The Archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989

A Catch-22 December 1989, Groundhog-Day Production. Presenting the Personal Research & Scholarship of Richard Andrew Hall, Ph.D.

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Decembrie 1989: Sibiu 1990. Inainte de boala amneziei cvasi-totale.

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 31, 2009

Monica N. Marginean, “MARIAN VALER:  Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres, nr. 33 (septembrie 1990), p. 2.

Sa continuam dialogul inceput acum citeva saptamini prin limpezirea unor aspecte din evenimentele lui decembrie 1989 la Sibiu, aspecte pe care dubla calitate de procuror si membru al Comisiei de ancheta va impiedicau sa le dati publicitatii.  Deci, de fapt, ce a putut afla, in ciuda obstructiilor si piedicilor de tot felul, fostul procuror Marian Valer, despre implicarea unor elemente ale fostei securitati si militii in evenimentele singeroase din Sibiu?

In urma anchetelor desfasurate la Sibiu, rezulta ca la data evenimentelor din decembrie 1989, organele Ministerului de Interne aveau adoptate doua planuri de actiune in cazul aparitiei unei defectiuni antiregim sub forma revoltei sau manifestatiei anti-ceausiste ale populatiei, ori sub forma unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara.  Astfel, in primul rind, pe baza ordinului ministrului de interne nr. 02600/1988, la data respectiva functia sus mentionata fiind detinuta de Tudor Postelnicu, ordin emis ca urmare a manifestatiilor anticeausiste de la Brasov, din 15 noiembrie 1987, s-a adoptat la nivelul Inspectoratului judetean Sibiu al M.I. un plan unic de actiune si interventie in cazul unor manifestatii, in care urmau sa fie implicate securitatea, militia, trupele de securitate si cele de pompieri din cadrul Ministerului de Interne.  Intr-o asemenea eventualitate, un rol deosebit urmau sa detina plutoane de interventie special constituite, respectiv plutoantele Scutul, Soimii si U.S.L.A.  In al doilea rind, in urma investigatiilor efectuate a rezultat ca organele M.I. mai aveau un plan secret de actiune impotriva unitatilor Ministerului Apararii in cazul unei tentative de lovitura de stat militara sau a altei atitudini antiregim a armatei.  Probabil ca acest plan era in conexiune cu planul Z-Z, la care facea referire Ion Dinca in cazul procesului sau si care consta in acorduri secrete incheiate de Ceausescu cu 5 state arabe pentru acordarea de asistenta militara directa in cazul unui puci militar in Romania.  In acest sens, in timpul evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din Sibiu, armata a gasit o harta cu casele conspirative ale Securitatii din jurul unitatilor militare din municipiu, in care urmau sa fie plasate cadre de securitate care sa actioneze impotriva  acestora, in eventualitatea dezicerii armatei de regimul ceausist.  In urma investigatiilor efectuate, s-a constatat ca din asemenea case s-a actionat cu foc asupra unor unitati militare, incepind cu dupa-amiaza zilei de 22 decembrie 1989, deci dupa rasturnarea dictaturii.  S-a mai constatat ca, in general, in casele respective locuiau foste cadre de securitate sau militie, care se pensionsera sau trecusera in rezerva, sau informatori al securitatii, precum si ca, dupa inceperea manifestatiilor anticeausiste la Sibiu, la casele respective au intrat autoturisme care aveau numere de inmatriculare din alte judete, de exemplu Constanta, Iasi, Bacau.  Astfel asupra U.M. 01512, s-a tras din imobilul nr. 7 din str. Stefan cel Mare, situat vis-a-vis de pavilionul central ai acesteia, in care locuiau familii ale unui fost comandant al securitatii din Sibiu si un informator al securitatii, precum si din imobilele situate in str. Moscovei, paralela cu unitatea militara.  Asupra U.M. 1606, s-a tras din imobilul cu nr. 47 de pe str. Moldoveanu, in care locuiau un fost sef al militiei judetului Sibiu, iar asupra U.M. 01080 s-a tras din vila Branga, de pe Calea Dumbravii, in care locuia cu familia un mare crescator de oi, precum si din vila unui medic.  A mai rezultat ca locatarii imobilelor respective au lipsit de la domiciliu in timpul evenimentelor, parasindu-le cu citeva zile in prealabil, precum si ca in unele din aceste case nu s-au gasit urme de mobilier sau de obiecte casnice.  Harta caselor conspirative ale securitatii si militiei a ajuns in posesia locotenent-colonelului Dragomir, comandantul garnizoanei Sibiu, dar acesta, fiind solicitat sa o depuna la comisia de ancheta, a motivat ca nu o mai gaseste.

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decembrie 1989 : “Inca o Fateta a Diversiunii”

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 31, 2009

Sint citeva publicatii care gazduiesc cu seninatate unele actiune sa le zicem…ofensive indreptate impotriva armatei.  Nu stim in ce masura le avantajeaza sau nu aceste sageti otravite, nici nu ne-am propus sa aflam.  Probabil ca n-am avea nici cine stie ce sanse, intrucit serviciile de informatii puse in slujba minuitorilor de zvonuri si calomnii beneficiaza si de alte…servicii, lesne de inteles de ce factura.  De ce lesne?  Pentru ca le demasca…stilul materialelor publicate, o anume arie de notiuni si informatii, precum si modul de a le aranja, astfel incit, in continuare, castanele sa fie scoase din foc tot cu mina altuia…Numai ca astfel de intentii nu pot ramine chiar neobservate si nesesizate.  Semnele de mirare ca si nedumeririle celor care scriu si intreaba nu sint de fel cuminti si nevinovate.  Dimpotriva.  Veninul iese din coltii scosi din alveole inainte de muscatura, capul ascuns in nisipul fierbinte nu poate ascunde si clopoteii din…inima impietrita de otrava.  Sarpele n-a murit.

     Este si cazul intrebarii pe care si-o pune, cuminte, domnul G.I. Olbojan in numarul din 23-29 aprilie al publicatiei “Express” [sic. Zig-Zag ] “Mortii din TIR-ul frigorific — ofiteri D.I.A.?”  Ce aveti cu omul?  In fond, el doar intreaba.  Oricare cetatean al acestei tari poate sa intrebe orice!  Altfel n-ar mai fi democratiei!  Sursa de incredere care i s-a destainuit se vede, nu i-a dat si raspunsul cel mai potrivit, de vreme ce autorul articolului cu pricina inca intreaba.

     Dupa parerea autorului acestui articol, armata trebuia neaparat sa-si creeze un…inamic.  Doar si in poligon isi monteaza tiinte ca sa traga in ele, nu ?  De ce n-ar face-o in strada?

     Si apoi, dupa ce si-ar fi ucis proprii ofiteri–si probabil, nu pe cei mai slabi–ar fi trebuit sa-i recupereze, si sa-i fure adica de la morga!  Si a apelat, pentru aceasta, la bunavointa militiei si securitatii.  Prin aceasta remarcandu-se in fata “comandamantului suprem.”  Extraordinar!  Dupa cum se vede, armata si-a facut singura un…motiv!  Oare chiar asa naiv sa fie autorul articolului?

     Sa fim seriosi, domnilor!  In afara de citiva cercetasi care aveau misunea sa culeaga informatii si sa raporteze ce se intimpla in strada (o astfel de misiune este absolut necesara cind actioneaza armata), nici un alt ofiter n-a fost in strada decat cu subunitatea pe care o comanda.  Dar si cei care au fost acolo faceau parte din subunitatile de cercetare si nu din ceea ce autorul articolului respectiv numeste D.I.A.!  Intr-adevar, in depozitia sa, inculpatul Filip Teodorescu a dat un exemplu, in maniera in care o stim cu totii.  Si care nu se deosebeste prea mult de cea in care a scris articolul.  A se citi:  stim mai mult.  dar…atentie!  Sursa la care va referiti, domnule Olbojan, stia deci ca un intrus care, vezi doamne, ar fi fost de la D.I.A. (cu acte in regula!) ar fi avut misiunea sa destabilizeze activitatea inspectoratului M.I. !  Ar fi facut-o in prezenta lui Macri, a lui Teodorescu si a celor mai buni contraspioni ai tarii la acea data!  Al dracului trebuie sa fi fost instrusul asta!

     Serviciul de contrainformatii ai armatei, stimabili calomnitori, retineti, se compunea din lucratori ai Ministerului de Intere, care controlau fiecare miscare a cadrelor si ostasilor din toate unitatile si de la toate esaloanele, mai ales de la cele mari !  Si daca se intimpla ca vreunul sa aiba vreo legatura (inclusiv amoroasa) neprincipiala, ei erau primii care informau pe cei interesati.  Ei stiau totul si nu le scapa nimic despre sistemul de informare de la toate nivelurile!  Le-ar fi scapat tocmai o astfel de actiune!  Ia mai ginditi-va!

     Au fost sustrase file din registrele garzii, au fost impuscati raniti in lift, plus toate celelalte pe care dumneavoastra le sistematizate pe puncte si de puneti in spinarea armatei!

    Nu se stie nimic si totusi sursa dumneavoastra, care le stie pe toate, va lasa fara raspuns.  Deznodamintul cel mai fericit pe care il intrevedeti este si el tot un fel de a…confectiona tinte de carton sa avem in ce trage.  Cartoane inca mai exista (ziarele se tiparesc pe altceva) , dar si cind se vor termina, n-o sa le simtim prea mult lipsa.  Tintele se pot confectiona si din altceva.  Din plastic sau din oameni vii, chiar si dintre morti.  Daca nu ajung, cei vii, puteti trage si in cei morti.  Armata are destui.  Doar e democratie!  Tot trebuie sa aiba tintele din poligon culoare kaki, nu?  Chiar si cele de la casa denumita Postelnicu, de ling aeroportul Otopeni erau, in marea lor majoritate, kaki!

