The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘nicolae ceausescu december 1989’

The Historiography of the Romanian Revolution: the Uses of Absurdity and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 31, 2013

(strictly personal viewpoint based on research and publications in academia from September 1990 to September 2000)

Not for nothing, as I like to say, did I include the phrase, “the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism” in my dissertation title (Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington IN, Ph.D. in Political Science awarded February 1997).

Although my 1999 article in East European Politics and Societies (Richard Andrew Hall, “The Uses of Absurdity: the Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” East European Politics and Societies, September 1999, vol. 13, 3:  pp. 501-542.) focused heavily on the “consumption” or “demand-side” of how Securitate revisionism came to be integrated, paralleled, and accepted in the Romanian media and body politic, I also discussed the content, role, and intentions of Securitate disinformation as disseminated by former Securitate personnel and collaborators in shaping the historiography of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  Here is an excerpt:

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…Securitate disinformation has perhaps been so effective precisely because it did not have to follow any detailed script:  the goal was not to construct a single, coherent alternative to the initial understanding of events, but to destroy the initial understanding.  In other words, the goal was to create confusion for the sake of confusion.  This has had unintended, but nevertheless beneficial, consequences.  First, it has spared former Securitate members from having to worry about the problem of contradiction.  Second, it has appealed to their egos by encouraging individual former Securitate members to add their personal flourish to the evolving tall tale.

Disinformation in the Romanian case, I suspect, has been more anarchical and individually initiated, than planned and ordered from above.  Nobody needed to tell former Securitate members what they should or should not say about the December events.  They knew well that initial accounts had identified the Securitate as the terrorists.  None of them could be sure how their colleagues might respond to an admission that the initial account was indeed correct.  Moreover, as the dust began to settle after December 1989, it did not take long to realize that even if the Securitate no longer existed as an institution, many former colleagues considered the identity relevant and considered it the duty of former Securitate personnel to uphold the institution’s reputation in the historiography of the December events.  Prudence counseled a conservative approach and that meant denying the initial understanding of the Securitate’s culpability.  Indeed, Securitate disinformation may have been designed as much for internal consumption as to manipulate the public.  The individual former Securitate officer who negated the existence of Securitate terrorists was in effect demonstrating his continued loyalty to his colleagues.  Such manifestations of individual behavior collectively preserved the meaning and relevance of the Securitate’s identity beyond the institution’s official death.

Little did I think, of course, that two decades on, the direct influence of the former Securitate on the historiography of December 1989 should be so strong, so obvious, and yet go so-unchallenged in the Romanian media.  What follows is the “harvest” from this year’s anniversary’s crop of articles on December 1989.  I will present links to those articles first, briefly identifying the persons involved, and then post links to my research refuting their claims where appropriate (virtually all necessary features are covered in the first two deconstructions, as former Securitate revisionism is nothing if not repetitive…) and including a preview of some documents, photos, articles from that research.

1) Adevărul

Cristian Troncotă, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Filip Teodorescu (Grigore Cartianu)

http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/adevarul-live-ora1300-cine-a-tras-22-grigore-cartianu-1_52b023b6c7b855ff56c613cf/index.html

http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/cine-fost-teroristiii-cine-a-tras-22-grigore-cartianu-8_52b02b7ec7b855ff56c64a04/index.html

Grigore Cartianu moderează o nouă emisiune Adevărul Live despre evenimentele sângeroase din decembrie 1989. Dezbaterea îşi propune să ofere răspunsuri convingătoare unor întrebări dureroase: Cine au fost „teroriştii“? Cine-a tras în noi după 22? De ce au fost lichidaţi soţii Ceauşescu în ziua de Crăciun? În studioul Adevărul Live se află trei invitaţi de mare greutate: istoricii Cristian Troncotă şi Alex Mihai Stoenescu, precum şi Filip Teodorescu, unul dintre „aşii“ contraspionajului din decembrie 1989.Troncotă is the editor-in-chief of Revista Vitralii Lumini si Umbre, a mouthpiece for former Securitate officers,  http://www.acmrr-sri.ro/categorii/19/revista-vitralii–lumini-si-umbre.html

Alex Mihai Stoenescu has been publicly identified as former Securitate collaborator and is known for research and publications exonerating the former Securitate

Filip Teodorescu is a former Securitate officer

Cartianu has been promoted for his writings on December 1989 by the following: Joi, 16 decembrie, 11.30h dezbatere publica la IICCMER: Armand Gosu, Raluca Grosescu, Grigore Cartianu, Mihail Neamtu

http://tismaneanu.wordpress.com/2010/07/21/deshumarea-lui-ceausescu-un-pas-spre-adevar/

http://www.movingimagesource.us/articles/how-was-ceausescu-possible-20110929

2) Evenimentul Zilei

Marian Ştef, Securitate officer in Timisoara in December 1989

Când a început Procesul Revoluţiei, Ştef a ajuns martor al apărării. “Am încercat să povestesc despre “combinezoanele negre” , adică despre agenţii KGB care au făcut atmosferă la Revoluţie. Nu m-au lăsat. În seara de 16 decembrie, aproape de biserica lui Tokes, undeva între orele 19 şi 20, i-am văzut
prima dată pe agenţi. Erau opt, îmbrăcaţi în negru. Spărgeau vitrinele la Librăria Mihail Sadoveanu şi îi îndemnau şi pe puştanii de stradă să facă la fel. Mi-a sărit în faţă vocea lor: vorbeau româneşte, dar suna diferit. Aveau accent străin. Peste trei zile, am reîntâlnit  combinezoanele negre  pe podul de la Elba, când a fost incendiat un tractor. Erau 12. Instigau oamenii. Au introdus elemente de teroare în rândul oamenilor”, îşi aminteşte fostul ofiţer de contraspionaj economic.

Ion Mihai Pacepa, former head of Foreign Intelligence until his defection in 1978

http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/pacepa-nicolae-ceausescu-a-fost-executat-pentru-a-i-se-inchide-gura-1074110/pagina-comentarii/1.html#comentarii

background on the connections of Pacepa’s interviewer:  http://blog.itmorar.ro/un-traseist-de-opinie-andrei-badin/

Pacepa’s interview was also broadcast by the B1 station and its details relayed by the daily Cotidianul

http://www.cotidianul.ro/pacepa-despre-executia-lui-ceausescu-229030/

3) Cotidianul

Aurel I. Rogojan, chief deputy to General Iulian Vlad, the Securitate Director in December 1989

Part 3 of a 5 part series:  http://www.cotidianul.ro/evenimentele-din-decembrie-1989-intre-sperantele-unora-si-deziluziile-altora-iii-228956/

4) Curentul

General Maior Victor Nicolciou, head of the Securitate’s so-called anti-KGB and Warsaw Pact counterespionage

http://www.curentul.ro/2013/index.php/2013122094848/Decembrie-1989-marturii-si-documente/Fostul-sef-al-unitatii-anti-KGB-si-turistii-din-decembrie-1989.html

1) Grigore Cartianu

http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/adevarul-live-ora1300-cine-a-tras-22-grigore-cartianu-1_52b023b6c7b855ff56c613cf/index.html

at minute 35, Troncota claims the “terrorists” were an “invention”:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/text-of-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-29-january-1990-declaration-identifying-the-terrorists/

Declaratia lui Iulian Vlad, 29 ianuarie 1990, nepublicat de presa romana timp de mai bine de 23 de ani!!!

