The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘Nicolae Ceausescu decembrie 1989’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #21 The “Bizarre” Tactics of the Terrorists

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 27, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

What would it have looked like if Nicolae Ceausescu’s Securitate executed a plan to counter an invasion…but the invaders never came?

Answer:  Well, you would have something that looked suspiciously similar to what actually happened in December 1989 in Romania…

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ )

A military aviation official, Colonel Mircea Budiaci, described the characteristics of the so-called “radio-electronic war” the armed forces faced, as follows:“…we were confronted with a powerful adversary which operated on the basis of long-prepared plans which were centrally directed and permanently adapted to changing conditions.  [They attacked] by radio-electronic means by creating signals on our radar identical to those which represented real targets.  When they reached a distance between 800 and 1500 meters from an object on the ground they would simulate gunfire of various types of weapons.  These two things created the image of an air attack.  They were combined with ground attacks, real or false, with various types of telephone calls by identified or unidentified callers, and with the spreading of rumors…on our operating frequencies there were conversations between what were presumed to be aircraft in flight and base command.  You didn’t know what to make of it, and the confusion was intensified by the fact that they were speaking not only in Romanian, but also in English, Turkish, and Arabic…You can imagine in what a situation we had to perform our duties…” (Colonel Mircea Budiaci, interview by Maior D. Amariei, “NU!  Teroristii n-au avut elicoptere,’ Armata Poporului, 21 March 1990, p. 4.) https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/04/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-8-usla-and-friends/

Questioned by a reporter in 1992 if the Television station had ever really been in danger, Militaru responded:

No….You see, not even those of our commanders who were responsible for the defense of such objectives thought through and analyzed well enough exactly whom they were confronting. Because the adversary did not have an extraordinary number of men with which to take an object such as the TV tower by assault. They [the Army commanders] did, however, have to face a very well-equipped, well-prepared, and perfidious enemy. Not having sufficient forces, they [the “terrorists”] resorted to “gunfire simulators” which caused extraordinary confusion. They thus sought to do something completely different: to infiltrate…They succeeded in infiltrating into the TV station…[69]
[69].. Nicolae Militaru, interview by Corneliu Antim, “Ordinul 2600 in Revolutia din decembrie,” Romania Libera, 17 December 1992, 2.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/

 

Through the years, the Romanian media–and especially former Securitate officers or collaborators in the Romanian media–have been very good about telling us the role of the Army in the event of a foreign invasion–but they have neglected to tell us about the planned role of Securitate units.

In fact, the tactics of the “terrorists” in December 1989 are strikingly similar to what was described in the journal of the Securitate (available on the CNSAS.ro site):

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Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

Actiunile de lupta desfasurate de formatiunile de rezistenta prezinta citeva caracteristici, altfel:  de regula, sint de scurta durata si violente, avind aspectul unor lovituri fulgeratoare; vizeaza in principal obiective ale inamicului de o dezvoltare mai redusa, dar de mare importanta pentru acesta; au un pronuntat caracter de independenta, ducindu-se in conditiile lipsei unor vecini apropriati si a sprijinului altor forte militare; se desfasoara cu forte relativ putin numeroase; necesita o minutioasa si, uneori, indelungata pregatire a luptatorilor participanti la actiune; impun cunoasterea amanuntita a particularitatilor terenului in care va avea loc actiunea, precum si elaborarea unui plan simplu, usor de aplicat; se desfasoara, de regula, noaptea si in conditii grele de stare a vremii, in momente si locuri in care sa se realizeze surprinderea inamicului…

Members of the Romanian Armed Forces have hinted at their suspicion that in December 1989 Securitate forces were executing attacks and disinformation in conformity with the “lupta de rezistenta” concept…

(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor.  Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21″), 30 mai 1990.  Xerox-ul facut in anul 1994 la Biblioteca Academiei Romane).

Mai mult decit atit, a fost cunoscut si folosit in scop de diversiune inclusiv sistemul de transmisiuni pentru conducerea si instiintarea trupelor de aparare antiaeriana a teritoriului.  In majoritatea cazurilor, pregatirea actiunilor de lupta, aeriana si terestre, s-a desfasurat pe timp de noapte, probabil cu forte si mijloace dispuse din timp in zonele respective, dar si cu altele redislocati pe parcurs.  In aceasta ordine de idei, exista suficiente date si informatii care ne indreptatesc sa afirmam ca toate actiunile aeriene au fost declansate–fie real (cu ajutorul unor mijloace si dispozitive adecvate de creare a tintelor aeriene false), fie imitate (cu o aparatura radioelectronica moderna)–din interiorul tarii si, de regula, din aceleasi zone in raionele unor localitatii pe care, din motive pe care nu este aici cauza sa le explicam, nu le vom divulga.

Am adauga ca, in conceptia doctrinara referitoare la apararea patriei de catre intregul popor, elaborata ‘sub obladuirea fostului comandant suprem’ a existat, atit sub aspect teoretic, metodologic, cit si practic, o sustinuta preocupare, mai ales in ultimii ani, pentru fundamentarea conceptului de ‘razboi de rezistenta’ si de pregatire, inca din timp de pace, a unor formatiuni ‘de rezistenta’ si a unor ‘zone libere’ si raioane de pe teritoriu in care, in cazul ocuparii unor parti din teritoriul national, vor actiona asa-zise ‘grupuri sau detasamente de rezistenta.’

Dar se parea ca ‘serialul nocturn’ al atacurilor teroriste incepe sa-si arate anumite ‘tipicuri’–daca le putem numi asa–care ar fi meritat sa fie mai judicios analizate si luate in calcul pentru luarea unor masuri mai eficiente de contracarare.  Toate atacurile terestre ale teroristilor erau executate exclusiv pe timp de noapte si, de regula, in doua ‘reprize’ a circa o jumatate de ora fiecare, una in prima parte a noptii (aproximativ intre orele 22-23) si alta spre ziua (in jurul 02-03).  Executate de grupuri mici de teroristi–dar niste profesionisti ai luptei de gherila avind un armament de inalta precizie, dotat cu sisteme optice de ochire pe timp de noapte–atacurile nu vizua insa altceva decit intretinirea unei atmosfere stresante, de tensiune, de amenintare permanenta, pentru mentinirea intregului efectiv (pe cit posibil!) in cazarma, intr-o permanenta stare de lupta, pentru a-l uza si a-l determina sa-si iroseasca o cantitate de mai mare din resursele de munitie.

Even the former head of the Securitate, General Iulian Vlad, admitted in a very judiciously worded declaration from 29 January 1990 that the “terrorists” were from the Securitate.  (Significantly, this declaration has never appeared in the Romanian press, and even since its revelation by General Ioan Dan it has been consistently ignored.  It is, to say the least, painful and difficult for the deniers to address.)

General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

  1. a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

  1. b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.
  2. c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.
  3. d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.
  4. e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

  1. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

  1. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);
  2. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;
  3. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

Generalul Mircea Mocanu, comandantul CAAT în 1989, declara în faţa Comisiei Senatoriale pentru Cercetarea Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989 că România s-a confruntat în mod cert, în timpul Revoluţiei, cu ceea ce se numeşte „război electronic”. El explică câteva dintre metodele unei astfel de operaţiuni. „Ulterior au fost găsite pe teritoriul ţării mai multe baloane tip meteo, cu materialul din plastic sfâşiat de schije; de baloane atârnau reflectoare poliedrice, adică un schelet de lemn cu foiţă de staniol în măsură să reflecte undele electromagnetice emise de staţiile de radio­­locaţie. Pe cutie – o brumă de aparatură, pe care scria în limba rusă «fabricat în URSS»; aveau şi o etichetă pe care scria în limba maghiară: «Cine aduce la organele locale un asemenea obiect primeşte 50 de forinţi»”Citeste mai mult: adevarul.ro/news/societate/video-misterele-revolutiei-diversiunea-radioelectronica-sovieticii-americaniii-1_50ad127b7c42d5a6638e4c95/index.html

 

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

In fact, the tactics of the “terrorists” in December 1989 are strikingly similar to what was described in the journal of the Securitate (available on the CNSAS.ro site):

Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

– desfasurarea unor activitati de dezinformare a inamicului cu privire la actiunile fortelor proprii…

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Let’s take a look at some of the claims made about the character and content of the disinformation–especially as pertains to the so-called “radioelectronic war”–as it transpired in December 1989:

volumul Armata romana in revolutia din decembrie 1989 (Editura Militara)

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Apreciem că, în acelaşi context, prezintă o oarecare importanţă şi aspectul semnalat în NOTA S.R.I. transmisă comisiei cu nr. S/9.022/1992 şi anume: „… În ziua de 2 ianuarie 1990 a fost reţinut la Unitatea militară 01929 Reşiţa, alături de alte cadre de securitate fostul şef al Serviciului „T”, cpt.(r.) Berinde Florin. Cu ocazia anchetelor la care a fost supus de către unele cadre militare ale M.Ap.N. şi organe ale procuraturii militare, acesta a relatat că, în ziua de 23 decembrie 1989, în jurul orelor 1500, pe când se efectuau acordurile pe scala staţiei R-105, pentru menţinerea legăturii, conform celor convenite anterior, s-au auzit convorbiri în limba rusă, ce aveau intonaţii puternice, de ordin. La auzul acestor mesaje lt.col. Măriuţa Gheorghe de la fostul organ de miliţie, cel mai mare în grad dintre cei prezenţi, a dat ordin să se închidă staţia pentru a nu afla şi alte cadre şi a nu crea o stare de panică în rândul efectivelor. Din cele relatate rezultă că aceste convorbiri se auzeau deosebit de clar se transmiteau de aproape, fără zgomot de fond fâsâit sau bruiaj. Acelaşi ofiţer a mai relatat că, în împrejurările de mai sus a discutat şi cu cpt.ing. Brencea Constantin, care i-a spus că începând cu 23 decembrie 1989 şi ei au fost bruiaţi pe sistemul de transmisiuni radioreleu pe unde scurte, pe toate canalele posibile cu semnale care emit fie convorbiri în limba rusă, fie un fel de triluri muzicale, iar pe radiolocatoare au fost bruiaţi prin generarea unui semnal care imita ţinte reale…”.

https://sites.google.com/site/problemeistorice/raport-final-comisia-senatoriala-decembrie-1989-sectiunea-5

Generalul Mircea Mocanu, comandantul CAAT în 1989, declara în faţa Comisiei Senatoriale pentru Cercetarea Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989 că România s-a confruntat în mod cert, în timpul Revoluţiei, cu ceea ce se numeşte „război electronic”. El explică câteva dintre metodele unei astfel de operaţiuni. „Ulterior au fost găsite pe teritoriul ţării mai multe baloane tip meteo, cu materialul din plastic sfâşiat de schije; de baloane atârnau reflectoare poliedrice, adică un schelet de lemn cu foiţă de staniol în măsură să reflecte undele electromagnetice emise de staţiile de radio­­locaţie. Pe cutie – o brumă de aparatură, pe care scria în limba rusă «fabricat în URSS»; aveau şi o etichetă pe care scria în limba maghiară: «Cine aduce la organele locale un asemenea obiect primeşte 50 de forinţi»”.

http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/video-misterele-revolutiei-diversiunea-radioelectronica-sovieticii-americaniii-1_50ad127b7c42d5a6638e4c95/index.html

Reflectori poliedrici cu marca “Fabricat in URSS”
Faptul ca pe langa tintele false au existat si tinte reale este sustinut in cadrul raportului MApN de gasirea, in diferite locuri, a unor baloane asemanatoare cu cele utilizate in meteorologie. Neobisnuit insa, aceste baloane aveau acrosati reflectori poliedrici  care puteau induce pe ecranele de radiolocatie semnale similare celor provenind de la o aeronava reala. Pe cutia aparaturii acrosata baloanelor distruse s-au gasit inscriptii in limba rusa sau engleza cu “Fabricat in URSS”. Raportul militar mai mentioneaza un aspect greu de crezut, un fel de fantezie, si care pare mai degraba o influenta a curentului antimaghiar dezvoltat preponderent in randurile cadrelor armatei, indoctrinate sub comunism, din acea perioada, si anume ca mai existau “atasate biletele in limba maghiara prin care se promiteau aducatorilor acestor obiecte recompense de 150 forinti”. Era si o perioada in care teoria conspiratiei incerca sa justifice evenimentele din perioada Revolutiei. Sa nu uitam ca si Ceausescu, la fel ca si cadrele Armatei si Securitatii, avea aceasta obsesie a “cetatenilor straini care vor sa destabilizeze tara si sa fure Transilvania”. Ceea ce militarii specializati si procurorii militari au denumit, la inceputul anilor ’90, razboiul radio-electronic a amplificat starea emotiva a unei parti din participantii la Revolutie, care faceau periodic trimiteri la eventuale forte straine, solicitand implicit interventii din partea Armatei si a grupurilor de civili inarmati.

Elicopterul rusesc a ramas in urma
Mai multi tanchisti din batalionul de tancuri de la Targoviste, dislocat pentru apararea Ministerului Apararii Nationale si pentru intarirea dispozitivelor de paza din zona, au sustinut ca, incercand sa-si racordeze frecventele radio, au surprins fragmente din conversatii in limba rusa identificate ca avand drept sursa o formatiune de elicoptere. Din convorbirile interceptate, traduse de inginerul Simion Barbu, rezulta ca era vorba de o formatiune de zbor careia ii ramasese in urma un elicopter, aparat ce ar fi fost pilotat de o femeie. In transmisiunea radio, pilotul isi justifica ramanerea in urma si desprinderea de formatie prin defectiuni survenite la aparat, iar comandantul formatiunii i-a transmis ordinul sa pastreze aceeasi altitudine si acelasi itinerar pana in momentul in care va reusi sa realizeze contactul cu formatiunea de care apartinea.

http://m.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/prigoana-vantului-diversiunea-elicopterelor-cu-teroristi-libieni-142385.html

Amiralul (r) Gheorghe Anghelescu*** rememorează la rândul său: „Acţiunile noastre au început să se desfăşoare atunci când ne aşteptăm mai puţin. În noaptea de 22-23 decembrie, pe ecranele
radiolocatoarelor sistemului de observare electronic al Marinei şi Apărării Antiaeriene a teritoriului au apărut nenumărate nave, avioane şi
elicoptere, care toate se îndreptau spre litoralul nostru. Prin reţelele radio se primeau cele mai diverse informaţii care confirmau această mare acţiune aeronavală ostilă. Totul părea incredibil. În portul Constanţa navele comerciale aveau indicii că sunt minate de scafandri inamici, de pe litoral, posturile de observare ne semnalau elicoptere, navele civile şi platformele petroliere marine descopereau şi informau despre ţinte aeriene, în reţelele radio se intensifica frecvenţa convorbirilor în limba rusă, arabă şi engleză; toate acestea ne-au făcut să percepem ca reală o agresiune aeronavală”.
Ţintele se îndreptau către plajele Mamaia, Mangalia, Sf. Gheorghe şi Sulina, zone propice efectuării de desantări de trupe. Rapoartele primite înştiinţau prezenţa elicopterelor în largul Mării Negre, în zona platformelor de foraj marin.

http://surrysipluta.blogspot.com/2010/12/decembrie-1989-si-caietele.html

Cine sunt agresorii din decembrie? Îi vom cunoaşte vreodată pe cei care au bântuit cerul în acele zile? Uimirea miltarilor a atins apogeul, când s-a constatat corelarea perfectă a evenimentelor din teren cu cele aeriene şi convorbirile radio: “04 către 34 … Staţia S, defectă … mergem numai 18 … unitatea de lângă noi a tras cu mitraliere, tunuri şi rachete”. Toate aceste convorbiri radio, se refereau la probleme concrete, la acţiuni reale; sau un alt caz: “se poate decola pentru că S.R.C. (staţia radiolocaţie cercetare) nu lucrează … aruncarea în aer a containerului …”Asemenea convorbiri se amestecau cu altele în limba rusă, arabă, engleză.

După data de 28 decembrie, atât numărul ţintelor reperate cât şi traficul radio, au căzut, ajungând la zero. Dealtfel şi fragmentele de conversaţii interceptate sugerau o retragere spre “bazele proprii”.  (Carol Roman, “Enigmele ale Revolutiei Romane din ’89”)

http://revista.balcanii.ro/index_html?editia=94-95&page=revolutia&nr=2

Simultan in circuitile telefonice, radio, si chiar de comanda (da, nu este o exagerare!) se inregistreaza o avalansa de ordine si informatii, atit in limba romana, cit si in engleza, araba, si turca.

Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bordea, “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor,” Armata Poporului, nr. 19 (9 mai 1990), p.2.

Convorbirile erau purtate in mai multe limbi, preponderent in engleza (cu un pronuntat accent arab), dar si in italiana, turca, bulgara, sirba, si romana…

Mai mult:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/razboiul-radio-electronic-noiembrie-1989-ianuarie-1990/

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (VI) plus BONUS: de ce a ocolit zona Moldovei razboiul radioelectornic?!!!

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (V)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (IV)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (III)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (II)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (I)

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ ; xeroxes below are from 1994 and 1997, Bucharest and Cluj)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

ALL THE RUSSIAN TOURISTS, WHERE DO THEY ALL COME FROM?…WHERE DO THEY ALL BELONG?

A modest proposal:  In order to operate in a country under foreign occupation and to confuse the foreign occupier, the “nuclee de rezistenta” would need equipment that could pass for that of the occupier.  In the previous episode, we saw this possibility with the weather balloon, with Russian writing, but a fictitious address in Budapest.  Since Nicolae Ceausescu was afraid most of all of a Soviet invasion, the “resistance fighters” would need to be able to appear or pass themselves off as Soviets/Russians themselves.  Is it then possible that the former Securitate’s insistence upon mentioning the presence of convoys of male Soviet tourists in Russian cars with Soviet plates is an admission–stripped out of context–that these cars and their occupants were part of the “resistance war” so long planned for and which we have seen awarded a critical, though until now not publicized, role to the Securitate?

Valer Marian’s revelations in September 1990 are VERY interesting in this regard…

Monica N. Marginean:  Sa revenim la datele concrete ale regiei de care vorbeam anterior.  Cum arata, de pilda, povestea atit de dezbatuta la procesul lui Nicu Ceausescu a cursei ROMBAC, daca o privim din perspectiva Comisiei de ancheta?

fostul procuror Marian Valer:  In mod normal, cursa de avion Bucuresti-Sibiu trebuia sa decoleze de pe aeroportul Baneasa, la orele 17,10 folosindu-se pe acest traseu avioane marca Antonov.  In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, insa, in jurul orelor 17, deci in apropierea orei prevazute pentru decolarea cursei obisnuite, pasagerii pentru Sibiu au fost invitati si dusi la Aeroportul Otopeni unde au fost imbarcati intr-un avion marca ROMBAC care a decolat in jurul orelor 18,30 si a aterizat pe aeroportul Sibiu in jur de ora 19.  Fac precizarea ca in dupa-amiaza aceleiasi zile, cu aproape 2 ore inaintea decolarii acestei curse, a aterizat pe aeroportul Otopeni avionul prezidential cu care Ceausescu s-a reintors din Iran. Conform datelor furnizate de agentia TAROM Bucuresti, in avionul respectiv spre Sibiu au fost imbarcati 81 pasageri.  In radiograma cursei sint consemnate domiciile doar la o parte din pasageri, cu mentiunea ca unele sint incomplete, lipsind fie localitatea, fie strada, fie numarul, iar la restul pasagerilor figureaza doar mentiunile ,rezervat’ sau Pasaport RSR.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, au putut fi identificati doar 44 de pasageri, majoritatea avind domiciliul in municipul si judetul Sibiu, stabilindu-se ca au fost persoane trimise in delegatie la foruri tutelare din capitala, sau studenti plecati in vacanta, iar citiva domiciliati in judetul Alba.  Mentionez ca asupra acestor persoane nu planeaza nici un dubiu.  Dubiile sint create insa in primul rind de faptul ca mai multi pasageri figureaza cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, dar in realitate nu domiciliaza la adresele consemnate, iar la unele adrese sint intreprinderi.  Un alt element creator de dubii il constituie prezenta in avionul respectiv a unui inspector de la Departmentul Aviatiei Civile, cu numele de Nevrozeanu, care nu figureaza pe lista pasagerilor si cu privire la care s-a stabilit ca, in trecut, se deplasa cu avionul in cazuri speciale doar pe relatia Moscova, fiind un bun cunoscator al limbii ruse.  Mai multi pasageri sustin ca in partea dreapta din fata a avionului au sesizat un grup de barbati, mai inalti, atletici, imbracati sportiv, multi dintre ei fiind blonzi, grup care li s-a parut suspect.  Aceste afirmatii se coroboreaza cu faptul ca in zona respectiva a avionului nu a stat nici unul din pasagerii identificati.  Mai mult, verificindu-se la hotelurile din municipiul Sibiu persoane care aveau numele celor 37 de persoane neidentificate, s-a constatat ca doar un pasager neidentificat care figureaza pe listele TAROM-ului cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, care nu exista la adresa respectiva din localitate, a fost cazat la hotelul Bulevard, dar in registrul de evidenta figureaza cu un alt domiciliu din Bucuresti.  Ambele domicilii, si cei din diagrama TAROM si cel de la hotel sint false.  Cu ocazia acelorasi verificari s-a constatat ca in perioada respectiva in hotelurile din Sibiu au fost cazati multi turisti sovietici, in special la Imparatul Romanilor, Continental, si Bulevard, situate in zona centrala a municipiului.  Fac mentiunea ca din hotelurile respective s-a tras asupra manifestantilor si a armatei. Am omis sa precizez ca pe aeroportul Otopeni, in avionul ROMBAC au fost incarcate sute de colete identice ca format, dimensiuni si culoare, de marime apropriata unei genti diplomat, precum si ca, cu citeva minute inaintea decolarii cursei spre Sibiu, de pe acelasi aeroport au decolat curse ROMBAC spre Timisoara si Arad.  Consider ca, in legatura cu pasagerii neidentificati, sint posibile doua versiuni, respectiv sa fie au fost luptatorii U.S.L.A. trimisi in sprijinul lui Nicu Ceausescu, fie au fost agenti sovietici trimisi sa actioneze in scopul rasturnarii regimului Ceausescu.

