The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘teroristii din 1989’

What can we learn from Dosarele Revolutiei de la Timisoara (VI)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 28, 2012

[Documentary evidence in support of the publication entitled:  Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:  The Amazing, Disappearing Counter-Revolution of December 1989  ]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/16/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/19/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/20/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutie-de-la-timisoara-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/21/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-iv/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/12/27/what-can-we-learn-from-dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-v/

On 1 December 2012, Doru Teodor Maries and Asociatia 21 decembrie 1989 made images of many of the official files investigating the events of December 1989 in Timisoara available on the Internet at http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/ .  Among the copies available are testimonies from victims of the repression of the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, witnesses of the repression, relatives of the victims of the repression, and members of regime forces that either participated in the repression or were witnesses to it.  These documents allow researchers the ability to confirm or infirm claims made in the Romanian media or accounts published since December 1989.

“BUSINESS CARDS” OF EMIL BOBU AND ION DINCA FOUND ON THE BODY OF A TERRORIST WEARING THREE PAIRS OF CLOTHES ONE ON TOP OF THE OTHER KILLED NEAR OTOPENI AND TRANSPORTED TO I.M.L.:  IF THE TERRORISTS DIDN’T EXIST HOW COULD ONE BE FOUND WITH THREE PAIRS OF CLOTHES ON HIM AND WITH THE BUSINESS CARDS OF NICOLAE CEAUSESCU’S HENCHMEN??? !!!

6 februarie 1990

Declaratie.  Subsemnatul Bucurescu Giani, general-maior [D.S.S.]

0436

La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…

Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L.  Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.

Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi.  Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…

Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…

Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu

0437

The three pairs of clothes worn one on top of the other–allowing them to adapt to changing situations–was common among those arrested as terrorists, as the following video shows:

About the dead terrorists transported to the IML and their fate thereafter…

3.  Teroristii morti. Desi existenta lor este vehement negata de toate institutiile oficiale, noi sintem in masura sa dovedim ca au existat, si sint suficiente date pentru identificarea lor.

Redam, in continuare, citeva fragmente semnificative din declaratia lui Ion Lungu, seful grupului de luptatori care a asigurat paza Institutului de Medicina Legala incepind din seara zilei de 22 decembrie 1989:

“Cind am preluat paza, pe la ora 20, in morga erau peste 200 de cadavre (cifra oficiala a victimelor represiunii din Bucuresti–pina la inceperea diversiunii teroristilor–este, conform Procuraturii, de numai 50).  Impuscati, taiati, zdrobiti.  Am si acum in fata ochilor chipul unei tinere de 18 ani in craniul careia ramasese o adincitura in care se potrivea perfect patul unui pistol mitraliera.  La IML exista deja o echipa criminalistica formata din procurorul Eugen Vasiliu si cinci ofiteri de militie care se ocupau de cadavre.  Aceasta echipa fotografia mortii neidentificati si afisa pozele la intrare pentru a fi recunoscuti de familii.  Permanent soseau masini care aduceau morti, atit militari cit civili.  Incepind din ziua de 23, au fost adusi, in citeva rinduri, si morti mai ‘speciali’.  Erau adusi numai de masini militare si insotiti de ofiteri.  Toti erau imbracati la fel:  combinezoane de culoare kaki, fara grade sau alte insemne militare, bocanci imblaniti, lenjerie din bumbac.  Toate efectele erau noi.  Procedura stabilita atunci era ca in momentul cind erau descarcati din masini, la rampa de acces din spatele IML, sa fie dezbracati si perchezitionati.  Aceste gasite se predau procurorului Vasiliu si ofiterilor criminalisti.  Armele si munitiile le preluam eu si le predam–pe baza de proces verbal–ofiterului de serviciu de la UM 01046.  Arme si munitii s-au gasit numai asupra acestor morti ‘speciali’.  Cei care ii aduceau spuneau despre ei ca sint teroristi.  Am predat la acea unitate militara cinci pistolete (trei Stecikin si doua Makarov–toate de calibru 9 mm), doua pumnale tip comando si citeva sute de cartuse de 9 mm si 7,62 mm (folosibile la pistolul mitraliera AKM).  Au fost tinuti separat de ceilalti morti, intr-o camera–cred ca inainte fusese garderoba–si cu paza militara la usa.  Mai exista paza militara numai la frigidere, unde era corpul lui Milea.  in camera teroristilor accesul era strict interzis.  Intrau numai procurorul Vasiliu, ofiteri criminalisti, prof. dr. Belis si seful autopsierilor.  Asupra lor, pe linga arme, s-au gasit si acte personale, pasapoarte (unele in alb), tot felul de legitimatii–una din ele era in mod cert falsa, scria ca teroristul mort ar fi fost director la Laromet (de la acea intreprindere nu a murit nici un director)–buletine de identitate noi-noute, diverse ordine de serviciu stampilate in alb.  Toti erau impuscati de rafale (unul era chiar rupt in doua) si prezentau orificii produse de gloante de calibru mare.  Unii din ei aveau tatuaje (unul avea pe piept un vultur), erau tineri (in jur de 30 de ani) si bine facuti fizic.  Cred ca identitatea lor era cunoscuta, altfel nu imi explic de ce fotografiile lor nu erau afisate la panou ca ale celorlalti morti neidentificati.  O data au fost adusi noua intr-o singura masina.  In total, au fost circa 30 de teroristi morti.”

Iata acum si textul unui proces-verbal incheiat intre dl. Ion Lungu si un ofiter de la UM 01046:

Proces verbal

Incheiat astazi 26.12.89 la UM 01046 intre noi Relenschi Dumitru si Lungu Ion, G.P. sector 4,

procedind primul la primirea si secundul la predarea urmatoarelor materiale gasite asupra teroristilor de la morga.

1 Pistol cal. 9 mm cu seria DL 7163/63

2 (doua) incaracatoare de 9 mm

12 cartuse 9 mm; an fabricatie 78/38

72 cartuse 7,62 si gloante an fab. 71/22

Drept pentru care am incheiat prezentul proces-verbal in doua exemplare, unul la primitor si altul la predator:

(semnaturi)

Dupa cum se poate observa este specificata si seria armei.  Ar fi foarte usor, pentru Procuratura Militara, sa afle cine o detinea in decembrie 1989.  Ar trebui sa mai existe, de asemenea, si fotografiile teroristilor morti.  Cadavrele lor au disparut de la IML.  Nu se stie unde.  Poate la Straulesti, poate prin cimitirile eroilor martiri ai Revolutiei.  Pentru ca nu au reusit sa gaseasca nici un terorist, toti procurorii au fost avansati.

Ioan Itu, “Mostenirea teroristilor,” Tinerama, nr. 123 (9-15 aprilie 1993), p. 7.

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

(English) From The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums

See the signed testimony to the contrary by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi dated 26 December 1989, reproduced in Ioan Itu, “Mostenirea teroristilor,” Tinerama, no. 123 (9-15 April 1993), p. 7. I translated the important parts of this document in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. Significantly, according to this document, Dr. Belis had access to the dead terrorists:

Dead Terrorists. Although their existence is vehemently denied by all official institutions, we are able to prove that they existed and have sufficient details to identify them.…We continue with some excerpts of the declaration of Ion Lungu, head of the group of fighters who guarded the ‘Institute of Legal Medicine’ [IML, the main Bucharest morgue], beginning from the evening of 22 December 1989:

“Starting from the 23rd, there were brought, in succession, more ‘special’ corpses. They were brought only by military vehicles and were accompanied by officers. They were all dressed the same: kaki uniforms, with or without military insignia, fur-lined boots, cotton underwear. All the clothes were new. The established procedure at that point was that when the bodies were unloaded from the trucks, at the ramp to the back of the IML, to be disrobed and inspected. The documents found were released to Prosecutor Vasiliu and criminology officers. The weapons and munitions we found and surrendered—on the basis of a verbal procedure—to the officer on duty from UM 01046. Weapons and ammunition were found only on those ‘special’ corpses. Those who brought them said that they were terrorists. I turned over to this military unit five pistols (three Stecikin and two Makarov—all 9 mm caliber), two commando daggers and hundreds of 9 mm and 7.62 mm cartridges (compatible with the AKM machine gun). They were held separately from the other corpses, in a room—I believe that it used to be the coatroom—with a guard at the door.…

Access to the room with the terrorists was strictly forbidden. Only Prosecutor Vasiliu, criminologist officers, Dr. Belis, and the chief of autopsies could enter. On top of them, next to the arms, there were personal documents, passports (some blank), all types of identity cards—one of them was clearly false, it stated that the dead terrorist was the director at Laromet (at that plant no director died)—identity cards that were brand new, different service stamps in white. All had been shot by rifles (one was severed in two) and showed evidence of gunshots of large caliber. Some had tattoos (they had vultures on their chests), were young (around 30 years old), and were solidly built. I believe that their identity was known, since otherwise I can’t explain why their photographs were attached to those of unidentified corpses. They were brought to us in a single truck. In all, there were around 30 dead terrorists. [The document is signed by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi on 26 December 1989]”


——————————————————————————————————————————–

Advertisements

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , | 9 Comments »

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part III: “Lost”…during Investigation) by Richard Andrew Hall

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 24, 2010

for Part I see PART I: His Name Was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias

for Part II see Part II: A Revolution, A Coup d\’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.


“LOST”…DURING INVESTIGATION:  WHEN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE IS NOT EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE.[1]

From early in 1990, those who participated in or were directly affected by the December 1989 events have attested to efforts to cover-up what happened.  Significantly, and enhancing the credibility of these accusations, those who claim such things come from diverse backgrounds, different cities, and from across the post-Ceausescu political spectrum.  Further enhancing their credibility, in many cases, they do not attempt to place these incidents into larger narratives about what happened in December 1989, but merely note it as a fact in relating their own personal experiences.

Let’s take the case of Simion Cherla, a participant in the December 1989 events in Timisoara.  Here is how Radu Ciobotea recounted Cherla’s story in May 1991:

Simion Cherlea also arrives, agitated.  He received a death threat, wrapped in a newspaper.  Next to it, in his mailbox, a bullet cartridge was also found.  To suggest to him that that is how he would end up if…

–If I talk.  Or if I have a copy of the file that I removed on 22 December 1989 from the office of the head of the county Securitate.  There was a map of the 8 Interior Ministry formations from Timisoara and “registry-journal of unique ordered operational activities.”  I gave them to Constantin Grecu (since transferred to the reserves), who gave them to Colonel Zeca and General Gheorghe Popescu.  These documents were of great use…in the Army’s fight against the terrorists.