     Sa concluzionam.  Blinzii oameni ai lui Teodorescu si ai celorlalti (de profesie securisti, culegatori de informatii) n-au facut altceva decit sa contacteze pe cei din retea (a se citi pe informatori), in timp ce armata (prin D.I.A.) si-a scos patruzeci de ofiteri in bataia pustilor proprii!  Ei, blinzii nostri securisti, au stat de o parte si au asistat la acest spectacol straniu, in calitatea lor de contraspioni si, bineinteles, de organe de ordine.  Ei nu stiu nimic, ei n-au vazut nimic.  Au venit, au privit, au verificat daca sint sau nu sint spioni straini si au aflat-o spun, poate acum, prin intermediul unei surse demne de incredere si al unui semnatar de articol — ca si de cealalta parte a baricadei au fost tot…cei de la armata.  Deci armata si-a omorit patruzeci de oameni, apoi si i-a furat, iar acum ar trebui, probabil desfiintata, imbracat in zeghe si, de ce nu, trimisa iarasi sa termine canalele, sa stringa recolta, sa curete WC-ului, eventual sa lustruiasca cizmele, celor care vor primi misiunea sa o controleze si sa faca pe gardienii.  Pina aici totul e clar.

     Autorul scrie ca “lipsesc din proces si nici nu se face caz de absenta lor cei care au ales cadavrele si au facut sa dispara registrele cu evidenta ranitilor si mortilor.  Daca respectivi indivizi ar fi fost ofiteri de securitate, ar fi prezenti in proces si condamnati cu toata asprimea.”  Daca s-ar sti cine sint aceia, fiti sigur, domnule Olbojan, ca nu i-ar ocoli nimeni.  Poate ati uitat ca insesi cadrele armatei au cerut ca toti cei ce se fac vinovati de cele intimplate la Timisoara sa fie arestati.  Nu asta va intereseaza insa pe dumneavoastra, ci altceva.  Scopul pe care il urmariti este probabil acela de a mai crea inca o mica diversiune, pe linga toate celelalte.  Intrebarea care se pune este:  in folosul cui?  Nu este exclus ca si acest nevinovat articolas, pierdut intr-un podval, sa faca parte din acelasi sistem diabolic de actiune psihologica si radioelectronica, de dezinformare si razboi al zvonurilor si miniciunilor care, daca armata n-ar fi fost inteleapta si ferma pe pozitie, ar fi dus aceasta tara la cel mai cumplit dezastru.  Dumneavoastra (sau cei care v-au indemnat sa scrieti) stiti foarte bine cu ce anume se ocupa D.IA. (asa cum si inculpatul Teodorescu stie).  Si tocmai din acest motiv intreprinderea pe care o faceti mi se pare cel putin josnica.

     Cunosc bine armata romana, domnule Olbojan.  Toate armele si toate componentele ei au un loc in inima mea.  Ar trebui, daca sintet totusi roman, sa-l aiba si in inima dumneavoastra.  Va inchipuiti oare ca armata s-ar fi dedat la astfel de acte?  Poate tot ca, armata si-a creat si acele puhoaie de tinte aeriene false, pentru a-si consuma rachetele si munitia si a se juca de-a…razboiul!

     Ca sa puteti dormi linistit, domnule semnatar al articolui cu pricina, va informez ca treaba celor din D.I.A. este cu totul alta.  Spre folosul apararii acestei tari.  Si nu a vreunui regim politic.  Nici a vreunui clan sau vreunui stat in stat.  Cum a fost cel pe care incercati sa-l slujiti.

(Colonel V. Gheorghe, “Inca o Fateta a Diversiunii,” Armata Poporului, nr. 18 (21) joi 3 mai 1990, p. 1, p. 3a)

N-au fost vorbe in vint…Olbojan s-a dovedit a fi, intr-adevar, si deloc intimplator…un fost securist…si din articolul lui (incoace) s-a nascut ipoteza ca D.I.A. ar fi fost teroristii din decembrie…o ipoteza pretuita a fostei securitatii, imbratisata de catre Gheorghe Ratiu (fost sef Dir I, politia politica), Nicolae Plesita, Ion Hotnog, Teodor Filip, Dumitru Burlan (fostul doppelganger al lui Nicolae Ceausescu) si multi alti fosti securisti…

Cazul lui Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan

Radio Free Europe Research “East European Perspectives”

3 April 2002, Volume  4, Number  7

 THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

THE CASE OF GHEORGHE IONESCU OLBOJAN
Less well known than the comparatively high-profile cases of Corut and Bacescu is the case of Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan. Olbojan’s treatment by the Romanian press corps differs little from that of Corut and Bacescu. Like Corut and Bacescu, in the early 1990s Olbojan was writing in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s publications — specifically “Zig-Zag” in 1990. By the late 1990s, journalists who wrote about Olbojan’s publications did not hesitate to identify him as a former Securitate officer. A reviewer of Olbojan’s 1999 book, titled “The Black Face of the Securitate,” and Ion Mihai Pacepa in the satirical weekly “Catavencu” described Olbojan’s allegations that Ceausescu was overthrown by the Soviet Union in conjunction with Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Israel, and bluntly stated that Olbojan was a disgruntled former Securitate officer (“Catavencu,” 23 July 1999). Filip Ralu, a journalist working for the daily “Curierul national,” was even more specific: Olbojan, he wrote, was a DIE (Foreign Intelligence Directorate) officer (“Curierul national,” 19 March 2001).

Why so bold and so sure, we might ask. Because it was no longer a secret: Olbojan had admitted in print — at least as early as 1993 — that he indeed served in the former Securitate. On the dust jacket of his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms,” a polemic apparently in response to criticisms of his earlier book, “Goodbye Pacepa,” his editor proudly touts the “latest raid effected by former Securitate officer Gh. Ionescu Olbojan” (Olbojan, 1994). Inside, Olbojan describes how he was recruited in the 1970s while at the Bucharest Law Faculty, finished a six-month training course at the famous Branesti Securitate school, and worked at an “operative unit” of the “Center” from 1978 to 1982 and then at the famous Securitate front company “Dunarea” until being forced — he claims — to go on reserve status in 1986 after violating certain unspecified “laws and regulations of security work” (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 17-19). According to Olbojan, as early as the fall of 1990 — at a time when he was writing a series on the makeup of the former Securitate and when Cristoiu would address him with the words, “Olbojan, did you bring me the material?” — he “pulled back the curtain of protection behind which he had been hiding for so long” and revealed to a fellow journalist his Securitate background (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 14-15). There is thus no doubt here: It is not a question of supposition or innuendo by this or that journalist — Olbojan has publicly admitted to a Securitate past.

APRIL 1990: OLBOJAN WRITES ON THE REVOLUTION
In the ninth issue of “Zig-Zag,” which appeared in April 1990 — an issue in which Angela Bacescu wrote a famous piece revising the understanding of the deaths of a group of Securitate antiterrorist troops at the Defense Ministry during the December events, a piece that was vigorously contested by journalists in the military press (for a discussion, see Hall, 1999) — Olbojan wrote an article entitled “Were The Corpses In The Refrigerated Truck DIA Officers?” (Olbojan, 1990). In the article, Olbojan attacked the official account regarding the identity of 40 bodies transported by the Securitate and by the Militia from Timisoara to Bucharest on 18-19 December 1989 for cremation upon the express orders of Elena Ceausescu. The FSN regime maintained that these were the cadavers of demonstrators shot dead during antiregime protests, but Olbojan now advanced the possibility that they might have been the corpses of members of the army’s elite defense intelligence unit, DIA.

Olbojan’s “basis” for such an allegation was that nobody allegedly had come forward to claim the corpses of the 40 people in question and therefore they could not have been citizens of Timisoara. Mioc counters that this is preposterous, and that unfortunately this myth has circulated widely since Olbojan first injected it into the press (Mioc, 2000b) — despite the publication of correct information on the topic. Mioc republished a list with the names, ages, and home addresses of the (in reality) 38 people in question and noted that it was published in the Timisoara-based “Renasterea Banateana” on 2 March 1991, the Bucharest daily “Adevarul” on 13 March 1991, the daily “Natiunea” (also published in Bucharest) in December 1991, as well as in the daily “Timisoara” on 29 November 1991 — but significantly was refused publication in Tudor’s “Romania Mare”!

THE IMPLICATIONS AND INTENTIONS OF OLBOJAN’S APRIL 1990 REAPPRAISAL OF THE TIMISOARA EVENTS
On the face of things — in the spring 1990 context of a publication that appeared courageous enough to stand up to the rump party-state bureaucracy and with no public knowledge about Olbojan’s past — Olbojan’s article could be interpreted as a laudable, if poorly executed, effort at investigative journalism or at worst as innocuous. But context can be everything, and it is in this case. It seems significant that Olbojan considers his April 1990 “Zig-Zag” article important enough to reproduce in its entirety in his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms” and then discuss the impact the article had upon getting people to rethink the December 1989 events and how later works by other authors (including those with no connection to the former Securitate but also including the previously-mentioned notorious former Securitate officer Pavel Corut) confirmed his allegations (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 276-299).