Monica N. Marginean:  Ce alte demersuri a facut Comisia de ancheta pentru elucidarea misterului celor 37 de pasageri neidentificati?

Marian Valer:  Am luat contact cu unul din loctiitorii comandamentului trupelor U.S.L.A. din capitala, caruia i-am solicitat sa-mi puna la dispozitie pe cei trei insotitori U.S.L.A. ai avionului ROMBAC.  Loctiitorul mi-a spus ca acestia au fost audiati de un procuror militar si nu mai este de acord sa fie audiati inca o data.

Monica M. Maginean:  “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html (Submitted via the CIA publication review process January 2002, cleared without changes March 2002)

Reports Archive

East European Perspectives: April 17, 2002

17 April 2002, Volume  4, Number  8

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

Part 2: ‘Tourists Are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns…’ *

HOW THE ‘TOURISTS’ ENTRY INTO THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989 PARALLELS THE EXIT OF THE SECURITATE
In commenting in August 1990 upon how the details of the state’s case against him had changed since early in the year, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, ironically highlighted how Securitate forces had begun to fade away from the historiography of the December 1989 events. In the August 1990 interview from his prison cell with Ion Cristoiu’s “Zig-Zag” (mentioned above), Nicu discusses the “tourists” for which he was asked to find accommodations in the context of a group of mysterious passengers who had arrived by plane from Bucharest on the evening of 20 December 1989. We know that in the period immediately following these events, the then-military prosecutor, Anton Socaciu, had alleged that these passengers from Bucharest were members of the Securitate’s elite USLA unit (Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare) and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred in Sibiu during the December events (for a discussion, see Hall, 1996). In August 1990, however, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

The impact of this “reconsideration” by the authorities could be seen in the comments of Socaciu’s successor as military prosecutor in charge of the Sibiu case, Marian Valer (see Hall 1997a, pp. 314-315). Valer commented in September 1990 that investigations yielded the fact that there were 37 unidentified passengers on board the 20 December flight from Bucharest and that many of the other passengers maintained that “on the right side of the plane there had been a group of tall, athletic men, dressed in sporting attire, many of them blond, who had raised their suspicions.” While investigations revealed that during this time there “were many Soviet tourists staying in Sibiu’s hotels,” they also established that “military units were fired upon from Securitate safehouses located around these units as of the afternoon of 22 December, after the overturning of the Ceausescu regime.” He thus carefully concludes:

“As far as the unidentified passengers are concerned, there are two possible variants: Either they were USLA fighters sent to defend Nicu Ceausescu, or they were Soviet agents sent to act with the intent of overthrowing the Ceausescu regime” (“Expres,” no. 33, September 1990).

Thus, as the “tourists” began to enter the historiography of the December 1989 events, so the Securitate — specifically the USLA — began to disappear.

http://portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=3.615

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #615 on: March 08, 2010, 15:31:24 PM »

Fac apel la oricine care a fost in seara de 21 spre 22 (ora 11,30-11,50) pe strada(actuala)Revolutiei, sau a vazut autoturismele parcate vis-sa vis de fosta Brutarie Nesciuc trei albe si una rosu inchis “Lada”. Va intreb daca cele 11 persoane imbracate cu scurta albastre tip jeans,  pantaloni deschisi la culoare, doi cu caciula de blana, trei cu caciula de lana impletita de culoare inchisa, si restul cu capul gol care au intors autoturismele parcate din capatul strazii si incendierea acestora? Statura lor era atletica? Cine a mai vazut apoi aceste persoane (acest gen) in afara de Piatza Mare din 21 decembrie ora 11,30 cand l-au protejat pe domnul care a iesit in fatza scutierilor cu copilul ridicat pe maini? (in dreptul Casei Albastre)
Aceleasi persoane au fost si in data de 21 decembrie la ora 9 in fata intrarii in magazinul Dumbrava, cand au “jenat” fara nici o teama scutierii si politistii care incercau sa prinda persoanele care fugeau prin magazin…Mai apelez la locatarii Blocului de garsoniere “turn” din coltul Calea Dumbravii-Milea, sa ne trimita o informatie cu intamplarile din 23-25 de la etajul 7-8, cu persoanele in combinezon de culoare inchisa care au coborat pe partea dinspre magazin din balcon in balcon, inclusiv despre persoana decedata, daca are legatura cu acel incident.O alta intrebare extrem de importanta: stie cineva cine a organizat “filtrele” de pe strazile Sibiului?Va multumesc
O precizare: Autoturismele erau parcate pe str Dobrun inspre str. Berariei Era pe trotoarul brutariei particulare (Nescuc sau Cibu, nu mai stiu cum se chema)

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #623 on: March 11, 2010, 14:16:55 PM »

Acesti emanati, aceste lichele, nu-si puteau face jocurile, acapararea puterii totale, precum si inaintasii lor Dej si Ceausescu, decat prin forta represiunii armate. Parte din armata a reactionat pasnic, datorita onor ofitzeri care au dovedit mai multa logica, parte din armata a jucat rolul de dusman al romanilor. La Sibiu, avem tot mai multe date care intaresc teoria ca Dragomir a fost teroristul Nr. 1 in acele zile, ajutat si de grupul USLA trimis de la Bucuresti la Sibiu, pentru protectia lui NC, si care s-au reantors la “locul faptei” dupa ce l-a pus pe Nicu in siguranta. Ei au fost aceia care au comis executiile din Piatza Mare in ziua de 21 decembrie ora 11,45 cu primele victime ucise sau ranite. Au fost repartizati in patru puncte ale pietii: In podul Casei Albastre, in podul actualei Primarii, in podul de deasupra Tunelului Generalului si in podul de deasupra magazinului Moda. De aici, au deschis foc inspre demonstranti. Au deschis foc si pe data de 22 decembrie inspre hotelul Imparatul Romanilor din acelasi pod de deasupra Tunelului Generalului care avea corespondent cu celelalte poduri dinspre magazinul Covorul. Aceste grupe ale USLA nu aveau insemne de grad sau arma, nu purtau boneta militara si aveau la dispozitie doua microbuze ale unitatii 01512 care i-a transportat in tot acest timp. Un grup al USLA era incepand din ziua de 21 decembrie ora 07 la sediul Judetenei de partid, ocupand garajul din curtea din sapate cu munitie si armament special. Se poate descoperi foarte repede, numele persoanelor care au fost trimise la SIBIU cu Rombacul in dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, ca urmare a convorbirilor indelungate purtate de Nicu si Bucuresti, despre demonstratia anuntata pentru dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie de la Mag Dumbrava. In timpul convorbirii telefonice, in biroul lui Nicu se afla Traian Popsa, fostul director de la IJIM Sibiu, maiorul Dragomir, seful Garzilor judetene Pescaru, secretar al CJPCR Sibiu si Niculae Hurubean, prim secretar la Alba care se afla in trecere prin Sibiu. Aceste trupe USLA au purtat alternativ, combinezoane negre, uniforma militara sau haine civile…

————————————————————————————————————————————

Perhaps it should thus no be so surprising, that of all the people to talk with a former “KGB agent” in Romania, it was Sorin Rosca Stanescu, former USLA collaborator:

HOW THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH NEVERTHELESS GAINED MAINSTREAM CREDIBILITY AND ACCEPTANCE
How, then, did the “tourist” myth gain credibility and acceptance in the Romanian press, given its rather obvious pedigree in the remnants of the Ceausescu regime, especially among former high-ranking Securitate officers and others most in need of an alibi/diversion to save their careers and avoid the possibility of going to jail? Although the reference to “tourists” during the December events probably entered the lexicon of mainstream reporting on the Revolution as early as April 1990 — not insignificantly, first in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s weekly “Zig-Zag,” it appears — it was in particular journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu who gave the theme legitimacy in the mainstream press.

Without specifying the term “tourists” — but clearly speaking in the same vein — Stanescu was probably the first to articulate the thesis most precisely and to tie the Soviet angle to it. In June 1990 in a piece entitled “Is The Conspiracy of Silence Breaking Down?” in the sharply anti-government daily “Romania libera,” Stanescu wrote:

“And still in connection with the breaking down of the conspiracy of silence, in the army there is more and more insistent talk about the over 4,000 Lada cars with two men per car that traveled many different roads in the days before the Revolution and then disappeared” (“Romania libera,” 14 June 1990).

Stanescu’s article was vigorously anti-FSN and anti-Iliescu and left little doubt that this thesis was part of the “unofficial” history of the December events, injurious to the new leaders, and something they did not wish to see published or wish to clarify.

But it was Stanescu’s April 1991 article in “Romania libera,” entitled “Is Iliescu Being Protected By The KGB?,” that truly gave impetus to the “tourist” thesis. Stanescu wrote:

“A KGB officer wanders in France. He is losing his patience and searching for a way to get to Latin America. Yesterday I met him in Paris. He talked to me after finding out that I was a Romanian journalist. He fears the French press. He knows Romanian and was in Timisoara in December 1989. As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania? Witness what the anonymous Soviet officer related to me in Paris:

‘There existed an intervention plan that for whatever reason was not activated. I received the order to enter Romania on 14 December and to head for Timisoara. Myself and my colleague were armed. During the events, we circulated in the military zone around Calea Girocului [Giriocul Road]. Those who headed toward Bucharest had the same mission. Several larger cities were targeted. We were to open fire in order to create a state of confusion. I never, however, received such an order. I left Romania on 26 December.’

I don’t have any reason to suspect the validity of these revelations. This short confession is naturally incomplete, but not inconclusive. What purpose would this elaborate, but aborted, KGB plan have had? The only plausible explanation is that it wasn’t necessary for KGB agents to intervene. The events were unfolding in the desired direction without need for the direct intervention of the Soviets. But this leads to other questions: What did the Ceausescu couple know, but were not allowed to say [prior to their hurried execution]? Why is Securitate General Vlad being held in limbo? To what degree has President Iliescu maintained ties to the Soviets? What are the secret clauses of the Friendship Treaty recently signed in Moscow? Is Iliescu being protected by the KGB or not? Perhaps the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor, the Romanian Information Service] would like to respond to these questions?”

Stanescu’s April 1991 article did not go unnoticed — despite its nondescript placement on page eight — and has since received recognition and praise from what might seem unexpected corners. For example, previously-discussed former Securitate Colonel Filip Teodorescu cited extensive excerpts from Stanescu’s article in his 1992 book on the December events, and he added cryptically:

“Moreover, I don’t have any reason to suspect that the journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu would have invented a story in order to come to the aid of those accused, by the courts or by public opinion, for the results of the tragic events of December 1989” (Teodorescu, 1992, pp. 92-94).

Radu Balan, former Timis County party secretary, imprisoned for his role in the December events, has also invoked Stanescu’s April 1991 article as proof of his revisionist view that “tourists” rather than “non-existent ‘terrorists'” were to blame for the December 1989 bloodshed:

“…[W]hile at Jilava [the jail where he was imprisoned at the time of the interview, in October 1991], I read ‘Romania libera’ from 18 April. And Rosca Stanescu writes from Paris that a KGB agent who deserted the KGB and is in transit to the U.S. stated that on 18 December [1989] he had the mission to create panic on Calea Girocului [a thoroughfare in Timisoara]. What is more, on the 18th, these 11 cars were at the top of Calea Girocului, where I saw them. I was dumbfounded, I tell you. I didn’t tell anybody. Please study ‘Romania libera,’ the last page, from 18 April 1991” (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October1991).

In this regard, it would be irresponsible to totally discount the relevance of Rosca Stanescu’s past. Since December 1989, Stanescu has undeniably been a vigorous critic of, and made damaging revelations about, the Securitate’s institutional heir, the SRI, and the Iliescu regime, and he has frequently written ill of the former Securitate and the Ceausescu regime. Nevertheless, in 1992 it was leaked to the press — and Rosca Stanescu himself confirmed — that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s he was an informer for the Securitate (for a discussion, see Hall, 1997b, pp. 111-113). What was significant, however, was precisely for which branch of the Securitate Rosca Stanescu had been an informer: the USLA.

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html

BUT WAIT, THERE’S MORE…A “SOVIET TOURIST” ENCORE IN 1990

Add to all of this (!), the allegations that the “Soviet tourists” were seen again on the streets during major crises in 1990, such as the ethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 (for evidence of the reach of the allegation of KGB manipulation via the “tourist” mechanism both in December 1989 AND in March 1990, see Emil Hurezeanu, “Cotidianul,” 23 December 1999; according to Hurezeanu, “It appears they didn’t leave the country until 1991, following a visit by [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu to Moscow”!).  Then there is the famous April 1991 interview of an alleged KGB officer—who spoke flawless Romania and was in Romania during the December 1989 events—who the interviewer, the vigorous anti-Iliescu foe, Sorin Rosca Stanescu, claimed to have just stumbled into in Paris.  Of all the reporters who could have stumbled into a KGB officer present in Romania during the Revolution—the only such case I know of—it was Rosca Stanescu, who, it turned out later, had been an informer for the Securitate until the mid-1980s—but not just for anybody, but for the USLA.  Intererstingly, although the article appeared on the non-descript page 8 of the primary opposition daily at the time (“Romania Libera”), the aforementioned Filip Teodorescu and Radu Balan invoked it in support of their contentions regarding the the “tourists” (for a discussion of this, see Hall 2002).  Even more suprising, or not, depending on your point of view, in his April 1991 article, Stanescu attempted to tie together December 1989 with December 1990 (!):

“As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil [in December 1989] of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania?” (emphasis added) (“Romania Libera,” 18 April 1991)

(This points again to the idea that, to the extent the claim has any truth to it–and clearly, as always, there is an exaggeration of numbers–these “Soviet tourists” were of domestic manufacture.)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/

In addition, it is interesting to note that senior former Securitate officials like to point out that the cars being used were…”brand-new”…suggesting that they had not been used before…something you might expect for equipment to be used in a contingency plan.

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

Part 2: ‘Tourists Are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns…’ *

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html

Not to be out-done, Cluj Securitate chief Ion Serbanoiu claimed in a 1991 interview that, as of 21 December 1989, there were over 800 Russian and Hungarian tourists, mostly driving almost brand-new Lada automobiles (but also Dacia and Wartburg cars), in the city (interview with Angela Bacescu in “Europa,” no. 55, December 1991).

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In February 1991 during his trial, former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad, not surprisingly, also spoke of “massive groups of Soviet tourists…the majority were men…deploy[ing] in a coordinated manner in a convoy of brand-new Lada automobiles” (see Bunea, 1994, pp. 460-461),

Radu Balan, former Timis County party boss, picks up the story from there. While serving a prison sentence for his complicity in the Timisoara repression, in 1991 Balan told one of Ceausescu’s most famous “court poets,” Adrian Paunescu, that on the night of 18-19 December — during which in reality some 40 cadavers were secretly transported from Timisoara’s main hospital to Bucharest for cremation (reputedly on Elena Ceausescu’s personal order) — he too witnessed the role of these “foreign agents”:

“We had been receiving information, in daily bulletins, from the Securitate, that far more people were returning from Yugoslavia and Hungary than were going there and about the presence of Lada automobiles filled with Soviets. I saw them at the border and the border posts, and the cars were full. I wanted to know where and what they were eating and how they were crossing the border and going through cities and everywhere. More telling, on the night of 18-19 December, when I was at a fire at the I.A.M. factory, in front of the county hospital, I spotted 11 white ‘Lada’ automobiles at 1 a.m. in the morning. They pretended to ask me the road to Buzias�.The 11 white Ladas had Soviet plates, not Romanian ones, and were in front of the hospital” (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October 1991).

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/

[Timis County party boss] Radu Balan ‘remembers’ that on 18 December at midnight when he was heading toward IAEM, he passed a group of ten soviet cars stopped 100 meters from the county hospital. (It turns out that in this night, in the sight of the Soviets, the corpses were loaded!).” [emphasis in the original] (Flacara, no. 27, 1991, p. 9).

 

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ )

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

Efectivele care desfasoara actiuni in cadrul lupte de rezistenta se vor dota corespunzator misiunilor incredintate.  Materialele  necesare vor fi realizate din cele aflate in dotarea unitatilor sau din depozitele special create in locuri ascunse, din capturi de la inamic, trimitere pe calea aerului sau alte surse…

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The Securitate, in recounting their version of what happened in December 1989, love to point out how their official stockpiles of arms were sealed when the Ceausescus fled by helicopter at approximately 12:00 on 22 December 1989.  (Even this is only partially true.)  Military Prosecutor General Dan Voinea, and many researchers of December 1989–including some of the best among them, such as Peter Siani-Davies, repeat claims similar to this–or to the extent that they acknowledge Securitate weapons might have been used, they suggest, as does Siani-Davies, that we cannot just assume that the Securitate used them, but that they may have fallen into the hands of civilians, the Patriotic Guards, the Army, etc.  None of this, however, accounts for the fact that from injured civilians, to domestic and foreign doctors who operated on them, to military officers, have attested to the existence, use, and discovery of atypical munitions not in the Army’s arsenal–namely the use of exploding Dum-Dum bullets and/or “vidia” bullets.  The Securitate appear to be generally correct:  these weren’t in their normal stockpiles.  But they didn’t use those.  Naturally, in the context of an assumed foreign invasion and occupation, they could not bank on access to such stockpiles, which would probably have fallen into the hands of the enemy.  Instead, they would have to rely on hidden stockpiles, secret deposits strategically placed in major cities and outside of them, that only they knew about, and that could be accessed in the case of foreign occupation.  Also, one can assume the scruples that they might have had with regard to the use of such munitions against their own unarmed people–although given what happened, it turns out they didn’t have many scruples after all–did not apply to an invading and occupying foreign force–hence the preparation of such munitions.  Moreover, after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December, the character of the terrorist actions were very much in keeping with what we might expect from a “resistance war” (lupta de rezistenta):  as some have noted in recounting what happened, if they were unarmed they seemed to be able to move with reasonable ease and not great fear of being shot…however, if they were armed they became a target, and could receive a sniper shot to the head or chest (something of which a civilian with little familiarity with arms or access to them before 22 December 1989 would have been unlikely to be able to pull off).

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“Saptamina trecuta am incheiat un ciclu de 2 saptamini de pregatire si examinare, la Baneasa, pentru obtinerea gradului de subofiter.  Acest ciclu l-am efectuat la Baneasa, deoarece stagiul militar de 9 luni, l-am satisfacut intr-o unitate apartinind Securitatii Statului.

–Ce specific a avut pregatirea?

Am fost antrenati pentru lupta de gherila urbana, in caz de agresiune externa.  Eram organizati in grupuri mici care actionau pentru destabilizarea inamicului, pe teritoriul ocupat de el.

–S-au facut afirmatii in perioada revolutiei, ca nu exista trupe specializate in gherila urbana!  Este adevarat?

Nu!  In cazul in care se face exceptie de notiunea de inamic strain sau agresiune externa, pregatire multor generatii de militari au acest specific.

–Ati fi activat doar in termenul celor 9 luni?

Nu!  Noi sintem la dispozitia lor in permanenta.  Putem fi convocati telefonic sau printr-o alta modalitate conspirativa.  Existe case conspirative si depozite de munitie in plin Bucuresti, de unde ne-am fi aprovizionat cu armament si munitie pentru a efectua ambuscade, aruncari in aer si altele.

–Considerati ca dupa revolutie lucrurile s-au schimbat, cum apreciati ca ati fost chemat tot la o unitate fosta a Securitatii?

Am fost indignati si chiar ne-am manifestat in sensul acesta!  La toate intrebarile noastre n-am primit raspuns.  De abia la sfirsitul stagiului am aflat ca ne-am pregatit, de fapt, la trupele de jandarmi.

–Si pina atunci?

Col. Porumbelu ne-a tacut un mic istoric din care am sa citez:  “Din 22 dec. in 28 am fost teroristi!  Din 28 pina in martie am fost M.Ap.N.-isti.  Pina pe 5 iulie sintem trupe de jandarmi….

 [Dinu Ispas, “Baneasa–Comedie muta ’90” Expres, iulie? /august ? 1990, p. ?]

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Stiu ca in zilele de 23-25 XII 1989, din circa 150 sesizari facute de cetateni 48 s-au dovedit intemeiate in sensul ca, in punctele indicate, s-au gasit depozite de arme.  Deci nu exista “taina absoluta.”  Depozitul de arme gasit in blocul Scala, prabusit la cutremur, era tot al USLA, deci de mult a fost pregatita actiunea.  Avem de a face cu o organizatie criminala pregatita de un stat impotriva populatiei sale.  — N.F., pensionar, Bucuresti.  “Voi ati tras in noi, noi va salvam viata!” 22, nr. 5 (16 februarie 1990), p. 10.  Now available online at http://www.revista22.ro/nou/arhivapdf/5_1990.pdf .

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from Gardianul 16 December 2005

(Virgil Magureanu before the Parliamentary Commission investigating the events of December 1989):

Vreau sa va spun ca tot atunci a venit tot un subordonat de-al meu, locotenent-colonel Chilin, si era seful informatiilor la brigada antiterorista

Nicolaescu: Ati stat de vorba cu un general de Securitate, ati luat niste securisti cu dv., ati plecat la televiziune sa aparati televiziunea, impotriva cui? Cu cine credeati dv. ca luptati?

