(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)
***UPDATED: from the Wilson Center Digital Archive. Released to the public on 10 December 2019, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/633/cia-reports-on-the-collapse-of-communism-in-europe/5. At least one Bucharest daily has over the course of the last few days been translating and publishing these documents. Unfortunately, if predictably, the portions of this document with the highest classification (sources and methods), and hence best stuff, have been redacted. Still the overall conclusions of what is left make clear CIA’s view at the time. I append this here to my last post on this site, of 4 January 2015; the reader can piece together below the traces of the Securitate coverup after the fact…
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December 28, 1989
Romania: New Regime Consolidating Security
An analysis of the new government’s efforts to eliminate the threat posed by Securitate troops.
http://atomic-temporary-3899751.wpcomstaging.com/gallery-of-images-uploaded-1000/
By the last full week of January 1990 the door on what happened in December 1989 was beginning to close. Here, a last glimpse of some of those details from an official:
Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989
by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.
Standard Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
[Submitted to CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) 19 November 2009; cleared without changes by PRB 15 December 2009; final FEAB clearance for publication 22 December 2009]
I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. I have been a CIA analyst since 2000. Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.
for full article and citations, please see here: (word file and pdf respectively)
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Romania, December 1989: a Revolution, a Coup d’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution
This December marks twenty years since the implosion of the communist regimeof Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. It is well-known, but bears repeating: Romania not only came late in the wave of communist regime collapse in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact in the fall of 1989 (Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria), it came last—and inevitably that was significant. Despite the more highly personalist (vs. corporate) nature of the Ceausescu regime, the higher level of fear and deprivation that characterized society, and the comparative insulation from the rest of the East European Warsaw Pact states, Romania could not escape the implications of the collapse of the other communist party-states. Despite the differences, there simply were too many institutional and ideological similarities, or as is often most importantly the case, that is how members of both the state and society interpreted matters. “Going last” [in turn, in show] almost inevitably implies that the opportunities for mimicry, for opportunism, for simulation on the one hand and dissimulation on the other, are greater than for the predecessors…and, indeed, one can argue that some of what we saw in Romania in December 1989 reflects this.
Much of the debate about what happened in December 1989 has revolved around how to define those events…and their consequences. [These can be analytically distinct categories and depending on how one defines things, solely by focusing on the events themselves or the consequences, or some combination thereof, will inevitably shape the answer one gets]. The primary fulcrum or axis of the definitional debate has been between whether December 1989 and its aftermath were/have been a revolution or a coup d’etat. But Romanian citizens and foreign observers have long since improvised linguistically to capture the hybrid and unclear nature of the events and their consequences. Perhaps the most neutral, cynical, and fatalistic is the common “evenimentele din decembrie 1989”—the events of December 1989—but it should also be pointed out that the former Securitate and Ceausescu nostalgics have also embraced, incorporated and promoted, such terminology. More innovative are terms such as rivolutie (an apparent invocation of or allusion to the famous Romanian satirist Ion Luca Caragiale’s 1880 play Conu Leonida fata cu reactiunea , where he used the older colloquial spelling revulutie) or lovilutie (a term apparently coined by the humorists at Academia Catavencu, and combining the Romanian for coup d’etat, lovitura de stat, and the Romanian for revolution, revolutie).
The following characterization of what happened in December 1989 comes from an online poster, Florentin, who was stationed at the Targoviste barracks—the exact location where Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu would be summarily tried and executed on 25 December 1989. Although his definitions may be too economically-based for my taste—authoritarianism/dictatorship vs. democracy would be preferable—and the picture he presents may be oversimplified at points, the poster’s characterization shows that sometimes the unadorned straighttalk of the plainspoken citizen can cut to the chase better than many an academic tome:
I did my military service, in Targoviste, in fact in the barracks at which the Ceausescu couple were executed…It appears that a coup d’etat was organized and executed to its final step, the proof being how the President of the R.S.R. (Romanian Socialist Republic) died, but in parallel a revolution took place. Out of this situation has transpired all the confusion. As far as I know this might be a unique historical case, if I am not mistaken. People went into the streets, calling not just for the downfall of the president then, but for the change of the political regime, and that is what we call a revolution. This revolution triumphed, because today we have neither communism, nor even neocommunism with a human face. The European Union would not have accepted a communist state among its ranks. The organizers of the coup d’etat foresaw only the replacement of the dictator and the maintenance of a communist/neocommunist system, in which they did not succeed, although there are those who still hope that it would have succeeded. Some talk about the stealing of the revolution, but the reality is that we live in capitalism, even if what we have experienced in these years has been more an attempt at capitalism, orchestrated by an oligarchy with diverse interests…
This is indeed the great and perhaps tragic irony of what happened in December 1989 in Romania: without the Revolution, the Coup might well have failed, but without the Coup, neither would the Revolution have succeeded. The latter is particularly difficult for the rigidly ideological and politically partisan to accept; yet it is more than merely a talking point and legitimating alibi of the second-rung nomenklatura who seized power (although it is that too). The very atomization of Romanian society that had been fueled and exploited by the Ceausescu regime explained why Romania came last in the wave of Fall 1989, but also why it was and would have been virtually impossible for genuine representatives of society—led by dissidents and protesters—to form an alternative governing body on 22 December whose decisions would have been accepted as sufficiently authoritative to be respected and implemented by the rump party-state bureaucracy, especially the armed forces and security and police structures. The chaos that would have ensued—with likely multiple alternative power centers, including geographically—would have likely led to a far greater death toll and could have enabled those still betting on the return of the Ceausescus to after a time reconquer power or seriously impede the functioning of any new government for an extended period.
The fact that the Revolution enabled the coup plotters to seize power, and that the coup enabled the Revolution to triumph should be identified as yet another version—one particular to the idiosyncracies of the Romanian communist regime—of what Linz and Stepan have identified as the costs or compromises of the transition from authoritarian rule. In Poland, for example, this meant that 65 percent of the Sejm was elected in non-competitive elections, but given co-equal authority with the Senate implying that “a body with nondemocratic origins was given an important role in the drafting of a democratic constitution”; in fact, Poland’s first completely competitive elections to both houses of Parliament occurred only in October 1991, fully two years after the formation of the first Solidarity government in August 1989. In Romania, this meant that second-rung nomenklaturists—a displaced generation of elites eager to finally have their day in the sun—who to a large extent still harbored only Gorbachevian perestroikist views of the changes in the system as being necessary, were able to consolidate power following the elimination of the ruling Ceausescu couple.
The self-description by senior Front officials (Ion Iliescu) and media promoters (such as Darie Novaceanu in Adevarul) of the FSN (National Salvation Front) as the “emanation of the Revolution” does not seem justified. It seems directly tied to two late January 1990 events—the decision of the Front’s leaders to run as a political party in the first post-Ceausescu elections and the contestation from the street of the Front’s leaders’ legitimacy to rule and to run in those elections. It also seems difficult to defend objectively as a legitimate description, since even according to their own accounts, senior Front officials had been in contact with one another and discussed overthrowing the Ceausescus prior to the Revolution, since there had existed no real competing non-Ceausescu regime alternative on 22 December 1989 (an argument they themselves make), and since they had clearly not been elected to office. Moreover, when senior former Front officials, Iliescu among them, point to their winning of two-thirds of the votes for the new parliament in May 1990 and Iliescu’s 85 percent vote for the presidency, the numbers in and of themselves—even beyond the by now pretty obvious and substantiated manipulation, surveillance, and intimidation of opposition parties, candidates, movements and civil society/non-governmental organizations that characterized the election campaign—are a red flag to the tainted and only partly free and fair character of those founding elections.
But if the FSN and Ion Iliescu cannot be accurately and legitimately described as the “emanation of the Revolution,” it also seems reasonable to suggest that the term “stolen revolution” is somewhat unfair. The term “stolen revolution” inevitably suggests a central, identifiable, and sufficiently coherent ideological character of the revolution and the presence of an alternative non-Ceausescu, non-Front leadership that could have ensured the retreat of Ceausescu forces and been able to govern and administer the country in the days and weeks that followed. The absence of the latter was pretty clear on 22 December 1989—Iasi, Timisoara, and Arad among others, had local, authentic nuclei leading local movements (for example, the FDR, Frontul Democrat Roman), but no direct presence in Bucharest—and the so-called Dide and Verdet “22 minute” alternative governments were even more heavily compromised by former high-ranking communist dignitary inclusion than the FSN was (the one with the least, headed by Dumitru Mazilu, was rapidly overtaken and incorporated into the FSN).
