The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘tirgoviste decembrie 1989’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #14 Flight of the Ceausescus

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 22, 2014

(purely personal views as always, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

Fuga cuplului Ceausescu – din mai multe unghiuri, posted by the Alk1970

http://revolutions.gandul.info/stiri/omul-care-a-filmat-revolutia-cum-au-fost-inregistrate-primele-imagini-in-piata-universitatii-in-decembrie-1989-13733807

http://revolutions.gandul.info/stiri/imagini-inedite-primul-documentar-despre-revolutie-de-craciun-ne-am-luat-ratia-de-libertate-13734054

Nicolae Deca cu Petre Mihai Bacanu, “Ceausescu nu s-a gandit sa fuga din tara,” Romania Libera, 23 decembrie 1993, p. 15.

“Nicolae Ceausescu nu s-a gandit nici o clipa sa fuga din tara, pentru ca elicopterul avea suficient combustibil sa ajunga in Irak sau Iran, locuri care, cred eu, i-ar fi asigurat viata.”

from the 1993 documentary, The Last Day, by Arnaud Hamelin

Why did Ceausescu not intend to flee the country?  Why did he tell Nicolae Deca that he planned to “organize the resistance” in Tirgoviste?

What “organized resistance”  would Nicolae Ceausescu have had in mind?

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/19/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasion-but-the-invaders-never-came-i/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/21/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-ii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/24/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iii/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/01/27/what-would-it-have-looked-like-if-nicolae-ceausescus-securitate-executed-a-plan-to-counter-an-invasionbut-the-invaders-never-came-iv/

Tirgoviste was one alternate in a longstanding plan…

Mirel Curea, Evenimentul Zilei, nr. 317, 9 iulie 1993, p. 3

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

22 December 1989: What Forced the Ceausescus to Flee?

At midday on Friday, 22 December 1989, a large, overloaded helicopter lifted off from the roof of the Central Committee (CC) building and struggled to clear the grey Bucharest skyline. Moments later, demonstrators reached the roof of the CC building and began destroying the landing pad so as to ensure that no more helicopters could land. Below in Palace Square almost 100,000 people had gathered and were now singing deliriously to the tune of a widely-known English soccer hymn: “Ole! Ole! Ole! Ceausescu nu mai e!” (”Ole! Ole! Ole! Ceausescu is no more!”). The helicopter carried Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu on their final, convoluted journey out of Bucharest and brought to an abrupt and ignominious end Nicolae Ceausescu’s twenty-four year reign. After the violence of the previous night, the peaceful denouement to the confrontation between population and the Ceausescu regime came unexpectedly. Most observers figured that Ceausescu would rather have held out in the Central Committee building–”surrounded by mountains of cadavers,” as one person put it–than flee from power.[106] Thus, these observers have come to assume that the Securitate must have abandoned Ceausescu en masse.[107] Ilie Stoian summarizes the prevailing view when he states that “we are convinced that if the Securitate had not wished it so, no one would have penetrated the CC [building] and Ceausescu would not have fallen on this day.”[108]

Moreover, there has been widespread speculation that the leadership of the former Securitate must already by this time have come to some sort of understanding with the coup plotters who were to lead the National Salvation Front to power.[109] Such speculation is important for if the Securitate as institution abandoned Ceausescu and already had an agreement with the country’s new political leaders, then the “terrorists” who appeared after the evening of 22 December must either have been working on behalf of the National Salvation Front or have been an invention designed to legitimate the Front’s seizure of power.

Opposition sources have provided fodder for both conclusions. According to Liviu Valenas: “In Bucharest, it is certain that the Securitate had crossed over practically in corpore to the side of the plotters already from the night of 21/22 December 1989, probably around midnight.”[110] He speculates that General Vlad had already been engaging in dissident activity over the preceding days: “it appears that he [Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad] is the person who transmitted to Timisoara the orders…’that in Timisoara there will not be calm,’ ‘for the workers to go out into the street,’ and ‘for the Army to be withdrawn to barracks.’”[111] Ilie Stoian attempts to imply that during the evening of 21/22 December 1989, General Vlad was already attempting to distance himself from the other regime commanders. Stoian contrasts the actions of Defense Minister Milea–who remained among the group of party, Army, Securitate, and Militia officials who were coordinating the repression–and those of General Iulian Vlad who “stood alone on the sidewalk across from these [officials], a place from which he did not leave until the morning of 22 December and in which he remained quiet and did not attempt to make contact with anyone.”[112]

This allegation seems doubtful, however. In March 1990, a demonstrator alluded to Vlad’s role at University Square on the night of 21/22 December: “we were several hundred people then, when the sinister person who hid behind the codename ‘M-88′ gave the order for us to be massacred.”[113] In the transcript of communications among USLA and Militia personnel on 21 and 22 December, “88″ is indicated as General Vlad’s code.[114] Furthermore, as our discussion of the events in University Square revealed, Securitate forces were clearly involved–and in fact appear to have been the main component–in the brutal repression which took place on this night.

The sudden death of Defense Minister Vasile Milea just before 9:30 a.m. on 22 December 1989 was a critical moment in the evolution of events. The announcement on national television a little more than an hour later (10:50 a.m.) that “the traitor Milea has committed suicide” only seemed to hasten the fraternization already underway between Army recruits and the protesters heading for the city center. The official explanation of General Milea’s sudden death raised incredulity then and has continued to ever since. The title of an interview with one of Milea’s deputies sums up the details of Milea’s death which make the official “suicide” explanation questionable: “A curiosity: you shoot yourself in the heart, place the gun on the table, and then lie down on the sofa.”[115]

In 1995, Liviu Valenas publicized the claims of a former officer of the Securitate’s foreign intelligence branch (DIE)–now sharply critical of the Iliescu regime and SRI–regarding Milea’s death. According to this Securitate source, the Securitate was already serving the interests of the National Salvation Front by the morning of 22 December. He alleged that Milea was shot by the Securitate “on the orders of Ion Iliescu” and that this “smoothed the way for the success of a coup d’etat of KGB inspiration.”[116]