Magureanu: Dl, noi am presupus ca insurgentii erau cei care nu doreau prabusirea regimului; indiferent cine erau aceia; dar noi am vazut ca televiziunea era in primejdie de a scapa din mana celor care dadusera anatema regimului Ceausescu si erau vadit impotriva. Acolo taberele erau cei pro si impotriva regimului Ceausescu.

Asa am apreciat atunci.

Si asa imi mentin aprecierea si azi. De principiu.

Ma rog, aflasem mai multe lucruri. Despre niste depozite de armament (Chilin mi-a zis) de pe traseul de la Piata Palatului spre iesirea din Bucuresti de unde se aproviziona Securitatea atunci cand pazea traseul, despre niste subterane in care ar exista, de asemenea, armament si munitie, subterane care trebuiau luate in posesie si sa fie vazut ce e acolo. (In other words, an USLA official confirmed that the Securitate had deposits of arms and munitions along routes in Bucharest.)

(“If memory serves correct, years later in Curierul National, Andronic was to refer to finding out about the collapsing of the Ceausescu regime from USLA officer, Alexandru Ioan Kilin.”  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/05/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-9-orwellian-sanitywont-get-fooled-again/ , for a mention of Kilin see also  http://ohanesian.wordpress.com/2010/07/11/tiganul-din-dosarul-carlos-sacalul/)

Nicolaescu: De cine sa fie luate in posesie?

http://www.newspad.ro/Magureanu-In-decembrie-1989-TVR-nu-era-atacata-de-teroristi-ci-de-insurgenti,66491.html

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Magureanu: In decembrie 1989, TVR nu era atacata de «teroristi», ci de insurgenti

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Magureanu: In decembrie 1989, TVR nu era atacata de «teroristi», ci de insurgenti
16 decembrie 2005

Magureanu: Si am ajuns. Oamenii de acolo, cand am aparut eu, sigur ca s-au strans in jurul meu. Vreau sa va spun ca tot atunci a venit tot un subordonat de-al meu, locotenent-colonel Chilin, si era seful informatiilor la brigada antiterorista. S-au grupat pur si simplu in jurul meu ca nici ei nu aveau cu cine sta de vorba acolo. Militarii aveau sarcinile lor in dispozitiv, ceilalti, politicienii erau cu preocuparile lor si ingrijorarile lor, iar eu disponibil.

Nicolaescu: Ati plecat de la Eforie, cam la ce ora si cati insi?

Magureanu: Dl Nicolaescu deci toate acestea s-au petrecut pana in dupa-amiaza; ora nu o stiu cu precizie si traseul a fost dificil. Ca sa nu fim opriti, deci a fost o dubita si cateva masini cu toti astia. Cred ca nu erau in civili, cred ca erau totusi in kaki, dar trebuie sa-i intrebam chiar pe ei. Oamenii au venit cu automatele, s-au asezat in dispozitiv, in partea dinspre Dorobanti.

Nicolaescu: La cine v-ati prezentat cu ei la televiziune? La ce poarta?

Magureanu: Daca nu ma insel, era generalul Tudor care-i repartiza in dispozitiv de aparare. I-am dus acolo, i-am lasat si oamenii si-au vazut de treaba lor in continuare.

Nicolaescu: Si dv. ati plecat mai departe?

Magureanu: Pe urma ce-a fost? A venit, ca iarasi ma cunosteau, se lipise de mine un inginer de la un institut de cercetari, care a si ramas cu mine, a aparut acolo a fost o cunostinta de-a mea, altul care a incercat sa-l contactez, fara succes, fostul general la politie generalul Penciuc. A fost trecut in rezerva. Prin 1983-1984 i-am facut o vizita la Baneasa. Nu a percutat in nici un fel. Si el stie o multime de lucruri despre ce s-a intamplat in decembrie. Dumitru Penciuc. Nu mai stiu ce functie a avut. Dar a venit la mine in 23 la amiaza. Chilin a venit si au mai venit inca si ne-au spus o serie de lucruri pe care noi am socotit ca e bine sa le transmitem in forma aceea celor de la aparare si dlui Iliescu.

Nicolaescu: Ati stat de vorba cu un general de Securitate, ati luat niste securisti cu dv., ati plecat la televiziune sa aparati televiziunea, impotriva cui? Cu cine credeati dv. ca luptati?

Magureanu: Dl, noi am presupus ca insurgentii erau cei care nu doreau prabusirea regimului; indiferent cine erau aceia; dar noi am vazut ca televiziunea era in primejdie de a scapa din mana celor care dadusera anatema regimului Ceausescu si erau vadit impotriva. Acolo taberele erau cei pro si impotriva regimului Ceausescu.

Asa am apreciat atunci.

Si asa imi mentin aprecierea si azi. De principiu.

Ma rog, aflasem mai multe lucruri. Despre niste depozite de armament (Chilin mi-a zis) de pe traseul de la Piata Palatului spre iesirea din Bucuresti de unde se aproviziona Securitatea atunci cand pazea traseul, despre niste subterane in care ar exista, de asemenea, armament si munitie, subterane care trebuiau luate in posesie si sa fie vazut ce e acolo.

Nicolaescu: De cine sa fie luate in posesie?

Magureanu: De catre cei care-si asumasera noua putere. Totusi se infiripase acolo. Nu era la televiziune intr-un dispozitiv care se raliasera evenimentelor? Si intr-un fel sau altul cei care luptau pentru apararea televiziunii trebuiau sa stie si unde sunt punctele de rezistenta ale celor care se opuneau.

Nicolaescu: Nu va suparati pe mine pentru ca vreau sa lamuresc.

Magureanu: Dle Nicolaescu nu cred ca sunt aici pentru sentimente precum suparare sau altceva.

Deci, sa stiti, treaba cu depozitele s-a dovedit nereala ulterior. Era Penciuc, inginerul asta de care va spun.

A, era sa-mi scape un amanunt. Cand am ajuns acolo si am stat de vorba cu Mortoiu, mi-a zis: “Toti isi iau arme automate. Luati-va si dv. macar un pistol, un pistolet”. Eu nu am purtat in viata mea arma. Nici acum nu o port. Este o chestie de psihologie personala.

Insa atunci s-a insistat “ia-l ca nu se stie ce se poate intampla”. Nu-mi dadeam seama ce se poate intampla si nici ce as face eu cu o arma pentru ca nu sunt capabil sa traga cineva.

In fine, daca a insistat si ca sa scap de gura lui am zis “bine domnule”. S-a nimerit ca nu a fost magazionerul acolo si am plecat fara, mai tarziu.

Nicolaescu: Ceilalti cum au luat arme daca nu era magazionerul acolo?”

Magureanu: Automatele mari erau intr-un loc anume. Oamenii nu aveau arme asupra lor, dar atunci li s-au distribuit arme si munitie din dotarea unitatii.

Pistoletele aveau probabil un alt regim. In orice caz, omul care trebuia sa-mi dea nu era.

Ca sa nu fim banuiti de altceva s-a scris pe pancarte: “Noua securitate a poporului”. Pe la Universitate am fost oprit si inca in vreo doua locuri. Si oamenii bombaneau “bine, bine numai sa fie noua”.

Mergem cu masini. Am ajuns fara incidente la TV. S-au repartizat in dispozitiv, tirul era “in draci”.

Reconstituirea traseului, daca are vreo importanta pot s-o fac dupa ce stau de vorba cu cei care au fost acolo.

In sfarsit, ce vroia sa spun. Doua ore mai tarziu hotarasem sa ne ducem la armata sa le spunem alora de depozit, de subterane, imi facusera capul calendar. Dl Chilin poate sa vina sa depuna aici. Acum s-a privatizat.

Si aceasta problema este un capitol separat (cu privatizarea).

Cand am iesit din TV ca sa mergem la armata (eram Peciuc si altii, nu-mi aduc aminte, eram cu o masina. Erau doua grupuri; unul mai mare si unul mai mic in stari diferite de luciditate. In Piata Aviatorilor – grupuri care stateau pe margini in partea dinspre Arcul de Triumf. Primul grup era de 15-20, curios este ca desi nu aveau imbracaminte neobisnuita, toti au trecut, pe mine m-au oprit. Am trecut de primul grup la al doilea mi s-a infundat. M-au buzunarit, au confruntat actele; daca gasea si pistolul, eram terminat. Cred ca cu ala ma impuscau. Nu am mai putut trece de ei. S-a produs o busculada. Era o dunga de la caciula si au zis “asta avea cascheta aici, e securist, e terorist, puneti mana pe el. Mai aveam inca in buzunar si biletele de tren. M-au tot inghesuit ca nu puteau sa gaseasca ceva. Toti cu care eram plecasera, singurul care ramasese cu mine era inginerasul acela de la institutul de cercetari. Unul din grupul acela, mai lucid, mi-a zis: “Dle uite astia vor sa-ti faca ceva, mai bine te legam, te punem intr-o Raba si te ducem la militie sa te indentifice. Eu aveam acte la mine, dar actele alea nu le spuneau nimic. Ne-am dus la postul de militie din dreapta statuii Aviatorilor si am stat vreo trei orei. Deci legat la maini pe mine si pe inginerul de care v-am spus.

Raposatul Stark a dat telefon de la TV sa-mi dea drumul. Numai asa mi-au dat drumul. M-am intors la TV.

Hossu: De unde stiau sa sune la TV?

Magureanu: Eu le-am dat sugestia. Le-am spus: Sunati la TV” ca de acolo am venit, nu am venit din alta parte.

Sabin Ivan: Din tot grupul cum de v-a luat tocmai pe dv.?

Magureanu: Nici eu nu-mi pot explica. Probabil ca au intuit ce o sa ajung eu.

Sabin Ivan: Pai asta era ideea. Nu-i tineti minte pe aia?

Magureanu: Nu.

Nicolaescu: Nu cumva totusi cineva din aia v-a recunoscut?

Magureanu: Nu. In mod sigur, nu.

Daca incidentul prezinta importanta, in nume personal eu oricum puteam sa fiu terminat acolo. Daca as fi avut ceva de ascuns va dati seama ca nu-l reproduceam.

Ivan Sabin: De ce l-ati reprodus totusi, ca nu e asa important?

Magureanu: Ar trebui sa va decideti dl. Am remarcat ca nu aveti decat intepaturi pentru mine.

Deci dlor ne-am intors la televiziune.

In 23 seara la circa o ora-doua a venit dl Iliescu, abia atunci am putut sa stam de vorba si am plecat impreuna cu niste TAB-uri la Aparare. Era cu noi Voican. Motanu, Babone – care a si produs un incident in noaptea aceea, cred ca era securist, dar de proasta calitate. Dl Iliescu nu-i cunostea.

Vreau sa va spun un lucru, care cred ca ma disocia fata de ceilalti. Multi s-au bagat acolo, in grupul acela cam fara nici o legatura cu ceea ce se intamplase. Si multi au avut grija sa apara pe urma in umbra actualului presedinte (eventual barba, sa li se vada).

Sabin Ivan: Astia au ramas in continuare langa presedinte?

Magureanu: Dar dv. stiti aceste lucruri. In orice caz de aceea am intrebat pe dl Iliescu daca-i cunoaste pentru ca anturajul devenise incert, dupa parerea mea. Prea multa lume civila si intamplatoare in sediul Apararii. Si orice ar fi cand e vorba de armata si de militarie in actiuni de acest gen, multi incurca “batatura”.

Acolo erau perdelele trase, o canonada in draci. Se discuta “cam la podea”. Cand am intrat acolo, proaspatul numit ministru Militaru s-a apropiat de dl Iliescu si i-a spus ca situatia tinde sa scape de sub control. Si a inceput sa insire escadrile de elicoptere dinspre mare, desant aerian, coloane de blindate pe Oltenitei si inca vreo doua din astea.

Platica: Ati amintit adineauri de proaspat numitul ministru. Deci in seara de 23?

Magureanu: Deci Militaru era acolo in calitatea de care eu va vorbesc acum.

Platica: Din discutiile avute cu ceilalti, aceasta numire a fost plasata in ziua de 24 din punct de vedere sa-i spunem formal, iar de drept, din 25 sau 26.

Magureanu: E posibil ca semnarea acestei numiri sa fi fost ulterioara, insa Militaru era in tinuta militara. Oricum el a fost primul care s-a apropiat de Ion Iliescu si i-a prezentat ceea ce v-am spus. Nu stiu cata insemnatate are data, s-ar putea de vreme ce m-ati intrebat, dar efectiv eu asa tin minte; ca in seara de 23 el era deja ministrul apararii. Dar bineinteles se poate reconstitui. Poate fi intrebat si dl Iliescu, Stanculescu. Dragos Munteanu actual ambasador la Washington. M-as fi mirat sa nu fie asa pentru ca de un ministru al apararii in acel moment este evident ca era nevoie.

Platica: Este evident ca era, dar tocmai de atunci incolo se mai pun niste intrebari. Stiti cumva la sugestia cui s-a facut aceasta numire? Pentru ca era inca o situatie de provizorat. Chiar dv. mai adineauri ati spus ca ati ramas oarecum mirat de configuratia formulei care exista in cadrul ministerului. Cum de s-a ajuns la aceasta numire a dlui Militaru?

Magureanu: Nu sunt in masura sa va raspund eu. Eu v-am relatat situatia care am vazut-o acolo. Poate ca intrebati chiar pe impricinat.

Va rog permiteti sa derulez noaptea acea de 23-24, dupa care va rog foarte mult programati-ma la o data care o considerati dv. convenabila ca sa revin sa reluam amanuntit.

Deci in 23-24, lucrurile au mers ca asa. Pe un fond de razboi psihologic foarte dens, Militaru a spus atunci ceea ce v-am spus. Poate s-o confirme, poate ca a si comunicat-o. In acel moment, generalul Stanculescu, care era de fata, a zis ca “nu crede ca 95% pot fi adevarate”. Este mai degraba o alarma falsa. Deci cel care a incercat sa dea o imagine mai moderata a fost Stanculescu. Cu mai mult realism, mai multa luciditate.

Canonada era in toi. Si atunci s-a presupus ca MAN era inconjurat de profesionistii in terorism care intentioneau sa distruga creierul apararii militare. Si pe acest fond a aparut acolo un personaj, defunctul Ardeleanu, fostul sef al USLA, cu care regret ca nu am stat mai mult de vorba cu el.

Nu-mi aduc aminte daca Vlad era, in orice caz era in alta incapere daca era.

Mai era si cu cineva din fostii mai-marelui regim, un personaj de prim-rang langa Ardeleanu, pentru ca ei pe urma au fost izolati. In orice caz, incerc sa-mi aduc aminte pana data viitoare.

Sursa: Gardianul

destituirea 2 years ago

– Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,343

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/usla-bula-trosca-militaru-m-ap-n/

(Sergiu Nicolaescu, Cartea revolutiei romane.  Decembrie ’89, 1999, p. 217.)

Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,

comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv.  Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoara–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/01/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribui-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/04/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-ii/

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/25/tvr-chirurgi-si-reportaje-despre-gloante-explozive-dum-dum/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/05/16/dosarele-revolutiei-si-expertize-balistice-cine-a-tras-in-voi-cu-gloante-explozive/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/06/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribuit-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-iii/

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/08/decembrie-1989-gloante-speciale-sau-ce-s-a-mai-gasit-in-cladirea-directiei-a-v-a/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/cine-a-tras-dupa-22-cine-au-fost-teroristii-inca-o-dovada-de-adevar-ce-lipseste-din-cartea-lui-marian-romanescu-fost-uslas/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/05/03/decembrie-1989-securitatea-si-lupta-pe-teritoriul-vremelnic-ocupat/

As I previously wrote here:  it appears the Securitate was accorded a critical, if rarely discussed role in contingency plans for a possible invasion and occupation of Romanian territory, the so-called lupta de rezistenta (“resistance war”) or lupta pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat (“war on temporarily occupied territory”)–which explains the “strange” and “anonmalous” characteristics of the “terrorists” after 22 December 1989.  (It is this which I believe also in part explains the refusal and reluctance of Romanian authorities to clarify the identity, intentions, and actions of the “terrorists” of December 1989.)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

This hypothesis gains confirmation from the following discussion found at http://fortespeciale.ro/securitatea-si-fortele-speciale/

– In 1989 USLA a avut mai multe interventii efectuate cu profesionalism, intre care una intr-un bloc dintr-un cartier bucurestean, interventie in urma careia au fost lichidati trei “teroristi” (dupa dotare -pistoale Makarov- probabil tot colegi de-ai lor, din alt compartiment, destinat luptei pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat).

This appears to be a reference to an incident that transpired at the Hotel Ambasador in Bucuresti, which was mentioned in the following interview with Army Col. Ilie Stoleru by Mihail Galatanu in Flacara in July 1992 (see bottom of column 3 second xerox).

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Indeed, the very clearly knowledgeable author of the above page(s) and information, came upon and used information from the internal “strict secret” Securitatea journal found on the site of the CNSAS (Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (C.N.S.A.S.)) a year and a half before I did independently (thanks to a tip to its existence).

5. Lupta in conditii de clandestinitate/ teritoriu vremelnic ocupat a constituit o preocupare deosebita a Securitatii dupa 1968, cu doua varfuri de activitate: 1969 si 1987. S-au creat structuri destinate acestei misiuni, o parte dintre ele constituind asa numita retea de rezerva- in Directia I, cunoscuta sub diverse denumiri (Reteaua S- confundata de altfel foarte competentul istoric Alex Mihai Stoenescu cu Unitatea Speciala S).

In afra de luptatorii din reteaua de rezistenta, toate unitatile si cadrele Securitatii erau pregatite pentru actiuni clandestine in teritoriul vremelnic ocupat (un fel de a doua specialitate).

 

 

6. Prin actiuni in adancimea strategica a teritoriului inamic intelegem o parte dintre misiunile paramilitare executate pe teritoriul unor state.

In aceasta categorie intra si UM o544/R din cadrul CIE, care se ocupa cu antiterorismul pe plan extern (“antiterorism” fiind un eufemism), dar si Brigada U (“Fantome”, “Ilegali” etc) unii dintre ofiterii infiltrati ar fi avut in caz de razboi printre misiuni si executarea unor sabotaje/diversiuni.

Este relevant ca o buna perioada de vreme toti ofiterii securitatii erau brevetati parasutisti, parasutarea fiind unul dintre mijloacele clasice de infiltrare, intre timp inlocuit de alte procedee mai putin romantice, dar mai eficiente.

 

 

NOTA * sursa CNSAS

Other interesting tidbits from this post, echo information found elsewhere:

– In afara de colaborarea cu GSG9, ofiteri ai USLA au fost trimisi in Liban unde au fost instruiti de membri Al Fatah. Au circulat si zvonuri legate de colaborari cu Israelul si de cadre USLA trimise la centrul sovietic de instructie spetsnaz de la Odesa, insa deocamdata n-au fost confirmate.

– Dotarea USLA era unica la nivelul Romaniei: casti balistice sovietice K6-3 (din titan), pistoale mitraliera cu teava scurta, pistoale automate Stechkin, autovehicule blindate de interventie (ABI), carabine cu luneta model 44 cu amortizor de zgomot etc.

We have had other information suggesting precisely the involvement and role of the USLA in such a contingency:

destituirea 2 years ago

– Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,343

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/08/decembrie-1989-gloante-speciale-sau-ce-s-a-mai-gasit-in-cladirea-directiei-a-v-a/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/cine-a-tras-dupa-22-cine-au-fost-teroristii-inca-o-dovada-de-adevar-ce-lipseste-din-cartea-lui-marian-romanescu-fost-uslas/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/21/maracineni-securitatea-si-lupta-de-rezistenta-pe-teritoriul-vremelnic-ocupat-de-inamic-decembrie-89-soferii-iadului-in-varianta-autohtona-expres-19-25-ianuarie-1993/

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comuna_M%C4%83r%C4%83cineni,_Buz%C4%83u

Possibly linked to the Maracineni case is the following:   Securitatea: Lupta de rezistenta in cadrul razboiului de aparare a patriei. Particularitati ale participarii unitatilor centrale si teritoriale de securitate la organizarea si ducerea luptei de rezistenta pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat de inamic.  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

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Ioanesi Adrian ( 548 )
Profesie: Soldat in termen la UM 01027 Piatra-Neamt, sublocotenent post-mortem
Data nasteri: 24.09.1969
Locul nasterii: Vaslui
Calitate: Erou Martir
Data mortii: 24 decembrie 1989
Locul mortii: Maracineni, Buzau
Cauza: Impuscat in inima si cap
Vinovati:
Observatii:

http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?menu=1&jud=53

“In jurul orei 02,30 a fost impuscat, din spate, de 2 gloante de provenienta straina–unul in cap si unul in omoplatul sting.  Se presupune ca s-a tras cu arme de constructie speciala, foarte eficiente si pe timp de noapte.” Armata Poporului, p. 3, nr. 41 (44) Octombrie 1990.

