The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘teroristi decembrie 1989’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #20 Identifying the Terrorists: Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Ignored Declaration and other Evidence

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 26, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:
The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
[Submitted to CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) 19 November 2009; cleared without changes by PRB 15 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

Bullets Lies and Videotape The Amazing Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 by Richard Andrew Hall 103013tk1

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

[5]

[In viewing these photos, witness what Constantin Fugasin recounted in “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, in 1990, based in part on an interview with Dr. Andrei Firica:

At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.[6]]

 

[7]

[Dr. Andrei Firica, 2004:  From a diagnostic perspective, those who maintain that the terrorists didn’t exist are telling an outrageous lie…In the Emergency Hospital, people were brought who were shot with precision in the forehead, from behind, just a few yards in the crowd of demonstrators, such people who did this can only be called terrorists…[8]]


Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.

To the question of whether he informed the Military Procuracy?

Of course, I announced the Prosecutor’s Office, and requested an investigation [of those shot in the revolution].  For example, when I showed them the apartment from where there were was shooting during the revolution, on the fourth floor of the ‘Luceafarul’ cinema, the prosecutors told me that they sought to verify it and uncovered that there was a Securitate ‘safehouse’ there and that was it.

In 1992, I signed along with other doctors, university professors, renowned surgeons, a memorandum [see page 5 (below) for an article apparently linked to the memorandum] addressed to the Prosecutor General in which we requested an investigation regarding the wounded and dead by gunfire.  Not having received any response, after six months I went there to ask what was going on.  They told me they were working on it, and they showed me two or three requests and that was it.  One of the prosecutors took me into the hallway and told me “I have a child, a wife, it is very complicated.”  He asked me what I thought I was doing…I lit back into him, I told him I wasn’t just any kind of person to be blown off.

I showed him the x-rays of those who were shot, I showed him the bullets in the liver.  The x-rays exist, they weren’t my invention, I didn’t just dream all this up to demand an investigation!  I told them that there are some people who wish to find out the truth and they signed a memo to the Procuracy and they aren’t just anybody, but doctors with experience, experts in the field.  In vain, we requested ballistics tests and other research, in vain we presented forms, documents, x-rays, studies.  They did not want to undertake a serious investigation.[9]

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

[5] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[6] Significantly this video is in direct contradiction and contests the claims of the Sorin Iliesiu who maintains that “General Dan Voinea has said clearly:  The terrorists did not exist.  Those who seized power lied to protect the real criminals….The diversion of the ‘terrorists’ has been demonstrated by [the] Justice [System], not a single terrorist being found among the dead, wounded or arrested  (Sorin Iliesiu, “18 ani de la masacrul care a deturnat revoluţia anticomunistă,” 21 December 2007, http://www.romanialibera.com/articole/articol.php?step=articol&id=6709).  For a discussion, see Hall 2008.

[7] Screen capture from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7rp6b_revolutia-romana-2225-dec1989-part_shortfilms posted by Alexandru2006.

[8] Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/23/a-tale-of-two-letters-by-securitate-director-general-iulian-vlad-what-the-romanian-press-does-and-does-not-publish/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/20/when-a-truth-commission-misses-crucial-evidence-the-romanian-cpadcr-final-report-and-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-declaration/

It is virtually certain that the authors of the Chapter on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (pp. 620-627, especially p. 625 http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf ) had no knowledge of Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Declaration of 29 January 1990 … with predictable negative consequences for their understanding of what happened in December 1989.

And one wonders why I found (find) mainstream Romanian studies so unhelpful in trying to understand Nicolae Ceausescu’s overthrow and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989?  Read Vladimir Tismaneanu or Tom Gallagher (or in its 2014 variation, see Grigore Pop-Eleches in Bernhard and Kubik) on Romania in the early 1990s and one is presented with a world of good and evil, of angels and demons, with distance from former nomenklaturist and high-ranking communist Ion Iliescu and the core of the National Salvation Front being as being the simple formula for explaining and understanding any event or policy.  As opposed to this highly–one might say blatantly–politically partisan [and bureaucratically ignorant] approach, on the other side stand functional or deconstructionist explanations–the kind favored by Peter Gross, Katherine Verdery, Peter Siani-Davies, or Ruxandra Cesereanu–which would explain the press of the time as the function of market pressures, sensationalist appetites, an anomic readership, poor journalistic training and professionalism, etc.

How then does one explain the following conundrum:  the selective treatment of the letters and declarations of former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad?  Oh, yes, the text of General Vlad’s letters which allege he was a stooge and victim of Ion Iliescu, etc. can be found in the Romanian press.  No problem!  But what about his declaration of 29 January 1990, where he deftly admits the responsibility of his institution for the bloodshed of December?  What, that not sensationalist enough, different enough to sell papers?  That’s not “anti-communist” enough for publication?  Is it somehow less credible than the other letters whose text has been published without problem?  24 plus years later, the Romanian media has yet to publish this document!  Could it be that the problem with this declaration is that it does not fit with and undermines the other popular narratives of December 1989 that minimize and even absolve the former Securitate of responsibility for the bloodshed of December 1989?

image0-001

Ion Cristoiu’s Evenimentul Zilei debuted in June 1992 and was the flagship of opposition to the regime of Ion Iliescu.  In the fall of 1992 it ran a zealous campaign opposed to Iliescu’s reelection.  Here is the exculpatory letter from former Securitate General Iulian Vlad (dated 20 March 1990) that was published on 19 September 1992:

image0-004

“Generalul IULIAN VLAD se adreseaza dlui Ion Iliescu:  Am fost arestat pe nedrept (20 March 1990),” Evenimentul Zilei, 19 septembrie 1992, p. 3.  “Intr-adevar pe dictatorul Ceausescu l-am tradat” “M-am integrat total Revolutiei” “Sint convins ca datele nu va erau cunoscute”  I.V. Vlad 20 martie 1990

And, yet, what of General Iulian Vlad’s declaration of 29 January 1990.  As far as I know, in 24 plus years, only this brief allusive mention on the 15th anniversary of the letter (although not mentioned or acknowledged in the article, and possibly accidental) has made its way into the Romanian press.  Below it:  the text of the statement of 29 January 1990!

image0-005

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/text-of-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-29-january-1990-declaration-identifying-the-terrorists/

image0-001

It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

image0

image0-002

General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Gheorghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/10/04/declaratia-generalului-ion-hortopan-cum-a-vazut-armata-colaborarea-generalului-iulian-vlad/

image0-010

Declaratia generalului colonel I. Hortopan, 16.02.1990 (din cate cunosc, pana publicarea cartii lui Dan Ioan, timp de 22 de ani, aceasta declaratie n-a aparut in presa romana)

