ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

This paper MAY be cited when accompanied by a full, proper citation.  Thank you.

The USLA:  At the Very Least…Knowledgeable about the “Terrorists”

What is, of course, most interesting about the USLA relationship to the USLAC is that during and immediately after December 1989, the USLA seemed more knowledgeable than anybody else about the characteristics of the weapons and tactics of the “terrorists.”  The question, of course, is why?  How would they have known?

The Army daily Armata Poporului noted in mid-January 1990 the many requests they had received concerning the “lunetisti” who appear to have operated during the December violence…Interestingly, to whom did they go to answer these inquiries:  a member of the USLA.  Here is the passage in question:

“‘How can we explain the amazing precision of the terrorist gunfire:  even though in the majority of cases, they operated at night, most victims were shot—mortally—in the head, throat, or heart?’”

“To this question—which we took from letters and telephone calls received at the editorial office—responded major engineer Ion Iliuta, specialist in antiterrorist warfare:  ‘Much has been said and written in the press about the infrared scopes of the terrorists.  The truth is that they possessed means of sighting that were even more sophisticated, more precise.  I am talking about a complex apparatus that possesses a laser marker and a light-amplifier of the LITTON variety…’”[99]

The USLA seemed to have the answer to the nightscope question, but also to the munitions issue—as we have seen, the anomalous five caliber bullets with uncharacteristic properties were a recurrent feature in descriptions of the events.

Io[a]n Iliuta and Major Ene Zaharia of the USLA appear to be the sources of the following revelation to Army Major Mihai Floca in early January 1990:

“Upon clearing out the houses surrounding the Television station, it was discovered, that from the staircases they were firing at the house of a writer.  Specials of the unit [presumably the USLA] arrived at the conclusion that a 5.6 mm Heckler-Koch pistol with a cartridge that melts away for added impact was used.”[100]

Part of their knowledge about these bullets apparently came from their role in “cleaning up” after the “terrorists.”  Let us recall the earlier comments of an employee of the Museum of National Art located in the old Royal Palace across from the CC building in central Bucharest.

…The next day [23 December 1989] and over the following days I found bullets in the Museum.  They were not normal bullets.  They had a rounded head.  They appeared to have a lead jacket.  It was of a caliber between five, five something.  The USLAsi did not want to leave us a bullet.  I asked them to leave me at one as a memento.  They did not want to.  They said that they needed them for the purpose of identification.  They noted where they gathered them from.[101]

How would they have known so well?  True, they were good at their craft and experienced, but the following recollection by Army Captain Gheorghe Bobric at Targoviste perhaps is more telling:

“At the same time, I don’t think [Securitate Lt. Col. Gheorghe] Dinu was foreign to the actions that took place against our unit.  For example, one night, he sent me outside, into the courtyard of the unit, and hearing noises from the town, he said to me:  ‘Pay attention, these are ABI-uri [vehicles only the USLA possessed]…In 10 minutes, they will begin to fire…’  He knew it all, as if he were confirming a plan known well in advance.  And he said to me:  ‘The terrorists and antiterrorists are trained according to the same standards and principles, they undergo the same training.’ [emphasis added]”[102]

So, common training.  In other words, something that sounds very like the admissions of the USLA recruit above, about the masked ones in black whom the USLA were to capture in simulations!  It is these who sound like the USLAC.

It is interesting to note here that despite the detailed descriptions by multiple soldiers at Targoviste during these days, attesting to gunfire against them, Prosecutor Dan Voinea—who was at the unit only for the period of the Ceausescus’ trial and execution—disputes not only that the Targoviste barracks was ever under attack, but, in his typical exaggerated, hyperbolic style goes on to tell an interviewer in November 2005:  “No.  Nobody attacked any [!] unit in Romania….[and, of course] Not a single terrorist existed.”[103]

Finally, there is the ominous quote taken from an article immediately after the events by Army Major Mihai Floca in describing the actions of USLA personnel Gh. Grigoras, Mircea Zatreanu, Ion Stefanut, Ion Popescu, and Marin Vasile.  Floca quotes one of the USLA as saying:

“The fact that some considered us terrorists isn’t accidental at all, notes the commander of the unit [presumably Grigoras].  Knowing that we were well trained, capable of annihilating them, the true/real terrorists acted in our name, and did everything to compromise us.”[104]

This is an interesting admission, which, I believe, brings us closer to the USLAC and to the role USLA played.  The question, of course, is:  did it go beyond this?  Was there more to it?  What was the role of the USLA proper?

Questioning the Role of the USLA

British scholar Peter Siani-Davies has recently authored a wonderfully-written and insightful volume that is likely—and deserves—to become the “record of account” on the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  His volume is to be commended not only for its readability, but for—and I am far from the first to point this out—his seamless and easy-going incorporation of theories of collective violence and revolution with the narrative of the Revolution.  Such a poignant marriage of social science theory and historical detail is rare in today’s social sciences, and Siani-Davies does a superb job in integrating the two.  Moreover, in contrast to much that has been written on December 1989, Siani-Davies did not dabble:  he performed in-depth and detailed research of Romanian sources.  As the “powers-that-be”—from its ‘terminally vain’ to its ‘absentee monarch’—in Romanian, and East European, studies somehow have “overlooked” providing me with, and are unlikely to provide me with, the opportunity to play any role in reviewing Siani-Davies’ work, prior to or after publication, and some of his claims invoke my research directly and are pertinent to the argument here, I will address some of our key differences now.

Siani-Davies’ key passage concerning my research is the following:

“From the evidence so far available there is little to suggest that any of the larger securitate units per se came into open conflict with the forces of the revolution after the overthrow of Ceausescu, although the absence of detailed information makes it impossible to discount the possibility that some members of these or other securitate units, acting as individuals or small groups, did take up arms against the incoming regime.  At first sight, some support for this view may be found in the ballistics evidence presented by Richard Hall, in which he stresses that during the revolution ammunition was fired which was not in possession of the army.  Focusing particularly on 9mm machine guns of West German origin, which he says were only in the possession of USLA and the V Directorate, Hall points out that bullets of this caliber were found at various ‘hot spots’ during the revolution, and in the corpse of a student of the military academy who died defending the Ministry of Defense building on the night of December 22-23.  However, it may be questioned whether this evidence is quite so conclusive proof of the existence of securitate terrorists as Hall suggests.  As of March 1990, thirty-one of these guns from the arsenal of the V Directorate still remained unaccounted for and, given the circulation of guns during the revolution, it is by no means certain that it was troops from these units that fired the weapons in question.  And, even if members of USLA and the V Directorate had been responsible for using these weapons, given the confusion at the time and the fact that some troops from these units were actively engaged in the fighting on the behalf of the new authorities, it does not follow that they were used against the revolution.”[105]

There are a host of problems with this analysis—as we have already seen.  In a 300 odd page book, this passage is pretty much the sole analysis of the ballistics evidence from December 1989, and, frankly, I venture to guess that the ballistics question would not have garnered any attention had he not been commenting on my findings.  It is, of course, more than most accounts of the December events which have nothing to say at all about the ballistics evidence.  I’ll deal later with his allegations regarding the 9 mm Stecikin and Makarov guns he alludes to, but it is important to highlight that in the discussion of the ballistics’ evidence he quotes from my dissertation, I spent two pages discussing the 9 mm, and three discussing the 5.6/vidia ammunition—and he makes no reference whatsoever to the latter.[106]

How is it that Siani-Davies has nothing to say about the “five, five something” caliber ammunition, in particular those with “vidia” tip?  My guess is that it does not fit into his focus on the official, registered arsenals of the units in question in December 1989.  Yet, I believe that I have demonstrated abundantly above that these bullets were seemingly ubiquitous in the December 1989 events, despite their not having been “on the books” so-to-speak.  The most important thing the distribution of these identical bullets across a wide geographical region shows is pattern—the exact kind of thing Siani-Davies wants to avoid because he realizes quite well the idea of isolated freelancers falls apart when you have people showing up using the same kind of weapons and bullets, and wearing the same kind of outfits (he also has nothing to say about the “combinezoane negre,” which as we saw appear in a host of far-flung cities)! [107]

Nor do any of the admissions by former USLA/Securitate personnel that the USLA/USLAC were responsible for the “terrorism” show up in Siani-Davies’ volume—1) (according to former USLA officer Marian Romanescu) USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu’s admission about people found with USLA and USLAC identity cards “who had no right to have them in their possession;” 2) former Timisoara Securitate officer Roland Vasilevici’s revelations, and 3) the allegations of an anonymous former USLA recruit.

Daniel Chirot’s comments on the dust-jacket attesting to the quality and insight of Siani-Davies volume are well-merited, but how can he claim that the Siani-Davies account is “near definitive” when it completely ignores this critical evidence?  Indeed, almost nothing of the evidence I have presented so far, shows up in Siani-Davies’ otherwise excellent account:  why?  In a decision I cannot explain, Siani-Davies almost entirely avoided Romanian weeklies, including Expres, Cuvintul, Baricada, Expres Magazin, Zig-Zag, NU!(Cluj), Flacara, Tinerama, Orizont (Timisoara), Europa…and the list goes on.  For the uninitiated in the dimensions of the historiography of the Revolution, such as the esteemed Professor Chirot, the importance of this literature is unapparent…and yet as my citations above demonstrate, it is critical.

From Where Would Such Suspicions of the USLA Come?

Siani-Davies expresses some bewilderment at the genesis of the “rumor” that the USLA were going to launch a counterattack on the afternoon of 22 December.  He concludes that when Army General Nicolae Tudor pronounced it on the evening of 22 December, he was probably building on the panicked statements by TV reporter Teodor Brates and others early that afternoon that the “columns of the USLA were coming to massacre them.”  But that does not explain where Brates and the others imported this idea from, or whether or not they concocted it themselves.

Angela Bacescu, the notorious cheerleader of the former Securitate, known for her endless interviewing of them in the pages of Europa since fall 1990, may have supplied us with one possible explanation to this.  In late summer 1990, Bacescu, who, not surprisingly, denies the existence of any real “terrorists” and refers to them as “imaginary,” targeted Brates and a whole host of usual characters for this “lie,” but added someone else:

“Among those [who showed up at Television on the afternoon of 22 December after Ceausescu fled] was this Cirjan, an ordinary thief, who entered with a false ID.  He had been thrown out of the USLA, several years earlier, because he was stealing from passengers’ baggage, was dealing on the black market, and other such things, and [here] he is from the first moment shouting ‘Death to the Securitate’ and ‘The USLA are coming to shoot us’.”[108]

I won’t dwell on this here, but it seems significant that Bacescu centers upon a former USLA member as perhaps the initial source at TV for the fears that the USLA were going to attack.  As a former USLA member might Cirjan have known of the role of the unit in a contingency plan for the overthrow of the regime?  It is certainly plausible, in particular when one considers the revelations above by Securitate Colonel Gheorghe Dinu and the anonymous USLA recruit—both attesting to the combined/common training of antiterrorist and “terrorist” forces.

Moreover, even in the event that Bacescu was inventing this, what would make her believe/suspect/accuse a former USLA member as being responsible for the “rumor” that the USLA were going to launch a counterattack?  An interesting hunch/accusation, no?  This gives us an explanation to the question most people simply ignore when discussing the “suspicions” against the USLA beginning on 22 December:  from where did they come?  Why so specific?  Cirjan would have had that one critical element to know:  credible access to the information when he was in the unit.

The Hypothesis of “Freely Circulating Weapons”

As noted in Siani-Davies’ comments above, he proposes what seems the very reasonable proposition that since weapons allegedly circulated freely during the events, just because a weapon belonged to the USLA or Directorate V-a, it is does not mean they necessarily were the ones who used them.  Nothing wrong with that supposition…until one starts looking at where the weapons ended up.

