The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Posts Tagged ‘pavel corut’

Lying in wait: Securitate Director General Vlad in the CC building (I)

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on September 14, 2013

Sergiu Tanasescu (medicul echipei de fotbal Rapid Bucuresti), iaunarie 1990:  “Amindoi, el [Generalul Guse] si cu [Generalul] Vlad tineau ocupate in permanenta ‘scurturile,’ ‘T.O.’ telefoane operative.  Practic era imposibil sa li comunice evenimente poate mult mai importante.  Daca intre timp se suna cumva al treilea telefon se repezeau sa vorbeasca si la acela, nelasindu-ne sa primim nici un mesaj.  Chestia ni s-a parut suspecta.

Revolutionaries in the CC were understandably suspicious of the behavior of General Vlad and General Guse on these phones…as Sergiu Tanasescu recalled in late January 1990:

“Intre noi si el [Guse] se crease insa o stare de tensiune.  Nu ne placea cum vorbea la telefon, parca fiecare fraza avea un subinteles.  De exemplu, au sunat cei de la Boteni care au anuntat ca au doborit niste elicoptere neidentificate.  Guse s-a rastit la ei, ca de unde stiu lucrurile alea, ca actele gasite n-au nici o valoare, ca de ce sint atit de siguri pe ei? etc.  Parca el era la Boteni!  L-am intrebat ce se intimpla.  Ne-a raspuns:  “Niste timpiti, dom-le, unii trag in altii.  Nici o problema.”  Amindoi, el si cu [Generalul] Vlad tineau ocupate in permanenta ‘scurturile,’ ‘T.O.’ telefoane operative.  Practic era imposibil sa li comunice evenimente poate mult mai importante.  Daca intre timp se suna cumva al treilea telefon se repezeau sa vorbeasca si la acela, nelasindu-ne sa primim nici un mesaj.  Chestia ni s-a parut suspecta.


The following passage is indicative of Vlad’s duplicity and lack of credibility.  Playing dumb about the report of unidentified helicopters, he responds to one of the revolutionary’s questions–suggesting that the helicopters belonged to Vlad’s Securitate–in a ridiculous and unserious manner,”perhaps they are yours?” he says to the man. (!)

1:32 Iulian Vlad: Dar eu nu-nţeleg de ce au plecat elicopterele.
1:34 Bărbat: Ale teroriştilor.
1:35 Iulian Vlad: Care terorişti, domnule, de unde au venit ăştia? Că n-au…
1:38 Bărbat: (neînţelegibil) speciale
1:40 Iulian Vlad: Păi de unde? Ori ale dînsului (arată spre Guşă), ori ale mele tre’ să fie. Altele nu sînt.
1:44 Bărbat: Ale dumneavoastră.
1:46 Iulian Vlad: Ale dumneavoastră, măi copii.
1:47 Bărbat: Au fost şi altele.
1:49 Iulian Vlad: Foarte curioasă treaba asta.
1:51 Bărbat: Sînt de la dumneavoastră cu alte ordine.

1:53 Iulian Vlad: Păi nu am decît trei elicoptere.

transcribed at

Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu admitted to journalist Dan Badea in 1991 that the USLA (special anti-terrorist unit) had its own helicopter force, thereby substantiating the suspicion of the unidentified revolutionary that the helicopters in question were “special”/”from a special unit.”  Thus, it is abundantly clear that Vlad’s claim that the Securitate had “just three helicopters” was a bald-faced lie.


Moreover, there was confirmation outside of Romania as to the activity of Securitate helicopters during these days:  specifically, Hungarian Defense Officials.  Not only did the Securitate have “a large number of helicopters” (Def. Min. Ferenc Karpati) but on Saturday 23 December 1989, two of them briefly violated Hungarian airspace near Battonya (which is not far from the Romanian city of Arad).  The idea that somehow Hungarian Defense officials did not know the difference between Romanian Air Force and Romanian Securitate helicopters–given the fact that they were both Warsaw Pact members and given that at least since 1986 tensions between Hungary and Romania had been at an increasingly high level–verges on the implausible.

Finally, if the following personally stylized “transcript” of former Securitate officer (Military Counter-Intelligence, Directorate IV) Pavel Corut is anywhere close to accurate, it is clear that not only did General Vlad lie about the possibility (i.e. reality) that the unidentified helicopters in question belonged to his Securitate, but he attempted to suggest that the helicopters belonged to Hungary and were transporting Hungarian parachutists into Transylvania (see pages 186 and 187 below, Pavel Corut Floarea de Argint (Editura Miracol, 1994), pp. 182-191 ).

