The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘nicu ceausescu 1989’

Nicu Ceausescu, Sibiu, teroristii, combinezoane negre, si decembrie 1989 (articole uitate, revista Expres 1990)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on April 8, 2010

from Orwellian, Positively Orwellian (2006)

MEN IN BLACK:  The Recurring Theme of “Black Jumpsuits”

Part of the great riddle of the “terrorists” concerns their clothing.  In Brasov, it was noted the individual arrested on 23 December firing a 5.65 mm Thomson automatic was wearing a “black jumpsuit.”  The descriptions go by different names—“combinezoane negre,” “salopete negre,” or “de culor inchis,” for example—but they all note the black or dark outfits of many of those suspected of being “terrorists.”

It is critical to note that we have evidence that the focus on the black clothing of those identified as “terrorists” occurred among participants at the time, and is not merely some ex post facto artifact.  Major A.D. of Directorate V-a (probably Major Aurel David) recounted in early 1991 that while under arrest on 27 December 1989, the Army soldiers guarding him asked “If” as Major A.D. had sought to convince them, “it isn’t Ceausescu’s guard [i.e. V-a]” who was firing, “then who are the black-shirted ones [emphasis added]?”[52] The report of the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor] on Timisoara indirectly confirms Army suspicion when alleging that Army Colonel Constantin Zeca gave the order after 22 December 1989, to shoot at anybody “in a blue, navy blue, or black jumpsuit.”[53] Why this clothing in particular, and why the suspicion then?

Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.”  Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:

“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.

The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital.  It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route].  Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad.  Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note:  possible reference to 5 mm weapons].  Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic.  The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks.  They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out].  Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty.  A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area.  All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit.  At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes.  Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47.  One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit.  The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman.  All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic.  After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three.  After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened.  All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]

Another small group of people wearing “black jumpsuits” held a military convoy under fire near the city of Buzau. On the evening of 23 December 1989, a military convoy from Piatra Neamt en route to Bucharest reached the community of Maracineni near Buzau.  Members of the local military unit told the soldiers from Piatra Neamt that

…the unit had been attacked by two people, a civilian and Militia NCO, who disappeared with an Oltcit [car] and an ABI vehicle [an armored transport used exclusively by the Securitate’s USLA].  Shortly after [being told] this, gunfire opened on the convoy.  And gunfire reopened on the local military unit….those from the unit fired back with ordinance that lit the sky, in this way enabling them to observe a group of 3-4 armed people, wearing black jumpsuits (“salopete negre”) who were shooting while constantly changing position.  At the same time, on the radio frequencies of the convoy, they received messages about coming devastating attacks, and even Soviet intervention.  All of these proved to be simple disinformation.  The next day, in a moment of calm, villagers brought the soldiers food, and related how the terrorists had occupied attics of their houses.  They said they [the occupiers] were Romanians and that in a few words they had ordered [the villagers] to let them into the attics of their houses….In general, they shot at night, but on 25 December the cannonade continued during the day…. Curiously, the ‘fighting’ in Maracineni continued until 30 December.  Who and for whom were they trying to impress? [emphasis added][55]

Indeed, there are three key aspects here:  1) this was not a heavily populated area, thereby undermining arguments about “operetta-like” fake warfare to impress the population, 2) it is difficult to explain this episode as the result of “misunderstandings” between units, and 3) the gunfire lasted well over a week, a fact that is difficult to ascribe to confusion.

Did the black-suited ones have any affiliation to any institution?  After all, is it not odd that so many of them would appear to be dressed in the same garb?  In 1990, an engineer, Mircea Georgescu, expressed his frustration about the post-December disappearance of the “terrorists” in Sibiu, Nicu Ceausescu’s fiefdom, as follows:

“Who fired from the attics of Sibiu on 21-22 December 1989?  Who are the so-called terrorists?  Where are their guns with scopes and unmistakable cadence?  Silence on all fronts:…

c) A fighter from the guards, along with his brother, captured in these days (23-25 dec.) some 8 securisti among whom:  one about 45-50 years old, at the State Theater Sibiu, we surrendered him to the Commander at the Army House.  He was taken under guard by 4 civilian fighters (one in front had a club in his hand) and by a soldier with a gun at his side.  He was dressed in a vest (like a smith’s) and a pant-suit (combinezon) that was black or a very dark grey…brown with short hair, well-built and 1,70-1,75 m tall….What, nobody knows anything about this guy either?…[emphases added]”[56]

Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:

…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons.  I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits.  The Militia told me that they weren’t their people.  At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire.  I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?”  I told him we were being attacked.  He told me to cease fire.  Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender.  I slammed the telephone down.  Then [Army General] Stanculescu called.  I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me:  ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified:  they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]

Finally, in this context, the comments of a Codrut H. in July 1990 about what he and other civilians found when they occupied Securitate headquarters in Brasov on the night of 22 December:  “What appeared suspicious to me was that the Securitate there appeared to have been prepared [for something]….  Out front of the building there was a white ARO [automobile] in which there were complete antiterrorist kits [emphasis added].” What else did the civilians find there?…combinezoane negre. [58]

Sibiu, 19-22 December 1989

In Sibiu, Siani-Davies tells us:

Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989.  It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[151]

From the standpoint of Siani-Davies’ unsuspecting reader such a conclusion may seem not only credible, but judicious.  But one of Siani-Davies’ habits—identified negatively by even those who praise the book—is his tendency to draw negative equivalencies:  i.e. there is about as much evidence to support x as there is to support y, in order to disprove or discount both propositions.  In a review, Doris Mironescu writes:

“Very common are claims such as the following:  ‘Finding the proof to sustain such an explanation of the events [that the Army’s Intelligence arm, the DIA simulated the “terrorist diversion,” to permit the Front’s takeover and a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of the country] is as difficult as proving that special units of the securitate took up arms against the revolution’ (p. 154).  Mutually contradictory hypotheses are invoked in order to negate each other, not so much because of the weight of the claims, but through the ideological similarity of both.”[152]

This tendency definitely affects Siani-Davies’ analysis of the “terrorists” and its accuracy.  To begin with, in the very book (Sandulescu) invoked by Siani-Davies, the head of the DIA (Battalion 404 Buzau), Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) that “we hardly had 80 fighters in this battalion.”[153] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[154] This makes it highly unlikely that they were on the 20 December TAROM flight to Sibiu that is in question.[155]

Contrast this with the signs that exist pointing to the mystery passengers as having been from the Securitate/Interior Ministry, in particular the USLA.  Nicu Silvestru, chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in a letter from prison that on the afternoon of 19 December 1989, in a crisis meeting, Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced that he was going to “call [his] specialists from Bucharest” to take care of any protests.[156] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “some troops” and he had informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[157] If they were, indeed, DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and Postelnicu informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?

The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA.  Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:

“…[T]he Military Prosecutor gave me two variants. In the first part of the inquest, they [the flight’s passengers] were from the Interior Ministry. Later, however, in the second half of the investigation, when the USLA and those from the Interior Ministry began, so-to-speak, to pass ‘into the shadows,’ – after which one no longer heard anything of them – they [the passengers] turned out to be simple citizens…”[158]

Beginning, at least as early as August 1990, with the allusions of Major Mihai Floca, and later seemingly indirectly confirmed by former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, it was suggested that when USLA Commander Ardeleanu was confronted at the Defense Ministry on the night of 23/24 December 1989, Ardeleanu reportedly admitted that “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’.”[159] Finally, and along these lines, we bring things full circle—and recall our “phantoms in black” again in the process—with the testimony of Army officer Hortopan to the same Serban Sandulescu at the Gabrielescu Commission hearings:

Sandulescu:  About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?

Hortopan:  On the contrary.  These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu].  I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was:  out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders.  Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[160]

Bringing us up to the morning of 22 December 1989, and setting the stage for what was to come, Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:

Dragomir:  Events began to develop quickly on 22 December.  In the morning some of the students posted in different parts of the town began to observe some suspect individuals in black jumpsuits on the roofs in the lights of the attics of several buildings.