“Actiunile teroristilor au crescut in intensitate in ziua de 23 decembrie si in seara zilei, la o analiza a Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale, Vlad a fost intrebat cine sunt cei care trag asupra Armatei si populatiei, la care acesta — in scopul de ne induce in eroare — a raspuns ca manifestantii patrunzand in anumite obiective importante, printre ei fiind si elemente rauvoitoare, fosti puscariasi de drept comun, au pus mana pe arme, s-au constituit in grupuri si trag asupra noastra.  In timpul actiunii, trupele noastre au prins un numar de teroristi care faceau din unitatile de Securitate, au cerut cuvantul si au prezentat numarul unitatilor din care faceau parte (UM-0672F, UM-0639, UM-0106, UM-0620), la care Vlad, tot pentru inducere in eroare, a afirmat ca acestia s-ar putea sa fie fanatici, care, chipurile, ar actiona pe cont propriu.”

image0-011

image0-012

image0-013

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/ 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/14/planul-z-z-ion-mihai-pacepa-si-liviu-turcu-in-decembrie-1989/

I have attempted to trace Pacepa’s public discussion of Plan Z-Z to verify claims made by other actors (see below, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Giani Bucurescu/Virgil Lovescu) in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  All of these actors refer to Pacepa’s discussion on Radio Free Europe/Radio Europa Libera sometime apparently between 24 and 26 December 1989.  Unfortunately, although there are a series of audio clips and transcripts from these days on the Europa Libera site http://www.europalibera.org/archive/1989/latest/452/982.html, there is no mention of the Pacepa intervention in question and no indication of record of its existence on the Internet.

0436

6 februarie 1990

Declaratie.  Subsemnatul Bucurescu Giani, general-maior [D.S.S.]

La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…

Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L.  Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.

Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi.  Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…

Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…

Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu

0437

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/28/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-vi/

We have two different accounts from Gheorghe Diaconescu, which roughly match:

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VI_continut.pdf

image0

image0-001

This also seems to confirm the following (when adjusted for the corrected dates):

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch.  This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’  I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people.  And I was told:  Only you and two other people know this.  I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]

[95] Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990.  I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.

But it almost doesn’t matter when Pacepa first discussed this…because almost identical details were disclosed by Liviu Turcu, a DIE officer who had defected earlier in 1989 (thereby being far more knowledgeable of current plans/realities inside the Romanian security state), only without reference to a named plan, such as Plan Z-Z.  It was thus Turcu on 23 December 1989 (within 24 hours of the outbreak of terrorist hostilities in Romania; the interview would have taken place on Saturday the 23rd) who first informed Western media of the existence of such a plan–although it appears Turcu’s disclosures were never relayed by Romanian media or by Radio Europa Libera.

Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces

The Washington Post
December 24, 1989 | Dan Morgan

The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.

Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.

The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.

The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.

The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.

The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.

As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5″ in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.

Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.

Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.

The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.

Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.

In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.

Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.

For verification of some of Turcu’s claims (in particular, the less-discussed participation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, see here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/)

“They dress in black berets and black jumpsuits [combinezoane negre, salopete negre] with red silk stripes on their sleeves.  They carry small two-way radios and speak into them in coded language.  They are equipped with automatic rifles with infrared nightscopes for sniping.”

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h-27121989-01min55s/

Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…

Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala
improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba
poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in
rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale
poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind
asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta
Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care
nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi
sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca
tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.

(capitanul Romanescu Marian, cu Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si
‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, 8-9)

image-15

(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLAC erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

image-13

Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

image-18image-17image-16image-15

image-4image-9

Advertisements

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Braila in zilele revolutiei (7 si 12+)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 11, 2014

Convorbiri interceptate prin radiotelefoane folosite de Militie in noaptea de 24/25.12.1989 in municipiul Braila (publicate ca Lt. Col. Fanica Voinea Ene, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (7),” Libertatea (Braila), 14 noiembrie 1991, p.1, p. 4.; si in serialul “Intimplari straini la Braila,” Armata Romaniei; mai jos din cartea Armata română în revoluţia din decembrie 1989).  (SOARE este Colonelul Soare, Seful Securitatii Brailei; se pare ca e vorba de programul planificat de impuscaturi in miezul noptii spre dimineata (o tactica descrisa aici:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/); e clar din discutia ca armata este considerata de catre acesti militieni si securisti, dusmanul!)

image0-001

image0-003

image0-005

Armata Romaniei, nr. 41 (96) 9-15 octombrie 1991 p. 3

Lt. Col. Fanica Voinea Ene, “Intimplari Straini la Braila (VIII)” (n-a aparut in serialul publicat in Libertatea (Braila))

Gheorghe Lupascu, membru al Uniunii Scriitorilor:  “Cine trage in noi, tovarase [colonel, seful Securitatii Brailei] Soare?” l-am intrebat ‘Libienii lui Ceausescu, cine sa traga!?”

Or fi fost si din astia, nu contest.  Nu intimplator un cetatean de la noi din oras, care lucra in Libia pe atunci, afirma ca imediat dupa declansarea revolutiei in Romania au fost sechestrati in aceasta tara.  Li s-a dat drumul abia prin ianuarie 1990, cind probabil au fost recuperati studenti, in ghilemele, ai acestei tari aflate in Romania.

Scopul celor care trageau era sa provoace deruta in armata, s-o imprastie peste tot pentru a nu putea reactiona.  Se pregatea ceva, cred.  Iar Braila era un fel de cap de pod, cum spuneti, dvs. militarii.  Pentru ca avea Insula Mare, o zona intinsa, ideala pentru debarcari si desantari…

Iar acum, vezi Doamne, armata e vinovata pentru tot ce s-a intimplat.  Generalul Rizea pentru ca n-a consu cu competenta, nu stiu care colonel pentru ca n-a coordonat…Si de aici mortii si ranitii Brailei!

Sa fim seriosi!  Care era structura pe care se bazeaza totalitarianism?  Securitatea si Militie!  Fara Securitate si militie nu putea face nimic.