Weapons similar to those of Directorate V-a and the USLA could have shown up anywhere during the Revolution, in anybody’s hands, but what is interesting is among whose hands they did show up.  Official Army documents and recollections by Army participants in the early 1990s show that a citizen with a Libyan passport in his billfold shot in the CC building on the night of 22 December was found in possession of a 9 mm“Makarov” pistol…a pistol whose serial number was traced back to a V-a member who claimed that he had “thrown it away” earlier that afternoon.[109]

Yes, of course, it is possible, but the Securitate seemed to have a history of “lending” or “losing” or “misplacing” weapons that just happened to show up in the hands of foreign terrorists.  Notably, documents show that in 1981 on two occasions, Colonel Sergiu Nica of the Securitate, on the orders of his leadership, requested arms for “special missions”—including Walter, Makarov, and Stecikin [9 mm] pistols, AKM machine guns, and pusti semiautomate cu luneta [PSLs]—arms which apparently were delivered to and used by the infamous international terrorist, Carlos “The Jackal.”[110]

The Incident Involving the Military Academy Students

Let us turn then to one of the incidents mentioned specifically by Siani-Davies in the passage above:  the case of the students from Military Technical Academy.

Focusing particularly on 9mm machine guns of West German origin, which he says were only in the possession of USLA and the V Directorate, Hall points out that bullets of this caliber were found at various ‘hot spots’ during the revolution, and in the corpse of a student of the military academy who died defending the Ministry of Defense building on the night of December 22-23….  Even if members of USLA and the V Directorate had been responsible for using these weapons, given the confusion at the time and the fact that some troops from these units were actively engaged in the fighting on the behalf of the new authorities, it does not follow that they were used against the revolution. (p. 154)

Examining the specific case of the military academy students at the Defense Ministry on the night of 22-23 December, we can make the following observations.  According to one of the commanders of the students who was at the scene:  five students were killed in all, “four shot in the head, one in the chest,” and eight were wounded.[111] The 9 mm bullet was removed on the morning of 23 December from the upper jaw of one of the students shot in the head; a commission from the military academy concluded that those shot were shot with guns with “a precise targeting system for nighttime use.”[112]

There is one explanation suggested by Siani-Davies that we can probably eliminate pretty quickly in this particular case:  the idea that this was an accidental shot by an USLA member fighting on behalf of the new authorities.  The whole issue surrounding the dispatch and clash of an USLA unit on the following night of 23-24 December 1989 at the Defense Ministry appears to have been determined by their absence in that area prior to that time:  hence, they were ostensibly called upon to root out terrorists from the area because they had not been in the area until that time.  There is no indication of an USLA unit in that area on the night of 22-23 December, and mixed units of Army and USLA personnel do not appear to have gone into action until after the morning of the 23^rd, likely with the official TV and radio announcements by Securitate Director Vlad and Interior Minister Postelnicu ostensibly pledging their loyalty to the new political order.

Siani-Davies appears to overlook the contradiction between the passage cited above and an earlier quote from Army General Traian Dafinescu he invokes about “a massive attack” on the night of 22-23 December against the Defense Ministry by “terrorists” firing “from the tallest houses and apartment blocs” in the surrounding area (p. 98).  It is important to quote from passages of the interview with Dafinescu that Siani-Davies did not include:  Dafinescu goes on to note that the soldiers (from the military academy) who were killed were shot precisely, “being tracked evidently with ‘arme cu lunete’ (i.e. lunetisti)…All the terrorists were wearing black outfits, without any documents or identity cards on them.  [emphasis added].”[113]

The head of the first parliamentary commission investigating the December events published in 1995 a list of the locations from which gunfire was opened upon the Defense Ministry from 22-27 December 1989.  Here is part of that list:

“…–from the rooftops of blocs C-2, C-4, and T-8 there was gunfire with PSLs and rifles, and from the right flank of blocs T-9 and on C-2 on some nights, there were signal lights shining toward neighboring blocs and toward the Defense Ministry building, followed next by the execution of gunfire, by terrorist elements, from different directions toward the Defense Ministry building;

–from the terraces of blocs A-2 and A-4 on the night of 22.12.1989, there was PSL and machine gun fire.  Also from B1.  From A-2 there were signal lights followed by gunfire.”[114]

One can get a sense here of the specificity involved in attempting to record and recreate the places from which there was terrorist gunfire—specifically, inhabited apartment blocs.  Interviews conducted by Army journalists in May-June 1990 with residents of blocs A1, A2 and B3 make abundantly clear the terror residents felt beginning on this night of 22-23 December and in some cases their own personal encounters with or sighting of the terrorists (one resident described them as being dressed in some type of “salopete” “probably grey in color.”)[115] Army Colonel Gheorghe Vaduva recounted that during these days,

“…on the top floor [of the Defense Ministry], I found together with those I was with there, the remains of bullets and even some 9 mm caliber bullets.  This caliber bullet was not at that time part of the Romanian Army’s arsenal.  Stecikin and Makarov guns using this type of munition, were in the stockpile of some of the special forces of the Securitate and the Interior Ministry.”[116]

Certainly, the image of an attack from surrounding buildings by unknown sources is enhanced by Securitate officers forced to give testimony immediately after the events.

In early January 1990, “Cpt. Soare Ovidiu, [of Securitate] Directorate V-a, Services 4+5, resident of Bucharest, Mendeleev Street,” presumably under questioning, spoke about those he had seen killed as “terrorists”:

“Defense Ministry Headquarters [M.Ap.N.], 22/23.12.1989

On the night of 22/23 December 1989, being located in the Defense Ministry Headquarters, around 22:00, a forceful attack began upon the building from the ‘Orizont’ Complex and from the blocs to the left and right of it.  Based on the manner in which they acted and how the victims from among the soldiers who were defending the building appeared (shot in the head or in the area of the head), everybody concluded that they were shot by guns with infrared night scopes [emphasis added]….The attack upon MapN Headquarters was unleashed with fanaticism, one of the attackers jumped a wall armed with a knife, he was shot, and in the morning I saw him from a distance of about 5-6 meters and I could conclude that he appeared Arab (olive-skinned, black hair and mustache).  It was said he had no documents upon his person….”[117]

Lt. Mr. Apostol M. Anton, Service 1:  “On 29 December 1989 he learned form his neighbor Pipoi Remus, who lives on the second floor, beneath his apartment, that he saw many people shooting toward the Defense Ministry, whom he was convinced were not Romanian.  They appeared to him to be Arab.  They were shooting with small automatic guns.”[118]

According to the military’s semi-official account of the December events, at 2130 on 22 December gunfire was opened on the Defense Ministry from the direction of “the Orizont, Favorit, and Ghencea.”[119] Here is the description of Lt. Marius Mitrofan of the Military Technical Academy of what happened when they arrived at the Defense Ministry on that night:

“Our buses stopped on the service road in front of the A1 and B3 blocs.  The first students had hardly gotten off the buses when from the area of the Agency for Foreign Trade [a building that would likely have been controlled by the Securitate] gunfire was opened upon us.  Simultaneously, terrorists located in these three blocs also began to fire on us.  Colleagues who had already gotten off [the buses] responded with a flurry of bullets against the terrorists on the upper floors of these blocs.  I was in the third of these buses and we got off last; the gunfire was reaching maximum intensity.  Two leaps later I was behind a tree from where I could see the results of the bullets from [bloc] B3.  My colleague in front of me had fallen, I pulled myself toward him:  he was shot in the head.  Honestly, I was filled with horror:  I had seen death!  The next moment a colleague fell behind me, also shot in the head!  Diabolical precision—proof that we weren’t squaring off with just some amateurs, but with professional killers.  In the morning, we realized how many had fallen from our ranks:  five dead—four shot in the head, one in the chest—eight wounded.  Who were the killers?…Why has nothing been done to find and punish them?”[120]

Let us end here as Floca and Stoica do, with an expression of anguish in June 1990 that nothing was seemingly being done to find the culprits of December 1989:

“Let us also note that, on the morning of the 23rd, a 9 mm caliber bullet—unknown until then by military cadre—was removed from a student.  The bullet was well-placed.  Strange, very strange but, until now, no one has been interested in it [the bullet].  Perhaps from this day forward…”

Evidence Other Securitate Personnel Themselves Suspected the USLA/C at the Time

We have a written record from Securitate officials that they were asked while the violence was taking place to hand over the details of their safehouses…but refused.  From USLA Commander General Ardeleanu’s report, dated 8 January 1990:

“General Bucurescu Giani communicated on 23 December ’89 that the members of the special unit for antiterrorist warfare would be assembled in buses and brought to a field near Ghencea to fall out in formation.  The same general ordered that a list of all safehouses of the unit be forwarded to deputy of the Counterintelligence Directorate [Directorate IV-a] Colonel Balasoiu, who was on the secure line at MI 199 belonging to the head of the Disinformation Service—Colonel Tatu—where all means were being taken to form a verification unit.  This detail was analyzed and the USLA Commander [i.e. Ardeleanu himself] ordered that this list of safehouses not be forwarded, instead to be forwarded, at the appropriate time, to the Defense Ministry to whom we were subordinated.”[121]

Why would the Deputy Director of the Securitate, General Bucurescu ask that USLA personnel fall-out for inspection at Ghencea stadium, the stadium of the Army soccer team?  Securitate apologists and others will suggest they were to be killed, because they were being set up by those who seized power to be killed and then cynically presented to the public as “terrorists.”  A more plausible explanation is that senior Securitate leaders who had abandoned Ceausescu themselves suspected the whereabouts of USLA personnel and their relationship to the terrorism—why else take the risky step of trying to assemble the whole unit in the same place?  As would be expected, precise information concerning the USLA, its facilities (including safehouses), and activities, appears to have been heavily-compartmentalized within the Securitate itself—characteristic of many state security and intelligence organizations, but especially within a totalitarian and sultanist state like that of Nicolae Ceausescu.

The revelations of USLA Major Marian Romanescu—who claims he attempted to turn himself in multiple times during the events to avoid having to execute orders he did not agree with [!]—enhance the idea that even the Securitate itself was suspecting the USLA.  Romanescu’s comments also highlight the standard use of multiple, false identity cards during the events:

“[During the night of 22 December 1989]…Utilizing the cover IDs that we had in our possession I easily passed through the check-point set up by revolutionaries on the way from Baneasa airport….I presented myself at another object of national economic importance (the M.T.Tc), and asked for the protection of the Army.  I am interrogated, questioned by officer F.I., himself an officer of the DSS (Directorate IV-a [i.e. Military Counterintelligence]) but which had long since crossed over to the Revolution.  I am asked to conform to certain rules imposed by the situation and not to transmit signals or other messages to the elements that had opened fire on the object, the unit of which I was a member being taken into account [!]” (emphasis added) [122]

“Defense Ministry Incident” Redux:  the USLA on 23/24 December 1989

What we know is that this requested “fall-out” of USLA cadre never took place.  We also know from the mouth (Romanian Television, 1991) and hand (a directed report dated 8 January 1990) of USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu himself that, on that evening of 23 December 1989, Army General Ion Hortopan broke into a meeting of Ardeleanu with generals and other officials of the Front leadership and announced that “Near a military objective, on the outskirts of the capital, that was being fired upon, an armed Plutonier Major Popa Ion Stefan from the USLA was captured.”[123] Clearly, it would appear, based on this, that this USLA member was not part of some team dispatched in the “defense of the Revolution.”  According to Mihai Floca writing in August 1990, the objective in question outside the capital was the CITc (?), the USLA member claimed he was coming to the military unit to “surrender,” and Ardeleanu, “upon receiving the news played dumb, [saying] ‘I think it is [USLA] Chief of Staff Trosca’s doing, he did this to me’.”[124]

Floca and others have maintained that at this point, late on the night of 23 December 1989, while at the Defense Ministry, General Militaru called upon Ardeleanu to bring the entire personnel of the USLA (757 officers and ncos) to the Defense Ministry to root out the “terrorists” who were firing upon it.  As “30 were on guard at [various] embassies, and 80 had been dispatched to Sibiu with a Rombac [aircraft] from 20 December 1989 upon ‘orders from on-high’,” this left 647.  Of these, Militaru supposedly wanted 600 to report.  Instead, only 18 came in 3 ABIs.[125]

It has always seemed unusual, and this has been highlighted by others, in the serious situation that prevailed on the night of 23-24 December 1989, that in order to clear these blocs of “terrorists,” the units that came were led by the Chief of Staff Gheorghe Trosca.  Why send your leadership out to do this job?