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General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan, Teroristii din ’89 (Lucman, 2012).

at minute 51, there is a discussion that “Soviet tourists” were the “terrorists”:

Generalul Emil Macri (seful Dir. II-a Securitatii, Contrainformatii Economice),

Declaratie 2 ianuarie 1990:

“Rezumind sintetic informatiile obtinute ele nu au pus in evidenta nici lideri si nici amestecul vreunei puteri straine in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.  Raportarea acestor date la esalonul superior respectivi generalului I. Vlad a produs iritare si chiar suparare…”

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Filip Teodorescu (adj. sef. Dir III Contraspionaj D.S.S.), Declaratie, 12 ianaurie 1990: 

Seara [luni, 18 decembrie 1989], dupa 23:00, responsabili (anumiti ?) de generalul-maior Macri Emil pe diferitele linii de munca au inceput sa vina sa-i raporteze informatiile obtinute.  Au fost destul de neconcludente si cu mare dificultate am redat o informare pe care generalul-maior Macri Emil a acceptat-o si am expediat-o prin telex in jurul orei 01:00 [marti, 19 decembrie 1989.  In esenta se refera la:

–nu sint date ca ar exista instigatori sau conducatori anume veniti din strainatate…

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The Last Report of the Securitate (DSS) to Nicoale Ceausescu

Please note:  no mention whatsoever of the alleged role played by “Russian tourists” or “Soviet tourists” in allegedly fomenting the Timisoara uprising

published in Evenimentul Zilei, 28 iulie 1992, p. 3.

at minute 64, discussion that the “terrorists” were from the Army’s special DIA unit, a favorite, longstanding myth invented and spread by members of the former Securitate:

image-61image-62

Expres Magazin, 9 ianuarie 1992

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at minute 69, blaming Teodor Brates at TVR for intentionally creating panic about the “terrorists”:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-iii-the-water-is-poisoned-apa-este-otravita-dr-heyndrickxs-toxicology-report/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/22/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-iv-the-romanian-television-building-is-in-danger-bomba-in-subsolul-televiziunii/

Romania

On December 21, 1989, people drinking from water tank #4 in Sibiu experienced headache, visual disturbances, loss of consciousness, vomiting, etc.  These symptoms are all compatible with organophosphate poisoning.  The analysis of the water (by gas chromatography) and the determination of the cholinesterase activity of the blood was done in the University of Cluj.  The conclusion was that an organophosphate had been used.  Atropine sulfate and toxogonin were advised.

As soon as the symptoms appeared among the population, water tank #4 was shut off, rinsed, and cleaned.  The people received water from army trucks.

A few days later, there was a fight in Timisoara between the army and Securitate over the water tanks.  Poisoning was feared, as had occurred in Sibiu.  According to witnesses, the Securitate possesses “all possible chemical warfare agents.”

Toxicologist Aubin Heyndrickx supervised the chemical tests and interviewed the physicians at Central Hospital who treated the patients.  From the tests and from the very high dose of atropine required to produce a response, he concluded that the tank was poisoned with sarin or VX (Report on the Humanitarian Mission to Romania, December 23-29, 1989, Laboratoria voor Toxicologie Criminalistiek, State University of Ghent).

http://www.physiciansforcivildefense.org/cdp/jan90.htm

Indeed, one can watch a brief discussion of the incident with Dr. Heyndrickx beginning at approximately the 40 second mark from an ITN broadcast of 27 December 1989

http://www.itnsource.com/en/shotlist//ITN/1989/12/27/BSP271289002/?s=romania+sibiu+after+the+revolution+27+1989&st=0&pn=1

ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION:

}T27128901   ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89     relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX           to treat the people who were injured during the fight against
             Securitate (secret police). Toxicologists have found evidence
             that the security police poisoned the water supply. Injured
             Securitate are being treated in hospitals alongside the people
             they shot.
Clip Ref: BSP271289002 0

Clip 1of1

}T27128901   ROMANIA: SIBIU AFTER THE REVOLUTION: United Nations medical
27.12.89     relief team arrives in Sibiu with medical supplies and blood
TX           to treat the ...
  • Duration: 00:01:44 |
  • Timecode – In: 00:00:00:00  Out: 00:01:44:00 |
  • Copyright: ITN / 3rd Party Copyright

Corneliu Vaida has been kind enough to share with me, the following additional confirmation of his actions in the document below:

HP0010

For more about Corneliu Vaida during the Revolution in Timisoara in December 1989, see his interview with ITN correspondent Penny Marshall on 27 December 1989:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/05/11/lets-go-to-the-videotape-i-to-the-army-its-confirmation-that-theyve-been-dealing-with-a-specially-trained-force-because-its-the-type-of-bullet-theyve-never-seen-before-itn-uk-telev/

Corneliu Vaida Timisoara December 1989

In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania).  Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

This was also discussed by Bucharest medical personnel at a 1994 conference:

AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA

“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”

Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2

“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”.  Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat:  dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989.  “Documentatia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat.  “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina).  Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel.  Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate.  S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe.  Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta.  In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu:  “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit.  “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.

NOR WERE THESE THE ONLY DOCTORS AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL–FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC–WHO ATTESTED TO THE USE OF DUM-DUM EXPLODING AND OTHER ATYPICAL, UNUSUAL MUNITIONS USED DURING THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 1989

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/08/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-i-dr-manuel-burzaco-medecins-sans-frontieres/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/10/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-ii-trimisi-in-strainatate-italia-franta-austria-anglia-si-germania-pentru-tratament/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/08/11/doctors-and-dum-dum-bullets-in-romania-in-december-1989-iii-ce-spun-medici-romani/

Dr. Manuel Burzaco from “Doctors without Borders” was part of a team of doctors from that group who visited hospitals in Bucharest, Ploiesti, Brasov, Buzau and Braila in late December 1989 and early January 1990.  This report from the Madrid daily El Pais touches upon the women and children gravely injured by the exploding “dum dum bullets used by the Securitate.”

Other reports from Bucharest and Timisoara hospitals during the events:

“At Bucharest’s main emergency hospital, doctors said that Securitate snipers, apparently using infra-red telescopic sights and exploding dum-dum bullets, had been firing throughout Saturday night and they shot many civilians, with bullets striking foreheads and hearts.  The morgue at the hospital was stacked with 90 bodies at noon today, almost all of them civilians dead of gunshot wounds.”

Blaine Harden, “In Bucharest, Tears and Prayers for the Fallen,” The Washington Post, 25 December 1989, p. A1; A40.

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.”

