The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on February 2, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)


[UPDATE 2.  A Response to Watts: The Pitfalls of Not Having Any Evidence

UPDATE I.  Related of relevance:

What do previous studies tell us about the Soviets sending in agents posing as “tourists” prior to or during a military action or invasion against another country?

Mark Kramer has detailed Soviet use of “tourist” cover in the following CWIHP Bulletin article (Fall 1993, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia:  New Interpretations (Second of two parts),.  What is important to take away from this?  The Soviets posed as WESTERN tourists.  They did not pose as…”Soviet tourists”!!!…

Indeed, what Larry Watts seems to miss in his exposition of claimed incidents of Soviet use of “tourist” cover in the context of planned/actual invasion is that in none of the examples do Soviet agents pose as…”Soviet tourists”…Why?  Because it is a relatively poor cover story that doesn’t give much deniability that they were Soviets.  If you are trying to conceal your Soviet links, you would most likely pose as some kind of other tourist, not as a Soviet tourist…

Why then, in December 1989, in Romania, are we to believe, that the Soviets would have abandoned precedent and posed as…”Soviet tourists”…driving around in Soviet automobiles (more easily identifiable in Romania than other Soviet bloc states because of the domestic production of and dominance of the market by Dacia vehicles) with Soviet tags/license plates, and apparently carrying Soviet passports?  Doesn’t sound particularly intelligent, does it?  Instead, such things would draw attention to you and would mint you as…Soviets! ]


2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This (likely aperiodic) series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Until the documents below were made publicly available and I unearthed the following, we had to rely primarily on arguments emphasizing the Securitate roots of these claims and/or about the implausibility and often absurdity of these claims.  We now have documentary evidence that in the immediate wake of December 1989 not even the Securitate believed in the claims they would make so frequently later on.

The Timisoara files about December 1989 are now publicly available (when the link works!) on the Internet at  What they show is that Securitate, Militia, and other regime officials from Timis County were asked by Bucharest–communicated via the person of Securitate Director, General Iulian Vlad–to investigate the role of foreign elements, specifically tourists, in the Timisoara protests of mid-December 1989.  But they were not the only ones.  General Vlad tasked senior Securitate officials from Bucharest sent to Timisoara to report back to him on this very topic alleging external involvement and manipulation of the Timisoara demonstrations.  What remains unclear is how much of this tasking was General Vlad communicating his own “hypothesis” or how much of it was he relaying Nicolae Ceausescu’s “theory” about what was going on.  This much is clear:  neither those stationed in Timis County, nor those officials sent from Bucharest could find evidence of a foreign hand in the Timisoara uprising, despite being asked to investigate exactly this aspect.  How do we know this?  From their own written confessions immediately after the December 1989 events.  (Below are four of them:  Nicolae Mavru, Liviu Dinulescu, Emil Macri, and Filip Teodorescu.)

Niculae Mavru, fost sef al sectiei ‘Filaj si investigatie’ de la Securitatea Timis, declaratia din 13 ianuarie 1990:  …la ordinul col. Sima Traian, am primit…misiuni de a observa si sesiza aspecte din masa manifestantilor, din diferite zone ale orasului in sensul de a raporta daca sint straini (ceea ce nu prea au fost) care incita la dezordine, acte de violenta sau altfel de acte… 0331 25 iunie 1991 “Desi ne-am straduit nu am putut raporta col. Sima implicarea completa a vreunui cetatean strain in evolutia demonstratiilor cit si fenomenlor care au avut loc la Timisoara,..”


“Sarcina primordiala pe care am primit-o de la col. Sima a fost daca in evenimentele declansate la Timisoara erau implicate elemente straine din afara tarii.  Cu toate eforturile facute nu a rezultat lucru pe linia mea de munca.” 0174

26 iunie 1991, Declaratia lui Liviu Dinulescu, cpt. la Serviciul de Pasapoarte al jud. Timis (in decembrie 1989, lt. maj. ofiter operativ Securitate judetean la Serv. III, care se ocupa de contraspionaj)

“Precizez ca anterior declansarii evenimentelor de la Timisoara din datele ce le detineam serviciul nostru nu rezulta vreun amestec din exterior in zona judetului Timis.”