–Do you know what the deal is with such formations?…When I looked at the map, my eyes glazed over.  Their formations were for entire zones where 10 to 12 nests of gunfire were programmed to shoot at a precise hour and minute!  Can you imagine!  And I, because I was trying to help in the fight against the terrorists, I turned it over to them!  So now I asked for it to be used at the trial.  In the registry everything was written:  who ordered, who executed the mission, the place, the hour, how long it last, the impact.  Great, all these documents are now said to have disappeared.  And I am threatened that I too will disappear like them.[2]

The discovery and then disappearances of such maps showing the placement and actions of Interior Ministry units—in particular, the Securitate—was recounted by others in the early 1990s.[3]

Nor, as we saw earlier from Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu’s testimony above, could one count on the military prosecutor’s office.  Jean Constantinescu [no apparent relation], who was shot in the CC building on 23 December 1989, stated the following in a declaration he gave just last year (as recounted by the investigative journalist Romulus Cristea):

I had two encounters with representatives from the prosecutor’s office.  The first prosecutor visited me at home, around two months after the events, he listened and noted my account, and as a conclusion, informally, he said something to me such as “we already know a good part of the shooters, they can be charged and pay civil damages, you can be part of the lawsuit and request appropriate damages.”  After hesitating, I added such a request, at the end of my written declaration, which I signed….

The second prosecutor, who later came to head the institution [the procuracy], invited me after several months to the office near Rosetti Square.  At the end of the conversation, he attempted to convince me that we shot amongst ourselves [ie there was no real enemy, no terrorists].[4]

The second prosecutor’s actions, according to Constantinescu’s recounting, are very familiar.  Already in mid-January 1990, participants in the gunfights of Brasov were telling the press that important evidence was missing and that the former Securitate were attempting to change the story of December 1989:

Florin Crisbasan:  Now the securisti are spreading their version:  “You guys shot into one another like a bunch of idiots.”…About 100 people were arrested as terrorists, but now they tell us they no longer have them…documents are missing, they don’t know how or what type:  a video cassette that I wished to access, with film from the events, can no longer be found….

Emil Ivascu:  If they tell us that “we shot among ourselves,” how the hell do you explain the ammunition with which they [the terrorists] fired? A bullet would rip your foot apart.  We saw for ourselves these type of arms.  Could just average civilians have been in possession of these?[5]

In May 1991, Gheorghe Balasa and Radu Minea described in detail for journalist Dan Badea the atypical ammunitions they found in the headquarters of the Securitate’s Vth Directorate (charged with Ceausescu’s personal security) building, including dum-dum bullets and special bullets (apparently vidia bullets).  They noted the civilians and soldiers who had witnessed this find, and mentioned that a certain Spiru Zeres had filmed the whole sequence, cassettes that were available for the military procuracy.[6]

Journalist and documentary-maker Maria Petrascu, who with her since deceased husband Marius, had for years investigated the Brasov events, also drew attention to the type of ammunition used in December 1989 when she recalled in 2007 that, “For a long time the Brasov Military Procuracy didn’t do anything, although they had evidence, statements, documents, photos and even the atypical bullets brought by the families of those killed or wounded.”[7] A soldier shot on 23 December 1989 in Buzau recently admitted that his doctors changed their declarations regarding the bullet with which he had been hit—identified by another soldier with whom he was interned as a ‘vidia’ bullet—to standard 7.62 mm ammunition.[8] In fall 2006, the daughter of a priest recalled:

In December ’89, after he arrived from Timisoara, my father stayed with me on Stefan Cel Mare Boulevard [in Bucharest].  We returned to our home, on the corner of Admiral Balescu and Rosenthal.  I found the cupboard of the dresser pure and simple riddled with bullets, about 8 to 10 of them. Someone who knew about such things told me they were vidia bullets. They were brought to a commission, but I don’t know what happened to them.[9]

This echoes something that Army Colonel Ion Stoleru was saying back in 1992:  that the “terrorists” had “weapons with silencers, with scopes, for shooting at night time (in ‘infrared’), bullets with a ‘vidia’ tip.  Really modern weapons,” to which he added, significantly, The civilian and military commissions haven’t followed through in investigating this…[10]

And yet, amazingly—despite all these testimonies regarding the existence and use of atypical munitions, or perhaps better put, precisely because of them—as of August 1991, Rasvan Popescu could report that “of the thousands of projectiles shot against the revolutionaries during  December 1989, the Prosecutor’s office has entered into the possession of…four bullets.  A ridiculous harvest.”[11]

[1] The origin of this phrase is apparently ascribed to the astronomer and scientist Carl Sagan, and only later became a favorite of former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

[2] Radu Ciobotea, “Spitalul groazei nu are amintiri,” Flacara, nr. 19 (8 mai 1991), p. 4.

[3] See the sources listed in endnote 59, Hall 2006.

[4] http://romuluscristea.wordpress.com/2009/04/21/cautari-dupa-20-de-ani/#more-2603 It would be interesting to say the least to know who the second prosecutor was, although I have my suspicions as to who it could have been.

[5] Mircea Florin Sandru, “Brasov:  Intrebari care asteapta raspuns (II),” Tineretul Liber, 17 ianuarie 1990, p. 1, p. III-a).

[6] I discussed all of this in detail, including a partial English translation of the article, in Hall 2008.

[7] http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=1.msg214 Reply #131.

[8] http://1989.jurnalul.ro/stire-special/baiete-ai-avut-zile-526579.html.

[9] Christian Levant, “Dacă tata nu-l salva pe Tokes, dacă nu salva biserici, tot se întâmpla ceva,” Adevarul, 30 September 2006, online at http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/dac-x103-tata-nu-l-salva-pe-tokes-dac-x103-nu-salva-biserici-tot-se-nt-mpla-ceva/200090.

[10] Army Colonel Ion Stoleru with Mihai Galatanu, “Din Celebra Galerie a Teroristilor,” Expres, no. 151 (22-28 December 1992), p. 4, and “Am vazut trei morti suspecti cu fata intoarsa spre caldarim,” Flacara, no. 29 (22 July 1992), p. 7.  Cited in Hall, 2008.

[11] Rasvan Popescu, “Patru gloante dintr-o tragedie,” Expres, nr. 32 (81) 13-19 August 1991, p. 10 (?).

Posted in raport final, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments »

Romania 1989: Unde sint teroristii? PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (I) 13 iunie 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on March 30, 2010

Ziarul armatei–deci al unei institutii situate, gratie Revolutiei din Decembrie, in afara politicii–nu este, in mod deliberat, o publicatie polemica. Asa cum este si organismul din care faceum parte, noi, ziaristii militari, am optat pentru o atitudine sobra, echilibrata, pe cit posibil obiectiva, constienti de faptul ca, prin lispa materialelor sezationale, de scandal vom avea, pentru inceput, o audienta mai redusa in rindul cititorilor. Fericiti ca, in sfirsit, ne putem vedea de treburile noastre–ca si armata in ansamblul el, de altfel–noi nu ne-am propus deci, in mod programatic, sa ne luam la harta cu diverse organe de presa din tari, nici vorba de cele din strainatate. Iata, insa, ca saptaminal independent “Expres”–nr. 18, mai 1990–ne pune la curent cu dezvaluirile senzationale ale revistei franceze “LE POINT”, din 21 mai 1990. Initial, ne-am gindit ca-i treaba politicienilor sa dezamorseze, sa combata continuntul incitantului articol, intitulat “In Romania, complotul iese la iveala.” Dar cind am aflat, de la niste ziaristi straini, ca armata noastra “a tras si asupra propriilor rinduri, astfel ca, in confuzia generala, au murit aproape la fel de multi ostasi si civili,” nu am putut ramine in expectativa. Pentru ca este vorba de o incalificabila ofensa adusa eroilor pe care armata i-a jertfit pe altarul Revolutiei. Noi nu cunoastem meseria armelor din carti, ci am deprins-o in poligoane, pe cimpurile de instructie. Daca accidentele se pot produce si pe timp de pace–lucru de care ne-au convins viata, practica militara pe care am trait-o, vreme de peste doua decenii–acestea au fost pe deplin posibile, si chiar s-au produs, si pe timpul Revolutiei, cind inamicul era peste tot si nicaieri. Dar de aici si pina a afirma ca cei 267 de morti si 674 raniti ai armatei s-au impuscat intre ei e o cale atit de lunga, pe care nici un om cu buna credinta n-ar face-o. Nu punem la indoiala buna credinta a jurnalistilor francezi, desi ideea promovata de ei convine de minune celor care se dau de ceasul mortii sa ne demonstreaza ca, de fapt, teroristii n-au existat. Fie-ne, insa, permis sa aratam ca documentarea celor de la “Le point” a fost, cel putin, incompleta. O spunem noi, care am fost tot timpul aici, reporteri printre gloante, in punctele fierbinti ale Revolutiei. O spunem si o argumentam, pentru inceput, cu fapte petrecute in zona sediului Ministerului Apararii Nationale.

DIVERSIUNE SI INTIMIDARE.

Nu ne vine sa credem! Desi a trecut peste o jumatate de an de la consumarea
evenimentelor, oamenii sint speriati. Este vorba de locatarii celor trei
blocuri–A1, A2, B3–dispuse in fata Centrul de Calcul al M.Ap.N. In urma cu
citeva saptamini, erau deschisi, raspundeau la orice intrebare, relatau faptele,
imprejurarile extrem de grele prin care au trecut, iar acum sint prudenti, retinuti, tematori. Mai mult, o doamna–cu mina pe inima si vocea tremurinda–ne
sfatuieste sa o lasam balta, ca riscam prea mult…

Ce s-a intimplat de fapt? In ultima vreme, pe la usile unor apartamente, au
batut citeva…persoane de bine, care, cu destula discretie–si
subtitlitate–s-au straduit sa le explice oamenilor cum s-au petrecut, cu
adevarat, lucrurile in perioada 22-25 decembrie 1989. De exemplu, in blocul A.1,
apartamentul 27, o doamna–banuitaj de a fi avut, in trecut, relatii cu
securitatea de trist renume–le a sugerat gazdelor cum sa interpreteze ,corect’
incidentul cu cele doua A.B.I.-uri din noaptea de 23/24 decembrie.