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

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Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

 Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

IMG_0330

at minute 89, claimed “inventions” about the secret tunnels underneath the Central Committee building and elsewhere

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2012/11/28/post-ceausescu-romania-confronted-by-questions-they-dont-like-a-number-of-military-officers-and-officials-whom-we-encountered-simply-lied-stupid-lies-the-kind-that-speak-of-a-society/

I know of no better metaphor for what has happened to research on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 than Ted Koppel’s surreal experience in Bucharest in early 1990 recounted below.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.

Monday, March 5 (1990). 

Bucharest.  Among the many art forms that have atrophied during the past 45 years in Romania, is that of dissembling.  Confronted by questions they don’t like, a number of military officers and officials whom we encountered, simply lied.  Stupid lies; the kind that speak of a society in which no one ever dared to question an official pronouncement.

We had requested a tour of the complex of tunnels that radiate out from beneath the old Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest.  An army colonel escorted us along perhaps 50 yards of tunnel one level beneath the ground and the pronounced the tour over.  I asked to be shown the second and third levels, videotape of which had already been provided us by some local entrepreneurs.  “There is no second or third level,” said the colonel.  I assured him that I had videotape of one of his own subordinates, who had escorted us on this tour, lifting a toilet that concealed the entrance to a ladder down to the next level of tunnels.  The colonel went off to consult with his man.  When he came back he said, “my officer says he’s never seen you before.”  “True,” I replied, but then I’d never said he had, only that we were in possession of the videotape I’d described.  “There are no other tunnels,” said the colonel.

Ted Koppel, “Romanian Notebook.  The week Lenin got the hook.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1990, A25.


Dupa alti 20 de metri militarii au observat ca peretii tunelului au alta culoare, sunt mai noi si sunt acoperiti cu un fel de rasina sintetica. Dupa inca 10 metri culoarul se infunda. Chiar la capat se afla un piedestal din lemn pe care era asezat un capac de WC. Au ridicat capacul iar sub el au gasit un chepeng de fier. L-au ridicat si au gasit… un rau cu apa curata, care curge intr-o matca artificiala din beton. Are latimea de circa 1,5 metri si adancimea de aproximativ un metru. Raul se afla la aproximativ 12 metri sub platforma Pietei Revolutiei . Cele 16 barci erau folosite de fapt pentru acesta cale de navigatie.

from 2 April 1990, ABC News Special.  The Koppel Report:  Death of a Dictator.

 

2) Evenimentul Zilei

See among others:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/27/revizionism-securist-despre-spargerea-vitrinelor-la-timisoara-si-cateva-adevaruri-incomode-pentru-securisti-revizionisti/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/16/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-tudor-postelnicu-unii-militari-de-la-trupele-de-securitate-ale-brigazii-timisoara-au-facut-unele-provocari-la-unele-magazine-si-vitrine-spargind-geamurile/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/07/07/after-the-ceausescus-were-executed-the-counter-revolution-is-disappeared-26-december-1989-24-january-1990/

I will leave the rest to some of the commenters to former Securitate officer Marian Stef’s claims on the Evenimentul Zilei site:

25 December, 11:19. Adevarul combinezoanelor

Nu stiu ce fel de “ofiter de Securitate ai fost (probabil,o lichea ca toti ceilalti!) si cum dracu ai ajuns SRI-st (alt gen de lichea!),dar imi aduc aminte cum toate lichelele din militie si securitate,spuneau in decembrie 1989 si 1990 ca ei sunt ‘militari”.niste NENOROCITI care au ajuns dupa aia sa spuna ca MILITARII sunt vinovati pentru asasinatele de la revolutie.Voi,cei din militie,securitate,DGIa sunteti calaii si principalii vinovati pentru acele crime!voi sunteti cei in “combinezoane negre” care ati ASASINAT nevinovati!”Combinezonul” era semnul distinctiv si de recunoastere intre voi,criminalilor! ….Iti spune toate astea,un militar adevarat (nu de la militie,Securitate sau din structurile informative si represive!)!

25 December, 11:45. Vom fi ce am fost

Securitatea romana avea o anumita calitate care o punea mai presus decat multe servicii mari de informatii din lume. Acest lucru a fost confirmat de aceste mari servicii de securitate care au recunoscut ca la acest capitol Secu era mult mai tare ca ei. Si anume la: DEZINFORMARE
Dezinformare a fost inainte de ’89, a fost imediat dupa ’89, si este si acum poate mai tare ca oricand.

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Revisiting the Myths of the Revolution: “Romania’s TV Revolution had only one side…everyone had been on it.”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 20, 2013

Previous material on the same general topic (strictly personal views as always):

Revisiting the Myths* of the Romanian Revolution.  Part I:  The Hegemony of Conspiratorial and Postmodernist Explanations https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-romanian-revolution-part-i-the-hegemony-of-conspiratorial-and-postmodernist-explanations/

Myth 1:  The “Timisoara Syndrome” or the “False Timisoara Grave (the Paupers Cemetery)/Massacre” https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-ii-the-timisoara-syndrome-or-the-false-timisoara-grave-the-paupers-cemeterymassacre/

Myth 2:  The water is posioned!  (Apa este otravita!) https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-iii-the-water-is-poisoned-apa-este-otravita-dr-heyndrickxs-toxicology-report/

Myth 3:  The Romanian Television building is in danger, danger of an explosion!   (TVR e in pericol–Pericol de explozie!) https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/revisiting-the-myths-of-the-revolution-part-iv-the-romanian-television-building-is-in-danger-bomba-in-subsolul-televiziunii/

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“Romania’s TV Revolution had only one side…everyone had been on it.”

So told us Andrei Codrescu in a Harper’s Magazine article–“Big Chills:  My High School Reunion in Romania,” an apparent play on the 1983 reunion film, The Big Chill–published in November 1990 (see the link below for an online version).  Codrescu’s article is unintentionally a tour de force in relaying to English-language readers Securitate (the Romanian secret police of the communist era) disinformation regarding their role in December 1989.  I was, ironically, myself in the same city, Sibiu, during the same month (mid-late July 1990), and heard many of the same details and arguments from Romanians that Codrescu recounts in the article.  Of course, I have learned an awful lot since then…

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:R0rgBuN52mUJ:alina_stefanescu.typepad.com/files/big-chills-my-high-school-reunion-in-romania-by-andrei-codrescu-1.pdf+romania+big+chills+codrescu+one+side&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgdk_7CPbEjBWbb_Qu0X-f8DTaCv4LzfLkp32-9uQ0FM5IQBPrp55QzDOlUlRa8ATqFHD_zuf5-Duji83oZsMIOxFtpCGqm1v1-MUq52PRv6HSrazFkl6oYCZeVKT6N24DvX_by&sig=AHIEtbT7nr99RVabjfFfuNQpOD5okuapCA

There are many ways to disprove the myth that “Romania’s TV Revolution had only one side…everyone had been on it.”  I choose here one that has gone unmentioned inside Romania and in the English-language literature on December 1989–and one of which so few people appear to be aware:  the statements of senior military officials of a neighboring country attesting to the fact that Romania’s TV Revolution did not have only one side, but had an adversary, Securitate forces.  In fact, the Hungarian military relayed to the Romanian military the locations of Securitate transmitters, allowing the Romanian military to neutralize those facilities.

