The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘nicolae ceausescu’

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #12 Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: A Pro-Regime Rally, Televised Live

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 21, 2014

(purely personal views, based on two decades of prior research and publications)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/12/cine-a-avut-ideea-organizarii-mitingului-din-21-decembrie-1989/

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December

It is informative to look back upon how the disruption of the rally was reported by foreign correspondents in Bucharest just after it had taken place. Shortly after the rally disbanded, a Bulgarian correspondent related that the cause of the commotion had been the use of “tear gas grenades” by regime forces attempting to prevent demonstrators from entering the square and the ensuing panic this had unleashed among those who were already in the square.[67] The correspondent suggested that the demonstrators had originally gathered near the Roman Square on Magheru boulevard and numbered in the thousands by the time they reached Palace Square where the speech was taking place.Similar reports come from the Yugoslav TANJUG correspondent who transmitted that demonstrators had gathered in the northwest corner of Palace Square near the Athenee Palace Hotel and that when they “tried to approach the official meeting, tear gas was thrown at them.”[68] According to the same correspondent, young men had begun to shout anti-Ceausescu slogans, were chased away by the Militia, and then proceeded through the side streets in order to get around to the other side of the meeting.[69] The Militia then used tear gas to prevent these demonstrators from joining the official meeting and it was after the “tear-gas bombs exploded that the live relay of radio and television was disrupted for several minutes.”[70]

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http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2013/06/28/cercetarile-parchetului-in-dosarul-revolutiei-11-bucuresti-busculada-de-la-mitingul-lui-ceausescu/

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/01/13/rich-andrew-hall-rescrierea-istoriei-revolutiei-triumful-revizionismului-securist-in-romania-5-cine-a-aruncat-petarda/

Dar incidentul “petardei” şi tulburarea simultană ar putea avea o explicaţie mai simplă. Este folositor să revedem cum a fost raportată tulburarea mitingului de către corespondenţii de presă străini din Bucureşti, imediat după ce-a avut loc incidentul. Scurt timp după ce adunarea populară s-a destrămat, un ziarist bulgar a relatat că motivul tulburării a fost folosirea de grenade cu gaze lacrimogene de către forţele regimului pentru a împiedica demonstranţii să intre în piaţă şi panica pe care aceasta a dezlănţuit-o printre cei care erau deja în piaţă<Sofia Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 21 decembrie 1989, în FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 decembrie 1989, pag. 71>. Ziaristul sugerează că demonstranţii s-au adunat iniţial lîngă Piaţa Romană pe bulevardul Magheru şi erau de ordinul miilor cînd au ajuns în Piaţa Palatului unde avea loc discursul [lui Ceauşescu].

Relatări similare vin de la ziaristrul agenţiei iugoslave Tanjug care a transmis că demonstranţii s-au adunat în colţul din nord-vest al Pieţii Palatului lîngă hotelul Athenee Palace, şi cînd “au încercat să se apropie de mitingul oficial, s-a aruncat cu grenade de gaz lacrimogen asupra lor”<Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service, 1359 GMT 21 decembrie 1989, în FBIS-EEU-89-245, 22 decembrie 1989, pag. 77>. Conform aceluiaşi corespondent, bărbaţi tineri au început să strige lozinci anti-Ceauşescu şi cînd au fost alungaţi de miliţie au luat-o pe străzi laterale pentru a ajunge la o altă parte a mitingului<Belgrade Domestic Service, 1410 GMT 21 decembrie 1989, în FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 decembrie 1989, pag. 70-71>. Miliţia a folosit atunci gaze lacrimogene pentru a-i împiedica pe aceşti demonstranţi să ajungă la mitingul oficial şi după ce “au explodat grenadele cu gaze lacrimogene, transmisia directă la radio şi televiziune a fost tulburată pentru cîteva minute”<Ibidem>.

Este semnificativ că şi martori oculari ai confruntărilor dintre forţele regimului şi demonstranţi din după-masa şi seara de 21 decembrie se referă la forţele regimului folosind “petarde” împotriva demonstranţilor<Băcanu, “Intercontinental 21/22”, România Liberă 15 martie 1990; 5 aprilie 1990; 19 aprilie 1990>. Un martor ocular al întîmplărilor din Piaţa Universităţii din 21 decembrie povesteşte că “Securitatea fugea după ei [demonstranţi] în grupuri şi folosea petarde şi bastoane contra lor”<Vezi comentariile lui Marcel Constantinescu în Băcanu, “Intercontinental 21/22”, România Liberă 15 martie 1990, pag. 3>. Mai mult, Rady a observat că în noaptea de 21/22 decembrie Securitatea “a detonat bombe în cîteva locuri cu speranţa că va răspîndi panica”<Rady, Romania in Turmoil, pag. 104>.

Care forţe ar fi putut folosi “petarde” şi grenade cu gaze lacrimogene împotriva demonstranţilor? În procesul său de la începutul lui 1990, ministrul de interne din perioada evenimentelor, Tudor Postelnicu, a afirmat că “USLA aveau grenade cu gaze lacrimogene” la miting<Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neîntrebat”, România Liberă, 30 ianuarie 1990, pag. 3>.

©AFP Général – Jeudi 21 Décembre 1989 – 14:24 – Heure Paris (169 mots)
Roumanie Manifestations, lead.
    Manifestations de masse a Bucarest, selon Tanjug.
   BELGRADE, 21 dec (AFP – Des milliers de personnes manifestent a Bucarest dont le centre est bloque par d importantes forces militaires et policieres, a rapporte l agence Tanjug.
   Le ” meeting de soutien ” au president Ceausescu s est transforme en une manifestation d hostilite au regime, a indique le correspondant de l agence yougoslave.
   Des milliers de personnes scandent ” A bas Ceausescu ” et ” A bas les assassins ” .
   Le nombre de manifestants ne cesse de croitre, a indique l agence yougoslave.
   Selon le correspondant de l agence yougoslave, ces manifestations ont commence lors du meeting officiel lorsqu un groupe de jeunes a commence a temoigner son mecontement des le debut du discours de M. Ceausescu. La retransmission de ce discours a ete interrompue lorsque la police est intervenue au moyen de gaz lacrymogenes pour tenter d ecarter les jeunes gens. Le leader roumain a ete contraint de reduire la duree de son discours, ecrit l agence.
   HDP/MH/nl.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
E685C73DAC093F0DB6587F48B514C0AF33B78BAB
©AFP Général – Jeudi 21 Décembre 1989 – 16:38 – Heure Paris (348 mots)

Roumanie manifestation
La manifestation hostile au regime Ceausescu continue a Bucarest, selon la radio bulgare – SOFIA 21 dec (300 WORDS).
    La manifestation anti-gouvernementale continuait jeudi apres-midi a Bucarest ou des milliers de gens etaient toujours rassembles sur la place devant l hotel Intercontinental, selon des temoins oculaires cites par la radio bulgare.
   Un char et quatre vehicules blindes sont stationnes a cet endroit. La milice n est pas intervenue contre les personnes rassemblees pres de l hotel alors que les miliciens avaient attaque quelques heures plus tot les gens qui scandaient des slogans hostiles au chef du parti et de l Etat roumains, Nicolae Ceausescu, lors de la manifestation initialement organisee en soutien au ” Conducator ” , a-t-on precise de meme source.
   Les forces de l ordre avaient fait l usage de gaz lacrymogenes contre les manifestants qui avaient crie ” liberte ” et ” democratie ” lors du rassemblement qui s est transforme en manifestation hostile au regime, selon des employes de la compagnie bulgare Balkanair et l agence de voyage bulgare Balkantourist dont les bureaux sont a proximite de l hotel.
   L intervention des forces de l ordre a provoque un mouvement de panique au meeting officiel et le reportage en direct a ete interrompue pour cinq minutes a la television, selon ces memes sources. Les manifestants criaient ” assassins ” , ” a bas Ceausescu ” et ” nous ne sommes pas des fascistes ” .
   (Selon des informations anterieures donnees par les agences sovietique TASS et yougoslave Tanjug, la police et l armee ont ouvert le feu sur les manifestants dans le centre de Bucarest, faisant de nombreux blesses et probablement des morts, ont indique des temoins occulaires).
   Par ailleurs a Sofia, le personnel de l agence de presse bulgare BTA a proteste jeudi contre ” les repressions sanglantes par lesquelles le regime de Ceausescu essaie de prolonger son agonie politique. ” Dans une declaration, BTA demande a l assemblee nationale, au Conseil d Etat et au gouvernement de Bulgarie de tout faire ” pour aider les Roumains et garantir le respect de leurs droits conformement a l acte final d Helsinki. “.
   VS-STZ/jlb.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
4D05E2193CD5C0123E441166CFAE1FBCD3CACFD4

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December


By the morning of Thursday, 21 December 1989, the regime was no longer master of the situation in Timisoara. Moreover, it was rapidly losing control in several nearby cities: Lugoj and Cugir. Nevertheless, the regime might have withstood these challenges had it not been for Nicolae Ceausescu’s insistence on convoking a mass rally and addressing his “adoring” subjects in person. It was Nicolae Ceausescu’s delusion of his own invincibility which ensured that the regime would be unable to reestablish control. Ceausescu’s inflammatory, rambling tirade on national television on Wednesday evening had signalled panic to those who watched it. If Ceausescu was so worked up, they concluded, something serious must have occurred in Timisoara. Following his televised address, Ceausescu decided to hold an open-air, pro-regime rally the following day in the sprawling square in front of the Central Committee building in the center of Bucharest. The event was to be carried live over Romanian radio and television.

Precisely because this mass rally turned out to be the deathknell for the Ceausescu regime speculation has surrounded who “goaded” Ceausescu into making such a colossally-misguided decision. In January 1993, the opposition daily Romania Libera suggested that “the meeting was organized at the suggestion of [CPEx member] Gogu Radulescu.”[31] The same article maintained that Radulescu had been followed during these days and was “observed transmitting something abroad,” thereby once again insinuating the role of foreign powers in the Romanian events.[32]

Yet it is doubtful that Nicolae Ceausescu required Radulescu’s encouragement to convoke such a rally. It seems highly likely that the idea was Ceausescu’s own brainchild and that as usual the docile members of the CPEx did not dare contradict him. It was a typically instinctive, rash, and overconfident reaction to crisis on Ceausescu’s part. Moreover, as we have seen, for Nicolae Ceausescu the events confronting him in December 1989 were a replay of August 1968: not only was socialism at stake, but Romania’s national sovereignty and independence. Thus, in this crucial moment, he would appeal not primarily to the party’s political interests, but to what were the core institutional interests of the Securitate. And he would rely on a trusted totalitarian, mobilizational technique: the “spontaneous” mass rally of support for the regime.

The pro-regime rally began at midday on Thursday, 21 December 1989 as such events always had. Almost 100,000 workers, hand-picked from Bucharest’s major factories, had been herded into the center of Bucharest to await Ceausescu’s address from the balcony of the Central Committee building. There were the customary “spontaneous” chants in support of the dictator and his policies, and obsequious introductions by party underlings. Ceausescu had been speaking for only a few minutes when an unidentifiable disruption in the crowd forced him to pause in mid-sentence. It was now that the folly of his insistence that his address be broadcast live by television and radio was realized. Before the television and radio relays could be interrupted, a national audience was able to hear high-pitched screams and shouts of “Down with Ceausescu!” “Murderer!” and “Timisoara, Timisoara!” Even worse, television cameras had captured Ceausescu’s stunned and confused facial expression. About three minutes later, after some semblance of order had been restored in the square, the live broadcast resumed. Ceausescu announced that just that morning the CPEx had approved an increase in the minimum salary and pensions![33] Ceausescu was able to finish his speech, although shouting and commotion could still be heard sporadically in the background.

It is impossible to know how much the image of a frightened Ceausescu, futilely motioning to the crowd to quiet down, influenced those who saw it. However, the scope and boldness of protest against the regime clearly intensified after the broadcast of the dictator’s previously-unimaginable moment of weakness. Anti-regime demonstrations spread throughout the major cities of Transylvania–Brasov, Sibiu, Cluj, and Tirgu Mures–on the afternoon of 21 December. It did not matter that a sufficient degree of order had been reestablished such that Ceausescu was indeed able to finish his speech or that Romanian television would rebroadcast the same speech later that evening with pro-Ceausescu chants dubbed-in over the commotion. Irreparable damage had been done.

Observers have argued that those brief, but seemingly interminable seconds during which the television camera broadcast Nicolae Ceausescu’s disbelief and helplessness live to an entire nation, constituted a sort of “singular psychological moment,” something akin to a rock shattering a mirror. What had prompted Ceausescu’s reaction? Initially, most accounts stressed how several people in the crowd had begun shouting anti-Ceausescu slogans.[34] Fearing they would be caught, they then rushed through the crowd. The other members of the crowd were frightened by this unexpected act of courage and themselves attempted to flee. The great commotion which viewers had heard before the transmission had been cut, was the sound of these people trying to force their way out of the square. Many later explanations have maintained, however, that these events were merely a response to the initial act of defiance: the setting-off of firecrackers (”petarde” in Romanian) by someone in the crowd. Only then did demonstrators take advantage of the confusion and anonymity of the moment to shout down Ceausescu. In both cases, the spontaneity of the catalytic event has been drawn into question.

Nica Leon: The Strange Tale of the “Hero” of the 21 December Rally

Because the interruption of Ceausescu’s speech proved such a turning point in the December events, it was natural that in early 1990 the newly-liberated media should try to find the person or persons responsible for “unleashing the Bucharest revolution.” In a series of interviews during March and April 1990, Petre Mihai Bacanu, senior editor of Romania Libera, introduced the nation to a group of factory workers whom he presented as the “heroes” of the 21 December rally.[35] Bacanu was widely-viewed both at home and abroad as the “conscience” of the journalistic profession (a journalist for Romania Libera before the events, he had been imprisoned between January and December 1989 for his involvement with two other people in an attempt to print an illegal underground newspaper) and his newspaper was the hub of the growing political and social opposition to the National Salvation Front regime.

Thanks in large part to Bacanu, one of these workers in particular, Nica Leon, was to become identified as the man who had dared to shout down Ceausescu.[36] Leon was presented as having yelled out “Long live Timisoara, down with the butcher, down with Ceausescu!” and “Timisoara, Timisoara” at the crucial moment during Ceausescu’s speech. Highly-respectable foreign sources such as Ratesh credit Leon by name with having disrupted the 21 December rally.[37]

In the months immediately following December 1989, Nica Leon certainly appeared every bit the hero. It turned out that on 20 December 1989, the day before his historic shout, the Toronto daily The Globe and Mail had printed an open letter by Nica Leon criticizing Ceausescu’s rule.[38] This fact seemed confirmation of the courage of his action on 21 December. During 1990, Leon was the president of a small political party, a founding member of the Romanian branch of Amnesty International, and a prominent critic of the Iliescu regime.[39] During the chaotic and violent events of 13-15 June 1990 which brought an end to the two-month occupation of University Square by demonstrators, he was arrested and over the following month and a half was the object of an eventually-successful campaign spearheaded by Romania Libera to gain his release. The opposition embraced him with open arms and he regularly appeared in interviews with the opposition press.

Yet in the ensuing years, the opposition clearly soured on Nica Leon and he broke with them in as definitive a manner as imaginable. By 1992, one opposition publication was describing Nica Leon as “at war with the whole world” and it was clear from the questions and comments of opposition journalists that they no longer held him in the high esteem they once had.[40] Ilie Stoian’s 1993 description of Leon’s role at the 21 December rally reflects this changed perception of Leon: “Just then Nica Leon took advantage of the protection offered by the uproar and yelled ‘Timisoara’…after which he ran away out of fear.”[41] Leon’s heroism had apparently become contingent upon his relationship with the opposition.

On the surface, Leon himself appeared to have undergone a striking metamorphosis: from being a fixture of the opposition to granting interviews to the press of the Ceausescu nostalgics. In early 1994, the very same Nica Leon could be found in the pages of Europa praising the Securitate and virtually lamenting the overthrow of Ceausescu which his actions had hastened.[42] He strenuously defended the actions of the Securitate Director, General Iulian Vlad, in December 1989 as honest and patriotic. How had a person the opposition had presented as a dissident for a decade prior to the December events, an unrelenting foe of the Securitate, and the hero of the 21 December rally come to this?

What is interesting about Leon is that his views on certain key issues about the December 1989 have remained remarkably consistent in spite of his flip-flop from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Leon’s defense of–and sympathy for–General Vlad was not something which had suddenly appeared after he crossed over to the Ceausist camp. It appears in the interviews he gave the opposition press in 1990.[43] Moreover, Leon strenuously denied the existence of any “terrorists” during the December events. In April 1990, he told Expres that “the terrorists were invented.”[44] In September 1990, Leon told Liviu Valenas and Daniela Rainov at Baricada that “Everything [in December 1989] was a grand diversion! THERE WEREN’T ANY TERRORISTS!” and that Vlad had been arrested because he possessed damaging information against the Front.[45]

In his interviews with Petre Mihai Bacanu at Romania Libera in April 1990, Nica Leon also mentioned several episodes which placed the Securitate and Militia in a surprisingly positive light. He maintained that during the showdown between protesters and regime forces in University Square on the afternoon of 21 December, he had spoken with a Militia sergeant major who had “wished us [the protesters] success.”[46] He also claimed that he had helped an injured Militia man to safety on this evening.[47] Leon chatted with the USLA troops at University Square and characterized their actions as follows:

…the USLA were blocking the street leading to the American Embassy and the Israeli airline company El Al. The USLA did not attack the crowd, but rather stood chatting with the demonstrators and explaining to them that they could not join them because they had an order to stay between the French Bank and the Intercontinental Hotel.[48]

As we shall see, other eyewitness accounts of these events challenge Leon’s portrayal of the USLA.

But clearly the most damaging fact about Nica Leon was the one Petre Mihai Bacanu neglected to inform his audience of: the hero of the Bucharest Revolution had been arrested as a “terrorist” on 24 December 1989. Leon had been discovered in the basement of the Central Committee building, attempting to transmit something through a radio-transmitting device belonging to the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate.[49] One might be inclined to believe that Leon had been the victim of a tragic misunderstanding were it not for a series of articles written by a former officer of the Fifth Directorate in the Ceausist publication Timpul during early 1991.[50] The former Securitate officer presented the saga of a group of those arrested as “terrorists” during the December events: among them, other officers of the Fifth Directorate, USLA members, a Jordanian student, and Nica Leon. Leon is credited with having sustained the morale of the other prisoners. According to the Fifth Directorate officer: “Nica Leon encouraged us and frequently repeated that if he escaped, he would testify for us all the way to the UN.”[51] Moreover, Leon is praised for having contacted the wives of the Fifth Directorate officers–to tell them that their husbands were still alive–after he was released on 30 December 1989. Other Securitate officers confirm Nica Leon’s presence among the arrestees.[52]

Even prior to Bacanu’s interview with Leon, there were indications that Leon was a less than completely credible source. In February 1990, Leon had given an interview to Democratia, the publication of one of Ceausescu’s most notorious former speechwriters, Eugen Florescu.[53] Surprisingly, since this was one of Leon’s first interviews since the events, there was no mention of his famous shout at the 21 December rally. In its issue of 9 March 1990, the popular Expres had made a coy reference to Leon’s arrest (while using a radio-transmitting device) in the CC building.[54] Moreover, at a meeting of the ruling Provisional Council of National Unity in early 1990, Front official Dan Iosif is said to have referred to Leon’s arrest and called him either a “securist” or “terrorist.”[55]

Nica Leon remains an enigma. It is difficult to say exactly what he was really up to on 21 December 1989. People in the crowd did indeed shout “Timisoara, Timisoara,” for it could be heard on the television broadcast. If Leon did shout it, was he the first to do so? If not, what was his motivation for shouting it? Was his shout a genuine act of individual courage at the time? Was he perhaps acting as a Securitate provocateur–someone who wished to infiltrate the protesters’ ranks–on 21 December 1989? As with other aspects of the December events, the historiography of what happened is as important as–if not more important than–what actually happened. In the case of Nica Leon, the historiography at the very least suggests a highly-manipulative portrayal of his actions in December 1989.

Who Threw the “petarde”?

Many sources have suggested that it was the explosion of a “petarde” (or firecracker) and a simultaneous commotion in the square which startled Ceausescu and made it possible for the demonstrators to yell the anti-Ceausescu slogans. Once again the discrepancy between the reporting on this incident and the reality of what appears to have happened is informative. The report of the first Senatorial commission investigating the December events (published in 1992) maintains that “while [Ceausescu] was speaking, an explosion was heard and caused substantial commotion. Shortly after this, the meeting disbanded in disorder.”[56] Stoian describes the “petarde” incident as follows:

…[then] Ceausescu took the floor. At that moment the thing which appears to us the most important event of this period occurred. It is not true that the crowd began to boo spontaneously. While Ceausescu was stumbling through a phrase up on the balcony, somewhere in the center of the Square, where there were mostly women, someone exploded a Christmas ‘petarde’ [o petarda de genul celor de Craciun]. The first reaction of these frightened women was to begin to scream. Then, all those around them began to boo.[57]

Romanians have occasionally referred to this as “the petarde of our happiness.”[58]

Part of the problem with the “petarde” scenario stems from the fact that there is no agreement upon who exploded it and no one has come forward to claim responsibility for this historic action. Nevertheless, many names have been put forward in connection with it.[59] Securitate sources clearly wish to suggest that the setting-off of this “petarde” and the causes of the commotion which ensued were part of a premeditated plan to disrupt the rally. Once again, they attempt to negate the spontaneity of the anti-Ceausescu uprising. A journalist for the Ceausist journal Democratia wrote in December 1990:

…It must be stressed that during this rally long-studied methods for the psychological manipulation of compact crowds–acoustic sounds with subliminal messages transmitted through the loudspeaker system (imitating the rumble of an earthquake, the noise of troops and tanks and gunfire); the movement of some groups through the square with the intention of dislocating the crowd; petardes–were applied.[60]

According to “a group of former Securitate officers,” the “tourists” and their domestic collaborators made their way from Timisoara to Bucharest and infiltrated the meeting. The “tourists” attempted to scare those in the crowd into believing that “they were under fire” by jabbing them in the back with “reinforced steel prongs…against the background of the noise of fire-crackers and the short-circuiting of the public address loudspeakers.”[61] Interestingly, this is how a former USLA officer has portrayed the event:

On 21 December 1989 I was taking part in the antiterrorist measures for the “goodbye” meeting. In the crowd, I identified and observed eight strange men: all were dressed approximately the same (knee-length woolen coats, hats), all were smoking at the same time, standing in a group. Some looked slavic, others asiatic. At a given moment, they took out from their pockets globe-shaped objects, lit them with their cigarettes, and threw them into the crowd; in the globes there were firecrackers which put the crowd to flight.[62]

The SRI’s 1994 report on the events suggests that the “powerful thunder claps” which were heard could have come from the detonation of a “petarde” and that the “sonic boom”-like sound which occurred came not from the crowd, but from the loudspeakers.[63] The panic among the crowd was caused by the transmission of high-pitched soundwaves (outside the range of human hearing) and by the fact that unidentified demonstrators were prodding the others with steel poles while shouting “Run away, they will kill us!” and “The tanks are coming!”[64]

Opposition accounts incorporate familiar elements. The influential journalist Cornel Nistorescu places the “petarde” incident in the context of a coup d’etat supported by a faction within the Securitate:

Simultaneously, at the meeting of 21 December, according to incontrovertible information, a Securitate officer launched the two petardes which provoked panic and unleashed the redemption of Bucharest’s citizens. Meanwhile, through the loudspeaker system controlled by the Securitate, boos and whistles were disseminated.[65]

Ecaterina Radoi of Zig-Zag suggests that the unbelievable panic which ensued was the result of the emission of sounds resembling the rumble of tanks and machine gun fire.[66]

But the “petarde” incident and the simultaneous commotion may have a simpler explanation. It is informative to look back upon how the disruption of the rally was reported by foreign correspondents in Bucharest just after it had taken place. Shortly after the rally disbanded, a Bulgarian correspondent related that the cause of the commotion had been the use of “tear gas grenades” by regime forces attempting to prevent demonstrators from entering the square and the ensuing panic this had unleashed among those who were already in the square.[67] The correspondent suggested that the demonstrators had originally gathered near the Roman Square on Magheru boulevard and numbered in the thousands by the time they reached Palace Square where the speech was taking place.

Similar reports come from the Yugoslav TANJUG correspondent who transmitted that demonstrators had gathered in the northwest corner of Palace Square near the Athenee Palace Hotel and that when they “tried to approach the official meeting, tear gas was thrown at them.”[68] According to the same correspondent, young men had begun to shout anti-Ceausescu slogans, were chased away by the Militia, and then proceeded through the side streets in order to get around to the other side of the meeting.[69] The Militia then used tear gas to prevent these demonstrators from joining the official meeting and it was after the “tear-gas bombs exploded that the live relay of radio and television was disrupted for several minutes.”[70]

Significantly, eyewitness accounts of the confrontations between regime forces and demonstrators on the afternoon and evening of 21 December refer to regime forces firing “petardes” at the demonstrators.[71] One eyewitness to the events in University Square on the afternoon of 21 December recounts that “the Securitate ran after them [the demonstrators] in groups and used ‘petardes’ and clubs against them.”[72] Moreover, Rady has observed that on the night of 21/22 December, the Securitate “[i]n a few places…detonated bombs in the hope of spreading panic.”[73]

Which forces would have used the “petardes” and tear-gas against the demonstrators? During his trial in early 1990, the Interior Minister at the time of the events, Tudor Postelnicu, stated that “the USLA were in charge of tear-gas” at the rally.[74] Stoian has noted the difference between the 21 December rally and past rallies in his typically colorful tone:

In the first place, how striking it was that if in the past at the meetings to which Bucharest’s citizens were all too well-accustomed, people were indifferent–indeed, some were even happy since they would get three or four hours of work off–now nobody was smiling. Almost everybody entered [the square] in an ill-omened silence. A completely new element was the verification of identity papers of most people on the streets on this occasion; those who did not belong to the groups of workers [chosen to participate] were politely made to exit the columns…After the Palace Square was full, something unexpected happened. If in the past, the ring of civilians (Securitate men, party activists) and Militia men [around the crowd at such an event] would not permit those bored of listening to Ceausescu’s idiocies to leave, this time things were completely the other way around….Anyone who wanted to leave could, but no one from outside the ring could enter the protected zone.[75]

Eyewitnesses have specifically identified the forces preventing their entrance into the square as “USLA troops.”[76]

The partial transcripts of communications among USLA and Militia units on 21 and 22 December in Bucharest were published in late January-early February 1990 in the daily Libertatea.[77] These transcripts suggest that even before the rally had begun, large groups of demonstrators had gathered at a number of the intersections leading onto Palace Square, were shouting anti-regime slogans, and were taxing the capacity of the regime forces to prevent them from entering the square.[78] The demonstrators apparently realized well the tremendous opportunity offered them by the live national broadcast of this rally. Thus, the impression left by most accounts–that it was a few, isolated, brave men, within a crowd of tens of thousands of automatons, who had dared to challenge Ceausescu–is simply romanticized. The actions of those prevented from entering the meeting probably emboldened those in the crowd to shout down Ceausescu.

The transcripts also show that on the order of Securitate Director General Vlad, the USLA used “gela” (the Securitate reference for “petardes”) against the demonstrators.[79] Ilie Stoian alleges that General Grigore Ghita, the commander of the Securitate’s uniformed troops, “violated his brief” when he incorporated units of the USLA, including a “geniu-chimic” unit (which would have been in charge of tear-gas), among the regime forces assigned to work the rally.[80] Yet such an action does seem in accordance with Interior Ministry Order No. 2600. Moreover, even the Senatorial commission’s report illustrates that the security for the rally of 21 December was left almost entirely in the hands of the Securitate, and that General Vlad’s deputy, General Gianu Bucurescu, was given personal charge of the rally.[81]

It appears then that a key factor contributing to the disruption of Ceausescu’s speech was the attempt by regime forces to hold off anti-Ceausescu demonstrators from entering Palace Square. This commotion and confusion so changed the complexion of the rally that those among the crowd handpicked to attend took advantage of the opportunity and suddenly switched from chanting pro-Ceausescu slogans to jeering and booing the dictator. It is possible that the “petarde” at the rally was launched by the Securitate, but it is unlikely it did so as an act of defiance against the dictator. The “petarde” may have been used to prevent protesters from entering the square or to disorient the crowd and mask the sound of the anti-Ceausescu slogans. The disruption of the rally may therefore have been far less “organized” than has commonly been presumed.

[31].. R.M., “Dezvaluiri [Revelations],” Romania Libera, 19 January 1993, 1. Radulescu died in 1994.

[32].. Ibid. Presumably that foreign power would have been the Soviet Union.

[33].. Nicolae was probably improvising. A tape of the rally broadcast on a Bucharest FM radio station in December 1993 recorded Elena yelling at her husband: “Promise them something! Promise them anything!”

[34].. Rates, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 39; Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 100.

[35].. See the series “Intercontinental 21/22″ in Romania Libera, especially for 31 March 1990, 1 April 1990, 2 April 1990, 5 April 1990, and 6 April 1990. There is no reason to believe that those Bacanu presented did not actually shout down Ceausescu at the rally. The issue is the context in which Bacanu chose to present their actions.

[36].. Leon’s notoriety also apparently stemmed from his exposure in a well-known documentary series entitled “Noaptea Generalilor” [The Night of the Generals] which appeared on Romanian television during 1990. This television series was also produced by Petre Mihai Bacanu.

[37].. Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 39.

[38].. Nicola Leon, “You took away our rights and gave us lice and fear,” The Globe and Mail, 20 December 1989, A7. In spite of the slight difference in name, Nica Leon has claimed that this is his letter and there seems little reason to doubt that this is the case. Nicola Leon is described as a “34-year old mechanical engineer living in Bucharest,” details which generally fit with Nica Leon’s background. It is unclear when this open letter arrived at the newspaper.

[39].. See, for example, his comments in Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Mai putine flori, mai multi participanti,” Romania Libera, 24 April 1990, 3.

[40].. Nica Leon, interview by editorial board, “Nica Leon in razboi cu toata lumea,” Flacara, no. 34 (26 August 1992), 4-5.

[41].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89, 23.

[42].. Nica Leon, interview by Angela Bacescu, Europa, March-April 1994, 2, 3. Bacescu introduced Leon as president of the Liberal Democratic Party and member of Amnesty International (!). Among the many dubious claims in this interview is the allegation that Elena Ceausescu had been plotting a coup d’etat against her husband set for 30 December 1989.

[43].. See, for example, Nica Leon, interview by Liviu Valenas and Daniela Rainov, “Lovitura de palat din Romania [The Palace Coup in Romania],” Baricada, no. 36 (18 September 1990), 3.