Reporter:  The same equipment as the USLAsi killed out front of the Defense Ministry…

Dragomir:  And on the roof of the Militia building there were three or four similar individuals…[161]

Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation.  Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[162]

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Procurori si decembrie 1989 : “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei” EXPRES nr. 33 (septembrie 1990).

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on February 19, 2010

In articolul acesta, se face referiri la demisia procurorului Marian Valer in 1990.  Am postat interviul cu Marian Valer in toamna trecuta.  Ceea ce este intersant, si ceea ce nu ne spune Antonie Popescu, este faptul ca atunci cind Marian Valer a demisionat in 1990, credea in securisti-teroristi si Planul Z-Z…

http://www.ziuaveche.ro/component/content/article/39-ultimele-stiri/788-maries-la-revolutie-fsn-primea-arme-la-liber

In legatura cu procurorii care au instrumentat aceste dosare, in afara de Dan Voinea, Antonie Popescu a reamintit cazul procurorului Marian Valer din Satu Mare, care a a fost delegat la Sibiu pentru a face cercetari in legatura cu evenimente din 20 decembrie 1989, si care si-a dat demisia din procuratura in august 1990, printr-o scrisoare publica adresata procurorului general din acea vreme. In scrisoarea respectiva, procurorul acuza ‘’lipsa de cooperare si obstructiile’’ facute de SRI (‘’ca urmare a unui ordin dat de insusi Virgil Magureanu’’, scria Valer), MapN, politie in ancheta pe care o desfasura’’, ‘’profanarea institutiilor reprezentative ale tarii cu persoane corupte, cercetate penal, foste cadre sau colaboratori cu structurile ceausiste’’, accederea in structurile esentiale ale Justitiei ale unor persoane compromise moral, ‘’vinovate de prostituarea justitiei romanesti in perioada dictaturii’’ etc.


from Orwellian Positively Orwellian

Where and From Where Was There Gunfire?

So if there is evidence of ammunition that cannot be accounted for in standard arsenals and of people killed and identified as “dead terrorists”—who clearly do not fit into the standard categories of those killed during the events—what is perhaps the next logical question?  That might be:  where and from where did the gunfire come?

To continue with Sibiu and Lt. Col. Dragomir’s claims, former Prosecutor Marian Valer, who claimed to have “noticed shortly after the publication of his resignation from this position [claiming obstruction] that I was benefiting from the services of the organization of Virgil Magureanu [i.e. the SRI, the Securitate’s institutional successor],” stated in September 1990:

…during the events of December 1989 in Sibiu, the army found a map with the safehouses of the Securitate, around the city’s military units, in which Securitate cadre were to be placed to act against them, in the eventuality of a defection by the army from the Ceausist regime.  Following the investigations conducted, it was determined that from these same houses gunfire was opened on some of these military units, beginning with the afternoon of 22 December 1989, therefore after the overthrow of the dictatorship.  It was also established that, in general, in these respective houses lived former cadre of the Securitate and Militie, who had retired or crossed into reserve status, or informers of the Securitate, and also that, following the outbreak of the antiCeausist demonstrations in Sibiu, at these houses entered cars that had license plates from other counties, for example Constanta, Iasi, [and] Bacau.  Thus upon the [Army unit] U.M. 01512, gunfire was opened from the house at no. 7 Stefan Cel Mare Street…in which lived the families of a former Sibiu Securitate commander and an informer of the Securitate…On U.M. 1606 there was shooting from no. 47 Moldoveanu Street, in which lived a former Militia chief of Sibiu county, while upon U.M. 01080 there was fire from vila Branga [see earlier discussion of this location referencing five mm caliber bullets]…It was determined that the owners of these places were not at home during the events, having left several days earlier, and that in some houses there was no furniture or signs of habitation.  The map of the safehouses of the Securitate and Militie came into possession of Lt. Col. Dragomir, commander of the Sibiu garrison, but when he was asked to present it to the investigatory commission he said he could not find it.[59]

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Dovada exista! Doua videouri noi din decembrie ’89 … impotriva procurorilor si uitarii: gloante dum-dum si vidia folosite de catre teroristii