As to the question of the ideological character of the revolt against Ceausescu, it is once again instructive to turn to what a direct participant, in this case in the Timisoara protests, has to say about it. Marius Mioc , who participated in the defense of Pastor Tokes’ residence and in the street demonstrations that grew out of it, was arrested, interrogated, and beaten from the 16th until his release with other detainees on the 22nd and who has written with longstanding hostility toward former Securitate and party officials, IIiescu, the FSN, and their successors, gives a refreshingly honest account of those demonstrations that is in stark contrast to the often hyperpoliticized, post-facto interpretations of December 1989 prefered by ideologues:
I don’t know if the 1989 revolution was as solidly anticommunist as is the fashion to say today. Among the declarations from the balcony of the Opera in Timisoara were some such as “we don’t want capitalism, we want democratic socialism,” and at the same time the names of some local PCR [communist] dignitaries were shouted. These things shouldn’t be generalized, they could have been tactical declarations, and there existed at the same time the slogans “Down with communism!” and flags with the [communist] emblem cut out, which implicitly signified a break from communism. [But] the Revolution did not have a clear ideological orientation, but rather demanded free elections and the right to free speech.
Romania December 1989 was thus both revolution and coup, but its primary definitive characteristic was that of revolution, as outlined by “Florentin” and Marius Mioc above. To this must be added what is little talked about or acknowledged as such today: the counter-revolution of December 1989. Prior to 22 December 1989, the primary target of this repression was society, peaceful demonstrators—although the Army itself was both perpetrator of this repression but also the target of Securitate forces attempting to ensure their loyalty to the regime and their direct participation and culpabilization in the repression of demonstrators. After 22 December 1989, the primary target of this violence was the Army and civilians who had picked up weapons, rather than citizens at large. It is probably justified to say that in terms of tactics, after 22 December 1989, the actions of Ceausist forces were counter-coup in nature, contingencies prepared in the event of an Army defection and the possibility of foreign intervention in support of such a defection. However, precisely because of what occurred prior to 22 December 1989, the brutal, bloody repression of peaceful demonstrators, and because the success of the coup was necessary for the success of the revolution already underway, it is probably accurate to say that the Ceausescu regime’s actions as a whole constituted a counter-revolution. If indeed the plotters had not been able to effectively seize power after the Ceausescus fled on 22 December 1989 and Ceausescu or his direct acolytes had been able to recapture power, we would be talking of the success not of a counter-coup, but of the counter-revolution.
A key component of the counter-revolution of December 1989 concerns the, as they were christened at the time, so-called “terrorists,” those who were believed then to be fighting in defense of the Ceausescu couple. It is indeed true as Siani-Davies has written that the Revolution is about so much more than “the Front” and “the terrorists.” True enough, but the outstanding and most vexing question about December 1989—one that resulted in 942 killed and 2,251 injured after 22 December 1989—is nevertheless the question of “the terrorists.” Finding out if they existed, who they were, and who they were defending remains the key unclarified question of December 1989 two decades later: that much is inescapable.
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We also know from Romanescu and a second source that USLA commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu (Bula Moise) addressed his troops as follows:
“On 25 December at around 8 pm, after the execution of the dictators, Colonel Ardeleanu gathered the unit’s members into an improvised room and said to them:
‘The Dictatorship has fallen! The Unit’s members are in the service of the people. The Romanian Communist Party [PCR] is not disbanding! It is necessary for us to regroup in the democratic circles of the PCR—the inheritor of the noble ideas of the people of which we are a part!…Corpses were found, individuals with USLAC (Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare) identity cards and identifications with the 0620 stamp of the USLA, identity cards that they had no right to be in possession of when they were found…’ He instructed that the identity cards [of members of the unit] had to be turned in within 24 hours, at which time all of them would receive new ones with Defense Ministry markings.”
In other words, a cover-up of a now failed attempt at counter-revolution—having been cut short by the execution of the Ceausescus, the object of their struggle—had begun. In the days and weeks that were to follow, the Securitate, including people such as the seemingly ubiquitous Colonel Ghircoias discussed in the opening of this article would go about recovering those “terrorists” who were unlucky enough to be captured, injured, or killed. By 24 January 1990, the “terrorists” of the Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989, no longer existed, so-to-speak, and the chances for justice and truth about what had happened in December 1989 would never recover.
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A Brief Timeline of the Counter-Revolutionary Coverup
26 December 1989
(Those who argue that there was no “other side” during the fighting of 22-25 December 1989–that the “terrorists” did not exist, that they were from the Army (in particular DIA), that it was all just “friendly fire,” misunderstanding, paranoia, fear, and suspicion (such post-modernist excess permeates the accounts of Peter Siani-Davies, Ruxandra Cesereanu , Adrian Cioflanca, to name a few of the more recent accounts, as well as reviews of films such as A Fost sau N-a Fost?/12:08 East of Bucharest)–have difficulty explaining how the Hungarian military maintains they were tracking Securitate radio transmitters/transmissions and relaying the information to the Romanian military leadership and that the operation of these Securitate transmitters dropped off in sync with the drop off in counter-revolutionary resistance posed by the Securitate…Then again they are not aware of this or most of the details/evidence presented for the period 26 December 1989 – 24 January 1990 below…)
Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, head of the Hungarian People’s Army Press Department: “…I would like to say that a progressive weakening of the Securitate has been experienced. We ourselves can see this, because our radio searching and locating units which were in Hungary a few days ago were monitoring broadcasts from 31 Securitate radio centers–yesterday 19, and today only 5. We of course put this data at the disposal of the Romanian military leadership.”
Ferenc Karpati: “A Securitate erői ellen hosszú, küzdelmes harcot folytattak a hadsereg és a forradalom más erői. Felszámolásuk érdekében a Magyar Honvédség speciális képzettségu rádióbemérő egységeinek egy részét átcsoportosítottuk a román államhatár közelébe, s így sikerült rádióállomásaikat bemérni, álláshelyeiket pontosan meghatározni. Az adatok átadásával jelentősen elősegítettük a Securitate-bázisok felszámolását.” KÁRPÁTI FERENC: A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése
1990. január 11., csütörtök 18:55
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Hungarian Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati and Romanian Defense Attache to Hungary Colonel Ioan Todericiu (see videos below) confirm below the violation of Hungarian airspace by Romanian helicopters during the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 that overthrew communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu 25 years ago. The context makes clear these were Securitate helicopters in the service of the Romanian secret police, the Securitate, and Nicolae Ceausescu.
Both at the time (Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the United States Government, FBIS-EEU-89-246, 26 December 1989) and 10 years later in 2000, Karpati acknowledged the violation of Hungarian airspace by Securitate helicopters. He didn’t have any doubt, these were not just the alleged suppositions of Hungarian journalists, and more than a decade after the events–in other words, after a tsunami of Securitate-inspired revisionism in Romania–he continued to maintain they belonged to the Securitate…not to the Romanian military as the timeless deniers would have us believe…
Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu admitted to journalist Dan Badea in 1991 that the USLA (special anti-terrorist unit) had its own helicopter force, thereby substantiating the suspicion of the unidentified revolutionary that the helicopters in question were “special”/”from a special unit.” Thus, it is abundantly clear that Vlad’s claim that the Securitate had “just three helicopters” was a bald-faced lie.
A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. KÁRPÁTI Ferenc. A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése. http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/en/tartalom/historia/00-04/ch10.html
Öt helikopter berepült Magyarországra
Ha a hadseregek közti fegyveres konfliktus esélyét minimálisnak is tekintette a magyar honvédség vezetése, a román belső feszültségekről a figyelmet elterelő provokációval továbbra is komolyan számoltak. Számos lakossági bejelentés érkezett, hogy hol láttak landoló román helikoptereket. Összesen öt légtérsértés valóban történt ezekben a napokban, helikopterek repültek át Romániából, de leszállás nélkül gyorsan vissza is tértek, ezért a magyar légierő állandó készültségben lévő MiG-21-esei nem is emelkedtek fel a betonról. Hogy csak tesztelték a rendszert, vagy besódródtak, az nem derült ki. De egy, a két évvel későbbi barcsi esethez hasonló ügynek – amikor a délszláv háború idején egy szerb gép kazettás bombát dobott le egy házra – a pattanásig feszült helyzetben komolyabb következményei lehettek volna.