[44].. Rasvan Popescu, “Moda lui Jos,” Expres, no. 13 (27 April-3 May 1990), 2. For the significance of his denial of the existence of the “terrorists” see chapters seven and eight.

[45].. Leon, interview, “Lovitura de Palat.”

[46].. Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 5 April 1990, 3.

[47].. Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 6 April 1990.

[48].. Ibid.

[49].. Leon proudly admits to this in Leon, interview, “Lovitura de palat.”

[50].. See the six-part series by Maiorul A.D. (apparently Major Aurel David, who was one of four Fifth Directorate officers tried and acquitted in March 1990) entitled “Scenariile si Realitatea. Marturie la dosarul ‘Teroristi’,” which appeared between January and March 1991 in Timpul. It is significant to note that when this series appeared Nica Leon was still a welcome member of the opposition.

[51].. Maiorul A.D., “Scenariile si Realitatea (VI),” Timpul, 1 March 1991, 11.

[52].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 161. USLA officer Romulus Garz refers to “officer David (one of four officers from Ceausescu’s guard)” and to the presence of Nica Leon among the prisoners he was held together with. Garz was arrested after the famous incident in front of the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December–discussed in chapter seven.

[53].. See the interview with Nica Leon in Democratia, no. 4 (12 February 1990).

[54].. See Expres, 9 March 1990, 8.

[55].. Valenas and Rainov did raise this issue with Leon in Leon, “Lovitura de palat.” However, they refused to challenge his answers and almost appeared to embrace them. While Leon was still aligned with the opposition, the regime-supportive press alleged that he had been a Securitate informer code-name “Nelutu.” The allegation appeared in the Ceausist Romania Mare, and the daily Azi, closely-linked to then Prime Minister Petre Roman, see Expres Magazin, no. 32 (13-20 August 1991), 2. Nica Leon himself–almost proudly–lists all the allegations launched against him (including that he was related to the Ceausescus) in Leon, “Nica Leon in razboi cu toata lumea,” Flacara, no. 34 (26 August 1992), 4. He avoids commenting on their validity, however.

[56].. Raportul Comisei Senatoriale pentru cercetarea evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, “Cine a tras in noi, in 16-22?” Romania Libera, 27 May 1992, 5.

[57].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 23. It was only after this, Stoian maintains, that Nica Leon delivered his famous shout.

[58].. Tudorel Urian, “Cabala Teroristilor,” Cuvintul, no. 20 (13 June 1990), 4.

[59].. The suspects are legion: The dubious Nica Leon claims that a 60-year old man named Andrei Ilie, “who kissed Iliescu when he arrived at the CC [building on 22 December],” threw the petarde (Leon, interview, “Nica Leon in razboi.”). Opposition journalist A. Corneliu Giagim writes that the “author” of the petarde was Matei Ilie who had assembled it out of an aerosol can (A. Corneliu Giagim, “16-22, Cine-a tras in noi?!” Baricada, no. 49-50 (18 December 1990), 6.). In early 1990, Petre Mihai Bacanu confidentially stated that a young man named Adrian Constantin had thrown the petarde (Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 31 March 1990, 1.). Whereas Bacanu had been able to interview Nica Leon and the young aviation mechanics who had started the chants against Ceausescu, he had been unable to track down Constantin to speak with him. Dan Iosif, the Front official who accused Leon of being a “terrorist,” has also been proposed as the source of the petarde (Expres Magazin, no. 30 (20-26 February 1991), 8.). There are likely others who have been credited with this act.

[60].. C. Maltese Martine Ui (possibly a pseudonym), “De la ‘Jos Ceausescu!’ am ajuns la ‘Jos Romania!’ Dubla Lovitura impotriva Romaniei” Democratia, no. 48 (December 1990), 3.

[61].. A Group of Former Securitate Officers, “Asa va place revolutia! Asa a fost!” Democratia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4. Also, see a translation of this article in FBIS-EEU-90-207, 25 October 1990, 50-53.

[62].. “S.V., reserve USLA officer” (perhaps Strat Vintila, based on other accounts), in Pavel Corut, Floarea de Argint (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), 171. In fact, the description of these men as wearing knee-length woolen coats and hats makes them sound suspiciously like the Securitate and the USLA themselves, as we shall see later.

[63].. “Fapte care trimit la o actiune premeditata a unor ‘actori’ din afara (II),” Curierul National, 10 July 1994, 2.

[64].. Ibid. Former deputy prime minister and senator, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, makes similar allegations. He claims that the explosion was caused by a “handcrafted petarde” (”o petarda artizanala”) made from an aerosol can. He too suggests that the panic was intensified by the “perhaps purposeful” malfunction of the loudspeaker system and the emission of a terrifying sound which resembled the “rumbling of tanks.” Voiculescu adds that “it is also possible…that there was a type of ‘acoustic bomb.’” Gelu Voican Voiculescu, interview by Neti Luchian and Val. Voiculescu, “‘Haosul nostru i-a paralizat (I),” Libertatea, 16 July 1991.

[65].. Cornel Nistorescu, “Complot sau conspiratie cu pretentii la putere? [Plot or conspiracy with pretensions to power]” Cuvintul, no. 20 (13 June 1990), 5.

[66].. Ecaterin Radoi, “Remember 15 decembrie 1989 – 20 mai 1990,” Zig-Zag, no. 190 (23-31 December 1993), 4-7.

[67].. Sofia Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 21 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 December 1989, 71.

[68].. Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service, 1359 GMT 21 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-245, 22 December 1989, 77.

[69].. Belgrade Domestic Service, 1410 GMT 21 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 December 1989, 70-71.

[70].. Ibid.

[71].. See accounts in Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 15 March 1990; 5 April 1990; 19 April 1990.

[72].. See the comments of Marcel Constantinescu in Bacanu, “Intercontinental 21/22,” 15 March 1990, 3.

[73].. Rady, Romania in Turmoil, 104.

[74].. Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neintrebat [Postelnicu spoke without being asked to],” Romania Libera, 30 January 1990, 3.

[75].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 22. Stoian’s “spin” on this event, however, is that people were not allowed to enter the square because “something was being awaited,” thus insinuating that the disruption of the rally was organized in advance.

[76].. See the comments of Nistor Ruxandoiu in Gheorghe Ionita, “Culcati-i la pamint!” Adevarul de Duminica, 14 January 1990, 2.

[77].. Published in Libertatea between 27 January and 15 February 1990 under the heading “Dintre sute de…catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie [From…hundreds of “masts” (radio identification for USLA officers conducting surveillance) Scanning the Revolution].” Such recordings could have come from only one source: the former Securitate. Interestingly, with the exception of one episode (3 February 1990), all of these communications come from the afternoon of 21 December or morning of 22 December. There are no communications for the USLA from 3:30 p.m. 21 December until 8 a.m. 22 December–the period during which regime forces opened fire on the demonstrators.

[78].. “Dintre sute de catarge,” 27 January 1990; 29 January 1990.

[79].. “Dintre sute de catarge,” 30 January 1990, 2. An anonymous editor defines the meaning of “gela” as “petarde” at the close of this episode. Stefanescu confirms the use of “petardes” in his statement that the USLA commander, Colonel Gheorghe Ardeleanu, was seen at the Central Committee building shouting to a subordinate “Give me ‘Gela’…Give me ‘Gela’.” According to Stefanescu, ‘Gela’ was the name of a “petarde” used by the USLA in the repression of demonstrators. Paul Stefanescu, Istoria Serviciilor Secrete Romanesti (Bucharest: Editura Divers Press, 1994), 287.

[80].. Stoian, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, 21.

[81].. Raportul Comisiei Senatoriale, “Cine a tras in noi, in 16-22?”

Timisorenii au “stricat” mitingul din 21 decembrie
Marti, 15 decembrie 2009 Sursa: Romania Libera Autor: Petre Mihai Bacanu

Mult timp nu s-a stiut cine a “stricat” mitingul lui Ceausescu din 21 decembrie 1989. Au aparut fel si fel de personaje care si-au arogat acest merit. Acum se stie ca acest fapt se datoreaza unor grupuri de timisoreni care s-au deplasat la Bucuresti. Satui de lupta, nu mai aveau frica si, practic, au fost nevoiti sa plece din Timisoara ca sa anunte ce se petrece acolo. La Timisoara se strigase “Lasilor, veniti cu noi!”, timisorenii avand impresia ca romanii ies greu la Revolutie. Suntem in posesia unor
marturii despre implicarea timisorenilor in declansarea scanteii de la Bucuresti.

Acuza ca i-a fost ucis sotul la Timisoara
ION ION, prelucrator prin aschiere IEI Bucuresti, 19 ani (in 1989): “In dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie 1989, o mare parte din lucratori se aflau la miting in Piata Palatului. Dupa un timp, am plecat si eu in oras. In timp ce ma deplasam pe Calea Victoriei spre Piata Palatului, sa fi fost ora 12.00, am vazut ca strada era blocata de un cordon de militieni in dreptul Hotelului Bucuresti.


M-am alaturat unui grup de civili care doreau sa treaca de acest cordon, incercand sa discutam cu cei din dispozitiv. O femeie din grupul nostru a strigat disperata, acuzand ca i-a fost ucis sotul la Timisoara. A fost retinuta de un militian. In momentul in care acesta a inceput s-o loveasca cu bastonul, au intervenit mai multi civili, creandu-se astfel un conflict deschis intre noi si militieni. In scurt timp a luat amploare, implicandu-se mai multi civili, iar din partea fortelor de ordine facandu-si aparitia un cordon de militari ai Armatei care s-au postat in fata militienilor si ne-au somat spunand ca vor face uz de arma.



Dupa un timp, au tras cu armele in plan vertical. S-a creat o ambuscada, noi, civilii, alergand in directia opusa acestora. In dreptul coltului din dreapta hotelului si-au facut aparitia trei camioane militare cu prelata, din care au coborat soldati cu casti albe cu vizeta si arme automate cu pat rabatabil. Ne-au blocat retragerea. Am fost imobilizat de patru soldati care m-au lovit cu patul armei in zona occipitala, apoi cu bocancii in toate partile corpului. Tot timpul eram filmati de la o fereastra a hotelului – etajul doi sau trei. A aparut in zona Postelnicu, care i-a spus unui civil care-l insotea sa ma impuste, insa a intervenit unul dintre soldatii care ma retinuse. Am fost dusi la Circa 1 Militie, batuti din nou, in final transferati la Jilava”.

Timisorenii s-au pierdut printre cei adusi la miting
DUMITRU SMEDESCU, colonel, lucra la Serviciul asigurare tehnico-materiala si financiara la Militia Capitalei. Aflase despre evenimentele de la Timisoara de la colegii sai. In ziua de 21.12.1989, la ora 6.00, a primit un telefon sa se prezinte imediat la serviciu, deoarece urma sa aiba loc un miting in Piata Palatului. Era seful unui dispozitiv compus din 20 de ofiteri care au luat pozitie la aproximativ 270 metri de intrarea principala in CC, in apropierea actualei statui a lui Iuliu Maniu. De organizarea mitingului s-au ocupat cei de la Armata, colonelului Smedescu parandu-i-se curios, deoarece la alte mitinguri de organizare se ocupau cadre ale Securitatii si Militiei. Difuzoarele dispuse in Piata Palatului au fost aduse de cei de la Armata. Dispozitivul de comanda se afla amplasat in incinta Bibliotecii Universitare.



“In jurul orei 12.00, in timp ce Ceausescu facea referire la evenimentele de la Timisoara si la marirea salariilor, s-a auzit un zgomot puternic, iar lumea a intrat in panica. Initial, pentru mitingul ce urma sa inceapa la ora 8.00 au fost solicitate sa participe anumite persoane, in special membri de partid. Amanandu-se pentru ora 10.00, nu au mai fost doar persoanele selectate initial. In spatele Palatului Regal au sosit mai multi cetateni de la Timisoara, care s-au pierdut printre cei ce participau la miting si au inceput sa scandeze lozinci anticomuniste si anticeausiste.”


S-a creat agitatie in multime
MIHAITA BALINT avea 19 ani in decembrie 1989 si era cioplitor la “Marmura”. La spargerea baricadei, in noaptea de 21 spre 22 decembrie, a fost impuscat in partea inferioara a tibiei piciorului drept.
“Cand am ajuns in Piata Palatului, mai exact in apropiere de Biblioteca Universitara, am vazut un grup de 30-40 de tineri care spuneau ca sunt din Timisoara. Venisera dinspre strada stirbei Voda, au intrat in multime si au inceput sa scandeze lozinci anticeausiste si despre victoria revolutiei de la Timisoara. Imediat, mai multi participanti au inceput sa-l huiduie pe Ceausescu, creandu-se agitatie in multime. In momentul in care au inceput sa se auda tipete si lumea se indrepta spre caile de iesire, am plecat si eu din piata, deplasandu-ma pe strada Onesti pana in zona Intercontinental, unde credeam ca suntem protejati de prezenta reporterilor straini. Am ramas pana dupa distrugerea baricadei, cand am fost impuscat.”

Studenta din Timisoara si-a cautat prietenul la morga Spitalului Coltea
MARIOARA TRONARU, lucratoare la bucataria Spitalului Coltea: “Pe 21 decembrie, in jurul orei 22.00, un tanar a fost impuscat in cap dupa ce s-a adapostit in curtea spitalului. Avea in jur de 20-23 de ani. Dupa aproximativ 30 de minute, o tanara cam de aceeasi varsta cu cel impuscat si care spunea ca este studenta la Timisoara a venit sa-l caute. Brancardierii au condus-o la morga, iar tanara l-a recunoscut pe cel decedat ca fiind prietenul ei, tot student la Timisoara. A declarat ca venisera mai multi din Timisoara pentru a-i mobiliza pe bucuresteni”.

Veneau din orasul inchis
PETRE CAPRARU, lucrator la Directia de Telecomunicatii: “Pe 21 decembrie, pe la pranz, am plecat spre Spitalul Coltea, sa-i duc un pachet surorii mele, internata. Grupuri de cetateni speriati veneau dinspre Sala Dalles. Mi-au spus ca mitingul oficial a fost spart. Au inceput repede sa protesteze la indemnul unor cetateni din tara. Un tanar de vreo 30 de ani, inalt, spunea ca era din Timisoara si a venit special la Bucuresti cu mai multi care scapasera din orasul inchis. Sa ne spuna si noua ce se intampla cu ei la Timisoara si ca au fost maltratati. Acestia strigau: «Nu va fie frica, Ceausescu pica!» si «Jos tiranul!». Indemnau trecatorii sa se solidarizeze, sa nu plece, ca sa nu mai fie chemati ciomagarii de la Timisoara”.

Tanarul din Timisoara avea in mana o cutie
ADRIAN UTALE lucra ca tehnolog productie la Combinatul Casa Scanteii. In dimineata zilei de 21 decembrie a fost scos, cu alti colegi, la ora 7.00, la mitingul din fata CC.
“Din ora in ora ne aliniau in fata intrarii principale a Casei Scanteii si apoi reveneau la directia luata. In jurul orei 11.00 ne-am indreptat pe jos catre Sala Palatului. Pe la ora 11.40, in timp ce ne aflam in centrul pietei, spre Biblioteca si Athenee am vazut langa mine un tanar care ne-a zis ca era din Timisoara si avea in mana o cutie. Ne-a zis: «O sa vedeti ce o sa se intample». Mitingul a inceput in jurul orei 12.00. Dupa ceva timp, tanarul a declansat o mica explozie, probabil o petarda; in jurul orei 12.30 s-a auzit o bubuitura in centrul manifestatiei, ceea ce a dus la haos total.”


Coloana stransa de manifestanti era din Timisoara
PETRU GIURA, strungar la IRA Grivita. Este victima a evenimentelor din decembrie: “Am ajuns la miting in tinuta civila, dupa ce in prealabil ni se spusese sa ne imbracam in cea a garzilor patriotice. Ne-au distribuit langa un sir de megafoane din care in timpul mitingului se auzeau aplauze inregistrate pe banda. In timpul discursului lui Ceusescu, cand s-a auzit o bubuitura, participantii la miting au fugit in toate directiile. Am luat-o spre strada Brezoianu. Am intalnit o coloana stransa de manifestanti, respectiv cate cinci in linie, care scandau lozinci anticeausiste. Acestia spuneau ca sunt de la Timisoara. Initial ne-am speriat si am fugit din calea lor, luand-o spre Romarta Copiilor. Am ramas insa la Intercontinental si am participat la toate evenimentele, pana am fost impuscat la Televiziune, pe 23 decembrie”.

“Nu cumva esti din Timisoara?”
GHEORGHE POPA era in decembrie 1989 sef de birou desfacere la Intreprinderea Poligrafica “Luceafarul”: “Am fost chemati la serviciu la ora 5.00 pentru mitingul din 21 decembrie. Noi am ocupat pozitia din dreptul restaurantului «Cina». Un activist de partid l-a controlat in geanta pe un coleg de-al meu, dar avea la el o sticla cu ceai si paine prajita. Am intervenit spunand ca este bolnav de ulcer, dar activistul a chemat un militian, care mi-a luat legitimatia de serviciu pe motiv ca produc agitatie. In timpul discursului lui Ceausescu s-a auzit un zgomot puternic in sistemul de sonorizare. Cand manifestantii s-au raspandit in toate directiile, am plecat cu mai multi colegi spre Bd. Magheru. In zona Hotelului Nehoiu am fost opriti de militieni si legitimati. Cum mie imi fusese confiscata legitimatia si nu aveam nici un act de identitate la mine, militianul m-a intrebat: «Nu cumva esti din grupul de la Timisoara?». Mi-a aplicat cateva lovituri cu bastonul, dupa care m-a lasat sa plec”.

“Fratilor, la Timisoara va mor copiii si fratii!”
IOAN PaUN lucra in decembrie 1989 ca laborant foto la Casa Scanteii: “La miting am fost pozitionati intre Palatul Regal si Biblioteca Universitara. Atmosfera era incordata. Am observat in coloana noastra multi civili pe care nu-i cunosteam. In timp ce Ceausescu se adresa multimii am vazut in apropierea noastra doi tineri care fluturau doua steaguri. Aveau accent ardelenesc. Unul dintre ei, de vreo 30 de ani, cu fata spre mine, a strigat: «Fratilor, la Timisoara va mor copiii si fratii!». Pe al doilea nu l-am vazut la fata. La scurt timp am auzit o bubuitura, o petarda, banuiesc, care a panicat multimea”.

Indemnau pasagerii sa li se alature
STEFAN DIMA, medic stomatolog: “Lucram ca medic la Calmatuiul de Sus si faceam naveta cu trenul pana la Rosiori. Pe 21 decembrie am vazut, pe la 16.00, in zona Piata Romana, cum fortele de ordine incercau cu disperare sa disperseze grupurile de manifestanti. Dimineata am plecat la serviciu cu trenul Bucuresti-Timisoara. Acesta a oprit neasteptat intre statii, concomitent cu aceeasi cursa care venea dinspre Timisoara. Intre pasagerii celor doua trenuri oprite paralel au avut loc discutii referitoare la evenimentele de la Timisoara. In trenul Timisoara-Bucuresti erau multi pasageri imbracati in doliu, avand steaguri si banderole tricolore. Scandau lozinci anticeausiste si indemnau pasagerii din trenul in care ma aflam sa li se alature”.

“Am intrat in multime strigand: «Timisoara, Timisoara!»”
LULCIUC CONSTANTIN, Timisoara: “In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20.12.1989, in timp ce ma aflam in filtrul ce se organizase langa gara din Timisoara, respectiv langa Militia TF, am fost chemati de Chira Vasile si Pantar Teodor, care mi-au spus sa ma deplasez in Piata Operei, deoarece, pe baza de voluntariat, se pleaca in Bucuresti, ca si in alte localitati – Brasov, Iasi, Sibiu, Ploiesti. Scopul principal era de a spune ce s-a intamplat in acele zile in Timisoara, dar si faptul ca se anuntase ca orasul Timisoara va deveni teren arabil, ca va fi exterminat. Am plecat aproximativ 30 de timisoreni, printre care Vasile Chira, Dumitru Pava, Teodor Pantar, Constantin Tataru, Dumitru Gherman, pentru a-i anunta si pe bucuresteni de cele intamplate la noi in oras. Am luat cu noi un steag cu stema decupata. Pe data de 21.12.1989, dimineata, in jurul orelor 6.30-7.00, am ajuns la Gara de Nord, ne-am deplasat pe jos, pe linia de tramvai, pana am ajuns in Parcul Cismigiu.


Ne-am continuat drumul pe jos pana in apropierea Bisericii Kretzulescu, unde am fost opriti de un cordon de militieni, deviindu-ne in partea stanga. Am incercat sa le explicam militienilor ca demonstram pasnic, dar intre noi si ei au intervenit divergente, moment in care steagul pe care noi il arborasem pe o creanga de copac ne-a fost luat, am fost imbranciti, moment in care am intrat in mijlocul multimii si am inceput sa strigam: «Timisoara, Timisoara!»”.

“Timisorenii ne explicau ca ei sunt liberi”
MARIANA SCHICHT, secretara ASE: “Pe 21 decembrie ne uitam obligatoriu la televizor la serviciu. Dupa intreruperea emisiunii, cu mai multi colegi si studenti, am plecat in Piata, alaturandu-ne altor manifestanti. Doi insi inalti, imbracati in negru, au tras la foc automat spre noi. Ranitii au fost dusi la Coltea, iar mortii au ramas pe loc. In fata Salii Dalles, sapte-opt morti erau aranjati in cerc. Cand s-a spart baricada, am luat-o spre magazinul Unirea, dar a venit o duba a Militiei in care au fost urcati mai multi manifestanti. Am fost luata in acel grup, insa un ofiter de armata m-a tras jos, intrucat tipam cat ma tinea gura. Impreuna cu alti manifestanti am ramas pana dimineata pe strazi laturalnice. Printre acestia erau si din Timisoara si ne explicau ca ei sunt liberi si ca bucurestenii trebuie sa se uneasca pentru a-l da jos pe dictator.

In noaptea de 22.12.1989, pe cand ma aflam in sediul CC, la parter, am observat o fata de aproximativ 16 ani, slaba, cu parul tuns scurt, care incerca sa intre in sediul CC. Pe data de 23 decembrie, dimineata, am aflat de la colegii fetei, care erau veniti de la Timisoara, ca aceasta a fost impuscata mortal in timp ce incerca sa escaladeze balconul. Unuia dintre baieti i se spunea «Lerurduzel» si era suparat ca murisera multi timisoreni.”

Au dat tonul protestelor
EUGENIU STAICU, electromecanic la MTTC: “La miting am ocupat zona din fata Hotelului Athenee Palace impreuna cu muncitorii din CFR care erau coordonati de secretarul de partid Teodor Carbunaru. Discursul lui Ceausescu a fost intrerupt de cateva ori de participantii la miting, care au inceput sa strige lozinci impotriva sa. Am aflat de la secretarul de partid Carbunaru ca un grup de tineri veniti de la Timisoara cu drapelul cu stema inlaturata a dat tonul acestor lozinci”.

Ei au scandat primii la Bucuresti: “Azi la Timisoara, maine in toata tara!”
CONSTANTIN MEDREGA, maistru montaj la Intreprinderea de Avioane Baneasa: “Eram acasa la televizor cand s-a intrerupt transmisia mitingului din Piata. Cum cei trei copii ai nostri se aflau la miting, am plecat sa vedem ce se intampla acolo. La Universitate, grupuri de manifestanti scandau lozinci anticeausiste. In fata Hotelului Intercontinental, un grup de aproximativ zece persoane, care au spus ca sunt de la Timisoara, scandau: «Azi in Timisoara, maine in toata tara!». Faceau apel sa ne alaturam lor.”

Grupul scanda: “Timisoara, Timisoara!”
TINCA CERNEA, casnica: “Pe data de 21 decembrie sotul meu a plecat in oras pentru a cumpara cadouri de Craciun
. La Izvor a aflat ca urma sa se organizeze un miting in Piata Palatului si din proprie initiativa a mers acolo. Mi-a povestit ca in timpul mitingului a intalnit un grup de manifestanti care scandau: «Timisoara, Timisoara!». S-a alaturat acestui grup si au plecat spre Comitetul Central, insa fortele de ordine i-au impiedicat sa ajunga in acea zona. Au coborat pe Calea Victoriei pana la CCA. Fiind mai in varsta, sotul meu s-a oprit sa se odihneasca, fiind retinut de trei indivizi in civil. A fost tarat in restaurantul Bulevard, fiind dus apoi la subsol si legat de maini si de picioare, impreuna cu alti demonstranti. Iar au fost batuti. In final, au ajuns la Jilava, unde au avut acelasi tratament
“.

“Sa povestim ce s-a intamplat la Timisoara”
CONSTANTIN TaTARU, Timisoara: “Pe data de 20.12.1989 ma aflam in Piata Operei. Aparusera zvonurile cu exterminarea Timisoarei. Cineva din multime ne-a sugerat sa ne deplasam in tara, dar mai ales la Bucuresti, sa povestim ce s-a intamplat in acele zile in oras, pentru a-i mobiliza pe bucuresteni sa ni se alature. Din Timisoara am plecat cu o coada de matura pe care am arborat un steag cu stema decupata”.

O timisoreanca, cu buletinul in mana, se ruga de lume sa reziste
SANDA MARIN, gestionara la un magazin din Bucuresti: “Cand am vazut la televizor cum s-a intrerupt transmisia la mitingul din Piata Palatului, am mers cu o colega in Piata Operetei, apoi in Piata Universitatii, unde tinerii demonstrau pe carosabil. Tinerii strigau lozinci anticeausiste. O tanara blonda a fost arestata de militieni. Am fost atacati si udati de fortele de represiune. Am vazut oameni cazand. Am vazut o femeie in jur de 50 de ani, cu buletinul in mana, care statea in genunchi pe carosabil si spunea ca a venit de la Timisoara, unde erau morti, si se ruga la lume sa reziste”.

Un video postat de catre tioluciano pe youtube

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-6-18-22-december-1989/

“Interceptarile si transcrierile pe foile de goniometrare au fost efectuate de radiotelegrafisti si alti angajati de la Centrul de Control al Radiocomunicatiilor din Strada Oltenitei nr. 103, Bucuresti. Inregistrarile au fost facute din propria initiativa a unor salariati, care si-au asumat riscurile de rigoare, in acea perioada fiind interzisa ascultarea frecventelor alocate organelor de Militie si Securitate.” — Romulus Cristea http://www.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/investigatii/huliganii-astia-trebuie-anihilati-71726.html

“Dintre sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 27 ianuarie 1990 – 15 februarie 1990

  1. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 27 ianuarie 1990, p.2″INCEPIND DIN 21 DECEMBRIE 1989, ORA 11.00Intre 11,00-12,00 I.M.B.
    –Tovarasul BRINZEI, va rog luati dv. acolo masuri, ca sa zic asa, organizatorice si tot efectivul care nu este bagat in misiune se se gaseste in unitate sa fie imediat imbracat “civil” si in frunte cu dv. va deplasati ugrent la Separatiune 1, dar in 5 momente imi comunicati prin acest sistem citi sint, normal. Tabel nominal cu dinsii.
    –Am inteles !
    –Indiferent de la formatiune este, circa cercetari penale, judiciar s.a.m.d.
    –Multi sint imbracati in uniforma. Se schimba in civil?
    –Pai, care au sa se schimbe in civil, care au intr-o jumatate de ora sa se schimbe si deplasarea urgent la Separatiune 1 si sa ramineti acolo pina primiti ordin de la mine.
    –Am inteles !
    11,55 C.P.M.B.–Bucur 9 sint Bucur 1 am primit telefon sa incepeti agitatia in piata (! –N.R.)
    12,10–146475 Intr. civil.–Oprea fa agitatie. Mai, terminati cu joaca la statie ca va ia dracu!
    (Se aude o voce care scandeaza “Ceausescu P.C.R.”).
    –Mai, nu mai strigati in statie!
    12,30 U.S.L.A.
    –Ati receptionat Catargul, Tridentul?
    –Tridentul, se pe Calea Victoriei, la Giocanda, iarasi este un grup care scandeaza lozinci.
    –Tridentul, Catargul, sint Catargul 5, la Muzica, aici in fata, a izbucnit scandal. Pe Victoriei, spre Posta scandeaza lozinci dar nu intervine nimeni. Militia se uita doar la ei.
    –Sint Catargul 5. Au fost indepartati pe Victoriei, spre C.C.A. incolo.
    –Catargul, Catargul 2. Sus, aproape de Comitetul Central, se afla un cetatean. E de-al nostru sau nu este? Sus pe bloc,pe blocul de vizavi. Pe Boteanu, se afla sus de tot un cetatean.
    –Tridentul si Catargul, sint Catargul 5. Continua sa fie la intersectia 13 Decembrie cu Victoriei, la Continental acolo, un grup mare care scandeaza.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 2. Deasupra magazinul Muzica, vizavi de C.I.D., se pare ca este o persoana acolo.
    –Da este. E de-al nostru.
    I.M.B.–Vezi ce poti. Pe care poti sa-i temperezi, ca nu sint multi. Trebuie o forta mai dura un pic.
    –Toate fortele sa intervina sa-i imprastie.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–
    In zona Catargul 2 este liniste.
    –La fel in zona Catargului 1.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au indepartat pe Victoriei. Nu mai sint in aproprierea mea.
    –Sint Catargul 3. Au ramas la Gioconda in fata. Vad ca s-au potolit.
    I.S.M.B.–Mai, transmite la mine. Doua unitati de-ale lui Popa sa mearga la Calea Victoriei la…si doua sa vina la Onesti imediat.
    –Am inteles!
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul. Ai receptionat mesajul de la Catargul 3?
    –Da, a fost receptionat.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4. Va rog, repetati.
    -D-ta ai probleme deosebite?
    –Nu, deocamdata.
    –Nici sa nu ai.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–Manifestantii de la Gioconda incearca sa sparga zidul de la militie.
    –Sint Catargul 1.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste aici la Catargul 1. Defluire in ordine.
    –Sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –Da, bine, multumesc.
    –La intersectia 13 Dec., Calea Victoriei este blocata de ai nostri. Nu mai e nici o problema acolo.
    –Catargul 3, Tridentul.
    –La Catargul 3 situatia este inca incordata. Se scandeaza si militienii nu pot sa-i imprastie.
    –La Catargul 2, liniste. Defluire in liniste.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Publicul se retrage in liniste.
    I.S.M.B.–Sala Dalles, (lociitor sef securitate municipului Bucuresti). In fata la Sala Dalles sa vina aici forte.
    –Da, s-au trimis, draga, s-au trimis.
    –Sa-i scoata de aici pe astia care instiga.
    12,00-14 I.S.M.B.–Am trimis, am trimis forte.
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)
  2. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 29 ianuarie 1990, p.2–Aici s-au concentrat, la Sala Dalles, colt cu Batistei.
    –Am inteles !
    12-14 U.S.L.A.–Ma receptionezi, sint Catargul. Tridentul confirma, te rog.
    –Te retragi si supraveghezi.
    –Supraveghezi si ma tineti la curent.
    —Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati in primul rind. Nu sint hotariti astia. Ar trebui sa-i ia repede. Restul sint sovaitori.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –La Catargul 3, in fata hotelului Bucuresti, se scandeaza.
    –Da, s-au luat masuri.
    –Catargul ? Tridentul. (nu raspunde).
    –Catargul 1.
    –La Catargul 1, liniste.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 3. Tridentul. Situatia.
    –Aceeasi. Se scandeaza si se string foarte multi.
    –Circa 200. Daca impresureaza anexa si ii scoate din zona ii termina repede.
    –Nu sint fortele de ordine acolo, d-le?
    –Sint doar in fata, un aliniament si in spate nimic.
    –Las’ ca vin acolo…
    12,30-14 I.S.M.B.–(sefi servicii, birouri, securitatea municipului Bucuresti), (loctiitor seful Securitatii). Arunca cu niste portret. Probabil Doina Cornea. Invoca personalitati!
    –Da, da…
    –Sint vreo 5, care sint mai ai dracu’ si tipa.
    –Fara incidente, pentru ca ii provocam mai mult.
    –Am inteles. Imi pare rau ca de la hotel intercontinental ii filmeaza si de la noi nu vine nimeni sa-i filmeze.
    –Sa-i identificam pe huliganii astia.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 1, liniste, Atheneu.
    –Catargul 2, liniste.
    –La 3 s-a format o hora si cinta Hora Unirii.
    I.M.B.–Aici la Steaua este retinut unul care, sustin tovarasii, ca a incitat sa dea foc.
    –Catargul, au venit fortele speciale de interventie.
    –Striga acum ca armata e cu ei.
    –Hai ma, lasa-i in pace nu mai…
    –Ar trebui sa vina mai repede sa-i ia odata de aici.
    –Vine, stai linistit acolo.
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunica, Catargul.
    –Parte din demonstranti au luat-o in stinga, spre Luterana, marea majoritate, ceilalti au luat-o spre Cosmonautilor. In fata hotelului Bucuresti nu sint probleme deosebite. S-au imprastiat. In schimb, in spate, in dreptul Giocondei au inceput sa se adune pina la nivelului C.S.P.-ului.
    –Cam citi sint?
    –Aproximativ 100. Cei mai multi sint pasnici.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Se pare ca spre Cismigiu se aud scandari. Populatie multa.
    –Deci Tridentul, ait receptionat ca la Cismigiu se pare ca s-a format din nou o grupare.
    –La Catargul 2 e liniste.
    –Catargul 4, raportez ca nu se mai aude nimic dinspre Cismigiu acum.
    –La Catargul 3 e liniste.
    –La Catargul 1 nimic deosebit, 2 nimic deosebit, la 3 se formeaza un dispozitiv cu virf inainte, care se lanseaza catre Luterana si se formeaza acum al doilea dispozitiv, probabil ca in spate. Nu am posibilitati de vedere.
    I.S.M.B.–Pentru /2 sa vina la baza sau ce face?
    –Da, sa vina urgent.
    –Da, da, vine imediat.
    –Putem trece cu escorta a doua si cu intiia?
    –Nu se poate. Sint deplasati tocmai la Comonauti, restaurantul Gradinita.
    –Pai, si-i indepartam.
    –(Da, sau am inteles).
    –Sint forte acuma?
    –Da, sint.
    –Sa-i indeparteze spre Romana incolo, dar cu grija sa n-o ia pe Dorobanti.
    –Am inteles !
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunicati.
    –La intersectia Luterana cu Stirbei Voda (intreruperi repetati).
    –Vad explozii la Union. Sint Catargul 2.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au auzit 4-5 explozii puternice!
    –De la Union, de acolo s-au auzit. Le-am vazut si noi explozile, de aici la Catargul 2, de la Athenee Palace.
    –Catargul 5, ai sa-mi comunici ceva?
    –Catargul sint Catargul 5. Undeva spre Continental, nu am vizibilitate, se mai aude strigind asa, ca un ecou (…)
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)