 

Articole anterioare din serialul Braila in zilele revolutiei:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/09/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-12/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/08/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-11/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/07/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-10/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-9/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-8/

Episode 7 mai sus

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/22/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/18/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-i/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Braila in zilele revolutiei (12)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 9, 2014

O cetateanca ce nu doreste sa-i fie dat publicatii numelePe 24 decembrie ’89, pe la orele 11 noaptea s-a declansat tirul asupra comandamentului unitatii din doua case particulare, aflate in jurul nostru.  Una era evacuata pentru a fi demolata, cealalta apartinea familiei Glont (el, un vechi activist de partid, care se zicea ca lucra ca vopsitor la Santierul Naval).  Se tragea din poduri, de pe ferestre.  Casa noastra era la mijloc, intre cele doua locuinte si comandamentul diviziei.  Va dati seama ca distrugeri am suferit.  Astea n-ar fi nimic, o casa mai poate construi omul, dar cine-i mai feda sanatatea sotului meu?  A fost grav ranit in plamini.  Si acum are schije in el.  Medicii n-au putut sa-i le scoata.  Dupa cum apreciaza ei, a fost impuscat cu glont care face explozie in corp.

image0-001

Locotenent-colonel dr. Petru Nica:  Eu locuiesc intr-un bloc la care domiciliaza si unii ofiteri din fosta securitate si militie.  E vorba de blocul ,Romarta’ din care, nu-i nici un secret, toata lumea o stie, s-a tras asupra demonstrantilor din piata si asupra aparatorilor Consilului.

Focul s-a executat incepind cu 23 decembrie seara, dar fenomene oarecum bizare au aparut aici cu 4-5 zile inainte.  De pilda pe 18 dupa amiaza, am constatat cu stupoare ca de pe cutiile postale si usile apartamentelor cadrelor Ministerului de Interne au disparut numerele si numele lor.  Sotia mi-a spus sa le stergem si noi.  I-am interzis.  N-aveam de ce ne ascunde.  Apoi, dupa consemnul asta, cine stie ce persoane ti-ar fi putut intra in casa.  Alta bizarie:  boxele respectivelor au fost camuflate cu table, cartoane si alte materiale, sa nu se vada ce-i in interior.  Un du-te-vina la fel de inexplicabil a constat familia mea la aceste apartamente; in conditiile in care, se stie, si ei ca si noi erau in alarma de pe 17 decembrie 1989.  Ca sa nu mai vorbesc de lazi suspecte, care nu aparusera pina atunci…

 

image0-003

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (12),” Libertatea (Braila), 27 decembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 2.

Articole anterioare din serialul Braila in zilele revolutiei:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/08/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-11/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/07/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-10/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-9/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-8/

Episode 7 to be published at a future date

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/22/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/18/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-i/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Braila in zilele revolutiei (11)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 8, 2014

Maior Tanase Horiaeste un fapt dovedit deja, ca pe teritoriul Romaniei au patruns elicoptere straine.  Argumentul principal il constituie nu atit tintele aparute pe ecranele radar–deoarece multe din elicoptere foloseau spatiile ,moarte’, pentru radiolocatia de cercetare–ci declaratiile martorilor care le-au vazut si, mai ales urmele lasate la aterizare de talpice.  Or, stiti bine, elicopterele romanesti au trenul de aterizare pe roti.  Ca sa nu mai amintesc de convorbirile radio interceptate; ,Get sometthing ready!’ (engleza) ,Pregateste ceva!’ ,Su anda Bulgariwstan ta gizdyraz’ (turca)–,In clipa asta ne indreptam spre Bulgaria’ sau ‘K 33 indreapta-te spre Istanbul’ (romana).  Toate aceste mesaje coincideau cu evolutia tintelor pe ecrane.  Cind disparea imaginea lor pe radar, incetau si asemenea discutii.

Stiti care a fost poarta lor numarul unu de intrare in tara?  Braila!  Adica traseul:  Delta–Insula Mare a Brailei–Baragan.  Multe dintre ele nu s-au sinchisit de cercetarea noastra de radiolocatie, deci au aparut pe ecran, dar au avut grija, asa cum am mai spus, sa ocoleasca cu mare atentie zonele de foc ale artilierei antiaeriene.

Interesant este si faptul ca cele care au patruns pe poarta amintita au avut si o baza de aprovizionare cu carburant.  Stiti unde?  In Insula Mare a Brailei.  Aici dispareau majoritatea tintelor (?), identificate pe ecrane, care defilau (dupa indeplinirea misiunii), ca apoi sa reapara in acelasi loc, dupa 15-40 de minute.  Ce putea insemna asta, decit o escala pentru umplerea rezervoarelor.  Probabil, in Insula Mare a Brailei exista un elicopter special pentru reimprospatarea cu combustibil.  Stiti bine ca elicopterele au raza mica de actiune, circa 500 de kilometri.  Plecind de undeva din exteriorul Romaniei si indeplinind misiuni in interiorul ei, nu se puteau intoarce la baza tara reimprospatarea rezervoarelor.

Fara discutie ca exista si un punct de comanda al aeronavelor care ne-au vizitat.  Dupa parerea mea, el a functionat in afara tarii.  Daca ar fi fost in tara, ar fi fost usor de descoperit si neutralizat.  Ca sa nu mai luam in seama scandalul international care s-ar fi putut naste de aici.  In schimb, in tara au existat puncte fixe (in special in vilele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu) si mobile (pe autoturisme Dacia si Lada), din care s-au transmis mesaje codificate, probabil pentru conducerea operatiunii radioelectronice si de dezinformare la care am fost martori si victime totodata.  Cei de la goniometraj va pot spune mai multe in acest sens.  In Insula Mare a Brailei exista o vila de vinatoare, care a apartinut lui Ceausescu.

image0-007

 

image0-009

 

image0-011

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (11),” Libertatea (Braila), 19 decembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 3.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ceva-era-putred-in-dobrogea/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/anatomy-of-a-cover-up-or-constanta-we-have-a-problem/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/07/31/decembrie-1989-si-diversiunea-radioelectronica-varianta-la-invazia-extraterestrilor-vi/

Articole anterioare din serialul Braila in zilele revolutiei:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/07/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-10/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-9/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-8/

Episode 7 to be published at a future date

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/22/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/18/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-i/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Braila in zilele revolutiei (10)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 7, 2014

Gabriel Constantinescu:  Dar cea mai curioasa actiune a fost cea de distrugere a unor documente despre Revolutie, pe care mare parte dintre noi, cei ramasi in noul organ de conducere, le detineam.  De pilda, maistrului Melinte i-a fost omorit ciinele din curte si i s-a cotrobait prin casa.  Nu i s-a luat nimic.  Omul nu tinea documentele acasa.  Si domnului Ceausu, detinut politic pe vremea raposatului, i s-a spart casa, fara i se fure nici un leu.  Mie mi-au patruns in locuinta si mi-au violat cinci filme, desi n-aveau nici o legatura cu Revolutia.  Alaturi, in dulap, aveam bani si obiecte de valoare.  Nici nu s-au atins de ele.  Apoi opt casete, cu inregistrari din timpul Revolutiei au disparut, in mod misterious, pe traseul spre Televiziune.

image0-003

Dumitru Badila (fost tehnician la fazanaria Lacu Sarat):  Cu 2-4 zile inainte de evenimentele din decembrie ’89, cadrele ale fostei securitati au facut in zona un exercitiu.  Ei spuneau ca se antreneaza in vederea asigurarii pazei presenditelui, dar dupa cite am priceput eu nu prea era asa.  Ce rost avea atunci sa declaseze opertiuni de atac?  Care(?) pentru securitate unei persoane sint cu specific de aparare.  Apoi ele se desfasoara cu deosebire in localitatea si nu in padure.

image0-005

 

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (10),” Libertatea (Braila), 12 decembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 2.