Generalul Emil Macri (seful Dir. II-a Securitatii, Contrainformatii Economice),

Declaratie 2 ianuarie 1990:

“Rezumind sintetic informatiile obtinute ele nu au pus in evidenta nici lideri si nici amestecul vreunei puteri straine in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.  Raportarea acestor date la esalonul superior respectivi generalului I. Vlad a produs iritare si chiar suparare…”

IMG_1219 IMG_1215 Filip Teodorescu (adj. sef. Dir III Contraspionaj D.S.S.), Declaratie, 12 ianaurie 1990:  Seara [luni, 18 decembrie 1989], dupa 23:00, responsabili (anumiti ?) de generalul-maior Macri Emil pe diferitele linii de munca au inceput sa vina sa-i raporteze informatiile obtinute.  Au fost destul de neconcludente si cu mare dificultate am redat o informare pe care generalul-maior Macri Emil a acceptat-o si am expediat-o prin telex in jurul orei 01:00 [marti, 19 decembrie 1989.  In esenta se refera la: –nu sint date ca ar exista instigatori sau conducatori anume veniti din strainatate… IMG_1453 IMG_1438

Mai jos, declaratiile lui Petre Pele, Tudor Postelnicu, Gheorghe Diaconescu, si Iulian Vlad Excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus have not been revised in any form.

A Review of the Evidence

Although at first glance the regime’s treatment of Pastor Tokes seems strange and even illogical, within the context of the workings of the Ceausescu regime and the regime’s strategy for dealing with dissent it makes perfect sense. There is simply no convincing evidence to believe that the Securitate–or a faction within it–purposely dragged its feet in enforcing Pastor Tokes’ eviction, or was attempting to spark a demonstration in the hopes of precipitating Ceausescu’s fall. The regime’s decision to evict Tokes was not a last-minute decision. Moreover, the regime exerted tremendous and sometimes brutal pressure to silence Tokes in the months preceding this deadline. Interestingly, according to high-ranking members of the former Securitate, Nicolae Ceausescu’s unwillingness to approve the more definitive measures requested by the Securitate allowed the Tokes case to drag on without resolution (see below). The Tokes case suggests the bureaucratic and byzantine mentalities of the Ceausescu regime, and the clash between a dictator’s instructions and how the institutions charged with defending him interpret their mission. … The suggestion that the Securitate treated Tokes gently prior to his eviction is simply incorrect. On 2 November 1989, four masked men burst through the locked doors of the parochial residence, wielding knives and screaming in a fury. Tokes was slashed on the forehead before his church bodyguards could come to his rescue, causing the four to flee. The numerous Securitate men posted out front of the building had done nothing to intervene in spite of calls for help. Puspoki suggests that these “Mafia-like thugs,” who attacked as if from “an Incan tribe,” were some of Colonel Sima’s “gorillas,” sent to deliver a clear message to Tokes that he should leave immediately.[40] The view of the former Securitate–as expounded by Colonel Sima’s senior deputy, Major Radu Tinu–insinuates a “tourist”-like scenario. According to Tinu, the incident was clearly a “set-up” designed to draw sympathy to Tokes’ cause since the assailants fled away in a car with West German tags.[41] Not for the last time, the Securitate thus appears to attempt to attribute its own actions to foreign agents. A week after the mysterious attack by the masked intruders, all of the windows of the parochial residence and nearby buildings were smashed. Interestingly, the report drawn up for Bucharest by the Timisoara Securitate attempted to argue that “workers” from the Timisoara Mechanical Enterprise, offended by pastor Tokes’ behavior, had broken the windows. According to Puspoki, the use of a propaganda-like description was not accidental: the local Securitate was trying to present the incident as evidence of “the dissatisfaction of the working people of Timisoara” in the hope that it would finally prompt Ceausescu into approving definitive measures against Tokes.[42] Was Ceausescu responsible for the fact that the Tokes case dragged on without resolution? Support for such a conclusion comes from the comments of Securitate officers Colonel Filip Teodorescu and Major Radu Tinu. Teodorescu was dispatched to Timisoara with sixty other Securitate information officers in order to “verify” the request of the local Securitate that proceedings for treason be initiated against Tokes.[43] Teodorescu laments: Unfortunately, as in other situations…Nicolae Ceausescu did not agree because he didn’t want to further muddy relations with Hungary. Moreover, groundlessly, he hoped to avoid the criticisms of “Western democracies” by taking administrative measures against the pastor through the Reformed Church to which [Tokes] belonged.[44] Major Radu Tinu suggests that Ceausescu’s approval was necessary in the case of Securitate arrests and that the local Securitate remained “stupefied” that after having worked so long and hard in gathering information with which to charge Tokes with the crime of treason, Ceausescu rejected the request.[45] Tinu speculates that Ceausescu “did not want to create problems at the international level.” Because former Securitate officers rarely pass up the opportunity to absolve themselves of blame, and it would appear both easier and more advantageous to blame the deceased Ceausescu for being too unyielding in the Tokes affair, these allegations seem plausible. Thus, it would appear that because Nicolae Ceausescu was skittish of further damaging Romania’s already deteriorating relations with the international community, and the Tokes case was a high-profile one, he refrained from approving visible, definitive action against the pastor. The Securitate‘s attempt to goad Ceausescu to bolder action would appear to confirm Ghita Ionescu’s suggestion that where the security apparatus comes to dominate regime affairs it attempts to impose its institutional prerogatives upon political superiors. Ceausescu and the Securitate appear then to have had sometimes conflicting views over how to resolve the Tokes affair in the quickest and most efficient fashion. By December 1989, a huge group of Securitate officers were working on the Tokes case: the entire branch of the First Directorate for Timis county, the special division charged with combatting Hungarian espionage, high-ranking members of the First Directorate and Independent Service “D” (responsible for disinformation) from Bucharest, and members of the division charged with “Surveillance and Investigation.”[46] Puspoki describes Timisoara at this late hour as follows: Day and night, the telex machines on the top floor of the [County Militia] “Inspectorate” incessantly banged out communications, while the telephones never stopped ringing. Minister Postelnicu yelled on the phone, Colonel Sima yelled through the offices and the hallways. The officers ran, as if out of their minds, after information, besieged neighbors of the pastor, and dispatched in his direction–what they call–”informers with possibilities.”[47] Yet the case lingered on. On Sunday, 10 December 1989, Pastor Tokes announced to his congregation that he had received a rejection of his most recent appeal: the regime would make good on its threat to evict him on Friday, 15 December. He termed this an “illegal act” and suggested that the authorities would probably use force since he would not go willingly. He appealed for people to come and attend as “peaceful witnesses.”[48] They came.