This allegation is highly suspect. Questioned at his summary trial on 25 December 1989 just prior to his execution, Nicolae Ceausescu maintained that Milea was a traitor because “he did not urge his unit to do their patriotic duty.”[117] Ceausescu had expanded in greater detail at the emergency CPEx meeting immediately following Milea’s death:

General Milea left from my office and two minutes later I was informed that he had shot himself. Taking into account his behavior during this entire period, it is clearly evident that he sabotaged the application of measures and worked in close coordination with foreigners…In the Capital, they did not apply a measure, they did not assign the specified units to the Capital, but used them elsewhere….The traitor Milea left from here and committed suicide. I told him to go issue the order to call military units and he committed suicide….[118]

According to Rady, Milea’s alleged insubordination was not merely in Ceausescu’s imagination:

When daybreak came, the extent of Milea’s disobedience became clear. The Central Committee Building was only lightly guarded and the streets leading up to it were inadequately protected. At the same time, the earliest reports began to come in from local party secretaries and securitate offices that the army was no longer taking any action to put down demonstrations in the provinces. Thus whereas the previous day, the army had shot down six demonstrators in Tirgu Mures, it had now assumed a passive position, simply guarding the party headquarters and leaving the streets to the crowds.[119]

Rady proposes that for this is the reason, Milea was summoned to Ceausescu’s office and instructed “to order the army to recommence active operations immediately and to open fire on such units as proved recalcitrant.”

Army sources suggest that after exiting the first emergency CPEx meeting of the morning (at approximately 8:30 a.m.), Milea gave the order that the Army units on the streets of Bucharest should mass around their equipment, ignore “provocations,” and refrain from opening fire.[120] To some extent, Milea was merely responding to the realities in the field, for already after 7 a.m. huge columns of workers from the IMGB and other major factories were on the march towards the city center. Overwhelmed commanders in the field were constantly inquiring of their superiors as to how they should proceed in light of the rapidly-changing situation. In some cases, they apparently received the order from mid-level commanders to mass around their equipment; in others, they apparently followed their own conscience. According to Army sources, the effect of the soldiers grouping around their equipment was de facto to break up the cordons of regime forces designed to prevent the forward progress of the demonstrators.[121] Milea’s order solidified the unhindered passage of the demonstrators all the way into Palace Square.

It remains unclear whether Milea was assassinated by the Securitate for this insubordination or did indeed commit suicide.[122] For example, one Army officer has admitted that (apparently after his showdown with Ceausescu) a very emotional Milea ordered him to give him his gun and then Milea slammed the door to his office and shot himself.[123] What is clear is that immediately following news of Milea’s death, the CPEx met in emergency session again. The transcript of the emergency CPEx meeting sometime after 9:30 a.m. offers some surprises.[124] While most CPEx members obediently answered Ceausescu’s appeal for them to fight to the bitter end, several members appeared to equivocate in the face of the now massive numbers of protesters. Gogu Radulescu argued: “Based on the information we have, columns of workers have headed towards the center and it is necessary to take measures in order to avoid a bloodbath.” Even Prime Minister Constantin Dascalescu admitted: “I have been and will be by your side until the end, but I believe that it is necessary to consider what will happen if we shoot into honest workers.”

The views of the CPEx members seem also to have been influenced by news that some Army soldiers had been “disarmed” by protesters. Ion Radu stated that “Minister Vlad says that there are still isolated, small groups of disarmed soldiers.” Significantly, in the absence of a representative from the Army at the meeting, it was Securitate Director Vlad (officially not even a CPEx member) who assured those gathered that “the Army will not allow itself to be disarmed.” In the end, it was decided that only if the demonstrators were armed or attacked would regime forces open fire. While the post-Ceausescu media has occasionally recorded Vlad as having responded to Ceausescu’s appeal to “fight to the end” with the phrase “like hell we will,” the stenogram quotes him as replying obediently “we will proceed as you have instructed.”[125]

In the wake of Milea’s death, Nicolae Ceausescu personally appointed General Victor Stanculescu–freshly-arrived from Timisoara and a notorious favorite of Elena’s–as Defense Minister. From a bureaucratic standpoint, the Army Chief of Staff, General Stefan Guse, should have legally succeeded Milea. But Guse was still in transit from Timisoara and in such cases Ceausescu’s word was always the final arbiter. According to Stanculescu, Milea had phoned him the previous night and told him that “problems” had developed and that he should return to Bucharest immediately.[126] In one of the most famous pieces of folklore concerning the December events, upon returning to Bucharest in the early morning hours of 22 December, Stanculescu–according to his own account–was so determined to avoid being further implicated in a repression similar to what he had been involved in in Timisoara that he arranged for a doctor to put his left leg in a cast.[127] Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from being appointed Defense Minister.

Between 9:30 a.m. (when Milea was found dead) and 10:45 a.m. (when Stanculescu arrived at the CC building), the Army was essentially without a commander-in-chief and officers continued to transmit Milea’s last order prior to his death, calling on the troops not to open fire.[128] After Stanculescu arrived at the CC building, at 10:45 a.m. he expanded Milea’s “Rondoul” order to include the return of all Army units to barracks.[129] At the same time, however–according to Air Force Commander, General Gheorghe Rus, immediately after the events–Stanculescu instructed him to dispatch three hundred parachutists, with helicopters and airplanes, ready to descend and engage in battle in Palace Square.[130] While on trial in 1990, CPEx member Manea Manescu confirmed that the initial plan had been to evacuate the entire CPEx from the CC building.[131]

Sauca is probably correct that Stanculescu realized that if he did not quickly find a way to get rid of the Ceausescus, he too might suffer Milea’s fate.[132] The choice for Stanculescu was simple: “either him [Nicolae] or us!” Stanculescu maintains that because the hallways of the CC building were teeming with well-armed guards and “windows could already be heard shattering at the entrance to the CC,” he took the decision to evacuate the Ceausescus by helicopter in order to avoid a bloodbath or the lynching of the first couple.[133] According to Lieutenant Colonel Ion Pomojnicu, one of the few Army officers in the building at the time, the Securitate inside were indeed “armed to the teeth” with machine guns and piles of ammunition and “determined to face anything.”[134]