Articole anterioare din serialul Braila in zilele revolutiei:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-9/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-8/

Episode 7 to be published at a future date

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/22/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/18/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-i/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , | 3 Comments »

Braila in zilele revolutiei (9)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 6, 2014

Am in fata o lista cu numele a peste 130 de persoane, retinute incepind cu 23 decembrie in unitatile militare.  Intre ele, civilii, dar si cadre ale fostei militii, si securitatii.  Fara indoiala ca afirmatia facuta atunci in presa locala, ca sint teroristi, este lipsita de temei.  Fie numai si pentru faptul ca nu s-au semnalat in oras acte de terorism in adevaratul sens al cuvintului.  Focul deschis asupra unor unitati militare si obiective civile nu poate fi categorist astfel.  S-a tras mai mult cu scopul de a provoca armata si de a o stinjeni in misiunile ei, de a intimida, a produce panica. Totusi imprejurarile in care au fost surprinsi unii dintre cei retinuti par cel putin ciudate.

image0-001

image0-003

N.B. S-a facut afirmatia ca retinutii au fost in exclusivitate cadre ale fostei militii si securitati.  Cu totul inexact.  S-a confundat probabil trecerea acestora in subordinea armatei, potrivit hotaririi Consilului Frontului Salvarii Nationale.  Desi si aici ramin semne de intrebare.  Nici pina azi, nu s-a clarificat ce-au facut, in acea perioada cele 36 de cadre ale securitate absente la apelelul facut in zilele de 23, 24, 25 decembrie ’89 de catre Nicolae Galiti si locotenent colonel Cornel Bahrin…

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (9),” Libertatea (Braila), 28 noiembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 4.

Articole anterioare din serialul Braila in zilele revolutiei:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-8/

Episode 7 to be published at a future date

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/22/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/18/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-i/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , | 4 Comments »

Braila in zilele revolutiei (8)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 5, 2014

Dr. Petru Cotoiu, Spitalul de UrgentaAm operat in noptile de 23/24 si 24/25 dec. 1989 14 raniti prin impuscare.  A fost o munca epuizanta.  Asistentul meu a cazut din picioare de oboseala, pe timpul unei operatii. Dar astea au mai putina importanta.  Trebuia sa ne facem datoria.  Ceea ce mi s-a parut bizar este faptul ca la unii pacienti, tesuturile erau distruse pe spatii mari.  In interiorul nu gaseam gloantele intrege ci… dezbracate la cap de folia exterioara.  In jurul lor, la oarecare distanta, se aflau schije din acelasi invelis.  Nu cred sa fi fost vorba de o farimitare mecanica la impactul glontului cu oasele sau tesuturile tare ale pacientului.

Si a a mai fost ceva, care m-a revoltat.  Fostul director adjunct al Directiei Sanitare Judetene Braila, doctorul Tudorache ne-a cerut atunci sa nu consemnam in fise ca au fost plagi prin impuscare.  De ce, nu-mi dau seama nici acum.  Oricum n-am putut respecta aceasta…indicatie.

image0-001

Elena Pitea:  Sotul meu este electronist.  Stiu ca a demontat un aparat ciudat, cu un difuzor tip pilnie.  A fost gasit in baia unui apartament….(N.A….Revenind la dispozitivul in cauza, cred ca era un simulator de foc de arma.)

image0-003

Lt. Col. Fanica VOINEA ENE, “Braila in zilele revolutiei (6),” Libertatea (Braila), 21 noiembrie 1991, p. 1; p. 4.

Articole anterioare din serialul Braila in zilele revolutiei:

Episode 7 to be published at a future date

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-6/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/06/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/05/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/22/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/20/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/18/braila-in-zilele-revolutiei-i/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 5 Comments »

Former Securitate officials who corroborated General Iulian Vlad’s Declaration on the Terrorists: Liviu Turcu, Ion Mihai Pacepa, Radu Vasilevici, Marian Romanescu, and others

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 7, 2013

Timage0-001

It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

image0

image0-002

General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

— arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

— alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/14/planul-z-z-ion-mihai-pacepa-si-liviu-turcu-in-decembrie-1989/

I have attempted to trace Pacepa’s public discussion of Plan Z-Z to verify claims made by other actors (see below, Gheorghe Diaconescu, Giani Bucurescu/Virgil Lovescu) in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  All of these actors refer to Pacepa’s discussion on Radio Free Europe/Radio Europa Libera sometime apparently between 24 and 26 December 1989.  Unfortunately, although there are a series of audio clips and transcripts from these days on the Europa Libera site http://www.europalibera.org/archive/1989/latest/452/982.html, there is no mention of the Pacepa intervention in question and no indication of record of its existence on the Internet.

0436

6 februarie 1990

Declaratie.  Subsemnatul Bucurescu Giani, general-maior [D.S.S.]

La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…

Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L.  Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.

Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi.  Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…

Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…

Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu

0437

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/28/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-vi/

We have two different accounts from Gheorghe Diaconescu, which roughly match:

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VI_continut.pdf

image0

image0-001

This also seems to confirm the following (when adjusted for the corrected dates):

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch.  This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’  I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people.  And I was told:  Only you and two other people know this.  I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]

[95] Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990.  I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.

But it almost doesn’t matter when Pacepa first discussed this…because almost identical details were disclosed by Liviu Turcu, a DIE officer who had defected earlier in 1989 (thereby being far more knowledgeable of current plans/realities inside the Romanian security state), only without reference to a named plan, such as Plan Z-Z.  It was thus Turcu on 23 December 1989 (within 24 hours of the outbreak of terrorist hostilities in Romania; the interview would have taken place on Saturday the 23rd) who first informed Western media of the existence of such a plan–although it appears Turcu’s disclosures were never relayed by Romanian media or by Radio Europa Libera.

Romanian Army Rankled by Interference;Defector Cites Long-Standing Friction Between Military and State Security Forces

The Washington Post
December 24, 1989 | Dan Morgan

The violence that has erupted in Romania between the army and state security forces loyal to deposed president Nicolae Ceausescu is rooted in long-standing friction between the two institutions that has sharpened dramatically recently, a high-level Romanian defector said yesterday.