(26 December 1989 1730 GMT Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian,FBIS-EEU-89-247, p. 39)

Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, head of the Hungarian People’s Army Press Department:

“…I would like to say that a progressive weakening of the Securitate has been experienced.  We ourselves can see this, because our radio searching and locating units which were in Hungary a few days ago were monitoring broadcasts from 31 Securitate radio centers–yesterday 19, and today only 5.  We of course put this data at the disposal of the Romanian military leadership.”

The Hungarian Defense Ministry repeated this claim in a statement released on 11 January 1990:

1990. január 11., csütörtök 18:55


A Honvédelmi Minisztérium közleménye (4. rész) (OS)
A kezdeti időszakban, amikor a diktátorhoz hű Securitate a
forradalom vérbe fojtására jelentős erőket vetett be, a Magyar
Néphadsereg speciális képzettségű rádióbemérő alakulatainak egy
részét átcsoportosította a magyar-román államhatár közelébe a
Securitate rádióállomásainak bemérésére, helyeinek meghatározására.
Ezeknek az adatoknak az átadásával, az adók bemért földrajzi
helyeinek megjelölésével feltehetően segítséget nyújtott a Magyar
Néphadsereg a Securitate-bázisok felszámolásában, megsemmisítésében.
Szinte napról napra érzékelhető volt ezek számának csökkenése, ami a
magyar szakértők szerint arról tanúskodott, hogy a diktátorhoz hű
erők törzseit a román hadsereg folyamatosan számolja fel. Ezt
példázza, hogy a december 26-án nyilvánosságra hozottak szerint
24-én még 31, 25-én már 19 és 26-án csupán öt
Securitate-rádióközpont működését rögzítették és mérték be a magyar
rádiófelderítő és bemérő alegységek.

 

and Ferenc Karpati, Hungarian Defense Minister at the time of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, maintained this claim in an article published in Historia in 2000:

Ferenc Karpati:  “A Securitate erői ellen hosszú, küzdelmes harcot folytattak a hadsereg és a forradalom más erői. Felszámolásuk érdekében a Magyar Honvédség speciális képzettségu rádióbemérő egységeinek egy részét átcsoportosítottuk a román államhatár közelébe, s így sikerült rádióállomásaikat bemérni, álláshelyeiket pontosan meghatározni. Az adatok átadásával jelentősen elősegítettük a Securitate-bázisok felszámolását.”  KÁRPÁTI FERENC: A román forradalom és Magyarország, 1989. Egy volt miniszter emlékezése

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18-19 decembrie 1989: Timisoara, Nicolae Ceausescu in Iran, and Scinteia Tineretului

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 18, 2009

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Ceausescu Departs for Iran

On Monday morning 18 December 1989, President Nicolae Ceausescu departed on a previously-scheduled state visit to Iran. He was the first head of state to pay an official visit to Tehran since the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989.[1] By the time the presidential jet took off for Iran, Timisoara was under virtual military occupation by units of the Army, Securitate, and Militia. Ceausescu was apparently sufficiently satisfied by the news he was receiving on the status of the crackdown, that he judged it safe to leave the country. In his absence, the “Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee (CPEx)” was left in charge. In effect, this meant that power resided with the First Deputy Prime Minister, his wife Elena–hardly a stranger to such power–and the Vice President of the country, Manea Manescu, who was married to Nicolae’s sister Maria.[2]

On the one hand, the fact that Ceausescu would leave the country in the midst of the most serious challenge ever to communist rule in Romania–fully aware of what had happened to his fellow communist leaders in the region earlier that fall–was a testament to how supremely overconfident and detached from reality he had become. On the other hand, Ceausescu’s absence from the country between 18 and 20 December for a period in excess of forty-eight hours provided regime elites with the perfect opportunity to oust him from power had they wanted to. Ceausescu would likely have been granted asylum by the Iranian regime. In theory it seems, had Ceausescu’s ouster been premeditated, this was the ideal moment to strike.

Most regime elites had a vivid memory of how Ceausescu’s absence from the country during the devastating earthquake of March 1977 had paralyzed the regime apparatus.[3] Moreover, having been threatened by Ceausescu at the emergency CPEx meeting of 17 December with removal from their posts and possible execution–and Ceausescu had been persuaded merely to defer, rather than to cancel this decision–Ceausescu’s commanders had a strong incentive to act fast. Instead, Ceausescu’s henchmen faithfully executed his orders and patiently awaited his return. This is a powerful argument against any suggestion that Ceausescu’s subordinates were scheming to replace him and had intentionally allowed the Timisoara unrest to elude their control.

Theories which maintain that Ceausescu was overthrown by a foreign-engineered coup d’etat also have trouble explaining why the plotters did not attempt to seize power during the period while Ceausescu was out of the country and then prevent him from returning to Romania. The Timisoara events had already assured that Ceausescu’s ouster would contain the popular dimension which was reputedly so central to this coup d’etat scenario. Furthermore, if the Timisoara protests had been instigated by foreign agents, why were these agents unable to “spread the revolution” to Bucharest (which remained surprisingly quiet) during these days?

In support of his contention that the December events were a Soviet-backed coup d’etat, Cornel Ivanciuc has cited the March 1994 comments of Igor Toporovski (director of the Moscow-based Institute for Russian and International Political Studies) which allege that the Soviet Politburo “…chose the moment when Ceausescu was in Teheran [to oust him] because otherwise the action would have been difficult to initiate.”[4] Yet the facts tell another story. Ceausescu was not driven from power at the most opportune moment–while he was in Iran–and the uprising in Timisoara did not spread outside of Timisoara until after Ceausescu’s return. These points cast doubt upon Toporovski’s claims.