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 16, 2009

In seara aceasta, am gasit citeva videouri de o importanta extraordinara pentru intelegerea Revolutiei Romane din decembrie 1989.  (Amindoua din site dailymotion.com sit postat de un Alexandru2006; 8 in total si de o importanta deosebita din punctul de vedere istoric, chiar daca se pare ca pina acum numai citeva sute de oameni le-au vazut).  In prima video, vedeti secventa 1:20-2:50 in care se arata gloantele dum-dum si vidia depistate din arhiva securitatii.  In a doua, secventa 0:45 – 1:20 filmate se pare la Piata Aviatorilor (deci zona TVR-ului) in care omul demonstreaza cum gloantele teroristilor (in cazul acesta, se pare de tip vidia) sint diferite de gloante obisnuite.   Mai jos, cei care au negat si neg in continuare existenta gloantelor aceste…numai ca dovezii filmate mai exista…
Revolutia  Romana 22 Dec.1989 – cd4

OARE CINE NU CREDE IN GLOANTELE DUM-DUM SI VIDIA???

PAVEL CORUT, STEFAN DEMETER, TEODOR UNGUREANU, VLADIMIR BELIS, DAN VOINEA

1) Pavel Corut (ocupatie inainte de 1990:  securist)

“…nu a existat o garda speciala care sa fi depus un juramint de credinta de legionar fata de dictator, nu au existat lunetisti dotati cu sisteme de ochire cu infrarosii, nu s-a tras cu gloante vidia…”

Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 65 (42) 1991, p. 12.

“…Treburile pareau sa se fi indreptat catre directia buna, dar in dimineata zilei de 23 decembrie [sic. 24 decembrie], capitanul P.I. m-a informat ca in fata ministerului sint doua masini blindate cu teroristi de la U.S.L.A., lichidati de tanchistii nostri.  Discutase cu locotenentul (comandant de pluton) care facuse isprava si acesta mindru de fapta sa, se laudase ca intentionase chiar sa se urce cu tancul pe ei, dar nu a reusit.  Soldatul curier de corospondenta din organigrama compartimentului m-a informat ca peste noapte santinela din postul 2 il impuscase mortal pe ofiterul comandant de garda, un tinar locotenent.  Mai tirziu am citit relatari fanteziste si patetice referitoare la moartea acestui ofiter, “lovit de gloante vidia si explozive.”  Nu este singurul  militar mort in accident de lupta….”

2) col. Stefan Demeter (sef al birou de servicii si inzestrare al (atunci) Inspectoratului judetean al M.I.):

“Dupa munitia folosita si zgomotele auzite in oras, rezulta clar ca pina in seara de 22 decembrie s-a tras cu pistoale mitraliera model 1963, de 7,62. Nu s-a folosit munitia “Dum-Dum” cu virf exploziv, interzisa de Tribunalul de Haga. Din 1989 si armamentul “Stecikin” car folosea munitie de 9 mm scurt a fost retras din toate inspectoratele judetene ale M.I. S-a vorbit mult despre gloante vidia. Motivul e simplu: materialul vidia e foarte casant si ar distruge teava armei. Este, deci, pe cit de inutil, pe atit de scump. “Exemplele” prezentate ca “gloante vidia” erau, de fapt, miezuri de otel ale gloantelor de 7,62.”

Radu Ciobotea, “M.I.–Martor Incomod,” Flacara, nr. 33, 14 august 1991, pp. 4-5.

3) procuror ceausist Teodor Ungureanu (Facultatea de Drept, promotia 1978) care n-a vazut si n-a gasit nici un terorist in decembrie 1989, sau dupa…gazdat de catre Jurnalul National in perioada 2004-2005 (cam 10 articole)

http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/procuror-teodor-ungureanu-diversiunea-3-gloantele-vidia-erau-miezurile-de-otel-care-intrau-in-alcatuirea-proiectilului-762-mm/