Lidiu Turcu, who worked with the foreign intelligence branch of the Department of State Security, known as the Securitate, until his defection in Austria last January, said a special directorate monitored the loyalty of top army officers. As Ceausescu’s paranoia increased, he appointed his brother Ilia as first deputy minister of defense and chief of the political directorate in the army.

The military deeply resented that interference, he said. Also angering the military was the removal several years ago of two high-ranking generals denounced by Securitate informers for cultivating connections at the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, he said. There have been reports that the two were killed and dumped into the Black Sea from a helicopter, but Turcu said he could not confirm the story.

The well-equipped and dreaded security forces appear to number about 45,000 to 50,000 men, including 25,000 troops who live in barracks on the outskirts of major cities and 20,000 officers, technical personnel, and specialists, he said. That figure is far less than the up to 700,000 reported in recent days in other accounts from the region.

The officers and specialists were drawn from universities until several years ago. But in the 1980s, Turcu said, Ceausescu’s wife, Elena, ordered that recruitment of university students be stopped and that less-educated factory personnel be selected instead.

The uniformed force of fighters includes many young men who were taken from orphanages at an early age. These security soldiers, educated and trained at special schools, have no family loyalties and were indoctrinated to view Ceausescu as a father figure, Turcu said.

As Ceausescu’s fear of an internal threat to his security grew, he reportedly turned to a new “Directorate 5″ in the Securitate that had the responsibility for “defense of the leadership of the party.” Presumably this is the force involved in some of the recent fighting.

Growing evidence of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces against unarmed demonstrators-shooting into crowds in Timisoara and Bucharest-has raised questions about whether foreign mercenaries may be involved. Turcu said the massacres go against Ceausescu’s dictum of “no martyrs,” which was often repeated to his inner circle.

Turcu said he talked yesterday with a friend in Bucharest who reported being forced to evacuate his apartment complex by armed Arab commandos.

The former intelligence official said he was aware of a secret agreement between Ceausescu and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat that allowed PLO groups to use Romanian territory for “logistical support.” He said Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu, who oversaw the security forces, was present at a recent meeting between Ceausescu and Arafat.

Romanian cooperation with the PLO began in the late 1960s, Turcu said, but intensified in the past three years. He said rival PLO groups coexist within Romanian territory, but the agreement forbade clashes between these groups and prohibited their possession of arms. One job of the Securitate was to ensure that the PLO factions were obeying the agreement, Turcu said.

In addition to the PLO factions, he said, Syrian, Libyan, Iraqi and Iranian military or special operations units have been trained at a camp near Buzau, in the Carpathian foothills.

Contrary to reports that the security forces lived lavishly, Turcu said that except for higher salaries, most ordinary officials did not have access to special restaurants and stores stocked with Western electronic goods. He suggested that security officials resorted to corruption and abuse of office to satisfy their needs, which exacerbated the public’s hatred and fanned the fury that burst over the past week.

For verification of some of Turcu’s claims (in particular, the less-discussed participation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, see here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/)

“They dress in black berets and black jumpsuits [combinezoane negre, salopete negre] with red silk stripes on their sleeves.  They carry small two-way radios and speak into them in coded language.  They are equipped with automatic rifles with infrared nightscopes for sniping.”

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/les-souterrains-de-bucarest-ja2-20h-27121989-01min55s/

Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…

Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala
improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba
poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in
rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale
poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind
asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta
Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care
nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi
sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca
tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.

(capitanul Romanescu Marian, cu Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si
‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, 8-9)

image-15

(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLAC erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

image-13

Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

image-18image-17image-16image-15

image-4image-9

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

Revolutia furata

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 21, 2013

image0

Dumitru Mazilu, Expres Magazin, nr. 64 (41) 1991, p. 12.

image0-001

Dumitru Mazilu, Revolutia furata, Cozia, 1991.

image0-002

In 1991, Dumitru Mazilu, who had sought exile in Switzerland the previous year, published excerpts from his memoirs.[20] Mazilu has few kind words for his former Front compatriots, Brucan and Militaru. Nevertheless, Mazilu claims that during the events, “at least seven times they were informed that the ‘Guarding Directorate’ [the Fifth Directorate] had been trained in guerilla warfare.”[21] Mazilu elaborates:

From the evening of 22 December it turned out that the units and soldiers who continued to shoot in the population belonged to the Interior Ministry….this is confirmed by the following findings:

a) the places from which the population was shot belonged to the Interior Ministry with certainty (as in the case of the Central University Library, which belonged to Ceausescu’s Guarding Directorate) or with probability (the apartments of the building across from the work offices of the tyrant; the apartments in the vicinity of the villas of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu, as well as those near objects of strategic or political importance, such as the Defense Ministry, Romanian Television and Radio, etc.);

b) the use of special equipment, especially simulators, specific actions of guerilla warfare in order to confuse the revolting population;

c) the actions of snipers with nightscopes around objects of major interest from the inside of neighboring buildings, where the access to other persons was almost non-existent;

d) the organization of commando actions, such as what happened at the command post of the Central Committee building on the night of 23/24 December when many suspects were found with four or five identity cards on them–a procedure used by the Interior Ministry.[22]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/

Dumitru Mazilu, “Cine sint teroristii?,” Flacara, nr. 39, 25 septembrie 1991, p. 4.

 

image0-003

image0-004

Dumitru Mazilu:  “La 24 si 25 Decembrie am fost informati ca au fost raniti si internati in spital mai multe teroristi care proveneau din tari arabe.”

fotografiile lui Ion Laurentiu, CC-ul PCR-ului, in noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.

https://plus.google.com/photos/109794872578116972195/albums/5417438035204009089

OFICIAL:  “N-AU EXISTAT TERORISTI…SI IN NICI UN CAZ, TERORISTI ARAB”!!!

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , | 1 Comment »

After the Ceausescus Were Executed: The Counter-Revolution is “Disappeared” (26 December 1989 – 24 January 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 7, 2013

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/december-1989-2009-bullets-lies-and-videotape/

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989[1] 

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D. (published December 2009)

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.   I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

…In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun.  In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed.  By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.[53]

COLONEL GHIRCOIAS MAKES THE ROUNDS OF BUCHAREST’S HOSPITALS

Unofficially, we also know of Colonel Ghircoias’ exploits after the Ceausescu regime collapsed on 22 December 1989, exploits for which he was not charged at his trial and for which he has never been charged.  Of the 1,104 people killed and 3,352 people injured during the December 1989 bloodshed, 942 of them were killed and 2,251 wounded after Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled power on 22 December 1989.  At the time, personnel of the communist regime’s secret police—known as the Securitate—and allied foreign mercenaries fighting to restore the Ceausescu regime—collectively christened “the terrorists”—were thought to be the primary source behind the post-22 December bloodshed.

