Ion Iliescu.
Video No. 3: Bucharest, Soft-nosed (“Dum-Dum”) Bullets Found in the Headquarters of the Securitate’s V-th Directorate
The third video was found by the blogger who goes by the handle “Claude 2.0” (Claude 2.0 Dupa 19 ani – Gloante dum-dum ? postare din 14 aprilie 2009). It shows people going through material including bullets found in the headquarters building of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate (that charged with the personal protection of the Ceausescus). An article from March 1990 appended below has a senior arms specialist discussing his being summoned during these days to the zone around the CC building (where the Vth Directorate building was located), where he verified that “soft-nosed” bullets (known colloquially as “dum-dum”) were discovered (he then goes into detail about their properties). Discussion in the videotape about the box in which the bullets were discovered, as well as the comments of the arms specialist, suggest these were Kynoch-Magnum “soft-nosed” bullets—described in the article as “cartridges for [hunting] elephants.”
Video No. 4: Brasov, Morgue, Atypical (“Vidia”) Bullets
Video 4 comes from part 7 of Maria Petrascu’s 2005 documentary film “Revolutionary Brasov” (Brasovul Revolutionar PARTEA 7 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9z4wLuma0Q). It shows both the small, atypical, [“vidia”] bullets with which civilians and soldiers were killed, as well as an unidentified doctor speaking on 23 January 1990 in which he states that four of six soldiers he had looked at had been shot with great precision in the forehead with such bullets (film is also shown of their gruesome injuries). Maria Petrascu has described elsewhere what she and her husband found on 29-30 December 1989 at the County Morgue:
Even the halls were filled with the dead, there were over 100. They didn’t have any place to put them all, we walked through pools of blood, we saw the cadavers of children, young people, adults, shot in the forehead, in the heart, in the feet and abdomen with brains and intestines having exploded, nightmarish scenes that I shall never forget. It was then that we decided we wouldn’t rest until we discovered who fired, because we had begun to understand that many of those killed had been shot by guns with infrared scopes, by some professionals.[44]
As opposed to the aforementioned Vladimir Belis, Pavel Corut, and Dan Voinea, all of whom who have strenuously and repeatedly denied the existence and use in December 1989 of atypical munitions of dum-dum bullets and vidia bullets, there exist those who have told us of the existence and use of these in December 1989.[46] They are essentially, for lack of a better term, former Securitate whistleblowers, who have admitted the Securitate’s role in providing the “terrorists” who caused so much destruction, mayhem, and loss of life in those days.
For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).
Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989. What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding [dum-dum] bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridgeswhich upon hitting their targets caused new explosions” [emphasis added]—in other words, exploding or dum-dum bullets.[47]
The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:
I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89. In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched. Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition. In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances. I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets. In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox. We had been drugged. We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us. Don’t publish my name. I fear for me and my parents. When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’ The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize. I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’.[48] [emphases added]
As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention: the former Securitate. That is not accidental.[49]
Those discussed as alternatively “commandos” or “professionals” appear to have been members of the so-called USLAC—Special Unit for Anti-terrorist and Commando Warfare. In 1991, Dan Badea summarized former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu’s description of the USLAC as follows:
THE USLAC COMMANDOS:
Those who had and have knowledge about the existence and activities of the shock troops subordinated directly to Ceausescu remained quiet and continue to do so out of fear or out of calculation. Much has been said about individuals in black jumpsuits, with tattoos on their left hand and chest, mercenary fanatics who acted at night, killing with precision and withdrawing when they were encircled to the underground tunnels of Bucharest. Much was said, then nobody said anything, as if nothing had ever happened.
Traversing the [Securitate’s] Fifth Directorate and the USLA, the USLAC commandos were made up of individuals who ‘worked’ undercover at different posts. Many were foreign students, doctoral students and thugs committed with heart and soul to the dictator. Many were Arabs who knew with precision the nooks and crannies of Bucharest, Brasov and other towns in Romania. For training these had at their disposal several underground centers of instruction: one was in an area near Brasov, while another—it appears—was right under the former headquarters of the PCR CC [communist party central committee building], a shooting range that was—discovered by accident by several revolutionaries during the events of December .”[50]
We also know from Romanescu and a second source that USLA commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu (Bula Moise) addressed his troops as follows:
“On 25 December at around 8 pm, after the execution of the dictators, Colonel Ardeleanu gathered the unit’s members into an improvised room and said to them:
‘The Dictatorship has fallen! The Unit’s members are in the service of the people. The Romanian Communist Party [PCR] is not disbanding! It is necessary for us to regroup in the democratic circles of the PCR—the inheritor of the noble ideas of the people of which we are a part!…Corpses were found, individuals with USLAC (Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare) identity cards and identifications with the 0620 stamp of the USLA, identity cards that they had no right to be in possession of when they were found…’ He instructed that the identity cards [of members of the unit] had to be turned in within 24 hours, at which time all of them would receive new ones with Defense Ministry markings.” [51][52]
In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun. In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed. By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.[53]
THE REVOLUTION WAS TELEVISED. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION WAS VIDEOTAPED.
Poet, essayist, and NPR contributor Andrei Codrescu memorably turned Gil Scott Heron’s famous social commentary—“The Revolution Will Not Be Televised”—on its head, saying that contrary to what Heron’s song had led them to expect …in Romania, the revolution was televised! But if you read on or listen to Codrescu closely, it would be more accurate to say that he, like many Romanians and Romanianists, believes that what happened in December 1989 was a coup d’etat—he talks about the“staging of the revolution” and how the coup plotters “seized the means of projection”—and thus what he really seems to intend to say is that “the coup d’etat was televised.”[54]
On the other hand, Vladimir Tismaneanu is quoted as once having memorably said: ”The VCR killed Ceausescu even before his execution…It was the most important factor in terms of creating a mass consciousness.”[55] It is an important and insightful observation about the power of technology and the challenges it poses to centralized control, especially of the totalitarian state.
Ceausescu’s image and control was damaged by the video-player—to say nothing of, by live television, with the infamous “mirror-shattering” moment of 21 December 1989. However, as this paper has demonstrated, it is the video-recorder that has undone his final and unfortunately (ever)lasting “Christmas gift” to his Romanian subjects, and that has undone the lies of those—including certain past military prosecutors with roots in the communist era—bent on covering this up.
[1]For some of my previous publications on this topic, see Richard Andrew Hall:
Richard Andrew Hall, “Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989,” Europe-Asia Studies 2000, no. 6 (September 2000).
Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity: The ‘Staged-War’ Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies vol 13, no. 3 (Fall 1999) (University of California Berkeley Press).
[2] For a good discussion of this in English, which explains how cremation practices were at odds with Romanian burial traditions, see the article entitled “The Red Mask of Death: The Evil Politics of Cremation in Romania 1989,” in the journal Mortality, no. 15 (1).
[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.