Alti vizitatori n-au avut nici macar inspiratia de a-si disimula identitatea
(sau poate ca chiar asta au facut). Domnilor, mie sa nu-mi dati numele la ziar,
ne roaga alt locatar. Am avut destule necazuri cu securitatea. In 21 mai, a fost
la mine un maior de politie, Popescu zicea ca-l cheama. S-a interesat despre
teroristii care au tras din blocul nostru. I-am spus ca, daca vrea sa loveasca in armata, nu are nici o sansa: au tot adevarul ii voi
spune. In final mi-a adresat o rugaminte: sa nu stie cei de la armata de vizita
lui… A revenit peste 2-3 zile, dar mi-a fost frica sa-i mai deschid…”

Cine-o fi misteriosul maior si de ce pastreaza atita discretie? Se pare insa ca
persoanele cu pricina manifesta un mare interes pentru blocul B.3. Domnul Stancu
Varzan are mai mult curaj.

–Dumneavoastra nu stiti ce nopti de cosmar am trait noi: se tragea si din fata
si din spate, de la gunoaie. Totul a inceput in 22 decembrie, pe la orele 22.00:
la inceput sa auzeau focuri izolate. Apoi–ca la razboi. Numai in baie ne
simteam oarecum in siguranta. La un moment dat, am si ris. Fata mea a plecat
pina la bucatarie si, cind s-a intors, ne-a spus sa fim linistiti ca, de sus, de
pe bloc, trage o mitraliera si ne apara! Era vorba, de fapt, de o
pusca-mitraliera, care executa foc spre Centrul de Calcul…Si de pe casa
scarilor s-a tras, in aceasi directie. Teroristii au incercat sa intre la mine in apartament, dar noi avuseseram grija sa blocam usa cu un cuier
greu. Sint bolnavi astia care vor sa ne convinga ca a tras armata in noi si ca,
de fapt, nici nu au existat teroristi. Dar i-am auzit discutind precipitat,
tropaind: in jurul blocului, pe scari, pe acoperis.

In acelasi bloc, stam de vorba si cu sotii Florica si Gheorghe Petrut. Sint
revoltati.

–Au fost la noi doi civili, spune doamna. Ne-au fluturat pe sub nas niste
legitimatii, din care am retinut ca sint de la militia din Turnu-Severin. Cind
noi am intrebat cine a tras, ei ne-au informat: “armata a tras.” Bine, dar in
armata cine a tras?–am continuat noi–doar in parcul din fata blocului au fost
impuscati studenti militari. “Au tras unii in altii”–ni s-a raspuns.

Si in incheiere, gazdele noastre ne avertizeaza:

–Fiti cu mare bagare de seama, domnilor ofiteri. Astia au tot interesul sa va
compromita!!!

Deci ,baietii’ lucreaza. Fara voie ne gindim la povestea cu lupul care se
intoarce la locul unde a mincat o oaie. Si a criminalului care se intoarce la locul faptei…

(Maior Mihai Floca si Capitan Victor Stoica, Armata Poporului, 13 iunie 1990, p. 3)

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

Video din 24 decembrie 1989, zona C.C.-ului: gloante soft-nosed (dum-dum) si marca Kynoch-Magnum

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 15, 2009

Vedeti imaginea la 4:17 (din 4:55; 1450 24 decembrie 1989; intervalul 3:43-4:20)

Claude 2.0 Dupa 19 ani – Gloante dum-dum ? postare din 14 aprilie 2009

(se pare ca asta explica confuzia la 3:54…holland london…firma este Holland si Holland, locuit in London)

1:Kynoch 375 H&H Magnum - Full & Sealed - MINT!

2:

cred ca e posibil ca in articolul de mai jos, descrierea despre sesizarea lui Ion Stefanut intr-un caz asemantor din “zona fostului sediu al c.c.” are vreo legatura cu videoul postat de catre dl. Claude 2.0 (observati si foto-ul alaturat al gloantelor…cred ca in sus e forma de gloante explozive (soft-nosed, dum-dum) si in jos e un glont vidia (interesant este ca interviul acesta s-a sistat–fara orice explicatie–inainte de discutia despre gloante vidia :

image-9image-8

Posted in raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

decembrie ’89 la Spitalul Municipal, Spitalul Coltea, si Spitalul de Urgenta (Expres, Zig-Zag 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 18, 2009

image-48image-47

Posted in raport final | Tagged: , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

decembrie 1989: “Mostenirea teroristilor” (Ioan Itu, Tinerama, 1993)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 8, 2009

image-16

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , | 3 Comments »

Daca n-au existat teroristi in decembrie 1989…cum se explica actiunile lui Colonelul Nicolae Ghircoias “de la Interne” la spitalele bucurestene?

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 26, 2009

[thanks to V & J for turning me on to this…

shanepdonnelly is the one who put this great video together with it]

(English) Cited in The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums

Dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, surgeon at Coltea Hospital: “I remember that on 1 or 2 January ’90 there appeared at the [Coltea] hospital a colonel from the Interior Ministry, who presented himself as Chircoias. He maintained in violent enough language that he was the chief of a department from the Directorate of State Security [ie. Securitate]. He asked that all of the extracted bullets be turned over to him. Thus were turned over to him 40 bullets of diverse forms and dimensions, as well as munition fragments. I didn’t hear anything back from Chircoias or any expert. Those who made the evidence disappear neglected the fact that there still exist x-rays and other military documents that I put at the disposition of the [Military] Prosecutor.”

( http://www.romanialibera.ro/a113826/revolutia-5-000-de-victime-nici-un-vinovat.html)

Professor Andrei Firica at the Bucharest “Emergency Hospital” apparently also was paid a visit by Colonel Chircoias (aka Ghircoias), see fn. 4. He claims that he “made a small file of the medical situations of the 15-20 suspected terrorists from [i.e. interned at] the Emergency Hospital,” but as he adds “of course, all these files disappeared.” Firica reports that a Militia colonel, whom he later saw on TV in stripes as a defendant in the Timisoara trial [i.e. Ghircoias], came to the hospital and advised him “not to bring reporters to the beds of the terrorists, because these were just terrorist suspects and I didn’t want to wake up one day on trial for having defamed someone” (!) The colonel later came and loaded the wounded terrorist suspects into a bus and off they went. (Professor Andrei Firica, interview by Florin Condurateanu, “Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National, 9 March 2004, online edition.) Cited in Hall, “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.

—————————————————

Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea:  “Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred”

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

Dosarele revolutiei -  "Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile"

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.

Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Procurori timorati

– Ati sesizat Parchetul Militar? Ati cerut sa se faca o ancheta in legatura cu cei impuscati la revolutie?
– Bineinteles, am anuntat Parchetul, am cerut o ancheta. De exemplu, cand le-am aratat apartamentul de unde s-a tras la revolutie, de la etajul 4, de la cinematograful “Luceafarul”, procurorii mi-au zis ca au facut verificarile si au depistat ca acolo era o locuinta conspirativa a Securitatii si atat. In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare. Neprimind nici un raspuns, dupa sase luni m-am dus la Parchet sa intreb ce se intampla. Mi s-a raspuns ca se lucreaza, mi-au aratat doua-trei avize puse pe colturile cererii si atat. Unul dintre procurori m-a luat cu el pe un coridor si mi-a spus ca “are copil, are nevasta, e foarte complicat…”. Ma intreba pe mine ce sa mai faca… Am izbucnit, le-am spus ca nu sunt un om care sa fie, asa, aburit cu una, cu doua. Le-am aratat radiografiile celor impuscati, le-am aratat gloante in ficat. Radiografiile existau, nu erau inventiile mele, nu mi se nazarise asa, dintr-o data sa cer ancheta! Le-am spus ca niste oameni doresc sa afle adevarul si ca cei care au semnat memoriul catre Parchet nu sunt niste persoane oarecare, ci medici cu experienta, somitati in materie. Degeaba am solicitat expertize balistice sau alte cercetari, degeaba am prezentat acte, documente, radiografii, lucrari. Nu se dorea sa se faca o ancheta serioasa.

extras din articolul lui Romulus Cristea
Miercuri, 20 Decembrie 2006 Romania Libera
————————————————————————————-
Ce fel de gloante le-ar fi cautat Colonel Ghircoias de la Interne?  Gloante obisnuite, folosite de catre Armata?  Nu prea credem.  In schimb, se poate ca el le a cautat pe gloante de genul acesta (intervalul 1:57 – 3:20)?  Mai probabil…

un film realizat de catre Maria Petrascu, Brasov 2005
——————————————————————-
Sa continuam:
Bucuresti, Spitalul de Urgenta Floreasca: “a venit din nou colonelul acela de militie care ma indemnase sa nu mai duc ziaristii la patul teroristilor si i-a incarcat pe teroristi intr-un autobuz, plecand cu ei.”

Profesorul Andrei Firica, directorul Spitalului de Urgenta Floreasca in 1989, povesteste cum la camera de garda a spitalului au fost aduse, in zilele Revolutiei, mai multe persoane suspectate ca ar fi teroristi. Acestea au disparut apoi fara urma, luate de un colonel de la militie.
Dar, legat de teroristi, lucrurile s-au desfasurat astfel: a venit din nou colonelul acela de militie care ma indemnase sa nu mai duc ziaristii la patul teroristilor si i-a incarcat pe teroristi intr-un autobuz, plecand cu ei. Este exact ce eu doream, facand tot felul de demersuri pentru a fi preluati de Spitalul Jilava, fiindca ei nu aveau rani grave. Peste doua-trei zile am primit un telefon de la genelarul Chitac, deja ministru, care m-a intrebat ce e cu teroristii. I-am relatat cum ei au fost luati de acel colonel de militie si generalul Chitac n-a parut surprins. Chiar parea multumit ca au fost luati de acel colonel de militie. Marea mea surpirza a fost cand pe acel colonel de militie l-am revazut in zeghe, la televizor, in boxa acuzatilor, la procesul de la Timisoara. De altfel, l-am rugat pe fiul meu, care a facut Facultatea de Teatru si Film, sa-i filmeze pe acei teroristi prinsi cu catuse de paturile spitalului si am dat copii dupa aceasta caseta la Procuratura. Fiul meu filmase si desfasurarea Revolutiei pe strazi.

“Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta,” Jurnalul National
FLORIN CONDURATEANU
————————————————————————————–

Si inapoi la Spitalul Coltea:  “Colonelul Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii i-a adunat pe toti individzii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristi facandu-i disparuti.”

“In perioada 21-26 decembrie 1989 la spitalul Coltea au fost internati o serie de indivizi prinsi ca teroristi, printre care un anume plutonier de militie Tripon Cornel.

Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel ‘Negoiu’ din Bucuresti. Medicii de la spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri. Colonelul Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii i-a adunat pe toti individzii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristi facandu-i disparuti. Astfel Procuratura n-a mai avut obiect de cercetara pe linga disparitia banuitilor invocind ii decretul de amnistie dat de presedintele (pe atunci al C.P.U.N.) Ion Iliescu, in luna ianuarie 1990.

Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1

—————————————————————————

despre “ispravile” Colonelului Nicolae Ghircoias in intregul timp al revolutiei, vedeti

Cine a organizat furtul cadavrelor din morga spitalului judetean?

Nicolae Ghircoias, wikipedia

—————————————–

in legatura cu declaratia lui doctorului Constantinescu:  “In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare.”


AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA

“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”

Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2

“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”.  Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat:  dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989.  “Documentia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat.  “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina).  Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel.  Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate.  S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe.  Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta.  In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu:  “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit.  “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.


Posted in raport final, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

decembrie 1989 : “Inca o Fateta a Diversiunii”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 31, 2009

Sint citeva publicatii care gazduiesc cu seninatate unele actiune sa le zicem…ofensive indreptate impotriva armatei.  Nu stim in ce masura le avantajeaza sau nu aceste sageti otravite, nici nu ne-am propus sa aflam.  Probabil ca n-am avea nici cine stie ce sanse, intrucit serviciile de informatii puse in slujba minuitorilor de zvonuri si calomnii beneficiaza si de alte…servicii, lesne de inteles de ce factura.  De ce lesne?  Pentru ca le demasca…stilul materialelor publicate, o anume arie de notiuni si informatii, precum si modul de a le aranja, astfel incit, in continuare, castanele sa fie scoase din foc tot cu mina altuia…Numai ca astfel de intentii nu pot ramine chiar neobservate si nesesizate.  Semnele de mirare ca si nedumeririle celor care scriu si intreaba nu sint de fel cuminti si nevinovate.  Dimpotriva.  Veninul iese din coltii scosi din alveole inainte de muscatura, capul ascuns in nisipul fierbinte nu poate ascunde si clopoteii din…inima impietrita de otrava.  Sarpele n-a murit.

     Este si cazul intrebarii pe care si-o pune, cuminte, domnul G.I. Olbojan in numarul din 23-29 aprilie al publicatiei “Express” [sic. Zig-Zag ] “Mortii din TIR-ul frigorific — ofiteri D.I.A.?”  Ce aveti cu omul?  In fond, el doar intreaba.  Oricare cetatean al acestei tari poate sa intrebe orice!  Altfel n-ar mai fi democratiei!  Sursa de incredere care i s-a destainuit se vede, nu i-a dat si raspunsul cel mai potrivit, de vreme ce autorul articolului cu pricina inca intreaba.

     Dupa parerea autorului acestui articol, armata trebuia neaparat sa-si creeze un…inamic.  Doar si in poligon isi monteaza tiinte ca sa traga in ele, nu ?  De ce n-ar face-o in strada?

     Si apoi, dupa ce si-ar fi ucis proprii ofiteri–si probabil, nu pe cei mai slabi–ar fi trebuit sa-i recupereze, si sa-i fure adica de la morga!  Si a apelat, pentru aceasta, la bunavointa militiei si securitatii.  Prin aceasta remarcandu-se in fata “comandamantului suprem.”  Extraordinar!  Dupa cum se vede, armata si-a facut singura un…motiv!  Oare chiar asa naiv sa fie autorul articolului?

     Sa fim seriosi, domnilor!  In afara de citiva cercetasi care aveau misunea sa culeaga informatii si sa raporteze ce se intimpla in strada (o astfel de misiune este absolut necesara cind actioneaza armata), nici un alt ofiter n-a fost in strada decat cu subunitatea pe care o comanda.  Dar si cei care au fost acolo faceau parte din subunitatile de cercetare si nu din ceea ce autorul articolului respectiv numeste D.I.A.!  Intr-adevar, in depozitia sa, inculpatul Filip Teodorescu a dat un exemplu, in maniera in care o stim cu totii.  Si care nu se deosebeste prea mult de cea in care a scris articolul.  A se citi:  stim mai mult.  dar…atentie!  Sursa la care va referiti, domnule Olbojan, stia deci ca un intrus care, vezi doamne, ar fi fost de la D.I.A. (cu acte in regula!) ar fi avut misiunea sa destabilizeze activitatea inspectoratului M.I. !  Ar fi facut-o in prezenta lui Macri, a lui Teodorescu si a celor mai buni contraspioni ai tarii la acea data!  Al dracului trebuie sa fi fost instrusul asta!

     Serviciul de contrainformatii ai armatei, stimabili calomnitori, retineti, se compunea din lucratori ai Ministerului de Intere, care controlau fiecare miscare a cadrelor si ostasilor din toate unitatile si de la toate esaloanele, mai ales de la cele mari !  Si daca se intimpla ca vreunul sa aiba vreo legatura (inclusiv amoroasa) neprincipiala, ei erau primii care informau pe cei interesati.  Ei stiau totul si nu le scapa nimic despre sistemul de informare de la toate nivelurile!  Le-ar fi scapat tocmai o astfel de actiune!  Ia mai ginditi-va!

     Au fost sustrase file din registrele garzii, au fost impuscati raniti in lift, plus toate celelalte pe care dumneavoastra le sistematizate pe puncte si de puneti in spinarea armatei!

    Nu se stie nimic si totusi sursa dumneavoastra, care le stie pe toate, va lasa fara raspuns.  Deznodamintul cel mai fericit pe care il intrevedeti este si el tot un fel de a…confectiona tinte de carton sa avem in ce trage.  Cartoane inca mai exista (ziarele se tiparesc pe altceva) , dar si cind se vor termina, n-o sa le simtim prea mult lipsa.  Tintele se pot confectiona si din altceva.  Din plastic sau din oameni vii, chiar si dintre morti.  Daca nu ajung, cei vii, puteti trage si in cei morti.  Armata are destui.  Doar e democratie!  Tot trebuie sa aiba tintele din poligon culoare kaki, nu?  Chiar si cele de la casa denumita Postelnicu, de ling aeroportul Otopeni erau, in marea lor majoritate, kaki!

     Sa concluzionam.  Blinzii oameni ai lui Teodorescu si ai celorlalti (de profesie securisti, culegatori de informatii) n-au facut altceva decit sa contacteze pe cei din retea (a se citi pe informatori), in timp ce armata (prin D.I.A.) si-a scos patruzeci de ofiteri in bataia pustilor proprii!  Ei, blinzii nostri securisti, au stat de o parte si au asistat la acest spectacol straniu, in calitatea lor de contraspioni si, bineinteles, de organe de ordine.  Ei nu stiu nimic, ei n-au vazut nimic.  Au venit, au privit, au verificat daca sint sau nu sint spioni straini si au aflat-o spun, poate acum, prin intermediul unei surse demne de incredere si al unui semnatar de articol — ca si de cealalta parte a baricadei au fost tot…cei de la armata.  Deci armata si-a omorit patruzeci de oameni, apoi si i-a furat, iar acum ar trebui, probabil desfiintata, imbracat in zeghe si, de ce nu, trimisa iarasi sa termine canalele, sa stringa recolta, sa curete WC-ului, eventual sa lustruiasca cizmele, celor care vor primi misiunea sa o controleze si sa faca pe gardienii.  Pina aici totul e clar.

     Autorul scrie ca “lipsesc din proces si nici nu se face caz de absenta lor cei care au ales cadavrele si au facut sa dispara registrele cu evidenta ranitilor si mortilor.  Daca respectivi indivizi ar fi fost ofiteri de securitate, ar fi prezenti in proces si condamnati cu toata asprimea.”  Daca s-ar sti cine sint aceia, fiti sigur, domnule Olbojan, ca nu i-ar ocoli nimeni.  Poate ati uitat ca insesi cadrele armatei au cerut ca toti cei ce se fac vinovati de cele intimplate la Timisoara sa fie arestati.  Nu asta va intereseaza insa pe dumneavoastra, ci altceva.  Scopul pe care il urmariti este probabil acela de a mai crea inca o mica diversiune, pe linga toate celelalte.  Intrebarea care se pune este:  in folosul cui?  Nu este exclus ca si acest nevinovat articolas, pierdut intr-un podval, sa faca parte din acelasi sistem diabolic de actiune psihologica si radioelectronica, de dezinformare si razboi al zvonurilor si miniciunilor care, daca armata n-ar fi fost inteleapta si ferma pe pozitie, ar fi dus aceasta tara la cel mai cumplit dezastru.  Dumneavoastra (sau cei care v-au indemnat sa scrieti) stiti foarte bine cu ce anume se ocupa D.IA. (asa cum si inculpatul Teodorescu stie).  Si tocmai din acest motiv intreprinderea pe care o faceti mi se pare cel putin josnica.

     Cunosc bine armata romana, domnule Olbojan.  Toate armele si toate componentele ei au un loc in inima mea.  Ar trebui, daca sintet totusi roman, sa-l aiba si in inima dumneavoastra.  Va inchipuiti oare ca armata s-ar fi dedat la astfel de acte?  Poate tot ca, armata si-a creat si acele puhoaie de tinte aeriene false, pentru a-si consuma rachetele si munitia si a se juca de-a…razboiul!

     Ca sa puteti dormi linistit, domnule semnatar al articolui cu pricina, va informez ca treaba celor din D.I.A. este cu totul alta.  Spre folosul apararii acestei tari.  Si nu a vreunui regim politic.  Nici a vreunui clan sau vreunui stat in stat.  Cum a fost cel pe care incercati sa-l slujiti.