It was in this context, that doctors from Bucharest’s various main hospitals recall Colonel Ghircoias’ sudden, unannounced appearances during the last days of December 1989 and first days of January 1990.  Professor Andrei Firica of the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” recounted in a 2004 media interview largely the same details he had conveyed to the press in the summer of 1990.  According to Firica, some 15 to 20 suspected terrorists had been interned at the “Emergency Hospital” in varying states of medical distress.  He says he made a small file of the medical situations of these patients.  A Militia colonel, whom he later was to see in [prisoner] stripes on TV as a defendant in the Timisoara trial—i.e. fairly clearly Ghircoias—came one day and counseled him to keep nosy foreign reporters away from the beds of the “terrorists,” stating ominously that “these were just terrorist suspects and he [Dr. Firica] didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone”!   The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects onto a bus and off they went.  Firica maintains the files he kept on the terrorist suspects “of course, disappeared.”  He noted, however, that he asked his son, who had studied theater and film at university, to film the terrorists tied down to the hospital beds, and he claims he gave copies of this cassette to the Procuracy.[4]

  • At the Emergency Hospital 13 suspected of being what we call terrorists were interned.  Among these a few were definitely foreign, even though all had Romanian papers.  Two clearly had ‘Mongoloid’ (‘Asiatic’) features (one stated that his mother was Romanian, while his father was from Laos), while four others were Arabs.  Nevertheless, they spoke Romanian very well.  Doctor Nicolae Staicovici, who worked a time in Egypt and who treated them for a time spoke with them.  At a moment, he formed a question in Arabic.  One of the injured responded to him perfectly.  All were well-built, one was a ‘mountain of a man.’  He said nothing, although he probably had terrible pains.  There were also two terrorists who were not wounded.  One arrived at night, under some pretext.  Those on guard suspecting him, immobilized him.  He had on three layers of clothing and several ids.  They tied him to the stretcher, but although he appeared rather frail, at a given moment he ripped the restraints off.  [Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.]

[4]Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition, cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. For similar accounts, see Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1–“Colonelul Ghircoias, former director of the Securitate’s penal investigative unit, brought together the individuals accused of being terrorists and made them disappear”; Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, no. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5; Constantin Fugasin, “Unde ne sint teroristii?” Zig-Zag, 1990.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

A Brief Timeline of the Counter-Revolutionary Coverup

26 December 1989

(Those who argue that there was no “other side” during the fighting of 22-25 December 1989–that the “terrorists” did not exist, that they were from the Army (in particular DIA), that it was all just “friendly fire,” misunderstanding, paranoia, fear, and suspicion (such post-modernist excess permeates the accounts of Peter Siani-Davies, Ruxandra Cesereanu , Adrian Cioflanca, to name a few of the more recent accounts, as well as reviews of films such as A Fost sau N-a Fost?/12:08 East of Bucharest)–have difficulty explaining how the Hungarian military maintains they were tracking Securitate radio transmitters/transmissions and relaying the information to the Romanian military leadership and that the operation of these Securitate transmitters dropped off in sync with the drop off in counter-revolutionary resistance posed by the Securitate…Then again they are not aware of this or most of the details/evidence presented for the period 26 December 1989 – 24 January 1990 below…) 

Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, head of the Hungarian People’s Army Press Department:  “…I would like to say that a progressive weakening of the Securitate has been experienced.  We ourselves can see this, because our radio searching and locating units which were in Hungary a few days ago were monitoring broadcasts from 31 Securitate radio centers–yesterday 19, and today only 5.  We of course put this data at the disposal of the Romanian military leadership.”

Ferenc Karpati:  “A Securitate erői ellen hosszú, küzdelmes harcot folytattak a hadsereg és a forradalom más erői. Felszámolásuk érdekében a Magyar Honvédség speciális képzettségu rádióbemérő egységeinek egy részét átcsoportosítottuk a román államhatár közelébe, s így sikerült rádióállomásaikat bemérni, álláshelyeiket pontosan meghatározni. Az adatok átadásával jelentősen elősegítettük a Securitate-bázisok felszámolását.”  KÁRPÁTI FERENC: A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése

1990. január 11., csütörtök 18:55


A Honvédelmi Minisztérium közleménye (4. rész) (OS)
A kezdeti időszakban, amikor a diktátorhoz hű Securitate a
forradalom vérbe fojtására jelentős erőket vetett be, a Magyar
Néphadsereg speciális képzettségű rádióbemérő alakulatainak egy
részét átcsoportosította a magyar-román államhatár közelébe a
Securitate rádióállomásainak bemérésére, helyeinek meghatározására.
Ezeknek az adatoknak az átadásával, az adók bemért földrajzi
helyeinek megjelölésével feltehetően segítséget nyújtott a Magyar
Néphadsereg a Securitate-bázisok felszámolásában, megsemmisítésében.
Szinte napról napra érzékelhető volt ezek számának csökkenése, ami a
magyar szakértők szerint arról tanúskodott, hogy a diktátorhoz hű
erők törzseit a román hadsereg folyamatosan számolja fel. Ezt
példázza, hogy a december 26-án nyilvánosságra hozottak szerint
24-én még 31, 25-én már 19 és 26-án csupán öt
Securitate-rádióközpont működését rögzítették és mérték be a magyar
rádiófelderítő és bemérő alegységek.

25-27 December 1989

Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.  (Gheorghe Ratiu, interview by Ilie Neacsu (episode 17), Europa, 7-22 March 1995, cited in Hall 1997, p. 366.)

Gheorghe Ratiu (fost sef al Directiei I a Securitatii):  “La ordinul generalului Vlad, in zilele de 25-27 decembrie 1989, am coordonat o investigatie in spitalele si morgile Capitalei pentru a stabili care este adevarul in legatura cu ‘teroristii straini’ despre care se tot relata la televiziune si in presa.  Toate unitatiile spitalicesti si morga de la Institutul Medico-Legal, fusesera preluate in paza de catre armata.  La inceput, ofiterilor trimisi de mine nu li s-a permis intrarea in nici unul din aceste obiective, cu toate ca, oficial, de la data de 23 decembrie devenisem seful Directiei de Infromatii Interne a Armatei.  Pentru a strapunge acest baraj instituit, de forte oculte, am apelat si am primit sprijinul procurorului general Popovici, a ministrului adjunct dr. Iacob de la Ministerul Sanatatii, si a generalului Vasile, inca sef al Directiei de contrainformatii militare.  Am format astfel, patru echipe conduse de cate un procuror si din care mai faceau parte, cate un ofiter de contrainformatii cu uniforma al legitimatii cu uniforma si legitimatie de la Ministerul Apararii  Nationale [!!!], un ofiter de la directia mea si un inspector de la Directia sanitara a Municipului Bucuresti.  Aceste echipe au reusit sa patrunda peste tot [!!!], mai putin la Spitalul Militar Central…Rezultatul a fost ca in tara murisera in acea perioada doar patru cetateni straini…Deci, nici un terorist strain [!!!]“

Gheorghe Ratiu, interviu luat de Ilie Neacsu, Europa, episoade XVII si XVIII, martie-aprilie 1995.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

28 December 1989

Constantin Catalin-Ceferistul:  “Pe 28 decembrie am predat patru cetateni de nationalitate araba.  Aveau pasaport, Republica Irak.” (Expres Magazin, nr. 22 (1991))

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

30-31 December 1989

(To my pleasant surprise, I discovered the AFP (Agence France Presse) Archive online.  I finally dug into my pocket and purchased for approximately 3 euros an article the following articles.)