The Securitate apologists and conspiratorialists have, of course, sought to suggest that General Nicolae Militaru nominated them because precisely these individuals had surveilled him for alleged links to Soviet intelligence.  But, as I have written elsewhere, Ardeleanu himself, upends all of this when he freely admits that it was he who selected Trosca for this mission.[126] It, of course, seems to make a lot sense when one considers his apparent attempt to lay what was happening at the feet of Trosca.  That he ordered Trosca and the others to the scene, under absurd circumstances, and they ended up getting killed, appears to be something for which many former USLA personnel—some of whom appear to have genuinely resented the boorish and vindictive Ardeleanu for his slavish behavior toward Elena Ceausescu and Tudor Postelnicu—were never able to forgive Ardeleanu.

I won’t tax the patience of my readers with another rehash here of what happened when two of three USLA ABIs arrived out front of M.Ap.N. headquarters (Defense Ministry).  I have previously discussed it extensively elsewhere.[127] It is important to note, however, that the USLA officers who survived the incident admit that they were beaten up, interrogated about the makeup and duties of their unit, and forced to take urinalysis tests to determine if they were drugged—all things which suggest they were hardly considered the innocent victims of an unfortunate accident at the time it occurred.  Army officers involved in the confrontation who were interviewed in spring 1990 maintained that they witnessed gunfire from the guns on the USLA vehicles, three of the machine guns recovered from the USLA vehicles showed signs of having been fired, the gun barrel of one the tanks had been blocked, and on the top of another tank a machine gun and signal lantern were found.[128] These officers then claimed that after their recollections were published in June 1990, they were “warned to think long and hard since they have families and to stay on their own turf if they do not want to have problems.”[129]

Residents of the apartment blocs surrounding the Defense Ministry also claimed harassment and intimidation.  One family maintained that they had been visited in May 1990 by two individuals flashing “Militia” identity cards, inquiring what had happened in December 1989 in that location, and insisting that different parts of the Army had merely fired at one another—there had been no “terrorists.”  Another resident who requested anonymity since he had “had enough problems in the past with the Securitate” said he was visited on 21 May by a “police major who called himself Popescu [a common Romanian last name, commonly used as a cover by Securitate personnel]” and wanted to talk about the “terrorists,” but that the resident should not inform the Army of his visit.  Some residents maintained that a neighbor suspected of being a Securitate collaborator had been going around suggesting “how to ‘correctly’ interpret the incident with the two armored personnel vehicles [i.e. the USLA unit] on the night of 23/24 December.”  The Army journalists concluded in June 1990 based on these interviews that “therefore, ‘the boys’ [a common euphemism for the Securitate] are [still] at work.”[130] It has been particularly frustrating that neither Siani-Davies nor Dennis Deletant—both of whom have written on this key episode—has apparently ever taken the time to read the disclosures in Armata Poporului, and hence completely ignore the descriptions of what happened and claims of harassment and intimidation of citizens from these blocs.

Mihai Floca’s credibility on the issue of what happened on the night of 23-24 December with the USLA units at the Defense Ministry, what happened on the other nights of the period of the Revolution in the same location, and on the claims of residents of these blocs—as noted, witness accounts that other publications simply ignored—is enhanced by the fact that his articles from late December 1989 through 1990 clearly do not show someone out “to get” the USLA or tarnish their reputation.

What is particularly notable is that after writing the (in)famous 26 December 1989 Romania Libera article (“Ucigasii de meserie al teroristului nr. 1,” p. 3) claiming that these USLA personnel in the Defense Ministry incident were “terrorists,” Floca wrote articles demonstrating how the USLA collaborated with the Army in certain actions during December 1989, at the CC building (“Actiune concertata impotriva pericolului,” Romania Libera 29 December 1989, p. 4) and at the Television Station (“Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p.4).  Only in June 1990, did he begin publishing interviews with the Army soldiers involved in the 23-24 December incident with the USLA at the Defense Ministry and with the residents of the surrounding blocs.  These articles were as he noted prompted by two developments:  the articles in the opposition publication Zig-Zag rehabilitating the USLA and claiming they were innocent victims in the Defense Ministry incident (authored by the Securitate’s number one cheerleader, Angela Bacescu), and articles in the French press arguing that the “terrorists” had not existed.  It was thus not as Siani-Davies suggests a response prompted first by a letter from the widows of the dead USLA officers.[131]

Other “Misunderstandings” Involving the USLA

Nor, of course, were confrontations such as this one at the Defense Ministry “accidental” elsewhere.  Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time the decision was taken to send out mixed teams of Army and USLA personnel—in part, it would seem, in conformity with the so-called “planul unic de actiune” (single or special action plan)—it appears they became operational only on the 23^rd, perhaps after the overnight/early morning Television and Radio announcements by Interior Minister Postelnicu and Securitate Director Vlad ostensibly declaring their loyalty to the Revolution and calling on all units under their commands to follow their lead.[132] Certainly, we know that on this day, Saturday the 23^rd, they were sent out in Bucharest, Buzau, Arad, and it appears other large cities.  Thus, it seems clear that the “suspicions” or “fears” expressed by (Cirjan), Brates, General Nicolae Tudor, and others on Television on the 22^nd were being ignored or at least not taken into account (certainly something that damages the idea that among those who had seized power everyone was working off the same sheet of music and everything was (pre-)coordinated.)

Yet, in place after place where the USLA showed up there were to be “misunderstandings” and problems.  In Arad, Major Suciu of the USLA, who had been sent out on 23 December to help with the arrest of Militia Generals Nuta and Mihalea and the others who were shooting (“terrorists”) from the “Hotel Parc”—an unsuccessful mission—was arrested at noon on 24 December along with other Interior Ministry people, including USLA, probably in relation to an “accidental” confrontation involving an ABI.[133]

According to the Army’s semi-official account of the December events, in the area of the Cernica and Pustnicu forests and the Brick Factory in Bucharest (apparently in the vicinity of vilas of Postelnicu and Valentin Ceausescu), a tank unit under the command of Captain Ion Anghel “engaged in battle with terrorist elements that were on foot and in ABIs,” the latter being a vehicle exclusively belonging to the USLA, as was noted earlier.[134] In Sibiu, Lt. Col. Dragomir reported that two ABIs posted in front of the Militia Inspectorate and across from the military school which came under attack “had their machine guns pointed at the school, while the gun barrels exhibited signs of having been freshly fired.”[135] In Resita, “a group of three officers from the USLA were seen exiting the DSS [Securitate] building and after a consultation with a group of 5 individuals they entered a zone where gunfire erupted.  They returned after the gunfire ceased.”[136] These three were arrested upon the orders of Army Col. Todor Stepan.

And, of course, the USLA just happened to be arrested by accident as terrorists.  Somewhat cryptically DIA officer Remus Ghergulescu recounts:

“On the night of 24 December, the commander of the Central Military Hospital told me that they had two terrorists tied to their beds.  One had a strain, and the other a sprained shoulder.  They were in fact from the USLA and had participated at a demonstration [!].  At the ministry, ‘the terrorists’ were brought into the bathroom and investigations were conducted there.  In this case I saw that they were USLAS-si junior officers.”[137]

In Galati, matters also deteriorated on the 24th:  “On 24 December…at 7 PM, the actor Vlad Vasiliu appeared in the balcony and announced to the crowd that:  ‘We have traitors among us, [the] U.S.L.A. and [former Party first-secretary] Carol Dina have tried to launch a coup.”[138] This, of course, sounds similar to what happened in Craiova where, as we saw earlier in the discussion about vidia bullets, USLA officer Dinel Staicu related that he attempted to ‘infiltrate his boss, Mr. Sandu’ into the prefecture, and found himself placed under house arrest.

Perhaps the most eloquent example of USLA duplicity comes from the actor Ernst Maftei in reference to the USLA personnel who came on the night of 23-24 December to the CC building to “help” civilians and the Army face the “terrorists”:

Dan Badea (the reporter, DB):  Who was it Dan Iosif [a civilian who was to become a key member and defender of Iliescu’s circle from the December events onward] shot?

EM (Ernest Maftei):  USLA!  Sir, they ostensibly came to help us and instead they ended up shooting us!…In the sub-basement there were some men of ours, because there were some armored doors there and we didn’t know what the deal was with them.  And someone opened a door and saw lights on.  So we got scared about what was there.  Then the USLA came to help us.  Yes!  And when they went down, they shot all our people.  Two of ours were killed there, they were revolutionaries, simple people who went there to die [as it turned out].  And then we realized that these guys would kill us.  Then they ascended.  They too had three dead.  And so we surrounded them:  “Undress we told them!” My god, it was awful.

DB:  Dan Iosif claims that he didn’t shoot the 15 USLASI…

EM:  He’s having you on, don’t listen to him!  It was necessary to kill them there.  But he doesn’t want to say it because he doesn’t want it to be known because today the Securitate still rules.  Precisely some of those who shot at us are now in power.  Listen to me.  The USLA, the Fifth Column, were with Ceausescu [emphasis added].  You don’t think they would have killed us?  My god!

DB:  Who else besides Dan Iosif shot?

EM:  Many, about 5, I don’t know their names.  Hell, if we hadn’t shot them, we would have been dead!  It was revolution, sir.  It was civil war…[139]

Finally, the description of “dead terrorists” at the main Bucharest morgue, in a report dated 26 December 1989 (reproduced in the weekly Tinerama in 1993), seems to have clear signs pointing to the Securitate, especially the USLA and Fifth Directorate:

Dead Terrorists. Although their existence is vehemently denied by all official institutions, we are able to prove that they existed and have sufficient details to identify them.…We continue with some excerpts of the declaration of Ion Lungu, head of the group of fighters who guarded the ‘Institute of Legal Medicine’ [IML, the main Bucharest morgue], beginning from the evening of 22 December 1989:

“Starting from the 23^rd, there were brought, in succession, more ‘special’ corpses.  They were brought only by military vehicles and were accompanied by officers.  They were all dressed the same:  kaki uniforms, with or without military insignia, fur-lined boots, cotton underwear.  All the clothes were new.  The established procedure at that point was that when the bodies were unloaded from the trucks, at the ramp to the back of the IML, to be disrobed and inspected.  The documents found were released to Prosecutor Vasiliu and criminology officers.  The weapons and munitions we found and surrendered—on the basis of a verbal procedure—to the officer on duty from UM 01046.  Weapons and ammunition were found only on those ‘special’ corpses.  Those who brought them said that they were terrorists.  I turned over to this military unit five pistols (three Stecikin and two Makarov—all 9 mm caliber), two commando daggers and hundreds of 9 mm and 7.62 mm cartridges (compatible with the AKM  machine gun).  They were held separately from the other corpses, in a room—I believe that it used to be the coatroom—with a guard at the door.…

Access to the room with the terrorists was strictly forbidden.  Only Prosecutor Vasiliu, criminologist officers, Dr. Belis, and the chief of autopsies could enter.  On top of them, next to the arms, there were personal documents, passports (some blank), all types of identity cards—one of them was clearly false, it stated that the dead terrorist was the director at Laromet (at that plant no director died)—identity cards that were brand new, different service stamps in white.  All had been shot by rifles (one was severed in two) and showed evidence of gunshots of large caliber.  Some had tattoos (they had vultures on their chests), were young (around 30 years old), and were solidly built.  I believe that their identity was known, since otherwise I can’t explain why their photographs were attached to those of unidentified corpses.  They were brought to us in a single truck.  In all, there were around 30 dead terrorists. [The document is signed by Ion Lungu and Dumitru Refenschi on 26 December 1989]”[140]

As of December 1989, officially only the USLA and Directorate V-a possessed Stecikin and Makarov weapons in their arsenals.

[99] “Cum ocheau teroristii?” Armata Poporului, no. 3 (17 January 1990), p. 6.  Such devices were recovered from those arrested as “terrorists,” see Razvan Belciuganu, “Armele cu care au tras teroristii,” Jurnalul National, 6 December 2004, online edition.

[100] Quoted in Major Mihai Floca, “Reportaj la U.S.L.A.,” Tineretul Liber, 5 January 1990, p. 4.

[101] Dan Iliescu, interview by Ion Zubascu, “Misterioasa revolutie romana,” Flacara, no. 51 (19 December 1990), p. 11.

[102] Quoted in Viorel Domenico, Ceausescu la Targoviste 22-25 decembrie 1989.  (Bucharest:  Editura “Ion Cristoiu,” 1999), p. 157.