(Colonel V. Gheorghe, “Inca o Fateta a Diversiunii,” Armata Poporului, nr. 18 (21) joi 3 mai 1990, p. 1, p. 3a)

N-au fost vorbe in vint…Olbojan s-a dovedit a fi, intr-adevar, si deloc intimplator…un fost securist…si din articolul lui (incoace) s-a nascut ipoteza ca D.I.A. ar fi fost teroristii din decembrie…o ipoteza pretuita a fostei securitatii, imbratisata de catre Gheorghe Ratiu (fost sef Dir I, politia politica), Nicolae Plesita, Ion Hotnog, Teodor Filip, Dumitru Burlan (fostul doppelganger al lui Nicolae Ceausescu) si multi alti fosti securisti…

Cazul lui Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan

Radio Free Europe Research “East European Perspectives”

3 April 2002, Volume  4, Number  7

 THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

THE CASE OF GHEORGHE IONESCU OLBOJAN
Less well known than the comparatively high-profile cases of Corut and Bacescu is the case of Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan. Olbojan’s treatment by the Romanian press corps differs little from that of Corut and Bacescu. Like Corut and Bacescu, in the early 1990s Olbojan was writing in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s publications — specifically “Zig-Zag” in 1990. By the late 1990s, journalists who wrote about Olbojan’s publications did not hesitate to identify him as a former Securitate officer. A reviewer of Olbojan’s 1999 book, titled “The Black Face of the Securitate,” and Ion Mihai Pacepa in the satirical weekly “Catavencu” described Olbojan’s allegations that Ceausescu was overthrown by the Soviet Union in conjunction with Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Israel, and bluntly stated that Olbojan was a disgruntled former Securitate officer (“Catavencu,” 23 July 1999). Filip Ralu, a journalist working for the daily “Curierul national,” was even more specific: Olbojan, he wrote, was a DIE (Foreign Intelligence Directorate) officer (“Curierul national,” 19 March 2001).

Why so bold and so sure, we might ask. Because it was no longer a secret: Olbojan had admitted in print — at least as early as 1993 — that he indeed served in the former Securitate. On the dust jacket of his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms,” a polemic apparently in response to criticisms of his earlier book, “Goodbye Pacepa,” his editor proudly touts the “latest raid effected by former Securitate officer Gh. Ionescu Olbojan” (Olbojan, 1994). Inside, Olbojan describes how he was recruited in the 1970s while at the Bucharest Law Faculty, finished a six-month training course at the famous Branesti Securitate school, and worked at an “operative unit” of the “Center” from 1978 to 1982 and then at the famous Securitate front company “Dunarea” until being forced — he claims — to go on reserve status in 1986 after violating certain unspecified “laws and regulations of security work” (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 17-19). According to Olbojan, as early as the fall of 1990 — at a time when he was writing a series on the makeup of the former Securitate and when Cristoiu would address him with the words, “Olbojan, did you bring me the material?” — he “pulled back the curtain of protection behind which he had been hiding for so long” and revealed to a fellow journalist his Securitate background (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 14-15). There is thus no doubt here: It is not a question of supposition or innuendo by this or that journalist — Olbojan has publicly admitted to a Securitate past.

APRIL 1990: OLBOJAN WRITES ON THE REVOLUTION
In the ninth issue of “Zig-Zag,” which appeared in April 1990 — an issue in which Angela Bacescu wrote a famous piece revising the understanding of the deaths of a group of Securitate antiterrorist troops at the Defense Ministry during the December events, a piece that was vigorously contested by journalists in the military press (for a discussion, see Hall, 1999) — Olbojan wrote an article entitled “Were The Corpses In The Refrigerated Truck DIA Officers?” (Olbojan, 1990). In the article, Olbojan attacked the official account regarding the identity of 40 bodies transported by the Securitate and by the Militia from Timisoara to Bucharest on 18-19 December 1989 for cremation upon the express orders of Elena Ceausescu. The FSN regime maintained that these were the cadavers of demonstrators shot dead during antiregime protests, but Olbojan now advanced the possibility that they might have been the corpses of members of the army’s elite defense intelligence unit, DIA.

Olbojan’s “basis” for such an allegation was that nobody allegedly had come forward to claim the corpses of the 40 people in question and therefore they could not have been citizens of Timisoara. Mioc counters that this is preposterous, and that unfortunately this myth has circulated widely since Olbojan first injected it into the press (Mioc, 2000b) — despite the publication of correct information on the topic. Mioc republished a list with the names, ages, and home addresses of the (in reality) 38 people in question and noted that it was published in the Timisoara-based “Renasterea Banateana” on 2 March 1991, the Bucharest daily “Adevarul” on 13 March 1991, the daily “Natiunea” (also published in Bucharest) in December 1991, as well as in the daily “Timisoara” on 29 November 1991 — but significantly was refused publication in Tudor’s “Romania Mare”!

THE IMPLICATIONS AND INTENTIONS OF OLBOJAN’S APRIL 1990 REAPPRAISAL OF THE TIMISOARA EVENTS
On the face of things — in the spring 1990 context of a publication that appeared courageous enough to stand up to the rump party-state bureaucracy and with no public knowledge about Olbojan’s past — Olbojan’s article could be interpreted as a laudable, if poorly executed, effort at investigative journalism or at worst as innocuous. But context can be everything, and it is in this case. It seems significant that Olbojan considers his April 1990 “Zig-Zag” article important enough to reproduce in its entirety in his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms” and then discuss the impact the article had upon getting people to rethink the December 1989 events and how later works by other authors (including those with no connection to the former Securitate but also including the previously-mentioned notorious former Securitate officer Pavel Corut) confirmed his allegations (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 276-299).

The importance of suggesting that the cadavers transported to Bucharest for cremation were the bodies of army personnel and not average citizens may not be readily apparent. To make such a claim insinuates that the Iliescu leadership was/is lying about the December events and therefore should not be believed and may be illegitimate. It also insinuates that the events may have been more complicated and less spontaneous than initial understandings and the official history would have us believe: If those who were transported to Bucharest for cremation were not average citizens but army personnel, then is it not possible that Timisoara was a charade, a manipulation by forces within the regime — perhaps with outside help — to overthrow Ceausescu and simulate both revolutionary martyrdom and political change?

Moreover, it was significant that Olbojan maintained that the cadavers belonged not just to any old army unit but specifically to DIA. The army’s DIA unit — a unit which appeared to benefit organizationally from the December events, including having its chief, Stefan Dinu, for a time assume the command of the Romanian Information Service’s (SRI) counterespionage division (until his former Securitate subordinates appear to have successfully undermined him and prompted his replacement) — would during the 1990s become a common scapegoat for the post-22 December “terrorism” that claimed over 900 lives in the Revolution and initially had been blamed uniformly upon the Securitate (see, for example, Stoian, 1993 and Sandulescu, 1996). If the 40 cadavers were indeed DIA officers, then anything was possible with regard to the post-22nd “terrorism” — including that DIA, and not the Securitate’s antiterrorist troops, had been responsible for the tremendous loss of life. Indeed, in his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms,” Olbojan claims just that: In December 1989, there allegedly had been no Securitate “terrorists,” the “terrorists” had been from DIA, and it is they who were thus culpable for the bloodshed (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 276-291).

Nor can it be said that the timing of Olbojan’s publication was of inconsequence here: The trial of the Securitate and Militia officers charged with the bloody repression of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989 had begun the previous month and was still in progress at the time of the article’s appearance. Olbojan’s allegation clearly had implications for the verdicts of this trial. Mioc has noted of Olbojan’s account: “[T]he theory of the ‘mystery’ of the 40 cadavers would become the departure point for efforts to demonstrate the presence of foreign agents in Timisoara” (Mioc, 2000a). Indeed, during the Timisoara trial, reputed Securitate “superspy” Filip Teodorescu had attempted to implant this idea and would later reveal that among those his forces had arrested during the Timisoara events were two armed, undercover DIA officers in a Timisoara factory — the massive influx of foreign agents supposedly having eluded the “underfunded and undermanned” and “Ceausescu-distrusted” Securitate (Teodorescu, 1992). For Mioc, Olbojan’s echoing of Teodorescu’s attempts to muddy the historical waters of the birthplace of the Revolution, and Olbojan’s specific effort to sow wholly unnecessary confusion about the identity of the 40 cremated corpses (an issue which no one had considered the least bit suspicious until that time) cannot be separated from Olbojan’s admitted collaboration with the Securitate and his warm praise of that institution throughout most of the 1990s.

OLBOJAN’S CASE AS TYPICAL RATHER THAN ABERRANT
Significantly, even at the time, Olbojan’s account sparked innuendo in the press regarding his past, his credibility, his capacity for the truth, and his agenda in writing such an article. Unfortunately, but very tellingly, these accusations came not from the civilian press — of any political stripe — but from the military press. Colonel V. Gheorghe wrote in early May 1990 that Olbojan’s account was merely “yet another face of the diversion,” the latest in an emerging campaign attempting to exonerate the Securitate for the bloodshed, blame the army, plant the idea that the December 1989 Revolution was little more than a coup d’etat engineered from abroad, and cast doubt upon the spontaneity and revolutionary bravery of those who protested against Ceausescu and participated in the December events (Gheorghe, 1990).

Mioc notes accurately that “[I]n order for the [Olbojan’s] disinformation to succeed, the article was written in an anti-Iliescu and anticommunist style,” but he seems to imply that this was an exception (Mioc, 2000b). As the next two parts of this three-part article will demonstrate, far from being an exception, such an approach — in fact the dovetailing and entangling of Securitate disinformation with the agenda of the anti-Iliescu/anticommunist opposition — was all too common and ultimately a key cause of the destruction of the truth about the December 1989 Revolution and the Securitate’s institutional responsibility for the tremendous loss of life in those events.

(Richard Andrew Hall received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University in 1997. He currently works and lives in northern Virginia. Comments on this article can be directed to him at hallria@msn.com)

SOURCES Bacescu, A., 1990a “Adevarul despre Sibiu,” [The Truth On Sibiu] in “Zig-Zag,” (Bucharest) 19-26 June.