Anatomy of a Cover-up (or Constanta, we have a problem…):  In the waning days of December 1989 following the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu on Christmas Day, several high-ranking officials from Romania’s military and commercial navy stationed in and around Constanta recounted to foreign reporters details of what had happened off the Black Sea Coast during the previous week and a half…That they spoke out of turn and were entirely too honest could be surmised by the effort of Bucharest–and those directly charged with the overall governance and defense of the country–to deny the revelations out of Constanta.  It was the beginning of the cover-up of the Counter-Revolution of December 1989 and it was done precisely because of the involvement of foreign mercenaries in fighting side by side with elements of the Securitate who opposed the ouster of Nicolae Ceausescu.  (So, indeed, the cover-up was initiated by Romania’s new civil and military leaders to avoid international ramifications (the ultimate state function, regardless of regime, in a world of nation-states)…it would be continued by others.)

One wonders what would have happened had this series of reports been laid out in sequence and analyzed as a sequence.  There seems to have been more coverage of them (abroad) in the Budapest (see below), rather than Bucharest, press.  One of the few references in the literature on December 1989 is on page 66 of Nestor Ratesh’s Romania: The Entangled Revolution (1991), where Ratesh notes a (31 December 1989) Agence France Presse dispatch citing the office of naval commander Constantin Iordache on Soviet and Bulgarian information that helicopters were being launched by suspicious ships approximately 60 miles off the coast, as well as a later denial by other Romanian authorities of the existence of these helicopters.  As one can see below, the five AFP reports on the subject, from 30 and 31 December 1989, and 2 and 3 January 1990, are far more detailed, diverse, and damning than Ratesh’s allusion would suggest.

Note:  Not everything at this point had “disappeared”:  General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).

Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably:  The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.

Robert Cullen, “Report from Romania:  Down with the Tyrant,” The New Yorker, 2 April 1990.

Late the next night, Romanian television showed Ceausescu’s corpse, lying in a pool of blood.  After that, the Securitate resistance wilted, although sporadic sniping continued for a week or so.  It turned out that not all of the Securitate fighters were Romanian.  A ranking member of the National Salvation Front told me that about a hundred of them, including some who fought the longest, were from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries with histories of involvement in terrorism.  They had come to Romania ostensibly as exchange students, but had in fact received commando training.  In return, they agreed to serve the Securitate for several years.  As these foreigners were captured, and rumors–accurate ones–about their origins began to spread, the Front publicly denied that any Arabs had been involved with the Securitate.  It did so because it wished to avoid any trouble in relations with the Arab world, the Front official explained.  I asked what would become of the captured Arab commandos, and he responded by silently drawing his index finger across his throat.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

1-2 January 1990

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:

I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias.  He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate].  He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him.  Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.[9]

[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea:  “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.

Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

7 January 1990

Ion Medoia, “Teroristi prinsi pe teritoriul Iugoslaviei,” Romania Libera, 10 ianuarie 1990.

d. Stire de senzatie
Autoritatile iugoslave au arestat ieri 63 de teroristi, care au participat la masacrele de la Timisoara, Sibiu si Bucuresti. Cand vor fi predati inapoi, vom releva detalii semnificative.
(publicat in ziarul Renasterea banateana, Timisoara, 07.01.1990,pe prima pagina, fara titlu si nesemnat, dar incadrat in chenar)
N.R. La vremea respectiva colonelul Nicolae Predonescu, reprezentant al conducerii Garnizoanei militare Timisoara la Consiliul judetean FSN Timis si totodata membru al respectivului Consiliu, a informat, inclusiv pe presedintele Consiliului judetean FSN Timis, Lorin Ioan Fortuna, ca va pleca, impreuna cu o delegatie militara, la solicitarea

http://lorin-fortuna.ro/reviste/politica_nationala/Trimestrul_1_din_2004/html/index.htm


—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

9 January 1990

FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62

According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

11 January 1990

Mai tirziu in 11 ianuarie [1990], cind toata lumea spunea iarasi ‘civili sa predea armele’ impreuna cu Cercel Doina Rebeca am intrat in buncarul subteran din CC si am mai prins inca opt insi.  Au tras–daca nu era Rebeca era a treia oara cind muream….

———————————————————————————————————–

9 January 1990; 11-17 January 1990

Lt. Col. Alexandru Bodea (no. 22 May 1990 Armata Poporului):On 9 January 1990, between the hours of 21:55 and 23:14, on the radar screens of the missile managers of one of the subordinate subunits there were detected signals coming from about 12 unidentified aircraft, that were deploying, at a height of 300 to 1800 meters, in the direction of a nearby locality.The following day, between the hours of 03:00 and 04:15 again were detected the signals of six airships, after which—the same—between 17:00-18:00 and 21:30—the same type of signals, several aerial targets hovering at altitudes between 300-3000 meters, in the same direction as the previous day.Then, as if to boost the belief of the missile officers that this was no accident, on the third day, 11 January, between the hours 0400-0500, again there appeared the signals of 7 unidentified aircraft, having essentially the same flight characteristics.  What is curious is that not a single one of these targets was observed visually and no characteristic engine sounds were heard in the respective locations.But even more curious is that, just then, from the central radio base of a nearby municipality, there arrived a communications unit that intercepted foreign signals on a particular bandwidth, in impulses, while on another frequency an intense traffic in Arabic or Turkish was noted.In light of this information, the commander of the unit organized a radio inspection of numerous areas, with the help of transmissions’ equipment.  Therefore, on 11 January 1990, between 1120 and 1130 on the respective frequency were received the code signs in English, 122 calling 49, 38, 89, 11, 82, 44, 38, 84, and asked if they “were doing well.”From the fragments of discussions it could be understood that they were making references to explosives, hospitals, medicines, and wounded “for the hours 1400.”  At 1330, on the same frequency, once again were intercepted conversations in which there was mention of wounded and requests for help.  The transmissions were received over this, in which a more feminine voice and a dog’s bark could be clearly heard.  References were made to the preceding conversations that were to follow at 1800, 1900, 2200, and then on 12 January 1990, at 0910.Chatting with some citizens from the local area where these targets and foreign radio traffic were intercepted, the commander of the anti-aircraft unit to whom we referred found out that nearby there exists a wooded road (author’s note: the locality is in a mountainous area), surrounded by two rows of barbed wire, a road on which in fact there is no lumber transport.  Not by chance, since before the Revolution, the road was off-limits and was under the strict guard of the Securitate.  [emphasis added]These same citizens further informed the unit’s commander, that after the Revolution, the road in question did not become a no-man’s land, remaining instead in the hands of people dressed as woodsmen but about whom those from the local lumber collective had no clue.Who could these unknown “woodsmen” be?  And what “affairs” did they have there?  Perhaps exactly…[article concludes]