  1. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 27 ianuarie 1990, p.2″INCEPIND DIN 21 DECEMBRIE 1989, ORA 11.00Intre 11,00-12,00 I.M.B.
    –Tovarasul BRINZEI, va rog luati dv. acolo masuri, ca sa zic asa, organizatorice si tot efectivul care nu este bagat in misiune se se gaseste in unitate sa fie imediat imbracat “civil” si in frunte cu dv. va deplasati ugrent la Separatiune 1, dar in 5 momente imi comunicati prin acest sistem citi sint, normal. Tabel nominal cu dinsii.
    –Am inteles !
    –Indiferent de la formatiune este, circa cercetari penale, judiciar s.a.m.d.
    –Multi sint imbracati in uniforma. Se schimba in civil?
    –Pai, care au sa se schimbe in civil, care au intr-o jumatate de ora sa se schimbe si deplasarea urgent la Separatiune 1 si sa ramineti acolo pina primiti ordin de la mine.
    –Am inteles !
    11,55 C.P.M.B.–Bucur 9 sint Bucur 1 am primit telefon sa incepeti agitatia in piata (! –N.R.)
    12,10–146475 Intr. civil.–Oprea fa agitatie. Mai, terminati cu joaca la statie ca va ia dracu!
    (Se aude o voce care scandeaza “Ceausescu P.C.R.”).
    –Mai, nu mai strigati in statie!
    12,30 U.S.L.A.
    –Ati receptionat Catargul, Tridentul?
    –Tridentul, se pe Calea Victoriei, la Giocanda, iarasi este un grup care scandeaza lozinci.
    –Tridentul, Catargul, sint Catargul 5, la Muzica, aici in fata, a izbucnit scandal. Pe Victoriei, spre Posta scandeaza lozinci dar nu intervine nimeni. Militia se uita doar la ei.
    –Sint Catargul 5. Au fost indepartati pe Victoriei, spre C.C.A. incolo.
    –Catargul, Catargul 2. Sus, aproape de Comitetul Central, se afla un cetatean. E de-al nostru sau nu este? Sus pe bloc,pe blocul de vizavi. Pe Boteanu, se afla sus de tot un cetatean.
    –Tridentul si Catargul, sint Catargul 5. Continua sa fie la intersectia 13 Decembrie cu Victoriei, la Continental acolo, un grup mare care scandeaza.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 2. Deasupra magazinul Muzica, vizavi de C.I.D., se pare ca este o persoana acolo.
    –Da este. E de-al nostru.
    I.M.B.–Vezi ce poti. Pe care poti sa-i temperezi, ca nu sint multi. Trebuie o forta mai dura un pic.
    –Toate fortele sa intervina sa-i imprastie.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–
    In zona Catargul 2 este liniste.
    –La fel in zona Catargului 1.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au indepartat pe Victoriei. Nu mai sint in aproprierea mea.
    –Sint Catargul 3. Au ramas la Gioconda in fata. Vad ca s-au potolit.
    I.S.M.B.–Mai, transmite la mine. Doua unitati de-ale lui Popa sa mearga la Calea Victoriei la…si doua sa vina la Onesti imediat.
    –Am inteles!
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul. Ai receptionat mesajul de la Catargul 3?
    –Da, a fost receptionat.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4. Va rog, repetati.
    -D-ta ai probleme deosebite?
    –Nu, deocamdata.
    –Nici sa nu ai.
    12,00-14 U.S.L.A.–Manifestantii de la Gioconda incearca sa sparga zidul de la militie.
    –Sint Catargul 1.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste aici la Catargul 1. Defluire in ordine.
    –Sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –Da, bine, multumesc.
    –La intersectia 13 Dec., Calea Victoriei este blocata de ai nostri. Nu mai e nici o problema acolo.
    –Catargul 3, Tridentul.
    –La Catargul 3 situatia este inca incordata. Se scandeaza si militienii nu pot sa-i imprastie.
    –La Catargul 2, liniste. Defluire in liniste.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Publicul se retrage in liniste.
    I.S.M.B.–Sala Dalles, (lociitor sef securitate municipului Bucuresti). In fata la Sala Dalles sa vina aici forte.
    –Da, s-au trimis, draga, s-au trimis.
    –Sa-i scoata de aici pe astia care instiga.
    12,00-14 I.S.M.B.–Am trimis, am trimis forte.
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)
  2. “Dintre…sute de catarge! Revolutia ascultata prin statie,” Libertatea, 29 ianuarie 1990, p.2–Aici s-au concentrat, la Sala Dalles, colt cu Batistei.
    –Am inteles !
    12-14 U.S.L.A.–Ma receptionezi, sint Catargul. Tridentul confirma, te rog.
    –Te retragi si supraveghezi.
    –Supraveghezi si ma tineti la curent.
    —Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati in primul rind. Nu sint hotariti astia. Ar trebui sa-i ia repede. Restul sint sovaitori.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5.
    –Situatia.
    –Liniste.
    –La Catargul 3, in fata hotelului Bucuresti, se scandeaza.
    –Da, s-au luat masuri.
    –Catargul ? Tridentul. (nu raspunde).
    –Catargul 1.
    –La Catargul 1, liniste.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 3. Tridentul. Situatia.
    –Aceeasi. Se scandeaza si se string foarte multi.
    –Circa 200. Daca impresureaza anexa si ii scoate din zona ii termina repede.
    –Nu sint fortele de ordine acolo, d-le?
    –Sint doar in fata, un aliniament si in spate nimic.
    –Las’ ca vin acolo…
    12,30-14 I.S.M.B.–(sefi servicii, birouri, securitatea municipului Bucuresti), (loctiitor seful Securitatii). Arunca cu niste portret. Probabil Doina Cornea. Invoca personalitati!
    –Da, da…
    –Sint vreo 5, care sint mai ai dracu’ si tipa.
    –Fara incidente, pentru ca ii provocam mai mult.
    –Am inteles. Imi pare rau ca de la hotel intercontinental ii filmeaza si de la noi nu vine nimeni sa-i filmeze.
    –Sa-i identificam pe huliganii astia.
    12,30-14 U.S.L.A.–Catargul 1, liniste, Atheneu.
    –Catargul 2, liniste.
    –La 3 s-a format o hora si cinta Hora Unirii.
    I.M.B.–Aici la Steaua este retinut unul care, sustin tovarasii, ca a incitat sa dea foc.
    –Catargul, au venit fortele speciale de interventie.
    –Striga acum ca armata e cu ei.
    –Hai ma, lasa-i in pace nu mai…
    –Ar trebui sa vina mai repede sa-i ia odata de aici.
    –Vine, stai linistit acolo.
    U.S.L.A.–Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunica, Catargul.
    –Parte din demonstranti au luat-o in stinga, spre Luterana, marea majoritate, ceilalti au luat-o spre Cosmonautilor. In fata hotelului Bucuresti nu sint probleme deosebite. S-au imprastiat. In schimb, in spate, in dreptul Giocondei au inceput sa se adune pina la nivelului C.S.P.-ului.
    –Cam citi sint?
    –Aproximativ 100. Cei mai multi sint pasnici.
    –Catargul, sint Catargul 4.
    –Comunica.
    –Se pare ca spre Cismigiu se aud scandari. Populatie multa.
    –Deci Tridentul, ait receptionat ca la Cismigiu se pare ca s-a format din nou o grupare.
    –La Catargul 2 e liniste.
    –Catargul 4, raportez ca nu se mai aude nimic dinspre Cismigiu acum.
    –La Catargul 3 e liniste.
    –La Catargul 1 nimic deosebit, 2 nimic deosebit, la 3 se formeaza un dispozitiv cu virf inainte, care se lanseaza catre Luterana si se formeaza acum al doilea dispozitiv, probabil ca in spate. Nu am posibilitati de vedere.
    I.S.M.B.–Pentru /2 sa vina la baza sau ce face?
    –Da, sa vina urgent.
    –Da, da, vine imediat.
    –Putem trece cu escorta a doua si cu intiia?
    –Nu se poate. Sint deplasati tocmai la Comonauti, restaurantul Gradinita.
    –Pai, si-i indepartam.
    –(Da, sau am inteles).
    –Sint forte acuma?
    –Da, sint.
    –Sa-i indeparteze spre Romana incolo, dar cu grija sa n-o ia pe Dorobanti.
    –Am inteles !
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul.
    –Comunicati.
    –La intersectia Luterana cu Stirbei Voda (intreruperi repetati).
    –Vad explozii la Union. Sint Catargul 2.
    –Tridentul, sint Catargul 5. S-au auzit 4-5 explozii puternice!
    –De la Union, de acolo s-au auzit. Le-am vazut si noi explozile, de aici la Catargul 2, de la Athenee Palace.
    –Catargul 5, ai sa-mi comunici ceva?
    –Catargul sint Catargul 5. Undeva spre Continental, nu am vizibilitate, se mai aude strigind asa, ca un ecou (…)
    (Continuare in numarul viitor)

despre “Granitul” cititi si povestea lui Nicu Leon aici… https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/24/cc-ul-in-zilele-fierbinte-decembrie-1989/

Dovada crimelor din decembrie ’89
“Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati”
28 Martie 2006
“Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati”
149 VIZUALIZARI | COMENTARII  0

Toate convorbirile din perioada 21-22 decembrie 1989 purtate de sefii Securitatii, Militiei, Armatei si conducerii de partid prin intermediul statiilor de transmisiuni radio au fost inregistrate pe banda audio si transcrise pe foile de interceptare-goniometrare. Ziarul “Romania libera” a intrat in posesia acestor documente, fragmentele cele mai relevante urmand sa fie publicate incepand cu acest numar. De asemenea, suntem si in posesia unor liste de coduri folosite in cadrul acestor transmisiuni radio.Interceptarile si transcrierile pe foile de goniometrare au fost efectuate de radiotelegrafisti si alti angajati de la Centrul de Control al Radiocomunicatiilor din Strada Oltenitei nr. 103, Bucuresti. Inregistrarile au fost facute din propria initiativa a unor salariati, care si-au asumat riscurile de rigoare, in acea perioada fiind interzisa ascultarea frecventelor alocate organelor de Militie si Securitate.
Comunicarea pe unde radio se realiza utilizand anumite coduri si indicative. Toate inregistrarile contin dovezi clare privind ordinele date de cei care conduceau Militia, Securitatea, Ministerul Apararii si PCR prin care se solicita reprimarea manifestatiei anticomuniste si anticeausiste. Inca din primele momente ale revoltei, cei care conduceau tara, serviciile de informatii si fortele de ordine au dat ordine de reprimare a manifestantilor. Cu toate ca periodic erau raportate catre sefi numeroase victime, morti, raniti, arestati ilegal, s-a considerat ca trebuie continuata represiunea pentru asigurarea ordinii, in spiritul cuvantarii lui Ceausescu, care ceruse “o riposta hotarata” impotriva celor care contestau “maretele realizari pentru faurirea societatii socialiste multilateral dezvoltate”.Militienii imbracati in civil faceau agitatieIn ziua de 21 decembrie 1989, incepand cu ora 11, in piata din fata CC-PCR (actuala cladire a Ministerului Administratiei si Internelor din Piata Revolutiei) se desfasura un miting organizat de Comitetul Municipal de Partid, cu participarea cuplului Elena si Nicolae Ceausescu. Totul a luat o intorsatura neasteptata. Manifestatia de condamnare a “huliganilor” de la Timisoara s-a transformat intr-o revolta impotriva lui Ceausescu si a regimului comunist.
Va prezentam in cele ce urmeaza fragmente din interceptarile realizate in acea zi, incepand cu ora 11.
Intre orele 11-11.50 – Inspectoratul Militiei Bucuresti.
– Tovarasul Brinzei, va rog luati dvs. masuri, ca sa fie asa, organizatorice, si tot efectivul care nu este bagat in misiune si se gaseste in Universitate sa fie imbracati civil si in frunte cu dvs. Va deplasati urgent in separatiune 1 (dispozitiv – n.n.), dar in 5 momente imi comunicati prin acest sistem cati sunt nominal. Tabel nominal cu dansii.
– 2056 (Am inteles! – n.n.)
– Indiferent de la ce formatiune este, circa, cercetari, penale, judiciar etc.
– Multi sunt imbracati in uniforma. Se schimba in civil?
– Pai, care au sa se schimbe in civil, care nu, intr-o jumatate de ora sa se schimbe si deplasarea urgent la separatiune 1 si raman acolo pana primiti ordin de la mine.
– 2056.
Ora 11.55 – Consiliul Popular al Municipiului Bucuresti
– Bucur 9 sunt Bucur 1 (secretar al Comitetului Municipal de Partid – n.n.). Am primit ordin sa incepeti agitatia in piata.”O forta mai dura un pic” impotriva demonstrantilorTrebuie sa mentionam ca militienii imbracati in civil si care trebuiau “sa faca agitatie” erau trimisi pentru tinerea sub supraveghere a masei de oameni din fata CC-PCR, contribuind in acelasi timp la bunul mers al evenimentelor, prin aplauze sustinute si lozinci in favoarea lui Ceausescu. La mitingul lui Ceausescu erau adunati 105 mii de muncitori de la principalele uzine bucurestene. Insa in fata Hotelului Bucuresti, pe Calea Victoriei a aparut, chiar in timp ce vorbea Ceausescu, un grup de protestatari care scandau lozinci anticeausiste. In zona CC-ului s-a auzit apoi un vuiet peste care s-au suprapus alte zgomote, ca de explozii, venite dinspre Ateneu si – se pare – Biserica Kretzulescu. S-a produs panica, lumea a devenit agitata.
La acel moment, au fost interceptate urmatoarele convorbiri:
Ora 12.10
– 146, 475. Introdu civilii Oprea, fa agitatie. Mai, terminati cu joaca la statie, ca va ia dracu’. (Se aude o voce care scandeaza “Ceausescu PCR”).
– Mai, nu mai strigati in statie.
Ora 12.30 – USLA
– Tridentul, si pe Calea Victoriei, la Gioconda (un magazin de confectii – n.n.), iarasi este un grup care scandeaza lozinci.
– Tridentul, Catargul, sunt Catargul 5, la “Muzica”, aici in fata a izbucnit scandal. Pe Victoriei, spre posta. Scandeaza lozinci, dar nu intervine nimeni. Militia se uita doar la ei.
– Sunt Catargul 5. Au fost imprastiati pe Victoriei, spre Casa Centrala a Armatei.
De la Inspectoratul Militiei Bucuresti intervine cineva care comunica:
– Vezi ce poti. Pe care poti sa-i temporizezi, ca nu sunt multi. Trebuie o forta mai dura un pic.
– Toate fortele sa intervina sa-i imprastie!
Interesant este ca in zona Hotelului Bucuresti, chiar inainte de spargerea mitingului de la CC-PCR, persoane imbracate in costume de culoare kaki, cu cizme si fara insemne militare, au coborat dintr-un autocar si au luat la bataie, cu batele din dotare, persoanele aflate in zona, dupa care au aruncat cateva petarde si grenade lacrimogene. S-au facut primele retineri. Se banuieste ca exploziile auzite dinspre Ateneu si Biserica Kretzulescu ar fi fost ecoul acestor actiuni de la Hotelul Bucuresti.USLA, deranjata de “huligani”Orele 12.30-14; USLA:
– In zona Catargului 2 este liniste.
– La fel in zona Catargului 1 (dispozitiv USLA – n.n.)
– Sunt Catargul 3. Au mai ramas la “Gioconda” in fata. Vad ca s-au potolit.
Intervine un ofiter de la Inspectoratul Securitatii Municipiului Bucuresti:
– Mai, transmite la mine. Doua unitati de la Popa sa mearga la Calea Victoriei si doua sa vina la Onesti (actuala str. Dem I. Dobrescu). Imediat!
– Am trimis forte.
– Aici s-au concentrat, la Sala Dalles, colt cu Batistei.
– 2056.
In acelasi interval de timp (12-14), discutie intre “Tridentul” si “Catargul” de la USLA:
– Da, receptionez, sunt Catargul. Tridentul, confirma, te rog.
– Te retragi? Sunt forte de ordine care trebuie sa actioneze.
– Te retragi si supraveghezi.
– Supraveghezi si ma tineti la curent.
– Huliganii astia trebuie anihilati in primul rand. Nu sunt hotarati astia. Ar trebui sa-i ia repede. Restul sunt sovaitori.
– La Catargul 3, in fata Hotelului Bucuresti se scandeaza.
– Da, s-au luat masuri.
Zona Hotelului Bucuresti, pe Calea Victoriei, a fost locul unde a existat un prim grup de demonstranti care au inceput sa strige impotriva regimului ceausisto-comunist chiar cand se desfasura mitingul din fata CC-PCR.
Aici au fost primele persoane retinute si batute de fortele de ordine. Conform cercetarilor efectuate de procurorii militari, in zona respectiva a activat si un grup de persoane venite de la Timisoara. La un moment dat acestia, sustinuti de cativa bucuresteni, au reusit sa treaca prin barajul format de fortele de ordine si sa se indrepte apoi spre Piata Palatului. Incidentul a fost consemnat si in Raportul Comisiei Parlamentare de ancheta privind evenimentele din decembrie 1989.
0541

Col. Dumitru Dumitrascu, sef al Inspectoratului Muncipiului Bucuresti al Ministerului de Interne, Declaratie, 19 martie 1990

“In seara de 20 dec. 1989 in jurul orelor 23:30-24:00 eu fiind la inspectoratului am fost informat de primul secretar Barbu Petrescu, care in mod confidential mi-a spus ca ceausescu nicolae l-a intrebat daca se poate organiza in ziua de 21 XII 89 un mare miting in piata palatului asa cum a fost cel din 1968–cu privire la evenimentele din Cehoslovacia.”

0536

0160

Tudor Postelnicu, Ministrul de Interne, Declaratie, 21 iunie 1991

“Asa se explica ca Ceausescu a fost cel care a initiat in seara de 20 dec. sa se organizeze pt. a doua zi in P-ta Palatului acel miting cu muncitorimea din Bucuresti, fiind convins ca asa va demonstra tuturor sprijinul populatiei de care s-ar fi bucurat el.”

0152

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-6-18-22-december-1989/ 

Ceausescu’s Fatal Mistake: The Pro-Regime Rally of 21 December

By the morning of Thursday, 21 December 1989, the regime was no longer master of the situation in Timisoara. Moreover, it was rapidly losing control in several nearby cities: Lugoj and Cugir. Nevertheless, the regime might have withstood these challenges had it not been for Nicolae Ceausescu’s insistence on convoking a mass rally and addressing his “adoring” subjects in person. It was Nicolae Ceausescu’s delusion of his own invincibility which ensured that the regime would be unable to reestablish control. Ceausescu’s inflammatory, rambling tirade on national television on Wednesday evening had signalled panic to those who watched it. If Ceausescu was so worked up, they concluded, something serious must have occurred in Timisoara. Following his televised address, Ceausescu decided to hold an open-air, pro-regime rally the following day in the sprawling square in front of the Central Committee building in the center of Bucharest. The event was to be carried live over Romanian radio and television.

Precisely because this mass rally turned out to be the deathknell for the Ceausescu regime speculation has surrounded who “goaded” Ceausescu into making such a colossally-misguided decision. In January 1993, the opposition daily Romania Libera suggested that “the meeting was organized at the suggestion of [CPEx member] Gogu Radulescu.”[31] The same article maintained that Radulescu had been followed during these days and was “observed transmitting something abroad,” thereby once again insinuating the role of foreign powers in the Romanian events.[32]

Yet it is doubtful that Nicolae Ceausescu required Radulescu’s encouragement to convoke such a rally. It seems highly likely that the idea was Ceausescu’s own brainchild and that as usual the docile members of the CPEx did not dare contradict him. It was a typically instinctive, rash, and overconfident reaction to crisis on Ceausescu’s part. Moreover, as we have seen, for Nicolae Ceausescu the events confronting him in December 1989 were a replay of August 1968: not only was socialism at stake, but Romania’s national sovereignty and independence. Thus, in this crucial moment, he would appeal not primarily to the party’s political interests, but to what were the core institutional interests of the Securitate. And he would rely on a trusted totalitarian, mobilizational technique: the “spontaneous” mass rally of support for the regime.

[31].. R.M., “Dezvaluiri [Revelations],” Romania Libera, 19 January 1993, 1. Radulescu died in 1994.

[32].. Ibid. Presumably that foreign power would have been the Soviet Union.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #10 The Protesters Conquer Timisoara as the Army Withdraws to Maintain Institutional Command and Control

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #11 Ceausescu Returns from Iran…and Apparently Not Empty-Handed

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #11 Ceausescu Returns from Iran…and Apparently Not Empty-Handed

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 20, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/18/25-for-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-romanian-revolution-7-nicolae-ceausescu-leaves-on-a-less-than-spontaneous-trip-to-iran-18-december-1989/

in relation to Ceausescu’s trip to Iran, from Orwellian…Positively Orwellian (2006)

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go? What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]? Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator [RAH Observation:  this is very specific and phrased in a question…a tactic for relaying information while not directly violating a security oath]? If not for that reason, why? Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released. The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be. It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia. But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original]

‘Deghizarea’ (IV),” Romania Libera, 19 martie 1992, p. 5a.  Generalul Militaru: “Va sfatuiesc sa cercetati un detaliu privind vizita lui Ceausescu in Iran:  colonelul Ardeleanu, seful de la USLA, i-a insotit la plecare.  La intoarcere a venit cu o zi mai tirziu, aterizind cu un avion, incarcat cu persoane pe aeroportul Kogalniceanu.  Pe de alta parte, in ziua de 29-30 decembrie, de pe aeroportul Baneasa s-au luat zborul mai multe avioane libiene.  Cu oameni imbarcati.!”

Cuvintul, nr. 51 decembrie 1991

image0-001

My thanks to journalist Harvey Morris for his clarification of the above:

It all comes back to me now. I was at the main hacks’ hotel for a while and then also stayed at National (who knows in what room!) The telex was from Maryann Bird, colleague at the Independent foreign desk in London. The Rajavi group refers to the opposition People’s Mujahedin of Iran, an anti-government group that always was, and still is, propagandising against the Tehran regime. Which doesn’t mean they weren’t on to something in this case.
I now have a vague recollection of the message but can’t imagine I did much to follow it up, considering everything else going on. I certainly never established the presence of any Iranian revolutionary guards who, even had they been there on Dec 20, probably would have headed off as soon as Ceaucescu overthrown. My gut instinct would be it was Mujahedin propaganda, pegged to good Iranian relations with Ceaucescu.

Cuvintul, nr. 52-53 decembrie 1991

image0-003

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/01/the-dutch-nurse-sister-roza-thinks-mr-beres-who-was-shot-in-the-foot-on-the-night-of-22-december-1989-in-brasov-was-hit-by-a-hollow-nosed-dum-dum-bullet-because-of-the-nature-of-the-wound-harvey/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/04/sorin-said-that-on-the-eve-of-the-revolution-people-in-civilian-clothes-and-carrying-heavy-bags-began-arriving-at-the-hotel-parc-in-arad-from-bucharest-we-knew-they-were-police-and-that-they-w/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/10/05/sorin-said-that-on-the-eve-of-the-revolution-people-in-civilian-clothes-and-carrying-heavy-bags-began-arriving-at-the-hotel-parc-in-arad-from-bucharest-we-knew-they-were-police-and-that-they-w-2/

Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17. (syndicated copy above) WASHINGTON — Romanian despot Nicolae Ceausescu got some help last-minute help from a soul mate who is now embarrassed about coming to the aid of a loser.  Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to prop up Ceausescu by sending Iranian security goons to Romania to protect him.  Ceausescu’s three-day visit to Iran while his troops massacred dissidents at home contributed to the foment that eventually overthrew him.  Rafsanjani’s embrace of the Romanian dictator on that trip has not helped his stock with the Western diplomatic community. Iranian and Romanian sources and intelligence sources now tell us what went on behind the scenes when Ceausescu was in Iran. He flew to Tehran on Dec 18 while his troops were brutally putting down a riot in the Romanian city of Timisoara. The day before, Ceausescu’s secret police had used tanks and machine guns to open fire on crowds of demonstrators. Hundreds of men women and children were murdered. The battle continued while Ceausescu was being welcomed by an elated Rafsanjani. In his first six months as president of Iran, no other head of state had bothered to visit. The two men openly conferred about trade issues. Romania has been a major trading partner with Iran, and their business amounted to about $1.8 billion last year.  Ceausescu had become so enamored of Iran, according to Romanian sources, that in November he secretly deposited millions of dollars in gold for safekeeping in Iranian banks. He mistrusted Western banks after seeing some of them freeze the ill-gotten gain of another opportunist Ferdinand Marcos. On the second day of his visit to Tehran, Ceausescu placed a wreath on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini. In doing so, he became the only head of state to kiss up to Khomeini after death.  In retrospect, it was a kiss of death back home.  That night, with word that the demonstrations were out of control in Romania, Ceausescu begged Rajsanjani for help.  Rafsanjani supplied some of his most loyal Iranian bodyguards to protect Ceausescu on his return.  The next day, Dec 20, a contingent of Iranian Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard, secretly flew to Bucharest. Two days later, when the Romanian army turned against Ceausescu’s security police. the despot knew it was over.  He and his wife Elena fled Bucharest but were captured by peasants. Meanwhile, Timisoara was still a battleground where eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed the forces were not all Romanians.  According to some witnesses, Iranians or Libyans were doing some of the shooting. Similar reports of Iranian and Libyan snipers came from the industrial city of Craiova. In a two-hour secret trial on Christmas Day, the Ceausescus were convicted of genocide of 60,000 Romanians and theft of more than billion. “You should have stayed in Iran where you had flown to, the prosecutor told them. “We do not stay abroad,” Elena Ceausescu said. “This is our home.” The two were executed by firing squad. Rafsanjani was fit to be tied. He was embarrassed about helping Ceausescu at the end because he feared it would jeopardize trade arrangements with the new Romanian government. Rafsanjani dismissed his ambassador to Romania for not telling him about the power of the anti-Ceausescu forces in time to spare Iran the humiliation of hosting a has-been.