[40].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III),” Orizont, no. 11 (16 March 1990), 4.

[41].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 78.
[42].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III).”
[43].. Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat, 45-46.
[44].. Ibid., 90.
[45].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 78.
[46].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (II).”
[47].. Ibid.
[48].. Tokes, With God, for the People, 1-4. ————————————————————————————————

Tudor Postelnicu:  “Ceausescu Nicolae facuse o psihoza, mai ales dupa ce s-a intors de la sedinta de la Moscova in toamna lui ’89.  Era convins ca se planuieste si de cei de pe plan extern caderea sa, era convins ca toti sint spioni…” 0160 Petru Pele (Dir I, DSS). Declaratie, 16 ianuarie 1990:  “Printre sarciniile mai importante efectuate de catre acestia in  perioada 17-22.12.1989 s-a numerat (?) constituierea (?) listelor celor retinuti de organele militie cu listele celor predati sau reintorsi din Ungaria, intrucit s-a emis ipoteza ca evenimentele de la Timisoara au fost puse la cale in tara vecina…” 0299 0291 Gheorghe Diaconescu, Declaratie 31 decembrie 1989 “Luni 18 decembrie gl. col.  VLAD IULIAN a avut o convorbire cu colegul meu (local?) RADULESCU EMIL … 0476 Vlad Iulian (continuarea, declaratia lui Gheorghe Diaconescu) “?… foarte dur (?) ca nu (?) ca ‘un grup de turisti isi fac de cap in Timisoara’” 0477 0472 Tocmai Iulian Vlad, el insusi, recunoaste ne-implicarea strainilor in evenimentele de la Timisoara, aici… 0289 0290 Incepind cu noaptea de 16/17 dec. si in continuare pina in data de 20 dec. 1989 organul de securitate local col. Sima cit si gl. Macri si in lipsa lui col. Teodorescu imi comunicau date din care rezulta ca sute de elemente turbulente au devastat orasul, si ca elementul strain nu rezulta a se fi implicate in continuarea fenomenului.” 0291 “Mai exact, cei trimis de mine la Timisoara mi-au raportat ca nu au elemente din care sa rezulte vreum amestec al strainatatii in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.”

All this is important to keep in mind when coming across claims about the alleged role of these tourists in the overthrow of the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu:  none of the authors purporting such claims have addressed the documents above.  Among the authors who allege such a role and whose work is available on the Internet are the following:

James F. Burke (citing Grigore Corpacescu, General Iulian Vlad, and a well-known article from September 1990 in Democratia) (I have dealt with these allegations here, and

Catherine Durandin (citing Radu Portocala)  (I have addressed this allegation here

Alexander Ghaleb (fn. 9, citing “police sources”)

Jacques Levesque (citing a 1992 book by Filip Teodorescu)

John Simpson (citing Virgil Magureanu and the SRI)

Alex Mihai Stoenescu (p. 186 of 340, Petre Roman citing Mihai Caraman)

Larry Watts (fn. 90 p. 26, Petre Roman citing Mihai Caraman)  (Roman ironically himself undermined such a claim here: , Watts’ claim has been televised in the series “Mostenirea Clandestina,” start at about 46:10 to 46:60 and then assisted by Cristian Troncota, who discusses the “Soviet tourists,” including Watts’ claim, from 47:05 to 49:50…conveniently not mentioned here or anywhere else where Troncota appears (for example with Grigore Cartianu in Adevarul), Cristian Troncota was a Lt. Maj. in the Securitate:  see the index here from a 1987 issue of the Securitate‘s “strict secret” journal, (page 4 of 46 on the pdf) with a historical article beginning on page 78:  (vol. 80 from 1987).