“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor.  Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare.  Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122″ chema indicativele “49″, “38″, “89″, “11″, “82″, “44″, “38″, “84″, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00″.  La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare.  Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine.  S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere.  Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti?  Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo?  Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor.  Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?”
Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), mai 1990.)

asemenea actiuni de diversiune radio-electronica s-au mai inregistrat si in zilele de 11 si 17 ianuarie, deci aproape la o luna dupa Revolutie…

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

16 January 1990:  (Date of film procured by Ted Koppel and ABC News showing underground tunnels used by the “terrorists”)

Monday, March 5 (1990). 

Bucharest.  Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling.  Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied.  Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.

We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest.  An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over.  I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs.  “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel.  I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels.  The colonel went off to consult with his man.  When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.”  “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described.  “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.

Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook.  The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.


Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

18 January 1990

On Thursday morning [18 January 1990], for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.  In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.  This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television. [NYT 1/22/1990]

Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Rumanians Call for Freedom in Schools

By DAVID BINDER, Special to The New York Times
Published: January 22, 1990

BUCHAREST, Rumania, Jan. 21— Student leaders, addressing a crowd of about 3,000 of their classmates today, demanded far-reaching changes in the faculties of Bucharest University and other Rumanian institutions of higher learning.

The strongest demand, and the one cheered most loudly by the students, was for the ouster of professors most closely associated with the Communist dictatorship of the late Nicolae Ceausescu, particularly those working for the Securitate, or state security police.

”There are Securitate officers on the journalism faculty,” a student, Daniel Oghian, declared. He assailed Professor Radu Florian as a Ceausescu holdover whose advocacy of Communist ideology was particularly objectionable. Mr. Florian is a member of the Stefan Gheorgiu Academy, where Securitate officials were trained. The academy was grafted onto Bucharest University under the Ceausescu Government.

”Down with Florian!” the students chanted. ”Down with Stefan Gheorgiu! Depoliticize! Depoliticize!” ‘Militarized’ Classrooms Mihai Iliescu, a physics student, drew cheers when he declared that incompetent professors should be sent back to ”study their lessons over again” or be forced to resign. He also called for the ouster of the Ministry of Education’s inspector of universities.

Another speaker, from the Marine Sciences Institute in Constanta, said that his college had been ”militarized” and subjected to Securitate control under Mr. Ceausescu. Conditions were such that students were quartered 50 to a single room, he said, and buildings were unheated.

”Take it over!” the students shouted. ”Take it over!” It was the second rally in two weeks in the capital. The first was held at the Polytechnical Institute in western Bucharest. But this time the students gathered in University Square in the middle of the city under the auspices of a newly-formed Student League.

In passionate speeches commemorating classmates who were killed in the uprising that toppled the Ceausescu regime four weeks ago, the students said they wanted to create ”a new society” and ”a strong Rumania.”

”We speak from our hearts for those who were killed in the revolution,” said Mihai Gheorghiu, a third-year philosophy student. Dan Josif, another student, said, ”They fought with weapons, and we carried flowers.”

Government Is Silent on Protest

The students, many cradling lighted candles in their hands, bowed their heads in a minute of silence for their slain classmates, then raised their voices in four stanzas of the long-banned hymn ”Awake, Ye Rumanians,” which denounces ”barbarians and tyrants.”

There were no Government spokesmen at the rally. Nor was there any immediate reaction from the governing Council of National Salvation, although its President, Ion Iliescu, met with youth leaders today to discuss a future group for Rumanian young people to replace the Communist youth organization.

It has generally been impossible to obtain precise information about or reactions to daily events in Rumania from the Government, which closed its foreign press and telephone service on Saturday, even from its spokesman, although he holds periodic news conferences.

On Thursday morning, for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.

In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.

This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television.

Photos: Students in Bucharest demonstrating yesterday for far-reaching changes at universities, including the ouster of faculty members the students say were supporters of the deposed dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. (AP); A student at the rally mourning a relative killed in the revolution. (Reuters)

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

24 January 1990

A cryptic message announcing the abrogation of unspecified secret accords with unspecified countries carried out by the Ceausescu regime, but not contained in the registries of the Foreign Ministry and in contravention of international law (in other words, Plan Z-Z, an accord with several Middle Eastern states, most importantly perhaps Qadhafi’s Libya)…24 January 1990 appears to have also been–not coincidentally–the last day “foreign terrorists” who had fought with the Securitate against Ceausescu’s downfall were exfiltrated from the country–reputedly following a threat to Romanian workers in Libya by Qadhafi if the remaining Arab mercenaries in Romanian custody were not allowed to leave the country…WHY OH WHY, WE ARE CONSTANTLY ASKED, DID ILIESCU, ROMAN, AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT NOT PUT THE “TERRORISTS” ON TRIAL:  HERE IS YOUR ANSWER, THEY WERE COMPLICIT IN ALLOWING THEM TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND THEREFORE LACKED A KEY ELEMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECEMBER BLOODSHED.  THE TRUTH ABOUT THE REVOLUTION WAS THUS COMPROMISED, BURIED ON THAT FATEFUL DAY OF 24 JANUARY 1990.

Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul Z-Z si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 septembrie 1990.

Dupa citeva saptamini presedintele unei tari direct implicate a amenintat guvernul roman ca va recurge la represalii impotriva celor citeva mii de cetateni romani aflati cu contract de munca in tara respectiva daca nu vor fi returnati teroristii straini, vii sau morti.  Santajul respectiv si-a facut efectul si un avion romanesc a efectuat o cursa mai putin obisnuita catre un aeroport polonez, de unde o “incarcatura” mai putin obisnuita constind in persoane valide, raniti si cosciuge a fost transferata pe un alt avion, plecand intr-o directie necunoscuta.  In ziua aceea se stergeau orice urme ale planului “Z-Z”

24 ianuarie 1990

The End…of “The End of the End”

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , | 2 Comments »