Irán – Románia – fegyveres gárdisták

Bagdad, 1990. január 2. kedd (MTI/AFP)- A Modzsahedin Khalk (Népi Modzsahedin) elnevezésű iráni ellenzéki szervezet irodája Bagdadból közleményt juttatott el kedden az MTI-hez. Ebben a szervezet Iránból származó – pontosan meg nem nevezett – forrásokra hivatkozva közli: amikor Romániában kiéleződtek a belső harcok, december 20-án Rafszandzsani iráni elnök utasítására fegyveres gárdát (pasdaran) küldtek Bukarestbe a Ceausescu-rendszer védelmére.
A december 19-i romániai véres összecsapást követően
Rafszandzsani és Ceausescu december 19-én este Teheránban állapodott
meg abban, hogy a gárdistákat sürgősen átdobják – írja a Modzsahedin
Khalk közleménye. A bagdadi székhelyű szervezet a hír hitelességének
alátámasztására hét, Romániába küldött gárdistát név szerint is
megemlít: Morteza Hazveh, Szejed Reza Arai, Mohaved Tezar-Parto
Dezfuli, Masszud Orei, Szejed Ali-Aszgar Szadegi, Morteza Nikokar,
és M. Szalamati.
Az AFP bagdadi irodájának jelentése szerint az iráni ellenzéki
szervezet azonos tartalmú közleményt juttatott el hozzájuk, s ezt a
francia hírügynökség kedden nyilvánosságra hozta.+++1990. január 2., kedd 13:37

http://rendszervaltas.mti.hu/Pages/News.aspx?se=1&wo=pasdaran&sd=19890101&ed=19901231&sp=0&ni=231602&ty=1

©AFP Général – Samedi 30 Décembre 1989 – 12:28 – Heure Paris (310 mots)

Roumanie mercenaires
Temoignages sur la presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie
   BUDAPEST 30 dec – La presence de mercenaires etrangers en Roumanie, notamment de differents pays arabes et de l Iran, est hors de doute, selon le correspondant de l agence hongroise MTI a Bucarest largement cite dans la presse hongroise samedi.
   Toutefois, aucun ” mercenaire etranger ” n a jusqu a present ete identifie, presente a la television, ou interviewe a la radio.
   ” La participation d unites militaires etrangeres aux combats en Roumanie est un fait ” , selon le correspondant qui se refere aux temoignages de soldats roumains qui ont ” neutralise ” un groupe de 27 ” terroristes ” iraniens. Un des prisonniers a admis, selon le correspondant, que le commando ” etait venu directement de l Iran ” .
   Il etait connu, selon le correspondant de MTI, que quelque 12.000 etudiants etaient inscrits aux differentes hautes ecoles et universites roumaines et que des ” camps ont existe en Roumanie pour l entrainement d unites speciales au compte de differents pays arabes ” . Un de ces camps etait situe a proximite de Bucarest, dans la ville de Snagov, mais il en existait d autres un peu partout dans le pays, precise le correspondant toujours en reference a des recits de soldats roumains.
   Le correspondant de MTI revele egalement l existence d unites speciales de la Securitate nommees les ” Chemises Noirs ” qui fonctionnaient selon l exemple de la Loge P-2 (Loge maconnique clandestine italienne). Les plus hauts dirigeants roumains ont appartenu a cette loge clandestine dont notamment l ancien ministre de l Interieur, Tudor Postelnicu, un des chefs de la Securitate, le vice-premier ministre Ion Dinca et le fils du dictateur roumain dechu, Nicu Ceausescu. La Securitate etait divisee en 17 unites surveillant toute la Roumanie. Ses bases se trouvaient generalement dans des villas de luxe, precise le correspondant de MTI a Bucarest.
   ph-wb/nev/nl.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
CC12A16A1A31DB1EF1DA0D141071207DBFC664CE89959FCA

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.  (traducere in limba romana:  http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/01/05/rich-andrew-hall-rescrierea-istoriei-revolutiei-triumful-revizionismului-securist-in-romania-1-ceausescu-pleaca-in-iran/ si traducerea de catre marius mioc)

Ceausescu Departs for Iran

On Monday morning 18 December 1989, President Nicolae Ceausescu departed on a previously-scheduled state visit to Iran. He was the first head of state to pay an official visit to Tehran since the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989.[1] By the time the presidential jet took off for Iran, Timisoara was under virtual military occupation by units of the Army, Securitate, and Militia. Ceausescu was apparently sufficiently satisfied by the news he was receiving on the status of the crackdown, that he judged it safe to leave the country. In his absence, the “Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee (CPEx)” was left in charge. In effect, this meant that power resided with the First Deputy Prime Minister, his wife Elena–hardly a stranger to such power–and the Vice President of the country, Manea Manescu, who was married to Nicolae’s sister Maria.[2]

On the one hand, the fact that Ceausescu would leave the country in the midst of the most serious challenge ever to communist rule in Romania–fully aware of what had happened to his fellow communist leaders in the region earlier that fall–was a testament to how supremely overconfident and detached from reality he had become. On the other hand, Ceausescu’s absence from the country between 18 and 20 December for a period in excess of forty-eight hours provided regime elites with the perfect opportunity to oust him from power had they wanted to. Ceausescu would likely have been granted asylum by the Iranian regime. In theory it seems, had Ceausescu’s ouster been premeditated, this was the ideal moment to strike.

Most regime elites had a vivid memory of how Ceausescu’s absence from the country during the devastating earthquake of March 1977 had paralyzed the regime apparatus.[3] Moreover, having been threatened by Ceausescu at the emergency CPEx meeting of 17 December with removal from their posts and possible execution–and Ceausescu had been persuaded merely to defer, rather than to cancel this decision–Ceausescu’s commanders had a strong incentive to act fast. Instead, Ceausescu’s henchmen faithfully executed his orders and patiently awaited his return. This is a powerful argument against any suggestion that Ceausescu’s subordinates were scheming to replace him and had intentionally allowed the Timisoara unrest to elude their control.

Theories which maintain that Ceausescu was overthrown by a foreign-engineered coup d’etat also have trouble explaining why the plotters did not attempt to seize power during the period while Ceausescu was out of the country and then prevent him from returning to Romania. The Timisoara events had already assured that Ceausescu’s ouster would contain the popular dimension which was reputedly so central to this coup d’etat scenario. Furthermore, if the Timisoara protests had been instigated by foreign agents, why were these agents unable to “spread the revolution” to Bucharest (which remained surprisingly quiet) during these days?

In support of his contention that the December events were a Soviet-backed coup d’etat, Cornel Ivanciuc has cited the March 1994 comments of Igor Toporovski (director of the Moscow-based Institute for Russian and International Political Studies) which allege that the Soviet Politburo “…chose the moment when Ceausescu was in Teheran [to oust him] because otherwise the action would have been difficult to initiate.”[4] Yet the facts tell another story. Ceausescu was not driven from power at the most opportune moment–while he was in Iran–and the uprising in Timisoara did not spread outside of Timisoara until after Ceausescu’s return. These points cast doubt upon Toporovski’s claims.

[mai mult despre Ivanciuc…https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/timisoara-si-mostenitorii-revizionismul-securist/]

[1].. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17.

[2].. Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History (New York: IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 1992), 94. For Manescu’s link to the Ceausescu family, see ibid., 52-53.

[3].. Indeed, the abortive military coup d’etat attempt planned for October 1984 while the Ceausescus were on a state visit to West Germany had been inspired by memories of the March 1977 experience. See Silviu Brucan, The Wasted Generation: Memories of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 131-134.

[4].. Cornel Ivanciuc, “Raporturile dintre Frontul Salvarii Nationale si KGB,” 22, no. 21 (24-30 May 1995), 11.

http://www.jurnalul.ro/campaniile-jurnalul/jurnalul-national/ultima-excursie-in-iran-a-lui-nicolae-ceausescu-527641.html (Vasile Surcel)

PLECAŢI CU MULT ÎNAINTE
Contrar majorităţii “excursiilor” externe ale lui Ceauşescu, cea din Iran a fost foarte scurtă: a început la 18 decembrie 1989 şi s-a încheiat la 20. “Antemergătorii” au pornit însă la drum pe rând, cu mult înainte. Securiştii şi angajaţii MAE au plecat cu avionul, în primul “val”, la 9 decembrie, iar specialiştii în comerţ exterior la 12. Au făcut escală la Istanbul, de unde au ajuns la Teheran, tot pe calea aerului. Doar traseul ziaristului de la Agerpres a fost mai complicat. Plecat la 13 decembrie, el a trecut mai întâi pe la Moscova, unde a fost găzduit peste noapte la Ambasada României. La Teheran a ajuns abia a doua zi, la 14. În declaraţia sa, Ivanici nu a pomenit despre ciudatul ocol făcut pe la Moscova, într-o perioadă extrem de delicată pentru regimul comunist. Este drept că nici anchetatorii nu s-au arătat prea curioşi în privinţa acelui episod, despre care nu l-au întrebat absolut nimic.

VIAŢA DE SECURIST
Mihai Bucuci, Ioan Rotar şi Nicolae Florea, trei dintre “antemergătorii” delegaţiei oficiale, erau ofiţeri superiori de Securitate. Incluse în dosarul “T-Iran”, declaraţiile lor sunt interesante chiar şi acum, după atâţia ani de la prăbuşirea regimului comunist. Din ele aflăm, în premieră, cu ce se ocupau securiştii care pregăteau detaliile “tehnice” ale vizitelor externe la nivel înalt. Mihai Bucuci era colonel la UM 0666, iar de la el aflăm: “În toate cazurile am făcut parte din grupele pregătitoare care plecau în avans faţă de delegaţiile oficiale. Aceste grupe erau conduse de cadre cu funcţii importante: miniştri adjuncţi, secretari de stat sau şefi de unităţi. Activitatea grupei se baza pe un mandat scris, compus din 8-10 puncte. Concret, erau avute în vedere stabilirea şi organizarea măsurilor de pază la aeroport, la sosire şi la plecare, traseele de deplasare, reşedinţa şi obiectivele din program, dar şi asigurarea securităţii membrilor delegaţiei când se depuneau coroane de flori ori la vizitele în fabrici, uzine şi muzee”. Bucuci a plecat la 9 decembrie 1989 şi a ajuns la Teheran la 11, după o escală de o zi la Istanbul. Timp de o săptămână a pus la punct, cu organele de specialitate iraniene, paza delegaţiei oficiale. Pentru a evita orice manifestări ostile la adresa lui Ceauşescu, securiştii români au predat organelor locale de poliţie şi de siguranţă liste cu persoanele “periculoase”, de origine română sau străină, aflate în Iran ori în ţările vecine, liste întocmite “de unităţile centrale de Securitate”. Încercând poate să convingă că nu era un apropiat al Ceauşeştilor, Bucuci s-a plâns procurorilor: “Deşi am lucrat mult timp în UM 0666, care asigura paza fostului dictator, nu am fost agreat în reşedinţe, în apartamente sau birouri. Sarcinile «de intimitate» erau rezervate cadrelor din Serviciul 1″. În acelaşi timp, Bucuci a încercat să-i convingă pe procurori că nici nu prea era mare lucru să fii în slujba directă a lui Ceauşescu: “Serviciul 1 de la UM 0666 Bucureşti, care a asigurat securitatea lui N.C. şi a soţiei sale, era compus din 20 de ofiţeri cu vârste între 25 şi 55 de ani, care lucrau în ture, 24 cu 24. Salariile nu erau mult mai mari decât ale celorlalţi militari”. El a ţinut să menţioneze special că acei ofiţeri “trebuiau să aibă o condiţie fizică foarte bună, dar şi să joace bine volei, sport foarte agreat de Ceauşescu”. Aproape că îţi vine să le plângi de milă.

COMUNICAŢII “LA LIBER”
Securiştii care pregăteau vizitele oficiale răspundeau şi de legăturile telefonice cu ţara. În Iran această sarcină i-a revenit maiorului DSS Nicolae Florea, de la UM0695, specialist în telecomunicaţii. A ajuns la Teheran la 11 decembrie şi în câteva zile a pus pe roate întregul sistem de comunicaţii cu ţara. Era vorba despre telefon şi telex, precum releul tele-foto pentru Agerpres. Principalul “beneficiar” al muncii lui a fost chiar Ceauşescu. Cei care au stat în preajma preşedintelui afirmă că acesta a vorbit foarte mult cu Elena, pe care, în anumite perioade, a sunat-o şi din jumătate în jumătate de oră. În mod ciudat, convorbirile lui telefonice, la fel ca şi restul legăturilor cu ţara, nu au fost secretizate, fapt menţionat clar de fostul maior DSS Florea. Anchetatorii din 1990 nu au fost însă curioşi să afle de ce şi cine a avut interesul să nu codifice convorbirile lui Ceauşescu, făcând astfel accesibile toate ordinele date de el de la distanţă în acele zile tulburi.

DE CINE SE TEMEA CEAUŞESCU?
Această ciudăţenie tehnică nu a fost singura. În decembrie 1989, Ion Tâlpeanu era locotenent colonel în Serviciul l în Direcţia a V-a a Securităţii şi aghiotant prezidenţial. El relatează că delegaţia propriu-zisă, cea condusă de Ceauşescu, a plecat în Iran la 18 decembrie la ora 9:05 şi a ajuns la Teheran la ora 12:00. Ciudăţenia de care vorbeam a constat într-o adevărată premieră: în spaţiul aerian naţional şi al apelor teritoriale din Marea Neagră, avionul prezidenţial a fost escortat de patru avioane de vânătoare MIG 21, aparţinând flotei aeriene române. Aceleaşi măsuri de siguranţă neobişnuite s-au luat şi la 20 decembrie ’89, când, în jurul orei 15:00, aeronava prezidenţială a revenit acasă. De ce s-o fi considerat Ceauşescu vulnerabil atât timp cât a zburat “pe cerul patriei”? Nu vom şti niciodată.

TOVARĂŞI DE DRUM
Planificată cu mult înainte, această ultimă vizită oficială s-a înscris în tiparul celorlalte. Încă sigur pe el şi pe poziţia lui politică, probabil că lui Ceauşescu nici nu i-a trecut prin cap că, la 18 decembrie 1989, când pleca la Teheran, intrase în ultima lui săptămână de viaţă. Şi că peste doar câteva zile regimul comunist din România, pe care îl condusese 24 de ani, avea să se prăbuşească. În dimineaţa plecării, Ceauşescu a vorbit la reşedinţa din Primăverii cu generalii Iulian Vlad, Vasile Milea şi cu ministrul Tudor Postelnicu, veniţi la el rând pe rând. La întâlnirile cu ei, părea calm şi foarte liniştit. La ducere, Ceauşescu a discutat, în avion, în compartimentul de lucru, cu membrii delegaţiei: Ion Stoian, fost ministru de Externe, Constantin Mitea, consilier prezidenţial pe probleme de presă, secretarul personal Mihai Hârjeu, precum şi generalii Neagoe şi Iosif Rus.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #9 Ceausescu Regime Officials Involved before 22 December in Covering up Timisoara Repression…Remain Active after 22 December

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #10 The Protesters Conquer Timisoara as the Army Withdraws to Maintain Institutional Command and Control

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #8 Romania closes its borders to almost all foreigners…except Russian tourists returning from shopping trips to Yugoslavia (18-19 December 1989)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 19, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  During the meeting of the equivalent of the Politburo of the Romanian Communist Party on the afternoon of 17 December 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu announced:  “I have ordered that all tourist activity be interrupted at once. Not one more foreign tourist will be allowed in, because they have all turned into agents of espionage….Not even those from the socialist countries will be allowed in, outside of [North] Korea, China, and Cuba. Because all the neighboring socialist countries are untrustworthy. Those sent from the neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents.”  On 18 December 1989, in the aftermath of the bloodbath of regime repression that had transpired in Timisoara the night before, it was officially announced–in typical Ceausist- (and undeniably Orwellian) style–that Romania would not accept any more tourists because of a “shortage of hotel rooms” and because “weather conditions” were “not suitable for tourism.”  Only it turned out in practice one group of tourists from a neighboring communist state were exempted from this requirement:  Soviet tourists returning home from shopping trips in Yugoslavia…

image0

FBIS-EEU-89-242 (19 December 1989), p. 85.  Paris AFP in English 1430 GMT 19 December 1989.

Vatin, Yugoslavia, Dec. 19 (AFP)

Romania’s borders are now closed to all but Soviet travellers, who pass through Romania to return home after shopping trips to Yugoslavia….

An AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE reporter was curtly told to “go back home, only Russians can get through,” after two Romanian border guards–one armed with a Kalashnikov rifle with an Alsatian guard dog at his side–carried out a detailed inspection of the license plates on some 15 cars waiting to cross.

I have been using this source since back in the 1990s when I wrote my dissertation (defended December 1996) at Indiana University (Bloomington), but I still get a kick out of it when I come across it–particularly in light of the seemingly never-ending, snowballing revisionism which alleges that the Timisoara uprising was sparked by “Soviet tourists” or “Russian tourists,” etc.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/28/yugoslavia-romania-border-19-december-1989-an-agence-france-presse-reporter-was-curtly-told-to-go-back-home-only-russians-can-get-through/

 

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then [minus the xeroxes] and thus has not been revised in any form.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997-chapter-6-18-22-december-1989/ (traducere de catre Marius Mioc 18-19 decembrie 1989 )

18-19 December 1989: The Timisoara Crackdown in Ceausescu’s Absence

Considering the centrality of the “foreign tourist” scenario to Securitate-inspired accounts of the December events, it is interesting to note the actions taken by the Ceausescu regime on 18 December 1989. At the close of the emergency CPEx meeting on Sunday afternoon, Nicolae Ceausescu had announced:

I have ordered that all tourist activity be interrupted at once. Not one more foreign tourist will be allowed in, because they have all turned into agents of espionage….Not even those from the socialist countries will be allowed in, outside of [North] Korea, China, and Cuba. Because all the neighboring socialist countries are untrustworthy. Those sent from the neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents.[5]

[from Mircea Bunea, Praf in ochi:  Procesul celor 24-1-2 (Editura Scripta, 1994), p. 34.]

image0-001

On Monday, 18 December 1989, in typical Ceausist-style it was therefore announced that Romania would not accept any more tourists because of a “shortage of hotel rooms” and because “weather conditions” were “not suitable for tourism.”[6] Ironically, the only ones exempted from this ban were: “Soviet travellers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia”(!)[7]

Thus, it is intriguing to see how former Securitate Colonel Filip Teodorescu tailors his characterization of Timisoara on 18 December to account for this change:

There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses, or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these “tourists.”[8]

[from Filip Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat, 1992, p. 92]

image-68

This raises the question of why, if the Soviet tourists were the ones suspected from the first of being behind the unrest, it should have been exactly they who were given continued access into Romania? One of the most effective rejections of the “tourist” scenario came in 1991 from “a group of [Army] officers from the Timisoara garrison.” In an open letter, they proclaimed:

If they [the tourists] appeared suspect to the special forces of the Securitate and counter-military intelligence, why did they not attempt to keep them under surveillance? During this period, did the Securitate and the counter-intelligence officers not know how to do their jobs? Did they somehow forget why they were paid such weighty sums from the state budget?[9]

[Un Grup de Ofiteri din Garnizoana Timisoara, Romania Libera, 15 octombrie 1991
“4.  Existenta unui mare numar de turisti straini, care s-au deplasat (cu autoturisme) spre Timisoara si prin Timisoara.
Cine au fost acei turisti?  Turisti banuiti, si ei, de intentii destabalizatoare.
Daca fortelor speciale de securitate si contrainformatii militare li s-au parut suspecti, de ce nu s-au procedat la verificarea acestora?  Oare in acel rastimp, securistii si contrainformatorii nu mai stiau sa-si faca meseria?  Au uitat pentru ce erau platiti, din bugetul statului, cu bani grei?”]

As we mentioned earlier, in an interesting psychological twist the former Securitate sometimes appear to attribute their own actions to others, especially the convenient phantom-like “foreign tourists.” Some of the Securitate‘s arguments also appear to be based on the manipulation and perversion of real information which has been ripped from its context and placed in another one which suits the Securitate‘s institutional interests better. For example, the comments of the Yugoslav News Agency (TANJUG) correspondent at the Vatin border post on 20 December 1989 may give us a hint as to where the idea of “foreign tourists travelling in convoys of cars” originated from:

People who spent a long time at this crossing point today say that the Romanian government is even accompanying private cars of tourists returning home via Romania. They usually wait until five or six of them assemble and then let them continue in convoys led by official Romanian cars.[10]

[5].. See Mircea Bunea, Praf in Ochi. Procesul Celor 24-1-2. (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 34.

[6].. Belgrade Domestic Service, 1400 GMT 20 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-243, 20 December 1989.

[7].. Agence France Presse, 19 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-242, 19 December 1989.

[8].. Filip Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara decembrie 1989 (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc, 1992), 92.

[9].. Un grup de ofiteri din garnizoana Timisoara, “FRICA DE PROPRIUL POPOR… [Fear of your own people]” Romania Libera, 15 October 1991, 2a.

[10].. Belgrade TANJUG, 2137 GMT 20 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-244, 21 December 1989, 80. Disinformation is frequently thought of as synonymous with the “big lie,” but indeed the most effective disinformation always contains a kernel of truth. Frequently, real facts are merely presented out of context. It is also intriguing to note the almost Freudian mirror-imaging quality of this disinformation–a characteristic common to totalitarian regimes. This is especially the case when it comes to the accusations of foreign powers being engaged in “terrorist actions”–an eerily accurate description of the Ceausescu regime’s own actions.

—————————————-

In combination with the following declarations from late December 1989 and early 1990 by senior officials of the former Securitate, dispatched to find evidence of Nicolae Ceausescu’s (/General Iulian Vlad’s) theory of what was transpiring in Timisoara, but who found no evidence of such involvement, this should be a body blow to the revisionist “recovered memory” regarding “Russian/Soviet tourists” in the Timisoara uprising.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/08/23/nicolae-ceausescus-paranoia-as-a-theory-for-explaining-december-1989/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/17/filip-teodorescu-adj-sef-dir-iii-contraspionaj-d-s-s-nu-sint-date-ca-ar-exista-instigatori-sau-conducatori-anume-veniti-din-strainatate/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/16/emil-macri-rezumind-sintetic-informatiile-obtinute-ele-nu-au-pus-in-evidenta-nici-lideri-si-nici-amestecul-vreunei-puteri-straine-in-producerea-evenimentelor-de-la-timisoara/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/10/liviu-dinulescu-cpt-la-serviciul-de-pasapoarte-al-jud-timis-precizez-ca-anterior-declansarii-evenimentelor-de-la-timisoara-din-datele-ce-le-detineam-serviciul-nostru-nu-rezulta-vreun-amestec-di/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/06/secretele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-col-niculae-mavru-fost-sef-al-sectiei-filaj-si-investigatie-de-la-securitatea-timis/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ultimul-raport-al-securitatii-catre-nicolae-ceausescu/

 

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #7 Nicolae Ceausescu Leaves on a Less-than-spontaneous Trip to Iran (18 December 1989)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 18, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  On Monday 18 December 1989, the morning after the bloodbath in Timisoara, Nicolae Ceausescu left on a state visit to Iran.  On the one hand, some observers have jumped to the conclusion that this was a spontaneous, last-ditch effort by the dictator to seek the moral support of a friendly regime for the crackdown and perhaps to ask for military reinforcements or materiel.  As it turns out, Nicolae Ceausescu did not go to Iran as the result of a snap decision.  Instead, high-level Securitate and regime personnel had gone ahead to prepare for Ceausescu’s arrival, as early as 9 December 1989 (a fact we have known since March 1990, see article from Expres below)–therefore, a full week prior to the outbreak of the uprising against Ceausescu’s regime in Timisoara.  It is possible that Ceausescu brought gold for his hosts with him on this trip.

http://www.ina.fr/video/CAG03010187

below a previously unposted article

image0-001

An excerpt from

A chapter from my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.  (traducere in limba romana:  http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/01/05/rich-andrew-hall-rescrierea-istoriei-revolutiei-triumful-revizionismului-securist-in-romania-1-ceausescu-pleaca-in-iran/ si traducerea de catre marius mioc)

Ceausescu Departs for Iran

On Monday morning 18 December 1989, President Nicolae Ceausescu departed on a previously-scheduled state visit to Iran. He was the first head of state to pay an official visit to Tehran since the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989.[1] By the time the presidential jet took off for Iran, Timisoara was under virtual military occupation by units of the Army, Securitate, and Militia. Ceausescu was apparently sufficiently satisfied by the news he was receiving on the status of the crackdown, that he judged it safe to leave the country. In his absence, the “Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee (CPEx)” was left in charge. In effect, this meant that power resided with the First Deputy Prime Minister, his wife Elena–hardly a stranger to such power–and the Vice President of the country, Manea Manescu, who was married to Nicolae’s sister Maria.[2]

On the one hand, the fact that Ceausescu would leave the country in the midst of the most serious challenge ever to communist rule in Romania–fully aware of what had happened to his fellow communist leaders in the region earlier that fall–was a testament to how supremely overconfident and detached from reality he had become. On the other hand, Ceausescu’s absence from the country between 18 and 20 December for a period in excess of forty-eight hours provided regime elites with the perfect opportunity to oust him from power had they wanted to. Ceausescu would likely have been granted asylum by the Iranian regime. In theory it seems, had Ceausescu’s ouster been premeditated, this was the ideal moment to strike.

Most regime elites had a vivid memory of how Ceausescu’s absence from the country during the devastating earthquake of March 1977 had paralyzed the regime apparatus.[3] Moreover, having been threatened by Ceausescu at the emergency CPEx meeting of 17 December with removal from their posts and possible execution–and Ceausescu had been persuaded merely to defer, rather than to cancel this decision–Ceausescu’s commanders had a strong incentive to act fast. Instead, Ceausescu’s henchmen faithfully executed his orders and patiently awaited his return. This is a powerful argument against any suggestion that Ceausescu’s subordinates were scheming to replace him and had intentionally allowed the Timisoara unrest to elude their control.

Theories which maintain that Ceausescu was overthrown by a foreign-engineered coup d’etat also have trouble explaining why the plotters did not attempt to seize power during the period while Ceausescu was out of the country and then prevent him from returning to Romania. The Timisoara events had already assured that Ceausescu’s ouster would contain the popular dimension which was reputedly so central to this coup d’etat scenario. Furthermore, if the Timisoara protests had been instigated by foreign agents, why were these agents unable to “spread the revolution” to Bucharest (which remained surprisingly quiet) during these days?

In support of his contention that the December events were a Soviet-backed coup d’etat, Cornel Ivanciuc has cited the March 1994 comments of Igor Toporovski (director of the Moscow-based Institute for Russian and International Political Studies) which allege that the Soviet Politburo “…chose the moment when Ceausescu was in Teheran [to oust him] because otherwise the action would have been difficult to initiate.”[4] Yet the facts tell another story. Ceausescu was not driven from power at the most opportune moment–while he was in Iran–and the uprising in Timisoara did not spread outside of Timisoara until after Ceausescu’s return. These points cast doubt upon Toporovski’s claims.

[mai mult despre Ivanciuc…https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/timisoara-si-mostenitorii-revizionismul-securist/]

[1].. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17.

[2].. Martyn Rady, Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History (New York: IB Tauris & Co Ltd., 1992), 94. For Manescu’s link to the Ceausescu family, see ibid., 52-53.

[3].. Indeed, the abortive military coup d’etat attempt planned for October 1984 while the Ceausescus were on a state visit to West Germany had been inspired by memories of the March 1977 experience. See Silviu Brucan, The Wasted Generation: Memories of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 131-134.

[4].. Cornel Ivanciuc, “Raporturile dintre Frontul Salvarii Nationale si KGB,” 22, no. 21 (24-30 May 1995), 11.

in relation to Ceausescu’s trip to Iran, from Orwellian…Positively Orwellian (2006) https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/10/03/%E2%80%9Corwellian%E2%80%A6positively-orwellian%E2%80%9D-prosecutor-voinea%E2%80%99s-campaign-to-sanitize-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989-part-seven-foreign-involvement/

[85] …In no.8 (23-30 March 1990) Expres p. 8, Cornel Nistorescu wrote in “Tot Felul,”

“Our compatriots tried and are trying to sell a lie:  that the USLA had no role in guarding the dictator.  Mr. General Stanculescu, we communicate publicly to you something you know:  that every time Ceausescu went out in Bucharest, in each convoy there was an USLA team.  And for Ceausescu’s visit to Iran on flight RO 247 of 9 December to Istanbul and on to Teheran were the following:  Mortoriu Aurel, Ardeleanu Gheorghe, Bucuci Mihai, Ivan Gelu, Grigore Corneliu, Floarea Nicolae, Rotar Ion and Grecu Florin.  These weren’t diplomats and they weren’t going for a snack.”

Revista “Expres,” nr. 8 23-29 martie 1990, p. 8.

for further details on UM 0666 Directia V-a of the Securitate and some of the personalities listed above and below (Mihai Bucuci et. al.) see

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/rev89/simionica/manuscris/

Atentie, in special, la USLA, Stetikin/Stecikin, si “seviciu 150 Directia V-a a Securitatii”…

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/rev89/simionica/manuscris/docs/cap2.htm

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/rev89/simionica/manuscris/docs/cap3_1.htm

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/rev89/simionica/manuscris/docs/cap3_4.htm

http://www.jurnalul.ro/campaniile-jurnalul/jurnalul-national/ultima-excursie-in-iran-a-lui-nicolae-ceausescu-527641.html (Vasile Surcel)

PLECAŢI CU MULT ÎNAINTE
Contrar majorităţii “excursiilor” externe ale lui Ceauşescu, cea din Iran a fost foarte scurtă: a început la 18 decembrie 1989 şi s-a încheiat la 20. “Antemergătorii” au pornit însă la drum pe rând, cu mult înainte. Securiştii şi angajaţii MAE au plecat cu avionul, în primul “val”, la 9 decembrie, iar specialiştii în comerţ exterior la 12. Au făcut escală la Istanbul, de unde au ajuns la Teheran, tot pe calea aerului. Doar traseul ziaristului de la Agerpres a fost mai complicat. Plecat la 13 decembrie, el a trecut mai întâi pe la Moscova, unde a fost găzduit peste noapte la Ambasada României. La Teheran a ajuns abia a doua zi, la 14. În declaraţia sa, Ivanici nu a pomenit despre ciudatul ocol făcut pe la Moscova, într-o perioadă extrem de delicată pentru regimul comunist. Este drept că nici anchetatorii nu s-au arătat prea curioşi în privinţa acelui episod, despre care nu l-au întrebat absolut nimic.