The above passage from page 187 shows pretty clearly that Securitate General Iulian Vlad was intentionally misleading the revolutionaries in the CC and others, as he alleges an invasion of Hungarian parachutists in six Transylvanian cities.  There is absolutely no evidence–either in accounts of the time or since–that Hungarian parachutists turned up in these cities.  Thus, while Vlad attempted to play dumb regarding the suspected presence and activation of Arab terrorists allied with the Securitate on behalf on the Ceausescus–particularly in the Black Sea Coast region–he was seeking to disseminate disinformation about a non-existent–but highly nationalist, paranoid, and potentially resonant, especially perhaps in Transylvania–invasion by neighboring Hungary.  He knew exactly what he was doing and what was transpiring.

In other words, Securitate General Vlad was engaging in what Romanians describe as:  “Hoţul strigă hoţii!  (The thief shouts out:  [Stop] thieves!)

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The Blues Brothers. Oh, we got both kinds of music here: Country AND Western!

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on August 3, 2013

The ideologues would have us believe that it is all about the post-Ceausescu world view and politics of individuals of the former communist regime.  Bureaucratic/Institutional interests across world views and politics are thus ignored.  For example, only protochronists, Ceausescu nostalgics would allege that December 1989 was a Soviet plot.  Back in 2005, I took a look at the supposedly diametrically opposed claims of Ion Mihai Pacepa and Pavel Corut on December 1989.  As, one can see, stripped of all the philosophical rhetoric, their views are completely different and should in no case be compared with or considered similar to one another…


Ion Mihai Pacepa in Evenimentul Zilei, 29 aprilie 1993.


translated version in Romanian by Marius Mioc available at


Inevitably, too, in the wake of the Brandstatter film the Romanian media dragged out its old warhorse for such occassions, the former Director of communist Romania’s Foreign Intelligence Service, General Ion Mihai Pacepa, the man whose defection in 1978 led to his being sentenced to death in abstentia and whose sensational revelations about Ceausescu’s repressive and profligate rule helped erode the myth of Ceausescu in the West.  Pacepa’s break from Ceausescu and the communist regime, and his stinging criticism of the administrations of President Ion Iliescu for their incorporation of and reliance upon former Securitate personnel, have led Pacepa to be lionized in the West and to be highly-respected and thoroughly-trusted among Romania’s intellectual and media elites.

In the wake of Brandstatter’s film, and, indirectly, in support of Bukovski’s allegations, Pacepa’s claims about December 1989 were once again invoked.  Thus, for example, excerpts of an August 2000 interview on the Hungarian Duna TV channel (rebroadcast on Duna TV two nights before the debut of the Brandstatter film) were published (“Jurnalul National,” 26 February 2004).  In the interview, Pacepa maintained that there were no so-called “terrorists” during the Revolution—that the “terrorist” phenomenon was all a pretext used by the party-state officials who ousted Ceausescu to legitimate a Soviet intervention:

“Interviewer:  What exactly was the essence of the the ‘Dnestr’ Plan?

Pacepa:  It was necessary to find a motive [to justify] the Soviet intervention, if the coup was to succeed by itself.  Therefore it is very easy to understand.  On 22 [sic. 23] December 1989, at 2 pm in the afternoon, Romanian Television announced:  “The National Salvation Front has requested Soviet help because unidentified foreign terrorists are attacking Romania.”  Already on this day, Iliescu declared that the Ceausescu couple had been arrested and a trial would be held, only for Television to announce [later] that their trial and execution had taken place.” (“Confessions of a Spy Chief” in “Jurnalul National,” 26 February 2004)

Since the early 1990s, Pacepa has maintained that the events of December 1989 were part of a well-scripted Soviet plan—the so-called “Dnestr Plan”—to remove Ceausescu (for a summary, see Deletant, 1995, pp. 89-90).  According to Pacepa, the Soviet plan was a response to the 1969 visit of US President Richard Nixon to Bucharest.  Pacepa claims that Iliescu had been designated Ceausescu’s replacement in accordance with this plan as early as 1971!  Dennis Deletant cautions with regard to Pacepa’s account:

“Pacepa’s use of the term ‘Front for National Salvation’ smacks too much of an attempt to compromise the more recent Front for National Salvation, set up after the 1989 revolution, by suggesting that the seeds of it had been sown some twenty years earlier by Moscow.  It is difficult to believe that such a name could have been chosen so many years earlier.” (Deletant, 1995, p. 90)

Pacepa’s claims are even more questionable than Deletant’s moderate skepticism suggests.  As I wrote in 1997:

“Moreover, it is intriguing to note that Pacepa revealed these details [i.e. those of the ‘Dnestr’ plan] only after the December 1989 events (in his 1993 book ‘The Inheritance of the Kremlin’).  Although in ‘Red Horizons’ (his 1988 detail-filled, “tell-all” book on the Ceausescus and the Securitate) he mentioned cases in which alleged Soviet agents (including Army General Nicolae Militaru…) were caught, he did not mention anything about the so-called ‘Operation Dnestr’.” (Hall, 1997, p. 117).

Pacepa had no problem in “Red Horizons” revealing alleged Soviet agents in Romania and alleged secret plans by which Ceausescu’s fabled “independence from Moscow” was all a Moscow-created ruse, yet he somehow did not feel the need or desire to outline Moscow’s plan for further increasing their control over Romania through “Operation Dnestr?”  This is hard to believe.

…By 1993—and as we have seen from the quote from the 2000 interview, continuing long after that, to the present day—Pacepa was claiming that there had been no “terrorists,” that it was all just a pretext by the KGB agents who seized power from Ceausescu (Iliescu, Militaru, Brucan, etc.) for justifying Soviet military intervention (see, for example, his comments in “Evenimentul Zilei,” 10 April 1993; 29 April 1993).  The Ceausescus had been shot KGB-style to prevent them from revealing to the Romanian people and the world that the coup-plotters were KGB agents, according to Pacepa.  One must ask:  if Pacepa possessed this knowledge prior to December 1989—and he claims that the plan originated in 1969—and therefore had suspicions that the “terrorist” phase was merely a diversion designed to serve as a pretext for Soviet intervention, then why did he say what he said, and why did he not reveal his knowledge and voice his concerns before, during, or immediately after December 1989?

Finally, there is the problem of the similarity of Pacepa’s arguments on the Revolution with those of other former Securitate officers.  True, they hate Pacepa and Pacepa hates them equally.  But take, for example, the following quote:

“The coup d’état which ‘recovered the Revolution’…brought to power the FSN [the National Salvation Front] crew…[which] initiated the criminal scenario with Securitate-terrorists in order to spill blood and justify the assumption of power by people who had no business proclaiming themselves to be revolutionaries…[I]t was a diversion of the FSN in order to escalate the terror, suspicion, blood-letting, [and] chaos necessary to resolve the problem of taking state power and calling the Soviets.”

The source of this quote is not Pacepa, but the well-known “protochronist,” “national communist” former Securitate officer Pavel Corut (Corut, 1994, “Cantecul Nemuririi [Song of the Undying]” (Bucharest:  Editura Miracol, 1994), pp. 170, 172, quoted in Hall, 1997, p. 257).  The point is, as the accusations of Pacepa discussed at the beginning of this section demonstrate, Pacepa’s claims are identical to what Corut’s alleges.  By forcing an analytical, but also partisan ideological distinction by dividing protoWesterners from protochronists, as if the two were night-and-day and so easily identifiable, critical similarities such as this one—which demands attention and analysis precisely because it is unexpected—are ignored.

03 Mar 2004 – 00:00

“M-am mirat cat de repede au reusit agentii serviciilor secrete sovietice sa preia puterea politica dupa Ceausescu”
Celebrul dezertor roman Ion Mihai Pacepa este convins de implicarea sovieticilor in Revolutia din Romania. Intr-un interviu pentru un post de televiziune ungar, el afirma ca Nicolae Ceausescu a fost impuscat in stil KGB.