[103] See Dan Voinea, interview by Toma Roman, jr. and Laura Toma, “Surprizele generalului Dan Voinea—Cadavrele Ceausistilor, filmate de Topescu,” Jurnalul National, 3 November 2005, online edition.  Read the “service/duty journals,” reports, and testimonies of soldiers of various ranks in Viorel Domenico, Ceausescu la Targoviste:  22-25 decembrie 1989, (Bucuresti:  Editura ‘Ion Cristoiu,’ 1999), pp. 120-193, and you too may really begin to question Voinea’s motives for such definitive—definitively wrong—conclusions.

[104] Major Mihai Floca, “Actiune concertata impotriva pericolului,” Romania Libera, 29 December 1989, p. 4.

[105] Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 154.  I can, of course, well sympathize with—and admire—how long it took Siani-Davies to convert his 1995 dissertation into a book!  I must rely on incomplete notes here concerning Codrescu et. al. but even those suggest internal contradiction regarding V-a and other weapons.  I find a reference on p. 262 along the lines of “few of V-a weapons being recovered…including Makarov, Steicikin, Walter pusti semiautomate cu luneta [i.e. PSL]. ”  Elsewhere in Buzau we are told that “40 machine guns were missing” and that 22 armed civilians showed up at the headquarters of the Front with machine guns with folding tripod “that were not in the arsenal of the Army or the Patriotic Guards” with each having magazines “de tip sector, pline.”  They said they had been armed by the “IJMI” or in other words the county inspectorate of the Interior Ministry (pp. 192-193).  And in Braila, only 25 percent of personnel showed up at 1700 on 22 December at the IJMI, the rest only on 26 December with their weapons (p. 197).

[106] Hall 1997, pp. 319-323.

[107] There are in fact many issues Siani-Davies does not address—and understandably, they tend to play havoc with his bottom line on the supposed non-existence “terrorists.”  For example, he wants to explain the deluge of misinformation about prospective or actual attacks that were phoned into the Television Studios as the result of people on TV having given out the telephone numbers.  Fine, but such an explanation cannot explain the multiple reports by soldiers and others who were bombarded by phone calls at their military units.  Were these numbers known?  Announced on television?  Of course not, but at a minimum one can guarantee the Securitate would have known them.  According to the military, alone on 24 December 1989, the Chief of Staff Headquarters received 800 such phone calls (Codrescu et. al., p. 116)!

Similarly, there is the issue of false radar ‘bogeys,’ an issue which Prosecutor Voinea seeks to explain away as a kind of “computer game”—yes but if so by whom and to what end?  Siani-Davies appears to skirt this issue completely and yet it has gained extensive coverage.  A military aviation official, Colonel Mircea Budiaci, described the characteristics of the so-called “radio-electronic war” the armed forces faced, as follows:

“…we were confronted with a powerful adversary which operated on the basis of long-prepared plans which were centrally directed and permanently adapted to changing conditions.  [They attacked] by radio-electronic means by creating signals on our radar identical to those which represented real targets.  When they reached a distance between 800 and 1500 meters from an object on the ground they would simulate gunfire of various types of weapons.  These two things created the image of an air attack.  They were combined with ground attacks, real or false, with various types of telephone calls by identified or unidentified callers, and with the spreading of rumors…on our operating frequencies there were conversations between what were presumed to be aircraft in flight and base command.  You didn’t know what to make of it, and the confusion was intensified by the fact that they were speaking not only in Romanian, but also in English, Turkish, and Arabic…You can imagine in what a situation we had to perform our duties…” (Colonel Mircea Budiaci, interview by Maior D. Amariei, “NU!  Teroristii n-au avut elicoptere,’ Armata Poporului, 21 March 1990, p. 4.)

What follows is amazing evidence that the “radar games” of December 1989 did not end there, something which totally explodes once again the stupidities about a war with one side or accident, Lt. Col. Alexandru Bodea (no. 22 May 1990 Armata Poporului):

On 9 January 1990, between the hours of 21:55 and 23:14, on the radar screens of the missile managers of one of the subordinate subunits there were detected signals coming from about 12 unidentified aircraft, that were deploying, at a height of 300 to 1800 meters, in the direction of a nearby locality.

The following day, between the hours of 03:00 and 04:15 again were detected the signals of six airships, after which—the same—between 17:00-18:00 and 21:30—the same type of signals, several aerial targets hovering at altitudes between 300-3000 meters, in the same direction as the previous day.

Then, as if to boost the belief of the missile officers that this was no accident, on the third day, 11 January, between the hours 0400-0500, again there appeared the signals of 7 unidentified aircraft, having essentially the same flight characteristics.  What is curious is that not a single one of these targets was observed visually and no characteristic engine sounds were heard in the respective locations.

But even more curious is that, just then, from the central radio base of a nearby municipality, there arrived a communications unit that intercepted foreign signals on a particular bandwidth, in impulses, while on another frequency an intense traffic in Arabic or Turkish was noted.

In light of this information, the commander of the unit organized a radio inspection of numerous areas, with the help of transmissions’ equipment.  Therefore, on 11 January 1990, between 1120 and 1130 on the respective frequency were received the code signs in English, 122 calling 49, 38, 89, 11, 82, 44, 38, 84, and asked if they “were doing well.”

From the fragments of discussions it could be understood that they were making references to explosives, hospitals, medicines, and wounded “for the hours 1400.”  At 1330, on the same frequency, once again were intercepted conversations in which there was mention of wounded and requests for help.  The transmissions were received over this, in which a more feminine voice and a dog’s bark could be clearly heard.  References were made to the preceding conversations that were to follow at 1800, 1900, 2200, and then on 12 January 1990, at 0910.

Chatting with some citizens from the local area where these targets and foreign radio traffic were intercepted, the commander of the anti-aircraft unit to whom we referred found out that nearby there exists a wooded road (author’s note: the locality is in a mountainous area), surrounded by two rows of barbed wire, a road on which in fact there is no lumber transport.  Not by chance, since before the Revolution, the road was off-limits and was under the strict guard of the Securitate.  [emphasis added]

These same citizens further informed the unit’s commander, that after the Revolution, the road in question did not become a no-man’s land, remaining instead in the hands of people dressed as woodsmen but about whom those from the local lumber collective had no clue.

Who could these unknown “woodsmen” be?  And what “affairs” did they have there?  Perhaps exactly…[article concludes]

(For a more recent Internet discussion of such issues, see Razvan Belciuganu, “In decembrie 1989, toata Romania a fost bruiata,” Jurnalul National, 23 September 2004, online edition.)

[108] Angela Bacescu, Romania Mare, 7 September 1990, p. 5a; see also her allegations against Cirjan in the 21 August 1990 edition.  The individual in question is apparently Constantin Cirjan, who in fact shows up on the list of the initial 38 members of the National Salvation Front.  For more speculation on this see Richard Andrew Hall, “The 1989 Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game:  Brandstatter’s ‘Checkmate’ Documentary and the Latest Wave in a Sea of Revisionism,” 2005, online.

[109] Paul Vincius, “Moartea unui terorist,” Zig-Zag, no. 106 (April 1992), p. 7.  One of the documents attesting to the ownership of the weapon is reproduced in the article.

[110] Christian Levant, “Carlos a primit tone de arme din Romania,” Evenimentul Zilei, 6 September 2000, online edition.

[111] Major Mihai Floca and Captain Victor Stoica, “Unde sint teroristii?  PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (I), [Where are the terrorists?  ON THE STREET, AMONG US],” Armata Poporului, 13 June 1990, p. 3.

[112] Ibid..

[113] Interview reproduced in Aurel Perva and Carol Roman, Misterele revolutiei romane, pp. 73-74.

[114] From Sergiu Nicolaescu, Revolutia.  Inceputul Adevarului. (Bucharest:  Editura TOPAZ, 1995), pp. 244-245.

[115] Major Mihai Floca and Captain Victor Stoica, “Unde sint teroristii?  PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI, [Where are the terrorists?  ON THE STREET, AMONG US],” Armata Poporului, no. 24 (13 June 1990), p. 3 and no. 26 (27 June 1990), p. 1; 3.

[116] Col. Gheorge Vaduva, “Soldatii au zambit si au incalcat ordinul,” online at http://www.portarulrevolutiei.ro/arhiva2004 205.html.

[117] Catalin Antohe, “Trei indivizi, in uniforme de armata,” Romania Libera, 6 December 2005, online edition.

[118] “Marturii despre teatrele de razboi ale Revolutiei Romane,” Romania Libera, 7 December 2005, online edition.

[119] Costache Codrescu et. al. Armata romana in revolutia din decembrie 1989 (Bucharest:  Editura Militara, 1998), p. 141.

[120] Major Mihai Floca and Captain Victor Stoica, “Unde sint teroristii?  PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI (I),” Armata Poporului, 13 June 1990, p. 3.

[121] Ardeleanu’s full report is reproduced in Dan Badea, “Cine au fost teroristii?” Expres, vol. 2, no. 41 (90), 15-21 October 1991, 15.

[122] USLA Captain R. M. [Marian Romanescu], with Dan Badea, “U.S.L.A. in Stare de Hipnoza,” Expres, no. 13 (62) (April 1991).  It is interesting that he also notes that on the afternoon of 22 December 1989, “[USLA] officers received the orders to arm themselves with guns from another service dispatched to the field.”

[123] Dan Badea, “Cine au fost teroristii?” Expres, no. 41 (90) (15-21 October 1991), p. 10; p. 15.  Substantial sections of Ardeleanu’s 8 January 1990 report are reproduced in this article.

[124] Lt. Col. Mihai Floca and a “group of officers from the Defense Ministry who participated directly in the events,” Adevarul, 29 August 1990, p. 1-2.

[125] These numbers and discussion taken from both Badea, “USLA in stare de hipnoza,” Expres (April 1991), and Floca et. al. in Adevarul, 29 August 1990.

[126] Hall 2005, “The 1989 Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,” online, citing Ardeleanu to Europa.

[127] Most recently, see Hall 2005, “The Romanian Revolution as Geopolitical Parlor Game,” online.

[128] See the interviews in Major Mihai Floca, “Crima?” Armata Poporului (6 June 1990), p. 3.

[129] See Major Mihai Floca, “Crima?” Armata Poporului (6 June 1990),p.  3, and idem., “Eroi, victime, sau teroristi?” Adevarul 29August 1990, pp. 1-2.

[130] Major Mihai Floca and Captain Victor Stoica, “Unde sint teroristii?  PE STRADA, PRINTRE NOI,” Armata Poporului, no. 24 (13 June 1990), p. 3 and no. 26 (27 June 1990), p. 1; 3.

[131] See Siani-Davies 2005, p. 151, fn. 29.  The letter appeared only three days prior to the Army response in Adevarul in August 1990.

[132] Mihai Lupoi claims that on 22 December:  “When Ardeleanu appeared, it was suggested that mixed teams from the Army and USLA be formed to clear out ‘terrorists’ from the basement of the CC and Television, an issue that had been discussed at the Defense Ministry [earlier that afternoon] without the participation of Mr. Iliescu” (Mihai Lupoi, with Sorin Rosca Stanescu, “Noi dezvaluiri pe marginea stenogramei ,marelui consens’,” Romania Libera, 16 May 1990, p. 2.)

[133] Codrescu et. al., Armata Romana in Revolutia din Decembrie 1989, pp. 209-213.  Vasile Surcel, “19 oameni au murit la Arad in zilele Revolutiei,” Jurnalul National, 29 October 2004, online edition.

[134] Codrescu, et. al., p. 149.

[135] Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, “N-am nimic de ascuns!” Armata Romaniei, (1-7 June 1994), p.7.

[136] See Ilie Stoian, “La Resita s-a jucat o mare carte a Revolutiei,” Expres no.27 (July 1991), and “Ce zice fostul comandant al securitatii din Caras-Severin,” Expres no. 34 (27 August-2 September 1991), p. 10.  Not without potential importance, Securitate Col. Aurel Mihalcea is supposed to have been responsible for the accommodation of 80 Arab “tourists” at Herculane, starting from 20 December 1989.

[137] Remus Ghergulescu, interview, “Planul de gherila urbana, pus in aplicare la Bucuresti,” Jurnalul National, 4 March 2004, online edition.

[138] P. Barbu, “O stea de maior pentru o leafa de senator,” Flacara, no. 21, 22 May 1991, p. 7.