[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly: The terrorists did not exist. Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709). For a discussion, see Hall 2008.
[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.
[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.
[10]The hyperbolic and popular academic designation of the Ceausescu regime as Stalinist is not particularly helpful. Totalitarian yes, Stalinist no. Yes, Nicolae Ceausescu had a Stalinist-like personality cult, and yes he admired Stalin and his economic model, as he told interviewers as late as 1988, and we have been told ad nauseum since. But this was also a strange regime, which as I have written elsewhere was almost characterized by a policy of “no public statues [of Ceausescu] and no (or at least as few as possible) public martyrs [inside or even outside the party]”—the first at odds with the ubiquity of Nicoale and Elena Ceausescus’ media presence, the second characterized by the “rotation of cadres” policy whereby senior party officials could never build a fiefdom and were sometimes banished to the provinces, but almost were never eliminated physically, and by Ceausescus’ general reluctance to “spoil” his carefully created “image” abroad by openly eliminating high-profile dissidents (one of the reasons Pastor Tokes was harassed and intimidated, but still alive in December 1989) (see Richard Andrew Hall 2006, “Images of Hungarians and Romanians in Modern American Media and Popular Culture,” at http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/huroimages060207tk6.html). Ken Jowitt has characterized the organizational corruption and political routinization of the communist party as moving from the Stalinist era—whereby even being a high-level party official did not eliminate the fear or reality of imprisonment and death—to what he terms Khrushchev’s de facto maxim of “don’t kill the cadre” to Brezhnev’s of essentially “don’t fire the cadre” (see Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, especially pp. 233-234, and chapter 4 “Neotraditionalism,” p. 142). The very fact that someone like Ion Iliescu could be around to seize power in December 1989 is fundamentally at odds with a Stalinist system: being “purged” meant that he fulfilled secondary roles in secondary places, Iasi, Timisoara, the Water Works, a Technical Editing House, but “purged” did not threaten and put an end to his existence, as it did for a Kirov, Bukharin, and sadly a cast of millions of poor public souls caught up in the ideological maelstorm. Charles King wrote in 2007 that “the Ceausescu era was the continuation of Stalinism by other means, substituting the insinuation of terror for its cruder variants and combining calculated cooptation with vicious attacks on any social actors who might represent a potential threat to the state” (Charles King, “Remembering Romanian Communism,” Slavic Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (Winter 2007), p. 720). But at a certain point, a sufficient difference in quantity and quality—in this case, of life, fear, imprisonment, and death—translates into a difference of regime-type, and we are left with unhelpful hyperbole. The level of fear to one’s personal existence in Ceausescu’s Romania—both inside and outside the party-state—simply was not credibly comparable to Stalin’s Soviet Union, or for that matter, even Dej’s Romania of the 1950s. In the end, Ceausescu’s Romania was “Stalinist in form [personality cult, emphasis on heavy industry], but Brezhnevian in content [“don’t fire the cadres”…merely rotate them…privileges, not prison sentences for the nomenklatura].”
[11] For a recent discussion of the “diffusion” or “demonstration” effect and regime change, see, for example, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,”
Communist and Postcommunist Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (September 2006), pp. 283304.
[13]For discussion of the term see Michael Shafir, Romania: Politics,Economics, and Society (Boulder,1985).
[14]For discussion of the term see Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder (University of California Berkely Press, 1992).
[15] For earlier discussions of this topic from a theoretical perspective , see, for example, Peter Siani-Davies, “Romanian Revolution of Coup d’etat?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (December 1996), pp. 453-465; Stephen D. Roper, “The Romanian Revolution from a Theoretical Perspective,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 401-410; and Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 1-52 ff, but especially (chapter 7) pp. 267-286. For a recent effort to deal with this question more broadly, see Timothy Garton Ash, “Velvet Revolution: The Prospects, The New York Review of Books,Volume 56, Number 19 (December 3, 2009) at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23437. For a good comparison and analysis of public opinion polling performed in 2009 and 1999 about classifying what happened in December 1989, see Catalin Augustin Stoica in http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-special/a-fost-revolutie-sau-lovitura-de-stat-527645.html.
[18]This is a point that was first made credibly by Michael Shafir in Michael Shafir, “Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past,” Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 1, no. 41 (12 October 1990). It becomes all the clearer, however, when we consider that the XIV PCR Congress from 20-24 November 1989 went off without the slightest attempt at dissidence within the congress hall—a potential opportunity thereby missed—and that the plotters failed to act during what would have seemed like the golden moment to put an end to the “Golden Era,” the almost 48 hours that Nicolae Ceausescu was out of the country in Iran between 18 and 20 December 1989, after regime forces had already been placed in the position of confronting peaceful demonstrators and after they opened fire in Timisoara. In other words, an anti-regime revolt was underway, and had the coup been so minutely prepared as critics allege, this would have been the perfect time to seize power, cut off the further anti-system evolution of protests, exile Ceausescu from the country, and cloak themselves in the legitimacy of a popular revolt. What is significant is that the plotters did not act at this moment. It took the almost complete collapse of state authority on the morning of 22 December 1989 for them to enter into action. This is also why characterizations of the Front as the ‘counterstrike of the party-state bureaucracy’ or the like is only so much partisan rubbish, since far from being premised as something in the event of a popular revolt or as a way to counter an uprising, the plotters had assumed—erroneously as it turned out—that Romanian society would not rise up against the dictator, and thus that only they could or had to act. It is true, however, that once having consolidated power, the plotters did try to slow, redirect, and even stifle the forward momentum of the revolution, and that the revolutionary push from below after December 1989 pushed them into reforms and measures opening politics and economics to competition that they probably would not have initiated on their own.
[19] I remain impressed here by something Linz and Stepan highlighted in 1996: according to a Radio Free Europe study, as of June 1989 Bulgaria had thirteen independent organizations, all of which had leaders whose names were publicly known, whereas in Romania there were only two independent organizations with bases inside the country, neither of which had publicly known leaders (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 352). For more discussion of this and related issues, see Hall 2000.
[20] The presidency was also an unelected communist holdover position until fall 1990. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, pp. 267-274.
[21] For a discussion of the roots and origins of these terms, see Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The 1989 Revolution and Romania’s Future,” Problems of Communism, vol. XL no. 1-2 (January-April 1991), p. 52, especially footnote no. 38.
[22] Stephen Kotkin associates the concept, accurately if incompletely, with Tom Gallagher and Vladimir Tismaneanu in Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (Modern Library Chronicles, 2009), pp. 147-148 n. 1. Similar concepts have taken other names, such as “operetta war” (proposed but not necessarily accepted) by Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (Praeger, 1991) or “staging of [the] revolution” [advocated] by Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag (Morrow and Company, 1991). Dumitru Mazilu’s 1991 book in Romanian was entitled precisely “The Stolen Revolution” [Revolutia Furata]. Charles King stated in 2007 that the CPADCR Report “repeats the common view (at least among western academics) of the revolution as being hijacked,” a term essentially equating to “stolen revolution,” but as Tismaneanu headed the commission and large sections of the Report’s chapter on December 1989 use previous writings by him (albeit without citing where they came from), it is hard to somehow treat the Report’s findings as independent of Tismaneanu’s identical view (for an earlier discussion of all this, see Hall 2008)
[25]Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 286.