18-19 December 1989: The Timisoara Crackdown in Ceausescu’s Absence

Considering the centrality of the “foreign tourist” scenario to Securitate-inspired accounts of the December events, it is interesting to note the actions taken by the Ceausescu regime on 18 December 1989. At the close of the emergency CPEx meeting on Sunday afternoon, Nicolae Ceausescu had announced:

I have ordered that all tourist activity be interrupted at once. Not one more foreign tourist will be allowed in, because they have all turned into agents of espionage….Not even those from the socialist countries will be allowed in, outside of [North] Korea, China, and Cuba. Because all the neighboring socialist countries are untrustworthy. Those sent from the neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents.[5]

On Monday, 18 December 1989, in typical Ceausist-style it was therefore announced that Romania would not accept any more tourists because of a “shortage of hotel rooms” and because “weather conditions” were “not suitable for tourism.”[6] Ironically, the only ones exempted from this ban were: “Soviet travellers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia”(!)[7]

Thus, it is intriguing to see how former Securitate Colonel Filip Teodorescu tailors his characterization of Timisoara on 18 December to account for this change:

There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses, or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these “tourists.”[8]

This raises the question of why, if the Soviet tourists were the ones suspected from the first of being behind the unrest, it should have been exactly they who were given continued access into Romania? One of the most effective rejections of the “tourist” scenario came in 1991 from “a group of [Army] officers from the Timisoara garrison.” In an open letter, they proclaimed:

If they [the tourists] appeared suspect to the special forces of the Securitate and counter-military intelligence, why did they not attempt to keep them under surveillance? During this period, did the Securitate and the counter-intelligence officers not know how to do their jobs? Did they somehow forget why they were paid such weighty sums from the state budget?[9]

As we mentioned earlier, in an interesting psychological twist the former Securitate sometimes appear to attribute their own actions to others, especially the convenient phantom-like “foreign tourists.” Some of the Securitate’s arguments also appear to be based on the manipulation and perversion of real information which has been ripped from its context and placed in another one which suits the Securitate’s institutional interests better. For example, the comments of the Yugoslav News Agency (TANJUG) correspondent at the Vatin border post on 20 December 1989 may give us a hint as to where the idea of “foreign tourists travelling in convoys of cars” originated from:

People who spent a long time at this crossing point today say that the Romanian government is even accompanying private cars of tourists returning home via Romania. They usually wait until five or six of them assemble and then let them continue in convoys led by official Romanian cars.[10]

Finally, we will recall that the French journalists, Portocala and Weber, support their claims of “foreign intervention” by referencing the court statement of the Securitate’s “master spycatcher” (Colonel Filip Teodorescu) that during the events he arrested “foreign agents” in Timisoara. As it turns out, Teodorescu does indeed appear to have arrested “intelligence agents” at a major Timisoara factory. However, they were members of DIA, the Army’s intelligence unit, and not agents of foreign security services.[11]

Throughout Monday, house-to-house searches and arrests continued in Timisoara. Protesters attempted to gather again and began chanting the most tragic slogan of these days: “We want our dead!” Regime forces responded by opening fire again. At least seven people were killed and more than one hundred injured on 18 and 19 December alone. Securitate men are alleged to have shot some of the injured demonstrators in their hospital beds. This rumor seems to be confirmed by the observation of an Army soldier who witnessed the exhumation of twenty-seven bodies from the Timisoara “Paupers’ cemetery” in January 1990: some of the corpses bore clear signs of treated wounds.[12] Upon the orders of Elena Ceausescu, during the night of 18/19 December the Securitate and Militia removed the cadavers of forty dead protesters from the morgue of the county hospital and transported them to Bucharest where they were incinerated.[13] Just as on the night of 16/17 December when the regime had gone to absurd lengths to make it appear as if nothing unusual had happened the previous evening at the county party headquarters building–by repairing all the physical damage in the area–this incident reflected the belief that “where there are no identity papers and no bodies, there can be no dead.” The Orwellian reflexes of the regime never left it even in its greatest moment of crisis.

[1].. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17.

[2].. Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History (New York: IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 1992), 94. For Manescu’s link to the Ceausescu family, see ibid., 52-53.

[3].. Indeed, the abortive military coup d’etat attempt planned for October 1984 while the Ceausescus were on a state visit to West Germany had been inspired by memories of the March 1977 experience. See Silviu Brucan, The Wasted Generation: Memories of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 131-134.

[4].. Cornel Ivanciuc, “Raporturile dintre Frontul Salvarii Nationale si KGB,” 22, no. 21 (24-30 May 1995), 11.

[5].. See Mircea Bunea, Praf in Ochi. Procesul Celor 24-1-2. (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 34.

[6].. Belgrade Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 20 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-243, 20 December 1989.

[7].. Agence France Presse, 19 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-242, 19 December 1989.

[8].. Filip Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara decembrie 1989 (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc, 1992), 92.

[9].. Un grup de ofiteri din garnizoana Timisoara, “FRICA DE PROPRIUL POPOR… [Fear of your own people]” Romania Libera, 15 October 1991, 2a.

[10].. Belgrade TANJUG, 2137 GMT 20 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 December 1989, 80. Disinformation is frequently thought of as synonymous with the “big lie,” but indeed the most effective disinformation always contains a kernel of truth. Frequently, real facts are merely presented out of context. It is also intriguing to note the almost Freudian mirror-imaging quality of this disinformation–a characteristic common to totalitarian regimes. This is especially the case when it comes to the accusations of foreign powers being engaged in “terrorist actions”–an eerily accurate description of the Ceausescu regime’s own actions.

[11].. On this bizarre and slightly comical incident see “FRICA DE PROPRIUL POPOR” and Ilie Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii. (Bucharest: Editura Colaj, 1993), 17-18. In spite of Teodorescu’s steadfast allegations regarding the role played by foreign agents, he admits that those he arrested were DIA officers (Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat, 96). The circumstances surrounding this incident remain unclear; however, it may be an indication of the inter-institutional rivalry which permeated much of the December events.

[12].. Liviu Stefanut, interview by Dan Preisz, “Teroristii Timisoarei,” Romania Libera, 21 April 1994, 6. Although Securitate Colonel Teodorescu vehemently denies this allegation, his description of what went on during these days at the county hospital only serves to heighten such suspicion (Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat, 87-89). Hospital staff maintain that the Securitate conducted brutal interrogations and that no medical staff were present, see the comments of Curpas Florica in Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura [Reporting with Your Soul in Your Throat] (Timisoara: Editura Facla, 1990), 145.

———————————

Marius Mioc translated parts of this chapter on his blog, with at least one interesting result:

Ceausescu pleaca in Iran

18-19 decembrie 1989

traducerea de catre marius mioc

———————————-

also in relation to a correction by Marius Mioc

romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

January 8, 2009 at 2:45 am e

Regarding the following sentence from Chapter 6 (written in 1996), “This rumor seems to be confirmed by the observation of an Army soldier who witnessed the exhumation of twenty-seven bodies from the Timisoara “Paupers’ cemetery” in January 1990: some of the corpses bore clear signs of treated wounds.[12]

[12].. Liviu Stefanut, interview by Dan Preisz, “Teroristii Timisoarei,” Romania Libera, 21 April 1994, 6. Although Securitate Colonel Teodorescu vehemently denies this allegation, his description of what went on during these days at the county hospital only serves to heighten such suspicion (Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat, 87-89). Hospital staff maintain that the Securitate conducted brutal interrogations and that no medical staff were present, see the comments of Curpas Florica in Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura [Reporting with Your Soul in Your Throat] (Timisoara: Editura Facla, 1990), 145.