[139] See Ernst Maftei, interview with Dan Badea, “Iliescu putea sa fie eroul neamului, dar a pierdut ocazia! [Iliescu could have been a national hero, but he squandered the opportunity!],” Expres, no. 36 (85) 10-16 September 1991.  Maftei also details his own travels through the subterranean tunnels under the CC.

[140] Ioan Itu, “Mostenirea teroristilor,” Tinerama, no. 123 (9-15 April 1993), p. 7.

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

This paper MAY be cited when accompanied by a full, proper citation.  Thank you.

9 ianuarie 1990; 11-17 ianuarie 1990

Foreign Involvement

So far in this piece, we have seen references to the arrest or killing as “terrorists” of the following as apparent foreigners, notably Arabs:  1) the arrest of one with a PSL in Bucharest, 2) the arrest of another with a PSL, apparently somewhere near Brasov, 3) the revelations of soldiers who killed and arrested several in the Pantelimon area of Bucharest (I will consider these two revelations one and the same for our purposes here).  Years after the Revolution, there are still claims that Arabs were captured elsewhere:  in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”[81] Later we will see reports written by two Securitate officers immediately after the events—apparently required of them by Army officials—attesting to the killing of Arab “terrorists” in the area around the Defense Ministry building in Bucharest. We shall also see how a weapon registered to a member of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate just happened to show up in the hands of a man with a Libyan passport in his billfold who was shot in the Central Committee building in Bucharest on the night of 22 December.

Indeed, the presence and activity of these foreign, apparently mostly Arab terrorists, was almost prosaic.  Liviu Viorel Craciun (appropriately enough craciun means “Christmas”), the so-called “First Interior Minister of the Revolution” in one of the protogovernments that tried to form in the CC after the Ceausescus fled and—a source of much confusion in research on the events (more on this below)—a former USLA officer until 1986, reported that on 28 December 1989:  “…in the morning five cadavers were collected and a rough count was made, out of the five terrorist cadavers found in the street, two belonged to Arab mercenaries…The shot terrorists could not be identified and they did not seem to interest anyone.”[82]

So what was the role of foreigners, specifically Arabs, in the Revolution?  Interesting in this regard is a report dated 1 March 1990 by Lt-Colonel Ion Aurel Rogojan, who in 1989 was Securitate Director General Vlad’s chief of cabinet staff.  As B. Mihalache speculates somebody must have been interested in this question, “since Rogojan was ordered to write a report on it.”[83] Rogojan wrote in his 1 March 1990 report that he “has knowledge of the fact that between the Department of State Security and the ‘Al Fatah’ Security [service] of the Palestinian Liberation Organization there existed relations of cooperation based on a protocol.”  Rogojan continues in this report:

“At the same time, some activities for the training of USLA cadres abroad were carried out (the group was led by reserve colonel Firan, former chief of general staff of the mentioned unit).  The protocol was established in the period 1979-1980 and a copy can be found in the protocol relations division of the former Independent Judicial Secretariat Service of the DSS [i.e. Securitate].  In connection with the existence of this protocol, I was asked in recent weeks, by Colonel Ardeleanu Gheorghe, USLA Commander.  The Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare was coordinated on behalf of the DSS’ Executive Bureau by General-Colonel Iulian Vlad in the period 1977-1987, and after that by Secretary of State General-Major Alexie Stefan and Deputy Minister Major General Bucurescu Gianu.  In the USLA there existed a special detachment for antiterrorist intervention, organized in three shifts and subordinated to the chief of the general staff.  I don’t have any data concerning the activity of the USLA in the period of the December ’89 events.”[84]

It should also be abundantly clear here that Rogojan was being asked to write not just about the role of outside forces, but specifically about the role of the USLA in December 1989.  Once again, why such interest in the USLA?

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go?  What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]?  Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator?  If not for that reason, why?  Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released.  The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be.  It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia.  But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original][85]

We know from the revelations of a former worker (engineer Hristea Todor) at the Securitate’s special unit “P,” that the new Front leadership was sufficiently suspicious of Arab presence that “General Militaru referred to the transfer of some units from the MI and Securitate to the Defense Ministry.  He said the USLA had transformed into terrorists.  The electronic (telephone) surveillance of certain objectives was started up again—in particular Arab embassies.”[86] (Note:  this appears yet another reference to the aforementioned meeting at USLA headquarters on the evening of 25 December.)  Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.[87]

Notably, of course, with these exceptions, the former Securitate and their apologists—whom as Army General Urdareanu suggests uniformly don’t believe in the existence of real terrorists in December 1989, yet who love to blame foreign interference for Ceausescu’s overthrow (in particular, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews)—do not like to make reference to or talk about “Arab terrorists.”

Further evidence of the involvement of “Arab terrorists” comes from the behavior in late December 1989, as much as the later statements, of the usually garrulous Silviu Brucan.  In August 1990, Brucan would allege the involvement of “some 30 foreigners,” according to him, mostly Palestinian, who had been trained by the Securitate—what Michael Shafir termed “the first admission of foreign intervention by a member of the December 1989 leadership.”[88] Reminiscent of Tanasescu’s curt response to the reporter’s question about the involvement of foreign terrorists (discussed above)—“I ask that you be so kind as to…” not ask me about this—back on 29 December 1989, Brucan, at the time a key decision-maker in the new Front leadership (he would leave in February), told Le Monde that the issue was “very delicate” and “involving diplomatic implications that must still be worked out”; “better to be cautious,” he opined.[89] That was, of course, no denial; indeed, it sounds like the new leadership was trying to find a solution to the dilemma they found themselves in.

Suspicion, in particular, surrounded the role of Libyans, which, as we have seen, at the very least, somehow found themselves in areas of gunfire in December.  Sergiu Nicolaescu claims—I have been unable to verify this—that of all the countries to recognize the new National Salvation Front government, running to the top of the line to be first was…Qadafi’s Libya![90] The “anonymous plotters” who leaked information to Liviu Valenas of Baricada in August 1990 maintained that “It isn’t accidental that on 25 December 1989, the first plane bringing aid came from Libya.  However, when it went on its return route it was loaded with people.  In the almost complete chaos that dominated at the time, the New Power [i.e. the Front] did not know what the plane to Libya was carrying (it left from Otopeni, when the airport was still closed to traffic).”[91] In 1994, two journalists specified that the plane in question on the 25^th was a DC9 and that “40 Arabs” had been loaded aboard, and noted that they had learned that on 28-29 December 1989, “the [Otopeni’s] airport archive had disappeared.”[92]

Michael Shafir at Radio Free Europe Research at the time noted in October 1990 that “unconfirmed but very reliable military and governmental Romanian sources interviewed by RFE said that shortly after the capture of Palestinians, Libyans, and other Arabs who had fought on the side of pro-Ceausescu forces, Quadhafi had threatened to kill all Romanian specialists in Libya if the Arabs were not allowed to leave Romania.”[93] Certainly, this is what Constantin Vranceanu hinted at in September 1990 in Romania Libera when he wrote of “Plan Z-Z”—according to him, “practically an alliance, on many levels, including military between Romania and several other countries with totalitarian regimes (Iran, Libya, Syria), to which was added the PLO…which called for the other parties to intervene with armed forces to reestablish state order when one of the leaderships was in trouble”:

“Several weeks after 22 December, the president of one of the countries directly involved threatened the Romanian government that it would make recourse to reprisals against those several thousand Romania citizens who were working in that country if [the Romanian government] did not return the foreign terrorists, [whether] alive or dead.  This blackmail worked and a Romanian plane went on an unusual route to a Polish airport, from where the ‘contents,’ unusually including the able-bodied, wounded, and coffins, were transferred to another plane, that took off in an unknown direction.”[94]

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch.  This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’  I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people.  And I was told:  Only you and two other people know this.  I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”[95]

Relatedly, in July 1990, Liviu Valenas noted that,

“On 24 January 1990, the new Foreign Minister of Romania announced on Television and Radio that a series of secret treaties between the R.S.R. [Romanian Socialist Republic] and third countries had been abrogated, and are no longer valid and operational for the new Romania.  The New Power pledged to deal with these countries concerning Romania’s obligations through the abrogation of these accords.  An ambiguous text, apparently launched by Sergiu Celac’s group,led public opinion in Romania to believe that these treaties concerned ‘terrorist assistance.’”[96]

It is noteworthy that in the context of a series entitled “The Truth about the U.S.L.A.,” (more on this infamous series below), Horia Alexandrescu paused on 14 March 1990 to quote from a 1 February article by another journalist about TAROM flight 259 (to Warsaw and back):

“24 January, 4 PM:  After the aircraft was inspected [“controlul antiterorist”] (after the Revolution of 22 December, ,soimi’ as those who performed antiterrorist protection [i.e. USLA] were called by the pilots, were removed from both internal and external TAROM flights, even though all airlines have such teams), the plane left for Bucharest.  Meanwhile, however, the 45 Libyan passengers, who had gotten off for 5-6 hours in a layover at Otopeni, wanted to cross ‘the Polish border.’”[97]

According to Alexandrescu, the Polish authorities would not allow the TAROM plane to leave Poland, so it sat on the runway in Warsaw…until a second TAROM plane came—this time, according to Alexandru, including “uslasi”—the moral of the story of course being that the USLA needed to be put back on flights as soon as possible.[98] It is possible this is the plane Vranceanu was referring to in the quotation above.  One thing’s for sure, this seemingly insignificant incident got unusual media coverage, in particular with regard to the USLA.

Not surprisingly, in June 2006, Prosecutor General Dan Voinea reiterated his contention that there was no foreign involvement/intervention in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution!

[81] Mirel Paun, “Ion Capatana:  ‘Argeseni, va cer scuze ca am participat la Revolutie!” Cotidianul Argesul, 5/8/05 online at http://www.cotidianul-argesul.ro.

[82] Interestingly and notably, Craciun, who attempted in these days to form a political party with other revolutionaries, bitterly describes how the vague language that emerged in Front declarations by the ultimatum of the 27^th—suggesting anyone without authorization was prohibited from carrying an arm—allowed the rump party-state that was the Front to essentially crush any alternative nascent groups of anti-communist opposition.  That said, it is important to point out that Craciun had no doubt as to the existence of the “terrorists” that fought in these days; he describes matters as follows:  “…for five days they fought against the last partisans of the ‘Conducator’ [i.e. Ceausescu], the terrorists who attacked every night, using secret tunnels that allowed them to communicate between different government buildings.  The battlefield was well-defined:  Piata Republicii, on the one hand, the Presidential Palace, to which the terrorists would repair, on the other.”  See Liviu Viorel Craciun, with Horatiu Firica, “Destainuirile unui ministru de interne,” Zig-Zag, no. 70, 71, 72 (July and August 1991), p. 6, quotes from issue no. 72.

Soldiers entered the tunnels of the former Central Committee building, with Major Gheorghe Grigoras and Nicolae Grigoras, of the special unit for antiterrorist warfare [i.e. USLA].  The museum curator Dan Falcan relates the findings of the soldiers as follows:

“…in the basement of the building they found a tunnel, not very long, that descended into a type of barracks.  There were eight rooms with folding beds.  These rooms gave way to many hallways, one leading to the second floor of the building.  Via another hallway a larger bunker 7 meters deep could be reached.  This led to an armored door and a spacious apartment, 9 meters deep.  The soldiers found a room with a ventilation system and from there found a new corridor.  After going approximately 30 meters the soldiers noticed an alcove with a large trunk, in which there were 16 rubber rafts with pumps.  Twenty meters forward they found another room with synthetic…10 meters further and they were under water….  Following reconnaissance it was discovered that there were exits to 80 objectives in Bucharest, such as the ASE building, the Enescu House, the Romanian Opera, etc….”  (Sorin Golea, “Cai de navigatie secrete sub Bucuresti,” Libertatea, 22 December 2002, online edition, originally accessed at http://news.softpedia.com/news/1/2002/December/1913.shtml.)

[83] B. Mihalache, Romania Libera, 19 December 2004, online edition.

[84] Document reproduced in E. O. Ohanesian, “Pe stil vechi-colonel de securitate, pe stil nou-general NATO,” Romania Libera, 8 April 2004, online edition.