[26] The origin of this phrase is apparently ascribed to the astronomer and scientist Carl Sagan, and only later became a favorite of former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
[27] Radu Ciobotea, “Spitalul groazei nu are amintiri,” Flacara, nr. 19 (8 mai 1991), p. 4.
[28] See the sources listed in endnote 59, Hall 2006.
[35] Army Colonel Ion Stoleru with Mihai Galatanu, “Din Celebra Galerie a Teroristilor,” Expres, no. 151 (22-28 December 1992), p. 4, and “Am vazut trei morti suspecti cu fata intoarsa spre caldarim,” Flacara, no. 29 (22 July 1992), p. 7. Cited in Hall, 2008.
[36] Rasvan Popescu, “Patru gloante dintr-o tragedie,” Expres, nr. 32 (81) 13-19 August 1991, p. 10 (?).
[38] Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 66 (43) 30 October-5 November 1991, p. 12. Paul Cernescu is Pavel Corut’s acknowledged alias. During his journalistic career at Ion Cristoiu’s Expres Magazin, he began by writing under this pseudonym.
[39] Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 65 (42) 23-29 October 1991, p. 12.
[40] Pavel Corut, Fulgerul Albastru (Bucuresti: Editura Miracol, 1993), p. 177. For background in English on Corut, see Michael Shafir, “Best Selling Spy Novels Seek To Rehabilitate Romanian ‘Securitate,’” in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, no. 45, pp. 14-18.
“La cele de mai sus va trebui să adăugăm fabulaţiile cu privire la celebrele “gloanţe-widia”. Prin lansarea acestei aberaţii, cei mai de seamă reprezentanţi ai Armatei s-au compromis lamentabil. Ceea ce prezentau în emisiuni tv ori în paginile unor ziare ca fiind teribilele instrumente ale morţii, nu erau nimic altceva decât miezurile din oţel care intrau în alcătuirea internă a proiectilului cal. 7,62 mm-scurt destinat armelor tip AKM. Tot aşa aveau să fie făcute speculaţii asupra folosirii muniţiei explozive (de tip dum-dum), de către persoane care erau fie străine de efectele povocate asupra corpului uman de proiectile cu diverse energii cinetice (la momentul străpungerii), ori de fragmente din proiectile dezmembrate la un anterior impact cu un corp dur, fie de cei angajaţi într-o reală acţiune de dezinformare….”
[42] According to Sorin Iliesiu, the filmmaker who claims to have edited the chapter on December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Raport Final, the “spirit of Voinea’s findings can be found in the Chapter.” Indeed, the chapter includes snippets from an interview between Dan Voinea and Andrei Badin (Adevarul , December 2006). The “indefatigable” Voinea, as Tom Gallagher has referred to him, continues to be defended by Vladimir Tismaneanu who has expressed support for Voinea’s investigations “from both a juridic and historic viewpoint” (see the entries for 21 September 2009 at http://tismaneanu.wordpress.com), avoiding any mention of the reasons for Voinea’s dismissal from the Military Procuracy, mistakes that Prosecutor General Laura Codruta Kovesi says “one wouldn’t expect even from a beginner” (for more on this and background, see Hall 2008):
Ce îi reproşaţi, totuşi, lui Voinea? Punctual, ce greşeli a făcut în instrumentarea cauzelor?
Sunt foarte multe greşeli, o să menţionez însă doar câteva. Spre exemplu, s-a început urmărirea penală faţă de persoane decedate. Poate îmi explică dumnealui cum poţi să faci cercetări faţă de o persoană decedată! Apoi, s-a început urmărirea penală pentru fapte care nu erau prevăzute în Codul Penal. În plus
, deşi nu a fost desemnat să lucreze, spre exemplu, într-un dosar privind mineriada (repartizat unui alt procuror), domnul procuror Dan Voinea a luat dosarul, a început urmărirea penală, după care l-a restituit procurorului de caz. Vă imaginaţi cum ar fi dacă eu, ca procuror general, aş lua dosarul unui coleg din subordine, aş începe urmărirea penală după care i l-aş înapoia. Cam aşa ceva s-a întâmplat şi aici.
Mai mult, a început urmărirea penală într-o cauză, deşi, potrivit unei decizii a Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie, era incompatibil să mai facă asta. E vorba despre dosarul 74/p/1998 (dosar în care Voinea l-a acuzat pe fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu că, în iunie 1990, a determinat cu intenţie intervenţia în forţă a militarilor împotriva manifestanţilor din Capitală – n.r.).
Apoi au fost situaţii în care s-a început urmărirea penală prin acte scrise de mână, care nu au fost înregistrate în registrul special de începere a urmăririi penale. Aceste documente, spre exemplu, nu prevedeau în ce constau faptele comise de presupuşii învinuiţi, nu conţin datele personale ale acestora. De exemplu, avem rezoluţii de începere a urmăririi penale care-l privesc pe Radu Ion sau pe Gheorghe Dumitru, ori nu ştim cine este Gheorghe Dumitru, nu ştim cine este Radu Ion.
„Parchetul să-şi asume tergiversarea anchetelor”
Credeţi că, în cazul lui Voinea, au fost doar greşeli sau că a fost vorba de intenţie, ştiind că acuzaţii vor scăpa?
Nu cunosc motivele care au stat la baza acestor decizii şi, prin urmare, nu le pot comenta.
Poate fi vorba şi despre complexitatea acestor dosare?
Când ai asemenea dosare în lucru, nu faci astfel de greşeli, de începător. Eşti mult mai atent când ai cauze de o asemenea importanţă pentru societatea românească.
[45] This section borrows heavily from Hall 2008 and Hall 2006.
[46] In addition to these videos, I have thus far accumulated 45 mentions/claims of use of dum-dum and/or vidia bullets in December 1989. These include the testimonies of doctors who treated the wounded, but also military officers—not just recruits—who are familiar with ballistics. Separately, I also have accumulated 36 mentions/claims of people who were either killed or wounded by such atypical munitions during the events. Significantly, these include people killed or wounded prior to 22 December 1989 as well as after, and they are from multiple cities and a variety of locations for both periods—suggesting not accident, but a well-executed plan by the repressive forces of the Ceausescu regime, the Securitate and their foreign mercenary allies. See Hall 2008 for some of these.
[47] Puspoki F., “Piramida Umbrelor (III),” Orizont (Timisoara), no. 11 (16 March 1990) p.4, and Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (Timisoara: Editura de Vest, 1991), p. 61.
[48] “Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din decembrie ’89,” Romania Libera, 28 December 1994, p.3.