La cele de mai sus va trebui să adăugăm fabulaţiile cu privire la celebrele “gloanţe-widia”. Prin lansarea acestei aberaţii, cei mai de seamă reprezentanţi ai Armatei s-au compromis lamentabil. Ceea ce prezentau în emisiuni tv ori în paginile unor ziare ca fiind teribilele instrumente ale morţii, nu erau nimic altceva decât miezurile din oţel care intrau în alcătuirea internă a proiectilului cal. 7,62 mm-scurt destinat armelor tip AKM. Tot aşa aveau să fie făcute speculaţii asupra folosirii muniţiei explozive (de tip dum-dum), de către persoane care erau fie străine de efectele povocate asupra corpului uman de proiectile cu diverse energii cinetice (la momentul străpungerii), ori de fragmente din proiectile dezmembrate la un anterior impact cu un corp dur, fie de cei angajaţi într-o reală acţiune de dezinformare.

4) Vladimir Belis

dl profesor Vladimir Belis, care in decembrie 1989 era directorul Institutului de Medicina Legala Mina Minovici din Bucuresti

Povestile despre teroristi care trageau cu gloante “”dum-dum””, “”gloante cu cap vidia”” sau gloante de calibru mare, atipice pentru unitatile militare romanesti, vor ramane din cauza asta doar niste povesti care nu pot fi confirmate sau infirmate.

Belis nu a vazut cadavrele ceausestilor, Jurnalul National

5) si cu voia dvs.

Generalul Dan Voinea (procuror militar din 1982)

Dan Voinea, citat pe forumul asociatiei 21 decembrie 1989, nu exista victime de la dum-dum

“Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil”

Romulus Cristea
Joi, 22 Decembrie 2005

Interviu cu general-magistrat Dan Voinea

Romulus Cristea:  Munitia speciala, gloantele cu cap vidia sau dum-dum, a provocat victime? Presa de la acea vreme a fost plina cu astfel de relatari…
Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia, nici de la dum-dum. Pe durata evenimentelor s-a folosit munitie de razboi, munitie normala care se gasea la vremea respectiva in dotarea Ministerului de Interne si a Ministerului Apararii Nationale. Confuzia si informatiile false au aparut de la faptul ca se foloseau calibre diferite si, deci, zgomotul produs era altfel perceput.

Deci care este firul care reuneste aceste cinci cazuri?

Toti oameni patati de regimul Ceausescu,

si mai ales patati de relatii sau vulnerabilitatea lor fata cu fosta securitate…

deci putem intelege destul de usor de ce EI nu cred

in folosirea gloantelor dum-dum sau vidia in decembrie 1989…


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Decembrie 1989: Si totusi forumistii stiu cite ceva. Sibiu, Bucuresti, munitie atipica, si teroristii

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on December 23, 2008

(Duminică, 23 decembrie 2007, 11:33)

Istoric [anonim]

Cu repectul cuvenit fatza de cei omoriti in decembrie 1989,civili si militari,in calitate de rezervist al armatei Romane,indraznesc sa intreb si eu :

Cine avea in Romania anului 1989,munitie tip NATO, 5.5 mm calibru, in plus “crestata” – lucru interzis de Conventia de la Geneva,stiut fiind faptul ca Armata Romana avea la vremea aceea calibrul Pactului de laVarsovia ,pentru armamentul usor,adica 7,62 mm…..La vremea aceea chiar campionul olimpic la proba de pistol viteza,Sorin Babii,isi exprima nedumerirea….Eu am avut in mina citeva mostre din aceste cartuse :mici,negre,cu o spirala in virf,sau cu 4 muchii (cei ce cunosc putina balistica si medicina legala isi vor da seama de rolul devastator al acestor modoficari…

Astept si acum raspuns la intrebarile mele…poate ca totusi cineva se vagasi sa rupa tacerea…II multumesc anticipat !

http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-2121712-ultimele_zile_revolutiei_romane.htm

Monitorul de Sibiu: Zile fierbinti (V)