Si eu m-am mirat cat de repede au reusit agentii serviciilor secrete sovietice sa preia puterea politica dupa Ceausescu. Indata ce s-au prezentat imaginile cu Ceausescu fugind cu elicopterul, la televiziune a aparut generalul pensionar Militaru si s-a autoproclamat comandat suprem al armatei. Acest general Militaru este acela caruia, in 1978, microfoanele UM 920A i-au inregistrat convorbirea avuta la intalnirea cu un informator sovietic, atunci cand Moscova ar fi dorit sa-l includa in asa-numitul program “Dnester”. La cateva luni dupa raportul privind cele inregistrate am parasit Romania si mult timp nu am stiut daca a fost racolat. Da, Mihai Lupoi, primarul Bucurestiului, care a emigrat in Elvetia, a facut o declaratie in 1990 potrivit careia Militaru a devenit agent sovietic. Ca dovada este documentul Corbu din dosarul Securitatii. La scurt timp am fost din nou consternat. A aparut Ion Ilici Iliescu, fost secretar de partid, lider comunist pregatit la Moscova. Tatal sau l-a idolatrizat pe Lenin, motiv pentru care i-a dat fiului sau numele Ilici. Acesta este acelasi Iliescu care, tot cu ajutorul microfoanelor UM 920A, a inceput sa fie supravegheat, in 1972, datorita unor legaturi secrete la Moscova. Iliescu si Gorbaciov au invatat impreuna la facultate.

Care este esenta proiectului “Dnester”?

Sa se gaseasca un motiv pentru implicarea sovieticilor, daca puciul nu reuseste de la sine. Asa este mult mai usor de inteles. In 22 decembrie 1989, la ora doua dupa-amiaza, TVR a informat: “FSN a cerut ajutorul URSS pe motivul ca teroristi straini neidentificati au atacat Romania”. Inca in aceea zi, Iliescu a declarat ca au fost arestati sotii Ceausescu si procesul va fi deschis, cu toate ca televiziunea a informat doar despre faptul ca procesul si executia lor au avut loc.

A fost impuscat in stil KGB

Nu vi s-au parut mult prea pripite?

Se poate. Noii lideri au dorit sa ingroape secrete. Am motive serioase sa cred ca Ceausescu a fost executat pentru ca el stia cel mai bine ca Ion Ilici Iliescu si generalul Nicolae Militaru, precum si alti noi lideri erau agenti de legatura cu servicul de informatii sovietic, cu KGB. Sunt destul de neclare imaginile pe caseta, doua cadavre culcate pe spate care nu au urme de rana nici la nivelul pieptului, nici la fata, dar ale caror tample sunt intr-o balta de sange. KGB obisnuia sa-i impuste in cap, din spate, pe condamnati. Acesta este stilul KGB. Acestea au fost primele ganduri care mi-au trecut prin minte cand am vazut corpurile neinsufletite ale celor doi lideri draconici, cei care, spre nenorocul meu, mi-au condus cea mai mare parte din viata.




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Bullets, Lies, and Videotape: The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989 (Part IV: The Good ‘Sergeant Schultz’ or ‘They Know Nothing’) by Richard Andrew Hall

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on October 25, 2010

for Part I see PART I: His Name Was Ghircoias…Nicolae Ghircoias

for Part II see Part II: A Revolution, A Coup d\’etat, AND a Counter-Revolution

for Part III see Part III: Lost…during Investigation

Bullets, Lies, and Videotape:

The Amazing, Disappearing Romanian Counter-Revolution of December 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

Standard Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.  [Submitted for clearance 19 November 2009; PRB approved 15 December 2009]

I am an intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.  I have been a CIA analyst since 2000.  Prior to that time, I had no association with CIA outside of the application process.


If Rasvan Popescu’s account is correct, it is understandable why functionaries of the Ceausescu regime have long banked on an absence of evidence.  For example, when asked if other than the standard 7.62 mm caliber weapons belonging to the Army were used in December 1989, Dr. Vladimir Belis, the head of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (IML) at the time, claims he doesn’t know and can’t say, because he claims no autopsies were ever performed—leading journalists to conclude that “therefore the tales of terrorists who shot with ‘dum-dum’ bullets, ‘bullets with vidia tips’ or bullets of large caliber, atypical for Romanian military units, will remain just stories that can neither be confirmed nor denied.”[1]

Former Securitate officer-turned journalist, novelist, and celebrity, Pavel Corut, has written alternatively derisively and sarcastically—well-nigh tauntingly—about the existence of such atypical ammunition and its use in December 1989:

“…Later I read fantastical and pathetic accounts according to which this [Army] officer died by being ‘hit by vidia and explosive [dum-dum] bullets.’  It isn’t the only case of a solider killed accidentally in warfare…”[2]

“Now we know that all the information…was false:  there did not exist a special guard unit that pledged an oath of (legionary-like) fealty to the dictator, there did not exist snipers with infrared sighting systems, no one shot vidia bullets…”[3]