VIAŢA DE SECURIST
Mihai Bucuci, Ioan Rotar şi Nicolae Florea, trei dintre “antemergătorii” delegaţiei oficiale, erau ofiţeri superiori de Securitate. Incluse în dosarul “T-Iran”, declaraţiile lor sunt interesante chiar şi acum, după atâţia ani de la prăbuşirea regimului comunist. Din ele aflăm, în premieră, cu ce se ocupau securiştii care pregăteau detaliile “tehnice” ale vizitelor externe la nivel înalt. Mihai Bucuci era colonel la UM 0666, iar de la el aflăm: “În toate cazurile am făcut parte din grupele pregătitoare care plecau în avans faţă de delegaţiile oficiale. Aceste grupe erau conduse de cadre cu funcţii importante: miniştri adjuncţi, secretari de stat sau şefi de unităţi. Activitatea grupei se baza pe un mandat scris, compus din 8-10 puncte. Concret, erau avute în vedere stabilirea şi organizarea măsurilor de pază la aeroport, la sosire şi la plecare, traseele de deplasare, reşedinţa şi obiectivele din program, dar şi asigurarea securităţii membrilor delegaţiei când se depuneau coroane de flori ori la vizitele în fabrici, uzine şi muzee”. Bucuci a plecat la 9 decembrie 1989 şi a ajuns la Teheran la 11, după o escală de o zi la Istanbul. Timp de o săptămână a pus la punct, cu organele de specialitate iraniene, paza delegaţiei oficiale. Pentru a evita orice manifestări ostile la adresa lui Ceauşescu, securiştii români au predat organelor locale de poliţie şi de siguranţă liste cu persoanele “periculoase”, de origine română sau străină, aflate în Iran ori în ţările vecine, liste întocmite “de unităţile centrale de Securitate”. Încercând poate să convingă că nu era un apropiat al Ceauşeştilor, Bucuci s-a plâns procurorilor: “Deşi am lucrat mult timp în UM 0666, care asigura paza fostului dictator, nu am fost agreat în reşedinţe, în apartamente sau birouri. Sarcinile «de intimitate» erau rezervate cadrelor din Serviciul 1″. În acelaşi timp, Bucuci a încercat să-i convingă pe procurori că nici nu prea era mare lucru să fii în slujba directă a lui Ceauşescu: “Serviciul 1 de la UM 0666 Bucureşti, care a asigurat securitatea lui N.C. şi a soţiei sale, era compus din 20 de ofiţeri cu vârste între 25 şi 55 de ani, care lucrau în ture, 24 cu 24. Salariile nu erau mult mai mari decât ale celorlalţi militari”. El a ţinut să menţioneze special că acei ofiţeri “trebuiau să aibă o condiţie fizică foarte bună, dar şi să joace bine volei, sport foarte agreat de Ceauşescu”. Aproape că îţi vine să le plângi de milă.

COMUNICAŢII “LA LIBER”
Securiştii care pregăteau vizitele oficiale răspundeau şi de legăturile telefonice cu ţara. În Iran această sarcină i-a revenit maiorului DSS Nicolae Florea, de la UM0695, specialist în telecomunicaţii. A ajuns la Teheran la 11 decembrie şi în câteva zile a pus pe roate întregul sistem de comunicaţii cu ţara. Era vorba despre telefon şi telex, precum releul tele-foto pentru Agerpres. Principalul “beneficiar” al muncii lui a fost chiar Ceauşescu. Cei care au stat în preajma preşedintelui afirmă că acesta a vorbit foarte mult cu Elena, pe care, în anumite perioade, a sunat-o şi din jumătate în jumătate de oră. În mod ciudat, convorbirile lui telefonice, la fel ca şi restul legăturilor cu ţara, nu au fost secretizate, fapt menţionat clar de fostul maior DSS Florea. Anchetatorii din 1990 nu au fost însă curioşi să afle de ce şi cine a avut interesul să nu codifice convorbirile lui Ceauşescu, făcând astfel accesibile toate ordinele date de el de la distanţă în acele zile tulburi.

DE CINE SE TEMEA CEAUŞESCU?
Această ciudăţenie tehnică nu a fost singura. În decembrie 1989, Ion Tâlpeanu era locotenent colonel în Serviciul l în Direcţia a V-a a Securităţii şi aghiotant prezidenţial. El relatează că delegaţia propriu-zisă, cea condusă de Ceauşescu, a plecat în Iran la 18 decembrie la ora 9:05 şi a ajuns la Teheran la ora 12:00. Ciudăţenia de care vorbeam a constat într-o adevărată premieră: în spaţiul aerian naţional şi al apelor teritoriale din Marea Neagră, avionul prezidenţial a fost escortat de patru avioane de vânătoare MIG 21, aparţinând flotei aeriene române. Aceleaşi măsuri de siguranţă neobişnuite s-au luat şi la 20 decembrie ’89, când, în jurul orei 15:00, aeronava prezidenţială a revenit acasă. De ce s-o fi considerat Ceauşescu vulnerabil atât timp cât a zburat “pe cerul patriei”? Nu vom şti niciodată.

TOVARĂŞI DE DRUM
Planificată cu mult înainte, această ultimă vizită oficială s-a înscris în tiparul celorlalte. Încă sigur pe el şi pe poziţia lui politică, probabil că lui Ceauşescu nici nu i-a trecut prin cap că, la 18 decembrie 1989, când pleca la Teheran, intrase în ultima lui săptămână de viaţă. Şi că peste doar câteva zile regimul comunist din România, pe care îl condusese 24 de ani, avea să se prăbuşească. În dimineaţa plecării, Ceauşescu a vorbit la reşedinţa din Primăverii cu generalii Iulian Vlad, Vasile Milea şi cu ministrul Tudor Postelnicu, veniţi la el rând pe rând. La întâlnirile cu ei, părea calm şi foarte liniştit. La ducere, Ceauşescu a discutat, în avion, în compartimentul de lucru, cu membrii delegaţiei: Ion Stoian, fost ministru de Externe, Constantin Mitea, consilier prezidenţial pe probleme de presă, secretarul personal Mihai Hârjeu, precum şi generalii Neagoe şi Iosif Rus.

Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta reported in mid-January 1990–in article that referenced “Iranian and Romanian sources and intelligence sources,”–that “Ceausescu had become so enamored of Iran, according to Romanian sources, that in November he secretly deposited millions of dollars in gold for safekeeping in Iranian banks.”

Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “Iran Embarrassed by Ceausescu Visit,” The Washington Post, 17 January 1990, E17. (syndicated copy above) WASHINGTON — Romanian despot Nicolae Ceausescu got some help last-minute help from a soul mate who is now embarrassed about coming to the aid of a loser.  Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to prop up Ceausescu by sending Iranian security goons to Romania to protect him.  Ceausescu’s three-day visit to Iran while his troops massacred dissidents at home contributed to the foment that eventually overthrew him.  Rafsanjani’s embrace of the Romanian dictator on that trip has not helped his stock with the Western diplomatic community. Iranian and Romanian sources and intelligence sources now tell us what went on behind the scenes when Ceausescu was in Iran. He flew to Tehran on Dec 18 while his troops were brutally putting down a riot in the Romanian city of Timisoara. The day before, Ceausescu’s secret police had used tanks and machine guns to open fire on crowds of demonstrators. Hundreds of men women and children were murdered. The battle continued while Ceausescu was being welcomed by an elated Rafsanjani. In his first six months as president of Iran, no other head of state had bothered to visit. The two men openly conferred about trade issues. Romania has been a major trading partner with Iran, and their business amounted to about $1.8 billion last year.  Ceausescu had become so enamored of Iran, according to Romanian sources, that in November he secretly deposited millions of dollars in gold for safekeeping in Iranian banks. He mistrusted Western banks after seeing some of them freeze the ill-gotten gain of another opportunist Ferdinand Marcos. On the second day of his visit to Tehran, Ceausescu placed a wreath on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini. In doing so, he became the only head of state to kiss up to Khomeini after death.  In retrospect, it was a kiss of death back home.  That night, with word that the demonstrations were out of control in Romania, Ceausescu begged Rajsanjani for help.  Rafsanjani supplied some of his most loyal Iranian bodyguards to protect Ceausescu on his return.  The next day, Dec 20, a contingent of Iranian Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guard, secretly flew to Bucharest. Two days later, when the Romanian army turned against Ceausescu’s security police. the despot knew it was over.  He and his wife Elena fled Bucharest but were captured by peasants. Meanwhile, Timisoara was still a battleground where eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed the forces were not all Romanians.  According to some witnesses, Iranians or Libyans were doing some of the shooting. Similar reports of Iranian and Libyan snipers came from the industrial city of Craiova. In a two-hour secret trial on Christmas Day, the Ceausescus were convicted of genocide of 60,000 Romanians and theft of more than billion. “You should have stayed in Iran where you had flown to, the prosecutor told them. “We do not stay abroad,” Elena Ceausescu said. “This is our home.” The two were executed by firing squad. Rafsanjani was fit to be tied. He was embarrassed about helping Ceausescu at the end because he feared it would jeopardize trade arrangements with the new Romanian government. Rafsanjani dismissed his ambassador to Romania for not telling him about the power of the anti-Ceausescu forces in time to spare Iran the humiliation of hosting a has-been.

Petre Dumitru (cu un ofiter din Directia V-a), “Noi amanunte privind vizita lui Ceausescu in Iran,” Expres Magazin, nr. 9 (1991), p. 11.

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Articles suggesting that Ceausescu had been sending gold to Switzerland for safekeeping, prior to the outbreak of the December 1989 events.

 

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Marian Dumitrescu, “Cum au fost transportate 40 tone aur in Elvetia,” Romania Libera (?), 30 ianuarie 1990, p. 3.

Dan Badea reported later in the summer of 1991 about Ceausescu’s efforts in the summer of 1989 to have the USLA move some of his gold to Switzerland.

Dan Badea, “Transporturi Masive de Aur in Elvetia,” Expres nr. 23 (72) 11-17 June 1991, p. 16.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revoluion: #6 The Securitate Sends a Coded-Message to Its Undercovers in the Field (“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 December 1989)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 18, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:   The morning after the bloodbath in Timisoara, a by-any-standard bizarre article entitled “Some [very specific] advice for those who find themselves at the ocean these days,” was published in the official central organ, Scinteia Tineretului.  From the beginning the explanation that this was a joke–who in the dead of December would be vacationing at the beach in these days?–as the claimed author of this article later maintained was implausible.  The morning after the Timisoara massacre, when the Ceausescu regime was across the board in a high-state of alert, when the regime was desperately attempting to cover up that anything was wrong, on that morning the author and the editors decided this would be a good time for a joke about summer vacations?  Highly unlikely, and downright suicidal under such circumstances.  Of somewhat greater plausibility is the suggestion that the article was either an effort to communicate to would-be protesters about how to carefully assemble, or that this was the coded message of some KGB/GRU mole to Russian agents in the country.  Neither of these stands up very well either.  Everybody knew then as now, but especially in those tense days, that the Securitate controlled what got published and it is hard to see either of these scenarios playing out.  Another more plausible scenario is that it was from the Romanian military, a DIA message.  However, given the relationship between DIA and the Securitate at that time–not good–it is hard to see that happening.  Moreover, what is most significant, and what would seem to confirm the most likely scenario that it was a Securitate coded-message to undercovers in the field in light of what had happened in Timisoara, is that we now know the Romanian military was trying to divine the meaning of the message during December 1989 and January 1990.  Most significant in this regard are the revelations/interpretations below by General Dan Ioan.

Photo from http://www.agentia.org/anchete/decriptarea-textului-din-scanteia-tineretului-321.html
“Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” Scinteia Tineretului, 18 decembrie 1989
Photo from “Decriptarea textului din Scanteia Tineretului,” Luni, 28 decembrie 2009 11:51 by Mihaela G.

http://www.agentia.org/anchete/decriptarea-textului-din-scanteia-tineretului-321.html

Aceasta este decriptarea trimisa CSAT in 2007 – Declansati, pe neasteptate, planul ”Soare”. Incepeti prudent, cu operatiuni scurte, de 10-15 minute, simultan in mai multe zone, pana la acoperirea intregii tari.2 – Nu depasiti obiectivele. Altfel sunteti in mare pericol si nu va va ajuta nimeni.3 – Bazati-va pe sprijinul trupelor speciale care au rol activ intre orele 5,30 si 7,30 in scopul recuperarii ranitilor.4 – Devastati librariile si distrugeti ”operele alese” (cartile lui Ceausescu – n.r.) pentru instigare si intimidare.5 – Pentru nehotarati: nu tradati scopul, daca va iubiti tara.

Securitate General Iulian Vlad’s Declaration of 29 January 1990 identifying the “terrorists”:  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/11/20/when-a-truth-commission-misses-crucial-evidence-the-romanian-cpadcr-final-report-and-securitate-general-iulian-vlads-declaration/

“Acel articol a fost un cosmar pentru mine. In 22 decembrie au aparut fluturasi in Bucuresti cu “sfaturile ” din “Scinteia Tineretului “. Cine avea xeroxuri in acea vreme?”, se intreaba Sorin Preda. Am fost anchetat de Ministerul Apararii Nationale pentru ca generalul Militaru a considerat sau i s-a sugerat ca articolul meu era un semnal si pentru teroristi. Articolul il scrisesem cu patru zile inainte de aparitie si avea o introducere in care explicam caracterul lui umoristic. Nu stiu de ce acea introducere a disparut.”
 
…Buna ziua. Imi pare rau sa spun asta dar nu cred nici cat negru sub unghie ceea ce declara dl. Sorin Preda legat de articolul referitor la “sfaturile” pentru cei aflati pe litoral “la plaja” pe 18 Decembrie 1989. Este absurd. Ar fi prea multe coincidente. Eu detin ziarul respectiv in intregime. La vremea aceea eram ofiter activ in Brasov si vreau sa va spun ca dupa aparitia articolului, imediat dupa teleconferinta tinuta de Ceausescu in 17.12.1989, evenimentele au inceput sa se desfasoare intocmai cum era “ordonat” in “sfaturile” aparute in Scinteia Tineretului din 18.12.1989. Daca doriti sa va dau si decodificarea articolului o fac bucuros.Cu stima,Mircea
——————————————————————————
Mircea Ferestrăuariu avea 25 de ani în decembrie 1989 şi era locotenent în cadrul Şcolii Militare de Ofiţeri Activi şi Artilerie Antiaeriană şi Radiolocaţii „Leontin Sălăjan” din Braşov. Îşi aminteşte clar cum s-a răspândit în unitatea militară zvonul că „e ceva” cu articolul din „Scînteia tineretului”, că ar fi un articol codat şi cum, după câteva zile, a apărut şi o decodare pe care mai toată lumea din unitate şi-o copia de pe o fiţuică.  Mircea Ferestrăuariu are şi-acum decodarea, într-o cutie cu documente din casă. „Nu ştiu cum a intrat în şcoală decodarea, cine a adus-o, de unde, dar ea părea veridică. Iar la sfârşitul decodării scria că ea fusese făcută de un maior şi de un căpitan, maiorul Ioan Ardelean şi căpitanul Ioan Hendre. Numele nu-mi erau cunoscute, nu erau din unitatea noastră.  Oricum, eu sunt absolut convins că articolul a fost un ordin codat către forţele de represiune care nu făceau parte din structurile militare. Cine se duce la mare în decembrie să facă plajă şi baie? E de neconceput ca la vremea respectivă să apară un astfel de articol şi nimeni să nu sesizeze că e ceva aberant”.

General Magistrat (r) Ioan Dan, Teroristii din ’89 (Lucman, 2012):

In luna ianuarie 1990 eram la Timisoara, cand un subaltern mi-a prezentat un articol intitulat “Cateva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare,” publicat in ziarul ‘Scanteia Tineretului’ din ziua de 18 decembrie 1989.  Articolul–la care, de asemenea, m-a referit–se compune din 5  fraze sub forma de strofe, pe care le reproduc:

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Cu toate incercarile de a fi convins de contrariu, am considerat si consider ca acest articol a constituit ordinul de lupta transmis structurilor acoperite ale Securitatii.  Spun “ordin”, deoarece cuvantul “sfaturi” este pus intre ghilimele.

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“Avem inca o declaratie, din atatea altele, care ne duce cu gandul la acel faimos articol din ziua de 18 decembrie 1989, publicat in “Scanteia Tineretului”, prin care se dadeau sfaturi la cei aflati in acele zile de decembrie la mare si faceau plaja, sa inceapa cu reprize scurte, de 10-15 minute, cand pe-o parte, cand pe alta.”

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p. 309 In aceaste ordine de idei…

Ion Costin Grigore, Cucuveaua cu pene rosii (1994, Editura Miracol)

 

Textul din Scateia Tineretului:”Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare”*Evitati expunerea intempestiva si prelungita la soare. E de preferat sa incepeti mai prudent, cu reprize scurte de 10-15 minute – cand pe-o parte, cand pe alta. Astfel, va veti asigura un bronzaj placut si uniform.* Nu va avantati prea mult in larg. Oricum, in caz de pericol, nu strigati. Este inutil. Sansele ca prin apropuiere sa se afle vreo persoana dispusa a va asculta sunt minime.* Profitati de binefacerile razelor ultraviolete. Dupa cum se stie, ele sunt mai active intre orele 5,30 si 7,30. Se recomanda cu precadere persoanelor mai debile.* Daca sunteti o fire sentimentala si agreati apusurile soarelui, librariile de pe litoral va ofera un larg sortiment de vederi cu acest subiect.* Si inca ceva – daca aceste <sfaturi> v-au pus pe ganduri si aveti deja anumite ezitari, gandindu-va sa renuntati in favoarea muntelui, inseamna ca nu iubiti in suficienta masura marea. (S.P.)”Aceasta este decriptarea trimisa CSAT in 20071 – Declansati, pe neasteptate, planul ”Soare”. Incepeti prudent, cu operatiuni scurte, de 10-15 minute, simultan in mai multe zone, pana la acoperirea intregii tari.2 – Nu depasiti obiectivele. Altfel sunteti in mare pericol si nu va va ajuta nimeni.3 – Bazati-va pe sprijinul trupelor speciale care au rol activ intre orele 5,30 si 7,30 in scopul recuperarii ranitilor.4 – Devastati librariile si distrugeti ”operele alese” (cartile lui Ceausescu – n.r.) pentrui instigare si intimidare.5 – Pentru nehotarati: nu tradati scopul, daca va iubiti tara.
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“Acel articol a fost un cosmar pentru mine. In 22 decembrie au aparut fluturasi in Bucuresti cu “sfaturile ” din “Scinteia Tineretului “. Cine avea xeroxuri in acea vreme?”, se intreaba Sorin Preda. Am fost anchetat de Ministerul Apararii Nationale pentru ca generalul Militaru a considerat sau i s-a sugerat ca articolul meu era un semnal si pentru teroristi. Articolul il scrisesem cu patru zile inainte de aparitie si avea o introducere in care explicam caracterul lui umoristic. Nu stiu de ce acea introducere a disparut.”
…Buna ziua. Imi pare rau sa spun asta dar nu cred nici cat negru sub unghie ceea ce declara dl. Sorin Preda legat de articolul referitor la “sfaturile” pentru cei aflati pe litoral “la plaja” pe 18 Decembrie 1989. Este absurd. Ar fi prea multe coincidente. Eu detin ziarul respectiv in intregime. La vremea aceea eram ofiter activ in Brasov si vreau sa va spun ca dupa aparitia articolului, imediat dupa teleconferinta tinuta de Ceausescu in 17.12.1989, evenimentele au inceput sa se desfasoare intocmai cum era “ordonat” in “sfaturile” aparute in Scinteia Tineretului din 18.12.1989. Daca doriti sa va dau si decodificarea articolului o fac bucuros.Cu stima,Mircea
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Mircea Ferestrăuariu avea 25 de ani în decembrie 1989 şi era locotenent în cadrul Şcolii Militare de Ofiţeri Activi şi Artilerie Antiaeriană şi Radiolocaţii „Leontin Sălăjan” din Braşov. Îşi aminteşte clar cum s-a răspândit în unitatea militară zvonul că „e ceva” cu articolul din „Scînteia tineretului”, că ar fi un articol codat şi cum, după câteva zile, a apărut şi o decodare pe care mai toată lumea din unitate şi-o copia de pe o fiţuică.  Mircea Ferestrăuariu are şi-acum decodarea, într-o cutie cu documente din casă. „Nu ştiu cum a intrat în şcoală decodarea, cine a adus-o, de unde, dar ea părea veridică. Iar la sfârşitul decodării scria că ea fusese făcută de un maior şi de un căpitan, maiorul Ioan Ardelean şi căpitanul Ioan Hendre. Numele nu-mi erau cunoscute, nu erau din unitatea noastră.  Oricum, eu sunt absolut convins că articolul a fost un ordin codat către forţele de represiune care nu făceau parte din structurile militare. Cine se duce la mare în decembrie să facă plajă şi baie? E de neconceput ca la vremea respectivă să apară un astfel de articol şi nimeni să nu sesizeze că e ceva aberant”.
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Photo from “Decriptarea textului din Scanteia Tineretului,” Luni, 28 decembrie 2009 11:51 by Mihaela G.
Photo from http://www.agentia.org/anchete/decriptarea-textului-din-scanteia-tineretului-321.html

Decriptarea textului din Scanteia Tineretului

  • Luni, 28 decembrie 2009 11:51
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Sfaturi catre securisti in decembrie ’89Pe Ceausescu l-a doborat “o gluma” * In ziarul UTC, in plina iarna apare textul “Sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare” * La Timisoara era razboi civil, Armata tragea in populatie * Dupa 12 ani, un general din contraspionaj a trimis decriptarea textului la CSAT * Autorul sustine ca a scris un text umoristicIn data de 18 decembrie 1989, in timp ce in Timisoara era razboi civil, “Scanteia Tineretului” a publicat, in pagina 5, un text straniu, care nu avea nicio logica. Textul a facut valva la acea vreme, ca si in anii imediat urmatori Revolutiei. Erau sfaturi pentru cei ce se bronzau in acel moment, adica in mijlocul lunii decembrie, la mare. Textul a atras atentia imediat, in sensul ca semana cu un semnal incifrat pentru a se declansa ceva – dar pana azi contextul aparitiei sale nu a fost elucidat. A ramas ”o gluma”. In decembrie 2007, un general activ din contraspionajul romanesc a trimis decriptarea textului pentru a fi citita intr-o sedinta a Consiliului Suprem de Aparare a Tarii (CSAT). El era consilier in cadrul CSAT la acea vreme.
Textul din Scateia Tineretului:”Citeva sfaturi pentru cei aflati in aceste zile la mare”*Evitati expunerea intempestiva si prelungita la soare. E de preferat sa incepeti mai prudent, cu reprize scurte de 10-15 minute – cand pe-o parte, cand pe alta. Astfel, va veti asigura un bronzaj placut si uniform.* Nu va avantati prea mult in larg. Oricum, in caz de pericol, nu strigati. Este inutil. Sansele ca prin apropuiere sa se afle vreo persoana dispusa a va asculta sunt minime.* Profitati de binefacerile razelor ultraviolete. Dupa cum se stie, ele sunt mai active intre orele 5,30 si 7,30. Se recomanda cu precadere persoanelor mai debile.* Daca sunteti o fire sentimentala si agreati apusurile soarelui, librariile de pe litoral va ofera un larg sortiment de vederi cu acest subiect.* Si inca ceva – daca aceste <sfaturi> v-au pus pe ganduri si aveti deja anumite ezitari, gandindu-va sa renuntati in favoarea muntelui, inseamna ca nu iubiti in suficienta masura marea. (S.P.)”

Aceasta este decriptarea trimisa CSAT in 2007 – Declansati, pe neasteptate, planul ”Soare”. Incepeti prudent, cu operatiuni scurte, de 10-15 minute, simultan in mai multe zone, pana la acoperirea intregii tari.2 – Nu depasiti obiectivele. Altfel sunteti in mare pericol si nu va va ajuta nimeni.3 – Bazati-va pe sprijinul trupelor speciale care au rol activ intre orele 5,30 si 7,30 in scopul recuperarii ranitilor.4 – Devastati librariile si distrugeti ”operele alese” (cartile lui Ceausescu – n.r.) pentru instigare si intimidare.5 – Pentru nehotarati: nu tradati scopul, daca va iubiti tara.

Autorul spune ca a fost o glumaAutorul articolului, Sorin Preda, a declarat atat in fata anchetatorilor Ministerului Apararii cat si in presa, ca el a scris un text umoristic si atat. Adica cele cinci paragrafe, care au avut trimitere pe prima pagina, nu aveau nicio legatura cu Revolutia si a fost o simpla intamplare faptul ca au sunat atat de straniu in acele zile. Trebuie mentionat aici ca fisetul in care se pastrau manuscrisul si spaltul acestor ”sfaturi” a fost spart iar obiectele mai sus mentionate au disparut in timpul evenimentelor de dupa 22 decembrie 1989.Mihaela G.

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #5 Timisoara (Podul Decebal) Evidence Suggests only the Securitate Had Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 18, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  Romanian journalists and researchers, but perhaps in particular Timisoara journalists and researchers, have failed to systematically analyze the use of atypical munitions–most notably, exploding DUM-DUM bullets–in the wounding and killing of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989.  They invoke, for example, the claims of military prosecutors such as General Dan Voinea (http://rcristea.blogspot.com/2007/11/nici-simulatoare-de-tragere-nici.html), who outright denies their use, or General Romeo Balan ( https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/), who conveniently avoid mention of the type of bullets with which Timisoara demonstrators were wounded or killed. 

However, they suddenly are willing to countenance their use where demonstrators maintain they were shot by the Army.  But they fail to ask the critical question of what forces were present among those involved in firing on demonstrators and what evidence exists that the institution in question had access to and possessed such munitions?  The evidence is pretty clear:  even where demonstrators zealously maintain they were shot “by the Army,” Securitate forces were also present, and whereas there are multiple indications that the Securitate possessed and used such ammunition, there exists NOT a SINGLE piece of evidence that the Army did.  Until those who maintain this point of view can marshal evidence demonstrating that the Army possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets, logically one can only assume that it was the Securitate who possessed and used these vicious munitions.  To illustrate this, let us look at the tragedy at Podul Decebal in Timisoara on 17 December 1989.

(Dan Gavra has no doubt:  his foot was blown off by a double-explosion bullet, a DUM-DUM bullet.  Indeed, in this interview with Radio Timisoara Vocea Evangheliei, from approximately min. 20:45 he explains exactly why)

We know that at least four people and probably more were wounded or killed with exploding DUM-DUM bullets at Podul Decebal on 17 December 1989, including Ţînţaru Teodor Octavian (http://asociatia17decembrie1989timisoara.wordpress.com/in-memoriam/ “Octavian suferise o operaţie laborioasă condusă de Dr. Lazăr Fulger. Din cauza gloanţelor explozive i-au fost distruse un rinichi, jumătate din ficat şi artera femurală. Nu a supravieţuit pentru că nu erau rezerve de sânge pentru transfuzie.”) and  Banciu Leontina  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-4/masacrul-de-la-pod-i Pe certificatul medical de constatate a decesului soţiei scrie: plagă împuşcată torace, glonţ exploziv. Deci a explodat în inimă glonţul, iar Procuratura Militară, după declaraţiile care au fost, care le-am dat eu, mi-a dat alt certificat care zice că a fost în coloana de manifestanţi de la Podul Decebal din Timişoara şi a fost împuşcată în seara din 17 Decembrie.”)

Gavra continued:

D.G.: – Am rămas în picioare. Când am vrut să fug, a început, din nou, rafala. Iar am rămas în picioare. Iar s-a oprit. Şi atunci am vrut să fug. Şi-atunci a venit un cartuş, deci am luat-o spre stânga, direct din faţă a venit… deci eu am fost în mijloc, chiar în mijlocul şoselei. Când am vrut să fac stânga, a venit un cartuş şi m-a lovit în picior. Şi am zburat vreo doi, trei metri în aer. Am căzut pe marginea, pe pământ acolo, într-o baltă, într-o urmă de TAB, cred că acolo întorsese TAB-ul sau cine ştie, că eram parcă într-un tranşeu. Aşa am simţit, când am căzut jos, încă o rafală razantă cu pământul. Doar atât am apucat, să-mi pun mâinile după cap. Şi, când am vrut să mă ridic de acolo, din noroi – spun de noroi, pentru că am văzut că tot eram plin de noroi – nu mai reuşeam să-mi ridic piciorul. Piciorul meu parcă era bătut cu un ţăruş în pământ. Piciorul meu a dispărut de la genunchi şi până la talpă, pe o distanţă de douăzeci şi ceva de centimetri. A dispărut tibia, peroneul, tot. Au tras cu cartuşe cu dublă explozie.  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-5/masacrul-de-la-pod-ii 

Gavra has detailed whom he believes was involved in his wounding (and the death of his girlfriend at the time, 21 year old Ewinger Slobodanca) in the following interview.  His focus is on Army personnel who opened fire, commanded by Major Gheorghe Badea:

„Plutonul de execuţie era de la unitatea unde am făcut eu armata”

D.G.: – La Podul Decebal era un pluton de execuţie, o unitate militară… ironia sorţii, chiar cu câtva timp înainte fusesem concentrat la unitatea aceea militară.
L.K.: – Care unitate ?
D.G.: – 01185 de pe Chişodei. Era sub comanda maiorului Badea Gheorghe acel pluton. Ne-am apropiat de ei şi strigam: „Nu vă impacientaţi! Fără violenţă!”. Diferite lucruri. Şi ne-am apropiat la vreo 30 de metri de ei. Fără somaţie, fără nimic, s-a tras în plin în noi.

L.K.: – Până unde aţi ajuns? Până la colţ cu…
D.G.: – La vreo 30 de metri… Ei erau dispuşi în felul următor: un rând în genunchi, un rând în picioare. Între Parc şi Bega. Pe şoseaua aceea. La o distanţă de vreo cinci, zece metri de pod. Noi ne-am apropiat de ei, am zis 30 de metri, dar poate mai aproape, pentru că-i vedeam şi puteam să avem un dialog. De fapt, numai noi strigam: „Fără violenţă!”.

L.K.: – Erau luminile încă?
D.G.: – Nu. Nu erau. Şi s-a tras în plin în noi.
L.K.: – Aţi fost somaţi?
D.G.: – Nu, eu atâta mi s-a părut, că cel din dreapta plutonului fuma şi, când a aruncat ţigara, a început şi focul, dar poate-i doar închipuirea mea, n-a fost nicio somaţie, nici…

L.K: – Aţi văzut nişte siluete, practic? Un TAB aţi văzut? Erau în dispozitiv?

G.D.: – Nu. Erau… deci am spus că a fost o grupă. Vreo patru de tragere în genunchi şi vreo şase, şapte în picioare. Unii spun că au fost mai mulţi, dar eu cam aşa îmi aduc aminte. Pentru că eram chiar în faţă, am rămas, la un moment dat, toţi au fugit, au căzut, au murit, au fost răniţi. Eu am rămas în picioare, pentru că m-am şocat. Nu-mi venea să cred că se întâmplă. Patru bucăţi mi-au trecut, mi-au şuierat pe la urechea dreaptă. Am vrut să mă pun şi eu jos, au bătut în piatră cartuşele. Realmente nu mai ştiam ce să fac! Mă gândeam: acuma o să mor. Şi, când am simţit o ezitare între rafale, pentru că a fost o rafală… Eu am rămas şocat. S-a oprit.