Cazul Maracineni

Another small group of people wearing “black jumpsuits” held a military convoy under fire near the city of Buzau. On the evening of 23 December 1989, a military convoy from Piatra Neamt en route to Bucharest reached the community of Maracineni near Buzau.  Members of the local military unit told the soldiers from Piatra Neamt that

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…the unit had been attacked by two people, a civilian and Militia NCO, who disappeared with an Oltcit [car] and an ABI vehicle [an armored transport used exclusively by the Securitate’s USLA].  Shortly after [being told] this, gunfire opened on the convoy.  And gunfire reopened on the local military unit….those from the unit fired back with ordinance that lit the sky, in this way enabling them to observe a group of 3-4 armed people, wearing black jumpsuits (“salopete negre”) who were shooting while constantly changing position.  At the same time, on the radio frequencies of the convoy, they received messages about coming devastating attacks, and even Soviet intervention.  All of these proved to be simple disinformation.  The next day, in a moment of calm, villagers brought the soldiers food, and related how the terrorists had occupied attics of their houses.  They said they [the occupiers] were Romanians and that in a few words they had ordered [the villagers] to let them into the attics of their houses….In general, they shot at night, but on 25 December the cannonade continued during the day…. Curiously, the ‘fighting’ in Maracineni continued until 30 December.  Who and for whom were they trying to impress? [emphasis added][55]

Indeed, there are three key aspects here:  1) this was not a heavily populated area, thereby undermining arguments about “operetta-like” fake warfare to impress the population, 2) it is difficult to explain this episode as the result of “misunderstandings” between units, and 3) the gunfire lasted well over a week, a fact that is difficult to ascribe to confusion.

Ilie Stoian, Arta Diversiunii, 1993, pp. 55-57.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/25/teroristii-din-decembrie-1989-camasile-negre-a-fekete-ingesek-the-black-shirts-uslac/

http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/campaniile-rl/exclusiv-cum-au-disparut-gloantele-de-la-revolutie-si-despre-mortii-in-salopete-negre-247874.html

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-four-the-mysterious-men-in-black/

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Decembrie 1989, Securitatea, si Lupta pe Teritoriul Vremelnic Ocupat

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on May 3, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

As I previously wrote here:  it appears the Securitate was accorded a critical, if rarely discussed role in contingency plans for a possible invasion and occupation of Romanian territory, the so-called lupta de rezistenta (“resistance war”) or lupta pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat (“war on temporarily occupied territory”)–which explains the “strange” and “anonmalous” characteristics of the “terrorists” after 22 December 1989.  (It is this which I believe also in part explains the refusal and reluctance of Romanian authorities to clarify the identity, intentions, and actions of the “terrorists” of December 1989.)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

This hypothesis gains confirmation from the following discussion found at http://fortespeciale.ro/securitatea-si-fortele-speciale/

– In 1989 USLA a avut mai multe interventii efectuate cu profesionalism, intre care una intr-un bloc dintr-un cartier bucurestean, interventie in urma careia au fost lichidati trei “teroristi” (dupa dotare -pistoale Makarov- probabil tot colegi de-ai lor, din alt compartiment, destinat luptei pe teritoriul vremelnic ocupat).

This appears to be a reference to an incident that transpired at the Hotel Ambasador in Bucuresti, which was mentioned in the following interview with Army Col. Ilie Stoleru by Mihail Galatanu in Flacara in July 1992 (see bottom of column 3 second xerox).

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Indeed, the very clearly knowledgeable author of the above page(s) and information, came upon and used information from the internal “strict secret” Securitatea journal found on the site of the CNSAS (Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (C.N.S.A.S.)) a year and a half before I did independently (thanks to a tip to its existence).

5. Lupta in conditii de clandestinitate/ teritoriu vremelnic ocupat a constituit o preocupare deosebita a Securitatii dupa 1968, cu doua varfuri de activitate: 1969 si 1987. S-au creat structuri destinate acestei misiuni, o parte dintre ele constituind asa numita retea de rezerva- in Directia I, cunoscuta sub diverse denumiri (Reteaua S- confundata de altfel foarte competentul istoric Alex Mihai Stoenescu cu Unitatea Speciala S).

In afra de luptatorii din reteaua de rezistenta, toate unitatile si cadrele Securitatii erau pregatite pentru actiuni clandestine in teritoriul vremelnic ocupat (un fel de a doua specialitate).

 

 

6. Prin actiuni in adancimea strategica a teritoriului inamic intelegem o parte dintre misiunile paramilitare executate pe teritoriul unor state.

In aceasta categorie intra si UM o544/R din cadrul CIE, care se ocupa cu antiterorismul pe plan extern (“antiterorism” fiind un eufemism), dar si Brigada U (“Fantome”, “Ilegali” etc) unii dintre ofiterii infiltrati ar fi avut in caz de razboi printre misiuni si executarea unor sabotaje/diversiuni.

Este relevant ca o buna perioada de vreme toti ofiterii securitatii erau brevetati parasutisti, parasutarea fiind unul dintre mijloacele clasice de infiltrare, intre timp inlocuit de alte procedee mai putin romantice, dar mai eficiente.

 

 

NOTA * sursa CNSAS

Other interesting tidbits from this post, echo information found elsewhere:

– In afara de colaborarea cu GSG9, ofiteri ai USLA au fost trimisi in Liban unde au fost instruiti de membri Al Fatah. Au circulat si zvonuri legate de colaborari cu Israelul si de cadre USLA trimise la centrul sovietic de instructie spetsnaz de la Odesa, insa deocamdata n-au fost confirmate.

– Dotarea USLA era unica la nivelul Romaniei: casti balistice sovietice K6-3 (din titan), pistoale mitraliera cu teava scurta, pistoale automate Stechkin, autovehicule blindate de interventie (ABI), carabine cu luneta model 44 cu amortizor de zgomot etc.

We have had other information suggesting precisely the involvement and role of the USLA in such a contingency:

destituirea 2 years ago

– Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

Added: 3 years ago
From: destituirea
Views: 16,343

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It took 22 years for the text of Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad’s handwritten declaration of 29 January 1990 to become public knowledge–thanks to former military prosecutor General Ioan Dan.  (Inevitably, there will no doubt be those who will allege that General Vlad was “forced” to write this declaration to save his skin, etc., that this was the “propaganda of the moment” and all a huge lie.  If that were the case, one would have expected Iliescu, Brucan, Militaru, Voican Voiculescu, etc. to have made every effort for Vlad’s declaration to leak to the media.  Instead, for 22 years it was hidden from public knowledge!)

Of Note:  No “Soviet tourists,” no DIA (Batallion 404) troops of the army’s intelligence wing, no “there were no terrorists:  the Army shot into everyone else and into itself”–in other words, none of the spurious claims that have littered the narrative landscape, fueled by the former Securitate over the past two decades plus.  No, Vlad knew who the terrorists of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 were, because they reported to him!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan

In aprilie 1990, generalul Ghoerghe Diaconescu a fost destituit din functia de conducere in Directia Procuraturilor Militare.  La plecare, mi-a predat cheia de la fisteul sau, cu mentiunea ca acolo au mai ramas cateva hartii fara importanta. Intrucat, la data respectiva, ma aflam in cea mai mare parte a timpului, in procesul cercetarilor de la Timisoara, mult mai tarziu, am dorit sa pun in respectivul fiset o serie de acte.  Am cercetat ce mai ramasese de pe urma generalului Diaconescu si, spre surprinderea mea, am gasit declaratia olografa a generalului Iulian Vlad, data fostului adjunct al procurorului general, fostul meu sef direct, nimeni altul decat generalul Diaconescu, la 29 ianuarie 1990, cand toate evenimentele din decembrie 1989 erau foarte proaspete.  Repet, este vorba despre declaratia olografa, un text scris foarte ingrijit, pe 10 pagini, din care voi reda acum integral doar partea care se refera expres la “actiunile teroriste in Capitala” (formularea apartine generalului Vlad).

“Analizand modul in care au inceput si s-au desfasurat actiunile teroriste in Capitala, pe baza acelor date si informatii ce le-am avut la dispozitie, consider ca acestea ar fi putut fi executate de:

1) Elementele din Directia a V-a, USLA, CTS si din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv speciale.

a) Directia a V-a, asa cum am mai spus, avea in responsabilitate paza si securitatea interioara a Palatului Republicii, multe dintre cadrele acestei unitati cunoscand foarte bine cladirea, cu toate detaliile ei.  In situatia creata in ziua de 22.12.1989, puteau sa mearga la Palat, pe langa cei care faceau acolo serviciul si unii dintre ofiterii si subofiterii care se aflau la sediul CC ori la unitate.

Este ca se poate de clar ca numai niste oameni care cunosteanu bine topografia locului ori erau in complicitate cu cei care aveau asemenea cunostinte puteau patrunde in cladire (sau pe acoperisul ei) si transporta armamentul si cantitatile mari de munitie pe care le-au avut la dispozitie.

Tot aceasta Directie dispunea de o baza puternica si in apropierea Televiziunii (la Televiziunea veche).  De asemenea, avea in responsabilitate perimetrul din zona resedintei unde se aflau numeroase case (vile) nelocuite si in care teroristii ar fi putut sa se ascunda ori sa-si faca puncte de sprijin.

Sunt si alte motive care pun pe prim-plan suspiciuni cu privire la aceasta unitate.

b) Elemente din cadrul unitatii speciale de lupta antiterroriste care aveau unele misiuni comune cu Directia a V-a si, ca si o parte a ofiterilor si subofiterilor de la aceasta unitate, dispuneau de o mai buna instruire si de mijloace de lupta mai diversificate.

c) Elemente din Trupele de Securitate care asigurau paza obiectivilor speciale (resedinta, palat etc.) si, impreuna cu Directia a-V-a, Securitatea Capitalei si Militia Capitalei asigurau traseul de deplasare.

d) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Securitatea Capitalei, indeosebi de la Serviciul Trasee, sau dintre cei care au lucrat la Directia a V-a.

e) Elemente din alte unitati de Securitate, inclusiv unitatile speciale 544, 195 si 110, precum si din cele complet acoperite, comandate de col. Maita, col. Valeanu, lt. col. Sirbu, col. Nica, col. Eftimie si lt. col. (Eftimie sau Anghelache) Gelu (asa sta scris in declaratie–n.n.).  Aceste din urma sase unitati, ca si UM 544, in ansamblu, si UM 195 puteau dispune si de armament si munitii de provenienta straina, precum si de conditii de pregatire adecvate.

2) Ofiteri si subofiteri din Militie, atat de la Capitala, cat si de la IGM, cu prioritate cei din Detasamentul special de interventie si cei care asigurau traseul.

3) Cred ca s-ar impune verificarea, prin metode si mijloace specifice, a tragatorilor de elita din toate unitatile din Capitala ale Ministerului de Interne, precum si a celor care au avut in dotare sau au indeplinit misiuni folosind arme cu luneta.  N-ar trebui omisi nici chiar cei de la Dinamo si de la alte cluburi sportive.

4) Unele cadre militare de rezerva ale Securitatii, Militiei si Armatei, precum si actuali (la data respectiva) si fosti activisti de partid sau UTC, persoane apropriate tradatorului si familiei sale ori care poseda arme de foc.

Propun, de asemenea, o atenta investigare a celor care au fost in anturajul lui Nicu Ceausescu.  Acest anturaj, foarte divers, cuprindea inclusive unele elemente de cea mai scazuta conditie morala care puteau fi pretabile la asemenea actiuni.

Ar fi bine sa se acorde atentia cuvenita sub acest aspect si fratilor dictatorului–Ceausescu Ilie si Ceausescu Nicolae–care, prin multiplele posibilitati pe care le aveau, puteau organiza asemenea actiuni.

5) Anumite cadre militare sau luptatori din Garzile Patriotice.

6) Straini:

a. Din randul celor aflati la studii in Romania:

– arabi, in general, si palestinieni, in special, inclusiv cei care sunt la pregatire pe linia Armatei (de exemplu, la Academia Militara);

– alte grupuri de straini la studii (iranieni si altii).

b. Special infiltrati (indeosebi din cei care au urmat diverse cursuri de pregatire pe linia MI sau a MAN);

c. Alti straini aflati in tara cu diverse acoperiri, inclusiv diplomatice;

d. Fosti cetateni romani (care ar fi putut intra in tara si in mod fraudulos).

7) Elemente infractoare de drept comun care au posedat armament ori l-au procurat in chiar primele ore din dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, cand, din mai multe unitati de Securitate, intre care Directia a V-a si Securitatea Capitalei, s-a ridicat o cantitate mare si diversa de armament si munitie.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/08/decembrie-1989-gloante-speciale-sau-ce-s-a-mai-gasit-in-cladirea-directiei-a-v-a/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/cine-a-tras-dupa-22-cine-au-fost-teroristii-inca-o-dovada-de-adevar-ce-lipseste-din-cartea-lui-marian-romanescu-fost-uslas/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

What would it have looked like if Nicolae Ceausescu’s Securitate executed a plan to counter an invasion…but the invaders never came? (II)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on January 21, 2014

Answer:  Well, you would have something that looked suspiciously similar to what actually happened in December 1989 in Romania…

(strictly personal viewpoint as always; I began my analysis of what have been characterized as the “strange,” “counter-intuitive,” and “irrational” character of the “terrorist” actions in December 1989 in Chapter 8 my Ph.D. dissertation (defended December 1996), which can be found here:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-8-unsolving-december/ and continued it in articles such as the following in Europe-Asia Studies from 2000, which can be found here, https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/theories-of-collective-action-and-revolution-2000/ )

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

In fact, the tactics of the “terrorists” in December 1989 are strikingly similar to what was described in the journal of the Securitate (available on the CNSAS.ro site):

Lt. Colonel Tudor Alexandru si Capitan Nicolae Catana (Securitatea, nr. 85, martie 1989) http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201989-1-85.pdf :

— desfasurarea unor activitati de dezinformare a inamicului cu privire la actiunile fortelor proprii…

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Let’s take a look at some of the claims made about the character and content of the disinformation–especially as pertains to the so-called “radioelectronic war”–as it transpired in December 1989:

volumul Armata romana in revolutia din decembrie 1989 (Editura Militara)

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Apreciem că, în acelaşi context, prezintă o oarecare importanţă şi aspectul semnalat în NOTA S.R.I. transmisă comisiei cu nr. S/9.022/1992 şi anume: „… În ziua de 2 ianuarie 1990 a fost reţinut la Unitatea militară 01929 Reşiţa, alături de alte cadre de securitate fostul şef al Serviciului „T”, cpt.(r.) Berinde Florin. Cu ocazia anchetelor la care a fost supus de către unele cadre militare ale M.Ap.N. şi organe ale procuraturii militare, acesta a relatat că, în ziua de 23 decembrie 1989, în jurul orelor 1500, pe când se efectuau acordurile pe scala staţiei R-105, pentru menţinerea legăturii, conform celor convenite anterior, s-au auzit convorbiri în limba rusă, ce aveau intonaţii puternice, de ordin. La auzul acestor mesaje lt.col. Măriuţa Gheorghe de la fostul organ de miliţie, cel mai mare în grad dintre cei prezenţi, a dat ordin să se închidă staţia pentru a nu afla şi alte cadre şi a nu crea o stare de panică în rândul efectivelor. Din cele relatate rezultă că aceste convorbiri se auzeau deosebit de clar se transmiteau de aproape, fără zgomot de fond fâsâit sau bruiaj. Acelaşi ofiţer a mai relatat că, în împrejurările de mai sus a discutat şi cu cpt.ing. Brencea Constantin, care i-a spus că începând cu 23 decembrie 1989 şi ei au fost bruiaţi pe sistemul de transmisiuni radioreleu pe unde scurte, pe toate canalele posibile cu semnale care emit fie convorbiri în limba rusă, fie un fel de triluri muzicale, iar pe radiolocatoare au fost bruiaţi prin generarea unui semnal care imita ţinte reale…”.

https://sites.google.com/site/problemeistorice/raport-final-comisia-senatoriala-decembrie-1989-sectiunea-5

Generalul Mircea Mocanu, comandantul CAAT în 1989, declara în faţa Comisiei Senatoriale pentru Cercetarea Evenimentelor din Decembrie 1989 că România s-a confruntat în mod cert, în timpul Revoluţiei, cu ceea ce se numeşte „război electronic”. El explică câteva dintre metodele unei astfel de operaţiuni. „Ulterior au fost găsite pe teritoriul ţării mai multe baloane tip meteo, cu materialul din plastic sfâşiat de schije; de baloane atârnau reflectoare poliedrice, adică un schelet de lemn cu foiţă de staniol în măsură să reflecte undele electromagnetice emise de staţiile de radio­­locaţie. Pe cutie – o brumă de aparatură, pe care scria în limba rusă «fabricat în URSS»; aveau şi o etichetă pe care scria în limba maghiară: «Cine aduce la organele locale un asemenea obiect primeşte 50 de forinţi»”.

http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/video-misterele-revolutiei-diversiunea-radioelectronica-sovieticii-americaniii-1_50ad127b7c42d5a6638e4c95/index.html

Reflectori poliedrici cu marca “Fabricat in URSS”
Faptul ca pe langa tintele false au existat si tinte reale este sustinut in cadrul raportului MApN de gasirea, in diferite locuri, a unor baloane asemanatoare cu cele utilizate in meteorologie. Neobisnuit insa, aceste baloane aveau acrosati reflectori poliedrici  care puteau induce pe ecranele de radiolocatie semnale similare celor provenind de la o aeronava reala. Pe cutia aparaturii acrosata baloanelor distruse s-au gasit inscriptii in limba rusa sau engleza cu “Fabricat in URSS”. Raportul militar mai mentioneaza un aspect greu de crezut, un fel de fantezie, si care pare mai degraba o influenta a curentului antimaghiar dezvoltat preponderent in randurile cadrelor armatei, indoctrinate sub comunism, din acea perioada, si anume ca mai existau “atasate biletele in limba maghiara prin care se promiteau aducatorilor acestor obiecte recompense de 150 forinti”. Era si o perioada in care teoria conspiratiei incerca sa justifice evenimentele din perioada Revolutiei. Sa nu uitam ca si Ceausescu, la fel ca si cadrele Armatei si Securitatii, avea aceasta obsesie a “cetatenilor straini care vor sa destabilizeze tara si sa fure Transilvania”. Ceea ce militarii specializati si procurorii militari au denumit, la inceputul anilor ’90, razboiul radio-electronic a amplificat starea emotiva a unei parti din participantii la Revolutie, care faceau periodic trimiteri la eventuale forte straine, solicitand implicit interventii din partea Armatei si a grupurilor de civili inarmati.

Elicopterul rusesc a ramas in urma
Mai multi tanchisti din batalionul de tancuri de la Targoviste, dislocat pentru apararea Ministerului Apararii Nationale si pentru intarirea dispozitivelor de paza din zona, au sustinut ca, incercand sa-si racordeze frecventele radio, au surprins fragmente din conversatii in limba rusa identificate ca avand drept sursa o formatiune de elicoptere. Din convorbirile interceptate, traduse de inginerul Simion Barbu, rezulta ca era vorba de o formatiune de zbor careia ii ramasese in urma un elicopter, aparat ce ar fi fost pilotat de o femeie. In transmisiunea radio, pilotul isi justifica ramanerea in urma si desprinderea de formatie prin defectiuni survenite la aparat, iar comandantul formatiunii i-a transmis ordinul sa pastreze aceeasi altitudine si acelasi itinerar pana in momentul in care va reusi sa realizeze contactul cu formatiunea de care apartinea.

http://m.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/prigoana-vantului-diversiunea-elicopterelor-cu-teroristi-libieni-142385.html

Amiralul (r) Gheorghe Anghelescu*** rememorează la rândul său: „Acţiunile noastre au început să se desfăşoare atunci când ne aşteptăm mai puţin. În noaptea de 22-23 decembrie, pe ecranele
radiolocatoarelor sistemului de observare electronic al Marinei şi Apărării Antiaeriene a teritoriului au apărut nenumărate nave, avioane şi
elicoptere, care toate se îndreptau spre litoralul nostru. Prin reţelele radio se primeau cele mai diverse informaţii care confirmau această mare acţiune aeronavală ostilă. Totul părea incredibil. În portul Constanţa navele comerciale aveau indicii că sunt minate de scafandri inamici, de pe litoral, posturile de observare ne semnalau elicoptere, navele civile şi platformele petroliere marine descopereau şi informau despre ţinte aeriene, în reţelele radio se intensifica frecvenţa convorbirilor în limba rusă, arabă şi engleză; toate acestea ne-au făcut să percepem ca reală o agresiune aeronavală”.
Ţintele se îndreptau către plajele Mamaia, Mangalia, Sf. Gheorghe şi Sulina, zone propice efectuării de desantări de trupe. Rapoartele primite înştiinţau prezenţa elicopterelor în largul Mării Negre, în zona platformelor de foraj marin.

http://surrysipluta.blogspot.com/2010/12/decembrie-1989-si-caietele.html

Cine sunt agresorii din decembrie? Îi vom cunoaşte vreodată pe cei care au bântuit cerul în acele zile? Uimirea miltarilor a atins apogeul, când s-a constatat corelarea perfectă a evenimentelor din teren cu cele aeriene şi convorbirile radio: “04 către 34 … Staţia S, defectă … mergem numai 18 … unitatea de lângă noi a tras cu mitraliere, tunuri şi rachete”. Toate aceste convorbiri radio, se refereau la probleme concrete, la acţiuni reale; sau un alt caz: “se poate decola pentru că S.R.C. (staţia radiolocaţie cercetare) nu lucrează … aruncarea în aer a containerului …”Asemenea convorbiri se amestecau cu altele în limba rusă, arabă, engleză.

După data de 28 decembrie, atât numărul ţintelor reperate cât şi traficul radio, au căzut, ajungând la zero. Dealtfel şi fragmentele de conversaţii interceptate sugerau o retragere spre “bazele proprii”.  (Carol Roman, “Enigmele ale Revolutiei Romane din ’89”)

http://revista.balcanii.ro/index_html?editia=94-95&page=revolutia&nr=2

Simultan in circuitile telefonice, radio, si chiar de comanda (da, nu este o exagerare!) se inregistreaza o avalansa de ordine si informatii, atit in limba romana, cit si in engleza, araba, si turca.

Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bordea, “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor,” Armata Poporului, nr. 19 (9 mai 1990), p.2.

Convorbirile erau purtate in mai multe limbi, preponderent in engleza (cu un pronuntat accent arab), dar si in italiana, turca, bulgara, sirba, si romana…

Mai mult:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/razboiul-radio-electronic-noiembrie-1989-ianuarie-1990/

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (VI) plus BONUS: de ce a ocolit zona Moldovei razboiul radioelectornic?!!!

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (V)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (IV)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (III)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (II)

decembrie 1989 si diversiunea radioelectronica: “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor” (I)

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments »

Presa romaneasca din anii nouazeci despre cazul lui Constantin Vasiliu–suspectat de terorism la TVR

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 8, 2013

Daca din ratiuni necuoscute cazul Silviu Stefan Dutu

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/07/presa-romaneasca-din-anii-nouazeci-despre-cazul-lui-silviu-dutu-suspectat-de-terorism-la-tvr/

nu figureaza in dosarul  97/P/1990

publicat pe internetul pana acum, in schimb apare Lt. Col. Vasiliu Constantin:

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Valentin Gora:  Au fost arestati oameni ai securitatii, teroristi.  Astazi, nimeni nu stie ce s-a intimplat sa ce se intimpla in continuare cu ei.  Dumneavoastra i-ati vazut?  Ii cunoasteti?

Petre Constantin:  Au fost arestati multi oameni, am mai spus-o, care aveau asupra lor arme de toate felurile, pe toti i-a preluat armata si nu stiu ce s-a intimplat mai departe cu ei.  Adjunctul meu, Traian Puscasu, a fost injunghiat in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie, pe hol, la etajul 11.  Agresorul, locotenent-colonelul Vasiliu, il viza pe generalul Tudor sau pe mine.  Eu am lipsit citeva miunte, generalul Tudor s-a ferit in momentul atacului si a fost lovit Puscasu.  Totul se intimpla in usa biroului.  Militarii au sarit si l-au imobilizat imediat.

Valentin Gora cu Petre Constantin, “Petre Constantin:  Cind a dictat decretul de instalare ? de asediu pe intreg teritoriul tarii, in biroul lui Ceausescu se afla si Eugen Florescu,” Cuvintul, nr. 12, 18 aprilie 1990, pp. 4-5.

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http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2013/11/13/cercetarile-parchetului-in-dosarul-revolutiei-37-bucuresti-televiziune-raniti-si-ucisi-5/

425. Parte vătămată Puşcaşu Traian (Televiziune-Vol. 110)
Numitul Puşcaşu Traian, fiul lui Gheorghe şi Maria, născut la data de 01.03.1927, în Iaşi, domiciliat în Bucureşti (…) în noaptea de 22/23.12.1989, în timp ce se afla în incinta televiziunii, unde-şi desfăşura activitatea ca director adjunct al TVR, a fost înjunghiat în abdomen cu un cuţit de către lt. col. Vasiliu Cornel, care se afla în dispozitivul de pază al instituţiei respective.
Conform raportului medico-legal nr. A1/3409/1990, numitul Puşcaşu Traian a prezentat la data de 24.12.1989 o plagă abdominală penetrantă cu interesarea splinei şi arterei epigastrice. Leziunea a putut fi produsă prin lovire cu corp tăietor-înţepător (posibil cuţit). A necesitat circa 25 zile de îngrijiri medicale. Leziunea i-a pus viaţa în pericol.
Prin rezoluţia nr. 1411/P/1990, din data de 15.11.1990, Procuratura Militară Bucureşti a dispus neînceperea urmăririi penale faţă de lt. col. Vasiliu Constantin, sub aspectul infr. prev. de art. 20 rap. la art. 174 C.p., reţinându-se că, în urma expertizării sale psihiatrice, s-a stabilit că a acţionat fără discernământ.

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , | 1 Comment »

Vina de neiertat a TVR: a contribuit decisiv la victoria Revolutiei (II)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 4, 2013

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/01/vina-de-neiertat-a-tvr-a-contribui-decisiv-la-victoria-revolutiei-i/

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“Despre existenta simulatoarele, senatorul Sergiu Nicolaescu a adresat o intrebare fostului sef al Departmamentului Securitatii Statului, gl. Vlad Iulian, care a raspuns…”Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea…” (declaratie Iulian Vlad, pag. 75).

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In aceasta perioada, in zona Televiziunii au fost observate semnale luminoase ce prezentau imaginea unei balizari si care marcau inceputul sau incetarea atacurilor.

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Mai mult despre “semnale luminoase”:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/19/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-ii/

Doru Sciadei’s statement, 27 January 1990

“O persoana dintre militari a luminat cu o lanterna, iar altii 3-4 p(ersoane?) au tras (d)in casa (scarilor)”  [pagina 1 e greu de citit]

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“In urma radiografiei facute la Spitalul Judetean au spus ca am 2 schije in picior…consemnat de medicul radiolog si chirurg, care m-au consultat.

Convingerea mea este ca in acest atac (pe ?) Calea Girocului, asupra unor oameni pasnici si (?) s-au folosit cel putin doua tipuri de gloante, convingerea intirita de glontul scos din coapsa (?) si schijele din piciorul meu, care cred ca provin de un glonte exploziv.

…Se trage sistematic si concomitent cu tragerea de lumina de catre unul din ei cu o lanterna.”

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/16/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-i/

For example, in a 7 September 1995 interview, Dorina Aparaschivei told Marius Mioc about how her husband, Valentin Aparaschivei, was shot to death on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara ( “A luminat cu o lanterna si apoi a tras” http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT04~1.HTM ).  Among the details, she notes, “Cind militarii au ajuns in fata blocului unul dintre ei, mai batrin si cu mustata, a luminat cu o lanterna puternica si apoi a tras mai multe focuri spre noi. Sotul a fost impuscat in piept si a cazut pe spate.”

Thanks to the publication of Dosarele Revolutiei de la Timisoara, we can now confirm that was reported in the media in July 2008 is indeed the actual quote of Dumitru Marcu, commander of U.M. 01380 Arad, as recorded in his report dated 4 January 1990.  In this report, Marcu spoke of unidentified personnel infiltrated among the personnel of his military unit who used powerful flashlights (lanterns/lamps), and he suggests that these may have been Securitate/Militie personnel.

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Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

http://www.mediafax.ro/social/jurnalul-de-lupta-al-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-desecretizat-galerie-foto-2767638

Comandantul unitatii militare din Arad, martor al evenimentelor, a raportat ca “printre militarii care au actionat pe Calea Girocului s-au strecurat si persoane necunoscute, in uniforma, care aveau lanterne foarte puternice cu care luminau balcoanele blocurilor din apropiere, dupa care trageau asupra lor”.

1.  Intensitatea maxima a tragerilor executate de elementele teroriste a fost situata intre 22.12.1989 si 26.12.1989.

2.  Tragerile s-au executat indeosebi de pe terasele blocurilor, din apartamente, din spatiile dintre cladiri si mijloace mobile (conform schemei) si in detaliu astfel:

a) Latura dinspre Drumul Taberei:

–din mijloace mobile–turism Opel si camion cu remorca in noaptea de 22/23.12 si doua autoturisme blindate tip A.B.I. in noaptea de 23/24.12;

–de pe terasa blocului situat la intersectia str. HO SI MIN cu str. DRUMUL TABEREI;

–de pe terasa blocului A-2, etajul 2, scara A – cu pusca cu luneta, iar din fata partilor laterale ale acestuia — cu arme automate;

–de pe blocul A-1, de la etajul III si parter, scara A – cu pusca cu luneta;

–din spatele ghenei de gunoi (de langa B1, B4) – cu arme automate;

–de pe terasa complexului “ORIZONT”, de la farmacie, chioscul de ziare, cabinele telefonice, mercerie si de langa restaurantul “ORIZONT” (in special, in zilele de 22-23.12.1989);

–de pe Scoala generala nr. 193 si blocul 108 (in zilele de 24-25.12.1989);

–de pe acoperisurile blocurilor C-2, C-4 si T-8 s-a tras cu pusca cu luneta si pistoale, iar dinspre flancul drept al blocului T-9 si de pe C-2, in unele nopti, s-au executat semnale luminoase catre blocurile vecine si spre minister, urmate ulterior de executarea tragerilor, de catre elemente teroriste, din diferite directii asupra sediului M.Ap.N.;

–de pe terasele blocurilor A-2 si A-4, in noaptea de 22.12.1989, s-a tras cu pusti cu luneta si arme automate.  De asemenea, de pe B1.  A-2 s-au executat diferite semnale luminoase, urmate de executarea tragerilor.

b) Latura dinspre Aleea HAIDUCULUI:

–de pe terasa blocului 2 S-14 s-a tras asupra tancurilor aflate pe str. DRUMUL TABEREI;

–de pe blocul E-23 s-a tras asupra unui T.A.B., aflat in dispozitiv pe str. MIRON CONSTANTINESCU;

–de pe blocurile 4 S-14 si 28 s-au executat trageri asupra hotelului militar, situat pe Aleea HAIDUCULUI;

–de pe blocurile Z-10 si Z-11 s-a executat foc automat si cu pusca cu luneta asupra militarilor din dispozitivul de aparare situat pe latura dinspre cimitirul GHENCEA, foc dirijat prin semnale luminoase de pe blocul Z-8;

–in strada MIRON CONSTANTINESCU s-a executat foc din blocurile C-2 (etj. 4-5), Z-17 (etj. 10), C-1 (etj. 7), iar de la etj. 7 s-au facut semnale luminoase.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/05/04/decembrie-1989-situatia-prvind-actiunea-prin-foc-a-elementelor-teroriste-asupra-sediului-ministerului-apararii-nationale-in-perioada-22-2712-1989/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/17/la-resita-s-a-jucat-o-mare-carte-a-revolutiei-dovada-de-adevar-ce-spun-fosti-securisti-revista-vitralii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ceva-era-putred-in-dobrogea/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/15/decembrie-1989-cine-trage-dintr-un-aro/

Mai mult despre “simulatoare”

“O lupta cu fortele raului,” Orizont (Timisoara), nr. 5 (2 februarie 1990), p. 5.

Iosif Costinas: Care este opinia ta despre felul cum au actionat securistii-teroristi?

Lt. Col. Petre Ghinea: Spre deosebire de militarii nostri, ei au fost foarte bine pregatiti pentru lupta in oras. Dispuneau de armament modern, special (inclusiv simulatoare de foc). De pilda, la automatele lor rabatabile, cu gloante videa [vidia] sau gloante explozive, nu se putea vedea flacara la gura tevii….Initial, dupa opinia mea, au intrat in lupta elemente extrem de bine instruite, apoi acestea au disparut, lasind in locul lor o seama de colaboratori ai fostei Securitatii (din diferite, ca sa zi asa, categorii, socio-profesionale).  A fost un plan diabolic, indeplinit, din nefericire, in buna masura….

“In declaratiile pe care le-a dat sub prestare de juramant in fata Comisiei parlamentare de ancheta, generalul Vlad nu aminteste despre acest episod, iar la intrebarile puse de membrii Comisiei este fie evaziv, fie le deturneaza sensul. Fara sa vrea, lamureste insa partial una dintre problemele obscure privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989. Reproducem stenograma:

�Domnul Gabrielescu: Ati auzit despre acele simulatoare care s-au folosit?

Domnul Vlad: Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea… Mi se pare ca tot un asemenea aparat electronic s-a folosit si in ziua de 21 decembrie cand s-a spart mitingul. Dupa ce a facut Nica Leon (a strigat �Timisoara, Timisoara!� – n.n.) s-a auzit o arma automata si s-a creat panica mare…�”

Recurs la adevar

„Am fost împuşcat de un terorist” Costinel Venus Mirea, copleşit de amintirile de la Revoluţie    Foto: Victor C. Boldîr Domnule Costinel Venus Mirea, în decembrie 1989 eraţi locotenent-major la UM 01047. Care era atmosfera în unitate? Era o tensiune extraordinară. După ce în noaptea de 22 spre 23 s-a tras continuu asupra noastră, în următoarea noapte, odată cu lăsarea întunericului, au început iar să tragă. Noi răspundeam mereu cu foc automat, pentru că aşa prevedea regulamentul. Schimburile de focuri erau doar noaptea. Aveaţi idee cine trăgea? În blocurile din faţa unităţii, trăgătorul executa foc dintr-o armă, îşi punea un simulator, iar el se deplasa în alt loc şi continua tragerea, pentru a crea diversiunea. Au fost şi simulatoare, dar asta am aflat mai târziu.

 adevarul.ro/news/societate/masacrul-craiova-ordinul-militaru-1_50ad46457c42d5a663920ac2/index.html

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/06/02/iosif-costinas-cu-locotenent-colonelul-petre-ghinea-o-lupta-cu-fortele-raului-orizont-timisoara-nr-5-221990-p-5/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/27/dumitru-mazilu-si-mircea-dinescu-despre-revolutia-romana/

Mircea Dinescu:

Au existat, da! Există! Eu am văzut şi simulatoare electronice, astea erau împânzite în tot Bucureştiul, erau planuri vechi, pentru eventualitatea unor invazii, atacuri, etc.

 

Eugen Evu:

Acelaşi scenariu, peste tot unde s-a tras în oameni. Şi la Hunedoara, jur că s-a tras asupra mea, eram în faţa Poştei, cu o doamnă de la sindicate… Urma, gaura de glonţ vidia, alături de una normală, a stat mult timp în geamul intrării poştei, s-a tras asupra mea, eram de mult urmărit de securişti şi de unii de la miliţie, care mă arestau periodic, m-au anchetat şi penal, căci îi scrisesem lui Ceauşescu şi nu am vrut să recunosc! (ibidem,n.2006) În actuala Hunedoară, o biserică cu hramul martirilor prin împuşcare (şase la număr), stagnează de ani buni fără fonduri a se isprăvi. Pare un stigmat. Predicile se aud în oraş unele sunt de-a dreptul patetice, cu apeluri disperate, dar enoriaşii n-au bani, iar cei ce au nu prea se-apleacă. (ibid).

 

Mircea Dinescu:

De când erau în Cehoslovacia… Simulatoarele imitau mitralierele, soldaţii trăgeau uşurel, cu gloanţe în infraroşu, eu am văzut, erau împuşcaţi numai în frunte, aşa: în C.C., în întuneric! Numai acolo-ntr-o oră au fost împuşcaţi şaişpe inşi. Numai pe lumină stinsă, în frunte, doar erau profesionişti, erau băieţi care… aveau arme speciale cu lunetă!

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/arhivarev/docs/16.htm.
În jurul orei 2. La staţia de amplificare din CJ se anunţă că un grup de terorişti se pregăteşte în barul ARO să atace. Primele focuri de armă. Primă victimă, un bărbat ce vorbea mulţimii la un microfon din faţa CJ. Imediat se stinge lumina în toată clădirea Comitetului Judeţean. După câteva minute de linişte, a urmat dezlănţuirea infernului. Indivizi necunoscuţi trăgeau în populaţie din poziţii situate în clădirea Modarom, Facultatea de Electrotehnică şi hotelul Capitol. Simultan au fost semnalate atacuri asupra Rafinăriei, Metromului, Uzinei 2 şi Tipografiei. Abia mai târziu s-a demonstrat că toate aceste atacuri au fost simple diversiuni. Mulţimea se înghesuie în clădirea CJ. Focurile de armă încetează, iar lumina este restabilită în clădire.
Ora 3. Morţii sunt duşi în sala 105 din CJ. Şase dintre ei sunt soldaţi de la UM 01090 – Predeal – Vânători de Munte care nu aveau nici o oră de tragere. Locurile de la ferestrele CJ au fost ocupate de soldaţi care trăgeau în gol. La scurt timp, apărătorii au rămas fără muniţie.
Ora 4. Un camion cu muniţie este parcat în spatele CJ.
Ora 5. Focurile de armă au încetat. Sosesc câteva ambulanţe pentru a evacua morţii din clădirea CJ. Civilii sunt evacuaţi din clădire, rămânând doar cei din FSN.
Ora 6. Oraşul este cufundat în linişte. Se înmulţesc zvonurile de tot felul. La cei din CJ ajunge informaţia că în hotelul Capitol au fost reţinuţi trei terorişti, dar care au dispărut fără urmă. Alţi trei terorişti sunt văzuţi pe un bloc la Gemenii, nu trece mult timp şi o blindată MLVM îşi face apariţia în zonă. Teroriştii au dispărut şi de această dată. Muncitorii de la Rafinărie susţin că au găsit două simulatoare de arme de foc pe care le-au predat unui ofiţer de Miliţie. Simulatoarele au dispărut şi ele.

http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-decembrie-89/enigmele-neelucidate-ale-revolutiei-sibiene-528001.html

ANCHETA
La scurt timp după restabilirea liniştii, cercetarea evenimentelor de la Sibiu a fost preluată de anchetatorii Parchetului Militar Braşov, conduşi de către procurorul Socaciu. Revoluţionarul Ioan Nemeş ne-a declarat că în acea perioadă a adunat tot felul de gloanţe din zidurile caselor în care s-a tras, precum şi părţi componente ale unor puşti cu lunetă, găsite prin poduri. Alţi localnici afirmă că mai multe simulatoare de foc, găsite în imobilele amplasate în jurul unor unităţi militare, au fost predate comisiei de anchetă, conduse de acelaşi Socaciu.

Tot acolo s-a predat şi o ciudată geantă diplomat în interiorul căreia era mascat un revolver cu care se putea deschide focul în mod discret. Imaginea acelui dispozitiv a apărut în mai multe ziare. După doi ani, anchetatorii au anunţat că toate aceste probe, alături de mai multe declaraţii de martor, au dispărut fără urmă şi nu au mai fost găsite niciodată.

NUMAI CA E FOARTE INTERESANT SA NE AMINTIM CINE AU CALATORIT CU SI AU ADUS IN SIBIU “GENTI DIPOMATI” IN ACESTE ZILE:  USLASII (“turisti rusi”) COMANDATI DE CATRE PRINTISORUL, NICU CEAUSESCU, CARE AU VENIT CU ROMBAC-UL IN SEARA DE 20 DECEMBRIE 1989:

Posted in decembrie 1989 | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Final Boarding Call for TAROM’s special ROMBAC service from Bucuresti to Sibiu: Would the large party of suspicious “Soviet tourists” please report to the gate immediately! (IV)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 16, 2013

Part I :  Just how absurd is the Soviet tourist scenario?! https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/10/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-i/

Part II:  Senior Securitate officials sent to Timisoara cannot find the “foreign tourists” Nicolae Ceausescu and Iulian Vlad claim are behind the unrest.  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/11/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-ii/

Part III:  The Ceausescu regime bans new Soviet travellers to the country…but allows those “in transit,” already in Romania, to stay…and apparently, despite supposedly having great suspicions of their actions, do nothing to stop them… https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/08/14/final-boarding-call-for-taroms-special-rombac-service-from-bucuresti-to-sibiu-would-the-large-party-of-suspicious-soviet-tourists-please-report-to-the-gate-immediately-ii-2/

I hope to develop this, part IV, at another time…for now, some previously related content in reference to the famous ROMBAC flight of 20 December 1989 from Bucuresti (Otopeni) to Sibiu:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ultimul-raport-al-securitatii-catre-nicolae-ceausescu/

The Securitate’s last report to Nicolae Ceausescu:

Please note:  no mention whatsoever of the alleged role played by “Russian tourists” or “Soviet tourists” in allegedly fomenting the Timisoara uprising, or of their supposed presence on the ROMBAC of 20 December 1989

published in Evenimentul Zilei, 28 iulie 1992, p. 3.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/10/04/decembrie-89-citeva-indoieli-stirnite-de-un-articol-din-revista-22-cazul-ivanciuc-si-teza-turistilor-sovietici/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/03/26/a-ruse-by-any-other-name-general-stanculescu-the-soviet-tourists-and-december-1989/

THE 1989 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION AS GEOPOLITICAL PARLOR GAME: BRANDSTATTER’S “CHECKMATE” DOCUMENTARY AND THE LATEST WAVE IN A SEA OF REVISIONISM

By Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer: This material has been reviewed by CIA. That review neither constitutes CIA authentification of information nor implies CIA endorsement of the author’s views.

Part 3: Ruse

A SECURITATE RIDDLE: SOVIET “TOURISTS” AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE CEAUSESCU REGIME

Although I have written a good deal on the “tourist” conundrum in the past (see, for example, Hall 2002), I have not formally addressed the role of foreign histories of Ceausescu’s overthrow in the historiography of December 1989, particularly in regard to this topic. In the wake of the broadcast of Brandstatter’s “Checkmate” documentary in February 2004, Vladimir Bukovski’s invocation of journalist John Simpson’s 1994 article on the topic (discussed in Part 2 of this series) suggests, however, that it needs to be broached in greater detail. Moreover, as the year-long look-back at the December 1989 events in “Jurnalul National” shows, the “tourist” question—somewhat surprisingly to me—has become more and more central to arguments about the Revolution, thereby amplifying what is already tremendous confusion over the events in the Romanian press and public. Of course, as has traditionally been the case, the Soviet/Russian tourists figure prominently, and, to a lesser extent, the Hungarian tourists. However, the stock of other tourist groups has also gone up. For example, the role of Yugoslav (specifically Serb) tourists has found a greater emphasis, and, seemingly out of nowhere, so have East German/STASI tourists! The principal sources for all of these allegations are, as usual, former Securitate and Militia officers, with some military (intelligence) personnel thrown in for good measure.