[50] Captain Marian Romanescu, with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres (2-8 July 1991), pp. 8-9.
[51] Captain Marian Romanescu, with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres (2-8 July 1991), pp. 8-9.
[52] What evidence do we have that the “USLAC”—a reference attributed to Ardeleanu, discussed by Romanescu, and alluded to by Vasilevici (“commandos,” he specified the involvement of Arabs in his book) and the anonymous recruit (the “professionals in black camouflage”)—in fact existed? To me, the most convincing evidence comes from the comments of Dr. Sergiu Tanasescu, the medical trainer of the Rapid Bucharest soccer team, who was directly involved in the fighting at the Central Committee building. One has to realize that until his comments in March 1990, the very acronym “USLAC” and its extension does not appear to have appeared in the Romanian media—and has very rarely appeared since. Here is what he said:
Ion K. Ion (reporter at the weekly Cuvintul): The idea that there were foreign terrorists has been circulating in the press.
Sergiu Tanasescu (trainer for the Bucharest Rapid soccer club): I ask that you be so kind as to not ask me about the problem because it is a historical issue. Are we in agreement?
I.I.: O.K.
Tanasescu: I caught a terrorist myself, with my own hands. He was 26 years old and had two ID cards, one of a student in the fourth year of Law School, and another one of Directorate V-a U.S.L.A.C. Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare [emphasis added]. He was drugged. I found on him a type of chocolate, “Pasuma” and “Gripha” brands. It was an extraordinarily powerful drug that gave a state of euphoria encouraging aggression and destruction, and an ability to go without sleep for ten days. He had a supersophisticated weapon, with nightsights [i.e. lunetisti], with a system for long-distance sound…
Ion K. Ion: What happened to those terrorists who were caught?
S.T.: We surrendered them to organs of the military prosecutor. We caught many in the first days, their identity being confirmed by many, by Colonel Octavian Nae [Dir. V-a], Constantin Dinescu (Mircea’s uncle), [Army Chief of Staff, General] Guse, but especially by [Securitate Director] Vlad who shouted at those caught why they didn’t listen to his order to surrender, they would pretend to be innocent, but the gun barrels of their weapons were still warm from their exploits. After they would undergo this summary interrogation, most of them were released.
I.I.: Why?
S.T.: Because that’s what Vlad ordered. On 22 December we caught a Securitate major who was disarmed and let go, only to capture him again the next day, when we took his weapon and ammo and again Vlad vouched for him, only to capture him on the third day yet again. We got annoyed and then arrested all of them, including Vlad and Colonel Nae, especially after a girl of ours on the first basement floor where the heating system is located found him transmitting I don’t know what on a walkie-talkie.
I.I.: When and how were the bunkers discovered?
S.T.: Pretty late in the game, in any case only after 24 December. Some by accident, most thanks to two individuals [with a dog].
Sergiu Tanasescu, interview by Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera roz!” Cuvintul, no. 8-9, 28 March 1990, 15. From Hall, 2006.
[53] For some of the discussion of how the problem was made to “go away,” see Hall 2006 and the section “Foreign Involvement.”
[54] Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag (Morrow and Company, 1991). For a discussion of this Codrescu’s sources and arguments, including his allegations of a Yalta-Malta conspiracy, see Hall 2005.
We also know from Romanescu and a second source that USLA commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu (Bula Moise) addressed his troops as follows:
S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.
Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.
Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…
“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”
BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.
Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.
In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:
–armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:
–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;
–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;
–statii de emisie-receptie;
–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;
–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;
–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;
–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;
–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;
–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;
–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.
–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.
“S-AU GASIT LAZI INTREGI, CONTININD DE LA GLOANTE SPECIALE, PINA LA GLOANTE DE VINATOARE”
Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):
“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:
–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;
–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;
–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;
–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;
–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);
–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;
–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;
–codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;
–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;
–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;
–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;
–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;
–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;
–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:
–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….
Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.
Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.
[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]
(PERHAPS) ONLY IN ROMANIA!: Twenty Years Later Romanianists and Romanians Continue to Deny the Existence of Atypical Munitions in December 1989…Even Though Clear Video Evidence Exists to Confirm Their Presence!
DUM-DUM MUNITIONS OF THE SECURITATE’S ELITE SNIPERS (above); VIDIA BULLETS (below)
Holland & Holland (London) magnum bullets found in Securitate V-a building
VIDIA bullets (Bucuresti, zona TVR) below– individual demonstrates how much smaller they are than Army’s standard 7,62 mm munitions
Penny Marshall, ITN correspondent: “This is one of the thousands of bullets that’s been handed in or found on the streets here in Timisoara.
To the Army it’s confirmation that they’ve been dealing with a specially-trained force…because it’s the type of bullet they’ve never seen before.”
Soldier speaking to Ms. Marshall: “these are bullets…”
It is significant. Vaeni, in a confused intervention, shows a bullet which he says he was given by a soldier on a tank which he and other civilians rode out from the center…one can only imagine that since the soldier gave him the bullet as evidence that as Vaeni says “others shot,” that this was not in the Army’s arsenal (otherwise it does not make a lot of sense). So it is important to note, the whole discussion of the bullets used by non-Army forces (Securitate and Militia) began before the “terrorists” ever opened fire and in fact was specifically in discussion to bullets with which demonstrators had been shot the night before in Piata Universitatii (University Square).
Needless to say, the producer of this film (Sange pe Catifea, Cornel Mihalache) is unaware of the significance of this brief scene and doesn’t draw attention to it.
from TVR film “Sange pe catifea” (6b) between 10:00 and 10:30
Some excerpts: P.C.: Ati dat o declaratie? Po. I. : Da P.C.: O mentineti? Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.: “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da? V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste! “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)
Po. I.: …Da [am fost ranit]. Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica. M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap. Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana. La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu. Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica: “Luati-l si duceti-l la arest.” Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde. Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.” Asta tin minte precis. Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)
Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,
comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM
Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive. Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.
Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoart–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.
Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar. Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.
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Dr. Manuel Burzaco from “Doctors without Borders” was part of a team of doctors from that group who visited hospitals in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Brasov, Buzau and Braila in late December 1989 and early January 1990. This report from the Madrid daily El Pais touches upon the women and children gravely injured by the exploding “dum dum bullets used by the Securitate.”
Radu Anton Roman, “Batalia pentru Bucuresti,” Romania Literara, anul 23, nr. 3, 18 ianuarie 1990, pp. 14-15.
“Aveau un armament foarte divers. Gloante 5, 6, N.A.T.O. lungi, cu cap de otel de foarte mare viteza si forta de penetratie ce provoaca dezastre anatomice. Cartuse explozive Dum-Dum care n-au fost folosite impotriva oamenilor decit de fascisti in 1941 la Odessa. Dar si ei au renuntat, cind rusii le-au raspuns cu acelasi calibru. Lunete cu infrarosii, amortizor de zgomot si obturator de flacara la gura tevii.”