[85] Marian Romanescu with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si Fratii Musulmani,” Expres, no. 26 (2-8 July 1991), p. 8.  In no.8 (23-30 March 1990) Expres p. 8, Cornel Nistorescu wrote in “Tot Felul,”

“Our compatriots tried and are trying to sell a lie:  that the USLA had no role in guarding the dictator.  Mr. General Stanculescu, we communicate publicly to you something you know:  that every time Ceausescu went out in Bucharest, in each convoy there was an USLA team.  And for Ceausescu’s visit to Iran on flight RO 247 of 9 December to Istanbul and on to Tehran were the following:  Mortoriu Aurel, Ardeleanu Gheorghe, Bucuci Mihai, Ivan Gelu, Grigore Corneliu, Floarea Nicolae, Rotar Ion and Grecu Florin.  These weren’t diplomats and they weren’t going for a snack.”

[86] “Marturii din 23 decembrie,” Ziua , 23 December 2005, online edition.

[87] Gheorghe Ratiu, interview by Ilie Neacsu (episode 17), Europa, 7-22 March 1995, cited in Hall 1997, p. 366.

[88] See Michael Shafir, “Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past,” Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 1, no. 41 (12 October 1990), p. 36.

[89] Quoted in Shafir, “Preparing for the Future,” p. 37, fn. 35; also FBIS, 30 December 1989, for the last quote.

[90] See Sergiu Nicolaescu, Revolutia:  inceputul adevarului (Bucharest:  Editura TOPAZ, 1995), concluding chapter.  The Libyan ambassador gave a hasty statement on Romanian Television on 25 December 1989, becoming the first foreign ambassador to recognize the new government, according to Valenas et. al. (see next note #91, and Ratesh 1991, pp. 65-66).  According to FBIS, Bucharest’s Domestic Service on 30 December 1989 announced Dumitru Mazilu of the Front had met with “Qadafi’s representative.”

[91] See Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de palat din Romania:  Capii complotului dezvaluie,” Baricada, no. 32 (21 August 1990), p.3.  The speculation by Ratesh that the “anonymous plotters” were “surely Brucan and Militaru” seems correct; in fact, their photos appear in the center of the article, see Nestor Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution (New York:  Praeger, 1991), p. 65. Ion Cristoiu maintained in 1993 that, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, a key figure in the early Front, had then recently told him, that the British photo journalist (Ian Parry) who perished in the still murky incident surrounding the shooting down of an AN-24 on 28 December 1989, “had stayed at the ‘Hotel National’ and discovered, it appears, on a list many Libyans.” See Constantin Iftime, Cu ION CRISTOIU prin infernul contemporan (Bucharest:  Edtirua Contraria, 1993), pp. 31-32.

[92] Toma Roman, jr. and Lucia Stefanovici, “In 25 decembrie 1989, un avion DC9 venit din Libia as scos din tara 40 de arabi, la ordinul unui ‘emanat,’” Flacara, no 43 (25-31 October 1994), p. 6.

[93] Shafir, “Preparing the Past,” p. 37, fn. 35.

[94] Constantin Vranceanu, “Planul ,Z-Z’ si telefonul rosu,” Romania Libera, 28 September 1990, p. 3.  The information was given, according to Vranceanu, to him by a high-level anonymous political personality and supposedly confirmed by people of high-rank in the Securitate.  Vranceanu claimed he was told Soviet pressure led the countries involved to renounce fulfilling their end of the agreement.

[95] Ratesh, Romania:  The Entangled Revolution, pp. 66-67, quoting Radio Bucharest, 2 February 1990.  I don’t think from the context given it is clear that this alleged incident took place in January 1990, as Ratesh assumes; the reference to 27-28 might have been a reference to December 1989.

[96] Liviu Valenas, “Lovitura de palat din Romania:  Enigma ,teroristilor (I),’ Baricada, no. 29 (31 July 1990), p. 3.  Once again, I am unsure of the accuracy of the date used here, this time by Valenas.

[97] Horia Alexandrescu, “Adevarul despre U.S.L.A.:  Pornind de la ,Odiseea Zborului RO-259’,” Tineretul Liber, 14 March 1990, p.4.  He is quoting Rodica Dumitrescu’s article in Lumea, no. 5 (1 February 1990).

[98] I should add here:  they actually returned to airport duties in July 1990, but not before protests by airport employees.

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

This paper MAY be cited when accompanied by a full, proper citation.  Thank you.

The USLAC:  The Missing Men of the Romanian Revolution

But what evidence do we have that the “USLAC”—a reference attributed to Ardeleanu, and alluded to by Vasilevici (“commandos,” he specified the involvement of Arabs in his book) and the anonymous recruit (the “professionals in black camouflage”)—in fact existed?  To me, the most convincing evidence comes from the comments of Dr. Sergiu Tanasescu, the medical trainer of the Rapid Bucharest soccer team, who was directly involved in the fighting at the Central Committee building.  One has to realize that until his comments in March 1990, the very acronym “USLAC” and its extension does not appear to have appeared in the Romanian media—and has very rarely appeared since.  Here is what he said:

Ion K. Ion (reporter at the weekly Cuvintul):  The idea that there were foreign terrorists has been circulating in the press.

Sergiu Tanasescu (trainer for the Bucharest Rapid soccer club):  I ask that you be so kind as to not ask me about the problem because it is a historical issue.  Are we in agreement?

I.I.:  O.K.

Tanasescu:  I caught a terrorist myself, with my own hands.  He was 26 years old and had two ID cards, one of a student in the fourth year of Law School, and another one of Directorate V-a U.S.L.A.C. Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare [emphasis added].  He was drugged.  I found on him a type of chocolate, “Pasuma” and “Gripha” brands.  It was an extraordinarily powerful drug that gave a state of euphoria encouraging aggression and destruction, and an ability to go without sleep for ten days.  He had a supersophisticated weapon, with nightsights [i.e. lunetisti], with a system for long-distance sound…

Ion K. Ion:  What happened to those terrorists who were caught?

S.T.:  We surrendered them to organs of the military prosecutor.  We caught many in the first days, their identity being confirmed by many, by Colonel Octavian Nae [Dir. V-a], Constantin Dinescu (Mircea’s uncle), [Army Chief of Staff, General] Guse, but especially by [Securitate Director] Vlad who shouted at those caught why they didn’t listen to his order to surrender, they would pretend to be innocent, but the gun barrels of their weapons were still warm from their exploits.  After they would undergo this summary interrogation, most of them were released.

I.I.:  Why?

S.T.:  Because that’s what Vlad ordered.  On 22 December we caught a Securitate major who was disarmed and let go, only to capture him again the next day, when we took his weapon and ammo and again Vlad vouched for him, only to capture him on the third day yet again.  We got annoyed and then arrested all of them, including Vlad and Colonel Nae, especially after a girl of ours on the first basement floor where the heating system is located found him transmitting I don’t know what on a walkie-talkie.

I.I.:  When and how were the bunkers discovered?

S.T.:  Pretty late in the game, in any case only after 24 December.  Some by accident, most thanks to two individuals [with a dog].[77]

Tanasescu’s comments are a “treasure trove” of insights on what happened.  To begin with, at a time when it appears the term USLAC had yet to appear in the press, he gave both the acronym’s extension and its relationship to the Fifth Directorate.  Second, the identity of those caught and suspected as “terrorists” is known by a high-ranking Fifth Directorate official and Securitate Director General Vlad.  Third, we see a problem that lay at the heart of madness:   with the Securitate having “sided” with the Revolution, the fox was in the hen-house, so-to-speak.  Finally, Tanasescu’s blunt effort to cut off discussion about foreign involvement during the Revolution suggests someone who knew just what a sensitive question this was.

The next time we appear to find any discussion of the term USLAC in the Romanian press is 1991—and past the republication of the 1991 comments, the term has essentially disappeared from the lexicon of the Revolution…and with it any questions that it might provoke.  Dan Badea summarized USLA Captain Marian Romanescu’s explanation of the USLAC.  Given all the details we have seen in the many quotes from participants in the events—the discussion of black jumpsuits and of Arabs—as well as the admissions of former Securitate officer Vasilievici and the former USLA recruit, much of this should sound remarkably familiar…

“The USLAC Commandos:  Those who had and have knowledge about the existence and activities of the shock troops subordinated directly to Ceausescu remained quiet and continue to do so out of fear or out of calculation.  Much has been said about individuals in black jumpsuits (emphasis added), with tattoos on their left hand and chest, mercenary fanatics who acted at night, killing with precision and withdrawing when they were encircled to the underground tunnels of Bucharest.  Much was said, then nobody said anything, as if nothing had ever happened.  Overlapping the Fifth Directorate and the USLA, the USLAC commandos were made up of individuals who ‘worked’ undercover in different places. Many were foreign students, doctors and thugs committed with heart and soul to the dictator. Many were Arabs who knew with precision the nooks and crannies of Bucharest, Brasov and other towns in Romania.  (emphasis in original).”[78]

It is noteworthy in this context that in 1994, Army General Dan Ioan specified before the Senatorial Commission investigating the December events, that among those (some armed) civilian suspects arrested as terrorists, “verified more carefully, some of them had something to do with the M.I. [Interior Ministry, i.e. Securitate based on his earlier discussion].”[79]

The discussion of the USLAC as traversing Directorate V-a and the USLA—taken against the backdrop of what Tanasescu reported was the “Directorate V-a USLAC” identity card on the terrorist he arrested—sheds light on the often confusing admixture of Directorate V-a and the USLA in many descriptions.  Indeed, here we are reminded of some of the reporting from the time of the Revolution itself:  on 30 December 1989, for example, Blaine Harden of The Washington Post wrote about suspicions that the “terrorists” wearing “black jumpsuits”—“Securitate commandos” were members of the Fifth Directorate.[80] He may therefore have been describing the USLAC.

[77] Sergiu Tanasescu, interview by Ion K. Ion, “Dinca si Postelnicu au fost prinsi de pantera roz!” Cuvintul, no. 8-9, 28 March 1990, 15.

[78] Former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu, with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres (2-8 July 1991), p. 8.

[79] Dan Ioan cited in Urdareanu, 1989—Martor si Participant, 1996, p. 138.

[80] Blaine Harden, “Doors Unlocked on Romania’s Secret Police,” The Washington Post, 30 December 1989 p. A1; A14.

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

This paper MAY be cited when accompanied by a full, proper citation.  Thank you.

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The Shrinking Terrain of Denial:

Individuals with Credible Access to Information…Identify The “Terrorists”

What many Romanians and Romanianists don’t know or cannot bring themselves to acknowledge is that we have at least three sources who have admitted that their unit/institution provided the “terrorists” of December 1989, three sources whose details roughly match.  These things—to say the least—don’t grow on trees in post-communist Romania.  The three sources I shall invoke here all spoke in the first five years of the post-Revolution era.  Only on exceedingly rare occasions have these admissions been repeated and analyzed—usually devoid of context—and certainly short of my own research, no one else has gathered them together in one place.

One of the more persistently annoying characteristics of articles and books on December 1989 is the tendency to have no criteria—short of partisan political ones—for evaluating the credibility of assertions and claims about the events.  Thus, the civilian or Army soldier who declares that because in his or her own personal experience he or she did not see any “terrorists” and believes (often only in retrospect) he or she was sent on a wild goose chase and that there were no “terrorists” anywhere during the Revolution is readily accepted at face value.  The logical fallacy of deducing that from one’s own personal experience, a certain proposition cannot be true, should be plain for all to see.

More important, perhaps, is the inattention to basic questions concerning 1) would the person making the claim have been in a position or had a plausible opportunity to learn such information, and 2) in the case of a “whistleblower,” is their claim to threats and harassment because of disclosure plausible?  The Romanian historiography of people shooting off their mouths who would have been unlikely to have had access to the information they now claim and whose fear of reprisal seems subjective is abundant.

Admission I:

It will—and should—be mind boggling to the outsider, but an alleged meeting on the evening of Christmas Day 1989 at the USLA Headquarters shortly after the execution of the Ceausescus, has garnered almost no investigation and discussion inside or outside Romania.  Enough people have made reference to the meeting, from enough different entities and with different interests and equities—including USLA Commander Gheorghe Ardeleanu himself, a civilian representative of the Front (Mihai Montanu), former USLA officer Marian Romanescu, and Army General Tiberiu Urdareanu—to suggest that at the very least the meeting took place.[63] One would think this meeting might be of some historical interest, since the next day, 26 December 1989, the official order was issued integrating the remnants of the former Securitate and Interior Ministry into the Defense Ministry.