The importance of suggesting that the cadavers transported to Bucharest for cremation were the bodies of army personnel and not average citizens may not be readily apparent. To make such a claim insinuates that the Iliescu leadership was/is lying about the December events and therefore should not be believed and may be illegitimate. It also insinuates that the events may have been more complicated and less spontaneous than initial understandings and the official history would have us believe: If those who were transported to Bucharest for cremation were not average citizens but army personnel, then is it not possible that Timisoara was a charade, a manipulation by forces within the regime — perhaps with outside help — to overthrow Ceausescu and simulate both revolutionary martyrdom and political change?

Moreover, it was significant that Olbojan maintained that the cadavers belonged not just to any old army unit but specifically to DIA. The army’s DIA unit — a unit which appeared to benefit organizationally from the December events, including having its chief, Stefan Dinu, for a time assume the command of the Romanian Information Service’s (SRI) counterespionage division (until his former Securitate subordinates appear to have successfully undermined him and prompted his replacement) — would during the 1990s become a common scapegoat for the post-22 December “terrorism” that claimed over 900 lives in the Revolution and initially had been blamed uniformly upon the Securitate (see, for example, Stoian, 1993 and Sandulescu, 1996). If the 40 cadavers were indeed DIA officers, then anything was possible with regard to the post-22nd “terrorism” — including that DIA, and not the Securitate’s antiterrorist troops, had been responsible for the tremendous loss of life. Indeed, in his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms,” Olbojan claims just that: In December 1989, there allegedly had been no Securitate “terrorists,” the “terrorists” had been from DIA, and it is they who were thus culpable for the bloodshed (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 276-291).

Nor can it be said that the timing of Olbojan’s publication was of inconsequence here: The trial of the Securitate and Militia officers charged with the bloody repression of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989 had begun the previous month and was still in progress at the time of the article’s appearance. Olbojan’s allegation clearly had implications for the verdicts of this trial. Mioc has noted of Olbojan’s account: “[T]he theory of the ‘mystery’ of the 40 cadavers would become the departure point for efforts to demonstrate the presence of foreign agents in Timisoara” (Mioc, 2000a). Indeed, during the Timisoara trial, reputed Securitate “superspy” Filip Teodorescu had attempted to implant this idea and would later reveal that among those his forces had arrested during the Timisoara events were two armed, undercover DIA officers in a Timisoara factory — the massive influx of foreign agents supposedly having eluded the “underfunded and undermanned” and “Ceausescu-distrusted” Securitate (Teodorescu, 1992). For Mioc, Olbojan’s echoing of Teodorescu’s attempts to muddy the historical waters of the birthplace of the Revolution, and Olbojan’s specific effort to sow wholly unnecessary confusion about the identity of the 40 cremated corpses (an issue which no one had considered the least bit suspicious until that time) cannot be separated from Olbojan’s admitted collaboration with the Securitate and his warm praise of that institution throughout most of the 1990s.

OLBOJAN’S CASE AS TYPICAL RATHER THAN ABERRANT
Significantly, even at the time, Olbojan’s account sparked innuendo in the press regarding his past, his credibility, his capacity for the truth, and his agenda in writing such an article. Unfortunately, but very tellingly, these accusations came not from the civilian press — of any political stripe — but from the military press. Colonel V. Gheorghe wrote in early May 1990 that Olbojan’s account was merely “yet another face of the diversion,” the latest in an emerging campaign attempting to exonerate the Securitate for the bloodshed, blame the army, plant the idea that the December 1989 Revolution was little more than a coup d’etat engineered from abroad, and cast doubt upon the spontaneity and revolutionary bravery of those who protested against Ceausescu and participated in the December events (Gheorghe, 1990).

Mioc notes accurately that “[I]n order for the [Olbojan’s] disinformation to succeed, the article was written in an anti-Iliescu and anticommunist style,” but he seems to imply that this was an exception (Mioc, 2000b). As the next two parts of this three-part article will demonstrate, far from being an exception, such an approach — in fact the dovetailing and entangling of Securitate disinformation with the agenda of the anti-Iliescu/anticommunist opposition — was all too common and ultimately a key cause of the destruction of the truth about the December 1989 Revolution and the Securitate’s institutional responsibility for the tremendous loss of life in those events.

(Richard Andrew Hall received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University in 1997. He currently works and lives in northern Virginia. Comments on this article can be directed to him at hallria@msn.com)

SOURCES Bacescu, A., 1990a “Adevarul despre Sibiu,” [The Truth On Sibiu] in “Zig-Zag,” (Bucharest) 19-26 June.

Bacescu, A., 1990b “Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989,” [New Light On The December 1989 Events] in “Romania Mare,” (Bucharest) 21 August.

“Curierul national,” (Bucharest) 2001, Internet edition, http://domino.kappa.ro/e-media/curierul.nsf.

Gheorghe, V., 1990, “Inca o fateta a diversiunii,” in “Armata poporului,” (Bucharest), 3 May.

Hall, R. A., 1997, “The Dynamics of Media Independence in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” in O’Neil, P.H. (ed.), Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass,), pp. 102-123.

Hall, R. A., 1999, “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” in “East European Politics and Societies,” Vol. 13, no.3, pp. 501-542.

Iftime, C., 1993, Cu Ion Cristoiu prin infernul contemporan [With Ion Cristoiu Through The Contemporary Inferno], (Bucharest: Editura Contraria).

“Catavencu,” (Bucharest), 1999 (Internet edition), http://www.catavencu.ro.

Mioc, M., 2000a “Ion Cristoiu, virful de lance al campaniei de falsificare a istoriei revolutiei,” http://timisoara.com/newmioc.51.htm

Mioc, M., 2000b “‘Misterul’celor 40 de cadavre,” http://timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm

Olbojan Ionescu, G., 1990 “Mortii din TIR-ul Frigorific — ofiteri DIA?” [Were The Corpses In The Refrigerated Truck DIA Officers?] in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 23, 23-29 April.

Olbojan Ionescu G., 1994, Fantomele lui Pacepa [Pacepa’s Phantoms], (Bucharest: Editura Corida).

Sandulescu, Serban, 1996, Decembrie ’89: Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana [December ’89: The Coup d’tat Abducted the Romanian Revolution], (Bucharest: Editura Omega Press Investment).

Shafir, M., 1993, “Best Selling Spy Novels Seek To Rehabilitate Romanian ‘Securitate,'” in “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report,” Vol. 2, no. 45, pp. 14-18.

Siani-Davies, P., 2001, “The Revolution after the Revolution,” in Phinnemore, D. Light, D. (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition (London: Palgrave), pp. 1-34.

Stoian, I., 1993, Decembrie ’89: Arta Diversiunii, [ December ’89: The Art Of Diversion], (Bucharest: Editura Colaj).

Teodorescu, F., 1992, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989, [An Assumed Risk: Timisoara, December 1989] (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc).

Compiled by Michael Shafir

Dumitru Burlan si ipoteza DIA

Late last July, there was a book-signing in Bucharest. The man signing books was Dumitru Burlan—64 years old, a colonel in the former Securitate’s Fifth Directorate, and, last but not least, Nicolae Ceausescu’s so-called “unique double.” On the occasion of his book-signing, Burlan was kind enough to say a few words about his book to the journalists gathered for the event. A correspondent for Reuters quoted Burlan as declaring: “Romania’s secret service [i.e. the Securitate] staged Nicolae Ceausescu’s down fall…the KGB wanted to overthrow Ceausescu, even his son Nicu did…I wrote the book to show the Romanian people a small part of the truth.”

The title of Burlan’s book is “Sensational: After 14 Years Nicolae Ceausescu’s Double Speaks!” That it is possible that anything could be “sensational” in Romania after the past 14 years is in itself difficult to believe. The bigger problem with the title, however, is that Burlan did not really wait 14 years to “confess.”

Two years ago Burlan gave a multipart interview to the Romanian monthly “Lumea Magazin” (http://www.lumeam.ro/nr10_ 2001/politica_si_servicii_secrete.html). In that interview, he commented on the biggest enduring controversy of the Romanian Revolution: Who was responsible for the violence that claimed 942 lives—85% of the total 1,104 people who died in all “between 22 December, when the Ceausescus fled power, and Christmas Day, when they were tried and executed? At the time, elements of the Securitate who remained loyal to the Ceausescus—the so-called ‘terrorists'”were blamed for the bloodshed. However, despite the pledge by the former communists who seized power from Nicolae Ceausescu to prosecute those responsible, justice has never been served.

In the same interview, Burlan answers that those responsible for the bloodshed “were from the Army, [specifically] from DIA [the Army’s intelligence unit].” According to Burlan, the DIA were also responsible for the placement of gunfire simulators “so that everything—[the staged war that Ceausescu’s successors allegedly put in motion]—would appear credible.”As for the Securitate, Burlan protests: how could they have done anything “with just their Makarov pistols?”

Burlan’s answers seek to accredit the idea that the former communists who took power from Ceausescu simulated resistance by alleged Ceausescu loyalists in order to ease their seizure of power and gain a revolutionary legitimacy they otherwise would have lacked. The Securitate were thus victims of their poor image among the populace and of a power grab by unscrupulous nomenklaturists who wished to legitimize themselves by heaping false blame on the Securitate.