Nem könnyítette meg a magyar honvédség dolgát, hogy 89 december közepén, végén szinte végig taknyos, ködös idő volt. Ezért Keleti György visszaemlékezése szerint külön őröket állítottak a laktanyákba, hogy füleljenek és ha különös zajra lesznek figyelmesek, azonnal jelentsék.
http://index.hu/belfold/1989/2009/12/22/megoldani_erdely_ugyet_ugyes-okosan/
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25-27 December 1989
Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance. (Gheorghe Ratiu, interview by Ilie Neacsu (episode 17), Europa, 7-22 March 1995, cited in Hall 1997, p. 366.)
Gheorghe Ratiu (fost sef al Directiei I a Securitatii): “La ordinul generalului Vlad, in zilele de 25-27 decembrie 1989, am coordonat o investigatie in spitalele si morgile Capitalei pentru a stabili care este adevarul in legatura cu ‘teroristii straini’ despre care se tot relata la televiziune si in presa. Toate unitatiile spitalicesti si morga de la Institutul Medico-Legal, fusesera preluate in paza de catre armata. La inceput, ofiterilor trimisi de mine nu li s-a permis intrarea in nici unul din aceste obiective, cu toate ca, oficial, de la data de 23 decembrie devenisem seful Directiei de Infromatii Interne a Armatei. Pentru a strapunge acest baraj instituit, de forte oculte, am apelat si am primit sprijinul procurorului general Popovici, a ministrului adjunct dr. Iacob de la Ministerul Sanatatii, si a generalului Vasile, inca sef al Directiei de contrainformatii militare. Am format astfel, patru echipe conduse de cate un procuror si din care mai faceau parte, cate un ofiter de contrainformatii cu uniforma al legitimatii cu uniforma si legitimatie de la Ministerul Apararii Nationale [!!!], un ofiter de la directia mea si un inspector de la Directia sanitara a Municipului Bucuresti. Aceste echipe au reusit sa patrunda peste tot [!!!], mai putin la Spitalul Militar Central…Rezultatul a fost ca in tara murisera in acea perioada doar patru cetateni straini…Deci, nici un terorist strain [!!!]“
Gheorghe Ratiu, interviu luat de Ilie Neacsu, Europa, episoade XVII si XVIII, martie-aprilie 1995.
In perioada 23-25 decembrie 1989, Brasovul a fost un oras in stare de razboi. Nu vom incerca sa dam raspunsuri definitive in privinta evenimentelor din acele zile, ci vom prezenta doar o serie de aspecte ciudate. Pe 16 decembrie 1989 este vazut in oras Ion Dinca. Il insoseste comandantul trupelor terestre din China. Era vorba de a se perfecta o tranzactie cu masini de lupta blindate. Evenimentele din Timisoara anuntau schimbari exceptionale. Brasovul era pregatit pentru ceva asemanator. Doua personaje cheie se ocupau de aceste planuri. Primul, generalul Zagoneanu, sef al Inspectoratului judetean al M.I., venit pe 19 noiembrie 1987 la Brasov. Daogaru Gheorghe, in fapt eminenta cenusie a judetului, secretar cu problemele economice, a venit pe 19 noiembrie 1987. Cei doi erau numiti de Ceausescu pentru a face in asa fel ca revolta din noiembrie 1987 sa nu se mai repete. Pentru demonstratia de la 23 august 1989 a fost pregatit planul “Victoria”. Pe cladirile din jurul tribunei oficiale au fost plasati lunetisti. Alte echipe care filmau cu camere video erau amplasate in balcoane. Echipe USLA erau in alarma de lupta. O varianta imbunatatita si mult mai ampla a fost gata pe 21 decembrie 1989. Pe 18 decembrie 1989 la ora 9 dimineata s-a intrunit in sedinta Consilul Apararii. Zagoneanu a prezentat planul de interventie. Acest plan prevedea ca, daca vor fi mai mult de 400 de manifestanti, Securitatea va interveni numai la cooperare cu armata si garzile patriotice. In seara de 18 decembrie 1989 planul a fost materializat pina la ultimele amanunte la comandamentul Brigazii de vinatori de munte. Au participat generalul Florea, sef de stat major, lt. colonel Dumitru Popescu, maiorul Oprea, reprezentantul si Zagoneanu, un delegat al Scolii militare de ofiteri, un delegat de la apararea civila si un anume Dragnea de la garzile patriotice.
Pe 19 si 20 decembrie 1989 acest plan a fost pus pe curat in cinci exemplare pe harta orasului Brasov. Pe 7 februarie 1990 aceste planuri i-au parvenit generalului Florea din partea lui Zagoneanu. Urmau sa fie distruse. Pe 18 decembrie avea loc o intilnire intre Gheorghe Pana, delegat al CC al PCR Petre Preoteasa, prim-secretar, si Zagoneanu, in care se discuta planul de interventie. In cladirea “Modaromului” s-au dispus tragatori de elita la mai multe niveluri. Pe 21 decembrie echicpele de interventie au ocupat posturile de lupta obligatorii. Au fost adusi in oras palestinieni. Au fost cazati in oras in trei hoteluri, “Aro”, “Postavarul” si “Capitol”, in urma interventiei Securitatii. Iata ce declara generalul Florea pe 27 decembrie 1989 in sedinta CFSN. “Sa dam dovada de vigilenta deosebita. La ora actuala la Procuratura sint retinuti libieni si palestinieni care sint interogati de procurorul militar sef Centiu Ioan, dar trebuie sa mai cautam si altii.” Exista si se poate verifica stenograma sedintei. Ce dorea sa spuna generalul Florea? Pe 25 decembrie 1989, noaptea, au fost expediati la Bucuresti cetateni straini (arabi) in doua vagoane speciale. Se vorbeste despre o tabara de antrenament pentru arabi la Dumbravita Birsei. O alta tabara de antrenament pentru arabi se afla intre Fagaras si Brasov, la poalele muntilor. Prin Brasov circula uneori un autobuz pe care erau niste incriptii in limba araba. Implicarea unor indivizi de origine araba in lupte este certa….
In luna iunie, anul trecut [1990], s-a deplasat la Brasov domnul general Nicolae Constantin Spiroiu insotit de cinci ofiteri. Au contactat grupul “Opinia” si alte persoane pentru a alfa cine ancheteaza evenimentele din decembrie 1989. La sediul grupului “Opinia” domnul general Spiroiu a discutat mai bine de cinci ore cu Adrian Moruzi, Viorel Boeru, Viorel Nitescu, Alexandru Popescu si Katarina Peter.
Pe 14 iunie 1990 seara, generalul Spiroiu l-a sunat pe Adrian Moruzi interesindu-se ce se intimpla la Brasov. S-a procedat la o deshumare a mortilor din decembrie 1989. Totul s-a facut cu participarea Procuraturii care a prelevat gloantele ucigase. S-au gasit in special gloante de calibrul 5,6 mm care nu sint in dotarea armatei. Recent la sediul Procuraturii din Brasov s-a produs un incendiu devastator. Au ars mai multe documente legate de Revolutie. Incendiul a fost atit de puternic incit s-a calcinat peretii. Ar fi interesant de aflat ce material inflamabil a putut produce o astfel de putere calorica. –Romulus Nicolae
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27 December 1989 BBC
I know of no better metaphor for what has happened to research on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 than Ted Koppel’s surreal experience in Bucharest in early 1990 recounted below.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
Monday, March 5 (1990).
Bucharest. Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling. Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied. Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.
We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest. An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over. I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs. “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel. I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels. The colonel went off to consult with his man. When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.” “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described. “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.
Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook. The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.