Although the former Securitate contest the popular and “revolutionary” dimension of the December events, they routinely take credit for the fact that they did not open fire on demonstrators on the morning of 22 December 1989. For example, “a group of former Securitate officers” ask “a final question of all those ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘dissidents’ who attack the personnel of the former Securitate“: why if the officers of the Fifth Directorate located inside the CC building had 200,000 cartridges at their disposal did they not open fire?[135] General Vlad has gone to great lengths to detail the orders he gave to his subordinates on the morning of 22 December, instructing them not to open fire and to allow the peaceful entrance of demonstrators into the CC building and television station.[136]

Vlad’s statements are drawn into question, however, by the fact that they accompany claims that as early as 17 December 1989 he was disobeying Ceausescu’s orders and instructing his men in Timisoara not to open fire and to stay off the streets, and that on 18 December he issued such an order for the whole country.[137] The transcript of communications among USLA and Militia units does reveal that after 9:40 a.m. frequent references were made to a decision from “central headquarters” that regime forces were to open fire only if demonstrators attempted to penetrate regime buildings, in which case only warning shots were to be fired.[138] Yet the timing of this decision suggests that it was a reaction to the action–or rather, lack of action–of the Army which had allowed demonstrators to overwhelm the city center, and that it was in accordance with the decision taken at the second emergency CPEx meeting.

According to Army Lieutenant Colonel Ion Pomojnicu, the Securitate were fully-prepared to repress, but they were caught off-guard by the rapid development of events precipitated by the defection of the Army from the regime:

Generally-speaking, you know the withdrawal of the Army created great surprise. The moment the Army withdrew, the other forces fragmented and those forces belonging to the Interior Ministry fled. If this momentary disorganization of theirs had not intervened between 11 and 12 a.m. when it happened, it is possible that these Interior Ministry forces would have intervened. This moment of panic and disorientation favored the future evolution of events.[139]

Moreover, the evacuation of the Ceausescus from the CC building left them flat-footed:

…[The Securitate] fled as soon as their mission was finished; their mission was to defend this person, Ceausescu. If he had remained, they would have [opened fire]. I believe that for these people the flight of Ceausescu from the CC building eliminated the object they were supposed to defend in the building and would have defended indefinitely had he stayed….Don’t forget that there were similar forces not only inside the CC building. There were also troops barricaded in the headquarters of the Fifth Directorate and in the [National] Library. They did not come down from the top of the building until the helicopter had taken off….I am convinced that neither at the television station would anybody have penetrated inside if it had not been known that Ceausescu had fled. The flight of Ceausescu was vital to the unfolding of the Romanian Revolution.[140]

Further evidence that the Securitate were left in disarray by Ceausescu’s flight comes from Dr. Sergiu Tanasescu, one of the first people to enter the CC building:

…I must tell you those there were taken completely by surprise. We found half-finished coffees, abandoned cigarettes in the ashtrays….They were ripping off their epaulets, they had on shirts of one color and pants of another, trying to confuse us….At Entrance A there were many Securitate….who took advantage of the fact that they were dressed in civilian clothes and attempted to mix into the crowds….five in civilian clothes opened fire without any warning, even if it is true that they shot over the heads of the crowd…[141]

The Ceausescus on the Run

The situation in Palace Square evolved so quickly that in the end only one helicopter was able to land. Air Force Commander General Rus was forced to cancel the order for the parachutists and called the other helicopters back to base. Here was indeed a case where a slight change in timing might have had huge consequences. Had the demonstrators not made it to the roof of the CC building and set about destroying the landing pad–thus making it inoperable–Stanculescu would probably have boarded one of the other helicopters en route. The Army would have been far less likely to threaten to shoot down any of the helicopters knowing that the acting Defense Minister was aboard one of them.[142] The helicopter carrying the Ceausescus might then have made it to the heavily-fortified Boteni air force base. Had the commanders there obeyed the orders issued in person by the Supreme Commander (Ceausescu) “the situation would have become enormously complex.”[143]

But as things turned out, the protesters reached the roof of the CC building just as the Ceausescus were boarding the first helicopter–indeed, Ceausescu’s bodyguards from the Fifth Directorate had to hold back the demonstrators at gunpoint. Moreover, there were a host of eyewitnesses who distinctly heard Elena shout back to Stanculescu: “Victoras [a diminutive], take care of the children!” According to Brucan, Stanculescu was highly-aware of this fact, and realizing that Ceausescu was clearly finished, “with his characteristic elegance [he] made a sharp U-turn: ‘La stinga imprejur [About-Face]!’.”[144] Brucan suggests that he had complete confidence that from this moment, Stanculescu broke definitively with the Ceausescus and allied with the revolution.[145] Sauca states things more colorfully: “It is clear that from the moment when the helicopter lifted off from the roof of the CC, Victor Stanculescu no longer gave a damn for the lives of the Ceausescus and their clan.”[146]

Initially, it was assumed that the Ceausescus were headed for “an Arab country, presumably Libya, where they could count on their dollar deposit at Swiss banks.”[147] But, as Silviu Brucan writes: “our assumptions were wrong. No, Ceausescu was not a man to accept defeat so readily.”[148] After a short stopover at their Snagov villa–where Nicolae phoned frantically to find a safe haven within the country and where Elena packed four more bags of jewels, bathrobes, and towels to put aboard the already over-laden helicopter–they took off again headed for Tirgoviste (from which Nicolae had received the most encouraging reports). When the pilot of the helicopter, Lieutenant Colonel Vasile Malutan, informed Nicolae and Elena that the helicopter had been spotted on radar and could be shot down at any moment, the Ceausescus decided it was better to land.[149] Ceausescu’s Fifth Directorate bodyguards then flagged down a passing car at gunpoint and the first couple attempted to “hitch” their way to Tirgoviste. Their first lucky driver, doctor Nicolae Deca, has maintained that the Ceausescus “never thought for a moment of fleeing the country.”[150]