19 Responses to “25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Communist Regime: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising”

  1. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  2. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  3. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  4. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  5. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  6. Larry L. Watts said

    Your representation of my position needs correction. Specifically, you affirm that I am “among the authors who allege” a “role of [Soviet] tourists in the overthrow of the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu”; that my claim “has been televised in the “series ‘Mostenirea Clandestina,’ start[ing] at about 46:10 to 46:60”; and that I cite “Petre Roman citing Mihai Caraman” as my source for this alleged claim.

    None of these statements are true.

    I shall address them in reverse order:
    (1) I make no reference whatsoever to Soviet “tourists” in the episode of “Mostenirea Clandestina” that you cite, nor in any of the nine other episodes. In the clip you identify – from 46:10 to 46:53 (after which the program shifts to another interlocutor) – I speak only of the Romania’s post-revolution isolation, unrelated to the topic of “tourists.”
    (2) I make no reference whatsoever to any alleged role, action nor intent of Soviet “tourists” in my book “With Friends Like These: The Soviet Bloc’s Clandestine War Against Romania” (2010). The footnote you cite (fn. 90, page 26) notes only the reported presence of those “tourists” and the anomalous nature of their dimensions and timing. The sentence (on page 16) to which the footnote refers states: “It is suggestive that more than 25,000 of the 37,000 “extra” Soviet tourists that deemed Romania a desirable place to visit or transit in the two weeks prior to its revolution in December 1989 chose not to leave until almost a year later.” The implication, arising from the context in which the sentence appears, is that their presence may have been a source of instability.
    (3) My source for the presence of Soviet “tourists” is not merely “Roman citing Mihai Caraman,” as you claim. It is the Parliamentary hearings held by the special Senate Committee established to investigate the events of 1989. The report of those hearings was endorsed by the Senate Committee, which included both government and opposition parties. I note as example Roman’s testimony under oath. And I note Roman’s affirmation that he received this information from Caraman. But the citation is to an authoritative source, not a shady individual(s). And, again, it refers only to the presence of Soviet “tourists.” Not to any role in the overthrow of Ceausescu.
    (4) You also fail to direct readers to the first-hand Soviet source I cite on the matter of Soviet “tourist” presence (fn. 93, page 26.).

    Regarding Cristian Troncota and his reference to my writings, I would like to point out three things:
    (1) Troncota’s interpretation of my position is his own. It is not mine. I differ with it for the very same reasons I take issue with your interpretation of them. I chose my words carefully, precisely because I had not done the research to assert such a bold claim myself. I am looking at this issue more closely now, so I’m sure we will have further discussion regarding it.
    (2) I think it is important for your readers to know that Dr. Troncota’s Securitate affiliation has been public knowledge ever since 1989. A high school history teacher in 1980-1983, he became an archivist and researcher at the interior ministry after the five-month course at the Securitate’s training center at Gradistea in 1984, a post he held through the 1989 events. He remained with the newly christened SRI archive during 1990-1994 before becoming a researcher and eventually professor in Romania’s post-communist National Intelligence Academy (ANI). Everyone knew where he came from because he never left. However, his tasks within the Securitate hardly merit the ominous description you suggest.
    (3) Troncota’s rank in 1989, Lt. Maj., was equivalent to 1st Lieutenant. In the late 1940s the Communists changed Locotenent and Sublocotenent designations (1st Lieutenant and 2nd Lieutenant) to Locotenent-Major and Locotenent, so that no one would be considered “beneath” (sub) anyone else. Silly, but there you have it.

    Larry L. Watts

  7. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  8. […] For more such declarations, see… […]

  9. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  10. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  11. romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 said

    Larry, thank you for your comments above and here I only recently discovered that I must have changed the comments setting to “moderate all comments” about six months ago; hence apologies for the delay. [This is, of course, a purely personal response based on my own research of the past two plus decades.]