Bacescu, A., 1990b “Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989,” [New Light On The December 1989 Events] in “Romania Mare,” (Bucharest) 21 August.

“Curierul national,” (Bucharest) 2001, Internet edition, http://domino.kappa.ro/e-media/curierul.nsf.

Gheorghe, V., 1990, “Inca o fateta a diversiunii,” in “Armata poporului,” (Bucharest), 3 May.

Hall, R. A., 1997, “The Dynamics of Media Independence in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” in O’Neil, P.H. (ed.), Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass,), pp. 102-123.

Hall, R. A., 1999, “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” in “East European Politics and Societies,” Vol. 13, no.3, pp. 501-542.

Iftime, C., 1993, Cu Ion Cristoiu prin infernul contemporan [With Ion Cristoiu Through The Contemporary Inferno], (Bucharest: Editura Contraria).

“Catavencu,” (Bucharest), 1999 (Internet edition), http://www.catavencu.ro.

Mioc, M., 2000a “Ion Cristoiu, virful de lance al campaniei de falsificare a istoriei revolutiei,” http://timisoara.com/newmioc.51.htm

Mioc, M., 2000b “‘Misterul’celor 40 de cadavre,” http://timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm

Olbojan Ionescu, G., 1990 “Mortii din TIR-ul Frigorific — ofiteri DIA?” [Were The Corpses In The Refrigerated Truck DIA Officers?] in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 23, 23-29 April.

Olbojan Ionescu G., 1994, Fantomele lui Pacepa [Pacepa’s Phantoms], (Bucharest: Editura Corida).

Sandulescu, Serban, 1996, Decembrie ’89: Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana [December ’89: The Coup d’tat Abducted the Romanian Revolution], (Bucharest: Editura Omega Press Investment).

Shafir, M., 1993, “Best Selling Spy Novels Seek To Rehabilitate Romanian ‘Securitate,'” in “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report,” Vol. 2, no. 45, pp. 14-18.

Siani-Davies, P., 2001, “The Revolution after the Revolution,” in Phinnemore, D. Light, D. (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition (London: Palgrave), pp. 1-34.

Stoian, I., 1993, Decembrie ’89: Arta Diversiunii, [ December ’89: The Art Of Diversion], (Bucharest: Editura Colaj).

Teodorescu, F., 1992, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989, [An Assumed Risk: Timisoara, December 1989] (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc).

Compiled by Michael Shafir

Dumitru Burlan si ipoteza DIA

Late last July, there was a book-signing in Bucharest. The man signing books was Dumitru Burlan—64 years old, a colonel in the former Securitate’s Fifth Directorate, and, last but not least, Nicolae Ceausescu’s so-called “unique double.” On the occasion of his book-signing, Burlan was kind enough to say a few words about his book to the journalists gathered for the event. A correspondent for Reuters quoted Burlan as declaring: “Romania’s secret service [i.e. the Securitate] staged Nicolae Ceausescu’s down fall…the KGB wanted to overthrow Ceausescu, even his son Nicu did…I wrote the book to show the Romanian people a small part of the truth.”

The title of Burlan’s book is “Sensational: After 14 Years Nicolae Ceausescu’s Double Speaks!” That it is possible that anything could be “sensational” in Romania after the past 14 years is in itself difficult to believe. The bigger problem with the title, however, is that Burlan did not really wait 14 years to “confess.”

Two years ago Burlan gave a multipart interview to the Romanian monthly “Lumea Magazin” (http://www.lumeam.ro/nr10_ 2001/politica_si_servicii_secrete.html). In that interview, he commented on the biggest enduring controversy of the Romanian Revolution: Who was responsible for the violence that claimed 942 lives—85% of the total 1,104 people who died in all “between 22 December, when the Ceausescus fled power, and Christmas Day, when they were tried and executed? At the time, elements of the Securitate who remained loyal to the Ceausescus—the so-called ‘terrorists'”were blamed for the bloodshed. However, despite the pledge by the former communists who seized power from Nicolae Ceausescu to prosecute those responsible, justice has never been served.

In the same interview, Burlan answers that those responsible for the bloodshed “were from the Army, [specifically] from DIA [the Army’s intelligence unit].” According to Burlan, the DIA were also responsible for the placement of gunfire simulators “so that everything—[the staged war that Ceausescu’s successors allegedly put in motion]—would appear credible.”As for the Securitate, Burlan protests: how could they have done anything “with just their Makarov pistols?”

Burlan’s answers seek to accredit the idea that the former communists who took power from Ceausescu simulated resistance by alleged Ceausescu loyalists in order to ease their seizure of power and gain a revolutionary legitimacy they otherwise would have lacked. The Securitate were thus victims of their poor image among the populace and of a power grab by unscrupulous nomenklaturists who wished to legitimize themselves by heaping false blame on the Securitate.

Burlan’ s argument that the revolution was “staged,” some group other than the Securitate was responsible for the post-22 bloodshed, and that the Securitate did not open fire is a familiar tale by now. What has changed through the years is that certain variants—including the DIA variant Burlan markets—have become more common in the literature and interviews of the former Securitate and Ceausescu nostalgists. One doesn’t have to look far to see former high-ranking Securitate officers accrediting the idea that DIA, and most assuredly not the Securitate, bears responsibility for the December bloodshed. Just in the past three years, former Securitate officials such as Nicolae Plesita, Teodor Filip, and Ion Hotnog have argued this thesis. Nor is it the least bit surprising that these same officials marry the thesis with another perennial Securitate favorite: the suggestion that Russian and Hungarian agents posing as tourists—for those who with a distaste for detail, “occult forces”—played a seminal role in provoking the downfall of the Ceausescu regime and in the bloodshed that followed the Ceausescus’ flight from power. (For additional discussion of these ” tourists” see http://www.rferl.org/eepreport/2002/04/8-170402.htm l.)

The DIA variant, so dear to the hearts of Ceausescu’s double and his Securitate counterparts, has a long and fabled history. In the early and mid-1990s, it became a favorite of the opposition to the communist successor regime of President Ion Iliescu—an opposition that included many of those who had suffered most under the old regime. (After being voted out in 1996, Iliescu returned to the presidency in the 2000 elections.) In the opposition press, noted journalists such as Ioan Itu and Ilie Stoian at “Tinerama,” Cornel Ivanciuc [dovedit mai tirziu ca un colaborator al fostei securitatii] at “22” and later at “Academia Catavencu, ” and Petre Mihai Bacanu at “Romania Libera” promoted the DIA thesis at one time or another.

Opponents of the Iliescu regime believed the “staged war” story and its DIA variant be cause it seemed plausible given the undemocratic way the Iliescu regime behaved in the early post-Ceausescu years, and because it compromised Iliescu and his associates by suggesting that they “stole the revolution” through an elaborate plan to feign resistance by pro-Ceausescu elements of the Securitate. As with all beliefs that are viewed as spontaneous, grassroots/bottom-up, and therefore “pure,” the “staged war” theory possessed a power and hold on the imagination that ideas regimented “from above,” by a regime, can simply never achieve. Moreover, it possessed something of an (intellectual) haiduc romanticism and it was empowering at a time when the opposition was hounded by the Iliescu regime and weak, providing opponents with an issue of comparative consensus that could bind them together and provide them political identity. The theory thus fit with their fears, suspicions, and prejudices, and was politically expedient—a potent mixture that left them ripe for manipulation.

Unfortunately, very few of the opposition were familiar with or cared about the origins of the DIA thesis. The DIA thesis was older than they realized. Gheorghe Ratiu, the former head of the Securitate’s First Directorate (the one most considered “the political police”), was disseminating the theory back in early 1992. Indeed, the DIA theory can be traced back to a November 1990 interview with a former Securitate officer in a well-known provincial weekly (“Nu”), and probably even earlier—to two articles written by Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan for “Zig-Zag” magazine in April 1990 and particularly July 1990. In fact, Olbojan lauded himself for this accomplishment—and for its spread and influence since—in a book he published in 1994. Olbojan’s pre-1989 occupation deserves mention, however: as he admits in the book, he worked for the Securitate. The roots of the DIA theory thus lie in the former Securitate. (For additional discussion of the Olbojan case see http://www.rferl.org/eepreport/2002/04/7-030402.html.)

For the former Securitate, the DIA theory had one goal above all others, and it is as old as history itself: blame someone else in order to hide your own responsibility. Unfortunately, although some journalists in Romania have written with skepticism and sarcasm about the effort of Ceausescu’s double to disinform history, it is telling that they leave much of his discussion of the Revolution untouched. The confluence of blind political partisanship, opportunism, half-truths, misinformation, and disinformation a la Burlan have simply debased and devalued the currency of truth as regards what exactly happened in December 1989. To believe in Romania today that the Securitate were responsible for the vast majority of the bloodshed in December 1989 is to be viewed as the equivalent of a flat-earther.

If not Ceausescu himself from the grave, at least his double, is having the last laugh.

Posted in raport final, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

decembrie 1989: “Cu ce trag teroristii”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 14, 2009

Am avut in plama un glont dum-dum.  Dupa ce-si loveste tinta explodeaza.  E lung cam de 10 cm.  Virful de penetrare si partea exploziva se deosebesc usor.  In jurul capsei detonatoare este scris “RWS  9,3X74 R”.  Celebrele, din pacate, gloante mici sint de calibru 5,62 si se amabaleaza in cutii pe care scrie “STYPEN 6 carthouses [sic.?] standard“.

Gavrila Inoan, “Cu ce trag teroristii,” Tineretul Liber, 31 decembrie 1989, p. 1.

Am facut o cerecetare prin Google despre “RWS 9,3X74R.”  E vorba de munitie de productie germana, si este descrisa pe site-ul RWS Ammunition ca o “deformation bullet” folosita pentru vinatoare.

[Se poate ca gloantele prezentate cam pe minuta 4:15 in filmul postat pe site-ul lui Claude 2.0 14 aprilie dupa 19 de gloante dum-dum? sint de tipul acesta, dar nu sint sigur]

Se poate ca Celebrele, din pacate, gloante mici sint de calibru 5,62 si se amabaleaza in cutii pe care scrie “STYPEN 6 carthouses [sic.?] standard” este o referire la aceste asa-zise gloante cu cap vidia.  [Se pare ca e vorba mai corect de gloante cu cap “widia.”  Firma Widia este tot din Germania Widia ].