After nightfall, the Ceausescus ended up at the Inspectorate of the Militia and Securitate in Tirgoviste. According to Army Major Ion Tecu, in the preceding hours Militia men had held the couple in a nearby forest, apparently trying to decide what to do with them.[151] When they turned up unexpectedly at the Inspectorate, the head of the local Securitate, Colonel Gheorghe Dinu, agreed to turn the couple over to the Army detachment which had arrived to take control of the building. Brucan describes Dinu’s actions in the following quotation:

As was typical of the situation that fateful afternoon, the local Securitate commander could not make up his mind how to proceed. In the meantime, radio and television were signaling to the whole nation that the balance was tilting in favor of the revolution. The security officers started leaving the building, and very soon everybody was gone.[152]

Shortly after 6 p.m., the couple was transported to the Army garrison. Major Tecu states: “From 22 December at 6:20 p.m. until 25 December at 2:45 p.m., when the execution took place, [the Ceausescus] did not leave the perimeter of the barracks.”[153] Meanwhile, speaking from the balcony of the CC building in Bucharest, Ion Iliescu announced to a huge crowd that “the armed forces have been ordered to arrest Ceausescu. We have news that he has been captured near Tirgoviste and when this news is confirmed we will make it public…he will be arrested, and submitted to public justice!”[154] Not long after, the sporadic gunfire which had broken out after nightfall would become more sustained and erupt not only in Bucharest, but throughout the country. Phase two of the Revolution–the “terrorist” phase–had begun.

Conclusion

In two of the Eastern European countries with the most hardline regimes in the fall of 1989–East Germany and Czechoslovakia–the outbreak of unprecedented anti-regime demonstrations instigated and enabled officials within the party hierarchy to remove the hardline party leader (Erich Honnecker and Milos Jakes respectively). Moreover, after poorly-planned attempts by the security services to crush these demonstrations backfired and in fact catalyzed anti-regime sentiment, these institutions largely withdrew to the sidelines. The withdrawal of the state institutions of law and order from the aggressive defense of the party leadership and the communist regime allowed first for the removal of the hardline leadership and then for the collapse of the communist regime.

Anti-regime protest in Romania highlighted the basic differences in the institutional character of the Romanian regime even when compared to two such hardline regimes. Anti-regime protest in Romania could not precipitate Ceausescu’s removal from the position of general secretary by other party officials because the Romanian communist party had long since lost its corporate character. Instead, as we have seen, CPEx members obediently supported Ceausescu’s decision to suppress the Timisoara demonstrations. Moreover, the state security apparatus and the military participated in the aggressive and bloody defense of the regime in Timisoara. Significantly, even when given the perfect opportunity provided by Ceausescu’s two-day absence during his trip to Iran, senior party officials did not act to remove him as general secretary and neither the Securitate nor the Army launched a coup d’etat to end his rule.

The Romanian case supplies confirmation for the arguments of Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly that it is the action or inaction of the state which plays a critical, catalytic, and often unintended role in making revolution possible.[155] The heavy-handed, absurd speeches of party activists dispatched to the Timisoara factories, the tactical withdrawal of Army troops to barracks in Timisoara, Ceausescu’s rambling televised tirade on the evening of 20 December, and his tremendously misguided idea of convoking a pro-regime rally on 21 December and then assuring live transmission of this event to the entire nation, all emboldened the population and made fundamental contributions to the eventual collapse of the regime.

Finally, contrary to most accounts, the Ceausescu regime appears to have fallen on 22 December 1989 not as the result of some conspiracy or Securitate magnanimity, but as the result of a sudden expansion of protest and the reasonably spontaneous decisions of mid-level field commanders who took the initiative when confronted with events which were fast out-pacing them. This forced the Army high command to first allow the protesters to pass unhindered to the city center and then for the Army to retreat to barracks. The Army’s slippery-slope towards defection put the Securitate in an unenviable and somewhat unanticipated (if not wholly unprepared for) position. The evidence seems to suggest that the Securitate was simply overtaken by events, by the protesters and by the Army’s behavior. The Romanian events thus confirm the importance accorded by D.E.H. Russell to the centrality of the Army’s defection in making revolution possible.[156]

Endnotes

[106].. Alexandru Sauca, K.G.B.-ul si Revolutia Romana (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), 80.

[107].. See, for example, Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” East European Politics and Societies 7, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 328 (fn. 31 especially). According to Tismaneanu: “So far, however, the only certain elements are that the Securitate and the army switched allegiances and abandoned Ceausescu during the early hours of December 22, 1989…”

[108].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 28.

[109].. See, for example, Tismaneanu, “The Quasi-Revolution”: 328 (fn. 31): “…generals Stanculescu, Guse, and Vlad acted like traditional praetorian guard chieftains in that they abandoned the losing tyrant and played a crucial role in the selection of his successor (the palace coup).”

[110].. Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de palat din Romania,” Baricada, no. 26 (10 July 1990), 3.

[111].. Ibid.

[112].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 24. Indeed, according to Stoian, Defense Minister Milea was the supreme commander of the repressive forces on this night. In December 1993, on the fourth anniversary of these events, the opposition daily edited by Horia Alexandrescu, Cronica Romana, reiterated the claim that Vlad distanced himself from the team supervising the repression (Cronica Romana, 21 December 1993, 3.).

[113].. Vasile Neagoe, “Noaptea cea mai lunga,” Expres, no. 8 (23-29 March 1990), 6.

[114].. See “Dintre sute de catarge,” Libertatea, 1 February 1990; 9 February 1990; 12 February 1990.

[115].. Captain Alexandru Barbu, interview by Horia Alexandrescu, “O curiozitate: te impusti in inima, asezi pistolul pe masa, apoi te intinzi pe canapea!” Tineretul Liber, 2 June 1990, 1-2.