In 1991, former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu described Ardeleanu’s comments to his troops at this alleged meeting as follows:

“On 25 December at around 8 pm, after the execution of the dictators, Colonel Ardeleanu gathered the unit’s members into an improvised room and said to them:

‘The Dictatorship has fallen!  The Unit’s members are in the service of the people.  The Romanian Communist Party [PCR] is not disbanding!  It is necessary for us to regroup in the democratic circles of the PCR—the inheritor of the noble ideas of the people of which we are a part!…Corpses were found, individuals with USLAC (Special Unit for Antiterrorist and Commando Warfare) identity cards and identifications with the 0620 stamp of the USLA, identity cards that they had no right to be in possession of when they were found…’ He instructed that the identity cards [of members of the unit] had to be turned in within 24 hours, at which time all of them would receive new ones with Defense Ministry markings.”[64] (emphasis in the original)

Ardeleanu’s statement begs the question:  if these were non-USLA personnel, why exactly were they trying to pass themselves off as USLA personnel…to the point of losing their lives?  At the very least, his statement informs the idea that the individuals with these identity cards were innocent victims—because otherwise he would likely not have stated that they had “no right” to possess these identity documents, but instead would have presented them as heroes who had died in the name of the Revolution.  Ardeleanu’s comments can be interpreted as the beginnings of a cover-up, designed to reverse the popular understanding of the USLA’s responsibility for the December bloodshed.  This was a classic case of “plausible deniability”—now dead, and clearly having been involved in suspicious behavior, Ardeleanu denied any knowledge of them and any affiliation of them with his unit and command.

Army General Tiberiu Urdareanu also claims to have been present at the meeting.  In a 1996 memoir, he wrote that the new Defense Minister, General Nicolae Militaru, took the floor in a speech that focused principally on the secretive nature of and confusion surrounding the USLA.  Militaru stressed that now was the time for reconciliation between the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry (i.e. Securitate) and appealed at the end “for those involved in the genocide:  put an end to it!”  As Urdareanu concluded:

“From his [Military’s] discussion it was clear that, among other forces, the USLA were definitely taking part [in the terrorist actions], that they had prepared for this for many years, and it was not known how much money their preparation had cost.”[65]

Urdareanu asserts that USLA Commander Ardeleanu also talked at the session, essentially echoing the comments related by Romanescu above:

“Colonel Ardeleanu, the USLA Commander, palely observed that it wasn’t they [the USLA] who were fighting, but that they [the “terrorists”] were acting in the name of the USLA, but his intervention went unnoticed.”[66].

Enhancing the authenticity and credibility of Urdareanu’s claim, he notes that two Securitate officials spoke at this same session and made two requests—one, that Securitate phone lines that had been cut be reconnected, and two, that the situation of the State Archives be specified.  (Notably, Colonel Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate in December 1989, complained in 1995:  “From 24 December, our special telephone and governmental lines were cut…and even though I presented myself directly as a head of central directorate of the Defense Ministry, military commanders refused to allow me to communicate with my personnel…”[67] )  Finally, Urdareanu maintains he also asked a question of senior Army officials at the meeting:

“…personally I asked that information on the empty residences [i.e. safehouses]  in town used by the Securitate be put at our disposal, being convinced that it was from these that the gunfire was coming, and I received an affirmative response.”[68]

In other words, the previously-discussed safehouse issue.

Admission II:

The Revelations of former Timisoara Securitate officer Roland Vasilevici

Two months after the violence that marked Ceausescu’s overthrow—when in Bucharest the official and media rehabilitation of the USLA was already underway (discussed farther down)—a three-part series entitled “Piramida Umbrelor [Pyramid of Shadows]” appeared in the cultural/political Timisoara weekly, Orizont on 2, 9, and 16 March 1990.  The articles appeared under the name “Puspoki F.,” but it was clear from the text of the articles that the author must have some connection to the former Securitate or Militia, because he described the inner workings of these organs in their dealings with Pastor Laszlo Tokes, a focal point of the uprising against the Ceausescu regime, and their actions once protests began outside his residence on 15-16 December 1989.  Significantly, the author related the responsibilities and actions of the USLA, including their weaponry, munitions (including “special cartridges”), clothing, and physical disposition—details which were later to be substantiated elsewhere.  It was pretty clear in his discussion of the USLA and the “Comando” unit (a likely reference to the USLAC) that he believed them to have been the “terrorists” who had claimed so many lives.

In 1991, a 140 plus page book published in Timisoara, also entitled Piramida Umbrelor,

appeared.  Its author was Roland Vasilevici.  William Totok later interviewed Vasilevici in 1995, and it turned out that Vasilevici had worked for the Securitate unit that surveilled “culte [churches]” (he was specifically responsible for Roman Catholic churches) in Timisoara under the command of Radu Tinu.[69] The book included (lightly-edited) the passages that had originally appeared under the name “Puspoki F.” in Orizont and further elaborated on them.  It is pretty clear that Vasilevici was the original source of those articles.

The March 1990 Orizont series was and has been pretty much ignored in Romania—except among the former Securitate.  From jail, Radu Tinu, the Timis County Deputy Securitate chief, sought to counter the accusations “during March 1990, in the weekly “Orizont” in which a certain Puspok accused me of nationalism.”[70] In March 1992, retired Securitate Colonel Ion Lemnaru wrote in Spionaj-Contraspionaj about the 1990 pamphlet of Romeo Vasiliu, “Piramida Umbrelor,” identifying the author as Roland Vasilevici, publishing Vasilevici’s address, and then citing an extended section of the text of the pamphlet (identical to what is in the March 1990 Orizont article).  The section that is cited precisely concerns allegations about the USLA’s role in the Timisoara repression and terrorism—it is this that is clearly the focus of Colonel Lemnaru’s ire.[71]

When Vasilevici was preparing to release his book, he maintained that he was “receiving many threatening and ‘dead line’ phone calls in the middle of the night.”[72] He said two to three cars were posted outside his residence, and that he was accosted by six individuals when was on his way to the police station to file a complaint.  A former colleague informed him that he “had been contacted by the same Radu Tinu [by now out of jail] and was instructed to alert the network with the goal of by all means impeding the publication of the book.”  According to the Cuvintul interviewer, when he spoke to Vasilevici by phone, Vasilevici was “very scared…such a man generally does not panic so easily.”  When in December 1994, Vasilevici went on a local Timisoara television channel, Radu Tinu showed up at the station attempting to interrupt the transmission of the broadcast![73]

On the question of the existence of the “terrorists,” Radu Tinu would agree with Prosecutor Dan Voinea:  “There were no terrorists!  They [those who seized power and were on TV] invented them…”[74]

Admission III:

The comments of an anonymous former USLA recruit

As in the case of the “Puspoki” series, so it was in the case of the comments of a former USLA recruit.  Asked about the significance of this short A.M. Press news agency dispatch on page 3 of the daily Romania Libera on 28 December 1994 (“Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din decembrie ’89 [Revelations on USLA involvement in the events of December ‘89]”), Romanian journalists and intellectuals have no knowledge of it—not surprising—and dismiss it as unimportant.  Strangely, a former USLA officer read it and was so incensed he immediately published responses condemning it and identifying and denigrating the similarly anonymous correspondent of the dispatch (see footnote #76).  Why such a zealous reaction?

Here are the comments of the recruit that precipitated the reaction:

“A youth who did his military service with the USLA troops declared to A.M. Press’ Dolj correspondent:  ‘I was in Timisoara and Bucharest in December ’89.  In addition to us [USLA] draftees, recalled professionals, who wore black camouflage outfits, were dispatched.  Antiterrorist troop units and these professionals received live ammunition.  In Timisoara demonstrators were shot at short distances.  I saw how the skulls of those who were shot would explode.  I believe the masked ones, using their own special weapons, shot with exploding bullets. In January 1990, all the draftees from the USLA troops were put in detox.  We had been drugged. We were discharged five months before our service was due to expire in order to lose any trace of us.  Don’t publish my name.  I fear for me and my parents.  When we trained and practiced we were separated into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies.’  The masked ones were the ‘enemies’ who we had to find and neutralize.  I believe the masked ones were the terrorists’. [emphases added]”[75]

Note the references to black jumpsuits, special weapons, exploding bullets, and drugs.[76]

[63] See the comments of Ardeleanu (p. 119) and Montanu (p. 147) to the Ceausist weekly Europa reprinted in Angela Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea Navalirilor Barbare (Cluj-Napoca:  Editura ,Zalmoxis,’ 1994).

[64] Captain Marian Romanescu, with Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres (2-8 July 1991), p. 8. What makes this eminently believable too is that the parties present, and Ardeleanu himself, apparently viewed the FSN for the most part as just the rebaptized Communist Party!

[65] Tiberiu Urdareanu, 1989—Martor si Participant (Bucharest:  Editura Militara, 1996), p. 137.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Gheorghe Ratiu, interview with Ilie Neacsu, Europa, episode 18, 22 March-4 April 1995.

[68] Urdareanu, 1989—Martor si Participant, p. 138.

[69] William Totok, Constangerea memoriei.  Insemnari, documente, amintiri (Bucharest:  Polirom, 2001), pp. 186-203.

[70] The Europa interview from 1991 appears in Bacescu, Din Nou in Calea Navalirilor Barbare, 1994, p. 67.

[71] Col. (r) Ion Lemnaru, “Piramida de minciuni a lui Roland Vasilevici,” Spionaj-Contraspionaj, no. 24 (March 1992), p. 7a.  It appears that after “Puspoki F.,” Vasilevici adopted the pseudonym “Romeo Vasiliu” in publishing his revelations in pamphlet form.

[72] Roland Vasilevici, interview with Mireca Iovan, Cuvintul, no. 119 (May 1992), p. 8.

[73] See Romania Libera, 28 December 1994, p. 3.  It appears that during this interview Vasilevici invoked the presence of Libyans and their spiriting out of the country immediately after the events—for the discussion of this incident see below.

[74] See Tinu’s comments in the 13 August 2006 posting of a Radio Impact interview by Gabriel Argeseanu with Radu Tinu from 18 February 1999 at www.agonia.ro/index.php/article/198457/index.html.

[75] “Dezvaluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din decembrie ’89,” Romania Libera, 28 December 1994, p.3

[76] Teodor Filip, a former USLA officer, was apparently intrigued enough by this article that he went to the trouble of tracking down the identity of the correspondent of the dispatch.  According to Filip, the correspondent was Sterie Petrescu, who Filip claims was later expelled by both AM Press (Dolj) and Romania Libera for printing “scandalous disinformation,” and removed in 1996 from his position as head of Dolj County for the anti-Iliescu regime “Civic Alliance,” after which he had legal motions lodged against him.  Filip claims immediately after the above dispatch came out, he published rejoinders in the daily Crisana Plus.  In those responses, he rejected the claims of the dispatch in their entirety.  According to Filip:  “during the December 1989 events, not a single member of USLA was dispatched into the field…[and] the USLA did not commit a single act [of repression] against demonstrators [! See the discussion below on this issue]”  See Teodor Filip, Secretele USLA (Craiova:  Editura Obiectiv, 1998), pp. 109-111.

“ORWELLIAN…POSITIVELY ORWELLIAN:”

PROSECUTOR VOINEA’S CAMPAIGN TO SANITIZE

THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION OF DECEMBER 1989

by Richard Andrew Hall

Disclaimer:  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. Government agency.  Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author’s views.  This material has been reviewed by CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

This paper MAY be cited when accompanied by a full, proper citation.  Thank you.

MEN IN BLACK:  The Recurring Theme of “Black Jumpsuits”

Part of the great riddle of the “terrorists” concerns their clothing.  In Brasov, it was noted the individual arrested on 23 December firing a 5.65 mm Thomson automatic was wearing a “black jumpsuit.”  The descriptions go by different names—“combinezoane negre,” “salopete negre,” or “de culor inchis,” for example—but they all note the black or dark outfits of many of those suspected of being “terrorists.”