Marius Mioc claims that I confused the Paupers’ cemetery (cimitirul saracilor) and the Heroes’ cemetery (cimitirul eroilor) in this passage and that there were 10 not 27 corpses (see http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/01/06/rich-andrew-hall-rescrierea-istoriei-revolutiei-triumful-revizionismului-securist-in-romania-2-18-19-decembrie-evenimentele-din-timisoara-in-absenta-lui-ceausescu/). My words, however, are based on those of the soldier (Liviu Stefanut) who was interviewed. Here is what Stefanut said:

“In fata unitatii [UM 01864/I au fost 3 sau 4. Cei mai multi au fost impuscati la baricada, dupa ce s-a iesit din unitate. Nu s-a mai spus, pana acum, ca acesti 18 morti–intre care si o fetita de 10 ani–au fost ingropati, ca inca vreo cativa, cu excavatorul, in Cimitirul Saracilor, chiar pe Calea Lipovei, la o statie de troleibuze de unitate…Stiu ca au fost descoperiti pe 20 ianuarie, de noi, pentru ca s-a aflat ca au fost ingropati cu excavatorul. Si eu am asistat la dezgropare, la primii 17…Dupa aceea, nu am mai rezistat…Deja era o luna si patru zile de cand fusesera impuscati. 18 dintre ei au fost omorati la baricada din Calea Lipovei. Au fost mai multi ingropati, vreo 27, am impresia. Deci, au fost impuscati, dusi la doctor, operati, scoase gloantele, cusuti. S-ar putea ca unii dintre ei sa fi fost vii cand au fost scosi din spital, dusi acolo, ingropati, daca nu cumva ingropate de vii.”

It is unclear here whether Stefanut is conflating the two cemeteries, mixing elements of the two different events toegether or basing his knowledge of the events on more hearsay than he is willing to admit. Nevertheless, what he describes here, based on the date, is as Marius Mioc points out NOT the Paupers cemetery (cimitirul saracilor), but the Heroes cemetery (cimitirul eroilor).

Marius Mioc thus does us an important service in clarifying this confusion…because as is well-known the case of the Paupers’ cemetery with unearthed corpses that turned out to not have been from those who died as a result of the bloodshed became a cause celebre, particularly among those of a post-modernist bent. The terrible, tragic irony is that while publications such as Le Figaro and other French press were reporting in late January about the supposed “false massacre” in Timisoara–based on the Paupers’ cemetery incident–they were overlooking the real elements of the Timisoara massacre–the 15 January 1990 discovery of 10 bodies in the Heroes’ cemetery, including the tragic better-known cases of Luminita Botoc (age 14, shot on 17 December) and Sorin Leia (age 23, shot on 18 December).

A look at some of the most influential, or at least sensationalist literature (for example, Michel Castex), on the December 1989 events in Romania, reveals much discussion of the alleged “staged massacre that never happened” of the Paupers cemetery–referred to as “The Timisoara Syndrome” by some–is coupled with NO mention of the 15 January 1990 discovery of real victims of the December bloodshed in the Heroes cemetery.
Witness two classic cases:

Jean Baudrillard (trans. Chris Turner), The Illusion of the End (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), pp. 54-61 “The Timisoara massacre.”

p. 55 “It was not the dead that were the scandal, but the corpses being pressed into appearing before the television cameras, as in the past dead souls were pressed into appearance in the register of deaths.”

p. 60 “And yet there will, nonetheless, have been a kind of verdict in this Romanian affair, and the artificial heaps of corpses will have been of some use, all the same one might ask whether the Romanians, by the very excessiveness of this staged event and the simulacrum of their revolution, have not served as demistifyers of news and its guiding principle…Who can say what responsibility attaches to the televisual production of a false massacre (Timisoara), as compared with the perpetrating of a true massacre?”

Andrei Codrescu (well-known poet and National Public Radio commentator), The Hole in the Flag. A Romanian Exile’s Story of Return and Revolution (New York, William Morrow and Company, 1991), pp. 203-204 (in February 2005 in Jurnalul National, Vladimir Tismaneanu described Codrescu’s account unreservedly and memorably as “impeccably accurate”):

“The Romanian ‘Revolution’ was entirely televised, all those of us who believed for years with Gil Scott-Heron that ‘the revolution will not be televised’ were shaken by it. In truth, there were two revolutions: a real revolution that was not televised and that continues, particularly in Timisoara, and a studio revolution that fooled the entire world. Who could forget the piles of corpses stacked like cordwood in front of the Timisoara cathedral?…Or the image of the mother and child shot with a single bullet, lying in the arms of death? Watching these images in New Orleans via CNN, I was moved and enraged, along with millions of others in the world. We now know. The mass graves discovered in Timisoara and presented to the world as proof of the Hitlerite insanity of Securitate were in fact bodies dug out of a pauper’s cemetery with autopsy scars visible. Many of them were in an advanced state of decay…And the extraordinary picture of the mother and her baby killed with the same bullet, seen thousands of times on all the world’s TV screens, was a gross collage. A woman who had died of alcoholism had had an unrelated dead baby placed on her chest for video purposes. Someone made a neat bullet hole in both bodies.”

Marius Mioc brings us back to reality, however, explaining how desperation to find loved ones, and not some grand “staged” event, led to the frantic digging up of the graves on 22 December 1989 in the Paupers cemetery…and how some of those being sought were only discovered in the common grave dug up in the Heroes cemetery on 15 January 1990…

“Despre sute de cadavre filmate eu n-am auzit, am auzit de 2 filmări, una din 22 decembrie 1989 şi una din ianuarie 1990, fiecare cu vreo 10 cadavre. Că de la o filmare cu 10 cadavre unii ajung să-şi închipuie că au văzut sute sau mii de cadavre e problema lor şi a psihologilor.

Filmarea din 22 decembrie a fost cu cadavre dezgropate din cimitirul săracilor. Aceia nu erau morţi din revoluţie ci sărăntoci fără familie îngropaţi pe cheltuiala Primăriei. Familiile celor morţi în revoluţie, care nu găseau cadavrele celor dragi (fuseseră incinerate, dar nu se ştia asta pe atunci), în disperare au căutat pe unde le-a trecut prin minte, şi au dezgropat şi morţii de la cimitirul săracilor. S-a crezut atunci sincer că aceia sînt morţi din revoluţie.

În ianuarie 1990 s-a descoperit o altă groapă comună, la cimitirul eroilor, iar aceasta era într-adevăr cu morţi din revoluţie, îngropaţi cam prin 27 decembrie fiindcă nimeni nu-i revendica şi mirosea urît la morgă, nu mai puteau să-i ţină. Cazuri concrete sînt Sorin Leia http://timisoara.com/newmioc/11.htm sau Luminiţa Boţoc http://timisoara.com/newmioc/33.htm

http://piatauniversitatii.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=974

Here is the case of Luminita Botoc and her father: his fruitless search first on 22 December 1989 at the Paupers cemetery, and then tragically finding his dead daughter on 15 January 1990 at the Heroes cemetery:

Gasita in groapa comuna http://timisoara.com/newmioc/33.htm

Botoc Luminita Florina

nascuta in 16 aprilie 1976 la Timisoara, eleva, gasita in ianuarie 1990 in groapa comuna din cimitirul eroilor

Botoc Virgil (tata):

nascut in 1952 in comuna Focuri, sat Fintinele (jud. Iasi), cioplitor in marmura

In 17 decembrie pe la ora 19-19,30 am auzit o coloana de manifestanti care treceau prin fata blocului (str. Pomiculturii – n.n.) strigind “Jos Ceausescu!”, “Romani veniti cu noi!”, “Si voi sinteti romani!”.