Liviu BREZAE, 28/12/2006

Zvonuri alarmiste

Daca am face o lista cu zvonurile care circulau prin Sibiu atunci, zvonuri care mareau si mai mult teama de teroristi si contribuiau la mentinerea unei stari de teroare asupra populatiei, acum am putea ride o saptamina. Atunci toate erau adevarate. Incepind cu submarinele de pe Cibin, cu gloantele vidia, cu gloantele dum-dum care explodau dupa ce loveau tinta, cu rapirile de copii pentru a face scut uman, cu apa otravita, cu „Craciunul este al vostru – Anul nou e al nostru”, cu lunetistii care trageau ziua sau noaptea cu arme cu infrarosu, cu arabii veniti special in tara sa-l apere pe Ceausescu, cu uciderea bolnavilor din spitale si terminind cu teroristii care noaptea ridicau cadavrele celor cazuti in lupte.

magarii gazetaresti, nerusinate

esti magar, nu gazetar, sau “istoric”. Poate nu ai mers prin Sibiu in acele zile sa vezi gloantele de calibru mic, conice, din otel, imprastiate pe jos. Trase, de exemplu, pe B-dul Mihai Viteazu. Hai sictir, esti un securist sadea

gelu

28/12, 09:59

http://www.monitorulsb.ro/cms/site/m_sb/news/zile_fierbinti_v_6710.html

BOZGAN GHEORGHE

2008-09-08 22:33:10

DOMNILOR REVOLUTIONARI,ARMATA ISI BATE JOC DE DVS.

Infractiunile pedepsibile cu detentie pe viata sau inchisoare mai mare de 15 ani (cele de omor, in special) SE PRESCRIU in 15 de ani,deci pentru crimele din decembrie 1989 s-a implinit termenul de prescriptie prin 2005. Aproximativ 99 % din criminalii care au tras se afla in situatia asta.

In ziarul Tineretul Liber (fost Scinteia tineretului) din martie 1990,generalul Stanculescu este pozat tinind in mina citeva gloante cu cap vidia.Generalul spune ” am strins munitie si armament strain,am facut si un film in acest sens,uitati-va am aici in palma cite gloante cu cap vidia ce nu sunt in dotarea armatei romane” Stiti ce la ce concluzie au ajuns 3 Comisii parlamentare de cercetare a evenimentelor din decembrie 1989,dar si …Parchetul Militar ? NU S-AU DESCOPERIT DOVEZI PRIVIND EXISTENTA ARMAMENTULUI SI MUNITIEI DE PROVENIENTA STRAINA…..

[omul scrie aici despre interviul facut de catre Aurel Perva and Gavrila Inoan, Tineretul Liber, 5 martie 1991, pp. 1-2:  General Victor Stanculescu a precizat ca e vorba de gloante cu cap vidia, calibru 5, 56 mm.

“Yes, as I have already said, I have here two bullets with vidia [grooves]. Our Army does not use this type of ammunition. It is of caliber 5.56. As you can see, the bullet has a jacket that got deformed, while its core remained intact.” http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.]<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>

http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/forum/index.php?topic=1.msg9736

SIBIU

PROCESUL DE LA SIBIU

La locuinta lui Nicu Ceausescu din Sibiu

Astfel, din adresele numărul 68 000 07 din 7 ianuarie 1990 şi numărul 68000171 din 28 februarie 1990 ale Serviciului Independent Arme-Muniţie şi Substanţe Toxice din cadrul Inspectoratului general al Poliţiei rezultă că, inculpatul figurează în evidenţa deţinătorilor legali de arme, cu pistolul marca STAR calibrul 7,85mm şi 12 cartuşe acelaşi calibru. Pentru celelalte arme găsite în locuinţa din Sibiu şi anume:pistolul mitralieră AKM , calibrul 5,6 mm, pistolul SCHMIDT, carabină automatic marca G ARM, calibrul 5,5mm, carabina 7 x 64 SAKO, carabină BROWING şi puşcă de vânătoare cu alice, semiautomată,calibrul 12 mm, cât şi pentru muniţia:6 cartuşe –357 MAGNUM, 214 cartuşe calibul 12 mm , 66 cartuşe-300 V.I.N. , 140 cartuşe-7x64mm şi 506 cartuşe.