“Vidia bullets don’t exist anywhere in the world.  And yet even the Army believed that the ‘Securitate-terrorists’ used vidia bullets….All this information was designed to create [the impression of] terrorists.  To show the people and the whole world fanatical terrorists.”[4]

Last, but hardly least, military prosecutors with roots in the Ceausescu era, have assimilated or mirror such arguments.  General Dan Voinea who headed the investigations from 1997-2001 and 2004-2008 said as much:

Romulus Cristea (journalist):  “Did special ammunition, bullets with a vidia tip or dum-dum bullets, claim [any] victims?  The press of the time was filled with such claims…”

Dan Voinea:  There were no victims (people who were shot) from either vidia bullets or dum-dum bullets.  During the entire period of the events war munitions were used, normal munitions that were found at the time in the arsenal of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry. The confusion and false information were the product of the fact that different caliber weapons were used, and therefore, the resulting sound was perceived differently.[5][6] (Emphasis added)

The wonderful legalistic (alibi-bestowing) logic for Voinea and his colleagues then goes something like this:   there exist victims requesting damages for injuries, loss of life, livelihood or property sustained during the violence of December 1989, their loss was real and deserves to be compensated by the Romanian state; but those initially considered guilty of causing much of this injury, loss of life, and damage and taken into custody in December 1989—the”terrorist” suspects—were (either) released in January 1990 (or were never captured in the first place), and so juridically there do not exist defendants; nor does there appear to still exist in the hands of the military procuracy much of the material evidence presented in 1990-1991—maps, videos, etc.—and, apparently, only four bullets; and no autopsies were officially performed on those shot in December 1989.  So in essence, the only things left are the crimes themselves and the testimonies of those interviewed over the past two decades:  no autopsy records, little material evidence, and the original suspects have gone missing…Conclusion:  no atypical munitions existed, were used, or maimed or killed anybody, and there were no terrorists, everyone shot into everyone else in the chaos of the moment—or in other words, the exact argument which as we have seen has been with us since Florin Crisbasan and Emil Ivascu of Brasov related the former Securitate’s “line of reasoning” in mid-January 1990.


[1] Laura Toma, Toma Roman Jr. , and Roxana Ioana Ancuta, “Belis nu a vazut cadavrele Ceausestilor,” Jurnalul National, 25 October 2005,, discussed in Hall 2008.

[2] Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 66 (43) 30 October-5 November 1991, p. 12.  Paul Cernescu is Pavel Corut’s acknowledged alias.  During his journalistic career at Ion Cristoiu’s Expres Magazin, he began by writing under this pseudonym.

[3] Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 65 (42) 23-29 October 1991, p. 12.

[4] Pavel Corut, Fulgerul Albastru (Bucuresti:  Editura Miracol, 1993), p. 177.  For background in English on Corut, see Michael Shafir, “Best Selling Spy Novels Seek To Rehabilitate Romanian ‘Securitate,'” in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, no. 45, pp. 14-18.

[5] General Dan Voinea, interview by Romulus Cristea, “Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil,” Romania Libera, 22 December 2005, online edition.  Reproduced at, for example,

See also the claims of former military prosecutor Teodor Ungureanu (Facultatea de Drept, 1978) also in December 2005, at, for example,

and Nor does Teodoru Ungureanu believe in terrorists, vidia bullets, dum-dum bullets, or atypical ammunition:

“La cele de mai sus va trebui să adăugăm fabulaţiile cu privire la celebrele “gloanţe-widia”. Prin lansarea acestei aberaţii, cei mai de seamă reprezentanţi ai Armatei s-au compromis lamentabil. Ceea ce prezentau în emisiuni tv ori în paginile unor ziare ca fiind teribilele instrumente ale morţii, nu erau nimic altceva decât miezurile din oţel care intrau în alcătuirea internă a proiectilului cal. 7,62 mm-scurt destinat armelor tip AKM. Tot aşa aveau să fie făcute speculaţii asupra folosirii muniţiei explozive (de tip dum-dum), de către persoane care erau fie străine de efectele povocate asupra corpului uman de proiectile cu diverse energii cinetice (la momentul străpungerii), ori de fragmente din proiectile dezmembrate la un anterior impact cu un corp dur, fie de cei angajaţi într-o reală acţiune de dezinformare….”