Fetele Luminita, Cristina si Lacramioara au coborit. Luminita s-a dus cu manifestantii.

Dupa un timp am iesit pe balcon si am vazut ca s-au tras trei rachete rosii. I-am zis nevestei: “Ceva nu-i in regula! O sa se deschida focul!”. Peste 5-10 minute am auzit focuri de arma.

Am vazut ca Luminita nu se intoarce. M-am gindit ca a vazut ca se trage si a ramas la o prietena peste noapte.

Dimineata m-am dus in Calea Lipovei si m-am intilnit cu colegul Avadanei Stefan care mi-a povestit ca au fost morti. I-am zis ca si fata mea a fost printre manifestanti iar el mi-a spus ca printre morti se afla si o fata cu fis rosu, asa cum era imbracata Luminita. Avadanei mi-a spus ca toti ranitii si mortii au fost dusi la Clinicile Noi. Am plecat la Clinicile Noi. Acolo, autopsierul mi-a spus ca fata mea a fost moarta si a trimis-o la morga, la spitalul judetean.

A 2-a zi (19) am fost la spitalul judetean. Am mers la doctorul Dressler care s-a uitat in registre si a spus ca nu este nici un mort in morga. Am intrebat cum nu este nici un mort ca de la Clinicile Noi fata mea a fost adusa aicea. Un soldat in uniforma M.Ap.N., de vreo 18-19 ani, a venit cu arma asupra mea si a spus de ce fac galagie si sa plec imediat ca ma impusca.

In 20 sotia s-a dus cu o vecina la spital s-o caute pe Luminita. A vorbit cu un militian, i-a spus de fata. Militianul a dus-o in spital. Acolo erau trei domni imbracati in halate albe si cu arme la ei. Nevasta le-a dat datele fetei si o fotografie, iar domnii aceia i-au spus sa mearga acasa linistita, ca o sa ne anunte ei daca Luminita e ranita sau moarta.

In 22 dimineata la cimitirul saracilor s-au dezgropat niste morti. Am fost si eu acolo sa vad daca n-o gasesc pe Luminita. Aici era o groapa comuna, o alta groapa cu un singur mort si inca un mort in capela. Mortii fusesera ingropati dezbracati. Unii erau cusuti cu sirma, cel din capela avea si picioarele legate cu sirma. Am scos mortii, i-am pus pe niste cearsafuri.

O masina a trecut pe Calea Lipovei si anunta de la o statie de amplificare ca Ceausescu a fost prins.

La spitalul judetean n-am mai fost fiindca mi se spusese ca acolo nu mai sint morti si auzisem ca mortii de acolo au fost dusi la Bucuresti.

In 24 decembrie am fost la procuratura, am dat declaratii si fotografia fetei. Procurorul Balan mi-a spus ca are 60 de teroristi arestati si va cerceta daca recunoaste vreunul fotografia.

In 15 ianuarie iar am fost la tribunal si procurorul Balan mi-a spus ca pina acum nimeni n-a recunoscut-o pe fiica mea. Dupa ce am iesit de la tribunal, am aflat ca in cimitirul Eroilor s-a descoperit o noua groapa comuna. Am mers acolo. In groapa erau 11 morti, printre care si Luminita.

18 martie 1995

———————-

in relation to Ceausescu’s trip to Iran, from Orwellian…Positively Orwellian

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go? What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]? Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator? If not for that reason, why? Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released. The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be. It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia. But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original]<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[85]<!–[endif]–>

———————

Intrebari (Duminică, 23 decembrie 2007, 11:33)

Istoric [anonim]

Cu repectul cuvenit fatza de cei omoriti in decembrie 1989,civili si militari,in calitate de rezervist al armatei Romane,indraznesc sa intreb si eu :
1. De ce NIMENI,absolut NIMENI ,nu incearca sa explice articolul din “Scinteia Tineretului” din 17.12.1989 (presa controlata in TOTALITATE de cenzura ceausista ) ,articol intitulat “Sfaturi pentru turistii aflati ACUM LA MARE ” (!),publicat in pagina a VII -a a ziarului sub forma unei coloane ,articol din care mai tin minte si acum (nu voi uita niciodata)sfaturi de genul “Cei ce se vor avinta prea mult in larg,sa stie ca serviciile Salvamar nu ii vor cauta” sau “Cei ce prefera baile de soare sa stie ca cea mai mare concentratie de Ultraviolete este intre orele 4 si 6 dimineatza” sau “Cei ce prefera muntele marii sa stie ca nu vor fi iertati”;;;;;Cam ciudate sfaturi pentru turistii ce mergeau la mare sa se imbaieze in decembrie…

intr-adevar, forumistul are dreptate (daca citeva detalii sunt gresite)…nu e clar…dar eu nu cred ca a fost o gluma proasta de iarna…foarte important cum se dezvaluie in articolul de jos:  dupa 22 decembrie 1989, Generalul Militaru s-a interesat in acest articol fiindca el credea ca a fost un semnal…cred ca s-a interesat nu fiindca a fost vorba de un semn pentru revolutionari, dar mai probabil pentru mercenari (uslac) raspinditi prin tara…sa revenim…

“Acel articol a fost un cosmar pentru mine. In 22 decembrie au aparut fluturasi in Bucuresti cu “sfaturile ” din “Scinteia Tineretului “. Cine avea xeroxuri in acea vreme?”, se intreaba Sorin Preda. Am fost anchetat de Ministerul Apararii Nationale pentru ca generalul Militaru a considerat sau i s-a sugerat ca articolul meu era un semnal si pentru teroristi. Articolul il scrisesem cu patru zile inainte de aparitie si avea o introducere in care explicam caracterul lui umoristic. Nu stiu de ce acea introducere a disparut.