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/baza_de_date/procese/sibiu/Sedinta%201.doc

23 decembrie 1989

Ion Neata:  “…Avea cartus inauntru, l-am extras imediat si am inceput sa studiez arma, stiti, eu sint la maistri militari, specialitatea armament.  Mi-au trecut multe pusti prin mina, dar asa ,bijuterie’ inca nu am vazut.  Este vorba de un Browning de mare precizie, calibru 5,6 mm de productie belgiana….Controlindu-l am gasit asupra sa urmatoarele:  buletin de identitate pe numele Fanea Nicolae, legitimatie de serviciu, pe acelasi nume, din care rezulta ca este inginer la I.P.A.S….si o statie de emisie-receptie de tipul celor de la militie.”

[“On 23 December 1989 in Sibiu, a soldier participated in the capture of one Fanea Nicolae who was carrying a Belgian-made 5.6 mm Browning and “a radio transmitter-receiver of the type used by the Romanian ‘Militia’.

Ion Neata, interview by Major Mihai Floca, “Unde sint teroristii?,” Armata Poporului, no. 30 (25 July 1990), p. 3.”

http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html.]

BUCURESTI

PROCESUL DE LA SIBIU

La locuinta lui Nicu Ceausescu din Bucuresti

De asemenea, la locuinţa inculpatului situată în Bucureşti,strada Cosmonauţilor nr.2-4, a fost găsit un pistol cu aer comprimat calibrul 4,5 mm , 23 cartuşe calibrul 7x64mm, un cartuş 300 V.I.N., 44cartuşe-357 MAGNUM, 3 cartuşe calibrul 12 mm, 498 cartuşe-calibrul 5,6mm, 50 cartuşe-calibrul 9mm lung, 27 cartuşe-calibrul 6,35mm, două cutii cu diaboluri –calibrul 4,5mm pentru care nu a posedat autorizaţie legală, aşa cum prevede articolul 2,litera f din decretul numărul 367/1971.

http://www.memorialulrevolutiei.ro/baza_de_date/procese/sibiu/Sedinta%201.doc

La locuinta lui Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu din Bucuresti

“arma cu luneta si 695 gloante calibru 5,6 mm”

[Victor Dinu, Romania Libera, 12 April 1990, p. 2.

During the trial of Nicolae Ceausescu’s brother, Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu, head of the Securitate’s Baneasa training academy, it was disclosed that at his home “a gun with an infra-red scope and 695 cartridges of 5.6 mm bullets were found.”

http://homepage.mac.com/khallbobo/RichardHall/pubs/Voineaswar091706.html. ]

Dl. Savin Chiritescu

“Vreau sa arat ca subsemnatul si mai multi colegi din aceeasi unitate de tancuri [UM 01060 Bucuresti-Pantelimon] am capturat teroristi arabi (dintre care unul ne-a spus ca este din Beirut) inarmati, pe care i-am predate la Marele Stat Major. Unul era student, am gasit asupra lui un pistol mitraliera de calibrul 5.62 seria UF 060866, cu cadenta de ambreiaj, lung de vreo 40 cm, portabil pe sub haine: arma parea facuta dintr-un plastic foarte dur, cu exceptia tevii si a mecanismului de dare a focului. “

Al. Mihalcea, “O gafa monumentala,” Romania Libera, 31 October 1990, p. 5a.

Ing. Dan Iliescu, Muzeul de Arta

“S-a tras din Muzeu permanent. Aveam impresia ca se trage de la parter, de la arta feudala….Armele lor sunau altfel. Aveau o cadenta sanatoasa. A doua zi si in zilele urmatoare am gasit gloante in Muzeu. Nu erau gloante obisnuite. Aveau un virf tesit. Pareau imbricate intr-o camasa de plumb. Era un calibru intre cinci, cinci si ceva. N-au vrut uslasii [ USLA ]sa ne lasa nici un glont. I-am rugat sa ne lasa macar de amintire. N-au vrut! Au zis ca au nevoie pentru identificare. Au notat de unde le-au ridicat.”

Ion Zubascu, “Misterioasa revolutie romana,” Flacara 19 decembrie 1990, p. 11.

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