„Am zburat vreo trei metri şi am căzut într-o baltă”

D.G.: – Am rămas în picioare. Când am vrut să fug, a început, din nou, rafala. Iar am rămas în picioare. Iar s-a oprit. Şi atunci am vrut să fug. Şi-atunci a venit un cartuş, deci am luat-o spre stânga, direct din faţă a venit… deci eu am fost în mijloc, chiar în mijlocul şoselei. Când am vrut să fac stânga, a venit un cartuş şi m-a lovit în picior. Şi am zburat vreo doi, trei metri în aer. Am căzut pe marginea, pe pământ acolo, într-o baltă, într-o urmă de TAB, cred că acolo întorsese TAB-ul sau cine ştie, că eram parcă într-un tranşeu. Aşa am simţit, când am căzut jos, încă o rafală razantă cu pământul. Doar atât am apucat, să-mi pun mâinile după cap. Şi, când am vrut să mă ridic de acolo, din noroi – spun de noroi, pentru că am văzut că tot eram plin de noroi – nu mai reuşeam să-mi ridic piciorul. Piciorul meu parcă era bătut cu un ţăruş în pământ. Piciorul meu a dispărut de la genunchi şi până la talpă, pe o distanţă de douăzeci şi ceva de centimetri. A dispărut tibia, peroneul, tot. Au tras cu cartuşe cu dublă explozie.

D.G: – Doar praf în ochi. Pentru că nu doar ei au fost cei arestaţi. Pentru că maiorul Badea Gheorghe, cel care a tras în noi, ulterior, din ordin prezidenţial al tovarăşului Ion Iliescu, a fost avansat de la gradul de maior sau ce-o fost la gradul de locotenent-colonel.

 http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-5/masacrul-de-la-pod-ii 

Even more convinced that he was shot by a DUM-DUM bullet shot by the Army is Adrian Kali.  Significantly, Kali talks about being shot by two distinct bullets, one a normal munition and one a DUM-DUM bullet, demonstrating that doctors and others involved in these events were able to distinguish between different types of munitions used.

Rănit în Revoluţie, cu gloanţe adevărate

Deşi este proprietarul celei mai numeroase armate paşnice din România, Adrian Kali a fost împuşcat de două ori. Întâi cu un glonte exploziv, aşa-numitele dum-dum, apoi cu un glonte de 7,62. Asta s-a întâmplat în timpul Revoluţiei din 1989, în 17 decembrie, pe Podul Decebal.

http://blog.kali.hi2.ro/

BUT DOES THE CONVICTION OR FOCUS OF THESE PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WERE “SHOT WITH DUM-DUM BULLETS FIRED BY THE ARMY” HOLD UPON FURTHER ANALYSIS.  DO THEY ACTUALLY KNOW THE MAKE-UP OF THE UNITS THAT FIRED AT THEM?  THE ANSWER IS NO:  BECAUSE THESE UNITS WERE MADE UP NOT ONLY OF ARMY PERSONNEL BUT…ALSO OF SECURITATE PERSONNEL AS WE LEARN FROM NICOLAE DURBAC BELOW:

(Anexa 3)

“ COMISIA GUVERNAMENTALĂ

JUDEŢUL TIMIŞ

REFERAT

(luna mai 1990)

Din datele culese până în prezent de Comisia Guvernamentală, instituită la nivelul judeţului Timiş, a reieşit că în zona podului Decebal, din Timişoara, în seara zilei de 17. 12 1989, s-a deschis foc împotriva demonstranţilor şi au rezultat mai mulţi morţi şi răniţi. În urma verificărilor făcute, s-au stabilit următoarele :

Din cadrul M.U., (Divizia 18 Mecanizată Timişoara, n.a.), în după amiaza zilei de 17.12 1989, în zona podului Decebal s-au dispus, în cordoane, militari de la U.M. 01185, de la U.M. 01008, ambele din Timişoara. În zonă erau dis-puşi, de asemenea, şi militari de la Brigada de securitate Timişoara.

Aceste forţe au avut misiunea de a împiedica acce-sul demonstranţilor spre Comitetul judeţean al P.C.R. Timiş. În jurul orelor 19.30-20.00, cordonul de militari, dispus în partea dreaptă a podului, a deschis focul de armă împotriva unei coloane de demonstranţi care se deplasa pe strada Splaiul Galaţi, dinspre Complexul studenţesc spre podul De-cebal.

Din audierile militarilor aflaţi în zonă, rezultă că dis-pozitivul care a deschis focul de armă era format din militari de la U.M. 01185 Timişoara, sub comanda căpitanului Ba-dea Gheorghe şi din militarii de la Brigada de securitate, sub comanda locotentului major Zepa Anbrozie. Acest aspect rezultă din declaraţiile locotenent-colonelului Andrei Ilie, ale maiorului Dragomir Marin, ambii din cadrul U.M. 01008 Timi-şoara, ale maiorului Ghibea Dorel, din U.M. 01115 Timi-şoara şi ale căpitanului Lăzăroiu Ioan de la U.M. 01024 Timişoara, filele 30-33 şi 3-12. Din declaraţiile locotenentului major Zepa Anbrozie şi ale soldaţilor Brâncoveanu Gheor-ghe şi Ţibocu Iulian, toţi din cadrul Brigăzii de securitate, reiese că ordinul de a se deschide foc spre demonstranţi a fost dat de căpitanul Badea Gheorghe.

Fiind audiat căpitanul Badea Gheorghe şi alte cadre de la U.M. 01185 Timişoara, rezultă că au deschis numai foc de avertisment, în plan vertical, însă, la faţa locului, s-au înregistrat morţi şi răniţi. Totodată, acesta susţine că s-a deschis focul din altă direcţie, aspect care este infirmat de declaraţiile date de maiorul Dima Viorel, din aceeaşi unitate, fila 28, de căpitanul Lăzăroiu Ioan, de la divizie, de căpitanul Ghibea Dorel, de la U.M. 01115, filele 3-12, precum şi de declaraţia numitului Bindeleu Gelu, persoană prezentă în rândul demonstranţilor, fila 1-2.

Faţă de cele mai sus, Comisia Guvernamentală pro-pune cercetarea penală, de către Procuratura Militară Timi-şoara, a căpitanului Badea Gheorghe.

Semnează şi ştampilează membrii comisiei “

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/cada/duracn/docs/docs_3.htm

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/27/orasul-martir-timisoara/

for “Orasul martir Bucuresti” see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/11/26/doru-teodor-maries-despre-decembrie-1989/

a few observations on “Orasul martir Timisoara” http://www.tvrplus.ro/editie-memorial-90-267738

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25:35 Ioan Bânciu begins discussing of his experience, and the death of his wife Leontina

26:33 An interesting admission others have made too:  despite the well-known and well-deserved reputation of the Ceausescu regime for its repression, Bânciu claims that no one could believe when regime forces, including the Army, opened fire with real bullets, that they were generally surprised and that rumors had circulated according to which the Army did not have real bullets (my note: thus a situation where positive misinformation actually emboldened demonstrators and gave them optimism and hope beyond what they realistically would have had).

29:09 Soldiers allow them to proceed by the Cathedral, the cry “God exists!” rang out.

30:25 Bânciu talks about the area near the river/canal Bega where there were no houses, no institutions

31:03 Toward Decebal Bridge, all lights are off

31:34 Soldiers open fire without giving a warning.

32:30-33:05 An important discussion in which Bânciu says they were shot by hidden regime forces, not just soldiers but also probably of the “Securitate-police type”

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https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/09/07/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-alte-marturii-v-procurorul-romeo-balan-10-cazuri/

Bânciu Leontina

Raportul medico-legal nr. 982/A din 18.12.1989 a fost întocmit pentru cadavrul neidentificat de sex feminin, cu numărul de ordine 10. Ca semn de violenţă este consemnată o plagă orificială anfractuoasă cu marginile de 2/2 cm, orificiu de intrare pe faţa posterioară a hemitoracelui stâng în 1/2 inferioară, fără a se putea decela orificiul de ieşire. S-a concluzionat că moartea violentă s-a datorat hemoragiei interne şi externe consecutivă leziunii de organe interne, prin proiectil de armă de foc, tragerea fiind efectuată de la distanţă dinapoi înainte. În baza portretului vorbit, consemnat în raport, a obiectelor de îmbrăcăminte şi a leziunii de violenţă prin împuşcare, victima Bânciu Leontina a fost identificată de soţul ei. Acesta a fost martor ocular al împuşcării soţiei sale la Podul Decebal din Timişoara în seara zilei de 17 decembrie 1989, şi a putut da relaţii cu privire la faptul că soţia sa a fost împuşcată, în spate. Personal a transportat-o la Spitalul Judeţean Timiş. Bânciu Ioan a relatat:

Văzând că începe să se tragă, noi, eu cu soţia am intenţionat să ne salvăm şi să fugim spre gardul Parcului Tineretului. În acel moment, soţia mea a fost împuşcată în spate, mai sus de coapsa stângă. Am luat măsuri şi am transportat-o pe soţia mea cu un autoturism proprietate personală la Spitalul Judeţean, unde când am ajuns un medic mi-a spus că soţia a decedat. Am lăsat-o pe soţia mea decedată la spital şi apoi am plecat acasă la copii. A doua zi, când am revenit nu am mai fost lăsat nici să intru în spital şi nici să văd cadavrul soţiei. De atunci până în prezent nu am mai văzut cadavrul soţiei şi acesta nu mi-a fost eliberat.[10]

Pentru cadavrul neidentificat de sex feminin, cu numărul de ordine 42 a fost întocmit raportul medico-legal nr. 1014/A din 18.12.1989. Sunt prezentate leziunile de violenţă, respectiv frontal în stâng orificiu rotund pergamentat de circa 7 mm (orificiu intrare) şi plagă occipitală cu multiple eschile şi hernie de substanţă cerebrală (orificiu ieşire). S-a concluzionat că moartea s-a datorat unei plăgi împuşcate craniene. Plecând de la descrierea fizică şi a obiectelor de îmbrăcăminte precum şi a leziunilor de violenţă descrise de martorii oculari, Radu Daniela-Oxana a identificat cadavrul sorei sale Sava Angela-Elena. Aceasta a fost împuşcată mortal în aceleaşi împrejurări ca şi surorile Caceu, în seara de 17 decembrie 1989, în apropierea Catedralei.

https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2014/03/19/procuror-militar-general-r-romeo-balan-identificarea-victimelor-incinerate-ale-revolutiei-timisorene/

We know that at least four people and probably more were wounded or killed with exploding DUM-DUM bullets at Podul Decebal on 17 December 1989, including Ţînţaru Teodor Octavian (http://asociatia17decembrie1989timisoara.wordpress.com/in-memoriam/ “Octavian suferise o operaţie laborioasă condusă de Dr. Lazăr Fulger. Din cauza gloanţelor explozive i-au fost distruse un rinichi, jumătate din ficat şi artera femurală. Nu a supravieţuit pentru că nu erau rezerve de sânge pentru transfuzie.”) and  Banciu Leontina  http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-4/masacrul-de-la-pod-i 

“Pe certificatul medical de constatate a decesului soţiei scrie: plagă împuşcată torace, glonţ exploziv. Deci a explodat în inimă glonţul, iar Procuratura Militară, după declaraţiile care au fost, care le-am dat eu, mi-a dat alt certificat care zice că a fost în coloana de manifestanţi de la Podul Decebal din Timişoara şi a fost împuşcată în seara din 17 Decembrie.”)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/04/13/25-for-2014-25-things-you-should-know-about-the-romanian-revolution-on-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-fall-of-nicolae-ceausescus-communist-regime-5-timisoara-podul-decebal-evidence-suggests/

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Miriana Mişcov

13. Mişcov Miriana, 15 ani, elev, plagă membru inferior, 17.12.89, împuşcată în Calea Girocului;

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-3/copiii-si-revolutia

Fullscreen capture 11272014 112039 AM

Maria(na) Mişcov recounts the tragic death of her daughter, Miriana (above), between approximately 14:50 and 22:05.  From 16:08 or so she talks about these military men definitely not being draftees because they were older, they had military vests, but no epaulets, and satchels or bags.

These “mystery men” are analyzed in the following posts, for example:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/20/procesul-de-la-timisoara-viii-cine-au-fost-cei-necunoscuti-mai-in-varsta-care-au-tras-inainte-de-22-decembrie-1989/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/10/21/procesul-de-la-timisoara-ix-cine-au-fost-cei-necunoscuti-mai-in-varsta-care-au-tras-inainte-de-22-decembrie-1989-2/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

Fullscreen capture 11272014 112152 AM

For example, in a 7 September 1995 interview, Dorina Aparaschivei told Marius Mioc about how her husband, Valentin Aparaschivei, was shot to death on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara ( “A luminat cu o lanterna si apoi a tras” http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT04~1.HTM ).  Among the details, she notes, “Cind militarii au ajuns in fata blocului unul dintre ei, mai batrin si cu mustata, a luminat cu o lanterna puternica si apoi a tras mai multe focuri spre noi. Sotul a fost impuscat in piept si a cazut pe spate.”

Thanks to the publication of Dosarele Revolutiei de la Timisoara, we can now confirm that was reported in the media in July 2008 is indeed the actual quote of Dumitru Marcu, commander of U.M. 01380 Arad, as recorded in his report dated 4 January 1990.  In this report, Marcu spoke of unidentified personnel infiltrated among the personnel of his military unit who used powerful flashlights (lanterns/lamps), and he suggests that these may have been Securitate/Militie personnel.

IMG_3084

Un alt raport de Informare al Ministerului Apărării Naţionale, întocmit de comandantul Marcu Dumitru din Arad, arată că acesta a semnalat “efective militare necunoscute” printre militarii săi.

“Între efectivele noastre au fost semnalate efective de militari necunoscuţi care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice şi care îndreptau fascicolul luminos spre balcoane, iar după aceea trăgeau asupra acestora – cazuri semnalate pe calea Girocului – îmbrăcaţi civili. Au fost semnalate efective ale Securităţii şi Miliţie în toate punctele unde am avut efective. Nu cunoaştem misiunile pe care le aveau de îndeplinit aceşti indivizi”, raporta comandantul.

http://www.mediafax.ro/social/jurnalul-de-lupta-al-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-desecretizat-galerie-foto-2767638

Comandantul unitatii militare din Arad, martor al evenimentelor, a raportat ca “printre militarii care au actionat pe Calea Girocului s-au strecurat si persoane necunoscute, in uniforma, care aveau lanterne foarte puternice cu care luminau balcoanele blocurilor din apropiere, dupa care trageau asupra lor”.

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-3506099-jurnalul-revolutiei-timisoara-fost-desecretizat-securitatea-tras-manifestanti.htm

Internet posters claiming to have been in the military and on the streets of Timisoara in December 1989 have discussed the appearance of personnel in military uniforms who very clearly were not from the military (my thanks to Corneliu N. Vaida for bringing the following to my attention):

zainea

Am fost la Timisoara militar in termen in 89. In fata noastra la un moment dat a fost dizlocat un pluton cu militari in tinuta kaki, mai in varsta ca noi, la 30-35 de ani si care nu aveau petlite si nici insemne de arma. Ii intrebam de vorba si nu ne raspundeau ne ignorau… Au tras orizontal rafale de pistol automat… Noi pana atunci am tras in plan vertical. Cine erau acei “militari”?
Noi toti am banuit ca erau ofiteri din trupele de securitate imbracati in postav kaki nou de la stoc care mirosea a naftalina.
Dupa aceea toata revolutia am petrecut-o pe un bloc in fata unei mitraliere si cu un camarad cu care ma scimbam periodic. Am ramas de atunci bolnav cu “mijlocul” din cauza frigului pe care l-am suportat atunci pe acel nenorocit de bloc.
Dumnezeu sa-i ierte pe toti eroii revolutiei din 1989…

http://www.ligamilitarilor.ro/eroii-neamului/recunostinta-eroilor-revolutiei-din-%E2%80%9989-timisoara/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/12/17/dosarele-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-si-procesul-de-la-timisoara-cateva-documente/

So then the question becomes one of who would have possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets in Timisoara on 17 December 1989.  For one thing, we can almost automatically eliminate two hypotheses:  Peter Siani-Davies hypothesis used to cast doubt on the use of atypical munitions after 22 December 1989–i.e. that the revolutionaries/civilians could have themselves taken possession of the munitions and weapons of regime forces and used them–since it is clear from the events at Podul Decebal that the only ones who fired were from the regime forces.  Secondly, as part 1 of this series demonstrated, the Securitate themselves in their declarations immediately after the events denied the presence and involvement in the demonstrations of foreign agents, most notably the so-called “Soviet/Russian tourists.”

So what is the evidence that the Army would have possessed and used DUM-DUM bullets on 17 December 1989 in Timisoara?  The answer is essentially NONE.  In more than two decades, not a single Army officer or even draftee has come forward and alleged/admitted that a) the Army had them, b) that those munitions were distributed to them, and c) that they fired them against demonstrators.  This is in stark contrast to the case of the Securitate, where we have demonstrators overhearing the Army complaining about being left out to dry so-to-speak by the Securitate who was using these munitions (see below).  But moreoever, we have the claims of former Securitate whistleblowers, multiple cases, admitting that they had these munitions and used them.  Any logical, evidentiary based analysis of December 1989 then can only conclude that it was the Securitate who had and used these munitions.

 

The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off> (my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0291

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

IMG_0290

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

Stoica Mircea, 40 ani, topometrist, Bd. Republicii, impuscat mina si picior http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT06~1.HTM

197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat.  În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0307pciv.htm

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

IMG_0330

intreaga declaratie e aici:

imaginea 330
imaginea 331
imaginea 332
imaginea 333
imaginea 334
imaginea 335
imaginea 336

It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici:  both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!

image0

Uzina Sadu-Gorj, august-septembrie 1989,

comanda de fabricatie a gloantelor explozive DUM-DUM

Referitor la existenta cartuselor explozive si perforante, dupa unele informatii rezulta ca in perioada august-septembrie 1989 la uzinele Sadu-Gorj s-a primit o comanda de executare a unor asemenea cartuse explozive.  Comanda a fost ordonata de Conducerea Superioara de partid si executata sub supravegherea stricta a unor ofiteri din fosta Securitate.

Asa cum s-a mai spus, asupra populatiei, dar si asupra militarilor MApN teroristii au folosit cartuse cu glont exploziv. Cartusele respective de fabricarea carora fostul director al uzinei Constantin Hoart–actualmente deputat PSM Gorj–si ing. Constantin Filip nu sunt straini, au fost realizate sub legenda, potrivit careia, acestea urmai a fi folosite de Nicolae Ceausescu in cadrul partidelor de vanatoare.

Consider ca lt. col. Gridan fost ofiter de Contrainformatii pentru Uzina Sadu–actualmente pensionar ar putea confirma fabricarea unor asemenea cartuse si probabil si unele indicii cu privire la beneficiar.  Daca intr-adevar aceste cartuse au fost fabricate in Romania atunci este limpede ca o mare parte din teroristii din decembrie 1989 au fost autohtoni, iar organele de securitate nu sunt straine de acest lucru.

from Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

for Part I see PART I: His Name Was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias

for Part II see Part II: A Revolution, A Coup d\’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

for Part III see Part III: Lost…during Investigation

for Part IV see Part IV: The Good Sergeant Schultz or They Know Nothing

for Part V see Part V: Seeing is Believing Videos One and Two

for Part VI see Part VI: Seeing is Believing, Videos 3 and 4

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.  [Submitted 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.

Those Who Have Told Us the Truth[1]

As opposed to the aforementioned Vladimir Belis, Pavel Corut, and Dan Voinea, all of whom who have strenuously and repeatedly denied the existence and use in December 1989 of atypical munitions of dum-dum bullets and vidia bullets, there exist those who have told us of the existence and use of these in December 1989.[2] They are essentially, for lack of a better term, former Securitate whistleblowers, who have admitted the Securitate’s role in providing the “terrorists” who caused so much destruction, mayhem, and loss of life in those days.

For years I have been essentially the sole researcher inside or outside the country familiar with and promoting the claims of 1) former Timisoara Securitate Directorate I officer Roland Vasilevici—who published his claims about December 1989 under the byline of Puspoki F. in the Timisoara political-cultural weekly Orizont in March 1990 and under the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu”—and 2) an anonymous USLA recruit who told his story to AM Press Dolj (published on the five year anniversary of the events in Romania Libera 28 December 1994…ironically (?) next to a story about how a former Securitate official attempted to interrupt a private television broadcast in which Roland Vasilevici was being interviewed in Timisoara about Libyan involvement in December 1989).

Vasilevici claimed in those March 1990 articles and in a 140 page book that followed—both the series and the book titled Pyramid of Shadows—that the USLA and Arab commandos were the “terrorists” of December 1989.  What is particularly noteworthy in light of the above discussion about “exploding [dum-dum] bullets” was his claim that the USLA and the foreign students who supplemented them “used special cartridgeswhich upon hitting their targets caused new explosions” [emphasis added]—in other words, exploding or dum-dum bullets.[3]

The anonymous USLA recruit stated separately, but similarly:

I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89.  In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched.  Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition.  In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances.  I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode. I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets.  In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox.  We had been drugged.  We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us.  Don’t publish my name.  I fear for me and my parents.  When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’  The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize.  I believe the masked ones were the ‘terrorists’.[4] [emphases added]

Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din Decembrie ‘89

Un tanar care si-a facut stagiul militar in trupele USLA a declarat
corespondentului A.M. PRESS din Dolj: “Am fost la Timisoara si la Bucuresti in
Decembrie ‘89. Odata cu noi, militarii in termen, au fost dislocati si
profesionistii reangajati, care purau costume negre de camuflaj. Dispozitivele
antitero de militari in termen si profesionisti au primit munitie de razboi. La
Timisoara s-a tras in manifestanti de la distanta mica. Am vazut
cum sareau creierii celor ciuruiti de gloante. Cred ca mascatii, folosind armamentul lor special, au tras cu
gloante explozive.
In ianuarie 1990, toti militarii in termen din trupele USLA
au fost internati pentru dezintoxicare. Fusesaram drogati. Am fost lasati la
vatra cu cinci luni inainte de termen pentru a ne pierde urma. Nu-mi publicati
numele. Ma tem pentru mine si parintii mei. La antranamente si aplicatii eram
impartiti in “amici” si “inamici.” Mascatii erau “inamicii” pe care trebuia sa-i
descoperim si sa-i neutralizam. Cred ca mascatii au
fost acei teroristi.”

(Romania Libera, 28 Decembrie 1994, p. 3)

As I have pointed out, despite the short shrift given these two revelations by Romanian media and Romanianists, one group has paid close attention:  the former Securitate.  That is not accidental.[5]

for full discussion of those who told us the truth (i.e. continuation of above), see discussion here:

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part VII: Conclusion. Those Who Told Us the Truth) by Richard Andrew Hall (UPDATED with new xeroxes)

 

from Orwellian Positively Orwellian Part III a fistful of bullets

Bucharest: Stanculescu’s unexpected revelation prompted a participant in the Revolution to challenge Stanculescu’s claim to ignorance as to the source of the bullets.  Ironically, while this challenge suggests Stanculescu may have being playing coy and not telling everything he knew, it does not contradict Stanculescu’s claim that the ammunition was not the Army’s, but rather buttresses it:

Balasa Gheorghe:  I am very intrigued by the interview given by General Stanculescu to the newspaper ‘Tineretul Liber,’ an interview in which he avoids the truth.

 

From [Securitate] Directorate V-a, from the weapons depot, on 23-24 December 1989, DUM-DUM cartridges, special cartridges that did not fit any arm in the arsenal of the Defense Ministry were retrieved.  Three or four boxes with these kinds of cartridges were found.  The special bullets were 5-6 cm. in length and less thick than a pencil.  Such a cartridge had a white stone tip that was transparent.  All of these cartridges I personally presented to be filmed by Mr. Spiru Zeres.  All the special cartridges, other than the DUM-DUM [ones] were of West German [FRG] make. From Directorate V-a we brought these to the former CC building, and on 23-24 December ’89 they were surrendered to U.M. 01305.  Captain Dr. Panait, who told us that he had never seen such ammunition before, Major Puiu and Captain Visinescu know about [what was turned over].

 

In the former CC of the PCR, all of those shot on the night of 23-24 December ’89 were shot with special bullets.  It is absurd to search for the bullet in a corpse that can penetrate a wall….[44]

image-8image-7

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…

“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:

armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:

–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;

–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;

–statii de emisie-receptie;

–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;

–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;

–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;

–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;

–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;

–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;

–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.

–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.

“S-AU GASIT LAZI INTREGI, CONTININD DE LA GLOANTE SPECIALE, PINA LA GLOANTE DE VINATOARE”

Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):

“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:

–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;

–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;

–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;

–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;

–dozimetre, contoare Geiger, osciloscoape multispot, truse electronice de depanare, calculatoare, aparatura foto;

–truse chimice de teren;

–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);

–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;

–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;

codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;

–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;

–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;

–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;

–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;

–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;

–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:

–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….

Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.

Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.

[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

FBIS-EEU-90-006 9 January 1990 “Army Combs Timisoara Region for Securitate” Agence France Presse 9 January 1990, pp. 61-62

According to the journalist, the Army’s suspicions were confirmed when it found a cache of dum-dum bullets, exclusively used by the Securitate, at the home of the head of the agricultural cooperative at Topolovatu Mare, Ioan Josu [former member of the Communist Party Central Committee].

In early March 1990, AFP reported the declared findings of surgeons in Bucharest, attesting to the fact that many of those wounded on 21-22 December 1989 in Bucharest had been shot with exploding bullets, DUM-DUM bullets.  This is a critical article (and description of an event that I believe has gotten almost no coverage inside or outside Romania).  Lt. Gnl. Traian Oancea, chief of surgery in part of the Central Military Hospital in Bucharest, and Dr. Nicolae “Nae” Constantinescu, chief of surgery at the Coltea Hospital, discussed this at a meeting of the Society of Surgeons in Bucharest.

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #4 Timisoara Demonstrators Injured and Killed by Dum-Dum Bullets

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 17, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  No researcher has previously attempted to track and aggregate the discussion of atypical ammunition, to include exploding dum-dum bullets, that were used in the maiming and killing of demonstrators in Romania in December 1989.  Here we talk about their use prior to the flight from power of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu at 12:09 on 22 December 1989.  Romanian prosecutors, mostly notably former military prosecutor General Dan Voinea, have refused to acknowledge the existence and use of dum-dum bullets in December 1989–and yet the documents of the military procuracy itself contradict them.  (Voinea’s “findings” are invoked as the basis for the chapter about December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Commission Final Report).  Below, evidence from the testimonies of demonstrators, next of kin, and doctors in Timisoara.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film may have to be rewound to its beginning.)  The sequence beginning at 50:20 has doctors/medical staff talking about the destruction of internal organs among the wounded brought to the hospital and at 51:02-51:06 the doctor mentions the use of “explosive bullets.” (Scroll down for testimonies by doctors and medical staff about the use of explosive bullets by the repressive forces.)

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

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This post has four sections, as follows:

1) The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

2) 7 Declarations and/or courtroom testimony about demonstrators injured or killed by dum-dum bullets:  Doina Gherasim, Cristian Rusu, Robert Buzatu, M. Csikos, Dobosan, Florin Nicoara, and Doru Sciadei.

3) 10 other testimonies from Victims or Relatives of Victims of Dum-Dum Bullets on 17-18 December 1989:  Valentin Aparashivei, Ioan Musca, Danut Gavra, Octavian Tintaru, Adrian Kali, Mariana Rodica Farcau, Leontina Banciu, Vasile Avram, Marius Ciopec, and Florica Sava.

4) 6 Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…:  Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, Rodica Novac, Dr. Fluture, Csaba Ungor, Goga Andras.

After reading these four sections, it should be pretty clear that anyone who denies the use of exploding dum-dum bullets in Timisoara is either uninformed, lying, or so in denial that they cannot bring themselves to admit reality.  This many people are simply not wrong…

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1) The testimonies of the demonstrators Ion Popovici (9 January 1990) and Marin Stoica (8 January 1990) show that they overheard the discussion of the use of Dum-Dum bullets between soldiers and Interior Ministry personnel.

Popovici:  “Mi-am revenit intr-un camion militar in care eram multi civili unii morti fiind adusi la garnizoana militara.  La garnizoana eu am fost dat jos si predat unui cpt (capitan) sau unui lt.major (locotenent major). vazand rana mea n-a vrut sa ma primeasca exprimand: Voi trageti cu dum dum si noi sa raspundem pentru acest lucru.”  (my thanks to A.K. for this transcription)

Popovici:  “I came to in a military truck in which there were lots of civilians some dead being brought to the military garrison.  At the garrison I was taken down and surrendered to a captain or lt. major, who looking at my wound did not want to receive me, exclaiming:  You shoot with dum-dum bullets and we are held responsible for it.

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off> (my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

IMG_0291

available on this site http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/procesul-de-la-timisoara-1990-1991-vol-v ].  The following is from Volume V.]

Some excerpts: P.C.:  Ati dat o declaratie?   Po. I. :  Da  P.C.:  O mentineti?  Po. I. Da (p. 827) P.C.:  “Inteleg sa fiu audiat in cauza ca parte civila”, da?  V-as ruga sa faceti putin liniste!  “Mentin declaratia de la Procuratura si…” (p. 833)

Po. I.:  …Da [am fost ranit].  Si dupa aceea a venit unul dintre trei [civili mai in varsta] dupa mine, m-a tarat pana la masina si la masina, acolo, am luat o bataie…ca n-am putut doua saptamani nici sa mananc nimica.  M-a lovit cu patul de arma in falca si cu bocancii in cap.  Si m-au dus, m-au dus la Garnizoana.  La Garnizoana m-au aruncat din masina si a venit ofiterul de serviciu.  Au venit si acestia trei a spus lu’ ofiterul de serviciu, cica:  “Luati-l si duceti-l  la arest.”  Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica:  “Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.  Voi omorati oameni si raspunde Armata dupa aceea.”  Asta tin minte precis.  Si de acolo mi-am dat seama ca nu poate sa fie soldati aceia. (p. 830)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

IMG_0290

Mircea Stoica (declaratie, 8 ian 1990):  “Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

Mircea Stoica (declaration, 8 January 1990):  “When I got there, I heard a soldier’s voice from the garrison exclaim:  “What are you guys doing? You all with your BUM-BUM or DUM-DUM and then you send`em to us to solve the problem [almost impossible to solve]” <very angry, pissed off>

(my sincere thanks to Gigga Adrian Tudor for this transcription and translation of the quote!)