Burlan’ s argument that the revolution was “staged,” some group other than the Securitate was responsible for the post-22 bloodshed, and that the Securitate did not open fire is a familiar tale by now. What has changed through the years is that certain variants—including the DIA variant Burlan markets—have become more common in the literature and interviews of the former Securitate and Ceausescu nostalgists. One doesn’t have to look far to see former high-ranking Securitate officers accrediting the idea that DIA, and most assuredly not the Securitate, bears responsibility for the December bloodshed. Just in the past three years, former Securitate officials such as Nicolae Plesita, Teodor Filip, and Ion Hotnog have argued this thesis. Nor is it the least bit surprising that these same officials marry the thesis with another perennial Securitate favorite: the suggestion that Russian and Hungarian agents posing as tourists—for those who with a distaste for detail, “occult forces”—played a seminal role in provoking the downfall of the Ceausescu regime and in the bloodshed that followed the Ceausescus’ flight from power. (For additional discussion of these ” tourists” see http://www.rferl.org/eepreport/2002/04/8-170402.htm l.)

The DIA variant, so dear to the hearts of Ceausescu’s double and his Securitate counterparts, has a long and fabled history. In the early and mid-1990s, it became a favorite of the opposition to the communist successor regime of President Ion Iliescu—an opposition that included many of those who had suffered most under the old regime. (After being voted out in 1996, Iliescu returned to the presidency in the 2000 elections.) In the opposition press, noted journalists such as Ioan Itu and Ilie Stoian at “Tinerama,” Cornel Ivanciuc [dovedit mai tirziu ca un colaborator al fostei securitatii] at “22” and later at “Academia Catavencu, ” and Petre Mihai Bacanu at “Romania Libera” promoted the DIA thesis at one time or another.

Opponents of the Iliescu regime believed the “staged war” story and its DIA variant be cause it seemed plausible given the undemocratic way the Iliescu regime behaved in the early post-Ceausescu years, and because it compromised Iliescu and his associates by suggesting that they “stole the revolution” through an elaborate plan to feign resistance by pro-Ceausescu elements of the Securitate. As with all beliefs that are viewed as spontaneous, grassroots/bottom-up, and therefore “pure,” the “staged war” theory possessed a power and hold on the imagination that ideas regimented “from above,” by a regime, can simply never achieve. Moreover, it possessed something of an (intellectual) haiduc romanticism and it was empowering at a time when the opposition was hounded by the Iliescu regime and weak, providing opponents with an issue of comparative consensus that could bind them together and provide them political identity. The theory thus fit with their fears, suspicions, and prejudices, and was politically expedient—a potent mixture that left them ripe for manipulation.

Unfortunately, very few of the opposition were familiar with or cared about the origins of the DIA thesis. The DIA thesis was older than they realized. Gheorghe Ratiu, the former head of the Securitate’s First Directorate (the one most considered “the political police”), was disseminating the theory back in early 1992. Indeed, the DIA theory can be traced back to a November 1990 interview with a former Securitate officer in a well-known provincial weekly (“Nu”), and probably even earlier—to two articles written by Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan for “Zig-Zag” magazine in April 1990 and particularly July 1990. In fact, Olbojan lauded himself for this accomplishment—and for its spread and influence since—in a book he published in 1994. Olbojan’s pre-1989 occupation deserves mention, however: as he admits in the book, he worked for the Securitate. The roots of the DIA theory thus lie in the former Securitate. (For additional discussion of the Olbojan case see http://www.rferl.org/eepreport/2002/04/7-030402.html.)

For the former Securitate, the DIA theory had one goal above all others, and it is as old as history itself: blame someone else in order to hide your own responsibility. Unfortunately, although some journalists in Romania have written with skepticism and sarcasm about the effort of Ceausescu’s double to disinform history, it is telling that they leave much of his discussion of the Revolution untouched. The confluence of blind political partisanship, opportunism, half-truths, misinformation, and disinformation a la Burlan have simply debased and devalued the currency of truth as regards what exactly happened in December 1989. To believe in Romania today that the Securitate were responsible for the vast majority of the bloodshed in December 1989 is to be viewed as the equivalent of a flat-earther.

If not Ceausescu himself from the grave, at least his double, is having the last laugh.

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Securitatea si decembrie 1989: Planul Zig-Zig din 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 30, 2009

Constantin Iftime:  Cat ati stat la “Zig-Zag” ati avut sentimentul ca sunteti manipulat, ca revista este intoxicata?

Ion Cristoiu:  Nu…De unde au pornit toate aceste legende cu manipularea?  Eu am fost primul care, in “Zig-Zag” am deschis acea lunga campanie in legatura cu Revolutia.  Despre revolta populara si lovitura de stat.  Dintre cei care ne aduceau documente pe aceasta tema, era si celebra gazetarita de la “Europa” [e vorba de Angela Bacescu].  Ma trezisem intr-o zi cu o cetateanca in redactie, care sustinea ca vrea sa spuna adevarul, ca nu are nevoie de nici-un ban si ca are multe documente.  Intr-adevar, a adus foarte multe documente, care dadeau si punctul de vedere al Securitatii despre 22 decembrie 1989.  Le-am publicat.  Ulterior, vazand ca ea, Angela Bacescu, a ajuns la “Europa”, am putut presupune ca fusese infiltrata.  Dar nu regret si nu am constiinta ca am fost intoxicati.  Asa am avut mult succes.  In acea perioada conta si punctul de vedere al celeilalte parti.  Eu am aceasta obsesie, nu poate sa existe democratie in care punctului celuilalt de vedere sa i puna pumnul la gura.  Pana in aprilie 1990, Securitatea fusese prezentata ca o forta a raului.  Stiam foarte bine ca, potrivit scenariului, nu ar fi putut sa aiba loc aceasta lovitura de stat fara contributia macar a unei parti a Securitatii.  Deci Securiataea voia sa ajunga la o asemenea gazeta, care avea un atat de mare succes.  Chiar daca veneau si ei cu puncte de vedere, nu am considerat ca suntem intoxicati.  Succesul ziarului dovedea ca cititorii nu erau atat de prosti.  Isi dadeau seama ca si in ceea ce sustinea Securitatea era ceva adevar.  Era o tema absolut noua.  Un punct de vedere socant intr-o perioada in care puterea inca glorifica Revolutia si vorbea mereu de martiri…Iata, cineva incerca, cu documente, sa aduca un alt punct de vedere.  Asa am reabilitat situatia de la Sibiu [fieful lui Nicu Ceausescu] si am aratat ca acolo a fost o mare cacialma.  Am reabilitat asa-zisa batalie cu scoala de politie de la Baneasa.  Am aratat ca, de fapt, nu fusese nici un terorist acolo.  Ulterior, toate lucrurile astea s-au confirmat.

Constantin Iftime:  Pana la urma, Paunescu a fost adus la “Zig-Zag”

Ion Cristoiu: …Bineinteles, in primul sau editorial, Paunescu a spus ca vrea sa puna “Zig-Zag”-ul pe sine si a inceput elogiile la adresa lui Iliescu.  Gestul a fost catastrofal.

(Constantin Iftime, Cu ION CRISTOIU prin infernul contemporan, Bucuresti:  Editura Contraria, 1993, pp. 126-127.)

Angela Bacescu, “Adevarul despre Sibiu,” Zig-Zag, nr. 15, 19-26 iunie 1990, p. 8:

ziarista vorbeste in articolul acesta despre “asa-zisilor teroristi de la Sibiu” si despre “teroristii imagnari“:

“Toti arestati din bazin ofiteri si subofiteri de la Ministru de Interne, erau nevinovati.  Ei nu au fost teroristi.  Ei au fost omoriti si retinuti cind civilii aceia ne impuscau pe strazile Sibiului.”

Angela Bacescu, “Unde e Mortul lui Veverca?”  Zig-Zag, nr. 25, 28 august – 3 septembrie 1990, p. 8.

E de netagaduit:  In 1990 Zig-Zag a fost o publicatie de opozitie…si acolo portavocile securistilor (Bacescu, Olbojan…) au inceput campania lor de dezinformare:  n-au existat teroristi adevarati in decembrie 1989 (deci militieni sau securisti), ci numai falsi teroristi sau teroristi imaginari, samd (deci neexistenti sau daca au existat militari din armata)…foarte convenabil pentru fostii securisti, nu?  Si deloc intimplator… Norocul nostru ca marii politologi de atunci ne-au semnalat ca ceva n-a fost in ordine, si ca modelul binar si simplist de o presa buna (anti-fsn) si o presa mincinoasa (pro-fsn) a fost putin gresit.  Slava Domnului! 

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Zig-zag-urile istorice ale unei dezinformari securiste: rolul trupelor D.I.A. cercetare/diversiune in decembrie 1989

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 29, 2009

(Punctele de vedere exprimate aici imi apartin strict personal in totalitatea lor…chiar daca intr-o romana atit de stricata…)

Daca in martie 1990, securistul Filip Teodorescu a povestit la procesul de la Timisoara despre cum a capturat securitatea “doi spioni straini” in decembrie 1989, a fost numai mult tirziu cind s-a dovedit a fi vorba, de fapt, de doi ofiteri D.I.A (Directia de Informatii a Armatei). Deci se pare ca prima data cind s-a soptit numele trupelor D.I.A. a fost in articolul lui “G.I. Olbojan” “Mortii din TIR-ul frigorific-ofiteri D.I.A.?” (Zig-Zag, nr. 9, aprilie 1990, p. 7). Sigur, ca atunci, si chiar astazi studenti americani si englezi sint scoliti de mari politologi ca in Romania in epoca de “democratie orginala” a fost o presa credibila (presa anti-fsn) si o presa necredibila (presa pro-fsn). Simplu si frumos, nu? Numai ca…situatia a fost mult mai complicata… Uite cum scrie Marius Mioc despre articolul lui Olbojan:

Această aşa-zisă enigmă a fost popularizată iniţial prin articolul “Morţii din TIR-ul frigorific – ofiteri D.I.A.?” iscălit de Gheorghe Olbojan în revista “Zig-Zag” nr. 9/aprilie 1990. Pentru ca dezinformarea să aibe succes, articolul este scris într-un stil antiiliescian şi anticomunist. Domnul Gheorghe Olbojan, întîmplător, de meserie securist, este şi autor al cărţii “Good bye, domnule Pacepa”. Gheorghe Olbojan Zig-Zag Aprilie 1990

Deci articolul a fost intr-un ziar de opozitie. Un fapt destul de important, daca vrem sa intelegem strategia fostilor securisti de atunci.