“In biroul domnului ministru al Apararii Nationale, generalul Victor Stanculescu, am avut ocazia sa vad cinci gloante extrase din corpul unor victime ale revolutiei. ‘Armata romana nu are asemenea gloante in dotare’ mi-a spus domnia sa.”
“Am intrebat cu o naivitate din care eu insumi nu puteam sa inteleg decit doua lucruri: ori a tras securitatea, ori a tras populatia. ‘Inseamna ca a fost pus in aplicare planul ‘Z/Z’?’ Domnul general a raspuns: ‘Nu am auzit niciodata de acest plan ‘Z/Z’.’
(To my pleasant surprise, I discovered the AFP (Agence France Presse) Archive online. I finally dug into my pocket and purchased for approximately 3 euros an article the following articles.)
Anatomy of a Cover-up (or Constanta, we have a problem…): In the waning days of December 1989 following the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu on Christmas Day, several high-ranking officials from Romania’s military and commercial navy stationed in and around Constanta recounted to foreign reporters details of what had happened off the Black Sea Coast during the previous week and a half…That they spoke out of turn and were entirely too honest could be surmised by the effort of Bucharest–and those directly charged with the overall governance and defense of the country–to deny the revelations out of Constanta. It was the beginning of the cover-up of the Counter-Revolution of December 1989 and it was done precisely because of the involvement of foreign mercenaries in fighting side by side with elements of the Securitate who opposed the ouster of Nicolae Ceausescu. (So, indeed, the cover-up was initiated by Romania’s new civil and military leaders to avoid international ramifications (the ultimate state function, regardless of regime, in a world of nation-states)…it would be continued by others.)
One wonders what would have happened had this series of reports been laid out in sequence and analyzed as a sequence. There seems to have been more coverage of them (abroad) in the Budapest (see below), rather than Bucharest, press. One of the few references in the literature on December 1989 is on page 66 of Nestor Ratesh’s Romania: The Entangled Revolution (1991), where Ratesh notes a (31 December 1989) Agence France Presse dispatch citing the office of naval commander Constantin Iordache on Soviet and Bulgarian information that helicopters were being launched by suspicious ships approximately 60 miles off the coast, as well as a later denial by other Romanian authorities of the existence of these helicopters. As one can see below, the five AFP reports on the subject, from 30 and 31 December 1989, and 2 and 3 January 1990, are far more detailed, diverse, and damning than Ratesh’s allusion would suggest.
The Lushev quote cited above comes from Jean Paul Mari, “Le Coup d’Etat qui n’a jamais eu lieu,” Nouvel Observateur, 17-23 mai 1990.
Note: Not everything at this point had “disappeared”: General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).
Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably: The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.
Neither the terrorists (who didn’t exist) nor the secret underground tunnels (which the non-existent terrorists did not use), nor the radio-electronic war conducted against the Romanian Army (which also officially did not exist) ended with the execution of Nicolae Ceausescu and Elena Ceausescu on 25 December 1989…as the following make clear: the remnants of the failed Ceausist counterrevolution continued well into the third week of January 1990–something long since forgotten…
On Thursday morning [18 January 1990], for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising. In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving. This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television. [NYT 1/22/1990]
d. Stire de senzatie
Autoritatile iugoslave au arestat ieri 63 de teroristi, care au participat la masacrele de la Timisoara, Sibiu si
Bucuresti. Cand vor fi predati inapoi, vom releva detalii semnificative.
(publicat in ziarul Renasterea banateana, Timisoara, 07.01.1990,pe prima pagina, fara titlu si nesemnat, dar incadrat in chenar)
N.R. La vremea respectiva colonelul Nicolae Predonescu, reprezentant al conducerii Garnizoanei militare Timisoara la Consiliul judetean FSN Timis si totodata membru al respectivului Consiliu, a informat, inclusiv pe presedintele Consiliului judetean FSN Timis, Lorin Ioan Fortuna, ca va pleca, impreuna cu o delegatie militara, la solicitarea
Ion Medoia, “Teroristi prinsi pe teritoriul Iugoslaviei,” Romania Libera, 10 ianuarie 1990.
Mai tirziu in 11 ianuarie [1990], cind toata lumea spunea iarasi ‘civili sa predea armele’ impreuna cu Cercel Doina Rebeca am intrat in buncarul subteran din CC si am mai prins inca opt insi. Au tras–daca nu era Rebeca era a treia oara cind muream….
FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62
According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].
Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Rumanians Call for Freedom in Schools
By DAVID BINDER, Special to The New York Times
Published: January 22, 1990
BUCHAREST, Rumania, Jan. 21— Student leaders, addressing a crowd of about 3,000 of their classmates today, demanded far-reaching changes in the faculties of Bucharest University and other Rumanian institutions of higher learning.
The strongest demand, and the one cheered most loudly by the students, was for the ouster of professors most closely associated with the Communist dictatorship of the late Nicolae Ceausescu, particularly those working for the Securitate, or state security police.
”There are Securitate officers on the journalism faculty,” a student, Daniel Oghian, declared. He assailed Professor Radu Florian as a Ceausescu holdover whose advocacy of Communist ideology was particularly objectionable. Mr. Florian is a member of the Stefan Gheorgiu Academy, where Securitate officials were trained. The academy was grafted onto Bucharest University under the Ceausescu Government.
”Down with Florian!” the students chanted. ”Down with Stefan Gheorgiu! Depoliticize! Depoliticize!” ‘Militarized’ Classrooms Mihai Iliescu, a physics student, drew cheers when he declared that incompetent professors should be sent back to ”study their lessons over again” or be forced to resign. He also called for the ouster of the Ministry of Education’s inspector of universities.
Another speaker, from the Marine Sciences Institute in Constanta, said that his college had been ”militarized” and subjected to Securitate control under Mr. Ceausescu. Conditions were such that students were quartered 50 to a single room, he said, and buildings were unheated.
”Take it over!” the students shouted. ”Take it over!” It was the second rally in two weeks in the capital. The first was held at the Polytechnical Institute in western Bucharest. But this time the students gathered in University Square in the middle of the city under the auspices of a newly-formed Student League.
In passionate speeches commemorating classmates who were killed in the uprising that toppled the Ceausescu regime four weeks ago, the students said they wanted to create ”a new society” and ”a strong Rumania.”
”We speak from our hearts for those who were killed in the revolution,” said Mihai Gheorghiu, a third-year philosophy student. Dan Josif, another student, said, ”They fought with weapons, and we carried flowers.”
Government Is Silent on Protest
The students, many cradling lighted candles in their hands, bowed their heads in a minute of silence for their slain classmates, then raised their voices in four stanzas of the long-banned hymn ”Awake, Ye Rumanians,” which denounces ”barbarians and tyrants.”
There were no Government spokesmen at the rally. Nor was there any immediate reaction from the governing Council of National Salvation, although its President, Ion Iliescu, met with youth leaders today to discuss a future group for Rumanian young people to replace the Communist youth organization.