FOREIGN FORUM, ROMANIAN CONTEXT

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact first mention of “the tourists” and their alleged role in the Revolution, but it appears that although the source of the claim was Romanian, the publication was foreign. James F. Burke, whose name is unfortunately left off the well-researched and widely-consulted web document “The December 1989 Revolt and the Romanian Coup d‘etat,” alludes to the “Romanian filmmaker” who first made these allegations (Burke, 1994). The claims are contained in an article by Richard Bassett in the 2 March 1990 edition of “The Times (London).” According to Bassett,

“Mr. [Grigore] Corpacescu has no doubt that the revolution here was carefully stage-managed—as was the case in Prague and East Berlin—by the Russians…According to Mr. Corpacescu a party of Soviet ‘tourists,’ all usually on individual visas, arrived in Timisoara two days before the first demonstration outside Mr. [i.e. Pastor] Tokes’ house. Police records trace them reaching Bucharest on December 20. By the 24th, two days after Ceausescu fled by helicopter, the Russians had disappeared. No police records exist to indicate how they left the country. (“The Times (London),” 2 March 1990)

But Bassett’s interlocutor, Mr. Corpacescu, says some strange things. Bassett is not clear but it appears that Corpacescu suggests that the post-Revolution Interior Minister Mihai Chitac, who was involved in the Timisoara events as head of the army’s chemical troops, somehow purposely coaxed the demonstrations against the regime because the tear-gas cannisters his unit fired failed to explode—the failure somehow an intended outcome. But beyond this, Corpacescu, who is at the time of the article filming the recreation of Ceausescu’s flight on the 22nd—using the same helicopter and pilot involved in the actual event—makes the following curious statement:

“The pilot of this helicopter is an old friend. I have many friends in the police, Timisoara was not started by the Hungarian pastor, the Reverend Laszlo Tokes [i.e. it was carefully stage-managed…by the Russians].” (“The Times (London),” 2 March 1990)

The pilot of the helicopter was in fact Vasile Malutan, an officer of the Securitate’s V-a Directorate. What kind of a person would it have been at that time—and how credible could that person have been–who has the pilot as an old friend and “many friends in the police?” And it would have been one thing perhaps two months after the revolution to talk about the presence of foreign agents “observing” events in Timisoara, but to deny the spontaneity of the demonstrations and denigrate Tokes’ role at this juncture is highly suspicious. I have been unable to unearth additional information on Mr. Corpacescu, but his revelations just happen to serve his friends extremely well—particularly at at time when the prospect of trials and jail time, for participation in the repression in Timisoara and elsewhere during the Revolution, still faced many former Securitate and Militia [i.e. police] members.

THE FORMER SECURITATE AND MILITIA REMINISCE ABOUT THE SOVIET “TOURISTS”

A week after “The Times” article, the chief of the Securitate’s Counter-espionage Directorate, Colonel Filip Teodorescu, mentioned at his trial for his role in the Ceausescu regime’s crackdown in Timisoara that he had in fact detained “foreign agents” during the events there (“Romania Libera,” 9 March 1990). In his 1992 book, he developed further on this theme, specifically focusing on the role of “Soviet tourists:”

“There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these ‘tourists’” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 92).

Reporting in July 1991 on the trial involving many of those involved in the Timisoara repression, Radu Ciobotea noted with what was probably an apt amount of skepticism and cynicism, what was telling in the confessions of those on trial:

Is the End of Amnesia Approaching?…

Without question, something is happening with this trial. The Securitate doesn’t say, but it suggests. It let’s small details ‘slip out.’…Increasingly worthy of interest are the reactions of those on trial….Traian Sima (the former head of the county’s Securitate) testifies happily that, finally, the Securitate has been accepted at the trial, after having been rejected by Justice. Filip Teodorescu utters the magic word ‘diplomats’ and, suddenly, the witness discovers the key to the drawer with surpise and declares, after five hours of amnesia, that in Timisoara, there appeared in the days in question, foreign spies under the cover of being journalists and diplomats, that in a conversation intercepted by a mobile Securitate surveillance unit Tokes was reported as ‘well,’ and that all these (and other) counterespionage actions that can’t be made public to the mass media can be revealed behind closed doors to the judge….[Timis County party boss] Radu Balan ‘remembers’ that on 18 December at midnight when he was heading toward IAEM, he passed a group of ten soviet cars stopped 100 meters from the county hospital. (It turns out that in this night, in the sight of the Soviets, the corpses were loaded!).” [emphasis in the original] (Flacara, no. 27, 1991, p. 9).

The reference to the corpses being loaded is to an operation by the Militia and Securitate on the night of 18-19 December 1989, in which the cadavers of 40 people killed during the repression of anti-regime protesters were secretly transported from Timisoara’s main hospital to Bucharest for cremation (reputedly on Elena Ceausescu’s personal order).

Finally, as yet another of many possible examples, we have the recollections of Bucharest Militia Captain Ionel Bejan, which apparently appeared in print for the first time only in 2004, in a book by Alex Mihai Stoenescu (excerpted in “Jurnalul National,” 7 December 2004). According to Bejan, around 2 AM on the night of 21-22 December, not far from University Plaza, where at that moment regime forces were firing their way through a barricade set up by protesters (48 were killed that night, 604 wounded, and 684 arrested), he spotted two LADA automobiles with Soviet plates and two men and a woman studying a map and pointing to different locations among the surrounding buildings. Bejan recalled:

“One thing’s for sure, and that is that although they looked like tourists, they didn’t behave like tourists who had just arrived in town or were lost, especially as close by there were compact groups of demonstrators, while from armored personnel carriers there was intense warning fire and a helicopter hovered overhead with lights ablaze. I don’t know what kind of tourist tours somewhere in such conditions. They left the impression that they were sure of themselves, they didn’t need any directions, proof which was that they didn’t ask us anything even though we were nearby and, being uniformed Militia, were in the position to give them any directions they needed. One thing’s for sure when I returned to that location in January 1990…the buildings displayed visible signs of bullet holes…[emphasis added]” (“Jurnalul National,” 7 December 2004)

STRANGE “TOURISTS”…STRANGER STILL, THE REACTIONS OF THE AUTHORITIES

We can agree with Ionel Bejan in one respect. One thing is for sure: these were some very strange tourists. (They give a whole new meaning to the term, “adventure tourism.”) As curious as the “Soviet tourists” themselves is how little the Romanian authorities who claim to have seen them did to stop them—or even try to collect more information about them. Why is it that no official questioned the enigmatic “Soviet tourists” or asked them to leave the area when, as Radu Balan claims, he saw ten LADAs outside the Timis county hospital at 1 AM in the morning the night the cadavers of protesters were being loaded onto a truck for cremation? Or, as Ionel Bejan claims, he spotted several of them in the center of Bucharest at 2 AM, when the area was essentially a warzone of regime repression? The regime had closed the borders to virtually all other foreigners, tourists or otherwise, it was trying to prevent any word of the repression from reaching the outside world, and yet Romanian authorities were not concerned about these “tourists” taking pictures or relaying what they were seeing?!

As I have written before, if it was obvious before 18 December, as these Ceausescu regime officials claim, that “Soviet tourists” were involved in the events in Timisoara, then why was it precisely “Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia” who were the only group declared exempt from the ban on “tourism” announced on that day (see AFP, 19 December 1989 as cited in Hall 2002b)? In fact, an Agent France-Presse correspondent reported that two Romanian border guards on the Yugoslav frontier curtly told him: “Go back home, only Russians can get through”!!! The few official documents from the December events that have made their way into the public domain show the Romanian Ambassador to Moscow, Ion Bucur, appealing to the Soviets to honor the Romanian news blackout on events in Timisoara, but never once mentioning—let alone objecting to—the presence or behavior of “Soviet tourists” in Romania during these chaotic days of crisis for the Ceausescu regime (CWHIP, “New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania,” 2001). It truly strains the imagination to believe that the Romanian authorities were so “frightened” of committing a diplomatic incident with the Soviets that they would allow Soviet agents to roam the country virtually unhindered, allowing them to go anywhere and do anything they wanted.

BUT WAIT, THERE’S MORE…A “SOVIET TOURIST” ENCORE IN 1990

Add to all of this (!), the allegations that the “Soviet tourists” were seen again on the streets during major crises in 1990, such as the ethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in Tirgu Mures in March 1990 (for evidence of the reach of the allegation of KGB manipulation via the “tourist” mechanism both in December 1989 AND in March 1990, see Emil Hurezeanu, “Cotidianul,” 23 December 1999; according to Hurezeanu, “It appears they didn’t leave the country until 1991, following a visit by [SRI Director] Virgil Magureanu to Moscow”!). Then there is the famous April 1991 interview of an alleged KGB officer—who spoke flawless Romania and was in Romania during the December 1989 events—who the interviewer, the vigorous anti-Iliescu foe, Sorin Rosca Stanescu, claimed to have just stumbled into in Paris. Of all the reporters who could have stumbled into a KGB officer present in Romania during the Revolution—the only such case I know of—it was Rosca Stanescu, who, it turned out later, had been an informer for the Securitate until the mid-1980s—but not just for anybody, but for the USLA. Intererstingly, although the article appeared on the non-descript page 8 of the primary opposition daily at the time (“Romania Libera”), the aforementioned Filip Teodorescu and Radu Balan invoked it in support of their contentions regarding the the “tourists” (for a discussion of this, see Hall 2002). Even more suprising, or not, depending on your point of view, in his April 1991 article, Stanescu attempted to tie together December 1989 with December 1990 (!):

“As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil [in December 1989] of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania?” (emphasis added) (“Romania Libera,” 18 April 1991)

Indeed, what were they doing in Romania? But, more aptly:

WHO COULD THEY HAVE BEEN?

Some other recollections and comments may offer clues to the answer to this vexing question. For example, the Caransebes Militia Chief claims he helped a group of “Soviet tourists” coming from Timisoara on the night of 20-21 December when one of their cars—as usual, “it was part of a convoy of 20 cars, all of the same make and with 3-4 passengers per car”—went off the road (from “Europa,” no. 20, 1991, see the discussion in Hall 2002b). According to Teodorescu, the “tourists” greeted the militia chief with the phrase “What the hell? We are colleagues; you have to help us” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 93). The militia chief opines that despite their Soviet passports, “to this day, I don’t really know where they were from.”

Nicu Ceausescu, Nicolae’s son and most likely heir and party secretary in Sibiu at the time of the Revolution, claimed that he also had to deal with enigmatic “tourists” during these historic days (the following several paragraphs borrow heavily from Hall 2002b). From his prison cell in 1990, Nicu recounted how on the night of 20 December 1989, a top party official came to inform him that the State Tourist Agency was requesting that he — the party secretary for Sibiu! — “find lodgings for a group of tourists who did not have accommodation” He kindly obliged and made the appropriate arrangements (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

Interestingly, in the same interview Nicu discusses the “tourists” for which he was asked to find accommodations in the context of a group of mysterious passengers who had arrived by plane from Bucharest on the evening of 20 December 1989. We know that in the period immediately following these events, the then-military prosecutor, Anton Socaciu, had alleged that these passengers from Bucharest were members of the Securitate’s elite USLA unit (Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare) and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred in Sibiu during the December events. Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December in a crisis meeting, Ceausescu’s son announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests (“Baricada,” no. 45, 1990). Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request (“Romania Libera,” 30 January 1990.)

The rewriting of the story of the Revolution, the “tourists,” and the “terrorists” was already in full swing, when in August 1990, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

The impact of this “reconsideration” by the authorities could be seen in the comments of Socaciu’s successor as military prosecutor in charge of the Sibiu case, Marian Valer (see Hall 1997, pp. 314-315). Valer commented in September 1990 that investigations yielded the fact that there were 37 unidentified passengers on board the 20 December flight from Bucharest and that many of the other passengers maintained that “on the right side of the plane there had been a group of tall, athletic men, dressed in sporting attire, many of them blond, who had raised their suspicions.” The USLA, which were responsible for airport security and had “air marshals” on all flights (three in this case), refused to discuss the identity of these passengers with Valer. While investigations revealed that during this time there “were many Soviet tourists staying in Sibiu’s hotels,” they also established that “military units were fired upon from Securitate safehouses located around these units as of the afternoon of 22 December, after the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime.” He thus carefully concludes:

“As far as the unidentified passengers are concerned, there are two possible variants: Either they were USLA fighters sent to defend Nicu Ceausescu, or they were Soviet agents sent to act with the intent of overthrowing the Ceausescu regime” (“Expres,” no. 33, September 1990).

Clearly, one of these hypotheses is a lot more plauisble than the other…As I wrote in December 1996, partly based on the statements of the Military Prosecutor Marian Valer who stepped down from investigating the Sibiu events in fall 1990, citing duress: “thus as the USLA began to disappear from the historiography and therefore history of the Revolution, so the Soviet tourists began to enter it.” (Hall, 1996).

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

Sibiu, 19-22 December 1989

In Sibiu, Siani-Davies tells us:

Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989. It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[151]

From the standpoint of Siani-Davies’ unsuspecting reader such a conclusion may seem not only credible, but judicious. But one of Siani-Davies’ habits—identified negatively by even those who praise the book—is his tendency to draw negative equivalencies: i.e. there is about as much evidence to support x as there is to support y, in order to disprove or discount both propositions. In a review, Doris Mironescu writes:

“Very common are claims such as the following: ‘Finding the proof to sustain such an explanation of the events [that the Army’s Intelligence arm, the DIA simulated the “terrorist diversion,” to permit the Front’s takeover and a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of the country] is as difficult as proving that special units of the securitate took up arms against the revolution’ (p. 154). Mutually contradictory hypotheses are invoked in order to negate each other, not so much because of the weight of the claims, but through the ideological similarity of both.”[152]

This tendency definitely affects Siani-Davies’ analysis of the “terrorists” and its accuracy. To begin with, in the very book (Sandulescu) invoked by Siani-Davies, the head of the DIA (Battalion 404 Buzau), Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) that “we hardly had 80 fighters in this battalion.”[153] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[154] This makes it highly unlikely that they were on the 20 December TAROM flight to Sibiu that is in question.[155]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2009/12/18/hai-sa-ne-punem-capul-in-ghips/

in decembrie 1989, “temuta” unitate DIA Batalionul 404…avea…80 de luptatori!

Contrast this with the signs that exist pointing to the mystery passengers as having been from the Securitate/Interior Ministry, in particular the USLA. Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December 1989, in a crisis meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests.[156] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[157] If they were, indeed, DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and Postelnicu informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?

The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA. Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ – after which one no longer heard anything of them – they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…”[158]

Beginning, at least as early as August 1990, with the allusions of Major Mihai Floca, and later seemingly indirectly confirmed by former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, it was suggested that when USLA Commander Ardeleanu was confronted at the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December 1989, Ardeleanu reportedly admitted that “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’.”[159] Finally, and along these lines, we bring things full circle—and recall our “phantoms in black” again in the process—with the testimony of Army officer Hortopan to the same Serban Sandulescu at the Gabrielescu Commission hearings:

Sandulescu: About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?

Hortopan: On the contrary. These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu]. I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was: out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders. Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[160]

Bringing us up to the morning of 22 December 1989, and setting the stage for what was to come, Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:

Dragomir: Events began to develop quickly on 22 December. In the morning some of the students posted in different parts of the town began to observe some suspect individuals in black jumpsuits on the roofs in the lights of the attics of several buildings.

Reporter: The same equipment as the USLAsi killed out front of the Defense Ministry…

Dragomir: And on the roof of the Militia building there were three or four similar individuals…[161]

Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation. Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[162]

[151] Siani-Davies, 2005, p. 152, fn. no. 32.

[152] Doris Mironescu, “Revolutia româna, asa cum (probabil) a fost,” Timpul no. 1 (January 2006), at http://www.romaniaculturala.ro.

[153] Serban Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana (Bucharest: Omega, 1996), p. 214. Sandulescu’s book was marketed and printed by Sorin Rosca Stanescu’s Ziua press. Rosca Stanescu was a former USLA informer between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Who was Sandulescu’s chief counselor on these matters? Stefan Radoi, a former USLA officer in the early 1980s! These are the type of people who, of course, believe the passengers were DIA and not USLA! See my discussion of this whole fiasco in “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale,” RFE “East European Perspectives” 4-6/2002, online.

[154] See Dinu’s testimony in Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat, p. 220. Also see the claims of another senior DIA officer Remus Ghergulescu in Jurnalul National, March 2004, online edition.

[155] Speaking even more broadly, Army parachutists (whether from Buzau, Caracal, Campia Turzii, or Boteni) were in Timisoara, Caransebes, and Television, Piata Palatului and the Otopeni Airport in Bucharest during the December events, but that clearly leaves many places where there were “terrorist actions”—including Sibiu—without them, decreasing their likelihood as plausible suspects. See Catalin Tintareanu, “Sarbatoare la Scoala de Aplicatie pentru Parasutisti ‘General Grigore Bastan,” Opinia (Buzau), 10 June 2005, online edition.

[156] Nicu Silvestru, “Cine a ordonat sa se traga la Sibiu?” Baricada, no. 45, 1990, p.5.

[157] Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neintrebat,” Romania Libera, 30 January 1990, p. 1

[158] Interview with Nicu Ceausescu in Zig-Zag, no. 20, 21-27 August 1990.

[159] Adevarul, 29 August 1990. Also, Romanescu with Badea “U.S.L.A, Bula Moise…” 1991.

[160] “Virgil Magureanu sustine ca revolta din 1989 a fost sprijinita din interiorul sistemului,” Gardianul, 12 November 2005, online edition.

[161] Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, interview by Colonel Dragos Dragoi, “Sub tirul incrucisat al acuzatiilor (II),” Armata Poporului, no. 46 (November 1990), p. 3. Remus Ghergulescu specified USLA appearance as follows: “Over their black jumpsuits (‘combinezoanele negre’) in which they were dressed they had kaki vests. This was normal. They were equipped with the jumpsuits as “war gear,” while the vests were “city wear.’” (Colonel Remus Ghergulescu, interview with Razvan Belciuganu, “Teroristii au iesit din haos,” Jurnalul National, 29 November 2004, online edition.)

[162] See Evenimentul Zilei, 25 November 1992, p. 3.

RFE/RL Reports Print Version  E-mail this page to a friend

17 April 2002, Volume  4, Number  8

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

Part 2: ‘Tourists Are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns…’ *
The distance traveled by Securitate disinformation on the December 1989 events can be breathtaking. Bubbling up through the springs of popular rumor and speculation, it flows into the tributaries of the media as peripheral subplots to other stories and eventually wends its way — carried upon the waves of consensus and credibility that flow from its acceptance among prominent Romanian journalists and intellectuals — into the writings of Western journalists, analysts, and academics. Popular myths, which either have their origins in disinformation disseminated by the former Securitate, or which originated in the conspiratorial musings of the populace but proved propitious for the former secret police and thus were appropriated, nurtured, and reinjected into popular discourse, are today routinely repeated both inside and outside Romania. Frequently, this dissemination occurs without the faintest concern over, or knowledge of, the myth’s etymology or much thought given to the broader context and how it plays into the issue of the Securitate’s institutional culpability.

Take, for example, the “tourist” myth — perhaps the former Securitate’s most fanciful and enduring piece of disinformation. This myth suggests that in December 1989, Soviet, Hungarian, and other foreign agents posing as “tourists” instigated and/or nurtured anti-Ceausescu demonstrations in Timisoara, Bucharest, and elsewhere, and/or were responsible for the “terrorist” violence after 22 December that claimed over 900 victims, or almost 90 percent of those killed during the Revolution. The implication of such allegations is clear: It questions the spontaneity — and hence, inevitably, to a certain degree, the legitimacy — of the anti-Ceausescu demonstrations and the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime; it raises doubt about the popular legitimacy of those who seized power during the events; and it suggests that those who seized power lied about who was responsible for the terrorist violence and may ultimately have themselves been responsible for the bloodshed.

A robust exegesis of the “tourist” hypothesis was outlined on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the December 1989 events in the pages of the daily “Ziua” by Vladimir Alexe. Alexe has been a vigorous critic of Ion Iliescu and the former communists of the National Salvation Front (FSN) who took power in December 1989, maintaining that they overthrew Ceausescu in a Soviet-sponsored coup d’etat:

“The outbreak of the December events was preceded by an odd fact characteristic of the last 10 years. After 10 December 1989, an unprecedented number of Soviet ‘tourists’ entered the country. Whole convoys of Lada automobiles, with approximately four athletic men per car, were observed at the borders with the Moldovan Socialist Republic, Bulgaria, and Hungary. A detail worthy of mention: The Soviet ‘tourists’ entered Romania without passports, which suggests the complicity of higher-ups. According to the statistics, an estimated 67,000 Soviet ‘tourists’ entered Romania in December 1989″ (“Ziua”, 24 December 1999).

It is worth noting that Alexe considers elsewhere in this series of articles from December 1999 that the Russian “tourists” were an omnipresent, critical, and catalytic factor in the collapse of communism throughout ALL of Eastern Europe in December 1989.

Nor has the “tourist” hypothesis been confined strictly to the realm of investigative journalism. Serban Sandulescu, a bitter critic of Ion Iliescu and the former communists who seized power in December 1989, led the third parliamentary commission to investigate the December 1989 events as a Senator for the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNTCD). In 1996, he published the findings of his commission as a book titled “December ’89: The Coup d’Etat That Abducted The Romanian Revolution.” He commented on the “tourists” as follows:

“From the data we have obtained and tabulated it appears that we are talking somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000-6,000 ‘tourists’…. Soviet agents [who] came under the cover of being ‘tourists’ either in large organized groups that came by coach, or in smaller groups of 3-4 people that fanned out in Lada and Moskvich automobiles. They covered the whole country, being seen in all the important cities in the country. They contributed to the stoking of the internal revolutionary process, supervising its unfolding, and they fought [during the so-called ‘terrorist’ phase after 22 December]…” (Sandulescu, 1996, pp. 35, 45).