It is critical to note that we have evidence that the focus on the black clothing of those identified as “terrorists” occurred among participants at the time, and is not merely some ex post facto artifact.  Major A.D. of Directorate V-a (probably Major Aurel David) recounted in early 1991 that while under arrest on 27 December 1989, the Army soldiers guarding him asked “If” as Major A.D. had sought to convince them, “it isn’t Ceausescu’s guard [i.e. V-a]” who was firing, “then who are the black-shirted ones [emphasis added]?”[52] The report of the SRI [the Securitate’s institutional successor] on Timisoara indirectly confirms Army suspicion when alleging that Army Colonel Constantin Zeca gave the order after 22 December 1989, to shoot at anybody “in a blue, navy blue, or black jumpsuit.”[53] Why this clothing in particular, and why the suspicion then?

Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.”  Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:

“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.

The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital.  It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route].  Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad.  Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note:  possible reference to 5 mm weapons].  Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic.  The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks.  They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out].  Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty.  A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area.  All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit.  At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes.  Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47.  One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit.  The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman.  All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic.  After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three.  After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened.  All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]

Another small group of people wearing “black jumpsuits” held a military convoy under fire near the city of Buzau. On the evening of 23 December 1989, a military convoy from Piatra Neamt en route to Bucharest reached the community of Maracineni near Buzau.  Members of the local military unit told the soldiers from Piatra Neamt that

…the unit had been attacked by two people, a civilian and Militia NCO, who disappeared with an Oltcit [car] and an ABI vehicle [an armored transport used exclusively by the Securitate’s USLA].  Shortly after [being told] this, gunfire opened on the convoy.  And gunfire reopened on the local military unit….those from the unit fired back with ordinance that lit the sky, in this way enabling them to observe a group of 3-4 armed people, wearing black jumpsuits (“salopete negre”) who were shooting while constantly changing position.  At the same time, on the radio frequencies of the convoy, they received messages about coming devastating attacks, and even Soviet intervention.  All of these proved to be simple disinformation.  The next day, in a moment of calm, villagers brought the soldiers food, and related how the terrorists had occupied attics of their houses.  They said they [the occupiers] were Romanians and that in a few words they had ordered [the villagers] to let them into the attics of their houses….In general, they shot at night, but on 25 December the cannonade continued during the day…. Curiously, the ‘fighting’ in Maracineni continued until 30 December.  Who and for whom were they trying to impress? [emphasis added][55]

Indeed, there are three key aspects here:  1) this was not a heavily populated area, thereby undermining arguments about “operetta-like” fake warfare to impress the population, 2) it is difficult to explain this episode as the result of “misunderstandings” between units, and 3) the gunfire lasted well over a week, a fact that is difficult to ascribe to confusion.

Did the black-suited ones have any affiliation to any institution?  After all, is it not odd that so many of them would appear to be dressed in the same garb?  In 1990, an engineer, Mircea Georgescu, expressed his frustration about the post-December disappearance of the “terrorists” in Sibiu, Nicu Ceausescu’s fiefdom, as follows:

“Who fired from the attics of Sibiu on 21-22 December 1989?  Who are the so-called terrorists?  Where are their guns with scopes and unmistakable cadence?  Silence on all fronts:…

c) A fighter from the guards, along with his brother, captured in these days (23-25 dec.) some 8 securisti among whom:  one about 45-50 years old, at the State Theater Sibiu, we surrendered him to the Commander at the Army House.  He was taken under guard by 4 civilian fighters (one in front had a club in his hand) and by a soldier with a gun at his side.  He was dressed in a vest (like a smith’s) and a pant-suit (combinezon) that was black or a very dark grey…brown with short hair, well-built and 1,70-1,75 m tall….What, nobody knows anything about this guy either?…[emphases added]”[56]

Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, former commander of the “Nicolae Balcescu” Military Officers School in Sibiu, described in 1994 those killed as “terrorists” in Sibiu in December 1989:

…On the morning of 22 December…I was informed that on the rooftops there were some suspicious persons.  I saw 2-3 people in black jumpsuits.  The Militia told me that they weren’t their people.  At noon there appeared 10 to 15 people in black jumpsuits who opened massive gunfire on the crowds and soldiers. I ordered them to respond with fire.  I headed to the infirmary—the reserve command site, and col. Pircalabescu [head of the Patriotic Guards] called and asked me “why was there gunfire?”  I told him we were being attacked.  He told me to cease fire.  Ilie Ceausescu [Ceausescu’s brother, and an Army General] told me to surrender.  I slammed the telephone down.  Then [Army General] Stanculescu called.  I told him that we are under attack. Stanculescu said to me:  ‘Defend yourselves!’….The attackers had on black jumpsuits under which they had on civilian clothes….Weapons and ammunition that weren’t in the arsenal of the Army were found, guns with silencers were found, that aren’t in the Army’s arsenal….After the events declarations given to the investigating commissions disappeared, notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty (ofiterii de serviciu), and a map that noted from which houses gunfire came. The dead who were in jumpsuits and had several layers of clothing were identified:  they were cadre from the Sibiu Interior Ministry (Militia and Securitate)…. (“black jumpsuits” emphases and “weapons and ammunition…” emphasis added; rest in original)[57]

Finally, in this context, the comments of a Codrut H. in July 1990 about what he and other civilians found when they occupied Securitate headquarters in Brasov on the night of 22 December:  “What appeared suspicious to me was that the Securitate there appeared to have been prepared [for something]….  Out front of the building there was a white ARO [automobile] in which there were complete antiterrorist kits [emphasis added].” What else did the civilians find there?…combinezoane negre. [58]

Where and From Where Was There Gunfire?

So if there is evidence of ammunition that cannot be accounted for in standard arsenals and of people killed and identified as “dead terrorists”—who clearly do not fit into the standard categories of those killed during the events—what is perhaps the next logical question?  That might be:  where and from where did the gunfire come?

To continue with Sibiu and Lt. Col. Dragomir’s claims, former Prosecutor Marian Valer, who claimed to have “noticed shortly after the publication of his resignation from this position [claiming obstruction] that I was benefiting from the services of the organization of Virgil Magureanu [i.e. the SRI, the Securitate’s institutional successor],” stated in September 1990:

…during the events of December 1989 in Sibiu, the army found a map with the safehouses of the Securitate, around the city’s military units, in which Securitate cadre were to be placed to act against them, in the eventuality of a defection by the army from the Ceausist regime.  Following the investigations conducted, it was determined that from these same houses gunfire was opened on some of these military units, beginning with the afternoon of 22 December 1989, therefore after the overthrow of the dictatorship.  It was also established that, in general, in these respective houses lived former cadre of the Securitate and Militie, who had retired or crossed into reserve status, or informers of the Securitate, and also that, following the outbreak of the antiCeausist demonstrations in Sibiu, at these houses entered cars that had license plates from other counties, for example Constanta, Iasi, [and] Bacau.  Thus upon the [Army unit] U.M. 01512, gunfire was opened from the house at no. 7 Stefan Cel Mare Street…in which lived the families of a former Sibiu Securitate commander and an informer of the Securitate…On U.M. 1606 there was shooting from no. 47 Moldoveanu Street, in which lived a former Militia chief of Sibiu county, while upon U.M. 01080 there was fire from vila Branga [see earlier discussion of this location referencing five mm caliber bullets]…It was determined that the owners of these places were not at home during the events, having left several days earlier, and that in some houses there was no furniture or signs of habitation.  The map of the safehouses of the Securitate and Militie came into possession of Lt. Col. Dragomir, commander of the Sibiu garrison, but when he was asked to present it to the investigatory commission he said he could not find it.[59]

In 1991, Dumitru Mazilu, a key player in the December events who quickly fell out of favor with those who seized power and was marginalized, posed these appropriate observations about the fighting in Bucharest:

The involvement of some units and soldiers of the Interior Ministry during this particular period [after 22 December] is confirmed by the following observations:  a) the sites from which crowds were fired upon certainly belonged to the Interior Ministry (for example in the case of the buildings near the Central University Library, that belonged to the Guard Directorate [V-a] of the Ceausescus] or with great probability (the apartments from the Building General across from the work space of the tyrant; the apartments near the villas of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu, as well as those near objects of strategic importance, such as the Defense Department, Television, and Romanian Radio etc.)…[60]

…Without a doubt two other issues could play a major role in finding out who those were who were firing on Television:  a) First, to request the identity of the meeting houses of the organs of repression, in the area around the Television.  Then to verify who the people were who used these houses in the days from the afternoon of 22 December until 27, 28 December.  Again these sites could play a big role in the success of the investigations; b) Then to find out the other places from which people were fired upon in these dramatic days and nights.  And those who put their places at the disposition, either willingly or under duress, as well as their neighbors, could play a big role in discovering the terrorists.[61]

In 2003, Senator Sergiu Nicolaescu, who headed the first investigation into the December events back in the early 1990s was asked by an interviewer, “Mr. Senator, by now I also have reached the conclusion that in order for something like this to function there had to exist at least two things:  a plan and a leadership.  Who led it?”  Nicolaescu responded as follows:

There are links to the Securitate here.  They had made this strategy.  They had long had this mission, when these people were selected and conspired and received their orders.  In order to understand the phenomenon we started an investigation from the ground floor, with the most basic information.  There existed safehouses. I asked officially for information about these safehouses.  I don’t know if this is what they are technically-called, but we are talking about apartments, empty spaces in safehouses, some even in hotels, while another category that should not be confused with the first is that of guesthouses, where their people lived.  That was something else altogether.  They met there with informers.  That is different.  In the safehouses there were weapons and military outfits of different grades and specializations, as well as civilian clothing.  I asked the SRI [the Securitate’s official institutional heir] for the list, but they never gave me it.  I had the list of the apartments from which there was gunfire.  I attempted to reconstitute [a list] with the help of specialists and identified the places from which there was gunfire.  My intention was to compare this list with the list of safehouses.  They wouldn’t give it to me.  Thus, I made recourse, unofficially, to a different method to secure a copy of the list of safehouses.  It turned out exactly as I suspected—they matched exactly.  Thus I was able to learn who were the terrorists from this category who acted, since there were some houses from which there was no gunfire, where they did not go into action. [emphasis added][62]

[52] Maior A.D., “Scenariile si Realitatea:  Marturie la dosarul ,Teroristi’ (VI),” Timpul (ed. Raoul Sorban), 1 March 1991, p. 11.

[53] See Raportul SRI EPISODUL I (2/2) Timisoara ’89 at www.ceausescu.org/ceausesscu texts/revolution/raportul sri12.htm. As if to confirm the suspicions, Securitate officer Filip Teodorescu told the Gabrielescu Commission that “Whoever had the idea to dress [them] in combinezoane negre had a clever idea!” (using the English translation at en.wikisource.org.wiki/Stenograma sedintei de audiere din 14 decembrie 1994).

[54] Posted on the web forum at Jurnalul National, April 2006, online edition.

[55] Stoian, Arta Diversiunii, 1993, pp. 55-57.

[56] Ing. Mircea Georgescu, “Sibiu (III),” Expres, no. 28 August 1990.

[57] Quoted in Dan Badea, “Secretle Revolutiei,” Expres no. 22 (6-13 June 1994), pp. 8-9.

[58] Quoted in Alin Alexandru, “Brasov (II):  Linistea dinaintea macelului,” Expres, no. 26 (July 1990).

[59] Marian Valer, interview by Monica N. Marginean, “Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei [We are witnessing the burying of the Revolution],” Expres, no. 33 (September 1990), p. 2.  In 1994, Dragomir maintained:  “After the events some declarations given to the investigating commission disappeared, as well as notebooks filled with the recordings of officers on duty, and a map that had markings of the houses from where there was gunfire.”  See his comments in Dan Badea, “Secretele Revolutiei,” Expres, no. 22 (7-13 June 1994), p. 9.

[60] Dumitru Mazilu, “Cine sint teroristii?” Flacara, no. 39 (25 September 1991), p. 4.

[61] Dumitru Mazilu, “Cine sint teroristii?” Flacara, no. 41 (9 October 1991), p. 4

[62] Sergiu Nicolaescu, interview by Alex Mihai Stoenescu (2 September 2003), “Teroristi din URSS, Ungaria si Occident,” Jurnalul National, 10 December 2004, online edition.