[6] According to Sorin Iliesiu, the filmmaker who claims to have edited the chapter on December 1989 in the so-called Tismaneanu Raport Final, the “spirit of Voinea’s findings can be found in the Chapter.”  Indeed, the chapter includes snippets from an interview between Dan Voinea and Andrei Badin (Adevarul , December 2006).  The “indefatigable” Voinea, as Tom Gallagher has referred to him, continues to be defended by Vladimir Tismaneanu who has expressed support for Voinea’s investigations “from both a juridic and historic viewpoint” (see his post on his blog from 21 September 2009 Important este ca actiunea sa nu fie inchisa, nici juridic, nici istoric), avoiding any mention of the reasons for Voinea’s dismissal from the Military Procuracy, mistakes that Prosecutor General Laura Codruta Kovesi says “one wouldn’t expect even from a beginner” (for more on this and background, see Hall 2008):

Ce îi reproşaţi, totuşi, lui Voinea? Punctual, ce greşeli a făcut în instrumentarea cauzelor?

Sunt foarte multe greşeli, o să menţionez însă doar câteva. Spre exemplu, s-a început urmărirea penală faţă de persoane decedate. Poate îmi explică dumnealui cum poţi să faci cercetări faţă de o persoană decedată! Apoi, s-a început urmărirea penală pentru fapte care nu erau prevăzute în Codul Penal. În plus

, deşi nu a fost desemnat să lucreze, spre exemplu, într-un dosar privind mineriada (repartizat unui alt procuror), domnul procuror Dan Voinea a luat dosarul, a început urmărirea penală, după care l-a restituit procurorului de caz. Vă imaginaţi cum ar fi dacă eu, ca procuror general, aş lua dosarul unui coleg din subordine, aş începe urmărirea penală după care i l-aş înapoia. Cam aşa ceva s-a întâmplat şi aici.

Mai mult, a început urmărirea penală într-o cauză, deşi, potrivit unei decizii a Înaltei Curţi de Casaţie şi Justiţie, era incompatibil să mai facă asta. E vorba despre dosarul 74/p/1998 (dosar în care Voinea l-a acuzat pe fostul preşedinte Ion Iliescu că, în iunie 1990, a determinat cu intenţie intervenţia în forţă a militarilor împotriva manifestanţilor din Capitală – n.r.).

Apoi au fost situaţii în care s-a început urmărirea penală prin acte scrise de mână, care nu au fost înregistrate în registrul special de începere a urmăririi penale. Aceste documente, spre exemplu, nu prevedeau în ce constau faptele comise de presupuşii învinuiţi, nu conţin datele personale ale acestora. De exemplu, avem rezoluţii de începere a urmăririi penale care-l privesc pe Radu Ion sau pe Gheorghe Dumitru, ori nu ştim cine este Gheorghe Dumitru, nu ştim cine este Radu Ion.

„Parchetul să-şi asume tergiversarea anchetelor”

Credeţi că, în cazul lui Voinea, au fost doar greşeli sau că a fost vorba de intenţie, ştiind că acuzaţii vor scăpa?

Nu cunosc motivele care au stat la baza acestor decizii şi, prin urmare, nu le pot comenta.

Poate fi vorba şi despre complexitatea acestor dosare?

Când ai asemenea dosare în lucru, nu faci astfel de greşeli, de începător. Eşti mult mai atent când ai cauze de o asemenea importanţă pentru societatea românească.

Excerpted from

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Oare cine nu crede in folosirea gloantelor dum-dum sau vidia in decembrie 1989?

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on June 7, 2009


1) Pavel Corut (ocupatie inainte de 1990:  securist)

“…nu a existat o garda speciala care sa fi depus un juramint de credinta de legionar fata de dictator, nu au existat lunetisti dotati cu sisteme de ochire cu infrarosii, nu s-a tras cu gloante vidia…”

Paul Cernescu (aka Pavel Corut), “Cine a tras in noi?” Expres Magazin, nr. 65 (42) 1991, p. 12.

“…Treburile pareau sa se fi indreptat catre directia buna, dar in dimineata zilei de 23 decembrie [sic. 24 decembrie], capitanul P.I. m-a informat ca in fata ministerului sint doua masini blindate cu teroristi de la U.S.L.A., lichidati de tanchistii nostri.  Discutase cu locotenentul (comandant de pluton) care facuse isprava si acesta mindru de fapta sa, se laudase ca intentionase chiar sa se urce cu tancul pe ei, dar nu a reusit.  Soldatul curier de corospondenta din organigrama compartimentului m-a informat ca peste noapte santinela din postul 2 il impuscase mortal pe ofiterul comandant de garda, un tinar locotenent.  Mai tirziu am citit relatari fanteziste si patetice referitoare la moartea acestui ofiter, “lovit de gloante vidia si explozive.”  Nu este singurul  militar mort in accident de lupta….”