Eu nu stiu cind Marius Mioc a scris despre articolul lui Olbojan pentru prima data, dar mi se pare ca primul care i-a raspuns articolului lui Olbojan a fost Colonel V. Gheorghe in nr. 18 al publicatiei Armata Poporului (3 mai 1990, pp. 1, 3a) intr-un articolul numit “Inca o fateta a diversiunii.” (Atunci sigur ca dl. Olbojan n-a vorbit despre fosta meseria, dar colonelul Gheoghe a suspectat acest lucru dupa cum a fost scris rticolul lui Olbojan.)

Totusi, e adevarat ca in articolul lui din aprilie 1990, Olbojan n-a sugerat ca trupe D.I.A. ar fi fost teroristii din decembrie 1989. A fost in iulie 1990, tot in Zig-Zag, cind a debutat povestea aceasta:

“D.I.A.–Directia de Informatii a Armatei. ‘Fortele speciale’ de trupelor M.Ap.N. folosite in actiunile de diversiune din decembrie trecut si prin care s-a acreditat ideea ca fortele Ministerului de Interne opun rezistenta valului revolutionar declansat la Timisoara, Bucuresti, Sibiu” (G.I. Olbojan “Securitatea–Dictionar Explicativ,” Zig-Zag, nr. 19 (17-23 iulie 1990), p. 13)

DECI SA FIM CLARI: PINA ATUNCI NICI UN ZIARIST A INTRODUS-O ACEASTA IPOTEZA IN PRESA ROMANA, CHIAR DACA MAI TIRZIU MAI MULTI ZIARISTI DE OPOZITIE AU PROMOVAT-O…

Povestea D.I.A. a devenit destul de popular printre rindurilor anumiti fosti securisti…de exemplu…colonelul Gheorghe Ratiu, fost sef al Directiei a I a Securitatii (cu alte cuvinte, “politia politica” de atunci):

“In Romania, nu a fost nici un terorist,” cu Magdalena Amancei, Expres Magazin, nr. 1 (75), 9 ianuarie 1992, p. 30.

Gh. Ratiu: Un prim pas pe care l-a facut Militaru dupa ce a fost numit ministru al apararii a fost sa dea ordin si sa cheme din rezerva o serie de adepti al lui, printre care si cei care au condus Directia de Informatii a Armatei cu ani in urme, care erau la rindul lor infiltrati si recrutati de catre sovietici. Cu ajutorul lor a bagat in lupta unitati de diversiune care in mod normal erau pregatite sa lupte in spatele frontului inamic. Au in dotare si pregatirea necesara si au simulat acele atacuri teroriste. De fapt in Romania nu a fost nici un terorist. In primul rind aveau sa simuleze ca exista forte ceausiste care se impotrivesc revolutiei. Pentru a cistiga timp sa-si consolideze puterea Militaru si adeptii lui.

————————————————————————————————-

Radio Free Europe “East European Perspectives”

3 April 2002, Volume 4, Number 7

THE SECURITATE ROOTS OF A MODERN ROMANIAN FAIRY TALE: THE PRESS, THE FORMER SECURITATE, AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DECEMBER 1989

By Richard Andrew Hall

ION CRISTOIU’S ‘ZIG-ZAG’ AS GATEWAY
In the early 1990s, perhaps no mainstream publications served more as a haven for former Securitate officers and informers than the weeklies edited by Ion Cristoiu, in particular “Zig-Zag” and “Expres Magazin.” The Timisoara revolutionary Marius Mioc has gone so far as to call Cristoiu “the spearhead of the campaign to falsify the history of the revolution” (Mioc, 2000a). Cristoiu’s two most famous alumni are undoubtedly 1) Pavel Corut, a former Securitate officer who wrote under this name and the pseudonym “Paul Cernescu” for “Expres Magazin” during 1991 and 1992; and 2) Angela Bacescu, who since writing for “Zig-Zag” during the spring and summer of 1990 has been a mainstay for the notorious “Europa,” a veritable mouthpiece of the former Securitate (see Hall, 1997; for background on Corut, see Shafir 1993). Both strove during their tenure at Cristoiu’s publications to minimize and negate the Securitate’s role in the deaths of over 1,100 people in December 1989, particularly the Securitate’s responsibility for the so-called post-22 December “terrorism” that claimed almost 90 percent of those who died during the events.

Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, Cristoiu’s “Zig-Zag” and “Expres Magazin” were widely regarded as pillars of opposition to the rump Communist Party-state bureaucracy that made up the National Salvation Front (FSN) regime of President Ion Iliescu — including a large proportion of the former Securitate. To the extent that Cristoiu and his publications became the object of suspicion and cynicism within the opposition, it was because of an alleged slipperiness and inconsistency in his treatment of Iliescu — he was accused of cozying up to the regime when it appeared to benefit his interests (based on my own experience in discussions with various journalists and intellectuals in Romania between 1991 and 1994).

Probably no publication played a larger role in 1990 in rewriting the history of December 1989 than “Zig-Zag,” edited at the time by Ion Cristoiu. Because those analysts who have commented on the role of “Zig-Zag” in 1990 have focused almost exclusively on the change in coverage — a turn toward more favorable coverage of the FSN and President Iliescu after former Ceausescu court poet Adrian Paunescu took over editorship of the weekly from Cristoiu for a time during late 1990 and early 1991 — it is important to note that much of the most damaging revisionism began long BEFORE Paunescu became senior editor. As Marius Mioc notes, in an interview with Lucia Epure of the Timisoara daily “Renasterea Banateana” in September 1990, the notorious Ceausescu court poet Corneliu Vadim Tudor was asked which paper he enjoyed reading most (Mioc, 2000a). His response: “‘Zig-Zag.’ I like this boy, Ion Cristoiu.” The reason for Tudor’s appreciation of Cristoiu’s journal is “easy to understand,” according to Mioc, since that weekly “was the first [publication] that, after December 1989 (and especially after the May 1990 elections), began the campaign to rehabilitate the pro-Ceausescu theory of the revolution” (Mioc, 2000a). Indeed, in June 1990 when “Romania Mare” — a publication that at the time was supportive of the Iliescu regime — first began to appear, Tudor would list his favorite publications. At the top of the list with five out of five stars was “Zig-Zag,” a publication that under Cristoiu had developed a reputation as a critic of Ion Iliescu and the FSN!

It is hard to state with certainty what exactly Cristoiu’s role was in having his publications serve as a conduit for revisionist Securitate disinformation. This much is clear, however: Cristoiu was not unwitting for long about the backgrounds of the former Securitate personnel who came to work for him. Asked point blank about the Bacescu case in a book-length interview in 1993, Cristoiu was unrepentant. He claimed that he realized from the beginning that Bacescu was writing to defend the interests of the former Securitate but, since “there was something true in what the Securitate was saying,” he allowed her to publish (Iftime, 1993, p. 126). Cristoiu stated that he had “no regrets” and denied that it was accurate to assert that “Zig-Zag” had been “manipulated,” even though he admitted that Bacescu had shown up “without need of money…and she brought a lot of documents with her.” Cristoiu justified Bacescu’s sympathetic presentation of the Securitate in the December events as follows:

“Until April, 1990, the Securitate had been presented as a force of evil…. [Thus] [i]t was an absolutely new theme [to write that the Securitate had been innocent of the charges against them]. A shocking point of view in a period when the government was still glorifying the Revolution and always talking about martyrs…” (Iftime, 1993, p. 126).

Only in this way, Cristoiu concludes, was it possible to learn that “not a single terrorist had existed” in Sibiu — the city in which Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu Ceausescu, the so-called “Little Prince,” was party first secretary — a story which he maintains “was later confirmed” (Iftime, 1993, p. 127).

Despite Bacescu’s unambiguous ties to the former Securitate since she transferred to “Romania Mare” and then permanently to “Europa” in late 1990, to my knowledge — short of Marius Mioc — no Romanian writer has gone back to compare what Bacescu wrote after leaving “Zig-Zag” with what she wrote while at “Zig-Zag” or to scrutinize the validity of the allegations she made about the December 1989 events in the pages of that weekly. Significantly, for example, the article written by Bacescu to which Cristoiu alludes as exonerating the Securitate in the Sibiu events was reprinted VERBATIM in Tudor’s “Romania Mare” after she transferred to that publication in the second half of 1990 (Bacescu, 1990 a and b). Clearly, the publication of an article exonerating the Securitate by someone who did little to hide her connections to the former secret police — first in a publication bitterly critical of the Iliescu regime and then in a publication supportive of the very same regime — should have raised alarm bells and led to scrutiny of her claims. In the confused, stultifying, and slightly surreal context of post-Ceausescu Romania, however, it did not do so.