    1. On the contrary, the declarations immediately after December 1989 by senior Securitate and associated officials dispatched to Timisoara and directed precisely by Securitate Director Iulian Vlad to find evidence of foreign involvement in the Timisoara uprising–and including the declarations of Emil Macri, Filip Teodorescu, Nicolae Mavru (as well as Liviu Dinulescu, Petre Pele, and Gheorghe Diaconescu)–infirm the argument that Soviet tourists played any role in the Timisoara uprising. In addition to their claims that they could find no such presence and role played by Soviet tourists, not a single Soviet tourist was arrested in Timisoara prior to or after 22 December according to available records. The only way to get around such evidence is to argue that 1) these officials were coerced into writing false confessions or these are forgeries; 2) they weren’t coerced, but chose to leave out these details; and/or 3) the Soviet tourists, their entry into the country, and their involvement in Timisoara somehow escaped monitoring and notice by all these officials. None of these is terribly plausible. At a tactical level, the crown jewel of Securitate disinformation–their responsibility for instigating/inflaming the Timisoara uprising–lacks a critical evidentiary basis.

    2. Any suggestion of a tactical role for Soviet tourists in the uprising prior to 22 December is also undermined by the now public, final informational report by Iulian Vlad and the Securitate to Nicolae Ceausescu, found here . While discussing the Timisoara turmoil and already knowing of Ceausescu’s appetite to hear that foreign agents posing as foreign tourists were behind the uprising, the Securitate makes no mention of Soviet tourists. Once again, the options are limited to explain why this would have been if Soviet tourists had actually been behind the uprising.

    3. In one of your comments you note that Cristian Troncota’s background is not news in Romania. Please show me the articles or videoclips where when interviewed about December 1989, you or anyone else mentions Troncota’s Securitate background. Troncota’s past is only relevant in this context in that his arguments mirror the claims of other former Securitate personnel–many directly involved in the repression of December 1989–who seek to whitewash the Securitate’s responsibility for bloodshed in December 1989. To the extent, he was associated with the Securitate pre-1989, his claims mirror those of other Securitate officers and whitewash the Securitate’s responsibility, his Securitate past is relevant.

    4. I realize that in your previous books, December 1989 was not the subject of your research. To the extent I missed any references to your claims regarding Soviet tourists it was hardly intentional but because they were buried in footnotes and not found in the index. Because your next book will be about December 1989, I would ask you to ask your publisher to ensure that the index contains all such pertinent references.


  12. […] Finally, it has to be stressed that, besides sounding absurd–even if we ignore Petre Roman’s supposed earlier clarification to Stoenescu, according to Stoenescu, that all 30,000 of these Soviet tourists were members of Soviet special forces and estimate “conservatively” that “only” 10 percent were actual Soviet agents, that still leaves 3,000 Soviet agents (an incredible devotion of man power) traversing Romania not in Romanian Dacias so as to not draw attention but instead supposedly in Ladas and Moskovici!!!–THERE IS NO RECORD OF A SINGLE “SOVIET TOURIST” HAVING BEEN ARRESTED UPON SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT, LET ALONE ARMED INVOLVEMENT, IN THE UPHEAVAL THAT OVERTURNED THE REGIME OF NICOLAE CEAUSESCU BEFORE OR AFTER 22 DECEMBER 1989!  (And specifically with regard to the beginnings of the uprising in Timisoara, Securitate officials themselves, in the immediate aftermath of the events, confessed that despite being tasked from Bucharest to supply evidence of alleged foreign tourist involvement in the demonstrations and riots against Nicolae Ceausescu and his regime, were unable to do so! See 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the …) […]

  13. […]… […]

  14. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  15. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  16. […] 25 for 2014: 25 Things You Should Know about the Romanian Revolution on the 25th Anniversary of the … […]

  17. […] Hall a început o serie de postări despre ceea ce el consideră a fi lecţii învăţate despre revoluţia din 1989 cu una intitulată „Securitatea neagă instigarea străină în revoltele de la Timişoara“. Hall susţine că poate dovedi că prezenţa turiştilor sovietici este un „mit“ şi o „absurditate“ bazându-se pe depoziţiile unor ofiţeri martori ai Departamentul Securităţii de Stat şi pe rapoarte din presă. (#1 Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation.) […]

  18. […] Hall begins a series of posts on what he regards as lessons learned about the 1989 Revolution with one entitled: “The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising” (Securitate being Romanian short-hand for the Department of State Security or DSS). Hall claims to prove that the presence of Soviet tourists is a “myth” and an “absurdity” based on former DSS officer witness depositions and a media report. (#1 Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation) […]

  19. […] #1 Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation; #8 Romania Closes its Borders to Almost All Foreigners … Except Russian Tourists Returning from […]

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