[116].. Liviu Valenas, “Dosarele secrete ale neocomunismului din Romania [The secret files of Romanian neo-communism],” Romanul Liber XI, no. 8-9 (August-September 1995), 32. This appears to have originally been published in the opposition daily Evenimentul Zilei.

[117].. See FBIS-EEU-89-248, 28 December 1989, 63.

[118].. Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 53, 56.

[119].. Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 103. Indeed, information elsewhere suggests that before 10 a.m. demonstrators had taken control of local government in Alba Iulia, Arad, and other important towns in Transylvania.

[120].. See the comments of Lieutenant Colonel Rafaelescu Alexandru in Ion D. Goia, “Chiar daca fugea, Ceausescu nu scapa! [Even if he was fleeing, Ceausescu was not escaping!],” Flacara, no. 5 (6-12 February 1991), 8-9.

[121].. Lieutenant Colonel Ion Cotirlea and Lieutenant Colonel Rafaelescu Alexandru in ibid.

[122].. Even Brucan is unsure. See Brucan, The Wasted Generation, 2.

[123].. See the comments of Army Major Engineer Tufan as recounted by Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Andrei in Goia, “Chiar daca fugea,” 9.

[124].. See Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 53-56.

[125].. Ibid.

[126].. Stanculescu, interview by Ioan Buduca, 9.

[127].. Ibid. Hence, his satirical nickname in the Romanian media: “Ghipsulescu,” from the Romanian word “ghips” which means “cast.”

[128].. See the comments of Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Andrei in Goia, “Chiar daca fugea,” 9.

[129].. Ibid. See also Stanculescu, interview by Ioan Buduca, 9. According to the First Senatorial Commission report on the events, at 10:45 a.m. he instructed all units in Bucharest and on the road to Bucharest to return to barracks, and at 12:15 a.m. the order was transmitted for all units throughout the country to return to barracks (see “Cine a tras in noi, in 16-22?” Romania Libera, 27 May 1992, 5).

[130].. Brucan, The Wasted Generation, 2-3. Interestingly, Brucan comments: “[Rus’] statement was recorded in early January 1990 when his memory of events was still fresh and before political conditions began to engender the inhibitions that later would prevent generals from making such forthright statements….”

[131].. Ibid., 3.

[132].. Sauca, KGB-ul si Revolutia, 80-82.

[133].. Stanculescu, interview by Ioan Buduca, 9.

[134].. See Goia, “Chiar daca fugea,” 9.

[135].. A Group of Former Securitate Officers, “Asa va place revolutia?”

[136].. Iulian Vlad, “Ce mai aveti de spus?,” Adevarul, 19 January 1991, 5a.

[137].. Ibid.

[138].. “Dintre sute de catarge,” Libertatea, 3-14 February 1990.

[139].. Ion D. Goia, “Chiar daca fugea,” 9.

[140].. Ibid.

[141].. Dr. Sergiu Tanasescu, interview by Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera roz! [Dinca and Postelnicu were caught red-handed!],” Cuvintul, no. 7 (14 March 1990), 15.

[142].. Sauca suggests this idea in Sauca, KGB-ul si Revolutia, 82.

[143].. Ibid.

[144].. Silviu Brucan, Generatia Irosita (Bucharest: Editura Univers & Calistrat Hogas, 1992), 16. This discussion does not appear in the English version of his memoirs, The Wasted Generation.

[145].. Ibid., 16, 220-221.

[146].. Sauca, KGB-ul si Revolutia, 82.

[147].. Silviu Brucan, The Wasted Generation, 2.

[148].. Ibid.

[149].. Ibid., 4.

[150].. Nicolae Deca, interview by Petre Mihai Bacanu, “Ceausescu nu s-a gindit sa fuga din tara,” Romania Libera, 23 December 1993, 15.

[151].. See Tecu’s comments in Ion D. Goia and Petre Barbu, “Ceausestii la Tirgoviste,” Flacara, no. 51 (19 December 1990), 9-10.

[152].. Brucan, The Wasted Generation, 5. Tecu confirms that between 2 and 5 p.m., the Securitate and Militia personnel began evacuating the Inspectorate building in Goia and Barbu, “Ceausestii la Tirgoviste,” 10.

[153].. Goia and Barbu, “Ceausestii la Tirgoviste,” 10.

[154].. Revolutia Romana in Direct (Bucharest, 1990), 85.

[155].. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: Random House, 1978).

[156].. D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force (New York: Academic, 1974).

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #10 The Protesters Conquer Timisoara as the Army Withdraws to Maintain Institutional Command and Control

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #11 Ceausescu Returns from Iran…and Apparently Not Empty-Handed

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #12 Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: A Pro-Regime Rally, Televised Live

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #13 The Bloody Repression of Demonstrators at Piata Universitatii/Intercontinental

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Ceausescu nu s-a gandit sa fuga din tara (decembrie 1989)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 19, 2011

Nicolae Deca cu Petre Mihai Bacanu, “Ceausescu nu s-a gandit sa fuga din tara,” Romania Libera, 23 decembrie 1993, p. 15.

“Nicolae Ceausescu nu s-a gandit nici o clipa sa fuga din tara, pentru ca elicopterul avea suficient combustibil sa ajunga in Irak sau Iran, locuri care, cred eu, i-ar fi asigurat viata.”

from the 1993 documentary, The Last Day, by Arnaud Hamelin

Why did Ceausescu not intend to flee the country?  Why did he tell Nicolae Deca that he planned to “organize the resistance” in Tirgoviste?

Tirgoviste was one alternate in a longstanding plan…

Mirel Curea, Evenimentul Zilei, nr. 317, 9 iulie 1993, p. 3

Ted Koppel’s ABC News special Death of a Dictator (April 1990) has a good deal of discussion of Nicolae Ceausescu’s famous watch (ceasul lui Ceausescu), which allegedly had a radio-transmitter beacon in it…hence his continuous checking of his watch (as the first speaker below explained, looking at his watch and looking at the sky and looking back again, as if he was waiting for someone or something)…it lasted all the way up through his trial.