THE CASE OF GHEORGHE IONESCU OLBOJAN
Less well known than the comparatively high-profile cases of Corut and Bacescu is the case of Gheorghe Ionescu Olbojan. Olbojan’s treatment by the Romanian press corps differs little from that of Corut and Bacescu. Like Corut and Bacescu, in the early 1990s Olbojan was writing in the pages of Ion Cristoiu’s publications — specifically “Zig-Zag” in 1990. By the late 1990s, journalists who wrote about Olbojan’s publications did not hesitate to identify him as a former Securitate officer. A reviewer of Olbojan’s 1999 book, titled “The Black Face of the Securitate,” and Ion Mihai Pacepa in the satirical weekly “Catavencu” described Olbojan’s allegations that Ceausescu was overthrown by the Soviet Union in conjunction with Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Israel, and bluntly stated that Olbojan was a disgruntled former Securitate officer (”Catavencu,” 23 July 1999). Filip Ralu, a journalist working for the daily “Curierul national,” was even more specific: Olbojan, he wrote, was a DIE (Foreign Intelligence Directorate) officer (”Curierul national,” 19 March 2001).

Why so bold and so sure, we might ask. Because it was no longer a secret: Olbojan had admitted in print — at least as early as 1993 — that he indeed served in the former Securitate. On the dust jacket of his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms,” a polemic apparently in response to criticisms of his earlier book, “Goodbye Pacepa,” his editor proudly touts the “latest raid effected by former Securitate officer Gh. Ionescu Olbojan” (Olbojan, 1994). Inside, Olbojan describes how he was recruited in the 1970s while at the Bucharest Law Faculty, finished a six-month training course at the famous Branesti Securitate school, and worked at an “operative unit” of the “Center” from 1978 to 1982 and then at the famous Securitate front company “Dunarea” until being forced — he claims — to go on reserve status in 1986 after violating certain unspecified “laws and regulations of security work” (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 17-19). According to Olbojan, as early as the fall of 1990 — at a time when he was writing a series on the makeup of the former Securitate and when Cristoiu would address him with the words, “Olbojan, did you bring me the material?” — he “pulled back the curtain of protection behind which he had been hiding for so long” and revealed to a fellow journalist his Securitate background (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 14-15). There is thus no doubt here: It is not a question of supposition or innuendo by this or that journalist — Olbojan has publicly admitted to a Securitate past.

APRIL 1990: OLBOJAN WRITES ON THE REVOLUTION
In the ninth issue of “Zig-Zag,” which appeared in April 1990 — an issue in which Angela Bacescu wrote a famous piece revising the understanding of the deaths of a group of Securitate antiterrorist troops at the Defense Ministry during the December events, a piece that was vigorously contested by journalists in the military press (for a discussion, see Hall, 1999) — Olbojan wrote an article entitled “Were The Corpses In The Refrigerated Truck DIA Officers?” (Olbojan, 1990). In the article, Olbojan attacked the official account regarding the identity of 40 bodies transported by the Securitate and by the Militia from Timisoara to Bucharest on 18-19 December 1989 for cremation upon the express orders of Elena Ceausescu. The FSN regime maintained that these were the cadavers of demonstrators shot dead during antiregime protests, but Olbojan now advanced the possibility that they might have been the corpses of members of the army’s elite defense intelligence unit, DIA.

Olbojan’s “basis” for such an allegation was that nobody allegedly had come forward to claim the corpses of the 40 people in question and therefore they could not have been citizens of Timisoara. Mioc counters that this is preposterous, and that unfortunately this myth has circulated widely since Olbojan first injected it into the press (Mioc, 2000b) — despite the publication of correct information on the topic. Mioc republished a list with the names, ages, and home addresses of the (in reality) 38 people in question and noted that it was published in the Timisoara-based “Renasterea Banateana” on 2 March 1991, the Bucharest daily “Adevarul” on 13 March 1991, the daily “Natiunea” (also published in Bucharest) in December 1991, as well as in the daily “Timisoara” on 29 November 1991 — but significantly was refused publication in Tudor’s “Romania Mare”!

THE IMPLICATIONS AND INTENTIONS OF OLBOJAN’S APRIL 1990 REAPPRAISAL OF THE TIMISOARA EVENTS
On the face of things — in the spring 1990 context of a publication that appeared courageous enough to stand up to the rump party-state bureaucracy and with no public knowledge about Olbojan’s past — Olbojan’s article could be interpreted as a laudable, if poorly executed, effort at investigative journalism or at worst as innocuous. But context can be everything, and it is in this case. It seems significant that Olbojan considers his April 1990 “Zig-Zag” article important enough to reproduce in its entirety in his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms” and then discuss the impact the article had upon getting people to rethink the December 1989 events and how later works by other authors (including those with no connection to the former Securitate but also including the previously-mentioned notorious former Securitate officer Pavel Corut) confirmed his allegations (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 276-299).

The importance of suggesting that the cadavers transported to Bucharest for cremation were the bodies of army personnel and not average citizens may not be readily apparent. To make such a claim insinuates that the Iliescu leadership was/is lying about the December events and therefore should not be believed and may be illegitimate. It also insinuates that the events may have been more complicated and less spontaneous than initial understandings and the official history would have us believe: If those who were transported to Bucharest for cremation were not average citizens but army personnel, then is it not possible that Timisoara was a charade, a manipulation by forces within the regime — perhaps with outside help — to overthrow Ceausescu and simulate both revolutionary martyrdom and political change?

Moreover, it was significant that Olbojan maintained that the cadavers belonged not just to any old army unit but specifically to DIA. The army’s DIA unit — a unit which appeared to benefit organizationally from the December events, including having its chief, Stefan Dinu, for a time assume the command of the Romanian Information Service’s (SRI) counterespionage division (until his former Securitate subordinates appear to have successfully undermined him and prompted his replacement) — would during the 1990s become a common scapegoat for the post-22 December “terrorism” that claimed over 900 lives in the Revolution and initially had been blamed uniformly upon the Securitate (see, for example, Stoian, 1993 and Sandulescu, 1996). If the 40 cadavers were indeed DIA officers, then anything was possible with regard to the post-22nd “terrorism” — including that DIA, and not the Securitate’s antiterrorist troops, had been responsible for the tremendous loss of life. Indeed, in his 1994 book “Pacepa’s Phantoms,” Olbojan claims just that: In December 1989, there allegedly had been no Securitate “terrorists,” the “terrorists” had been from DIA, and it is they who were thus culpable for the bloodshed (Olbojan, 1994, pp. 276-291).

Nor can it be said that the timing of Olbojan’s publication was of inconsequence here: The trial of the Securitate and Militia officers charged with the bloody repression of demonstrators in Timisoara in December 1989 had begun the previous month and was still in progress at the time of the article’s appearance. Olbojan’s allegation clearly had implications for the verdicts of this trial. Mioc has noted of Olbojan’s account: “[T]he theory of the ‘mystery’ of the 40 cadavers would become the departure point for efforts to demonstrate the presence of foreign agents in Timisoara” (Mioc, 2000a). Indeed, during the Timisoara trial, reputed Securitate “superspy” Filip Teodorescu had attempted to implant this idea and would later reveal that among those his forces had arrested during the Timisoara events were two armed, undercover DIA officers in a Timisoara factory — the massive influx of foreign agents supposedly having eluded the “underfunded and undermanned” and “Ceausescu-distrusted” Securitate (Teodorescu, 1992). For Mioc, Olbojan’s echoing of Teodorescu’s attempts to muddy the historical waters of the birthplace of the Revolution, and Olbojan’s specific effort to sow wholly unnecessary confusion about the identity of the 40 cremated corpses (an issue which no one had considered the least bit suspicious until that time) cannot be separated from Olbojan’s admitted collaboration with the Securitate and his warm praise of that institution throughout most of the 1990s.

OLBOJAN’S CASE AS TYPICAL RATHER THAN ABERRANT
Significantly, even at the time, Olbojan’s account sparked innuendo in the press regarding his past, his credibility, his capacity for the truth, and his agenda in writing such an article. Unfortunately, but very tellingly, these accusations came not from the civilian press — of any political stripe — but from the military press. Colonel V. Gheorghe wrote in early May 1990 that Olbojan’s account was merely “yet another face of the diversion,” the latest in an emerging campaign attempting to exonerate the Securitate for the bloodshed, blame the army, plant the idea that the December 1989 Revolution was little more than a coup d’etat engineered from abroad, and cast doubt upon the spontaneity and revolutionary bravery of those who protested against Ceausescu and participated in the December events (Gheorghe, 1990).

Mioc notes accurately that “[I]n order for the [Olbojan’s] disinformation to succeed, the article was written in an anti-Iliescu and anticommunist style,” but he seems to imply that this was an exception (Mioc, 2000b). As the next two parts of this three-part article will demonstrate, far from being an exception, such an approach — in fact the dovetailing and entangling of Securitate disinformation with the agenda of the anti-Iliescu/anticommunist opposition — was all too common and ultimately a key cause of the destruction of the truth about the December 1989 Revolution and the Securitate’s institutional responsibility for the tremendous loss of life in those events.

(Richard Andrew Hall received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University in 1997. He currently works and lives in northern Virginia. Comments on this article can be directed to him at hallria@msn.com)

SOURCES Bacescu, A., 1990a “Adevarul despre Sibiu,” [The Truth On Sibiu] in “Zig-Zag,” (Bucharest) 19-26 June.

Bacescu, A., 1990b “Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989,” [New Light On The December 1989 Events] in “Romania Mare,” (Bucharest) 21 August.

“Curierul national,” (Bucharest) 2001, Internet edition, http://domino.kappa.ro/e-media/curierul.nsf.

Gheorghe, V., 1990, “Inca o fateta a diversiunii,” in “Armata poporului,” (Bucharest), 3 May.

Hall, R. A., 1997, “The Dynamics of Media Independence in Post-Ceausescu Romania,” in O’Neil, P.H. (ed.), Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass,), pp. 102-123.

Hall, R. A., 1999, “The Uses of Absurdity: The Staged War Theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989,” in “East European Politics and Societies,” Vol. 13, no.3, pp. 501-542.

Iftime, C., 1993, Cu Ion Cristoiu prin infernul contemporan [With Ion Cristoiu Through The Contemporary Inferno], (Bucharest: Editura Contraria).

“Catavencu,” (Bucharest), 1999 (Internet edition), http://www.catavencu.ro.

Mioc, M., 2000a “Ion Cristoiu, virful de lance al campaniei de falsificare a istoriei revolutiei,” http://timisoara.com/newmioc.51.htm

Mioc, M., 2000b “‘Misterul’celor 40 de cadavre,” http://timisoara.com/newmioc/53.htm

Olbojan Ionescu, G., 1990 “Mortii din TIR-ul Frigorific — ofiteri DIA?” [Were The Corpses In The Refrigerated Truck DIA Officers?] in “Zig-Zag,”, no. 23, 23-29 April.

Olbojan Ionescu G., 1994, Fantomele lui Pacepa [Pacepa’s Phantoms], (Bucharest: Editura Corida).

Sandulescu, Serban, 1996, Decembrie ‘89: Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana [December ’89: The Coup d’tat Abducted the Romanian Revolution], (Bucharest: Editura Omega Press Investment).

Shafir, M., 1993, “Best Selling Spy Novels Seek To Rehabilitate Romanian ‘Securitate,’” in “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report,” Vol. 2, no. 45, pp. 14-18.

Siani-Davies, P., 2001, “The Revolution after the Revolution,” in Phinnemore, D. Light, D. (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition (London: Palgrave), pp. 1-34.

Stoian, I., 1993, Decembrie ‘89: Arta Diversiunii, [ December ’89: The Art Of Diversion], (Bucharest: Editura Colaj).

Teodorescu, F., 1992, Un Risc Asumat: Timisoara, decembrie 1989, [An Assumed Risk: Timisoara, December 1989] (Bucharest: Editura Viitorul Romanesc).

Compiled by Michael Shafir

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Spitalele, Doctorii, Gloante Explozive, si Colonelul Nicolae Ghircoias in Decembrie 1989 – Ianuarie 1990

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 28, 2009

(un articol uitat…)

AMFITEATRUL FACULTATII DE MEDICINA

“Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”

Mihail Lechkun, Romania Libera, 10 februarie 1994, p. 2

“In decembrie 1989 a fost o disponsibilitate pentru bestialitate, pe care nu am crezut-o capabila la poporul care fac parte, ” a declarat dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu (Spitalul Coltea), in cadrul conferintei care s-a desfasurat marti seara in Amfiteatrul Mare al Facultatii de Medicina din Bucurest, avand ca subiect “Decembrie 1989, in spitalele din Bucuresti”.  Printre invitatii Ligii Studentilor in Medicina, organizatorul acestei conferinte, s-au numarat:  dl. prof. dr. Petre Andronescu, prorector, dl. dr. Constantin Antofie, dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel, dl. prof. conf. dr. Dan Niculescu, dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, dl. prof. conf. dr. Ilie Pavelescu, dl. dr. Eduard Geambasu, toti medici chirurgi din Capitala care au fost confruntate cu fluxul de raniti din decembrie 1989.  “Documentia pe care am avut-o, nu o mai avem,” a spus dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel (Spitalul de Urgenta) amintind totusi faptul ca au fost inregistrate date intr-o lucrare de doctorat.  “Putini dintre cei raniti au fost socati psihic,” isi aminteste prof. dr. Petre Andronescu (Spitalul Colentina).  Revolutionari si raniti au primit acelasi tratament, “stim doar ca la o parte din bolnavi s-au schimbat catusi” isi aminteste dl. prof. dr. Marian Ciurel.  Peste 60 la suta din ranitii adusi la Spitalul Coltea erau impuscati lateral sau din spate.  S-a tras si asupra oamenilor care au stat ghemuiti, acestia suferind astfel leziuni complexe.  Pe langa datele statistice prezentate, medicii prezenti au atras atentia asupra naturii leziunilor care, in numar mare, au fost cazate de munitie al carie efect a fost mai mult distrugerea, mutilarea decat scoaterea din lupta.  In acest sens, deosebit de interesante au fost datele prezentate din lucrarea de diploma, a medicului M. Briciu:  “S-a tras cu gloante explozive”. Concluziile ce se pot trage din faptul ca cei adusi in spitale, in intervale de timp distincte, prezentau leziuni corespunzatoare anumitor portiuni din corp, demonstreaza existenta unor ordine asupra locului unde trebuia ochit.  “Cred ca Romania va fi capabila sa constituie acel ecran care sa protejeze de acum inainte natia de asemenea manifestari,” a spus dl. conf. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu, remarcand aspectul benefic al unor astfel de conferinte.

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Bucuresti, Spitalul Coltea

Prof. univ. dr. Nicolae (Nae) Constantinescu, membru al Academiei de Medicina si al Academiei Oamenilor de Stiinta. Medic chirug la Spitalul Coltea.

– Ce s-a intamplat cu cartusele extrase chirurgical din ranile pacientilor? Erau niste probe care ar fi putut lamuri anumite aspecte…
– Pe data de 1 sau 2 ianuarie 1990 a aparut la spital un colonel Chircoias, de la Interne cred. Acest Chircoias a fost judecat si condamnat mai tarziu intr-un proces la Timisoara in legatura cu revolutia.
 Chircoias, care sustinea sus si tare ca ar conduce nu stiu ce sectie criminalistica din Directia Securitatii Statului, a cerut gloantele extrase. Acestea, vreo 40 la numar, i-au fost date de un medic care era secretar de partid la IMF. Tin minte ca erau gloante de diverse forme, de diferite dimensiuni.

Procurori timorati

– Ati sesizat Parchetul Militar? Ati cerut sa se faca o ancheta in legatura cu cei impuscati la revolutie?
– Bineinteles, am anuntat Parchetul, am cerut o ancheta. De exemplu, cand le-am aratat apartamentul de unde s-a tras la revolutie, de la etajul 4, de la cinematograful “Luceafarul”, procurorii mi-au zis ca au facut verificarile si au depistat ca acolo era o locuinta conspirativa a Securitatii si atat. In anul 1992 am semnat alaturi de alti medici, profesori universitari, chirurgi de renume, un memoriu pe care l-am adresat Parchetului General si prin care am solicitat sa se faca o ancheta cu privire la ranitii si mortii prin impuscare. Neprimind nici un raspuns, dupa sase luni m-am dus la Parchet sa intreb ce se intampla. Mi s-a raspuns ca se lucreaza, mi-au aratat doua-trei avize puse pe colturile cererii si atat. Unul dintre procurori m-a luat cu el pe un coridor si mi-a spus ca “are copil, are nevasta, e foarte complicat…”. Ma intreba pe mine ce sa mai faca… Am izbucnit, le-am spus ca nu sunt un om care sa fie, asa, aburit cu una, cu doua. Le-am aratat radiografiile celor impuscati, le-am aratat gloante in ficat. Radiografiile existau, nu erau inventiile mele, nu mi se nazarise asa, dintr-o data sa cer ancheta! Le-am spus ca niste oameni doresc sa afle adevarul si ca cei care au semnat memoriul catre Parchet nu sunt niste persoane oarecare, ci medici cu experienta, somitati in materie. Degeaba am solicitat expertize balistice sau alte cercetari, degeaba am prezentat acte, documente, radiografii, lucrari. Nu se dorea sa se faca o ancheta serioasa.

Interviu cu prof. dr. Nicolae Constantinescu

“Nici acum nu-mi dau seama cum am putut sa operez nonstop timp de trei zile”

Romulus Cristea

Miercuri, 20 Decembrie 2006

http://www.romanialibera.ro/a80869/34-nici-acum-nu-mi-dau-seama-cum-am-putut-sa-operez-nonstop-timp-de-trei-zile-34.html

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Bucuresti, Spitalul de Urgenta Floreasca

Profesorul Andrei Firica, directorul Spitalului de Urgenta Floreasca in 1989, povesteste cum la camera de garda a spitalului au fost aduse, in zilele Revolutiei, mai multe persoane suspectate ca ar fi teroristi. Acestea au disparut apoi fara urma, luate de un colonel de la militie.

Dar, legat de teroristi, lucrurile s-au desfasurat astfel: a venit din nou colonelul acela de militie care ma indemnase sa nu mai duc ziaristii la patul teroristilor si i-a incarcat pe teroristi intr-un autobuz, plecand cu ei. Este exact ce eu doream, facand tot felul de demersuri pentru a fi preluati de Spitalul Jilava, fiindca ei nu aveau rani grave. Peste doua-trei zile am primit un telefon de la genelarul Chitac, deja ministru, care m-a intrebat ce e cu teroristii. I-am relatat cum ei au fost luati de acel colonel de militie si generalul Chitac n-a parut surprins. Chiar parea multumit ca au fost luati de acel colonel de militie. Marea mea surpirza a fost cand pe acel colonel de militie l-am revazut in zeghe, la televizor, in boxa acuzatilor, la procesul de la Timisoara. De altfel, l-am rugat pe fiul meu, care a facut Facultatea de Teatru si Film, sa-i filmeze pe acei teroristi prinsi cu catuse de paturile spitalului si am dat copii dupa aceasta caseta la Procuratura. Fiul meu filmase si desfasurarea Revolutiei pe strazi.