Let’s Go to the Videotape! (I) “To the Army it’s confirmation that they’ve been dealing with a specially-trained force…because it’s the type of bullet they’ve never seen before” (ITN UK Television, Timisoara Romania, December 1989) (plus Irish Television, The Tragic Fate of Florica Sava)
Let’s Go to the Videotape! (II) (Romania December 1989) Was the Press of the Time Really So Wrong (about the “terrorists”)?
However, according to videotape from December 1989, ventilation/oxygen filtration systems (not to mention an elevator to a bunker, fully-stocked refrigerators, gas masks, etc. see below screen captures from French TV–seems those may have been taken from BBC1 Michael Stewart’s report from 27 December 1989 below) happened to turn up in what Voinea claims are the typical underground tunnels that span beneath any large city…
http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/04/subteranele-oraului.html
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The press of 1990 and later has told us of these tunnels and their features–including the ventilation/oxygen filtration systems–now confirmed by video, for many years.
“Echipa lui Gh. Grigoras “curata” in continuare subsolul ajungind la alta instalatie de aerisire. Filtre de aer ultramoderne, oxigen din belsug, ba chiar o mica… fabrica de oxigen, aflata la perfecta stare de functionare. Instalatia de ventilatie e super-sofisticata, iar dubla ei functionalitate consta in posibilitatea folosirii traseului secret pe care il ofera. Prin tunelele de ventilatie…”
“Labirintul subteran vechi al orasului pare neinsemnat pe langa cel construit din ordinul lui Ceausescu. Datele mi-au parvenit de la militarii care au intrat in subteranele fostului Comitet Central, actualul Senat la Romaniei, respectiv de la maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista. Ei au intrat in aceste catacombe chiar pe 25 decembrie 1989, impreuna cu un grup de genisti si pirotehnisti”, explica muzeograful Dan Falcan. Conform relatarii militarilor, la subsolul cladirii au gasit un tunel, nu prea lung, care coboara intr-un fel de cazarma. Opt camere cu paturi pliante. Din aceste camere pornesc mai multe culoare, unul ducand chiar pana la etajul II al cladirii. Pe un alt culoar se poate ajunge la un buncar mai larg, la 7 metri adancime. Se trece apoi de o usa blindata si se ajunge la un apartament spatios, la adancimea de 9 metri. Militarii au cautat apoi camera in care se afla sistemul de ventilatie si s-au trezit pe un nou culoar.”
Sorin Golea (Libertatea 2005)
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for older posts on this topic, see for example…
decembrie 1989: Doar despre CC-ul, tuneluri, subterane, “trupa speciala” (MI-securisti), si “sportivi” la Clubul Dinamo (dinamovisti)
O minciuna dejucata de o jumatate de adevar…(lipseste adevarul despre teroristii)
“O reţea de tuneluri, considerată ultra-secretă, străbate Capitala şi uneşte puncte strategice din oraş.”
http://www.tvr.ro/articol.php?id=96287
Mirel Curea, nr. 317, 9 iulie 1993, p. 3
WHY, OF WHY SO MANY YEARS AFTER DO WE NOT KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEMBER 1989 (DE CE NU STIM ADEVARUL DESPRE DECEMBRIE 1989?)
THE ANSWER CAN BE FOUND IN A PASSING COMMENT OF MIREL CUREA’S IN THIS JULY 1993 ARTICLE:
“Pentru a nu se crea probleme cu implicatii diplomatice internationale, nu insistam asupra acestei ultime etape.”
(In order not create any problems with international diplomatic implications, we won’t insist [upon discussing] this final stage [involving the role of foreign states]”
“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:” PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989 (Part Seven, Foreign Involvement)
(Romania decembrie 1989) “Asta nu este pentru urechile publicului…”: despre teroristii, Planul Z-Z, si arme Stecikin
Les souterrains de Bucarest
JA2 20H – 27/12/1989 – 01min55s
385 vues
Reportage sur le réseau souterrain de Bucarest, véritable ville parallèle créee par Ceausescu pour assurer sa défense et où se sont réfugiés les rebelles de la Securitate, la police secrète du régime, après la chute du dictateur. – Soldat roumain explorant un souterrain l’arme au poing. Soldat ouvrant une porte d’un coup de botte. GP Visage du soldat tendu par la peur de se trouver face à face avec un agent de la Securitate. Soldat prenant un ascenseur qui les ammène dans le bunker personnel du dictateur Ceausescu. Restes d’un repas sur la table. Réfrigérateur plein de viande. Soldat fouillant un agent de la Securitate qui vient d’être arrêté dans un tunnel du réseau souterrain. On examine ses papiers. GP Oranges découvertes sur lui, indice supplémentaire confirmant son appartenance à la Securitate. Soldat explorant un tunnel le long duquel s’écoule une rigole d’eau.
…dar ce spune Dan Voinea http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/11/nici-simulatoare-de-tragere-nici.html:
(pentru mai multe minciuni ale lui Dan Voinea va rog sa consultati capitolul despre “decembrie 1989” din Raportul Comisiei Prezidențiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România–scris de catre Vladimir Tismaneanu, Ruxandru Cesereanu, Sorin Iliesiu, si altii…despre Voinea si Raportul Final sunt multe de spus http://atomic-temporary-3899751.wpcomstaging.com/2010/12/18/raport-final-si-revolutia-reciclare-sau-rotatia-de-texte/ , http://atomic-temporary-3899751.wpcomstaging.com/2010/09/28/orwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-one-groundhog-day/ , http://atomic-temporary-3899751.wpcomstaging.com/2010/09/28/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-2/ )
Arhitectul bucurestean Camil Roguski, fost angajat al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, dar si la Unitatea de întretinere si decorare a palatelor prezidentiale din perioada ceausista a fost unul dintre putinii civili care au avut privilegiul sa vada si sa participe la cartografierea, la construirea si decorarea unor tuneluri secrete din mai multe localitati
Cum se „teleporta” Ceausescu
„Sub fostul CC exista mai multe cai de acces, la nivelul subsolului doi. In decembrie 1989, tunelul care era liber, accesat cu un lift personal ,si care ar fi trebuit sa-i asigure iesirea lui Ceusescu trecea pe sub CC, CC-UTC, Bdul Magheru, Intercontinental si facea legatura cu tunelurile tehnice de langa statia de metrou <<Universitate>>. Nu este un secret ca majoritatea statiilor de metrou au fost astfel construite încât sa poata fi folosite ca adaposturi antiatomice. Sub tunelul propriu – zis exista o retea de buncare si tuneluri mai mici, tehnice, care sunt ca un paienjenis sub Bucuresti. Prin aceste tuneluri se poate circula comod cu un anumit mijloc de transport electric. Se putea ajunge, urmând paralel traseul metroului, pâna la Palatul Primaverii unde exista un buncar central, de coordonare strategica . Din acest buncar, legatura era un tunel secret la care a lucrat, timp de trei ani, prin anii 80, o echipa de mineri de la Petrila. Legatura subterana ajungea la o amenajare de la Lacul Herastrau unde exista permanent o salupa rapida pregatita sa-l transporte pe un alt mal si unde astepta o masina cu destinatia Clinceni – aerodrom. Daca Ceausescu ajungea în subteranele de sub CC, avea posibilitea sa ajunga, foarte usor si rapid, în orice punct de la periferia Capitalei”, a precizat Roguski. Conform documentelor de arhiva si a marturiilor militarilor, de asigurarea securitatii la tunelurile din zona CC (adapost pentru conducerea PCR) se pare ca se ocupa direct, in acea perioada, generalul Ioan Geoana, seful Apararii Civile, tatal lui Mircea Geoana, actualul presedinte PSD.
buncarele au fost descoperite “destul de tirziu…dupa 24 decembrie”
U.S.L.A.C.
Sergiu Tanasescu (medicul echipei de fotbal Rapid Bucuresti) = S.T.
Ion K. Ion (ziarist, Cuvintul) = I.I.
I.I.: S-a vinturat prin presa ideea prezente unor teroristi straini…
S.T.: Imi veti ingadui sa nu ma priveasca aceasta problema ea tine de competenta
istoriei. De acord?
I.I.: O.K.