[Stim din alte surse ca au fost suspecti teroristi arestati cu arme de calibru cinci (intre 5,45 si 5,65  in multe locuri in decembrie 1989:  Calibru 5 bucuresti brasov sibiu braila ]

Deci, putem constata ca in amindoi cazuri e vorba de munitie fabricata in Germania.  In legatura cu dezvaluirea aceasta sa ne amintim de declaratia a lui Gheorghe Balasa din 1991:

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ‘89…

“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

Deci, gloantele speciale, lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groase decit un creion, au fost de provenienta RFG-ista, cu alte cuvinte germana…

altii au descoperit, se pare, gloante de acest gen in zona aceasta…dar N-au vrut uslasii [ USLA] sa ne lasa nici un glont

Ing. Dan Iliescu, Muzeul de Arta

“S-a tras din Muzeu permanent. Aveam impresia ca se trage de la parter, de la arta feudala….Armele lor sunau altfel. Aveau o cadenta sanatoasa. A doua zi si in zilele urmatoare am gasit gloante in Muzeu. Nu erau gloante obisnuite. Aveau un virf tesit. Pareau imbricate intr-o camasa de plumb. Era un calibru intre cinci, cinci si ceva. N-au vrut uslasii [ USLA] sa ne lasa nici un glont. I-am rugat sa ne lasa macar de amintire. N-au vrut! Au zis ca au nevoie pentru identificare. Au notat de unde le-au ridicat.”

Ion Zubascu, “Misterioasa revolutie romana,” Flacara, 19 decembrie 1990, p. 11.

se pare ca totusi niste forumisti stiu ceva in legatura cu gloantele aceste speciale.

1) (Duminică, 23 decembrie 2007, 11:33)

Istoric [anonim]

Cu repectul cuvenit fatza de cei omoriti in decembrie 1989,civili si militari,in calitate de rezervist al armatei Romane,indraznesc sa intreb si eu :

Cine avea in Romania anului 1989,munitie tip NATO, 5.5 mm calibru, in plus “crestata” – lucru interzis de Conventia de la Geneva,stiut fiind faptul ca Armata Romana avea la vremea aceea calibrul Pactului de laVarsovia ,pentru armamentul usor,adica 7,62 mm…..La vremea aceea chiar campionul olimpic la proba de pistol viteza,Sorin Babii,isi exprima nedumerirea….Eu am avut in mina citeva mostre din aceste cartuse :mici,negre,cu o spirala in virf,sau cu 4 muchii (cei ce cunosc putina balistica si medicina legala isi vor da seama de rolul devastator al acestor modoficari…

Astept si acum raspuns la intrebarile mele…poate ca totusi cineva se vagasi sa rupa tacerea…II multumesc anticipat !

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-2121712-ultimele_zile_revolutiei_romane.htm

2)

BOZGAN GHEORGHE
2008-09-08 22:33:10

DOMNILOR REVOLUTIONARI,ARMATA ISI BATE JOC DE DVS.

Infractiunile pedepsibile cu detentie pe viata sau inchisoare mai mare de 15 ani (cele de omor, in special) SE PRESCRIU in 15 de ani,deci pentru crimele din decembrie 1989 s-a implinit termenul de prescriptie prin 2005. Aproximativ 99 % din criminalii care au tras se afla in situatia asta.
In ziarul Tineretul Liber (fost Scinteia tineretului) din martie 1990,generalul Stanculescu este pozat tinind in mina citeva gloante cu cap vidia.Generalul spune ” am strins munitie si armament strain,am facut si un film in acest sens,uitati-va am aici in palma cite gloante cu cap vidia ce nu sunt in dotarea armatei romane” Stiti ce la ce concluzie au ajuns 3 Comisii parlamentare de cercetare a evenimentelor din decembrie 1989,dar si …Parchetul Militar ? NU S-AU DESCOPERIT DOVEZI PRIVIND EXISTENTA ARMAMENTULUI SI MUNITIEI DE PROVENIENTA STRAINA…..

http://www.ziua.net/f.php?f=news&data=2008-09-08&thread=12422

3)

LILI MARLEN
2009-05-03 11:33:03

MINCIUNA ARE PICIOARE SCURTE

Prin martie 1990 aparea in ziarul “Tineretul liber” (inainte de 1989 “Scinteia tineretului”) un articol si o poza in care ministrul Apararii,VA Stanculescu tine in palma miinii citeva gloante.Iata de declara atunci ministrul Apararii VA Stanculescu referindu-se la teroristi ” am aicea citeva glonate cu cap vidia,Romania nu a avut armament care sa foloseasca o astfel de munitie.S-au gasit si zeci de arme de provenienta straina,am si facut un film cu ele si il vom prezenta cit de curind.Pina in august (1990) vom afla cine au fost teroristii”
EI,BINE,DUPA O ASTFEL DE DECLARATIE INSOTITA SI DE PROBE MATERIALE
(GLOANTELE TINUTE IN PALMA GENERALULUI,CA SA NU MAI VORBESC DE FILM)SECTIA PARCHETELOR MILITARE A CONCLUZIONAT CA IN REVOLUTIE …..NU A EXISTAT ARMAMENT SI MUNITIE DE PROVENIENTA STRAINA.
CINE MINTE ? In mod paradoxal Stanculescu stie multe lucruri,dar fara ca cineva sa-l santajeze EL TREBUIE SA TACA,deoarece daca ar vorbi,nu ar face altceva decit sa se expuna si mai mult penal.Deocamdata mimeaza nevinovatia si se bazeaza pe solidaritatea opiniei publice cu victima care isi sustine constant nevinovatia (vezi cazul Cioaca,din politistul criminal odios al Elodiei,a devenit rasfatatul opiniei publice)si spera intr-o gratiere pe care cu certitudine o va primi pina la sfirsitul anului

http://www.ziua.ro/f.php?f=news&data=2009-04-30&thread=26964.

Interviul mentionat de sus [in mod gresit, nu martie 1990, dar in schimb martie 1991] de catre si Gheorghe Balasa, si acesti forumisti, este invocat si aici:

Multa vreme, existenta unor asemenea arme care nu puteau fi decit de provenienta straina a fost negata chiar de catre factorii implicati in anchetarea evenimentelor din Decembrie.  Sa ne reaminitim ca la Procuratura Militara, prin ianuarie 1990 ni se spunea ca ceea ce se considera a fi fost gloante de vidia–un aliaj extrem de dur capabil cum s-a vazut sa strapunga si obstacolele din otel–nu ar fi fost decit miezul metalic alb al unor gloante “descamesate” in urma ricosarii din diferite obstacole [se pare si astazi asta e explicatia a unor oameni ca de exemplu fostul procuror Teodor Ungureanu].  Pina la urma adevarul iese la iveala.  De altfel, in cursul unul interviu pe care l-am realizat cu domnul Victor Athanasie Stanculescu, ministrul Apararii Nationale in martie 1991, domnia sa ne-a dat confirmarea unor convingeri mai vechi legate de folosirea de catre teroristi a cartuselor din vidia [mai bine zis gloantele, cu cap vidia]–spre a fi mai explicit voi arata ca, in diminetile acelui decembrie cind veneam spre casa de la ziar cu masina unui coleg, secretarul nostru de redactie George Ecliserescu, geamul din spate al Daciei sale a fost strapuns de un asemenea glonte pe care l-am gasit apoi infipt la garnitura de cauciuc, din partea stinga fata a parabrizului–domnul general ne-a aratat citeva astfel de gloante recuperate din incinta ministerului dupa valurile de atacuri teroriste la care fusese supusa atunci institutia militara centrala a tarii.  Domnul Stanculescu preciza cu ocazia amintita ca urmeaza sa fie prezentate opiniei publice si alte marturii concrete, mijloace de lupta capturate in timpul Revolutiei, mijloacele folosite de elementele teroriste.  Dinsul a confirmat si banuiala ca in timpul luptelor s-au folosit si arme de provenienta straina, aflate in dotarea trupelor NATO, dar nu a intirziat sa faca precizarea ca asta nu inseamna automat o implicare directa a respectivilor tari in evenimentele din Romania, intrucit caile comertului cu arme sint foarte incurcate, iar armele respective puteau sa provina de oriunde, chiare de la tari din afara blocului militar occidental.

Aurel Perva si Carol Roman, Misterele Revolutiei Romane, 1990, pp. 104-105

o discutie pe tema aceasta din articolul meu  Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Voinea\’s War (2006)

Defense Minister, General Victor Athanasie Stanculescu, was asked by two journalists if the “terrorists used a particular type of ammunition…against the armed forces.”[42] Stanculescu responded:   Yes, as I have already said, I have here two bullets with vidia [grooves].  Our Army does not use this type of ammunition.  It is of caliber 5.56.  As you can see, the bullet has a jacket that got deformed, while its core remained intact.[43]

[42] Interview by Aurel Perva and Gavrila Inoan, Tineretul Liber, 5 March 1991, pp. 1-2, as translated in FBIS-EEU-91-047, 11 March 1991, p. 39.

[43] Ibid., using FBIS translation.

si in fine, o marturie a unui om care a lucrat intr-o “unitate speciala” [unitate speciala de lupta antiterorista oare ???]