Stoica Mircea, 40 ani, topometrist, Bd. Republicii, impuscat mina si picior http://www.timisoara.com/mioc/REVT06~1.HTM

197. Partea vătămată Stoica Maria cere 500000 lei, lunar, contribuţie de întreţinere, motivînd că, în decembrie 1989, soţul ei, Mircea Stoica a fost împuşcat, patru luni spitalizat, a rămas handicapat (gradul II de invaliditate), apoi a decedat.  În dovedirea cererii, depune acte de spitalizare şi de stabilire a capacităţii de muncă, care atestă vătămarea, cauzele şi consecinţele ei. Mai depune: declaraţia împuşcatului, actul lui de deces, actul de căsătorie şi carnetul de muncă (vol. 6 p. 304; vol. 10 p. 58-60, 170, 245-250; vol. 14 p. 54-61; vol. 27 p. 179-207).

http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0307pciv.htm

IMG_0335

“Cind am ajuns aici, la poarta o voce de militar din garnizoana s-a exprimat:  “Ce faceti mai — voi toti cu BUM-BUM sau DUM-DUM si ni-i trimiteti noua sa ne spalam pe cap cu ei.”

IMG_0330

intreaga declaratie e aici:

imaginea 330
imaginea 331
imaginea 332
imaginea 333
imaginea 334
imaginea 335
imaginea 336

It doesn’t take a genius to recognize the important similarity between the testimonies of Mircea Stoica and Ioan Popovici:  both are party to/overhear military personnel referring to the 1) use of DUM-DUM bullets, 2) that those who are using them are clearly not fellow soldiers and instead likely M.I./Securitate personnel, and 3) the Army personnel are resentful of essentially being left to “hold the bag” for the results of the DUM-DUM munitions!

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2) Declarations and/or courtroom testimony about demonstrators injured or killed by dum-dum bullets:  Doina Gherasim, Cristian Rusu, Robert Buzatu, M. Csikos, Dobosan, Florin Nicoara, Doru Sciadei, and Valentin Aparaschivei.

Doina Gherasim

IMG_0175

IMG_0305

Cristian Rusu:  Pe 8 ianuarie audiat de procuror:  …A venit o masina Dacia 1300 combi, culoare glabui, au coborat trei indivizi in civil, care au mers in spatele cordonului si au ordonat foc.  S-a tras cu gloante “dum-dum.”

Robert Buzatu “a fost lovit de un glont exploziv”

IMG_0045

imaginea 43
imaginea 44
imaginea 45
imaginea 46

Csikos [?] “Cred dupa rana [?]  ca au fost gloante dum-dum”

IMG_0088

Dobosan “am fost ranit…cu gloante dum-dum”

imaginea 127
imaginea 128

IMG_0128

Florin Nicoara “Am fost lovit in soldul drept cu un glont dum-dum”

IMG_0257

Griga “civilii au fost impuscati cu gloante plate [?], care asa cum spuneau medicii cu rupt tesuturile”

imaginea 170
imaginea 171

Doru Sciadei’s statement, 27 January 1990

IMG_0932

“In urma radiografiei facute la Spitalul Judetean au spus ca am 2 schije in picior…consemnat de medicul radiolog si chirurg, care m-au consultat.

Convingerea mea este ca in acest atac (pe ?) Calea Girocului, asupra unor oameni pasnici si (?) s-au folosit cel putin doua tipuri de gloante, convingerea intirita de glontul scos din coapsa (?) si schijele din piciorul meu, care cred ca provin de un glonte exploziv.

…Se trage sistematic si concomitent cu tragerea de lumina de catre unul din ei cu o lanterna.”

IMG_0929

3) Other testimonies from Victims or Relatives of Victims of Dum-Dum Bullets on 17-18 December 1989:  Valentin Aparashivei, Ioan Musca, Danut Gavra, Octavian Tintaru, Adrian Kali, Mariana Rodica Farcau, Leontina Banciu, Vasile Avram, Marius Ciopec, and Florica Sava.

Followed by 6 Medical Personnel Who Treated the Victims Attest to the Use of Dum-Dum Bullets

Cases available on the Internet mentioning the wounding or killing of demonstrators with dum-dum explosive bullets on 17-18 December 1989.  There are more than a dozen in all, many of whom we have seen were testified about during the Timisoara trials.

Doru Sciadei’s recollections are similar to those of Dorina Aparaschivei, whose husband, Valentin, was shot at the same location on Calea Girocului in Timisoara on 17 December 1989:

http://adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/decembrie-89-manifestantii-ucisi-s-au-refugiat-casa-scarilor-1_50ad7b6a7c42d5a66395fbe7/index.html

Pe 17 decembrie 1989, duminică seara, toată Calea Girocului a fost cuprinsă de febra revoltei. Mii de locuitori au ieşit pe stradă să îşi arate nemulţumirea faţă de sistem. Pe fondul izbucnirii conflictelor între manifestanţi şi soldaţi, s-a format un grup de 40 de militari sub comanda lt.col. Constantin Caraivan, care aveau misiunea de a restabili ordinea. „În jurul orei 23, când au început să tragă, am decis să ne retragem spre casă. Am fost şi noi la baricade. Soţul meu spunea că se trage cu gloanţe de cauciuc, voia să mă liniştească”, a spus Dorina Aparaschivei.

Ca în filmele de acţiune

Cordoanele de militari înaintau pe de o parte şi de alta a trotuarului, iar în mijloc se deplasa un tanc. „Noi ne-am băgat în scara de bloc unde erau peste 20 de persoane. Valentin era de mână cu cei doi copii, care aveau 12 şi 15 ani. La un moment dat am văzut o lumină puternică, moment în care au început să tragă”, a mai adăugat femeia. Au fost cinci gloanţe trimise către casa scării, iar unul dintre ele a trecut prin geam şi l-a nimerit în piept pe Valentin Aparaschivei. În acel moment, un bătrân a ieşit în genunchi şi a strigat „Măi militarilor, de ce aţi împuşcat un om nevinovat?”. I s-a răspuns: „Bagă capul că te împuşc şi pe tine!”.

Salvarea a sosit în scurt timp, însă medicii nu au putut să mai facă nimic. Avea o gaură mare în piept, cât o gură de pahar. Se spunea că erau gloanţe explozibile. L-am dus în casă cu pătura şi l-am pregătit pentru înmormântare. A doua zi au venit patru oameni în albastru, cu un sicriu şi l-au luat”, a mai povestit Dorina Aparaschivei. [my emphasis inserted in this sentence]

Criminali cu lanterne

În aceea seară şi în noaptea care a urmat, în zonă au acţionat pe lângă militari persoane necunoscute, care aveau în dotare lanterne foarte puternice. Îndreptau fasciculul luminos către balcoane şi scări, după care trăgeau. Au acţionat de asemenea, şi securişti şi miliţieni în civil. Pe toată Calea Girocului, de la intersecţia cu strada Albac până la intersecţia cu Liviu Rebreanu au fost 11 victime prin împuşcare şi 26 de răniţi.

from Adevarul http://www.adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/DECEMBRIE_-89-_Si-a_pierdut_iubita_si_piciorul_stang_0_173982752.html author Stefan Both

Danut Gavra with his two daughters in the Heroes’ Cemetery in December 2009

Irish Television (RTE) captured what were apparently the last hours of Florica Sava’s  tragic end.  Warning:  the scene from 11:00 to 11:30 is graphic and unsettling.

posted by mikenork

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3A6IiaOWhs

Brendan O’Brien (reporter):  “Florica Sava, a 33 year old mother of two young sons, was shot from a car with a dum-dum bullet.  It caused massive internal injuries.  Doctors said she had just hours to live.”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/lets-go-to-the-videotape-i-to-the-army-its-confirmation-that-theyve-been-dealing-with-a-specially-trained-force-because-its-the-type-of-bullet-theyve-never-seen-before-itn-uk-telev/

4) SIX Doctors/Medical personnel from Timisoara alone have discussed the use of dum-dum bullets against demonstrators in Timisoara…:  Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, Rodica Novac, Dr. Fluture, Csaba Ungor, Goga Andras

Doctors also reported on the wounds caused by explosive bullets (i.e. dum-dum bullets):  In this dispatch from Agence France Presse, relayed by Radio Free Europe on 25 December 1989, Dr. Aurel Mogosanu, a medic in the intensive care unit of a Timisoara hospital, says based on his thirty years of experience, some of the wounds could only have been CAUSED by EXPLOSIVE BULLETS SHOT AT THE PROTESTERS”

sursa (documentele Europa Libera disponibile la):  http://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/generic_file-2009-12-22-6754154-0-radio-bucuresti-25-dec-pdf.pdf (p. 49 of 82)

©AFP Général – Lundi 25 Décembre 1989 – 08:33 – Heure Paris (386 mots)
Roumanie, prev Nuit de Noel a l hopital central de Timisoara De l un des envoyes speciaux de l AFP, NICOLAS MILETITCH
   TIMISOARA (Roumanie) 25 dec – Devant l hopital central de Timisoara, dimanche soir, une quarantaine de camions remplis de medicaments et de produits alimentaires tout juste arrives, attendaient d etre decharges.
   ” L aide nous vient d un peu partout. Hongrie, RFA, Tchecoslovaquie, France, Yougoslavie, URSS, Bulgarie, Italie… ” , indique a l AFP l un des soldats qui gardent l hopital. Les militaires sont partout autour de l hopital, sur les toits, dans les cours et meme a l interieur.
   ” Des hommes de la Securitate ont tire pres de l hopital a plusieurs reprises, ces dernieres heures ” , explique le docteur Aurel Mogosianu, chef du service de soins intensifs, en donnant des ordres a un soldat qui passe, la mitraillette a l epaule, dans un couloir, entre les malades.
   Le Dr Mogosianu, qui a une trentaine d annees d experience, pense que certaines blessures particulierement horribles, n ont pu etre provoquees que par des balles explosives tirees contre les manifestants.
   Dans une salle de soins intensifs, une femme de 23 ans essaie de parler au docteur, puis renonce. ” C est un cas difficile. Elle a eu le dos transperce par une rafale ” , precise le Dr Mogosianu.
   En bougeant a peine la main, la jeune femme esquisse le ” V ” de la victoire pour dire ” au revoir ” . Un effort irrealisable pour son voisin qui a recu une balle dans le cou, impossible a extraire.
   Comme la plupart de ses collegues, le docteur travaille, a peu de choses pres, 24 heures sur 24 depuis le debut des evenements. Dans un coin, une infirmiere dort, ecroulee sur une chaise.
   Pour faire face a l afflux de blesses, la television de Bucarest a demande a tous les etudiants en medecine du pays de se rendre dans les hopitaux de la capitale et de Timisoara, ou la situation est la plus critique.
   Victor Jancu, 20 ans, a entendu cet appel. Dans la nuit de vendredi a samedi, il a quitte Cluj et reussi a rejoindre Timisoara, a plus de 300 kms de la, en arretant des camions.
   Quelques visiteurs arrivent a l hopital, portant a la main une petite branche de sapin : a Timisoara aussi, on voudrait feter Noel.
   nm/jga/vr.
Tous droits réservés : ©AFP Général
021851451DC1ED1D715E06849EA4C6E0F37C0C25ECE8D503

mai mult despre Dr. Aurel Mogosanu in decembrie 1989:  http://www.sorinbogdan.ro/2009/12/timisoara-18-decembrie-1989/.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2011/09/30/procesul-de-la-timisoara-iii-audierea-martorului-rodica-novac-directorul-directiei-sanitare-timis-13-iunie-1990/

Rodica Novac’s claim is corroborated elsewhere by four other medical officials on call during the Timisoara repression.  First, in Romanian, by Dr. Atanasie Barzeanu, then in Hungarian by three doctors (Vladimir Fluture, Csaba Ungor, and Andras Goga) present and performing surgery in Timisoara hospitals from 17-19 december 1989 who recount separately their discovery of dum-dum exploding bullets among the bullets with which demonstrators arriving at the hospital had been shot.  december 1989: temesvari orvosok, dum-dum golyok, es a roman forradalom

Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian

Barzeanu Atanasie, 65 anit, medic primar, doctor in stiinte, chirurg, Spitalul Judetean Timisoara

“…sintem deci in 18 decembrie…Pe la orele doua si patruzeci, cind inchideam o operatie–Sava Florica, 33 de ani, vinzatoare la Loto-pronosport in cartierul Fabric, impuscata din mers, in Piata Traian, dintr-un ARO, pacienta prezentindu-se o echimoza cu distrugerea tesuturilor (plaga in diametru de 15 centimetri), a tesuturilor din regiunea epigastrica, inclusiv a muschilor drepti abdominali, cu ruptura a colonului ascendent transvers si a jejuno-ileonului, fiind in stare de soc grav traumatic, hemoragic–, fara sa-mi poti explica nici macar acum cu ce fel de gloante a putut fi lovita, pentru ca nu am identificat nici orificiul de iesire si nici pe cel de intrare, a venit o asistenta de la Chirurgie I, care mi-a spus sa merg la domnul Ignat.”

Titus Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul la Gura, (Editura Facla 1990), pp. 133-134.

The following first appeared in Gyorgy Mandics’s Temesvari golgota (1991) pp. 348-349 and is reprinted in his A Manipulalt Forradalom (2009).  [My guess is this is also the source for the reference to dum dum bullets in the German language wikipedia entry for http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rum%C3%A4nische_Revolution_1989 — Hans Vastag, György Mandics, Manfred Engelmann: Temeswar. Symbol der Freiheit. Wien 1992. ]

pp. 348-349

Ket esetuk volt az elejen.  Ezert is hivtak be oket.  Egy 14 eves gyermeket a haz elott lottek le, szinte a szomszedban, egy golyoszoros ARO-rol talaltak el; egy oreg nenit a ter tuloldalon, az erkelyen ertek a golyok.  A zarja ment ki, kicsit nagyott hallott mar, amire is csoda, 64 evesen, azt hirtelen ugy erezte, hogy labaibol kimegy minden ero es lecsusott az erholya.  Na milyen gyonge lettem egyszeruen–mondotta maganak. de ahogyan fel akart tapaszkodni meg lepve tapasztalt, hogy vertocsa gyult alatta.  Bekialtolt a vegenek aki egy szomszed segitsegevel athozta a nenit a legkozelebbi korhazba, itt a Marasti ter tuloldalan, az uj Klinikakba, avagy hivatalos neven a 2 szamu korhazba, ahol rogton osszecodult mindenki csodat latni.  Ekkor hivtak be Baranziekat es minden mozgositato orvost, hiszen a fegyverek ropogatak.  Azota is kisebb nagyobb megszakitasokkal, felfelecsapolt a gepfegyverek, golyoszorok, geppisztolyok langzivatarja, remulettel telitva az ejszaki eget.

p. 349

De azt a ket elso esett nem kovettek ujabbok.  Igz aztan volt ido alaposan szemugyre venni a nenit akinek combjan elol egz akkora lyuk tatongott mint egy egy lejes, a comba hatso felen ahol eltavotott a golyo, ott viszont mar akkora mint egy otlejes.  Fluture doktor, az egzik sebesz erosen kototte az ebet a korohoz, hogy ez egz specialis dum-dum robbanogolyo okozta seb, hiszen a szakirodalomban azt irjak, hogy csak ez a robbannolovedek-fajta-amelyet ugyan az ENSZ eltitott, am a nemzetkozi terrorizmusban kulonesen divatos ma is–okoz az izomszovetbol kijovet sokkal nagyobb roncsolasokat mint a bemenetnel.  Az orvosok odazarandokoltak a sebesulthoz, mivel egzik sem latott semhogy dum-dum golyo utotte sebet, de egyaltalan lott sebet sem soha eleteben.  Igz aztan csak szivtak a rangeletrahoz igazodva a sebesz foorvosok az amerikai Kentet, a foamnesztezialogus a holland pipadohanyt, az asztalyos orovosok a bolgar BT-t, a fonoverek a jugoslav Vikend-et, a noverek es helyapolok a roman Snagov-t, Golfot.  Es vartak.

(Note: it is unclear who the 64 yr. old described was…there are several individuals without ages listed as injured or dead during the events, but I think it more likely the age of the woman is incorrect)

Jozsef Gazda Megvalto karacsonyErdelyi magyar tulelok emlekeznek. (1990)

Ungor Csaba:  Ket ora utan senkit be nem hoztak, senkit be nem engedtek, egyetlen sebesult sem.  A korhazbol kikanyarado  mentoautokra is lottek.  Ket ora utan mindre, ami mozgott, jarokelo, auto, mindenre lottek, csak hogy ok tudjak begyujteni a sebesulteket s a halottakat.  Kiderult az elso golyok utan, amiket a sebekbol gyujottek ossze, szedtek ki, hogy nem eles katonai toltenyekkel lottek, hanem dum-dum golyokkal, amik nagy rombolasokat okoztak.  Egy 16 eves, ketszer sebesult gyermek meselte el, ok azt hittek, hogy hosok, azt hittek, hogy meg fogjak menteni a forradalmat, mert biztosra vettek, ha a felnottek sorfala ele allnak, nem fognak belejuk loni.  Lottek rajuk is.

Goga Andras:  A masodik izgalomkelto esemeny volt kedden delelott, hogy az osszes regiszterunk–mind a surgossegen, mind az osztalyon–, melyekre felirtuk a muteteinket, eltuntek, a mai napig sem talaltuk meg.  Bennuk voltak az ev osszes mutetei[***]…En aznap kettot operaltam.  Egy tuntetonek a bore alol vettem ki egy nagyon kulonleges golyok, nem is golyot, egy ilyen repeszdarabot, melyet a katonasag aztan megvizsgalt, s azt mondtak, nekik nincs tudmasuk, hogy ez mi lehet.  Egy masiknak pedig fejserulese volt, persze abban nem talaltam golyot, atment rajta.

RELATED:

Procesul de la Timisoara (XII): Timisoara, the key to the Revolution then; the key now to the truth about the Counter-revolution

Procesul de la Timisoara (XI): Dupa 22 decembrie–teroristii. Martorii Alexandru Koos, Ion Flocioiu, si Herlea Floarea

Procesul de la Timisoara (X): Gloante explozive (dum-dum) dupa 22 decembrie 1989

Procesul de la Timisoara (IX): Cine au fost cei “necunoscuti,” mai in varsta, care au tras inainte de 22 decembrie 1989? (2)

Procesul de la Timisoara (VIII): Cine au fost cei “necunoscuti”, mai in varsta, care au tras inainte de 22 decembrie 1989?

Procesul de la Timisoara (VII): “La Timisoara cred ca si domnul procuror a vazut cartuse de acest calibru…Dar au existat in corpurile delicte ale procuraturii. Eu l-am vazut. Este un cartus ceva mai lung, negru, cu botul taiat. 5,56.”

Procesul de la Timisoara (VI): Impuscati dintr-un ARO…Al cui apartinea ARO-ul?

Procesul de la Timisoara (V): Martorii Cristian Rusu, Daniela Lengyel, si Aurica Rusu (mama lui Marius Ciopec)

Procesul de la Timisoara (IV): Martorii Adrian Kali, Ioan Musca, Traian Orban, si Alexandru Koos

Procesul de la Timisoara (III): Audierea martorului Rodica Novac, directorul Direcţiei Sanitare Timiş (13 iunie 1990)

Procesul de la Timisoara (II). Audierea partii civile Popovici Ion: “…Atata retin foarte bine minte, ca ofiterul a spus, cica: ‘Nu, voi trageti cu dum-dum-uri si dupa aia Armata raspunde.’”

Procesul de la Timisoara (I): Missed Press Opportunities. The testimonies of Margaret Cacoceanu and Doina Gherasim (25-26 September 1990)

http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/search/node/%22procesul%20de%20la%20timisoara%22
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. V
 ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA     Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009   Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_V_final.pdf 4 …Articol – dbaiski – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:03 – 0 comentarii – 1 fişier ataşat
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. IV
 ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA     Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009   Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_IV_prefata.pdf …Articol – dbaiski – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:02 – 0 comentarii – 3 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. III
ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA   Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009 Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_III_prefata.pdf 126.6 KB proc …Articol – banaticus – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:01 – 0 comentarii – 4 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. I, II
ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA   Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009 Ataşament Mărime prefata.pdf 199.39 KB procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_I.pdf …Articol – banaticus – 24 Iul 2009 – 16:00 – 0 comentarii – 3 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. VII
 Postul teritorial de Radio Timişoara Asociaţia ALTAR 1989, Timişoara Editor: Miodrag Milin Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VII_nota_asupra_editiei.pdf 68.46 KB procesu …Articol – dbaiski – 20 Mai 2009 – 17:06 – 0 comentarii – 3 fişiere ataşate
Procesul de la Timişoara (1990-1991) – Vol. VI
  ASOCIAŢIA MEMORIALUL REVOLUŢIEI  16-22 DECEMBRIE 1989, TIMIŞOARA   Editor: Miodrag Milin Timişoara, 2009 Ataşament Mărime procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_VI_nota_asupra_editiei …Articol – dbaiski – 20 Mai 2009 – 16:51 – 0 comentarii – 2 fişiere ataşate
Much of this has now been reposted or reproduced here:dosarelerevolutiei.ro

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #3 “Anti-terrorism” and Regime Repression

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 17, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  At one time the existence and importance of Interior Ministry Order 02600 (1988) in the regime repression from 16 to 22 December 1989 was essentially undisputed.  Indicative of the braziness of former Securitate revisionism is that by 2011, in the pages of what many regard as the most “anti-communist” Romanian daily, Evenimentul Zilei, Alex Mihai Stoenescu would argue the opposite, Loviturile Securităţii care i-au fost fatale lui Ceauşescu > EVZ.ro http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/operatiunea-voalul-negru-cum-l-a-lasat-securitatea-din-brate-pe-ceausescu-958514.html#ixzz2HEYADMSo.

In the previous episode, I examined the role of Securitate vandalism and attacks in justifying a legal pretext for regime repression (https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2014/12/16/25-for-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-romanian-revolution-2-shattered-glass-securitate-vandalism-to-justify-timisoara-crackdown/) .  In this episode, I examine one of the juridical bases for regime repression:  Ordinul 02600 (1988) al Ministerului de Interne.  Once it could be argued that “terrorst” or “extremist” actions had taken place, it stood to reason that “anti-terrorist” personnel (in Romania of the Ceausescu era, the USLA) could be deployed in accordance with the law as it existed at the time.  And so it was…

In Miodrag Milin’s compendium of the transcripts of the Timisoara trials http://www.banaterra.eu/romana/files/procesul_de_la_timisoara_volumul_I.pdf , on 5 March 1990 defendant Ion Popescu (former chief inspector of the Militia) acknowledged the implementation of Order 2600 beginning on 16 December 1989 as follows.

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Acţiunile forţelor de represiune din Ministerul de Interne | 16-20 Decembrie 1989 |
16 Decembrie 1989
Activitatea pastorului László Tőkés era atent supravegheată de o echipă a Securităţii Timiş, condusă de maiorul Radu Tinu. Lucrătorii Securităţii urmăreau cu atenţie evenimentele care se derulau în faţa Bisericii Reformate. După ce tramvaiele din Piaţa Maria au fost oprite de către manifestanţi, protestul celor aflaţi acolo s-a transformat radical. Dacă iniţial timişorenii s-au adunat la Biserica Reformată pentru a se împotrivi evacuării pastorului László Tőkés, din acest moment protestul s-a radicalizat, cerându-se, pentru prima dată, schimbarea lui Ceauşescu, exprimată prin scandarea primei lozinci: „Jos Ceauşescu!”. În acel moment a avut loc şi prima altercaţie între manifestanţi şi efectivele Ministerului de Interne şi s-au făcut primele arestări.
Colonelul Popescu Ion, inspectorul-şef al Inspectoratului de Interne Timiş, în baza Ordinului 02600 din 1 iulie 1988, pune în aplicare planul unic de acţiune, desfăşurând în Timişoara trupele de intervenţie avute la dispoziţie. Astfel, au intrat în dispozitiv: 2 plutoane de intervenţie dotate cu căşti, scuturi şi bastoane, trei subunităţi de la Brigada de Securitate şi două subunităţi de la Trupele de Grăniceri. La Consiliul Judeţean au intervenit în forţă, bătând şi arestând o mare parte din manifestanţii aflaţi în zonă.
Gino RADO

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/index.php?page=revista-on-line/memorial-6/actiunile-fortelor

from Expres, 1991, all but two parts compromising articles 15-21 of the order…

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/ordinul-2600-1988-al-ministerului-de-interne/

LIPSESTE PAGINA CU ARTICOLE 44-49

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

Posted in decembrie 1989, raport final | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments »

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #2 Shattered Glass: Securitate Vandalism to Justify Timisoara Crackdown

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 16, 2014

(Purely personal views as always, based on over two decades of research and publications inside and outside Romania)

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Significance:  I have essentially been the only researcher who has consistently advocated this understanding.  Most others–including Peter Siani-Davies–tended to dismiss it.  Now we have documentary evidence that it took place.

An excellent documentary from 1991 posted to the internet by Florin Iepan only recently and seen rarely if at all since its showing in 1991.  There is much interesting information in this film.  (The film seems to start at min. 19:00 and has to be rewound to its beginning.)  Here, I will focus on the claim beginning at approximately min. 17:40 that the destruction of Timisoara shops and storefronts was organized and a pretext to justify–including legally–the repression by the Ceausescu regime of Timisoara demonstrators.  Interior Minister Tudor Postelnicu’s declaration of 17 March 1990 confirms this claim and the observations of eyewitnesses.

Timisoara Decembrie 1989 / Timisoara December 1989,

regia/directed by – Ovidiu Bose Pastina
imaginea/camera – Doru Segal

Sahiafilm 1991

Tudor Postelnicu (Ministerul de Interne in decembrie 1989):  “Unii militari de la trupele de securitate ale brigazii Timisoara au facut unele provocari la unele magazine si vitrine spargind geamurile sa imprastie participantii de pe straziile din apropriere, apoi au intrat in altercatie cu ei, si acum (?) vor sa le faca militia ordine.  ‘Nu am aflat ca costa provocare a zis Gl. Nuta, am trimis pe …” (17.III.1990) 

http://sensidev.com/fc/dosare%20de%20urmarire%20penala/dosar%20%20de%20urmarire%20penala%20volumul%2011/IMG_2576.JPG (Dosarul de Urmarire Penala, Vol. 11, IMG 2576)

IMG_2576

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Before we move on here, it is worth noting how this destruction was covered in Peter Siani-Davies’ 2005 volume The Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  As I have written on many occasions, Siani-Davies’ volume is wonderfully-written and is excellent, but the claim by Daniel Chirot that is a “near-definitive” account is far off the mark.  One of the negative characteristics of Siani-Davies’ work is the use of “filler” rational choice, cui bono arguments where he concludes there is not enough information to make a valid judgment.  The problem is the question is never one of “what was possible?” “what makes ‘sense’?” but rather what did happen?

Thus, for example in the case of the destruction of Timisoara Siani-Davies argues that there was already enough of a basis for the regime to crackdown, therefore why would they need to create a pretext for cracking down:  “Given the seriousness of the situation and the fact that shots had already been fired elsewhere, the security forces hardly needed to produce a further ‘excuse’ for the massacre which was to follow.” (p. 68)

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Back to exploring more of the evidence…

An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997/

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Moldovan Fica (martor ocular)

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Andras Vasile (martor ocular)

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Ioan Savu discussed the windowbreakers as follows:

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Other depictions of this event available online:

Conducerea partidului, alarmată, a trimis în Piaţa Maria, conform Ordinului 02600, numeroşi miliţieni şi trupe speciale, pentru a lichida manifestaţia care luase amploare. Circulaţia în zonă se întrerupsese. În Piaţa Maria au fost trimişi aproximativ 200 de activişti de partid, miliţieni şi numeroşi ofiţeri de securitate, îmbrăcaţi în haine civile. Au urmat ciocniri violente, mai ales după ce manifestanţii s-au încolonat şi au pornit spre sediul CJ PCR, strigând “Libertate”, “Vrem pâine”, “Vrem căldură”, “Azi la Timişoara, mâine în toată ţara”.
În acea seară echipe de miliţie dinainte pregătite au spart vitrinele magazinelor din centrul oraşului, pentru a avea argumente pentru o intervenţie în forţă. Desigur, multe vitrine au fost sparte şi de derbedei, asupra cărora s-au găsit bunuri furate. În acea noapte au fost arestate aproape 5-600 de cetăţeni. Ei au fost duşi la Penitenciarul oraşului, unde au fost bătuţi în mod bestial. În zilele care au urmat arestării au fost anchetaţi în vederea trimiterii lor în judecată. Bineînţeles, dacă Revoluţia n-ar fi reuşit.

“Azi la Timişoara”
Ivan Sabin

http://revista.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=371

Totuşi, se ştie că în acele zile fierbinţi din Timişoara au existat „personaje neidentificate” care au acţionat în mai multe zone ale oraşului. Am să amintesc aici doar două aspecte concrete cu privire la implicarea acestora în evenimentele din Timişoara. În zilele de 16 şi 17 decembrie au fost sparte aproape toate vitrinele magazinelor din zona centrală a oraşului. Sunt zeci de declaraţii ale revoluţionarilor care fac o descriere clară a celor care au spart acele geamuri. Au fost oameni bine îmbrăcaţi, robuşti şi tunşi scurt. Aceştia erau dotaţi cu nişte beţe speciale cu care printr-un gest scurt şi foarte bine exersat loveau vitrinele, după care plecau fără a încerca să sustragă ceva din magazine. Aceste persoane au fost văzute chiar şi de forţele de ordine desfăşurate în acea zonă, care în mod ciudat nu au luat măsuri împotriva lor, ci au acţionat împotriva manifestanţilor ce demonstrau împotriva regimului ceauşist. Un alt aspect relatat de mulţi timişoreni se referă mai ales la zilele de 17-19 decembrie, când, în rândul cordoanelor militare din diferite dispozitive amplasate în zonele importante ale oraşului, între soldaţi, erau intercalate persoane mai în vârstă, nebărbierite îmbrăcate doar parţial în uniforme militare, care nu făceau parte din acele unităţi militare.

Cine au fost acele „persoane neidentificate”? De ce s-a dorit în unele cercuri, cu insistenţă chiar, acreditarea ideii că oamenii au fost scoşi în stradă de agenţi străini? De ce, chiar şi după 20 de ani, se fac afirmaţii de genul: cadavrele celor arşi la Crematoriul „Cenuşa” erau ale unor agenţi străini? Nu voi căuta acum răspunsuri la aceste întrebări, dar, cu siguranţă, ele există.