S.T.: Pe un terorist l-am prins chiar eu, mina mea. Avea 26 de ani si doua
legitimatii, una de student in anul IV la Drept si alta data de Directia a V-a
U.S.L.A.C. Unitati Speciale de Lupta Antiterorista si Comando. Era drogat. Am
gasit asupra lui si a altor teroristi un fel de cicolata, tipul “Pasuma” si
“Gripha”. Era un drog extraordinar de puternic ce dadea o stare de euforie,
axata insa pe agresivitate si distrugere, si o independenta fata de somn de cel
putin 10 zile. Aveau un armament supersofisticat, cu infrarosii, cu sistem de
auzire la distanta etc. Am capturat o arma din asta si am tras trei gloante
intr-o tinta aflata la vreo suta de metri. Arma n-avea nici un recul si,
controlind apoi, am constatat ca toate cele trei gloante se infipsesera unul in celalalt. Ne-am facut si
noi treaba apoi cu pusca asta pina s-a terminat munitia.
I.I. : Ce se intimpla cu teroristii prinsi?
S.T.: Noi i-am predat organelor de procuratura militara. Pe foarte multi i-am
prins in primele zile, identitatea lor fiind stabilita de mai multi, de
colonelul Octavian Nae, Constantin Dinescu (unchiul lui Mircea), Guse, dar mai
ales Vlad care strig la prinsii astia ca de ce nu i-au ascultat ordinul sa se
predea, ei faceau pe sfintii, dar teava armei era inca destul de calda de la
ispravile lor. Dupa ce suportau interogatoriul acesta sumar, celor mai multi li
se dadea drumul.
I.I.: De ce?
S.T. Asa ordona Vlad. Pe 22 decembrie am prins un maior de securitate care a
fost dezarmat si pus in libertate, a doua zi l-am prins din nou, i-am luat
armamentul si munitia si iarasi Vlad a garantat pentru el, numai ca a treia zi
l-am prins din nou. Ne-am enervat si atunci i-am arestat pe toti, inclusiv pe
Vlad si pe colonelul Nae, cu atit mai mult cu cit pe ultimul il surprinsese o fata de a noastra la subsol I,
unde era Termoficarea, transmitind nu stiu ce la un aparat de emisie-receptie.
I.I.: Cum si cind au fost descoperite buncarele?
S.T.: Destul de tirziu, in orice caz dupa 24 decembrie. Unele intimplator, cele
mai multe insa datorita insa a doi indivizi….
(Sergiu Tanasescu, cu Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera
roz!” Cuvintul, nr. 9 29 martie 1990, p. 15.)
se pare ca acesti doi indivizi au fost “maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista”…
Cai de navigatie secrete sub Bucuresti
La 12 metri sub platoul Pietei Revolutiei exista o retea de catacombe prin care se circula cu barca
La 12 metri sub platoul Pietei Revolutiei exista o retea de catacombe prin care se circula cu barca. E vorba de culoare betonate, cu latimea de aproximativ doi metri, prin care curge un rau subteran adanc de un metru. Cu apa curata. Debitul raului secret e aproximat la 1,5 metri cubi pe secunda. La intrare, aceste cai navigabile care stabat Capitala sunt utilate cu barci pneumatice. Informatiile ne-au fost furnizate de Dan Falcan, seful sectiei de istorie a Muzeului Municipiului Bucuresti. Istoricul a cules toate datele existente despre catacombele Bucurestilor, mai vechi si mai noi, si le-a pus cap la cap pentru a-si face o imagine asupra istoriei orasului.
(IMG:http://news.softpedia.com/images//news/1913_6.jpg)
Capitala Romaniei are o traditie de secole in materie de tainite si coridoare secrete. Din datele pe care le detin istoricii, primele coridoare subterane demne de luat in seama au fost beciurile producatorilor de vinuri. Acestea aveau zeci de metri si erau atat de largi incat se circula cu carele. In secolul al XIX-lea au aparut edificiile care aveau tuneluri de refugiu, cum e tunelul care leaga Palatul Ghica Tei de Manastirea Plumbuita, lung de mai bine de un kilometru. In nordul Parcului Cismigiu, Biserica Schitu Magureanu e legata prin subterane de Palatul Cretzulescu .
Sub Palatul Golescu, situat langa stadionul Giulesti, a fost depistat un coridor subteran care da inspre lunca Dambovitei . Coridorul a fost folosit si de Tudor Vladimirescu. “De pe la 1826 ne-au ramas
cateva relatari care ne dau o imagine asupra catacombelor de sub capitala Tarii Romanesti. La acea vreme haiduceau in zona vestitii Tunsu si Grozea. Timp de multi ani, ei au bagat spaima in boierii din Bucuresti, in special in cei care aveau casele in zona actualei sosele Panduri. Ii calcau mereu, iar poterele nu puteau face nimic. Desi reuseau sa ii localizeze si sa-i incercuiasca, cand sa puna mana pe ei haiducii dispareau “intrand in pamant”, adica coborau in subteran. Astazi putem afirma ca sub aceasta sosea erau o multime de coridoare subterane, late de trei metri si inalte de doi metri. Dar toate datele acestea au palit atunci cand am intrat in contact cu alte informatii recente. Labirintul subteran vechi al orasului pare neinsemnat pe langa cel construit din ordinul lui Ceausescu. Datele mi-au parvenit de la militarii care au intrat in subteranele fostului Comitet Central, actualul Senat la Romaniei, respectiv de la maiorul Gheorghe Grigoras si capitanul Nicolae Grigoras, de la unitatea speciala de lupta antiterorista. Ei au intrat in aceste catacombe chiar pe 25 decembrie 1989, impreuna cu un grup de genisti si pirotehnisti”, explica muzeograful Dan Falcan.
Conform relatarii militarilor, la subsolul cladirii au gasit un tunel, nu prea lung, care coboara intr-un fel de cazarma. Opt camere cu paturi pliante. Din aceste camere pornesc mai multe culoare, unul ducand chiar pana la etajul II al cladirii. Pe un alt culoar se poate ajunge la un buncar mai larg, la 7 metri adancime. Se trece apoi de o usa blindata si se ajunge la un apartament spatios, la adancimea de 9 metri. Militarii au cautat apoi camera in care se afla sistemul de ventilatie si s-au trezit pe un nou culoar. Dupa ce au strabatut aproximativ 30 de metri au gasit o nisa cu o lada mare, in care erau 16 barci din cauciuc, cu pompe de umflare. Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie. Albia amenajata are pe lateral bare metalice facute pentru oprirea sau impulsionarea barcilor. “In opinia militarilor, raul secret duce catre un lacurile din afara orasului, in nord, si Dambovita, in sud-est” , subliniaza Falcan. Ofiterii au vorbit insa de existenta unui alt canal similar, la capatul unui alt tunel, precum si de un sistem de inundare a labirintului, pe sectiuni. In cazul in care un eventual fugar e urmarit, el poate inunda portiuni de tunel in spatele lui pentru a opri urmaritorii. A mai fost gasita o gura de iesire din labirint in curtea interioara a fostului CC, de unde, printr-o retea de canale, se poate intra in canalizarea orasului, de unde se poate iesi catre Dambovita. Reteaua are guri de iesire in Palatul Regal, Biserica Cretzulescu si magazinul Muzica. “In urma unor cercetari ulterioare a reiesit ca ramificatiile subterane au corespondenta cu circa 80 de obiective din Bucuresti, cum ar fi cladirea ASE, Casa Enescu, Opera Romana etc. Subliniez, relatari sunt ale unor ofiteri din cadrul armatei. Lucru foarte interesant, nimeni nu neaga existenta acestor cai de navigatie secrete, dar cand am incercat sa le exploram, nu ni s-a permis pe motiv ca… nu se poate”. Despre aceste galerii ale lui Ceausescu ne-a vorbit si Radulescu Dobrogea, presedintele asociatiei Ecocivica, fost inspector de mediu in Primaria Capitalei, omul care s-a ocupat multi ani de panza freatica a orasului. El sustine ca stie de aceste galerii ale lui Ceausescu si ca apa limpede care curge prin ele este panza freatica de sub oras.