The time turned out to be:  the final minutes of his dictatorial regime and life…

Let’s Go to the Videotape (IV) “Instead of denying access to the rest of the tunnels…the authorities now deny their very existence” (Ted Koppel, Bucharest, Romania, March 1990)

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Povestea lui Florentin: “Eu am facut stagiul militar in 1989, la Targoviste, chiar in cazarma unde au fost executati sotii Ceausescu.”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on June 3, 2009

de Florentin:

CINE AU FOST TERORISTII? Problema este nu daca au existat teroristi locali, ci daca au existat trupe de mercenari straini ca sa-l salveze pe Ceausescu. Teroristi au fost denumiti de fapt fie securisti, fie ofiteri-subofiteri diversionisti, care actionau aparent individual si deschideau focul aproape fara motiv; au mai fost denumiti fanatici ai regimului muribund. Deci ei au fost teroristii. Eu am curajul sa afirm ca in evenimente au fost implicati, insa, chiar si mercenari [vedeti Arabesque: Arab Terrorist in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution ].  Pe radarele din unitatea noastra de antiaeriana de la Targoviste apareau tinte fictive, iar tehnlogia respectiva nu era la vremea aceea de origine romaneasca. Este ceea ce se cheama “razboi electronic”  [vedeti Razboiul electronic decembrie 1989 ] si putem doar concluziona cu o anumita doza de risc ca au existat trupe speciale cu origine necunoscuta pe teritoriul Romaniei. Termenul de teroristi a inceput sa fie vehiculat in acele zile cand unitatile antitero romane (trupe speciale ale Ministerului de Interne inca proceausist) se deplasau spre TVR pentru a-i inlatura de acolo pe revolutionari. Aceste trupe antitero au devenit pe moment inamicul nr. 1 al poporului si au inceput sa fie denumite nu antitero, ci teroriste si chiar ne-au tinut sub teroare o vreme, organizand tot felul de diversiuni ucigase cu ajutorul unor ofiteri de armata din unitatile militare asediate prin toata tara. Un asemenea terorist am capturat chiar eu si cativa colegi pe strazile din Targoviste: se daduse ordinul ca toate garzile civile sa predea armele, iar un domn conducea o Dacia cu automatul de gat. L-am oprit,nu a deschis focul, dar nici nu a vrut sa se predea si i-am zdrobit nasul cu catarea mea de la arma, cand a incercat sa riposteze. La perchezitie, am gasit in masina filme, munitie de pistol si documente cifrate. A stat o vreme in arest in corpul de garda unde a fost impuscat Ceausescu si nu mai stiu ce s-a intamplat cu el. Deci nu sunt teroristii problema, fiindca e clar ca au existat. Problema e daca au actionat si mercenari. Asta chiar nu se poate afla, cu toate indiciile…

Florentin, \”eu am facut stagiu militar la Tirgoviste\”

de Florentin:

Eu am facut stagiul militar in 1989, la Targoviste, chiar in cazarma unde au fost executati sotii Ceausescu. Daca va intereseaza cate ceva, astept intrebarile voastre. De pilda, de ce s-a tras in multime in mai multe orase din tara, de ce au fost executati Nicolae si Elena Ceausescu acolo si nu altundeva sau altcandva, dece procesul lor a fost un simulacru ? Sau cum aveau de gand sa scape de dictator, fiindca va garantez ca nu printr-un proces si o executie. Aceste raspunsuri le-au dat si altii, dar lumea nu vrea sa le asculte. Prefera misterul acelor evenimente.
de Florentin:
Ati observat ca am dreptate ? Toti cer aflarea adevarului despre Revolutie/lovitura de stat, dar in realitate nu mai prea intereseaza pe multa lume asa ceva. Si daca ati sti cat e de simplu. Acel adevar a fost intotdeauna la vedere, nicidecum bine ascuns. Ati observat ca Petre Roman aproape zambeste de fiecare data cand e intrebat si incepe sa raspunda, dar moderatorul il intrerupe prosteste chiar in momentul cheie ? A raspuns simplu si Ion Iliescu, insa vorbele lui nu au fost pe placul maselor si totul a fost ignorat. Asa ca sa nu va mai aud comentand evenimentele de la 1989. Avea Camil Petrescu o vorba: discutati mai bine despre ce va pricepeti. Sau, altfel spus, tineti minte cuvintele unui general la care se refera si Vlad Mixich: “Cazul Sacalul va depaseste”.
de Florentin:
Se pare ca fost organizata o lovitura de stat si chiar dusa la bun sfarsit, dovada felul in care a murit presedintele R.S.R., dar in paralel a existat si o revolutie. De aici toate confuziile. Este un caz unic in istorie, din cate cunosc eu, poate ma insel. Au iesit spontan oameni in strada, care au cerut nu doar caderea presedintelui de atunci, ci schimbarea unui regim politic, iar asta se cheama revolutie. Aceasta revolutie a triumfat, deoarece acum nu mai e comunism, nici macar cu fata umana sau neocomunism. Uniunea Europeana nu ar fi acceptat un stat communist in cadrul ei. Organizatorii loviturii de stat vizau doar inlocuirea dictatorului si ramanerea la comunism/neocomunism , ceea ce nu le-a reusit., desi inca mai spera si acum ca vor reusi. Unii vorbesc despre furarea acelei revolutii, dar realitatea este ca traim in capitalism, desi ceea ce a fost in acesti ani a fost mai mult o tentativa de capitalism, intretinuta de oligarhia cu diverse inerese, pauperizarea poporului, de pilda, pentru a dovedi mortis ca Romania nu este pe calea cea buna. Atentie, sunt opiniile mele, nu trebuie sa mi le impartasiti.
de Florentin:

Procesul respectiv a fost un simulacru fiindca a fost improvizat, organizat in graba. El nu trebuia sa aiba loc. Nu asa fusese pus la cale. Precizez ca emit un simplu punct de vedere, o marturie ca fapt divers, nu am dovezi pt. ceea ce afirm. Au incercat sa scape de Ceausescu in cu totul alt fel, dar pur si simplu nu au reusit. Au existat mai multe incercari de omorare “accidentala” a dictatorului, prin diversiuni organizate se pare de colonelul de atunci Kemenici sau cum s-o fi scriind, comandantul celebrei U.M.01417, dar el era poate cel care doar le punea in aplicare. Cu asta se cam ocupa generalii( a devenit general), stabilesc cine trebuie si cum sa moara. Nu le-a iesit, iar in final, fiindca Nicolae si Elena tot erau captivi la Targoviste, au improvizat respectivul proces, cu care s-au facut de ras pe mapamond. Pilotul de elicopter al lui Ceausescu stia exact unde trebuie sa-i duca pt. a fi “capturati” de armata, iar armata, cand i-a “capturat” le-a promis protectie, desi se stia clar ce urmeaza, inscenarea unui accident mortal, cu variante de rezerva. Am calculatorul asaltat cu “virusi”, abia mai face fata. Stati linistiti, dragii mei, ca spun un simplu punct de vedere, nu fac cine stie ce dezvaluiri socante presei. Unitatile 01378 si 01417 de langa gara erau asediate si totul trebuia sa se termine cat mai repede, altfel scapau. Cand au murit, toate impuscaturile s-au oprit, s-a facut liniste deplina. Asa se explica grraba si simulacrul. Soldatii din cazarma se retrageau incet incet in alte pozitii si nu mai faceau fata, iar procesul nu a putut sa se desfasoare asa cum ar fi trebuit, a fost improvizat si au existat greseli grave.
De ce a tras armata in multime: vreau sa va spun ca as fi tras si eu fara sa cracnesc; pai nici nu era nevoie de vreun ordin al vreunui ofiter. Inainte de luna decembrie -iar acest fapt se prea poate sa se fi intamplat in toate unitatile militare din tara- au avut loc tot felul de sedinte cu participarea militarilor in termen. Li s-a spus ca grupuri de cetateni straini ( sa nu zic maghiari)vor ataca unitati militare pentru a pune mana pe armamentul din dotare si a lua Ardealul. Iar cand iti spune asta un mare ofiter de stat major, nu ai cum sa nu crezi. Soldatilor care au tras in multime li se inoculase ideea ca isi apara tara si nu se lasau pacaliti de sloganurile multimii. Sa fiti convinsi ca niciun soldat nu ar fi executat ordinul de foc, daca ar fi stiut adevarul, cu toata teroarea specifica regimului comunist. De asta a tras armata, nu ca a dat neaparat cineva ordin.

de Florentin:

De ce au fost impuscati la Targoviste ? Stie toata lumea cum ar fi trebuit sa se desfasoare totul si ma refer la cazul lui Saddam Hussein. Din cate am observat eu, nu aveau da gand sa-i execute asa repede, voiau sa-i transporte cu elicopterele in Bucuresti, in stare de arest, unde poate avea sa fie organizata dupa mai multa vreme o executie, probabil precedata de un alt proces. Nu a fost sa fie asa din cauza fanaticilor lui Ceausescu, care cucerisera comandamentul, acesta fiind mutat intr-o alta pozitie. Ca sa iesi din corpul de garda la elicopter, trebuia sa iesi in camp deschis. Asta nu s-a putut, fiindca lunetistii nu ar fi iertat nimic si cuplul Ceausescu ar fi scapat. Ion Iliescu a declarat ca executia a fost pusa in aplicare din motive de siguranta nationala. Un mod frumos de a spune ca ar fi scapat si ca jumatate de popor ajungea in crematorii. Asa ca s-a auzit ordinul de foc. Nu a fost un pluton de executie propriu-zis, au descarcat pur si simplu mitralierele in ei. Din craniul Elenei nu a mai ramas decat jumatate, iar creierii au fost mancati de un caine negru, care a lins si sangele. De la Nicolae Ceausescu a curs mai putin sange, dar probabil a fost absorbit de palton. Am participat la fillmarile ulterioare ale lui Sergiu Nicolaescu, dar nu a fost ca in realitate. Eu nu am fost de fata la executie, dar am vorbit cu alti camarazi si am ajuns acolo la caeva minute, ca sa iau bucati de piatra sparte de gloante din zid. Zidul e inalt acolo, de asta nu s-a spart geamul si au crezut multi ca nu au fost impuscati in acel loc. Daca trecea de zidul corpului de garda, Ceausescu scapa. Nu aveai cum sa iesi viu de acolo. Securistii si-au facut-o cu mana lor, din exces de zel.

de Florentin:

CINE AU FOST TERORISTII? Problema este nu daca au existat teroristi locali, ci daca au existat trupe de mercenari straini ca sa-l salveze pe Ceausescu. Teroristi au fost denumiti de fapt fie securisti, fie ofiteri-subofiteri diversionisti, care actionau aparent individual si deschideau focul aproape fara motiv; au mai fost denumiti fanatici ai regimului muribund. Deci ei au fost teroristii. Eu am curajul sa afirm ca in evenimente au fost implicati, insa, chiar si mercenari. Pe radarele din unitatea noastra de antiaeriana de la Targoviste apareau tinte fictive, iar tehnlogia respectiva nu era la vremea aceea de origine romaneasca. Este ceea ce se cheama “razboi electronic” si putem doar concluziona cu o anumita doza de risc ca au existat trupe speciale cu origine necunoscuta pe teritoriul Romaniei. Termenul de teroristi a inceput sa fie vehiculat in acele zile cand unitatile antitero romane (trupe speciale ale Ministerului de Interne inca proceausist) se deplasau spre TVR pentru a-i inlatura de acolo pe revolutionari. Aceste trupe antitero au devenit pe moment inamicul nr. 1 al poporului si au inceput sa fie denumite nu antitero, ci teroriste si chiar ne-au tinut sub teroare o vreme, organizand tot felul de diversiuni ucigase cu ajutorul unor ofiteri de armata din unitatile militare asediate prin toata tara. Un asemenea terorist am capturat chiar eu si cativa colegi pe strazile din Targoviste: se daduse ordinul ca toate garzile civile sa predea armele, iar un domn conducea o Dacia cu automatul de gat. L-am oprit,nu a deschis focul, dar nici nu a vrut sa se predea si i-am zdrobit nasul cu catarea mea de la arma, cand a incercat sa riposteze. La perchezitie, am gasit in masina filme, munitie de pistol si documente cifrate. A stat o vreme in arest in corpul de garda unde a fost impuscat Ceausescu si nu mai stiu ce s-a intamplat cu el. Deci nu sunt teroristii problema, fiindca e clar ca au existat. Problema e daca au actionat si mercenari. Asta chiar nu se poate afla, cu toate indiciile…