Semnalul Revolutiei
Cand in plina iarna publici sfaturi pentru cei aflati la mare, initiativa redactionala pare bizara. Cand articolul respectiv se bucura si de o trimitere la prima pagina, gestul atrage automat atentia. Iar atunci cand langa “sfaturi” este publicat un articol despre evenimentele fierbinti de la Timisoara, totul devine parte a unui scenariu bine articulat. Au fost cele cateva randuri semnate de Sorin Preda in “Scinteia tineretului” din 18 decembrie semnalul Revolutiei? Multi spun ca da, insa autorul neaga.
10/03/2004 (Actualizat 7:00)
37 vizite
“Scinteia Tineretului” era considerata in presa comunista nu doar o pepiniera de cadre pentru “Scinteia batrana”, ci si publicatia in care se puteau citi si articole care ieseau din tipare.
DAN CONSTANTINAutocenzura redactiei si supravegherea sectiei de presa a CC erau mai relaxate la ziarul care s-a aflat mult timp sub coordonarea lui Nicu Ceausescu. In 18 decembrie 1989, in “Scinteia tineretului ” a aparut un mic articol care a fost considerat in perioada imediat urmatoare si in contextul misterelor Revolutiei un veritabil semnal pentru declansarea evenimentelor. Este vorba de “cateva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare”, care apareau in rubrica “In vacanta, educatia nu ia vacanta”. Sfaturile respective, date in plina iarna, par cu totul ciudate. “Nu va avantati prea mult in larg. Oricum, in caz de pericol nu strigati. Este inutil, sansele ca prin apropiere sa se afle vreo persoana dispusa sa va asculte sunt minime”, scria autorul semnat cu initiale S.P.Prima pagina

Un alt sfat: “E de preferat sa incepeti mai prudent, cu reprize scurte de 10-15 minute”. Colectia ingalbenita de timp a ziarului arata si o alta surpriza. Acest articol este anuntat in prima pagina, desi nu are nici o justificare din punct de vedere editorial. Trimiterea la pagina intai este plasata langa un articol in care erau condamnate actiunile lui Laszlo T.kes de la Timisoara, articol aparut in toata presa romana in acea zi. Simple coincidente? Cei care faceau “Scinteia tineretului” isi amintesc cu destula exactitate faptele.

Humor in zile grele

Gabriel Nastase era seful sectiei care realiza pagina elevului, unde au fost plasate “sfaturile”.

  • Imi aduc aminte ca am fost chemat din concediu de redactorul-sef care m-a anuntat ca s-au sistat zilele libere. Nu stiam nimic despre ce se intampla la Timisoara sau in tara. Eu i-am spus lui Sorin Preda – numele autorului articolului care a starnit atata valva – sa-mi scrie ceva pentru rubrica. Sorin era mai poet, a scris articolul intr-o maniera umoristica. Eu nu mi-am dat seama ca ar fi ceva ciudat. Nici dupa ce a aparut nu au fost probleme.
  • Conducerea redactiei s-a sesizat? Sectia de presa a gasit ceva nefiresc in sfaturile date?Nu. Nici Strungariu, redactorul-sef, nici Lucian Avramescu, adjunctul lui, nu au gasit ceva nefiresc, spune Gabriel Nastase.

Alt ziarist de la “Scinteia Tineretului”, Stefan Mitroi, ulterior redactor-sef al “Tineretului Liber”, publicatia transformata dupa Revolutie, ne spune ca problemele au aparut abia dupa 22 decembrie. Asupra lui Sorin Preda plana banuiala ca “ar fi fost ceva cu articolul”.

Colonelul Dosan stia?

Eu cred ca “dracul le-a potrivit”. Un fost ziarist din acea vreme, care s-a dorit anonim, ne spune ca “articolul nu era chiar nevinovat”. Asa ceva nu putea sa apara si colonelul Dosan, de la Securitate, care raspundea de publicatia noastra, stie mai multe. Articolul era cred si un raspuns la o scrisoare samizdat a lui Buduca.

Pe colonelul Dosan nu l-am gasit in cursul documentarii pentru articol, dar Sorin Preda este foarte clar in afirmatia ca totul a fost scos din context si s-a cautat de institutii specializate in manipulare sa fie considerat un “trompet al Revolutiei”.

Cosmar

  • “Acel articol a fost un cosmar pentru mine. In 22 decembrie au aparut fluturasi in Bucuresti cu “sfaturile ” din “Scinteia Tineretului “. Cine avea xeroxuri in acea vreme?”, se intreaba Sorin Preda. Am fost anchetat de Ministerul Apararii Nationale pentru ca generalul Militaru a considerat sau i s-a sugerat ca articolul meu era un semnal si pentru teroristi. Articolul il scrisesem cu patru zile inainte de aparitie si avea o introducere in care explicam caracterul lui umoristic. Nu stiu de ce acea introducere a disparut.
  • Dar de ce s-a facut trimitere din prima pagina? Il intreb pe autorul sfaturilor.”Nu a avut trimitere la pagina intai”, sustine Sorin Preda.
  • Avem facsimilul ziarului din 18 decembrie…Nu-mi mai aduc bine aminte, raspunde mai putin sigur Sorin Preda. Ce pot sa spun este ca am vrut sa dau o dezmintire la Televiziunea Romana ca nu am nici o legatura cu preparativele pentru Revolutie, dar DragosMunteanu, care conducea institutia, nu mi-a permis. Oricum, acele sfaturi au fost un cosmar pentru mine, conchide Sorin Preda.

Exista insa dupa atatia ani parerea ca articolul respectiv a fost un semnal pentru declansarea acelor evenimente din decembrie 1989. Istoricul Radu Portocala este convins de asta. La fel si senatorul Gabrielescu, seful unei Comisii parlamentare care a anchetat dosarele Revolutiei. Si inca un fapt neelucidat, fisetul in care se pastrau spalturile si manuscrisele de la “Tineretul Liber” a fost spart si “probele ” au disparut.

Cateva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare

  • Evitati expunerea intempestiva si prelungita la soare. E de preferat sa incepeti mai prudent, cu reprize scurte de 10-15 minute, cand pe o parte, cand pe alta. Astfel, va veti asigura un bronzaj placut si uniform pe tot corpul.
  • Nu va avantati prea mult in larg. Oricum, in caz de pericol, nu strigati. Este inutil. Sansele ca prin apropiere sa se afle vreo persoana dispusa a va asculta sunt minime.
  • Profitati de binefacerile razelor ultraviolete. Dupa cum se stie, ele sunt mai active intre orele 5:30 si 7:30. Se recomanda cu precadere persoanelor mai debile.
  • Daca sunteti o fire sentimentala si agreati apusurile de soare, librariile de pe Litoral va ofera un larg sortiment de vederi cu acest subiect.
  • Si inca ceva – daca aceste “sfaturi” v-au pus pe ganduri si aveti deja anumite ezitari, gandindu-va sa renuntati in favoarea muntelui, inseamna ca nu iubiti in suficienta masura marea. (S.P.)

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decembrie ’89: Teroristii au folosit si armament de provenienta straina

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 6, 2009

In legatura cu declaratia aceasta din Orwellian Positively Orwellian Part III A fistful of bullets

Vidia…

What about the use of “vidia” tip bullets Prosecutor Voinea also flatly dismisses?

In March 1991, Spiroiu’s predecessor as Defense Minister, General Victor Athanasie Stanculescu, was asked by two journalists if the “terrorists used a particular type of ammunition…against the armed forces.”[42] Stanculescu responded:

Yes, as I have already said, I have here two bullets with vidia [grooves].  Our Army does not use this type of ammunition.  It is of caliber 5.56.  As you can see, the bullet has a jacket that got deformed, while its core remained intact.

Aici puteti gasi articolul original:

image-7image-6

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