It has generally been impossible to obtain precise information about or reactions to daily events in Rumania from the Government, which closed its foreign press and telephone service on Saturday, even from its spokesman, although he holds periodic news conferences.
On Thursday morning, for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.
In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.
This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television.
Photos: Students in Bucharest demonstrating yesterday for far-reaching changes at universities, including the ouster of faculty members the students say were supporters of the deposed dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. (AP); A student at the rally mourning a relative killed in the revolution. (Reuters)
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“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor. Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare. Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122″ chema indicativele “49″, “38″, “89″, “11″, “82″, “44″, “38″, “84″, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00″. La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare. Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine. S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere. Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti? Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo? Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor. Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?”
Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), mai 1990.)
asemenea actiuni de diversiune radio-electronica s-au mai inregistrat si in zilele de 11 si 17 ianuarie, deci aproape la o luna dupa Revolutie…
In other words, the vast majority of research on December 1989 remains above ground, on the surface, in fact superficial, never delving to go underground, instead, accepting the reassuring “rationale” and “logical” myths embraced and legitimized by the prevailing consensus.
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 27, 2011
[as always, purely personal views based on purely personal research and publications over the past two decades]
–There are more than a dozen cases (most available online, including from court testimonies highlighted here) of people wounded or killed by exploding dum-dum bullets in Timisoara on 17-18 December 1989. Half a dozen medical personnel in Timisoara attest to treating people with dum-dum bullet wounds. Foreign television crews in Timisoara in the days of late December 1989 reported on the use of dum-dum bullets by Ceausescu regime forces and Army personnel in the early months of 1990 alleged the same. So why not admit the use of dum-dum bullets before 22 December 1989?…Therein lies the conundrum…
Thanks to Miodrag Milin (and ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI 16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA), the tapes of the Timisoara trials of 1990-1991 have been transcribed and made available to the public. These transcripts are highly valuable for the researcher of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution. To my knowledge, much of this information has never made it into the public domain, and much of the most important information has definitely not.
The 9 March 1990 testimony of Ion Deheleanu, chief of the Timis County Militia in December 1989, is edifying…he emphatically denies the existence of the terrorists after 22 december 1989 (using the oldest claim in the book, “because personally I never saw any”) and explains that the use of “different cartridges” after 22 december 1989 was a result of civilians having been armed from the stocks of the Securitate and Militia. He denies however that there might have been anything unusual about these cartridges (i.e. explosive dum-dum, etc.)
This confirms what can be proven from statements of the time, but has long since been forgotten: the idea that there were no terrorists, that Army units and civilians given arms shot wildly into one another by accident or by intention, did not originate with opponents of the Iliescu regime, but with the former Securitate and Militia….(the following article from 17 January 1990 makes this clear)
Deheleanu-type views can also be seen here in a late 1991 article by Pavel Corut under his later acknowledged alias of “Paul Cernescu”…he talks about reading the fantezist (fantastical) and pathetic revelations of Army personnel regarding the use of explosive and vidia bullets in December 1989…i.e. he too seeks to deny their use and existence
Paul Cernescu, acknowledged alias of a Fourth Directorate Securitate Military Counter-Intelligence officer, Pavel Corut
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Yet foreign media reporting from Timisoara and Army personnel in the initial post-revolutionary period talked about the use and existence of dum-dum bullets:
28th December 1989 – Timisoara search GRAPHIC Exit the secret police ROMANIA: Timisoara: EXT Soldiers standing outside Army HQ INT Camera goes inside HQ / Officer shows and explains weapons …
A1: Mix / A2: Mix
FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62
According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].
Two of the people who testified in court, Margaret Cacoceanu and Alexandru Koos, discussed the use of dum-dum bullets in Timisoara after the flight of Nicolae Ceausescu and Elena Ceausescu at noon on 22 December 1989 (Koos also described the terrorists he fought against and who he considered had shot him)
Peter Siani-Davies in 2005 speculated in general terms that any use of atypical munitions–those not used by the Army–could not necessarily be attributed to their use by the “terrorists” because civilians in certain places had been armed from Securitate and Militia stockpiles.
Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, p. 154. parts of this excellent book are available online at
The Siani-Davies’ thesis of free-floating arms, of civilians having shot with Securitate and Militia weapons and thus responsibility/guilt thereby not necessarily being attributable to the Securitate or Militia falls completely apart, however, when we turn to the court testimonies and revelations concerning those who were wounded and/or killed by dum-dum explosive bullets on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara. Clearly, unlike post 12:08 pm on 22 December 1989, there was no opportunity or possibility for civilians/protesters to have these arms.
Moreover, it should also be pointed out, the so-called DIA hypothesis (alleging that the terrorists were from the Army’s intelligence directorate and therefore might be the source of such atypical munitions) also falls apart here. DIA personnel were not present in Timisoara on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989 when these injuries and deaths from exploding bullets took place.
Finally, the idea that “perhaps the rank-and-file Army had dum-dum explosive bullets too” falls apart: in twenty-two years, not a single Army official (including former draftees!) has admitted or alleged such a thing and there has been absolutely no evidence that this might have been the case. What is more: as we have seen, where as some Army officials (see Petre Ghinea above) want to talk about the existence of dum-dum bullets and acknowledge there use in December 1989, Securitate and Militia personnel (Ion Deheleanu, Pavel Corut, etc.) deny their very existence! This speaks volumes about potential culpability.
Cases available on the Internet mentioning the wounding or killing of demonstrators with dum-dum explosive bullets on 17-18 December 1989. There are more than a dozen in all, many of whom we have seen were testified about during the Timisoara trials.
Danut Gavra with his two daughters in the Heroes’ Cemetery in December 2009
rish Television (RTE) captured what were apparently the last hours of Florica Sava’s tragic end. Warning: the scene from 11:00 to 11:30 is graphic and unsettling.
Brendan O’Brien (reporter): “Florica Sava, a 33 year old mother of two young sons, was shot from a car with a dum-dum bullet. It caused massive internal injuries. Doctors said she had just hours to live.”
Some excerpts: P.C.: Ati dat o declaratie? Po. I. : Da P.C.: O mentineti? Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.: “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da? V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste! “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)
Po. I.: …Da [am fost ranit]. Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica. M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap. Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana. La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu. Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica: “Luati-l si duceti-l la arest.” Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde. Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.” Asta tin minte precis. Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)
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Dr. Manuel Burzaco from “Doctors without Borders” was part of a team of doctors from that group who visited hospitals in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Brasov, Buzau and Braila in late December 1989 and early January 1990. This report from the Madrid daily El Pais touches upon the women and children gravely injured by the exploding “dum dum bullets used by the Securitate.”