Krokodilul Chichiricios
02-02-2009, 10:35 AM

Pe vremea când eram eu cătană/ asta se întâmpla prin 1982- dacă nu era găsit un tub de cartuș după tragerile de zi sau de noapte toată compania stătea în 4 labe și până nu găsea nenorocitul de tub de cartuș nu pleca de acolo. În mod oficial, piererea 1 (unui ) cartuș era considerată posibilă încercare de atentat la adresa șefului statului…Apoi să-mi fie iertat entuziasmul de luni dar Kalashnikov-ul e o armă mizerabilă. E bun pentru un val de soldați care stropește cu gloanțe tot ce-i iese în cale într-un asalt frontal dar este extrem de imprecis și de nereliabil pentru altceva. De aceea nici nu existau Kalashnikoave pentru sniperi (pe vremea mea) existând o armă special construită de ruși- parcă Zagunov- pentru trăgători de elită. Kalashnikov-ul- și mai ales cel produs în România- mai are o caracteristică tâmpită- după 30 de gloanțe trase țeava se curbează , nemaiexistând o minimă precizie.Din acest motiv, deși eram o unitate specială, deși am făcut trageri și cu gloanțe dum-dum și cu gloanțe cu cap vidia NU LE-AM FĂCUT NICIODATĂ CU KALASHNIKOV-ul pentru că riscam să ne omorâm noi întâi și inamicul să fie bine mersi.

cap vidia

deci se pare ca au existat aceste gloante, si ca au fost folosite in decembrie 1989, de catre teroristii…

imi place muzica…nu neaparat punctele de vedere politice de ale lor…

Posted in raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a Comment »

decembrie 1989: razboiul radioelectronic, “poate ca in realitate era un simplu joc pe calculator”…poate ca NU

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on June 11, 2009

(for English, see Orwellian…Positively Orwellian introduction and endnote 107)

Cit de penibile, strigatoare la cer, si usor de tagaduit sunt minciunile lui Dan Voinea (si cum a fost posibil ca nici un ziarist roman n-a incercat sa-l contrazica)?  Iata chestia cu simulatoarele…

Romulus Cristea:  Au fost descoperite undeva dispozitive automate de tragere sau simulatoare?

Dan Voinea- Nu! Nici o confirmare despre astfel de dispozitive de simulare a focului de arma! Pana in prezent nu suntem in posesia a nici unui astfel de dispozitiv. Nimeni nu a vazut un astfel de simulator de tragere. A fost prezentat la TV un dispozitiv ca simulator, dar care nici pe departe nu era asa ceva. A fost o minciuna! Inainte de ’89, orice dispozitiv trebuia sa fie in inventarul unei institutii. Nici o institutie de la noi, de la armata, interne sau servicii de informatii nu a avut in dotare o astfel de instalatie. Nu numai ca nu au existat in dotare, nu au fost gasite, dar nici nu avem dovezi ca asemenea aparate au fost aduse in tara. In alta ordine de idei, trebuie sa precizez ca noi ii cautam pe cei vinovati de uciderea si ranirea unor oameni. Nu ucizi oameni cu simulatorul. Interesul nostru se indreapta spre tragatorii reali, nu simulatoare.
deci e clar, Voinea spune:  “Nici o institutie de la noi, de la armata, interne sau servicii de informatii nu a avut in dotare o astfel de instalatie”  Zau?  Iata ceea ce Seful Securitatii Generalul Iulian Vlad a spus in fata comisiei lui Gabrielescu in 1994:

“In declaratiile pe care le-a dat sub prestare de juramant in fata Comisiei parlamentare de ancheta, generalul Vlad nu aminteste despre acest episod, iar la intrebarile puse de membrii Comisiei este fie evaziv, fie le deturneaza sensul. Fara sa vrea, lamureste insa partial una dintre problemele obscure privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989. Reproducem stenograma:

�Domnul Gabrielescu: Ati auzit despre acele simulatoare care s-au folosit?

Domnul Vlad: Sigur, tot Securitatea le avea… Mi se pare ca tot un asemenea aparat electronic s-a folosit si in ziua de 21 decembrie cand s-a spart mitingul. Dupa ce a facut Nica Leon (a strigat �Timisoara, Timisoara!� – n.n.) s-a auzit o arma automata si s-a creat panica mare…�”

Recurs la adevar

(Sa nu uitam aici cum Dan Voinea era slavit de catre Sorin Iliesiu: Justiţia română a dovedit diversiunea “teroriştii” şi nu a găsit nici un terorist printre morţi, răniţi sau arestaţi. D-l gen. Dan Voinea spune clar: “Teroriştii nu au existat. S-a minţit pentru a-i ascunde pe adevăraţii criminali”….Rechizitoriul Justiţiei române, spiritul acestora regăsindu-se în Raportul [Raport Final CPADCR]…)

in interviul citat de mai sus (“Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” 22 decembrie 2005, Romania Libera), inainte de a vorbi despre simulatoarele care n-au existat, Voinea a fost intrebat despre asa-numitul razboi electronic?…sigur, ca pentru Voinea era vorba numai despre un “joc de calculator”:

Razboiul electronic, un joc pe calculator
– A fost practicat razboiul electronic pe durata evenimentelor din decembrie 1989? Ce dovezi exista?
– Acest razboi electronic a fost deseori invocat ca un factor care a creat perturbari, confuzii. Prin acest razboi electronic s-ar fi simulat anumite tinte considerate initial elicoptere teroriste. Poate ca in realitate erau simple jocuri pe calculator sau mai stiu eu ce… Este insa clar ca nu avem victime ale razboiului electronic. Oameni macelariti au fost pe strada, la televiziunea publica, la CC-PCR, in jurul unitatilor militare, langa marile intreprinderi si unde nu au fost semnalate actiuni ale elicopterelor sau alte fenomene ale razboiului electronic.
deci hai sa incercam sa explicam ce s-a intimplat pe 9 ianuarie 1990?!
“…In data de 09.01.1990, intre orele 21.55 si 23.14, pe ecranele complexului de dirijare a rachetelor de la una dintre subunitatiile subordonate au fost sesizate semnale provenind de la un numar de 12 aeronave neidentificate, care se deplasau la inaltimi cuprinse intre 300 si 1800 de metri, pe directia unei localitatii invecinate.
In ziua urmatoare, intre orele 03.00 si 04.15, au fost sesizate, din nou, semnale de la sase aeronave, dupa care–la fel–intre orele 17.00-18.00 si 21.30–acelasi tip de semnale, despre niste tinte aeriene evoluind la altitudini cuprinse intre 800-3000 de metri, pe aceeasi directie de deplasare ca si in ziua precedenta.
Apoi, parca pentru a intari rachetistilor convingerea ca nu poate fi vorba de nici o confuzie, a treia zi, pe 11 ianuarie, intre orele 04.00-05.00, au mai aparut, iarasi, semnale despre 7 aeronave neidentificate, avind in esenta aceleasi caracteristici de zbor.  Ceea ce este curios e ca nici una dintre tinte nu a fost observata vizual si nici nu a facut sa se auda in zona respectiva zgomotului caracteristic de motor.
Dar si mai curios este ca, tot atunci, de la centrul de control radio din municipiul apropriat, a parvenit la unitate informatia ca, pe o anumita banda de frecventa, au fost interceptate semnale strainii, modulate in impuls, iar pe o alta frecventa se semnala un intens trafic radio intr-o limba araba sau turca.
In urma acestei informatii, comandantul unitatii a organizat cercetarea radio din mai multe zone, cu ajutorul unor mijloace de transmisiuni din inzestrare.  Astfel, in data de 11.01.1990 intre orele 11.20 si 11.30 au fost receptionate, pe frecventa respectiva, convorbiri radio, in fonic [?] in limba engleza, in cadrul carora indicatul “122” chema indicativele “49”, “38”, “89”, “11”, “82”, “44”, “38”, “84”, si le intreba “daca va simtiti bine”.
Din fragmentele de discutii s-a mai inteles ca se faceau referiri la explozivi, spital, medicamente, si raniti “pentru orele 16.00”.  La orele 13,30, pe aceeasi frecventa, au fost din nou interceptate convorbiri in care era vorba de raniti si se cereau ajutoare.  Emisiunile au fost receptionate pe fondul altor convorbiri, din care s-au detasat mai clar o voce feminina si un latrat de ciine.  S-au facut iarasi referiri la ulterioarele convorbiri ca urmau sa aiba loc la orele 16.00, 19.00, 22.00 si, apoi, in ziua de 12.01.1990, la 09.10.
Stind de vorba cu unii cetateni din zona localitatii unde au fost sesizate acele tinte aeriene si unde fusese localizat straniul trafic radio interceptat, comandantul unitatii de aparare antiaeriana la care ne-am referit a aflat ca, in vecinatate, exista un drum forestier (nota noastra; localitatea respectiva se afla intr-o zona muntoasa), marginit de doua rinduri de sirma ghimpata, drum pe care nu se efectueaza [?], de fapt, transporturi forestiere.  Nu de alta, dar si pentru ca, pina la Revolutie, drumul in cauza era interzis si se afla sub paza stricta a securitatii.
Tot acei cetateni au mai tinut sa-l informeze pe comandantul unitatii ca, nici dupa Revolutie, drumul respectiv nu a ramas chiar al nimanului, intrucit in zona respectiva au fost vazute persoane imbracate in uniforme de padurari despre care insa, nimeni de la ocolul silvic in raza cariua se afla acele locuri nu stia absolut nimic.
Cine sa fi fost oare acei “padurari” necunoscuti?  Si cu ce “treburi” pe acolo?  Poate tot…”
(Locotenent-colonel Alexandru Bodea, din serialul “Varianta la Invazia Extraterestrilor.  Pe cine interpelam pentru uriasa si ultraperfectionata diversiune psihologica si radioelectronica prin care s-a urmarit paralizarea conducerii armatei in timpul Revolutiei?” Armata Poporului, nr. 22 (“urmare din numarul 21”), mai 1990.)

COINCIDENTE. Chiar din acea seara de 22 decembrie 1989, cam pe la aceeasi ora, pe ecranele radarelor Armatei au inceput sa apara, deodata, o sumedenie de tinte. Concomitent, la sediul Comitetului Central rapaielile de arme automate au bagat groaza in cei din piata. Actorul Ion Caramitru striga: “Nu mai trageti!”. Conform logicii militare, apararea antiaeriana trebuia sa doboare tintele sau aviatia militara sa le intercepteze. “Apareau 20 de tinte simultan si aceasta se intampla, cu precadere, de-a lungul Dunarii, de-a lungul Prutului, al Tisei. Se crea impresia de invazie aeriana”, si-aminteste comandorul [Radu Borcea, in decembrie 1989, seful compartimentului de lupta electronica din Comandamentul Aviatiei Militare.]. In primele momente a aparut in comandament si ideea ca toate aceste actiuni erau lansate din fostele locuri de vanatoare ale lui Nicolae Ceausescu, unde, evident, aveau acces cei de la Securitate. [DA! Asa a fost…cititi mai sus, povestea lui Bodea!]

http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-special/invazie-pe-ecranele-radarelor-60655.html

Posted in raport final, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »