[documentary evidence in support of the publication entitled: Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Counter-Revolution of December 1989, strictly personal research, not for reproduction without prior author authorization]
The motto of Ceausescu’s Prosecutors about December 1989:
“I see nothing! I was not here! I did not even get up this morning!”
I) From “Bullets, Lies, and Videotape” (submitted to CIA PRB November 2009, cleared without revisions December 2009)
https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/december-1989-2009-bullets-lies-and-videotape/
[42] According to Sorin Iliesiu, the filmmaker who claims to have edited the chapter on December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Raport Final, the “spirit of Voinea’s findings can be found in the Chapter.” Indeed, the chapter includes snippets from an interview between Dan Voinea and Andrei Badin (Adevarul , December 2006). The “indefatigable” Voinea, as Tom Gallagher has referred to him, continues to be defended by Vladimir Tismaneanu who has expressed support for Voinea’s investigations “from both a juridic and historic viewpoint” (see the entries for 21 September 2009 at http://tismaneanu.wordpress.com), avoiding any mention of the reasons for Voinea’s dismissal from the Military Procuracy, mistakes that Prosecutor General Laura Codruta Kovesi says “one wouldn’t expect even from a beginner” (for more on this and background, see Hall 2008):
Ce îi reproşaţi, totuşi, lui Voinea? Punctual, ce greşeli a făcut în instrumentarea cauzelor?
Sunt foarte multe greşeli, o să menţionez însă doar câteva. Spre exemplu, s-a început urmărirea penală faţă de persoane decedate. Poate îmi explică dumnealui cum poţi să faci cercetări faţă de o persoană decedată! Apoi, s-a început urmărirea penală pentru fapte care nu erau prevăzute în Codul Penal. În plus, deşi nu a fost desemnat să lucreze, spre exemplu, într-un dosar privind mineriada (repartizat unui alt procuror), domnul procuror Dan Voinea a luat dosarul, a început urmărirea penală, după care l-a restituit procurorului de caz. Vă imaginaţi cum ar fi dacă eu, ca procuror general, aş lua dosarul unui coleg din subordine, aş începe urmărirea penală după care i l-aş înapoia. Cam aşa ceva s-a întâmplat şi aici.
Mai mult, a început urmărirea penală într-o cauză, deşi, potrivit unei decizii a Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie, era incompatibil să mai facă asta. E vorba despre dosarul 74/p/1998 (dosar în care Voinea l-a acuzat pe fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu că, în iunie 1990, a determinat cu intenţie intervenţia în forţă a militarilor împotriva manifestanţilor din Capitală – n.r.).
Apoi au fost situaţii în care s-a început urmărirea penală prin acte scrise de mână, care nu au fost înregistrate în registrul special de începere a urmăririi penale. Aceste documente, spre exemplu, nu prevedeau în ce constau faptele comise de presupuşii învinuiţi, nu conţin datele personale ale acestora. De exemplu, avem rezoluţii de începere a urmăririi penale care-l privesc pe Radu Ion sau pe Gheorghe Dumitru, ori nu ştim cine este Gheorghe Dumitru, nu ştim cine este Radu Ion.
„Parchetul să-şi asume tergiversarea anchetelor”
Credeţi că, în cazul lui Voinea, au fost doar greşeli sau că a fost vorba de intenţie, ştiind că acuzaţii vor scăpa?
Nu cunosc motivele care au stat la baza acestor decizii şi, prin urmare, nu le pot comenta.
Poate fi vorba şi despre complexitatea acestor dosare?
Când ai asemenea dosare în lucru, nu faci astfel de greşeli, de începător. Eşti mult mai atent când ai cauze de o asemenea importanţă pentru societatea românească.
Excerpted from http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/868918/Kovesi-despre-revolutia-ratata-a-lui-Voinea-A-gresit-ca-un-incepator/
III) The most significant revelation of Ion Baciu’s 23 January 1990 confession may not actually be his claim that he saw Dan Voinea at the Cenusa Crematorium on the morning of 20 December 1989, but that he recognized Voinea precisely because Voinea had previously worked for Directorate VI (“Department of Corrections” essentially) of the Securitate.
[On 20 December 1989 at 1010 at the Cenusa Crematorium arrived Lt. Col. Dan Voinea, a prosecutor from DPM, whom I knew because before that post he had worked in the Department of State Security (i.e Securitate), in the Directorate of Penal Investigations (Penitentiaries/Prisons, Directorate VI of the Securitate)].”
http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/volumul-203/
23.01.1990 Declaratie: Colonel Ion Baciu, șef al Direcției Economice din IGM,
(my thanks to researcher Mircea Munteanu, formerly of the CWIHP at the Woodrow Wilson Center, for helping me with the following transcription)
Pe 20.12.89 la orele 1010 la crematoriu a venit Lt. Col. Voinea Dan [[proc mil — procuror militar]] din D.P.M., pe care-l cunosc intrucit inainte de activare, a lucrat la Departmentul Securitatii Statului, directia cercetari penale.
Era imbracat civil, insotit de un procuror militar in uniforma. Au discutat cu o femeie, Geta, nu-i stiu numele care i-a spus: “[[Bine]] ca ati venit. Toata noaptea au ars aici si [[oamenilor]] le este teama.” Nu am auzit alte vorbe. Au discutat cu aceia femeie [[ca. –circa]] 15 minute dupa care au plecat.
Cred ca au fost trimisi acolo fie de Popovici, fie de Diaconescu, pentru a vedea cum decurge incinerarea.
Solicit sa fie audiati Popovici Nicolae, fost procuror general, Diaconescu Gh, adjunctul acestuia si cei doi procurori militari…
IV) Ion Baciu’s 12 March 1990 courtroom testimony saw him cutoff by the prosecutor who refused to allow in the official record that it was Voinea Baciu claimed to see on 20 December 1989 at the Cenusa Crematorium, but also, in particular, when Baciu attempted (and seemed) to state that Voinea essentially admitted as much to him during his later questioning by Voinea: (p. 406) “…pe domnul colonel Voinea care de altfel si cu ocazia anchetei mi s-a spus, de fapt…”
from Ion Baciu’s hearing 12 March 1990 http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_II.pdf
Baciu’s courtroom testimony (no reference made to his 23 January 1990 handwritten testimony above) was discussed by Vasile Surcel in the following article:
V) As the statements and testimony of other officials involved in the cremation of the Timisoara protesters make clear: Voinea is clearly dissembling and crafting a false narrative of how and when officials became aware of the cremation of the Timisoara protesters.
VI) Of course, Voinea has critical “top cover” for his denial that he was at the Cenusa Crematorium on 20 December 1989. His chief/boss, Ceausescu’s last Prosecutor General Nicolae Popovici denies that he knew anything until after 22 December 1989 about the cremation of protesters, even though multiple confessions by other officials make such a claim seem virtually impossible. Thus, as his declaration below demonstrates, he was clearly asked if he dispatched a military prosecutor and civilian prosecutor to Cenusa Crematorium on 20 December 1989. But to admit that he did would be to admit that he had known at the time about the burning of the corpses of Timisoara protesters…and therefore undermined the larger lie…
from http://www.scribd.com/doc/52568421/ORWELLIAN (Submitted to CIA’s PRB July 2006, cleared without redactions September 2006)
But my use of the term “Orwellian” in the title of this paper is not only designed to capture Voinea’s uncanny ability to make definitive statements that are demonstrably wrong, to argue that black is white and white is black—from his denial of the use of gunfire simulators in December 1989, to his claim that the only “lunetisti” who acted after 22 December were from the Army, to his denial of the existence of weapons and (especially “vidia”) bullets not in the arsenal of the Army, to his denial of the existence of “terrorists,” to his denial that any military unit was attacked during the events, to his denial of the role of foreigners in the events….
I use the term “Orwellian” here as much to describe the ease with which he has gotten and gets away with errors, misunderstandings, and falsehoods that could easily be challenged, if not combated by his interlocutors in the Romanian media and intelligentsia. For it is the fact that he has been able and is able to get away with all this that is truly “Orwellian” and that is indeed a tragedy for Romania’s citizens. The tragedy is thus less the predictable “supply side” of the post-authoritarian lie, than the enthusiastic consumption and appetite for it. This is why I believe, accurately I would argue, that “December 1989” long ago became more about post-Ceausescu Romania than about what happened in December 1989.
The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 