SIX Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…
Doctors also reported on the wounds caused by explosive bullets (i.e. dum-dum bullets): In this dispatch from Agence France Presse, relayed by Radio Free Europe on 25 December 1989, Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, a medic in the intensive care unit of a Timisoara hospital, says based on his thirty years of experience, some of the wounds could only have been CAUSED by EXPLOSIVE BULLETS SHOT AT THE PROTESTERS”
Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression. First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot. december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom
Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian
Barzeanu Atanasie, 65 anit, medic primar, doctor in stiinte, chirurg, Spitalul Judetean Timisoara
“…sintem deci in 18 decembrie…Pe la orele doua si patruzeci, cind inchideam o operatie–Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian, dintr-un ARO, pacienta prezentindu-se o echimoza cu distrugerea tesuturilor (plaga in diametru de 15 centimetri), a tesuturilor din regiunea epigastrica, inclusiv a muschilor drepti abdominali, cu ruptura a colonului ascendent transvers si a jejuno-ileonului, fiind in stare de soc grav traumatic, hemoragic–, fara sa-mi poti explica nici macar acum cu ce fel de gloante a putut fi lovita, pentru ca nu am identificat nici orificiul de iesire si nici pe cel de intrare, a venit o asistenta de la Chirurgie I, care mi-a spus sa merg la domnul Ignat.”
Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura, (Editura Facla 1990), pp. 133-134.
The following first appeared in Gyorgy Mandics’s Temesvari golgota (1991) pp. 348-349 and is reprinted in his A Manipulalt Forradalom (2009). [My guess is this is also the source for the reference to dum dum bullets in the German language wikipedia entry for http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum%C3%A4nische_Revolution_1989 — Hans Vastag, György Mandics, Manfred Engelmann: Temeswar. Symbol der Freiheit. Wien 1992. ]
pp. 348-349
Ket esetuk volt az elejen. Ezert is hivtak be oket. Egy 14 eves gyermeket a haz elott lottek le, szinte a szomszedban, egy golyoszoros ARO-rol talaltak el; egy oreg nenit a ter tuloldalon, az erkelyen ertek a golyok. A zarja ment ki, kicsit nagyott hallott mar, amire is csoda, 64 evesen, azt hirtelen ugy erezte, hogy labaibol kimegy minden ero es lecsusott az erholya. Na milyen gyonge lettem egyszeruen–mondotta maganak. de ahogyan fel akart tapaszkodni meg lepve tapasztalt, hogy vertocsa gyult alatta. Bekialtolt a vegenek aki egy szomszed segitsegevel athozta a nenit a legkozelebbi korhazba, itt a Marasti ter tuloldalan, az uj Klinikakba, avagy hivatalos neven a 2 szamu korhazba, ahol rogton osszecodult mindenki csodat latni. Ekkor hivtak be Baranziekat es minden mozgositato orvost, hiszen a fegyverek ropogatak. Azota is kisebb nagyobb megszakitasokkal, felfelecsapolt a gepfegyverek, golyoszorok, geppisztolyok langzivatarja, remulettel telitva az ejszaki eget.
p. 349
De azt a ket elso esett nem kovettek ujabbok. Igz aztan volt ido alaposan szemugyre venni a nenit akinek combjan elol egz akkora lyuk tatongott mint egy egy lejes, a comba hatso felen ahol eltavotott a golyo, ott viszont mar akkora mint egy otlejes. Fluture doktor, az egzik sebesz erosen kototte az ebet a korohoz, hogy ez egz specialis dum-dum robbanogolyo okozta seb, hiszen a szakirodalomban azt irjak, hogy csak ez a robbannolovedek-fajta-amelyet ugyan az ENSZ eltitott, am a nemzetkozi terrorizmusban kulonesen divatos ma is–okoz az izomszovetbol kijovet sokkal nagyobb roncsolasokat mint a bemenetnel. Az orvosok odazarandokoltak a sebesulthoz, mivel egzik sem latott semhogy dum-dum golyo utotte sebet, de egyaltalan lott sebet sem soha eleteben. Igz aztan csak szivtak a rangeletrahoz igazodva a sebesz foorvosok az amerikai Kentet, a foamnesztezialogus a holland pipadohanyt, az asztalyos orovosok a bolgar BT-t, a fonoverek a jugoslav Vikend-et, a noverek es helyapolok a roman Snagov-t, Golfot. Es vartak.
(Note: it is unclear who the 64 yr. old described was…there are several individuals without ages listed as injured or dead during the events, but I think it more likely the age of the woman is incorrect)
Jozsef Gazda Megvalto karacsony. Erdelyi magyar tulelok emlekeznek. (1990)
Ungor Csaba: Ket ora utan senkit be nem hoztak, senkit be nem engedtek, egyetlen sebesult sem. A korhazbol kikanyarado mentoautokra is lottek. Ket ora utan mindre, ami mozgott, jarokelo, auto, mindenre lottek, csak hogy ok tudjak begyujteni a sebesulteket s a halottakat. Kiderult az elso golyok utan, amiket a sebekbol gyujottek ossze, szedtek ki, hogy nem eles katonai toltenyekkel lottek, hanem dum-dum golyokkal, amik nagy rombolasokat okoztak. Egy 16 eves, ketszer sebesult gyermek meselte el, ok azt hittek, hogy hosok, azt hittek, hogy meg fogjak menteni a forradalmat, mert biztosra vettek, ha a felnottek sorfala ele allnak, nem fognak belejuk loni. Lottek rajuk is.
Goga Andras: A masodik izgalomkelto esemeny volt kedden delelott, hogy az osszes regiszterunk–mind a surgossegen, mind az osztalyon–, melyekre felirtuk a muteteinket, eltuntek, a mai napig sem talaltuk meg. Bennuk voltak az ev osszes mutetei[***]…En aznap kettot operaltam. Egy tuntetonek a bore alol vettem ki egy nagyon kulonleges golyok, nem is golyot, egy ilyen repeszdarabot, melyet a katonasag aztan megvizsgalt, s azt mondtak, nekik nincs tudmasuk, hogy ez mi lehet. Egy masiknak pedig fejserulese volt, persze abban nem talaltam golyot, amtent rajta.
comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM
Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive. Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.
Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoart–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.
Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar. Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.
The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.
Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information. [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.
As opposed to the aforementioned Vladimir Belis, Pavel Corut, and Dan Voinea, all of whom who have strenuously and repeatedly denied the existence and use in December 1989 of atypical munitions of dum-dum bullets and vidia bullets, there exist those who have told us of the existence and use of these in December 1989.[2] They are essentially, for lack of a better term, former Securitate whistleblowers, who have admitted the Securitate’s role in providing the “terrorists” who caused so much destruction, mayhem, and loss of life in those days.
For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).
Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989. What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding [dum-dum] bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridgeswhich upon hitting their targets caused new explosions” [emphasis added]—in other words, exploding or dum-dum bullets.[3]
The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:
I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89. In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched. Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition. In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances. I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets. In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox. We had been drugged. We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us. Don’t publish my name. I fear for me and my parents. When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’ The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize. I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’.[4] [emphases added]
As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention: the former Securitate. That is not accidental.[5]
for full discussion of those who told us the truth (i.e. continuation of above), see discussion here:
Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 25, 2011
[as always, purely personal views based on purely personal research and publications over the past two decades]
Thanks to Miodrag Milin (and ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI 16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA), the tapes of the Timisoara trials of 1990-1991 have been transcribed and made available to the public. These transcripts are highly valuable for the researcher of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution. To my knowledge, much of this information has never made it into the public domain, and much of the most important information has definitely not.
Maior A.D. (Aurel David?) din fosta Directie a V-a a D.S.S., “Scenariile si Realitatea. Marturie la dosarul ‘Teroristi’ (VI), Timpul , 1 martie 1991, p. 11.
“Nu pareau foarte convinsi, iar unul dintre ei a spus, parca dezamagit: ‘Daca nu e garda lui Ceausescu, atunci sint camasile negre!’ ‘Care camasi negre?’ am intrebat eu, spunindu-le ca in toata perioada in care m-am aflat in serviciul de garda, nu am avut voie sa port decit camasa alba, cel mult bleu. Unul din soldati mi-a spus ca a auzit de aceste ‘camasi negre’ care ar proveni din copiii orfani, crescuti la case speciale de copii, care ,rad tot,’ n-au mama, n-au tata. Pina la urma dupa cite ne-au spus soldatii, ei auzisera doar ca cei care luptau impotriva armatei ar fi ‘garda lui Ceausescu’ sau ‘camasile negre.’”
Dan Badea, “Secretele Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 22 (7-13 iunie 1994), pp. 8-9
“Secretele Revolutiei” (Dan Badea, Expres, 7-13 iunie 1994)
from Orwellian…Positively Orwellian (2006)
Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:
…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons. I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits. The Militia told me that they weren’t their people. At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire. I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?” I told him we were being attacked. He told me to cease fire. Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender. I slammed the telephone down. Then [Army General] Stanculescu called. I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me: ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified: they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]
Armata Poporului, “Sub tirul incrucisat…(II)” interviu cu Aurel Dragomir, nr. 46, noiembrie 1990 p. 3.
Finally, in this context, the comments of a Codrut H. in July 1990 about what he and other civilians found when they occupied Securitate headquarters in Brasov on the night of 22 December: “What appeared suspicious to me was that the Securitate there appeared to have been prepared [for something]…. Out front of the building there was a white ARO [automobile] in which there were complete antiterrorist kits [emphasis added].” What else did the civilians find there?…combinezoane negre.[58]
Herlea Floarea despre case conspirative, apartamente din care s-au tras
Similar situations with “safe houses” occurred in Brasov and Sibiu
Monica N. Marginean, “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 33 (septembrie 1990), p. 2.
Sa continuam dialogul inceput acum citeva saptamini prin limpezirea unor aspecte din evenimentele lui decembrie 1989 la Sibiu, aspecte pe care dubla calitate de procuror si membru al Comisiei de ancheta va impiedicau sa le dati publicitatii. Deci, de fapt, ce a putut afla, in ciuda obstructiilor si piedicilor de tot felul, fostul procuror Marian Valer, despre implicarea unor elemente ale fostei securitati si militii in evenimentele singeroase din Sibiu?
In urma anchetelor desfasurate la Sibiu, rezulta ca la data evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, organele Ministerului de Interne aveau adoptate doua planuri de actiune in cazul aparitiei unei defectiuni antiregim sub forma revoltei sau manifestatiei anti-ceausiste ale populatiei, ori sub forma unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara. Astfel, in primul rind, pe baza ordinului ministrului de interne nr. 02600/1988, la data respectiva functia sus mentionata fiind detinuta de Tudor Postelnicu, ordin emis ca urmare a manifestatiilor anticeausiste de la Brasov, din 15 noiembrie 1987, s-a adoptat la nivelul Inspectoratului judetean Sibiu al M.I. un plan unic de actiune si interventie in cazul unor manifestatii, in care urmau sa fie implicate securitatea, militia, trupele de securitate si cele de pompieri din cadrul Ministerului de Interne. Intr-o asemenea eventualitate, un rol deosebit urmau sa detina plutoane de interventie special constituite, respectiv plutoantele Scutul, Soimii si U.S.L.A. In al doilea rind, in urma investigatiilor efectuate a rezultat ca organele M.I. mai aveau un plan secret de actiune impotriva unitatilor Ministerului Apararii in cazul unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara sau a altei atitudini antiregim a armatei. Probabil ca acest plan era in conexiune cu planul Z-Z, la care facea referire Ion Dinca in cazul procesului sau si care consta in acorduri secrete incheiate de Ceausescu cu 5 state arabe pentru acordarea de asistenta militara directa in cazul unui puci militar in Romania. In acest sens, in timpul evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din Sibiu, armata a gasit o harta cu casele conspirative ale Securitatii din jurul unitatilor militare din municipiu, in care urmau sa fie plasate cadre de securitate care sa actioneze impotriva acestora, in eventualitatea dezicerii armatei de regimul ceausist. In urma investigatiilor efectuate, s-a constatat ca din asemenea case s-a actionat cu foc asupra unor unitati militare, incepind cu dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, deci dupa rasturnarea dictaturii. S-a mai constatat ca, in general, in casele respective locuiau foste cadre de securitate sau militie, care se pensionsera sau trecusera in rezerva, sau informatori al securitatii, precum si ca, dupa inceperea manifestatiilor anticeausiste la Sibiu, la casele respective au intrat autoturisme care aveau numere de inmatriculare din alte judete, de exemplu Constanta, Iasi, Bacau. Astfel asupra U.M. 01512, s-a tras din imobilul nr. 7 din str. Stefan cel Mare, situat vis-a-vis de pavilionul central ai acesteia, in care locuiau familii ale unui fost comandant al securitatii din Sibiu si un informator al securitatii, precum si din imobilele situate in str. Moscovei, paralela cu unitatea militara. Asupra U.M. 1606, s-a tras din imobilul cu nr. 47 de pe str. Moldoveanu, in care locuiau un fost sef al militiei judetului Sibiu, iar asupra U.M. 01080 s-a tras din vila Branga, de pe Calea Dumbravii, in care locuia cu familia un mare crescator de oi, precum si din vila unui medic. A mai rezultat ca locatarii imobilelor respective au lipsit de la domiciliu in timpul evenimentelor, parasindu-le cu citeva zile in prealabil, precum si ca in unele din aceste case nu s-au gasit urme de mobilier sau de obiecte casnice. Harta caselor conspirative ale securitatii si militiei a ajuns in posesia locotenent-colonelului Dragomir, comandantul garnizoanei Sibiu, dar acesta, fiind solicitat sa o depuna la comisia de ancheta, a motivat ca nu o mai gaseste.
Monica M. Maginean: “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.
Clip Ref: BSP271289002 0
The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 
22/02/2013 la 15:45