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decembrie 1989: COMANDOURILE USLAC

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 5, 2008

(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

…Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLA erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi.  Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

Sediul U.S.L.A , pe 25 decembrie 1989 in jurul orelor 18…

Pe 25 decembrie in jurul orelor 18, dupa executarea dictatorilor, col. Ardeleanu Gh. a adunat cadrele unitatii intr-o sala improvizata si le-a spus: “Dictatura a cazut! Cadrele unitatii se afla in slujba poporului. Partidul Comunist Roman nu se desfiinteaza! Trebuie sa ne regrupam in rindul fortelor democratice din P.C.R.–continuatorul idealurilor nobile ale poporului ai carui fii sintem ! (…) Au fost gasite cadavre, indivizi avind asupra lor legitimatii de acoperire USLAC (Unitatea Speciala de Lupta Antiterorista si Comando) si legitimatii cu antetul 0620–USLA, legitimatii care nu se justifica in posesia celor asupra carora au fost gasite…” A ordonat apoi sa fie predate in termen de 24 de ore legitmatiile de serviciu, urmind ca tuturor sa le fie eliberate altele cu antetul M.Ap.N.

“Pe un terorist l-am prins chiar eu, mina mea. Avea 26 de ani si doua legitimatii, una de student in anul IV la Drept si alta data de Directia a V-a U.S.L.A.C. Unitati Speciale de Lupta Antiterorista si Comando.”

(Sergiu Tanasescu, cu Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera roz!” Cuvintul, nr. 9 29 martie 1990, p. 15.)

Sergiu Tanasescu (medicul echipei de fotbal Rapid Bucuresti) = S.T.

Ion K. Ion (ziarist, Cuvintul) = I.I.

I.I.: S-a vinturat prin presa ideea prezente unor teroristi straini…

S.T.: Imi veti ingadui sa nu ma priveasca aceasta problema ea tine de competenta

istoriei. De acord?

I.I.: O.K.

S.T.: Pe un terorist l-am prins chiar eu, mina mea. Avea 26 de ani si doua legitimatii, una de student in anul IV la Drept si alta data de Directia a V-a U.S.L.A.C. Unitati Speciale de Lupta Antiterorista si Comando. Era drogat. Am gasit asupra lui si a altor teroristi un fel de cicolata, tipul “Pasuma” si “Gripha”. Era un drog extraordinar de puternic ce dadea o stare de euforie, axata insa pe agresivitate si distrugere, si o independenta fata de somn de cel putin 10 zile. Aveau un armament supersofisticat, cu infrarosii, cu sistem de auzire la distanta etc. Am capturat o arma din asta si am tras trei gloante intr-o tinta aflata la vreo suta de metri. Arma n-avea nici un recul si, controlind apoi, am constatat ca toate cele trei gloante se infipsesera unul in celalalt. Ne-am facut si noi treaba apoi cu pusca asta pina s-a terminat munitia.

I.I. : Ce se intimpla cu teroristii prinsi?

S.T.: Noi i-am predat organelor de procuratura militara. Pe foarte multi i-am prins in primele zile, identitatea lor fiind stabilita de mai multi, de colonelul Octavian Nae, Constantin Dinescu (unchiul lui Mircea), Guse, dar mai ales Vlad care strig la prinsii astia ca de ce nu i-au ascultat ordinul sa se predea, ei faceau pe sfintii, dar teava armei era inca destul de calda de la ispravile lor. Dupa ce suportau interogatoriul acesta sumar, celor mai multi li se dadea drumul.

I.I.: De ce?

S.T. Asa ordona Vlad. Pe 22 decembrie am prins un maior de securitate care a fost dezarmat si pus in libertate, a doua zi l-am prins din nou, i-am luat armamentul si munitia si iarasi Vlad a garantat pentru el, numai ca a treia zi l-am prins din nou. Ne-am enervat si atunci i-am arestat pe toti, inclusiv pe Vlad si pe colonelul Nae, cu atit mai mult cu cit pe ultimul il surprinsese o fata de a noastra la subsol I, unde era Termoficarea, transmitind nu stiu ce la un aparat de emisie-receptie.

I.I.: Cum si cind au fost descoperite buncarele?

S.T.: Destul de tirziu, in orice caz dupa 24 decembrie. Unele intimplator, cele mai multe insa datorita insa a doi indivizi….

Capitan Gheorghe Bobric (MApN) despre ceea ce s-a intimplat la Tirgoviste in aceste zile:

Totodata,  eu cred ca Dinu [lt-col., loctiitorul sefului Securitatii judetene] nu era strain de actiunile desfasurate impotriva unitatii.  De pilda, intr-o noapte, m-a scos afara, in curtea unitatii, si auzind in oras zgomote, imi spunea:  ‘Fii atent, astea sunt ABI-uri [vehicule USLA]…In 10 minute, incep sa traga…”  Stia totul, de parca isi confirma un plan cunoscut dinainte.  Si mi-a mai spus:  “Teroristii si antiteroristii sunt pregatiti dupa acelasi principii si reguli, fac aceeasi instructie”.

(Viorel Domenico, Ceausescu la Tirgoviste.  22-25 decembrie 1989, (Bucuresti:  Editura Ion Cristoiu SA, 1999), pp. 156-157)


Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj.
Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

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