DECEMBER 1989: NICOLAE CEAUSESCU INITIATES THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH
Not surprisingly, the “tourist” myth originated with none other than Nicolae Ceausescu. This myth inevitably implies illegitimate and cynical “foreign intervention,” and Ceausescu used it to make sense of what were — probably genuinely, for him — the unimaginable and surreal antiregime protests which began in Timisoara on 15 December 1989.

In an emergency meeting of the Romanian equivalent of the politburo (CPEX) on the afternoon of Sunday, 17 December 1989 — the afternoon on which regime forces were to open fire on the anti-Ceausescu demonstrators in Timisoara, killing scores and wounding hundreds — Ceausescu alleged that foreign interference and manipulation were behind the protests:

“Everything that has happened and is happening in Germany, in Czechoslovakia, and in Bulgaria now, and in the past in Poland and Hungary, are things organized by the Soviet Union with American and Western help” (cited in Bunea, 1994, p. 34).

That Ceausescu saw “tourists” specifically playing a nefarious role in stimulating the Timisoara protests is made clear by his order at the close of this emergency meeting:

“I have ordered that all tourist activity be interrupted at once. Not one more foreign tourist will be allowed in, because they have all turned into agents of espionage…. Not even those from the socialist countries will be allowed in, with the exception of [North] Korea, China, and Cuba. Because all the neighboring socialist countries are untrustworthy. Those sent from the neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents” (cited in Bunea, 1994, p. 34).

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE ‘TOURISTS’ ITINERARY AND ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO TOP SECURITATE AND PARTY OFFICIALS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF DECEMBER 1989
Filip Teodorescu, who as head of the Securitate’s Counterespionage Directorate (Directorate III) had been dispatched to Timisoara and was later arrested for his role in the repression there, maintained in March 1990 at his trial that he detained “foreign agents” during the Timisoara events (“Romania libera,” 9 March 1990). In a book that appeared in 1992, Teodorescu described as follows the events in Timisoara on Monday, 18 December — that is, after the bloody regime repression of anti-Ceausescu demonstrators the night before:

“There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these ‘tourists’” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 92).

Teodorescu appears here to be attempting to account for the fact that on Monday, 18 December 1989 — presumably as a consequence of Ceausescu’s tirade the afternoon before about the malicious intent of virtually all “tourists” — Romania announced, in typically Orwellian fashion, that it would not accept any more tourists because of a “shortage of hotel rooms” and because “weather conditions are not suitable for tourism” (Belgrade Domestic Service, 20 December 1989). Ironically, the only ones exempted from this ban were “Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia” (!) (AFP, 19 December 1989).

Radu Balan, former Timis County party boss, picks up the story from there. While serving a prison sentence for his complicity in the Timisoara repression, in 1991 Balan told one of Ceausescu’s most famous “court poets,” Adrian Paunescu, that on the night of 18-19 December — during which in reality some 40 cadavers were secretly transported from Timisoara’s main hospital to Bucharest for cremation (reputedly on Elena Ceausescu’s personal order) — he too witnessed the role of these “foreign agents”:

“We had been receiving information, in daily bulletins, from the Securitate, that far more people were returning from Yugoslavia and Hungary than were going there and about the presence of Lada automobiles filled with Soviets. I saw them at the border and the border posts, and the cars were full. I wanted to know where and what they were eating and how they were crossing the border and going through cities and everywhere. More telling, on the night of 18-19 December, when I was at a fire at the I.A.M. factory, in front of the county hospital, I spotted 11 white ‘Lada’ automobiles at 1 a.m. in the morning. They pretended to ask me the road to Buzias.The 11 white Ladas had Soviet plates, not Romanian ones, and were in front of the hospital” (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October 1991).

Nicu Ceausescu, Nicolae’s son and most likely heir and party secretary in Sibiu at the time of the Revolution, claimed that he also had to deal with enigmatic “tourists” during these historic days. From his prison cell in 1990, Nicu recounted how on the night of 20 December 1989, a top party official came to inform him that the State Tourist Agency was requesting that he — the party secretary for Sibiu! — “find lodgings for a group of tourists who did not have accommodation.” He kindly obliged and made the appropriate arrangements (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

Nor was Gheorghe Roset, head of the Militia in the city of Caransebes at the time of the Revolution, able to elude a visit from the “tourists” during these days. Writing from his prison cell in January 1991, he recounted:

“Stationed on the night of 20-21 December 1989 at headquarters, I received the order to issue an authorization for repairs for a Lada automobile that had overturned in Soceni, in Caras-Severin county, an order that was approved by the chief of the county Militia with the clarification that the passengers of this car were military personnel from the USSR. I was more than a little surprised when this car arrived in Caransebes and I saw that it was part of a convoy of 20 cars, all of the same make and with 3-4 passengers per car. Lengthy discussions with the person who had requested the authorization confirmed for me the accident and the fact that this convoy of cars was coming from Timisoara, on its way to Bucharest, as well as the fact that these were colleagues of ours from the country in question. He presented a passport in order to receive the documents he had requested, although not even today can I say with certainty that he belonged to this or that country. A short time after the convoy left on its way, it was reported to me that five of the cars had headed in the direction of Hateg, while the more numerous group headed for Bucharest” (“Europa,” no. 20, March 1991).

A September 1990 open letter authored by “some officers of the former Securitate” — most likely from the Fifth Directorate charged with guarding Ceausescu and the rest of the Romanian communist leadership — and addressed to the xenophobic, neo-Ceausist weekly “Democratia” (which was edited by Eugen Florescu, one of Ceausescu’s chief propagandists and speechwriters), sought to summarize the entire record of the “tourists” wanderings and activities in December 1989 as follows:

“11-15 [December] — a massive penetration of so-called Hungarian tourists takes place in Timisoara and Soviet tourists in Cluj;

15-16 [December] — upon the initiative of these groups, protests of support for the sinister ‘Priest [Father Laszlo Tokes of Timisoara]‘ break out;

16-17-18 [December] — in the midst of the general state of confusion building in the city, the army intervenes to reestablish order;

– this provides a long-awaited opportunity for the ‘tourists’ to start — in the midst of warning shots in the air — to shoot and stab in the back the demonstrators among whom they are located and whom they have incited;…

19-20-21 — a good part of the ‘tourists’ and their brethren among the locals begin to migrate — an old habit — from the main cities of Transylvania, according to plan, in order to destabilize: Cluj, Sibiu, Alba Iulia, Targu Mures, Satu Mare, Oradea, etc.” (“Democratia,” no. 36, 24-30 September 1990).

The authors of this chronology then maintain that this scene was replicated in Bucharest on 21 December, causing the famous disruption of Ceausescu’s speech and the death of civilians in University Square that evening.

Not to be out-done, Cluj Securitate chief Ion Serbanoiu claimed in a 1991 interview that, as of 21 December 1989, there were over 800 Russian and Hungarian tourists, mostly driving almost brand-new Lada automobiles (but also Dacia and Wartburg cars), in the city (interview with Angela Bacescu in “Europa,” no. 55, December 1991). In February 1991 during his trial, former Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad, not surprisingly, also spoke of “massive groups of Soviet tourists…the majority were men…deploy[ing] in a coordinated manner in a convoy of brand-new Lada automobiles” (see Bunea, 1994, pp. 460-461), while the infamous Pavel Corut has written of “the infiltration on Romanian territory of groups of Soviet commandos (“Spetsnaz”) under the cover of being tourists” (Corut, 1994).

REBUTTING THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH
I vividly recall early on in my research of the December 1989 events being told emphatically, and not for the last time, by a journalist at the Cluj weekly “Nu” — a publication staunchly critical of the Iliescu regime — that the guest lists of Romanian hotels for December 1989 were nowhere to be found because they contained the secrets of the Revolution. Certainly, this rumor has intersected with the “tourist” myth and has been used as confirmation of the latter.

Significantly, Marius Mioc has sought to investigate the reality of this matter in Timisoara (Mioc, 2000). The numbers provided to the 17 December Timisoara Association (which Mioc heads) by all of Timisoara’s hotels and by the State Tourist Agency for Timisoara lay bare two of the key components upon which the “tourist” myth has relied: a) that the records of the December 1989 manifests do not exist, and b) that there was an unusually dramatic increase in the number of foreign tourists staying in Romanian hotels during this period. In fact, the opposite proves to be true, the number of foreign tourists — and specifically those from other “socialist” countries — declined in December 1989 both in comparison to the previous December and in comparison to November 1989!

Of course, as we have seen, proponents of the “tourist” myth have also suggested that many of the alleged foreign agents posing as tourists “avoided staying in hotels.” But this still raises the question of why the Securitate allowed them into the country in the first place and why they then seemed unable to follow their movements and prevent their activities. A 1991 open letter by “a group of [Romanian Army] officers from the Timisoara garrison” perhaps provides the best riposte to the dubious logic underlying the “tourist” hypothesis:

“If they [the tourists] appeared suspect to the special forces of the Securitate and military counterintelligence, why did they not attempt to keep them under surveillance? During this period, did the Securitate and the counterintelligence officers not know how to do their jobs? Did they somehow forget why they were paid such weighty sums from the state budget?” (“Romania libera,” 15 October 1991).

One must also ask: If it was precisely Soviet tourists who were most suspected at the time of being up to no good in the country, then why was it precisely they who were the sole group among “tourists” in the country at the time to be permitted to stay and go about their business unhindered?

HOW THE ‘TOURISTS’ ENTRY INTO THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989 PARALLELS THE EXIT OF THE SECURITATE
In commenting in August 1990 upon how the details of the state’s case against him had changed since early in the year, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, ironically highlighted how Securitate forces had begun to fade away from the historiography of the December 1989 events. In the August 1990 interview from his prison cell with Ion Cristoiu’s “Zig-Zag” (mentioned above), Nicu discusses the “tourists” for which he was asked to find accommodations in the context of a group of mysterious passengers who had arrived by plane from Bucharest on the evening of 20 December 1989. We know that in the period immediately following these events, the then-military prosecutor, Anton Socaciu, had alleged that these passengers from Bucharest were members of the Securitate’s elite USLA unit (Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare) and were responsible for much of the bloodshed that occurred in Sibiu during the December events (for a discussion, see Hall, 1996). In August 1990, however, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

The impact of this “reconsideration” by the authorities could be seen in the comments of Socaciu’s successor as military prosecutor in charge of the Sibiu case, Marian Valer (see Hall 1997a, pp. 314-315). Valer commented in September 1990 that investigations yielded the fact that there were 37 unidentified passengers on board the 20 December flight from Bucharest and that many of the other passengers maintained that “on the right side of the plane there had been a group of tall, athletic men, dressed in sporting attire, many of them blond, who had raised their suspicions.” While investigations revealed that during this time there “were many Soviet tourists staying in Sibiu’s hotels,” they also established that “military units were fired upon from Securitate safehouses located around these units as of the afternoon of 22 December, after the overturning of the Ceausescu regime.” He thus carefully concludes:

“As far as the unidentified passengers are concerned, there are two possible variants: Either they were USLA fighters sent to defend Nicu Ceausescu, or they were Soviet agents sent to act with the intent of overthrowing the Ceausescu regime” (“Expres,” no. 33, September 1990).

Thus, as the “tourists” began to enter the historiography of the December 1989 events, so the Securitate — specifically the USLA — began to disappear.

HOW THE ‘TOURIST’ MYTH NEVERTHELESS GAINED MAINSTREAM CREDIBILITY AND ACCEPTANCE
How, then, did the “tourist” myth gain credibility and acceptance in the Romanian press, given its rather obvious pedigree in the remnants of the Ceausescu regime, especially among former high-ranking Securitate officers and others most in need of an alibi/diversion to save their careers and avoid the possibility of going to jail? Although the reference to “tourists” during the December events probably entered the lexicon of mainstream reporting on the Revolution as early as April 1990 — not insignificantly, first in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s weekly “Zig-Zag,” it appears — it was in particular journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu who gave the theme legitimacy in the mainstream press.

Without specifying the term “tourists” — but clearly speaking in the same vein — Stanescu was probably the first to articulate the thesis most precisely and to tie the Soviet angle to it. In June 1990 in a piece entitled “Is The Conspiracy of Silence Breaking Down?” in the sharply anti-government daily “Romania libera,” Stanescu wrote:

“And still in connection with the breaking down of the conspiracy of silence, in the army there is more and more insistent talk about the over 4,000 Lada cars with two men per car that traveled many different roads in the days before the Revolution and then disappeared” (“Romania libera,” 14 June 1990).

Stanescu’s article was vigorously anti-FSN and anti-Iliescu and left little doubt that this thesis was part of the “unofficial” history of the December events, injurious to the new leaders, and something they did not wish to see published or wish to clarify.

But it was Stanescu’s April 1991 article in “Romania libera,” entitled “Is Iliescu Being Protected By The KGB?,” that truly gave impetus to the “tourist” thesis. Stanescu wrote:

“A KGB officer wanders in France. He is losing his patience and searching for a way to get to Latin America. Yesterday I met him in Paris. He talked to me after finding out that I was a Romanian journalist. He fears the French press. He knows Romanian and was in Timisoara in December 1989. As you will recall, persistent rumors have circulated about the existence on Romanian soil of over 2,000 Lada automobiles with Soviet tags and two men in each car. Similar massive infiltrations were witnessed in December 1990, too, with the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. What were the KGB doing in Romania? Witness what the anonymous Soviet officer related to me in Paris:

‘There existed an intervention plan that for whatever reason was not activated. I received the order to enter Romania on 14 December and to head for Timisoara. Myself and my colleague were armed. During the events, we circulated in the military zone around Calea Girocului [Giriocul Road]. Those who headed toward Bucharest had the same mission. Several larger cities were targeted. We were to open fire in order to create a state of confusion. I never, however, received such an order. I left Romania on 26 December.’

I don’t have any reason to suspect the validity of these revelations. This short confession is naturally incomplete, but not inconclusive. What purpose would this elaborate, but aborted, KGB plan have had? The only plausible explanation is that it wasn’t necessary for KGB agents to intervene. The events were unfolding in the desired direction without need for the direct intervention of the Soviets. But this leads to other questions: What did the Ceausescu couple know, but were not allowed to say [prior to their hurried execution]? Why is Securitate General Vlad being held in limbo? To what degree has President Iliescu maintained ties to the Soviets? What are the secret clauses of the Friendship Treaty recently signed in Moscow? Is Iliescu being protected by the KGB or not? Perhaps the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor, the Romanian Information Service] would like to respond to these questions?”

Stanescu’s April 1991 article did not go unnoticed — despite its nondescript placement on page eight — and has since received recognition and praise from what might seem unexpected corners. For example, previously-discussed former Securitate Colonel Filip Teodorescu cited extensive excerpts from Stanescu’s article in his 1992 book on the December events, and he added cryptically:

“Moreover, I don’t have any reason to suspect that the journalist Sorin Rosca Stanescu would have invented a story in order to come to the aid of those accused, by the courts or by public opinion, for the results of the tragic events of December 1989″ (Teodorescu, 1992, pp. 92-94).

Radu Balan, former Timis County party secretary, imprisoned for his role in the December events, has also invoked Stanescu’s April 1991 article as proof of his revisionist view that “tourists” rather than “non-existent ‘terrorists’” were to blame for the December 1989 bloodshed:

“…[W]hile at Jilava [the jail where he was imprisoned at the time of the interview, in October 1991], I read ‘Romania libera’ from 18 April. And Rosca Stanescu writes from Paris that a KGB agent who deserted the KGB and is in transit to the U.S. stated that on 18 December [1989] he had the mission to create panic on Calea Girocului [a thoroughfare in Timisoara]. What is more, on the 18th, these 11 cars were at the top of Calea Girocului, where I saw them. I was dumbfounded, I tell you. I didn’t tell anybody. Please study ‘Romania libera,’ the last page, from 18 April 1991″ (“Totusi iubirea,” no. 43, 24-31 October1991).

In this regard, it would be irresponsible to totally discount the relevance of Rosca Stanescu’s past. Since December 1989, Stanescu has undeniably been a vigorous critic of, and made damaging revelations about, the Securitate’s institutional heir, the SRI, and the Iliescu regime, and he has frequently written ill of the former Securitate and the Ceausescu regime. Nevertheless, in 1992 it was leaked to the press — and Rosca Stanescu himself confirmed — that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s he was an informer for the Securitate (for a discussion, see Hall, 1997b, pp. 111-113). What was significant, however, was precisely for which branch of the Securitate Rosca Stanescu had been an informer: the USLA.

THE ‘TOURISTS’ MYTH TRAVELS WESTWARD
Almost inevitably, the “tourist” thesis has made its way into Western academic literature. For example, in a book lauded by experts (see for example, Professor Archie Brown’s review in “Slavic Review,” Winter 1998), Jacques Levesque invokes as “rare evidence” that the Soviets were responsible for igniting and fanning the flames of the Timisoara uprising the following:

“…testimony of an imprisoned Securitate colonel who was freed in 1991 [he is referring to the aforementioned Filip Teodorescu]. He writes that the Securitate had noted the arrival of ‘numerous false Soviet tourists’ in Timisoara in early December, coming from Soviet Moldova. He also reports that a convoy of several Lada cars, with Soviet license plates and containing three to four men each, had refused to stop at a police checkpoint in Craiova. After the Romanian police opened fire and killed several men, he claims that the Soviet authorities recovered the bodies without issuing an official protest. To the extent that this information is absolutely correct, it would tend to prove the presence of Soviet agents in Romania (which no one doubts), without, however, indicating to us their exact role in the events” (Levesque, 1997, p. 197).

Levesque seems generally unaware of or concerned with the problematic nature of the source of this “rare evidence” and thus never really considers the possibility that the Securitate colonel is engaging in disinformation. This is indicative of how upside-down the understanding of the December 1989 events has become in the post-Ceausescu era — and of the influence of the far-reaching and generally unchallenged revisionism of the events within Romania itself — that Western writers invoking the thesis seem to accept the claims at face value, never even enunciating any doubt about why the Securitate source in question might seek to make such an argument.

* A memorable phrase from Andrei Codrescu’s PBS special “Road Scholar” of the early 1990s.

(Richard Andrew Hall received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University in 1997. He currently works and lives in northern Virginia. Comments can be directed to him at hallria@msn.com.)

SOURCES

AFP, 19 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-242, 19 December 1989.

Belgrade Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 20 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-243, 20 December 1989.

Brown, A., 1998, “Review of Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe,” in “Slavic Review,” Vol. 57, no. 4 (Winter), pp. 882-883.

Bunea, M., 1994, Praf in ochi: Procesul celor 24-1-2 [Mud in the Eyes: The Trial of the 24-1-2], (Bucharest: Editura Scripta).

Court, P., 1994, Cantecul Nemuririi [Song of Immortality], (Bucharest: Editura Miracol).

“Democratia” (Bucharest), 1990.

“Europa,” (Bucharest), 1991

“Expres,” (Bucharest), 1990.

Hall, R. A., 1996, “Ce demonstreaza probele balistice dupa 7 ani?” [Seven Years Later What Does the Ballistic Evidence Tell Us?] in “22″ (Bucharest), 17-23 December.

Hall, R. A. 1997a, “Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University).

Hall, R. A., 1997b, “The Dynamics of Media Independence in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” in O’Neil, P. H. (ed.) Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass), pp. 102-123.

Levesque, J., 1997, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe, (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Mioc, Marius, 2000, “Turisti straini in timpul revolutiei,” [Foreign Tourists During the Revolution] timisoara.com/newmioc/54.htm.

“Romania libera” (Bucharest), 1990-91.

Sandulescu, S., 1996, Decembrie ’89: Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana [December ’89: The Coup d’tat Abducted the Romanian Revolution], (Bucharest: Editura Omega Press Investment).

Teodorescu, F., 1992, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989, [An Assumed Risk: Timisoara, December 1989] (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc).

“Totusi iubirea” (Bucharest), 1991.

“Ziua” (Bucharest), 1999.

“Zig-Zag” (Bucharest), 1990.

Compiled by Michael Shafir

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/04/15/sibiu-decembrie-1989-faimoasa-geanta-diplomat-si-tragatorii-din-poduri/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/30/decembrie-1989-turistii-si-sovietici/

Am scris despre “misterul” acesta de multe ori intre 1996 si 2005…

——————————————————————————————————————–
O singura intrebare…modesta:  aveau cumva uslasii vreo “acoperire” atunci cand erau “in teren”?  Si daca aveau, care ar fi fost aceasta “acoperire”?!
 