2) col. Stefan Demeter (sef al birou de servicii si inzestrare al (atunci) Inspectoratului judetean al M.I.):

“Dupa munitia folosita si zgomotele auzite in oras, rezulta clar ca pina in seara de 22 decembrie s-a tras cu pistoale mitraliera model 1963, de 7,62. Nu s-a folosit munitia “Dum-Dum” cu virf exploziv, interzisa de Tribunalul de Haga. Din 1989 si armamentul “Stecikin” car folosea munitie de 9 mm scurt a fost retras din toate inspectoratele judetene ale M.I. S-a vorbit mult despre gloante vidia. Motivul e simplu: materialul vidia e foarte casant si ar distruge teava armei. Este, deci, pe cit de inutil, pe atit de scump. “Exemplele” prezentate ca “gloante vidia” erau, de fapt, miezuri de otel ale gloantelor de 7,62.”

Radu Ciobotea, “M.I.–Martor Incomod,” Flacara, nr. 33, 14 august 1991, pp. 4-5.

3) procuror ceausist Teodor Ungureanu (Facultatea de Drept, promotia 1978) care n-a vazut si n-a gasit nici un terorist in decembrie 1989, sau dupa…gazdat de catre Jurnalul National in perioada 2004-2005 (cam 10 articole)

La cele de mai sus va trebui să adăugăm fabulaţiile cu privire la celebrele “gloanţe-widia”. Prin lansarea acestei aberaţii, cei mai de seamă reprezentanţi ai Armatei s-au compromis lamentabil. Ceea ce prezentau în emisiuni tv ori în paginile unor ziare ca fiind teribilele instrumente ale morţii, nu erau nimic altceva decât miezurile din oţel care intrau în alcătuirea internă a proiectilului cal. 7,62 mm-scurt destinat armelor tip AKM. Tot aşa aveau să fie făcute speculaţii asupra folosirii muniţiei explozive (de tip dum-dum), de către persoane care erau fie străine de efectele povocate asupra corpului uman de proiectile cu diverse energii cinetice (la momentul străpungerii), ori de fragmente din proiectile dezmembrate la un anterior impact cu un corp dur, fie de cei angajaţi într-o reală acţiune de dezinformare.

4) Vladimir Belis

dl profesor Vladimir Belis, care in decembrie 1989 era directorul Institutului de Medicina Legala Mina Minovici din Bucuresti

Povestile despre teroristi care trageau cu gloante “”dum-dum””, “”gloante cu cap vidia”” sau gloante de calibru mare, atipice pentru unitatile militare romanesti, vor ramane din cauza asta doar niste povesti care nu pot fi confirmate sau infirmate.

Belis nu a vazut cadavrele ceausestilor, Jurnalul National

5) si cu voia dvs.

Generalul Dan Voinea (procuror militar din 1982)

Dan Voinea, citat pe forumul asociatiei 21 decembrie 1989, nu exista victime de la dum-dum

“Toti alergau dupa un inamic invizibil”

Romulus Cristea
Joi, 22 Decembrie 2005

Interviu cu general-magistrat Dan Voinea

Romulus Cristea:  Munitia speciala, gloantele cu cap vidia sau dum-dum, a provocat victime? Presa de la acea vreme a fost plina cu astfel de relatari…
Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia, nici de la dum-dum. Pe durata evenimentelor s-a folosit munitie de razboi, munitie normala care se gasea la vremea respectiva in dotarea Ministerului de Interne si a Ministerului Apararii Nationale. Confuzia si informatiile false au aparut de la faptul ca se foloseau calibre diferite si, deci, zgomotul produs era altfel perceput.


Deci care este firul care reuneste aceste cinci cazuri? 

Toti oameni patati de regimul Ceausescu,

si mai ales patati de relatii sau vulnerabilitatea lor fata cu fosta securitate…

deci putem intelege destul de usor de ce EI nu cred

in folosirea gloantelor dum-dum sau vidia in decembrie 1989…

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