Administratorii Senatului au vazut numai intrarea in catacombe
“Pot sa va spun ca am auzit despre aceste lucruri, dar nu le-am vazut. Exista o cale de comunicatie subterana care pleaca din Senat catre Piata Revolutiei, o cale care pleaca de la Palatul Regal catre Piata si inca una, tot din Palatul Regal, catre Biserica Cretzulescu. Intrarile in aceste cai de acces le-am vazut, dar unde se opresc, nu stiu, nu este treaba noastra sa cotrobaim pe acolo”, ne-a declarat inginer Constantin Bratu, directorul tehnic al administratiai cladirii Senatului Romaniei.
Sorin Golea (Libertatea 2005)
Actorul Ernest Maftei a avut de a face cu tuneluri…si teroristi…
Dan Badea: Cine erau cei pe care i-a impuscat Dan Iosif?
Ernest Maftei: USLA! Venisera sa ne ajute si a venit sa ne’mpuste, dom’le! Ce dracu’, nu stiu? Au venit sa ne ajute. La demisol erau niste oameni de ai nostri, ca acolo erau niste usi blindate ca nu stiu ce-i. Si unui o deschis o usa dina asta si umbla la becuri. Si nu-am speriat ca ce-o fi fost acolo. Atunci vine USLA sa ne ajute. Vin 15 insi si 4 colonel, dom’le. Da! Si cind se duc jos, i-au impuscat pe toti ai nostri. Doi dintre ai nostri acolo au fost omoriti, erau revolutionari, oameni necajiti care s-au dus acolo sa moara. Si atunci ne-am dat seama ca astia ne omoara. Dar apoi vin sus. Au avut si ei 3 morti. Si-atunci i-am inconjurat: “Dezbracarea!” Pai da’ ce dracu’ dom’le?
Dan Badea: Atunci i-au dezbracat?
Ernest Maftei: Pai dar cum dom’le? I-au impuscat pe loc! Pai dar ne impuscau ei pe noi…
Dan Badea: Dan Iosif a spus ca nu i-a impuscat pe cei 15 USLASI…
Ernest Maftei: Da’ nu te lua cu el! A fost necesar de i-a’mpuscat acolo! Dar nu-i voie sa zica, fiindca nu vrea sa se afle. nu-i voie din cauza ca acu’ne conduce Securitatea. Chiar aia care au tras in noi sint pe posturi de conducere. Asculta ce spun! Ca USLA, coloana a 5-a, a fost cu Ceausescu. Nu ne-ar fi omorit? Vai de mine!…
Dan Badea: Despre teroristi ce ne puteti spune?
Ernest Maftei: Atunci cind s-au deschis usile, d-a intrat toata lumea, atunci au existat si asa-zisii teroristi. Cu salopete, cu arme ascunse. … Au intrat printre noi. Se de-aia, incepind cu 11 noaptea [23 decembrie 1989], acolo a fost razboi civil….Fug astia repede sa-l prinda si atunci am descoperit ca in fostul CC, intre ziduri, se circula. Era un culoar. In zid. Pai cum? …
Dan Badea: Pe unde credeti ca veneau teroristii?
Ernest Maftei: Eu ma miram asa, la un moment dat: cum dom’le, se trage, trag o jumatate de ora in plin si pe urma stau? Si zic: ba, baieti, de unde dracu vin? Era pe 23, de-acuma. Zic: de unde vin si unde se duc? de unde iau astia arme si inca nu-i videm? Ce crezi? Mi-am adus aminte, eu fiind batrin, ca la vila asta, care e a artistilor acuma, linga Biserica Alba, c-a fost vila lu’ Lupeasca. Si de-acolo, Carol al II-lea a facut tunel pa sub pamint pina la palat, ca sa duca la el. Venea cu masina, ca sa nu se vada lumea. Si la palatul regal trageau tare. Pai acolo, la vila aia, a fost armament mult. Stai sa vezi ce se intimpla. Era 1 noaptea, pe 23. Zic: ma copii, mergeti voi cu mine? Si ajung pina in dreptul blocului aia, cu astia….
(Ernest Maftei cu Dan Badea, “‘Iliescu putea sa fie eroul neamului, dar a pierdut ocazia!’,” Expres, nr. 36 (85), 10-16 septembrie 1991, pp. 10-11)
28 December 1989 ITN
Penny Marshall, ITN correspondent: “This is one of the thousands of bullets that’s been handed in or found on the streets here in Timisoara.
To the Army it’s confirmation that they’ve been dealing with a specially-trained force…because it’s the type of bullet they’ve never seen before.”
Soldier speaking to Ms. Marshall: “these are bullets…”
“…the explosive bullets”
http://www.itnsource.com/compilations/regions/europe/?lr=S24090801
Clip 100 of 125
Clip Ref: S24090801 2 113478
Copyright: ITN
Duration:00:01:44
Timecode – In:
Out:
28th December 1989 – Timisoara search GRAPHIC Exit the secret police ROMANIA: Timisoara: EXT Soldiers standing outside Army HQ INT Camera goes inside HQ / Officer shows and explains weapons …
A1: Mix / A2: Mix
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28 December 1989
Constantin Catalin-Ceferistul: “Pe 28 decembrie am predat patru cetateni de nationalitate araba. Aveau pasaport, Republica Irak.” (Expres Magazin, nr. 22 (1991))
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30-31 December 1989
Blaine Harden, “Doors Unlocked on Romania’s Secret Police,” The Washington Post, 30 December 1989, p. 1, 14A (sau cu alte cuvinte, despre USLAC in combinezoane negre)
(To my pleasant surprise, I discovered the AFP (Agence France Presse) Archive online. I finally dug into my pocket and purchased for approximately 3 euros an article the following articles.)
Anatomy of a Cover-up (or Constanta, we have a problem…): In the waning days of December 1989 following the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu on Christmas Day, several high-ranking officials from Romania’s military and commercial navy stationed in and around Constanta recounted to foreign reporters details of what had happened off the Black Sea Coast during the previous week and a half…That they spoke out of turn and were entirely too honest could be surmised by the effort of Bucharest–and those directly charged with the overall governance and defense of the country–to deny the revelations out of Constanta. It was the beginning of the cover-up of the Counter-Revolution of December 1989 and it was done precisely because of the involvement of foreign mercenaries in fighting side by side with elements of the Securitate who opposed the ouster of Nicolae Ceausescu. (So, indeed, the cover-up was initiated by Romania’s new civil and military leaders to avoid international ramifications (the ultimate state function, regardless of regime, in a world of nation-states)…it would be continued by others.)
One wonders what would have happened had this series of reports been laid out in sequence and analyzed as a sequence. There seems to have been more coverage of them (abroad) in the Budapest (see below), rather than Bucharest, press. One of the few references in the literature on December 1989 is on page 66 of Nestor Ratesh’s Romania: The Entangled Revolution (1991), where Ratesh notes a (31 December 1989) Agence France Presse dispatch citing the office of naval commander Constantin Iordache on Soviet and Bulgarian information that helicopters were being launched by suspicious ships approximately 60 miles off the coast, as well as a later denial by other Romanian authorities of the existence of these helicopters. As one can see below, the five AFP reports on the subject, from 30 and 31 December 1989, and 2 and 3 January 1990, are far more detailed, diverse, and damning than Ratesh’s allusion would suggest.
Note: Not everything at this point had “disappeared”: General Vasile Ionel confirmed that the terrorists had used foreign arms (arms not produced in Warsaw Pact countries, as he specified) and that they used munitions outlawed by international conventions, for example exploding DUM-DUM bullets (“balles explosives”).
Talk about a clear example where the stupidities about Front and/or Army “disinformation” “inventing the terrorists” cannot explain behavior and fall apart miserably: The case of the comments of military commanders on the Black Sea coast during the period 29-31 December 1989…and the reaction of senior military authorities in Bucharest who realized those revelations could cause international problems for Romania’s new leaders and thus needed to quash the truth as quickly as possible.
http://atomic-temporary-3899751.wpcomstaging.com/foreign-intervention/
fotografiile lui Ion Laurentiu, CC-ul PCR-ului, in noaptea de 23-24 decembrie 1989.
https://plus.google.com/photos/109794872578116972195/albums/5417438035204009089
Robert Cullen, “Report from Romania: Down with the Tyrant,” The New Yorker, 2 April 1990.