Asistam la Ingroparea Revolutiei

Monica N. Marginean:  Sa revenim la datele concrete ale regiei de care vorbeam anterior.  Cum arata, de pilda, povestea atit de dezbatuta la procesul lui Nicu Ceausescu a cursei ROMBAC, daca o privim din perspectiva Comisiei de ancheta?

fostul procuror Marian Valer:  In mod normal, cursa de avion Bucuresti-Sibiu trebuia sa decoleze de pe aeroportul Baneasa, la orele 17,10 folosindu-se pe acest traseu avioane marca Antonov.  In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, insa, in jurul orelor 17, deci in apropierea orei prevazute pentru decolarea cursei obisnuite, pasagerii pentru Sibiu au fost invitati si dusi la Aeroportul Otopeni unde au fost imbarcati intr-un avion marca ROMBAC care a decolat in jurul orelor 18,30 si a aterizat pe aeroportul Sibiu in jur de ora 19.  Fac precizarea ca in dupa-amiaza aceleiasi zile, cu aproape 2 ore inaintea decolarii acestei curse, a aterizat pe aeroportul Otopeni avionul prezidential cu care Ceausescu s-a reintors din Iran. Conform datelor furnizate de agentia TAROM Bucuresti, in avionul respectiv spre Sibiu au fost imbarcati 81 pasageri.  In radiograma cursei sint consemnate domiciile doar la o parte din pasageri, cu mentiunea ca unele sint incomplete, lipsind fie localitatea, fie strada, fie numarul, iar la restul pasagerilor figureaza doar mentiunile ,rezervat’ sau Pasaport RSR.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, au putut fi identificati doar 44 de pasageri, majoritatea avind domiciliul in municipul si judetul Sibiu, stabilindu-se ca au fost persoane trimise in delegatie la foruri tutelare din capitala, sau studenti plecati in vacanta, iar citiva domiciliati in judetul Alba.  Mentionez ca asupra acestor persoane nu planeaza nici un dubiu.  Dubiile sint create insa in primul rind de faptul ca mai multi pasageri figureaza cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, dar in realitate nu domiciliaza la adresele consemnate, iar la unele adrese sint intreprinderi.  Un alt element creator de dubii il constituie prezenta in avionul respectiv a unui inspector de la Departmentul Aviatiei Civile, cu numele de Nevrozeanu, care nu figureaza pe lista pasagerilor si cu privire la care s-a stabilit ca, in trecut, se deplasa cu avionul in cazuri speciale doar pe relatia Moscova, fiind un bun cunoscator al limbii ruse.  Mai multi pasageri sustin ca in partea dreapta din fata a avionului au sesizat un grup de barbati, mai inalti, atletici, imbracati sportiv, multi dintre ei fiind blonzi, grup care li s-a parut suspect.  Aceste afirmatii se coroboreaza cu faptul ca in zona respectiva a avionului nu a stat nici unul din pasagerii identificati.  Mai mult, verificindu-se la hotelurile din municipiul Sibiu persoane care aveau numele celor 37 de persoane neidentificate, s-a constatat ca doar un pasager neidentificat care figureaza pe listele TAROM-ului cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, care nu exista la adresa respectiva din localitate, a fost cazat la hotelul Bulevard, dar in registrul de evidenta figureaza cu un alt domiciliu din Bucuresti.  Ambele domicilii, si cei din diagrama TAROM si cel de la hotel sint false.  Cu ocazia acelorasi verificari s-a constatat ca in perioada respectiva in hotelurile din Sibiu au fost cazati multi turisti sovietici, in special la Imparatul Romanilor, Continental, si Bulevard, situate in zona centrala a municipiului.  Fac mentiunea ca din hotelurile respective s-a tras asupra manifestantilor si a armatei. Am omis sa precizez ca pe aeroportul Otopeni, in avionul ROMBAC au fost incarcate sute de colete identice ca format, dimensiuni si culoare, de marime apropriata unei genti diplomat, precum si ca, cu citeva minute inaintea decolarii cursei spre Sibiu, de pe acelasi aeroport au decolat curse ROMBAC spre Timisoara si Arad.  Consider ca, in legatura cu pasagerii neidentificati, sint posibile doua versiuni, respectiv sa fie au fost luptatorii U.S.L.A. trimisi in sprijinul lui Nicu Ceausescu, fie au fost agenti sovietici trimisi sa actioneze in scopul rasturnarii regimului Ceausescu.

Monica N. Marginean:  Ce alte demersuri a facut Comisia de ancheta pentru elucidarea misterului celor 37 de pasageri neidentificati?

Marian Valer:  Am luat contact cu unul din loctiitorii comandamentului trupelor U.S.L.A. din capitala, caruia i-am solicitat sa-mi puna la dispozitie pe cei trei insotitori U.S.L.A. ai avionului ROMBAC.  Loctiitorul mi-a spus ca acestia au fost audiati de un procuror militar si nu mai este de acord sa fie audiati inca o data.

Monica M. Maginean:  “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.


Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December in a crisis meeting, Ceausescu’s son announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests (“Baricada,” no. 45, 1990).  Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request (“Romania Libera,” 30 January 1990.)

The rewriting of the story of the Revolution, the “tourists,” and the “terrorists” was already in full swing, when in August 1990, Nicu wryly observed:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ — after which one no longer heard anything of them — they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…” (interview with Nicu Ceausescu in “Zig-Zag,” no. 20, 21-27 August 1990).

An interesting–if slightly confused–discussion of the “tourists”/ USLA in Sibiu in December 1989!

http://portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=3.615

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #615 on: March 08, 2010, 15:31:24 PM »

Fac apel la oricine care a fost in seara de 21 spre 22 (ora 11,30-11,50) pe strada(actuala)Revolutiei, sau a vazut autoturismele parcate vis-sa vis de fosta Brutarie Nesciuc trei albe si una rosu inchis “Lada”. Va intreb daca cele 11 persoane imbracate cu scurta albastre tip jeans,  pantaloni deschisi la culoare, doi cu caciula de blana, trei cu caciula de lana impletita de culoare inchisa, si restul cu capul gol care au intors autoturismele parcate din capatul strazii si incendierea acestora? Statura lor era atletica? Cine a mai vazut apoi aceste persoane (acest gen) in afara de Piatza Mare din 21 decembrie ora 11,30 cand l-au protejat pe domnul care a iesit in fatza scutierilor cu copilul ridicat pe maini? (in dreptul Casei Albastre)
Aceleasi persoane au fost si in data de 21 decembrie la ora 9 in fata intrarii in magazinul Dumbrava, cand au “jenat” fara nici o teama scutierii si politistii care incercau sa prinda persoanele care fugeau prin magazin…Mai apelez la locatarii Blocului de garsoniere “turn” din coltul Calea Dumbravii-Milea, sa ne trimita o informatie cu intamplarile din 23-25 de la etajul 7-8, cu persoanele in combinezon de culoare inchisa care au coborat pe partea dinspre magazin din balcon in balcon, inclusiv despre persoana decedata, daca are legatura cu acel incident.O alta intrebare extrem de importanta: stie cineva cine a organizat “filtrele” de pe strazile Sibiului?Va multumesc
O precizare: Autoturismele erau parcate pe str Dobrun inspre str. Berariei Era pe trotoarul brutariei particulare (Nescuc sau Cibu, nu mai stiu cum se chema)

Re: @ REVOLUTIA SIBIU 1989 @
« Reply #623 on: March 11, 2010, 14:16:55 PM »

Acesti emanati, aceste lichele, nu-si puteau face jocurile, acapararea puterii totale, precum si inaintasii lor Dej si Ceausescu, decat prin forta represiunii armate. Parte din armata a reactionat pasnic, datorita onor ofitzeri care au dovedit mai multa logica, parte din armata a jucat rolul de dusman al romanilor. La Sibiu, avem tot mai multe date care intaresc teoria ca Dragomir a fost teroristul Nr. 1 in acele zile, ajutat si de grupul USLA trimis de la Bucuresti la Sibiu, pentru protectia lui NC, si care s-au reantors la “locul faptei” dupa ce l-a pus pe Nicu in siguranta. Ei au fost aceia care au comis executiile din Piatza Mare in ziua de 21 decembrie ora 11,45 cu primele victime ucise sau ranite. Au fost repartizati in patru puncte ale pietii: In podul Casei Albastre, in podul actualei Primarii, in podul de deasupra Tunelului Generalului si in podul de deasupra magazinului Moda. De aici, au deschis foc inspre demonstranti. Au deschis foc si pe data de 22 decembrie inspre hotelul Imparatul Romanilor din acelasi pod de deasupra Tunelului Generalului care avea corespondent cu celelalte poduri dinspre magazinul Covorul. Aceste grupe ale USLA nu aveau insemne de grad sau arma, nu purtau boneta militara si aveau la dispozitie doua microbuze ale unitatii 01512 care i-a transportat in tot acest timp. Un grup al USLA era incepand din ziua de 21 decembrie ora 07 la sediul Judetenei de partid, ocupand garajul din curtea din sapate cu munitie si armament special. Se poate descoperi foarte repede, numele persoanelor care au fost trimise la SIBIU cu Rombacul in dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, ca urmare a convorbirilor indelungate purtate de Nicu si Bucuresti, despre demonstratia anuntata pentru dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie de la Mag Dumbrava. In timpul convorbirii telefonice, in biroul lui Nicu se afla Traian Popsa, fostul director de la IJIM Sibiu, maiorul Dragomir, seful Garzilor judetene Pescaru, secretar al CJPCR Sibiu si Niculae Hurubean, prim secretar la Alba care se afla in trecere prin Sibiu. Aceste trupe USLA au purtat alternativ, combinezoane negre, uniforma militara sau haine civile…
Lovitura de stat cu spectatori, cum zice Cornel Dinu, a functionat atata timp cat au avut nevoie pentru a pune mana pe putere acesti derbedei bolsevici-kaghebisti

Posted in decembrie 1989 | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments »

Final Boarding Call for TAROM’s special ROMBAC service from Bucuresti to Sibiu: Would the large party of suspicious “Soviet tourists” please report to the gate immediately! (I)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 10, 2013

“Thus, as the “tourists” began to enter the historiography of the December 1989 events, so the Securitate — specifically the USLA — began to disappear.”

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342503.html

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/

From the outside, it might seem to be obvious disinformation or misinformation:

In the dead of winter, a dictatorship has closed its borders with its neighbors. The dictator believes that protests against his rule are the work of foreign agents.  Therefore, the dictator declares all citizens of surrounding countries to be spies and bans their entry into his country for the foreseeable future.
Yet several days later, with a serious uprising against the dictatorship underway in the country, what are described as, several dozen, conspicuous, tall, athletic young men from a large neighboring country arrive at the airport in the country’s capital with lots of bags of various sizes…and they board a plane, a larger one than is usually used, in order to assure they can fit on the flight (how thoughtful of the country’s national airline).  Their destination?  The city where the dictator’s son is in charge.
Nobody, not the airport staff, not the country’s national airline staff in this police state, thinks to make a phone call, to question the presence of this large number of foreign tourists.  Not when the tourists are going through airport security, not when the tourists are lining up to check their bags in and receive their boarding passes.   Nope, they get their boarding passes and when they get to the plane, nobody stops them from boarding.
No, the large group of suspicious tourists makes their flight.  And nobody at the receiving airport in the city controlled by the dictator’s son seems to have any questions when they land there.  It is then alleged that these athletic young men, with their bags of various sizes, containing presumably guns, participated in the violence in the city of the dictator’s son over the next few days, and when they were finished, they left the city and eventually the country, without anybody really noticing, let alone attempting to stop them.
And, of course, none of this even explains how did they get to the capital’s airport or even enter the country in the first place, without anybody in this police state detecting them or intervening?
For the outsider, it must sound like a bad joke then.  And yet the informational/narrative space about December 1989 in Romania is so amazingly confused and contaminated, that many people believe just the fantastical, magical scenario outlined above.  And many of these are reasonably smart people with good heads on their shoulders…

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Emil Macri: “Rezumind sintetic informatiile obtinute ele nu au pus in evidenta nici lideri si nici amestecul vreunei puteri straine in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 16, 2013

Generalul Emil Macri (seful Dir. II-a Securitatii, Contrainformatii Economice),

Declaratie 2 ianuarie 1990:

“Rezumind sintetic informatiile obtinute ele nu au pus in evidenta nici lideri si nici amestecul vreunei puteri straine in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.  Raportaua (?) acestor date la esalonul superior respectivi generalului I. Vlad a produs iritare si chiar suparare…”

IMG_1219

IMG_1215

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Cine a avut ideea organizării mitingului din 21 decembrie 1989?

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 12, 2013

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Col. Dumitru Dumitrascu, sef al Inspectoratului Muncipiului Bucuresti al Ministerului de Interne, Declaratie, 19 martie 1990

“In seara de 20 dec. 1989 in jurul orelor 23:30-24:00 eu fiind la inspectoratului am fost informat de primul secretar Barbu Petrescu, care in mod confidential mi-a spus ca ceausescu nicolae l-a intrebat daca se poate organiza in ziua de 21 XII 89 un mare miting in piata palatului asa cum a fost cel din 1968–cu privire la evenimentele din Cehoslovacia.”

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Tudor Postelnicu, Ministrul de Interne, Declaratie, 21 iunie 1991

“Asa se explica ca Ceausescu a fost cel care a initiat in seara de 20 dec. sa se organizeze pt. a doua zi in P-ta Palatului acel miting cu muncitorimea din Bucuresti, fiind convins ca asa va demonstra tuturor sprijinul populatiei de care s-ar fi bucurat el.”

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An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-6-18-22-december-1989/ 

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December

By the morning of Thursday, 21 December 1989, the regime was no longer master of the situation in Timisoara. Moreover, it was rapidly losing control in several nearby cities: Lugoj and Cugir. Nevertheless, the regime might have withstood these challenges had it not been for Nicolae Ceausescu’s insistence on convoking a mass rally and addressing his “adoring” subjects in person. It was Nicolae Ceausescu’s delusion of his own invincibility which ensured that the regime would be unable to reestablish control. Ceausescu’s inflammatory, rambling tirade on national television on Wednesday evening had signalled panic to those who watched it. If Ceausescu was so worked up, they concluded, something serious must have occurred in Timisoara. Following his televised address, Ceausescu decided to hold an open-air, pro-regime rally the following day in the sprawling square in front of the Central Committee building in the center of Bucharest. The event was to be carried live over Romanian radio and television.

Precisely because this mass rally turned out to be the deathknell for the Ceausescu regime speculation has surrounded who “goaded” Ceausescu into making such a colossally-misguided decision. In January 1993, the opposition daily Romania Libera suggested that “the meeting was organized at the suggestion of [CPEx member] Gogu Radulescu.”[31] The same article maintained that Radulescu had been followed during these days and was “observed transmitting something abroad,” thereby once again insinuating the role of foreign powers in the Romanian events.[32]

Yet it is doubtful that Nicolae Ceausescu required Radulescu’s encouragement to convoke such a rally. It seems highly likely that the idea was Ceausescu’s own brainchild and that as usual the docile members of the CPEx did not dare contradict him. It was a typically instinctive, rash, and overconfident reaction to crisis on Ceausescu’s part. Moreover, as we have seen, for Nicolae Ceausescu the events confronting him in December 1989 were a replay of August 1968: not only was socialism at stake, but Romania’s national sovereignty and independence. Thus, in this crucial moment, he would appeal not primarily to the party’s political interests, but to what were the core institutional interests of the Securitate. And he would rely on a trusted totalitarian, mobilizational technique: the “spontaneous” mass rally of support for the regime.

[31].. R.M., “Dezvaluiri [Revelations],” Romania Libera, 19 January 1993, 1. Radulescu died in 1994.

[32].. Ibid. Presumably that foreign power would have been the Soviet Union.

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“Secretele Revolutiei de la Timisoara”: col. Niculae Mavru, fost sef al sectiei ‘Filaj si investigatie’ de la Securitatea Timis

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 6, 2013

Niculae Mavru, fost sef al sectiei ‘Filaj si investigatie’ de la Securitatea Timis, declaratia din 13 ianuarie 1990:  …la ordinul col. Sima Traian, am primit…misiuni de a observa si sesiza aspecte din masa manifestantilor, din diferite zone ale orasului in sensul de a raporta daca sint straini (ceea ce nu prea au fost) care incita la dezordine, acte de violenta sau altfel de acte…

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25 iunie 1991

“Desi ne-am straduit nu am putut raporta col. Sima implicarea completa a vreunui cetatean strain in evolutia demonstratiilor cit si fenomenlor care au avut loc la Timisoara,..”

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“Sarcina primordiala pe care am primit-o de la col. Sima a fost daca in evenimentele declansate la Timisoara erau implicate elemente straine din afara tarii.  Cu toate eforturile facute nu a rezultat lucru pe linia mea de munca.”

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si mai tarziu, dupa potopul de “memorie recuperata”

(“recovered memory,” dupa spusele lui Ken Jowitt)

al fostilor securisti si militieni…

http://jurnalul.ro/campaniile-jurnalul/decembrie-89/secretele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-72088.html

Secretele Revolutiei de la Timisoara

02 Mar 2004 – 00:00

Nicolae Mavru, fostul sef al filajului de la Securitatea Timis, dezvaluie episoade incredibile din timpul evenimentelor de la Timisoara. In prima noapte a Revolutiei, 20% din cei arestati erau informatori. Interviu cu col. (r) Nicolae Mavru, fostul sef al sectiei “Filaj si investigatie” de la Timisoara.

  • Jurnalul National: Va propun sa incepem cu problema coloanelor de turisti.Nicolae Mavru: Au existat. Legenda lor era bisnita. Ei au intrat in tara cu legenda ca se duc in excursie in Bulgaria sau Iugoslavia, dar cand au ajuns in zona Arad-Timisoara, au schimbat legenda ca sa poata sa stationeze. La un moment dat s-au retras sarbii, bisnitarii obisnuiti, si au fost inlocuiti de polonezi in octombrie 1989. La inceputul lui decembrie au disparut brusc polonezii si au venit rusii, cam 2.000 de oameni, majoritatea barbati tineri, atletici. Particularitatea acestor grupuri de bisnitari rusi era ca nu aveau marfa.
  • Va intrerup aici o clipa. Exista in documentele oficiale, fie depozitii din procese, fie audieri la Comisiile senatoriale, o contradictie. In timp ce unii conducatori ai DSS insista pe existenta si implicarea acestor “turisti” in evenimentele din Timisoara ( Vlad, Ratiu), altii neaga importanta acestor grupuri (col. Pele, Nicolicioiu).Coloanele si grupurile sovietice au existat. Eu fac aceasta distinctie, pentru ca ele au avut calitatea de coloane pana au ajuns la noi in judet; aici au stationat. Noi iiobservam, mi se raporta verbal despre ei si despre ceea ce fac, pentru ca la un moment dat umplusera soseaua Arad-Timisoara. Vindeau tigari, cafea, imbracaminte, dar foarte slab, cantitati foarte mici de produse, scule… Ei treceau foarte des in Ungaria si Iugoslavia, ca sa aduca marfa, dar se intorceau cu marfa foarte putina.
  • Spuneati ca erau barbati tineri, atletici… Banuiesc ca de la dvs. a pornit descrierea aceasta, folosita apoi in toata literatura despre revolutie.Majoritatea acestor indivizi era basarabeana, vorbind stricat romaneste, dar printre ei erau si cate 4-5 care vorbeau numai ruseste sau nu vorbeau deloc, pentru ca mi-am pus oamenii sa se infiltreze, sa faca pe cumparatorii; iiintrebau ceva, dadeau din cap si faceau semn unuia care vorbea romaneste.
  • Au fost la vreun moment dat inclusi in categoria suspecti?Au fost observati, mi s-a raportat verbal cazul lor, comportamentul lor, iar eu l-am informat verbal pe colonelul Sima. Acesta mi-a raspuns: “N-avem timp sa ne ocupam de ei”. Eram sufocati de celelalte activitati, inclusiv de cazul Tokes.
  • Va pun o intrebare mai… delicata. Este posibil ca acei din conducerea Securitatii sa fi ignorat rolul acestor grupuri sovietice, amplasandu-le in categoria bisnitarilor care bantuiau oricum zona, fara sa intuiasca potentialul lor interventionist, iar apoi, dupa revolutie sa exagereze informatiile despre ele, pentru a ascunde lipsa de prevedere si, in ultima instanta, de profesionalism?N-am cum sa stiu asta. Asta se intampla sus, eu stiam ce se intampla jos. Dar, va repet, am informat si Sima mi-a spus ca nu avem timp de ei.
  • Bun, atunci va intreb altceva: jos, acolo, in strada, cand s-au declansat evenimentele, grupurile acestea de basarabeni si-au parasit locurile de bisnita si s-au implicat in violente?Este posibil, da. Au aparut acesti indivizi puternici, atletici, cam blonzi asa, care incitau copiii strazii: “Haideti, ma, spargeti, nu va fie frica!”. Scenele astea le-am surprins. Insa, neocupandu-ne de ei inainte, nedocumentandu-i, nu am avut cum sa stim precis ca provin din grupurile de bisnitari de pe soseaua Arad-Timisoara.
  • Adica n-ati putut spune: individul cutare care incita in dreptul magazinului x este acelasi cu individul care ieri vindea tigari la kilometrul y.Nu, dar din experienta mea de cunoastere a oamenilor, a suspectilor, pentru ca serviciul meu era de “filaj si investigatie”, acesti indivizi care incitau copiii strazii la spargeri si devastari proveneau de acolo, aveau o anumita tipologie pe care specialistul in filaj o recunoaste foarte bine. Eu va pot spune imediat dintr-un grup de oameni care este basarabean, fara ca acela sa deschida gura. Dar cand o deschide!
  • Domnule colonel, nu credeti ca este posibil ca Securitatea sa fi ratat operatiunea de identificare din timp a acestor diversionisti, astfel ca ei au reusit ceea ce in termeni militari se numeste “surprinderea”?Toate informatiile despre acesti diversionisti se gasesc in notele de filaj pe care le-am inaintat conducerii.
  • Este vorba de notele de filaj care au fost prezentate in instante cu ocazia proceselor de la Timisoara, apoi au disparut?Nu stiam de disparitia lor, dar ele au existat sigur.

Pentru cine, in realitate, a provocat si a facut distrugerea magazinelor la Timisoara, vedeti aici:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/02/22/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-tudor-postelnicu-unii-militari-de-la-trupele-de-securitate-ale-brigazii-timisoara-au-facut-unele-provocari-la-unele-magazine-si-vitrine-spargind-geamurile-sa-im/

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , | 7 Comments »