Kali Adrian Matei

nascut in 30 iulie 1968 la Timisoara, muncitor la IJPIPS (1989), profesor de istorie la Liceul de informatica (1998), impuscat in spate

La Bijuterii concetatenii nostri tigani carau ce puteau. Numai la “Modex” nu era spart. Un grup de oameni se uitau cum niste indivizi bine instruiti spargeau geamurile de linga restaurantul Bulevard. Am rugat oamenii sa apere Modexul, pentru ca era clar ca spargatorii n-aveau nimic comun cu revolta.  30 septembrie 1995  http://timisoara.com/newmioc/4.htm

“În data de 14 decembrie, securitatea a spart toate gemurile din partea străzii principale, iar clădirea arăta ca o cetate asediată. Fostul primar al Timişorei, Petre Moţ l-a vizitat pe Tokes şi a ieşit la geam pentru a vorbi mulţimii. Moţ a cerut să se pună geamuri noi. Erau foarte multe maşini ale securiştilor. Întreaga stradă era ocupată. Se făcea filaj. Eu locuiam acolo, ba intram, ba ieşeam. Nu se vorbea încă revoluţie. Era o solidaritatea faţă de pastor”, declarat Iosif Kabai (foto), care locuieşte şi acum în clădirea bisericii reformate.Citeste mai mult: adevarul.ro/locale/timisoara/16-decembrie-1989-ziua-timisoara-s-a-strigat-data-democratie-jos-comunismul-1_50bd3d887c42d5a663c8e01f/index.html

Radu Tinu cu Angela Bacescu…

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

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RADU TINU:…SINGURLE COMPLEXE COMERCIALE RAMASE INTREGI AU FOST CELE DIN FATA MILITIEI JUDETENE SI CEL DE LANGA FABRICA “MODERN”…

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The significance of window-breaking as a justification for repression–something the Securitate would have realized–was outlined by Nicolae Ceausescu in his teleconference of 17 December 1989 as follows:

“Oricine intra intr-un Consiliu Popular, intr-un sediu de partid sau sparge un geam la un magazin trebuie sa primeasca riposta imediat.

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Col. Ion Popescu (sef IGM)’s defense lawyer appealed to Legea 21 and Decretul 121 specifically as obligating Interior Ministry (M.I.–Militia and Securitate) forces to intervene in response to the breaking of windows of commercial units…

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Thus, the breaking of windows, which according to Interior Minister was instigated and carried out in part by Securitate Brigade 30 under the command of Ion Bunoaica served a bureaucratic and legalistic function–a tactic not unknown in the annals of other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes…

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An excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus has not been revised in any form.

Chapter Five.  The Beginning of the End: Timisoara, 15-17 December 1989

The “Window Breakers”

The reportedly unusual scope of physical destruction which occurred in Timisoara, particularly on the afternoon and evening of 17 December 1989, has fueled revisionist arguments. Estimates of the damage during the Timisoara unrest are in the neighborhood of four to five billion lei (approximately forty to fifty million dollars at the time), a reasonably large sum given Romania’s standard of living at the time. A huge number of windows was broken and as many as 300 to 400 stores suffered some sort of damage, although relatively few were actually looted. On the evening of 17 December, stores, vehicles, and kiosks were burning in at least ten different areas of the city.[65]

Former Securitate officers clearly wish to link this destruction to the “foreign tourists” who were supposedly so ubiquitous in Timisoara during these days.[66] Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, former Securitate Director Iulian Vlad argued at his trial that

…the acts of vandalism, theft, destruction, arson… acts without precedent…could not have been the work [“opera”] of the faithful [apparently referring sarcastically to Tokes’ parishioners], nor the revolutionaries. They were produced by elements which wished to create a certain atmosphere of tension.[67]

“A group of former Securitate officers” wrote to the Ceausist Democratia in September 1990 that after the Militia and Securitate refused to respond to the demonstrations provoked by the “foreign tourists”: “they advance[d] to the next stage: the massive destruction of public property designed to provoke forcible interventions–human victims were needed.”[68]

Nevertheless, here is how one opposition journalist, Grid Modorcea, has described the strange character of Timisoara destruction:

For the first time in history, a revolution…was announced in a previously unknown and absolutely original manner, both literally and figuratively speaking: through the methodical breakage of thousands of windows. On 16 and 17 December 1989, Timisoara was the city of [glass] shards. Well-trained groups of athletes spread throughout the town, tactically, but energetically smashing to pieces hundreds of huge windows without apparently being interested in stealing from these stores…they were like mythical Magis coming to announce the end of one world and the beginning of another. And they gave it an apocalyptic quality: the sound produced by the breaking glass was infernal. The panic this caused was indescribable….Those who “executed” the windows did so with karate-like kicks while yelling “Liberty and Justice”!…The crowds of people who came out into the streets transformed spontaneously into columns of demonstrators, of authentic revolutionaries. The effect was therefore monumental: the breaking of the windows unleashed the popular revolt against the dictator.[69]

Modorcea is convinced that the Tokes case was “merely a pretext” and that “someone–perhaps those who planned the vandalizing of the windows–has an interest in preventing it from being known who broke the windows.” Although Modorcea maintains he is unsure who was responsible, he insists on observing that:

Only the Customs people know how many tourists there were. All were men and long-haired. Inside their cars they had canisters. This fits with the method of the breaking of the windows, with the Molotov cocktails, and the drums used as barricades–they were exactly of the same type….To what extent the new regime which came to power was implicated, we cannot say![70]

Many Timisoara protesters appear torn between wishing to rationalize the extensive destruction as the courageous response of an enraged, long-suffering population, and denying that the perpetrators could have come from among their ranks. Even those investigators attuned to the retroactive psychology of the protesters cannot help but admit that widespread destruction occurred and that it could not have been wholly spontaneous.[71] Furthermore, as Laszlo Tokes has observed in discussing the events at Piata Maria, manipulation and attempts to instigate the crowd to violence were constant features during these days.

Tokes maintains that Securitate provocateurs had tried to agitate the crowd by shouting things like, “Let’s break into the house. The Securitate are in there; they’re trying to kidnap Laszlo Tokes! Let’s rush them!” and by appealing for him to “Come down into the street and lead us!”[72] According to Tokes:

I was alarmed at the obvious provocation from individuals in the crowd clearly intent on making the situation uncontrollable….Later, thinking about the events of those two days, I realized that the authorities would have had a great deal to gain if the situation had become a riot.[73]

Mircea Balan questions whether the protesters would have set stores on fire which were located on the ground floor of the buildings in which the protesters themselves lived.[74] Moreover, he wonders how even the revolutionary fury of the crowd could drive protesters to break so many windows, particularly given the presence of repressive forces on the streets. It is what Balan has termed the “systematic devastation” of property which raises questions.

Eyewitness accounts recorded soon after the events–therefore at a time before the various plots and scenarios had permeated the popular imagination–support the hypothesis that the vandalism was organized. Moldovan Fica remarks:

I admit that I cannot escape a certain conclusion. All of this [destruction] was done by a group of about five or six individuals, whose calm demeanor and self-control continues to stay with me to this day. They did not run from the scene, they appeared as if they did not fear anything; I would say that, in fact, they were doing what was required of them, something which had been ordered directly of them![75]

Describing destruction in a different part of the city, Andras Vasile observed that

…four young men with shaved heads and wearing civilian clothes had sticks–I would term them special sticks–1.7 to 1.8 meters long, equipped with metal rings on the top of them. They were breaking the windows, but not taking anything, as if they only had something against the windows, something which they thus went about with great enjoyment…they were led by two individuals in leather jackets.[76]

Other eyewitnesses supply details which confirm the widespread character of the vandalism; its undeniably organized quality; the disinterest of its perpetrators in looting the stores; and the almost “drugged” nature of the perpetrators, who seemed unperturbed by the chaos and repression going on around them.[77]

Mircea Balan has little doubt who committed this “systematic destruction”:

Demonstrators might have thrown rocks in windows, but the destruction of the entire store was not their work…Nobody need believe that for such a thing foreign intervention was necessary, seeing as there were enough first-class specialists in destruction and demolition right here at home. The Securitate could not have been foreign to what happened, no matter how much it fiercely attempts to deny this today. They were professionals in the art of destruction. They needed a justification for the bloody repression.[78]

In March 1990, Puspoki had been willing to identify the culprits more specifically. According to Puspoki, as the demonstrators began to gather to prevent Tokes’ eviction:

The USLA’s Sabotage and Diversion team was readied to break store windows, to devastate and set fires–to create the conditions necessary for mass repression: the existence of disorder in the streets and theft on the part of the demonstrators.[79]

Securitate Major Radu Tinu’s observation that the commercial complex “in front of the county Militia building” (i.e. the Inspectorate in which both the Securitate and Militia offices were located) was one of only two such complexes in the whole city to remain intact during these days may also be an indication of the source of the destruction.[80]

It is possible then that to the extent that this destruction did indeed contain an organized component, it was designed by the regime to subvert and cast suspicion upon the intentions of the protesters and to create a pretext for repression. To the extent that an organized component did contribute to the destruction, it was far more likely to have been regime forces attempting to undermine the protests than foreign agents attempting to provoke an uprising against the regime.

[65].. See, for example, Grid Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor [The Breaking of the Windows],” Expres Magazin, no. 49 (1991), 8-9; Mircea Bunea, “Eroii noi si vechi [New and old heroes],” Adevarul, 2 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 448-449; Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 57-58.

[66].. See, for example, the comments of Radu Tinu, the deputy director of the Timis County Securitate, in Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 67-85.

[67].. Mircea Bunea, “Ipse Dixit,” Adevarul, 21 February 1991, in Bunea, Praf in Ochi, 463. Vlad’s determination to emphasize that these were “acts without precedent” makes one wonder if they were indeed without precedent.

[68].. A group of former Securitate officers, “Asa va place revolutia? Asa a fost! [You like the revolution? Here is how it was!],” Democratia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4. The lengthy defense by these officers of the Fifth Directorate in this letter suggests that they were members of this directorate.

[69].. Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” 8.

[70].. Ibid.

[71].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[72].. Tokes, With God, for the People, 153, 156.

[73].. Ibid., 156.

[74].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[75].. Suciu, Reportaj cu Sufletul, 96.

[76].. Ibid, 118. The fact that the two persons supervising the destruction are described as having worn “leather jackets” strongly suggests they may have been Securitate men. Mihai Decean claims that on a train headed for Bucharest on 25 December (therefore after Ceausescu’s flight), he helped in the arrest of two USLA officers whom he describes as “athletic, with shaved heads, and wearing leather jackets.” See Laura Ganea, “La Timisoara se mai trage inca” Tinerama, no. 77 (July 1991), 3.

[77].. Ibid., 71, 122. Some of the eyewitnesses cited in Modorcea, “Spargerea Geamurilor,” say similar things; Modorcea, however, gives them a very different interpretation.

[78].. Balan, “Masacrul.”

[79].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III).”

[80].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 80.

The following was added some years later as a footnote to the section above in republications of this chapter.  Badea says here “many years later” Postelnicu admitted this, but as we can now see from the Timisoara files, he wrote it in his declaration/statement dated 17 March 1990.

(In connection with the “window breakers” we do know a little more today than we did then back in 1996.  Dan Badea wrote in 1999 Bunoaica and the Window Breakers that “Tudor Postelnicu, the Interior Minister at the time, was to declare many years later that the “breaking of the windows” was a mission executed by personnel from the 30th Securitate Brigade led by col. Ion Bunoaica).  Orele 20.00 – 21.00: Sint sparte toate vitrinele magazinelor de pe Bulevardul 6 Martie (Tudor Postelnicu, ministru de interne la acea vreme, avea sa declare multi ani mai tirziu ca “spargerea vitrinelor” a fost o misiune executata de militari ai Brigazii 30 Securitate condusa de col. Ion Bunoaica).

25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

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25 for the 25th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution: #1 The Securitate Deny Foreign Instigation of the Timisoara Uprising

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 16, 2014

(strictly personal views, based on more than two decades of prior research and publications)

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/a-response-to-watts-ii-preliminary/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/a-response-to-watts-the-pitfalls-of-not-having-any-evidence/

2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe–Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.  This series looks at 25 things I have learned about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The numbering is not designed to assign importance, but rather–to the extent possible–to progress chronologically through those events.

Looking through the Romanian media’s articles devoted to the 25th anniversary of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 that overthrew the communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, one cannot help but be reminded of Valentin Ceausescu’s 1997 claim according to which (paraphrased),

–“Have you noticed? All the heroes…now are the militia and the Securitate.” “The villains are now the heroes…and the heroes are now the villains!”

Until the documents [screen captures] below were made publicly available and I unearthed the following, we had to rely primarily on arguments emphasizing the Securitate roots of these claims and/or about the implausibility and often absurdity of these claims.  We now have documentary evidence that in the immediate wake of December 1989 not even the Securitate believed in the claims they would make so frequently later on according to which foreign agents were allegedly responsible for the Timisoara uprising.

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Back in 1997, the American novelist and Pulitzer Prize Winner William McPherson wrote of what Valentin Ceausescu, communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu’s eldest son, told him about the events of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  Here are some excerpts:

  • Valentin and I were having coffee in the Vox Maris, the same grand casino where the funeral feast was held. It was morning, two days after the funeral [of Nicu Ceausescu], and the crowds had not yet arrived.
  • “Nicu was never groomed to be the successor. That was [only] the rumor.” He paused for a moment. “But rumors even become the reality.”
  • “Yes. Especially in Romania.”
  • “Maybe others in the party thought it would be a good idea. He could command a lot of sympathy. He always wanted to look tough and act strong, but he wasn’t. He was more like a child than anything else.”
  • “What about the 90 people killed in Sibiu?”
  • “He did not order the shooting. I know when he’s trying to lie, and he wasn’t lying. I knew immediately. That’s why I defended him so strongly.”
  • He paused and lit another Pall Mall. “Have you noticed? All the heroes in Sibiu now are the militia and the Securitate – all the dead people, and now they are the heroes of the revolution.”
  • “So the villains are now the heroes?”
  • “Yes.”
  • And the heroes are now the villains.
  • The official toll of the dead, revised frequently with a final version released three years after the events, is 1,104; only 160 were killed before the dictator fled.
  • Curious – if the figures are accurate – that the majority of them were killed in Sibiu. “A lot of effort,” Valentin once said, “to kill these two old people.”

William McPherson, “A Balkan Comedy,” The Wilson Quarterly, Volume 21, Issue 3 (Summer 1997)

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Thus it is that at Evenimentul Zilei, long hailed by Romania’s westward leaning intelligentsia and Romanianists in North America as the most authentically anti-communist and credible of Romania’s dailies, articles continue their reliance–very selectively–of recent years on the claims of senior former Securitate officers, Iulian Vlad, Emil Macri, Filip Teodorescu, Nicolae Mavru, etc., or on the research of Alex Mihai Stoenescu, whose work is detailed and meticulous and thus deserves to be read, but, who, it turns out, not accidentally, is also an acknowledged former Securitate collaborator.  (Not for nothing, the Evenimentul Zilei series is entitled “25 de ani de la evenimentele din decembrie ’89. Lumini si umbre” thus intentionally or unintentionally conjuring up the name, appropriately enough, of the current preferred vehicle of the former Securitate for discussing December 1989, http://www.acmrr-sri.ro/categorii/19/revista-vitralii–lumini-si-umbre.html )

(See, for example, http://www.evz.ro/document-strict-secret-1989-raportul-generalului-iulian-vlad-catre-nicolae-ceausescu.html or http://www.evz.ro/25de-ani-de-la-evenimentele-din-decembrie-1989-generalul-iulian-vlad-daca-oamenii-nu-erau-nemultumiti-strainatatea-nu-l-putea-rasturna-pe-ceausescu.html; http://www.evz.ro/timisoara-protestul-pentru-laszlo-tokes-si-povestea-agentilor-straini.html; http://www.evz.ro/dec-1989-cum-a-izbucnit-revolutia-romana-revolta-de-la-iasi-si-scanteia-maghiara-de-la-timisoara.html; http://www.evz.ro/25de-ani-de-la-evenimentele-din-decembrie-1989-declaratia-generalului-iulian-vlad-seful-securitatii-din-procesul-revolutiei-de-la-timisoara-daca-oamenii-nu-erau-nemultumiti-strainatatea-nu-l-putea-rasturna-pe-ceausescu.html)

[Oh, but wait, there is good news!  In addition to all these articles furthering the viewpoint, to a lesser or greater extent, of the former Securitate, is the beginning of the chapter on December 1989 in The Greatest Tribute to Truth and Justice in the History of the World!, the so-called Final Report of the Tismaneanu Commission (CPADCR) of December 2006 condemning communism http://www.evz.ro/25de-ani-de-la-evenimentele-din-decembrie-1989-raportul-final-al-comisiei-prezidentiale-de-analiza-a-dictaturii-comuniste-condusa-de-vladimir-tismaneanu.html, which continues the glorious copy-paste tradition of the original, failing to cite that the text used in 2006 and now again in 2014, is from a 1997 chapter by the chair of the commission, Professor Vladimir Tismaneanu–that this is inarguable, see here https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/05/01/the-romanian-revolution-for-dum-dums-by-richard-andrew-hall/ , the xeroxes in fn. 10 in particular)]

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The Timisoara files about December 1989 are now publicly available (when the link works!) on the Internet at http://dosarelerevolutiei.ro/.  What they show is that Securitate, Militia, and other regime officials from Timis County were asked by Bucharest–communicated via the person of Securitate Director, General Iulian Vlad–to investigate the role of foreign elements, specifically tourists, in the Timisoara protests of mid-December 1989.  But they were not the only ones.  General Vlad tasked senior Securitate officials from Bucharest sent to Timisoara to report back to him on this very topic alleging external involvement and manipulation of the Timisoara demonstrations.  What remains unclear is how much of this tasking was General Vlad communicating his own “hypothesis” or how much of it was he relaying Nicolae Ceausescu’s “theory” about what was going on.  This much is clear:  neither those stationed in Timis County, nor those officials sent from Bucharest could find evidence of a foreign hand in the Timisoara uprising, despite being asked to investigate exactly this aspect.  How do we know this?  From their own written confessions immediately after the December 1989 events.  (Below are four of them:  Nicolae Mavru, Liviu Dinulescu, Emil Macri, and Filip Teodorescu.)

Niculae Mavru, fost sef al sectiei ‘Filaj si investigatie’ de la Securitatea Timis, declaratia din 13 ianuarie 1990:  …la ordinul col. Sima Traian, am primit…misiuni de a observa si sesiza aspecte din masa manifestantilor, din diferite zone ale orasului in sensul de a raporta daca sint straini (ceea ce nu prea au fost) care incita la dezordine, acte de violenta sau altfel de acte… 0331 25 iunie 1991 “Desi ne-am straduit nu am putut raporta col. Sima implicarea completa a vreunui cetatean strain in evolutia demonstratiilor cit si fenomenlor care au avut loc la Timisoara,..”

0173

“Sarcina primordiala pe care am primit-o de la col. Sima a fost daca in evenimentele declansate la Timisoara erau implicate elemente straine din afara tarii.  Cu toate eforturile facute nu a rezultat lucru pe linia mea de munca.” 0174

26 iunie 1991, Declaratia lui Liviu Dinulescu, cpt. la Serviciul de Pasapoarte al jud. Timis (in decembrie 1989, lt. maj. ofiter operativ Securitate judetean la Serv. III, care se ocupa de contraspionaj)

“Precizez ca anterior declansarii evenimentelor de la Timisoara din datele ce le detineam serviciul nostru nu rezulta vreun amestec din exterior in zona judetului Timis.”

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Generalul Emil Macri (seful Dir. II-a Securitatii, Contrainformatii Economice),

Declaratie 2 ianuarie 1990:

“Rezumind sintetic informatiile obtinute ele nu au pus in evidenta nici lideri si nici amestecul vreunei puteri straine in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.  Raportarea acestor date la esalonul superior respectivi generalului I. Vlad a produs iritare si chiar suparare…”

IMG_1219 IMG_1215 Filip Teodorescu (adj. sef. Dir III Contraspionaj D.S.S.), Declaratie, 12 ianaurie 1990:  Seara [luni, 18 decembrie 1989], dupa 23:00, responsabili (anumiti ?) de generalul-maior Macri Emil pe diferitele linii de munca au inceput sa vina sa-i raporteze informatiile obtinute.  Au fost destul de neconcludente si cu mare dificultate am redat o informare pe care generalul-maior Macri Emil a acceptat-o si am expediat-o prin telex in jurul orei 01:00 [marti, 19 decembrie 1989.  In esenta se refera la: –nu sint date ca ar exista instigatori sau conducatori anume veniti din strainatate… IMG_1453 IMG_1438 https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/04/29/high-time-to-unpack-already-why-the-restless-journey-of-the-soviet-tourists-of-the-romanian-revolution-should-come-to-an-end/

Mai jos, declaratiile lui Petre Pele, Tudor Postelnicu, Gheorghe Diaconescu, si Iulian Vlad Excerpt from Chapter 5 of my Ph.D. Dissertation at Indiana University: Richard Andrew Hall, Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceausescu Romania (defended 16 December 1996). This is the original chapter as it appeared then and thus have not been revised in any form. https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/rewriting-the-revolution-1997/

A Review of the Evidence

Although at first glance the regime’s treatment of Pastor Tokes seems strange and even illogical, within the context of the workings of the Ceausescu regime and the regime’s strategy for dealing with dissent it makes perfect sense. There is simply no convincing evidence to believe that the Securitate–or a faction within it–purposely dragged its feet in enforcing Pastor Tokes’ eviction, or was attempting to spark a demonstration in the hopes of precipitating Ceausescu’s fall. The regime’s decision to evict Tokes was not a last-minute decision. Moreover, the regime exerted tremendous and sometimes brutal pressure to silence Tokes in the months preceding this deadline. Interestingly, according to high-ranking members of the former Securitate, Nicolae Ceausescu’s unwillingness to approve the more definitive measures requested by the Securitate allowed the Tokes case to drag on without resolution (see below). The Tokes case suggests the bureaucratic and byzantine mentalities of the Ceausescu regime, and the clash between a dictator’s instructions and how the institutions charged with defending him interpret their mission. … The suggestion that the Securitate treated Tokes gently prior to his eviction is simply incorrect. On 2 November 1989, four masked men burst through the locked doors of the parochial residence, wielding knives and screaming in a fury. Tokes was slashed on the forehead before his church bodyguards could come to his rescue, causing the four to flee. The numerous Securitate men posted out front of the building had done nothing to intervene in spite of calls for help. Puspoki suggests that these “Mafia-like thugs,” who attacked as if from “an Incan tribe,” were some of Colonel Sima’s “gorillas,” sent to deliver a clear message to Tokes that he should leave immediately.[40] The view of the former Securitate–as expounded by Colonel Sima’s senior deputy, Major Radu Tinu–insinuates a “tourist”-like scenario. According to Tinu, the incident was clearly a “set-up” designed to draw sympathy to Tokes’ cause since the assailants fled away in a car with West German tags.[41] Not for the last time, the Securitate thus appears to attempt to attribute its own actions to foreign agents. A week after the mysterious attack by the masked intruders, all of the windows of the parochial residence and nearby buildings were smashed. Interestingly, the report drawn up for Bucharest by the Timisoara Securitate attempted to argue that “workers” from the Timisoara Mechanical Enterprise, offended by pastor Tokes’ behavior, had broken the windows. According to Puspoki, the use of a propaganda-like description was not accidental: the local Securitate was trying to present the incident as evidence of “the dissatisfaction of the working people of Timisoara” in the hope that it would finally prompt Ceausescu into approving definitive measures against Tokes.[42] Was Ceausescu responsible for the fact that the Tokes case dragged on without resolution? Support for such a conclusion comes from the comments of Securitate officers Colonel Filip Teodorescu and Major Radu Tinu. Teodorescu was dispatched to Timisoara with sixty other Securitate information officers in order to “verify” the request of the local Securitate that proceedings for treason be initiated against Tokes.[43] Teodorescu laments: Unfortunately, as in other situations…Nicolae Ceausescu did not agree because he didn’t want to further muddy relations with Hungary. Moreover, groundlessly, he hoped to avoid the criticisms of “Western democracies” by taking administrative measures against the pastor through the Reformed Church to which [Tokes] belonged.[44] Major Radu Tinu suggests that Ceausescu’s approval was necessary in the case of Securitate arrests and that the local Securitate remained “stupefied” that after having worked so long and hard in gathering information with which to charge Tokes with the crime of treason, Ceausescu rejected the request.[45] Tinu speculates that Ceausescu “did not want to create problems at the international level.” Because former Securitate officers rarely pass up the opportunity to absolve themselves of blame, and it would appear both easier and more advantageous to blame the deceased Ceausescu for being too unyielding in the Tokes affair, these allegations seem plausible. Thus, it would appear that because Nicolae Ceausescu was skittish of further damaging Romania’s already deteriorating relations with the international community, and the Tokes case was a high-profile one, he refrained from approving visible, definitive action against the pastor. The Securitate‘s attempt to goad Ceausescu to bolder action would appear to confirm Ghita Ionescu’s suggestion that where the security apparatus comes to dominate regime affairs it attempts to impose its institutional prerogatives upon political superiors. Ceausescu and the Securitate appear then to have had sometimes conflicting views over how to resolve the Tokes affair in the quickest and most efficient fashion. By December 1989, a huge group of Securitate officers were working on the Tokes case: the entire branch of the First Directorate for Timis county, the special division charged with combatting Hungarian espionage, high-ranking members of the First Directorate and Independent Service “D” (responsible for disinformation) from Bucharest, and members of the division charged with “Surveillance and Investigation.”[46] Puspoki describes Timisoara at this late hour as follows: Day and night, the telex machines on the top floor of the [County Militia] “Inspectorate” incessantly banged out communications, while the telephones never stopped ringing. Minister Postelnicu yelled on the phone, Colonel Sima yelled through the offices and the hallways. The officers ran, as if out of their minds, after information, besieged neighbors of the pastor, and dispatched in his direction–what they call–”informers with possibilities.”[47] Yet the case lingered on. On Sunday, 10 December 1989, Pastor Tokes announced to his congregation that he had received a rejection of his most recent appeal: the regime would make good on its threat to evict him on Friday, 15 December. He termed this an “illegal act” and suggested that the authorities would probably use force since he would not go willingly. He appealed for people to come and attend as “peaceful witnesses.”[48] They came.

[40].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III),” Orizont, no. 11 (16 March 1990), 4.

[41].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 78.
[42].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (III).”
[43].. Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat, 45-46.
[44].. Ibid., 90.
[45].. Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea, 78.
[46].. Puspoki, “Piramida Umbrelor (II).”
[47].. Ibid.
[48].. Tokes, With God, for the People, 1-4. ————————————————————————————————

Tudor Postelnicu:  “Ceausescu Nicolae facuse o psihoza, mai ales dupa ce s-a intors de la sedinta de la Moscova in toamna lui ’89.  Era convins ca se planuieste si de cei de pe plan extern caderea sa, era convins ca toti sint spioni…” 0160 Petru Pele (Dir I, DSS). Declaratie, 16 ianuarie 1990:  “Printre sarciniile mai importante efectuate de catre acestia in  perioada 17-22.12.1989 s-a numerat (?) constituierea (?) listelor celor retinuti de organele militie cu listele celor predati sau reintorsi din Ungaria, intrucit s-a emis ipoteza ca evenimentele de la Timisoara au fost puse la cale in tara vecina…” 0299 0291 Gheorghe Diaconescu, Declaratie 31 decembrie 1989 “Luni 18 decembrie gl. col.  VLAD IULIAN a avut o convorbire cu colegul meu (local?) RADULESCU EMIL … 0476 Vlad Iulian (continuarea, declaratia lui Gheorghe Diaconescu) “?… foarte dur (?) ca nu (?) ca ‘un grup de turisti isi fac de cap in Timisoara’” 0477 0472 Tocmai Iulian Vlad, el insusi, recunoaste ne-implicarea strainilor in evenimentele de la Timisoara, aici… 0289 0290 Incepind cu noaptea de 16/17 dec. si in continuare pina in data de 20 dec. 1989 organul de securitate local col. Sima cit si gl. Macri si in lipsa lui col. Teodorescu imi comunicau date din care rezulta ca sute de elemente turbulente au devastat orasul, si ca elementul strain nu rezulta a se fi implicate in continuarea fenomenului.” 0291 “Mai exact, cei trimis de mine la Timisoara mi-au raportat ca nu au elemente din care sa rezulte vreum amestec al strainatatii in producerea evenimentelor de la Timisoara.” https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/03/17/o-indicatie-pretioasa-de-pe-malurile-dimbovitei-implicarea-strainilor-in-evenimentele-de-la-timisoara-paranoia-lui-nicolae-ceausescu-sau-confirmarea-lui-iulian-vlad/0292

All this is important to keep in mind when coming across claims about the alleged role of these tourists in the overthrow of the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu:  none of the authors purporting such claims have addressed the documents above.  Among the authors who allege such a role and whose work is available on the Internet are the following:

James F. Burke (citing Grigore Corpacescu, General Iulian Vlad, and a well-known article from September 1990 in Democratia) http://www.ceausescu.org/ceausescu_texts/revolution/december_revolt_moscow.htm (I have dealt with these allegations here https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/29/presa-din-1990-despre-turistii-rusi-din-decembrie-1989/, and  https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/22/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/)

Catherine Durandin (citing Radu Portocala) http://www.diploweb.com/english/romania/durandin1.htm  (I have addressed this allegation here https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/09/24/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-four/)

Alexander Ghaleb (fn. 9, citing “police sources”) http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/165/art03-Ghaleb.php

Jacques Levesque (citing a 1992 book by Filip Teodorescu) http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft4q2nb3h6&chunk.id=d0e6746&toc.id=d0e6638&brand=ucpress

John Simpson (citing Virgil Magureanu and the SRI) http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/ten-days-that-fooled-the-world-1387659.html

Alex Mihai Stoenescu (p. 186 of 340, Petre Roman citing Mihai Caraman) http://www.scribd.com/doc/105257958/Alex-Mihai-Stoenescu-Istoria-Loviturilor-de-Stat-Din-Romania-Vol-4-1

Larry Watts (fn. 90 p. 26, Petre Roman citing Mihai Caraman) http://www.larrylwatts.com/excerpts/with_friends_like_these_excerpts.pdf  (Roman ironically himself undermined such a claim here:  http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/petre-roman-ceausescu-acceptat-controlul-psihiatric-proces-putea-scape-1_50ad124a7c42d5a6638e48ab/index.html , Watts’ claim has been televised in the series “Mostenirea Clandestina,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAPOEu0ebwI start at about 46:10 to 46:60 and then assisted by Cristian Troncota, who discusses the “Soviet tourists,” including Watts’ claim, from 47:05 to 49:50…conveniently not mentioned here or anywhere else where Troncota appears (for example with Grigore Cartianu in Adevarul), Cristian Troncota was a Lt. Maj. in the Securitate:  see the index here from a 1987 issue of the Securitate‘s “strict secret” journal, (page 4 of 46 on the pdf) with a historical article beginning on page 78:  http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201987-4-80.pdf  (vol. 80 from 1987).

 

 

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