Late the next night, Romanian television showed Ceausescu’s corpse, lying in a pool of blood. After that, the Securitate resistance wilted, although sporadic sniping continued for a week or so. It turned out that not all of the Securitate fighters were Romanian. A ranking member of the National Salvation Front told me that about a hundred of them, including some who fought the longest, were from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other countries with histories of involvement in terrorism. They had come to Romania ostensibly as exchange students, but had in fact received commando training. In return, they agreed to serve the Securitate for several years. As these foreigners were captured, and rumors–accurate ones–about their origins began to spread, the Front publicly denied that any Arabs had been involved with the Securitate. It did so because it wished to avoid any trouble in relations with the Arab world, the Front official explained. I asked what would become of the captured Arab commandos, and he responded by silently drawing his index finger across his throat.
CONTACT WITH QADDAFI Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland – A telephone contact took place between the brother leader of the revolution (Qaddafi) and Ion Iliescu, President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation in Rumania in order to set his mind at rest with regard to the progress of the popular revolution there. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation reassured the brother leader of the revolution regarding the successful progress of the popular revolution in Rumania. The President of the People’s Committee for National Salvation saluted the attitudes of the great Al-Fatih revolution and the Libyan Arab people to the people of Rumania and its revolution. President Iliescu informed the brother leader of the revolution that the popular revolutionary leadership does not believe the rumors about the participation of Arabs in the fighting against the popular revolution and said that those rumors were spread by enemies in order to influence our morale, the progress of the popular revolution, and our friendship with the Arabs. President Iliescu confirmed to the brother leader of the revolution that authority will be that of the people because the popular revolution was carried out by the whole Rumanian people. President Iliescu expressed his thanks for and appreciation of the Libyan Arab people for the urgent humanitarian assistance provided by air to the Rumanian people. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/29/world/upheaval-in-the-east-news-reports-excerpts-from-broadcasts-and-a-press-dispatch.html Angela Bacescu with the Libyan ambassador to Romania Abu Ghula, Europa (Est/Vest), no. 94, September 1992, pp. 14-15 The Libyan ambassador discusses how on 25 or 26 December 1989 the then Libyan ambassador went on Romanian television to deny the rumors of Libyans fighting. “What is more, he called for the delivery of any Libyan terrorirsts [!]“ On 29 or 30 December, Colonel Khadaffi addressed the Romanian people by satellite. “Libya sent 4 planes with humanitarian aid (food, beds, medicine) that landed at Otopeni airport, were unloaded and then returned empty to Libya [interesting that he should have to specify that they returned empty to Libya].” 
– 22 decembrie – 6 răniţi;
– 23 decembrie – 6 morţi, 15 răniţi;
– 24 decembbrie – 11 morţi, 40 de răniţi;
– 25 decembrie – 2 morţi, 10 răniţi;
– 26 decembrie – 6 răniţi;
– 28 deecmbrie – 2 răniţi ;
– 29 decmbrie – 1 mort;
– 31 decembire – 1 mort. 3 răniţi;
– 01 ianuarie – 3 morţi, 2 răniţi;
– 02 ianuarie – 3 morţi, 2 răniţi;
– 03 ianuarie – 1 mort;
– 04 ianuarie – 1 rănit;
– 05 ianuarie – 1 mort, 1 rănit;
– 12 ianaurie – 1 mort.
Decesul sau rănirea victimelor s-a produs în 100 de cazuri noaptea şi în 18 cazuri ziua.
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1-2 January 1990
Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, chief surgeon at the Coltea Hospital, also was paid the honor of a visit by Colonel Ghircoias during these days:
I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of I-don’t-know-what “criminalistic” department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments.[9]
[9] Dr. Professor Nicolae Constantinescu, interview by Romulus Cristea, “”Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile,” Romania Libera, 20 December 2006, online edition.
Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea: “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”
Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.
– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
– Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.
Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.
Screen Capture of a registry presented by Dr. Nicolae Nae Constantinescu in TVR documentary by Toma Roman Jr. mentioning an atypical bullet with cap (varf) retezat extracted from a patient on 23 December 1989 and later “collected” by Ghircoias.
Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus-numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel Negoiu din Bucuresti. Medicii de spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri. Colonel Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii, i-a adunat pe toti indivizii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristii, facindu-i disparuti.
Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera , 21 august 1992, p. 1, p. 3.
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7 January 1990
Dessa Trevisan (Belgrade), “Securitate agents seek Yugoslav sanctuary,” The Times (London), 1 January 1990.
“Ten Romanians suspected of being Securitate agents have sought asylum in Yugoslavia, where the authorities are cooperating with the new Romanian government to check their identity. Mr. Jovan Vuckovic, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, said that Yugoslavia was in touch with the Bucharest leadership after a warning that Securitate groups may be trying to escape.”
Ion Medoia, “Teroristi prinsi pe teritoriul Iugoslaviei,” Romania Libera, 10 ianuarie 1990.
| d. Stire de senzatie | ||||||||||
| Autoritatile iugoslave au arestat ieri 63 de teroristi, care au participat la masacrele de la Timisoara, Sibiu si | Bucuresti. Cand vor fi predati inapoi, vom releva detalii semnificative. | |||||||||
| (publicat in ziarul Renasterea banateana, Timisoara, 07.01.1990,pe prima pagina, fara titlu si nesemnat, dar incadrat in chenar) | ||||||||||
| N.R. La vremea respectiva colonelul Nicolae Predonescu, reprezentant al conducerii Garnizoanei militare Timisoara la Consiliul judetean FSN Timis si totodata membru al respectivului Consiliu, a informat, inclusiv pe presedintele Consiliului judetean FSN Timis, Lorin Ioan Fortuna, ca va pleca, impreuna cu o delegatie militara, la solicitarea | ||||||||||
http://lorin-fortuna.ro/reviste/politica_nationala/Trimestrul_1_din_2004/html/index.htm
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9 January 1990
FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62
According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].
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11 January 1990
Mai tirziu in 11 ianuarie [1990], cind toata lumea spunea iarasi ‘civili sa predea armele’ impreuna cu Cercel Doina Rebeca am intrat in buncarul subteran din CC si am mai prins inca opt insi. Au tras–daca nu era Rebeca era a treia oara cind muream….
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9 January 1990; 11-17 January 1990
Lt. Col. Alexandru Bodea (no. 22 May 1990 Armata Poporului):On 9 January 1990, between the hours of 21:55 and 23:14, on the radar screens of the missile managers of one of the subordinate subunits there were detected signals coming from about 12 unidentified aircraft, that were deploying, at a height of 300 to 1800 meters, in the direction of a nearby locality.The following day, between the hours of 03:00 and 04:15 again were detected the signals of six airships, after which—the same—between 17:00-18:00 and 21:30—the same type of signals, several aerial targets hovering at altitudes between 300-3000 meters, in the same direction as the previous day.Then, as if to boost the belief of the missile officers that this was no accident, on the third day, 11 January, between the hours 0400-0500, again there appeared the signals of 7 unidentified aircraft, having essentially the same flight characteristics. What is curious is that not a single one of these targets was observed visually and no characteristic engine sounds were heard in the respective locations.But even more curious is that, just then, from the central radio base of a nearby municipality, there arrived a communications unit that intercepted foreign signals on a particular bandwidth, in impulses, while on another frequency an intense traffic in Arabic or Turkish was noted.In light of this information, the commander of the unit organized a radio inspection of numerous areas, with the help of transmissions’ equipment. Therefore, on 11 January 1990, between 1120 and 1130 on the respective frequency were received the code signs in English, 122 calling 49, 38, 89, 11, 82, 44, 38, 84, and asked if they “were doing well.”From the fragments of discussions it could be understood that they were making references to explosives, hospitals, medicines, and wounded “for the hours 1400.” At 1330, on the same frequency, once again were intercepted conversations in which there was mention of wounded and requests for help. The transmissions were received over this, in which a more feminine voice and a dog’s bark could be clearly heard. References were made to the preceding conversations that were to follow at 1800, 1900, 2200, and then on 12 January 1990, at 0910.Chatting with some citizens from the local area where these targets and foreign radio traffic were intercepted, the commander of the anti-aircraft unit to whom we referred found out that nearby there exists a wooded road (author’s note: the locality is in a mountainous area), surrounded by two rows of barbed wire, a road on which in fact there is no lumber transport. Not by chance, since before the Revolution, the road was off-limits and was under the strict guard of the Securitate. [emphasis added]These same citizens further informed the unit’s commander, that after the Revolution, the road in question did not become a no-man’s land, remaining instead in the hands of people dressed as woodsmen but about whom those from the local lumber collective had no clue.Who could these unknown “woodsmen” be? And what “affairs” did they have there? Perhaps exactly…[article concludes]
asemenea actiuni de diversiune radio-electronica s-au mai inregistrat si in zilele de 11 si 17 ianuarie, deci aproape la o luna dupa Revolutie…
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16 January 1990: (Date of film procured by Ted Koppel and ABC News showing underground tunnels used by the “terrorists”)
Monday, March 5 (1990).
Bucharest. Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling. Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied. Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.
We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest. An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over. I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs. “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel. I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels. The colonel went off to consult with his man. When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.” “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described. “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.
Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook. The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie.
from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special. The Koppel Report: Death of a Dictator.
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18 January 1990
Radu Anton Roman, “Batalia pentru Bucuresti” Romania Literara, anul 23, nr. 3, 18 ianuarie 1990, pp. 14-15.
There’s much to be said about this article. My apologies for it’s quality: it was xeroxed from the Library of Congress’s microfilm collection and then scanned in. I wish I could say I came across this by myself, as I have so much of what I have found on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Instead, I found reference to it in Aurel Perva and Carol Roman’s 1991 book, Misterele Revolutiei Romane (see below).
“Aveau un armament foarte divers. Gloante 5, 6, N.A.T.O. lungi, cu cap de otel de foarte mare viteza si forta de penetratie ce provoaca dezastre anatomice. Cartuse explozive Dum-Dum care n-au fost folosite impotriva oamenilor decit de fascisti in 1941 la Odessa. Dar si ei au renuntat, cind rusii le-au raspuns cu acelasi calibru. Lunete cu infrarosii, amortizor de zgomot si obturator de flacara la gura tevii.”
On Thursday morning [18 January 1990], for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising. In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving. This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television. [NYT 1/22/1990]
Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Rumanians Call for Freedom in Schools
By DAVID BINDER, Special to The New York Times
Published: January 22, 1990
BUCHAREST, Rumania, Jan. 21— Student leaders, addressing a crowd of about 3,000 of their classmates today, demanded far-reaching changes in the faculties of Bucharest University and other Rumanian institutions of higher learning.
The strongest demand, and the one cheered most loudly by the students, was for the ouster of professors most closely associated with the Communist dictatorship of the late Nicolae Ceausescu, particularly those working for the Securitate, or state security police.
”There are Securitate officers on the journalism faculty,” a student, Daniel Oghian, declared. He assailed Professor Radu Florian as a Ceausescu holdover whose advocacy of Communist ideology was particularly objectionable. Mr. Florian is a member of the Stefan Gheorgiu Academy, where Securitate officials were trained. The academy was grafted onto Bucharest University under the Ceausescu Government.
”Down with Florian!” the students chanted. ”Down with Stefan Gheorgiu! Depoliticize! Depoliticize!” ‘Militarized’ Classrooms Mihai Iliescu, a physics student, drew cheers when he declared that incompetent professors should be sent back to ”study their lessons over again” or be forced to resign. He also called for the ouster of the Ministry of Education’s inspector of universities.
Another speaker, from the Marine Sciences Institute in Constanta, said that his college had been ”militarized” and subjected to Securitate control under Mr. Ceausescu. Conditions were such that students were quartered 50 to a single room, he said, and buildings were unheated.
”Take it over!” the students shouted. ”Take it over!” It was the second rally in two weeks in the capital. The first was held at the Polytechnical Institute in western Bucharest. But this time the students gathered in University Square in the middle of the city under the auspices of a newly-formed Student League.
In passionate speeches commemorating classmates who were killed in the uprising that toppled the Ceausescu regime four weeks ago, the students said they wanted to create ”a new society” and ”a strong Rumania.”
”We speak from our hearts for those who were killed in the revolution,” said Mihai Gheorghiu, a third-year philosophy student. Dan Josif, another student, said, ”They fought with weapons, and we carried flowers.”
Government Is Silent on Protest
The students, many cradling lighted candles in their hands, bowed their heads in a minute of silence for their slain classmates, then raised their voices in four stanzas of the long-banned hymn ”Awake, Ye Rumanians,” which denounces ”barbarians and tyrants.”
There were no Government spokesmen at the rally. Nor was there any immediate reaction from the governing Council of National Salvation, although its President, Ion Iliescu, met with youth leaders today to discuss a future group for Rumanian young people to replace the Communist youth organization.
It has generally been impossible to obtain precise information about or reactions to daily events in Rumania from the Government, which closed its foreign press and telephone service on Saturday, even from its spokesman, although he holds periodic news conferences.
On Thursday morning, for example, a plainclothes officer of the pro-Ceausescu Securitate suddenly emerged from a manhole on Nicolae Balcescu Boulevard, the main north-south thoroughfare. He was immediately detained by passers-by, who were evidently aware that in recent weeks the Securitate forces had used a vast network of underground tunnels for hit-and-run attacks on the Rumanian Army units that joined the uprising.
In a short time, armed soldiers gathered at the manhole and brought out another 16 Securitate officers who had been living in the tunnels for nearly a month. Down the street that same day, four more Securitate officers turned themselves in to an army unit in front of the Plaza Building, saying they were starving.
This was revealed by two associates of Cristian Popisteanu, editor in chief of Magazin Istoric, who witnessed the incidents. But so far, no word of what happened has appeared in the Bucharest press or on television.
Photos: Students in Bucharest demonstrating yesterday for far-reaching changes at universities, including the ouster of faculty members the students say were supporters of the deposed dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. (AP); A student at the rally mourning a relative killed in the revolution. (Reuters)
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24 January 1990
A cryptic message announcing the abrogation of unspecified secret accords with unspecified countries carried out by the Ceausescu regime, but not contained in the registries of the Foreign Ministry and in contravention of international law (in other words, Plan Z-Z, an accord with several Middle Eastern states, most importantly perhaps Qadhafi’s Libya)…24 January 1990 appears to have also been–not coincidentally–the last day “foreign terrorists” who had fought with the Securitate against Ceausescu’s downfall were exfiltrated from the country–reputedly following a threat to Romanian workers in Libya by Qadhafi if the remaining Arab mercenaries in Romanian custody were not allowed to leave the country…WHY OH WHY, WE ARE CONSTANTLY ASKED, DID ILIESCU, ROMAN, AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT NOT PUT THE “TERRORISTS” ON TRIAL: HERE IS YOUR ANSWER, THEY WERE COMPLICIT IN ALLOWING THEM TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AND THEREFORE LACKED A KEY ELEMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECEMBER BLOODSHED. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE REVOLUTION WAS THUS COMPROMISED, BURIED ON THAT FATEFUL DAY OF 24 JANUARY 1990.
Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul Z-Z si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 septembrie 1990.
Dupa citeva saptamini presedintele unei tari direct implicate a amenintat guvernul roman ca va recurge la represalii impotriva celor citeva mii de cetateni romani aflati cu contract de munca in tara respectiva daca nu vor fi returnati teroristii straini, vii sau morti. Santajul respectiv si-a facut efectul si un avion romanesc a efectuat o cursa mai putin obisnuita catre un aeroport polonez, de unde o “incarcatura” mai putin obisnuita constind in persoane valide, raniti si cosciuge a fost transferata pe un alt avion, plecand intr-o directie necunoscuta. In ziua aceea se stergeau orice urme ale planului “Z-Z”
24 ianuarie 1990
Dr. Manuel Burzaco (Medecins sans frontieres, “Doctors without Borders)
3) Dr. Richard Domergue (Marseille)
In early March 1990, Agence France Presse reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets. [Significantly, a slew of military prosecutors, among them General Dan Voinea, General Romeo Balan, and General Teodor Ungureanu have attempted to deceive Romanians in the years since by denying or avoiding mention of the existence and use of DUM-DUM munitions in December 1989.]
Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.
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The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 