Teroristii din Spitalul de Urgenta

09/03/2004

FLORIN CONDURATEANU

http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/71729/teroristii-din-spitalul-de-urgenta

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“In perioada 21-26 decembrie 1989 la spitalul Coltea au fost internati o serie de indivizi prinsi ca teroristi, printre care un anume plutonier de militie Tripon Cornel.

Confirm afirmatiilor medicului chirurg Nicolae Constantinescu, sus numitul Tripon Cornel a fost ranit prin impuscare in zona hotel ‘Negoiu’ din Bucuresti. Medicii de la spitalul Coltea au solicitat Procuraturii instrumentarea acestor cazuri. Colonelul Ghircoias, fost sef al directiei cercetari penale a Securitatii i-a adunat pe toti individzii care erau acuzati ca sint teroristi facandu-i disparuti. Astfel Procuratura n-a mai avut obiect de cercetara pe linga disparitia banuitilor invocind ii decretul de amnistie dat de presedintele (pe atunci al C.P.U.N.) Ion Iliescu, in luna ianuarie 1990.”

Florin Mircea Corcoz si Mircea Aries, “Terorist ascuns in Apuseni?” Romania Libera, 21 August 1992, p. 1

in legatura cu ceea ce Ghircoias a facut la Timisoara, vezi de exemplu http://www.romanialibera.ro/a51078/cine-a-organizat-furtul-cadavrelor-din-morga-spitalului-judetean.html

Marius Mioc ne atrage atentia ca Ghircoias a fost gratiat de catre Ion Iliescu:

Nicolae Ghircoiaş, colonel de miliţie care a furat şi distrus evidenţele Spitalului judeţean Timiş cu privire la morţii şi răniţii din perioada revoluţiei[5], condamnat la 4 ani închisoare dar cu constatarea că pedeapsa este în întregime graţiată prin Decretul-Lege nr. 23/1990[6] (Ghircoiaş este şi beneficiar al amnistiei din Decretul 3/1990, pentru o altă infracţiune săvîrşită în perioada revoluţiei – favorizarea infractorului)

http://procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0216docu.htm

http://procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mmioc/curteasup/docs/0225disp.htm

http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gra%C5%A3ieri_%C5%9Fi_amnistii_legate_de_revolu%C5%A3ia_rom%C3%A2n%C4%83_din_1989

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Bucuresti, Spitalul Municipal Rezerva nr. 3

“…O sa ne omoara pe toti, uite, asta de la mine din buzunar e primul glonte scos in spitalul nostru, dintr-o fetita de 12 ani. In salon e un baiat, foarte grav ranit, un glonte dum-dum, d-ala, i-a facut praf diafragma, creasta iliaca, la iesire perforatia era cit o moneda de 5 lei….”

Andreea Hasnas, “Reportajul unui film cu TERORISTI,” Expres, nr. 10 (6-12 aprilie 1990), p. 5.

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“In noaptea de 23 se reintorc in framintate zona a fostului cc. In corpul A. Rebeca este impuscata in ambele picioare. Este transportata la Spitalul Municipal. I se extrase unul dintre gloante si revine in acele locuri tulburi. In fata Directii a 5-a. Eugen Cercel este impuscat cu doua gloante explozive care i-au zdrobit bazinul si picioarele. Este invalid pe viata, si in carutul sa, se afla la mama sa in Moldova...”

Emil Munteanu, “Doi revolutionari [Rebeca Doina Cercel si Cazimir Benedict Ionescu], doua destine…” Romania Libera, 20 februarie 1992, p. 1.

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Cugir, 21-22 decembrie 1989

“CUGIR: Revolutionari achetati, criminali in libertate,” Expres, nr. 6, 9 martie 1990, p. 6.

“…Se tragea din birourile securistilor si s-a mai tras si cu o pusca de vinatoare si s-a mai tras cu gloante dum-dum si militia ardea ca o torta si oamenii au intrat in incendiu si atunci locotenentul major Mezei Dorin a sarit de la etaj cu pistolul mitraliera…Sint peste 40 de raniti si unii au primit gloante in cap dar cu totii sint in viata. Doi raniti sint in spitalele din RFG si unul este in Anglia. Cel din Anglia a fost impuscat cu dum-dum….UNDE SINT CEI CARE AU TRAS IN OAMENI?” –Vasile Neagoe

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Curtici, dupa 22 decembrie 1989

La gara primim un grup de belgieni care insotesc un tren de 42 de vagoane cu marfuri trimise de Comunitatea Europeana, in cadrul actiunii Operation Villages Roumains . Seful lor, care rupe cateva cuvinte romanesti, ne spune ca totul a fost organizat de Crucea Rosie belgiana si service-cluburile care au adoptat in lunile anterioare sate din judetele Iasi, Botosani, Caras-Severin sau Mehedinti. In noaptea urmatoare, prima echipa de 5 medici de la spitalul austriac Lorenz Bohler, care au sosit la Curtici cu un vagon-spital preiau un numar de 18 bolnavi in stare grava pentru a li se acorda un tratament special de 2-3 luni in Austria. E vorba de unele transferuri de organe sau proteze speciale, datorate efectelor monstruoase ale gloantelor dum-dum . Victimele sosesc de la Timisoara cu cateva ambulante; la lumina becurilor si a farurilor zarim fete tinere transfigurate de durere – printre acestea femei, adolescenti, un soldat si o fetita cu cate un picior amputat.

http://www.tourismguide.ro/html/orase/Arad/Curtici/istoric_curtici.php

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“Cine a tras gloante explozive?”

Revolutia din decembrie 1989 a lasat in urma ei foarte multe intrebari fara raspuns dintre care una destul de dureroasa este aceasta: cine a tras si mai ales cine a dat ordin sa se traga cu gloante explozive? Daca in rindurile care urmeaza nu putem raspunde acestor intrebari, cei putin vom reduce in actualitate o problema care este ignorata si trecuta sub tacere de cei care ar trebui s-o rezolve.

Inainte de toate, ce este un glont exploziv? Ca aspect si dimensiuni, nu se deosebeste de un glont obisnuit de calibrul 7,62 mm, deci poate fi folosit ca munitie pentru pistolul automat AKM. Ce il deosebeste de un glont obisnuit este faptul ca odata patruns in tinta, glontul “dum-dum” explodeaza, raspindind o puzderie de schije si producind distrugeri infioratoare in regiunea in care a intrat. Deci, daca cu un glont obisnuit se scoate adversarul din lupta, prin folosirea unui exploziv este sigur ca i se provoaca acestuia o rana care il va chinui toata viata, in cazul in care va supravietui leziunilor provocate de schije si puternicei hemoragii care insoteste de obicei o astfel de rana. Iata de ce acest tip de munitie a fost interzis de multi ani, prin tratate internationale.

Domnul profesor Nicolae Angelescu, seful Sectiei Chirurgie a Spitalului Coltea a avut amabilitatea sa ne explice citeva din aspectele tratamentului chirurgical al ranilor produse de gloante explozive:

–Sint mai multi factori, care contribuie la a face ca o plaga provocata de un astfel de glont sa fie greu de tratat si greu de vindecat. In primul rind prin explozia glontului se produc distrugeri masive de tesuturi in zona in care aceasta a patruns si uneori aceste tesuturi nu se mai pot reface. In al doilea rind, fragmentele metalice rezultate (?) in urma exploziei se raspindesc pe o intindere mare si de aceea nu pot fi extrase in totalitate, pentru ca extragerea lor ar provoca pacientului o rana mult mai mare decit cea produsa de glontul in sine. Deci, dupa operatie mai ramin in corpul pacientului destule fragmente metalice si acestea constituie surse de infectie care il agraveaza starea.

Pentru a va ajuta sa va dati seama cum arata si ce inseamna o rana produsa de un glont exploziv, va prezentam in continuarea diagnosticele de internare ale celor adusi in Spitalul Coltea, impuscati cu astfel de gloante:

1. Nicolae Lucian, adus pe data de 21 (?) decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: fractura cominutiva femur sting in treimea inferioara, cu leziune de artera si vena femurala si pierdere de substanta prin plaga impuscata.

2. Necunoscut, adus pe 22 decembrie, ora 1, decedat la ora 1.30. Diagnostic: hemoragie peritoneala cataclismica cu plage de vena porta, case splinice, zdrobire de pancreas prin plaga impuscata hipocondru sting. Plaga zdrobita de colon travers.

3. Radu Traian, adus pe data de 23 decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: plaga transfixianta glezna stinga cu fractura cominutiva tuberozitatea calcaneana. Sectinue artera si vena tibiala. Fractura deschisa cominutiva maleola interna dreapta.

4. Gherman Dumitru, adus pe 25 decembrie 1989. Diagnostic: plaga impuscata antrebat sting bipolara, cu explozie de ulna, in treimea distala si lipsa de substanta osoasa, sectiune de tendoane muschi flexori ai carpului si degetelor si sectiune de pachet vasculo-nervos ulnar.

5. Astafei Petre, adus pe 22 decembrie 1989, decedat. Diagnostic: plaga impuscata toraco-abdominala cu ruptura de ficat si rinichi drept. Hemopneu-motorax drept, hematom intraperitoneal, stare de soc hemoragic, fractura cominutiva coastele 7,8, si 9 drepte.

6. Soldat Constantinoiu Vasile, adus la data de 24 decembrie 1989, decedat. Diagnostic: hemotorax sting masiv cu soc hemoragic prin plaga impuscata cervico-toracala cu ruptura vertebrelor toracale T2, T6, ruptura vaselor vertebrale si a vaselor de la baza gitului….

Cristian Calugar, Flacara, 13-19 februarie 1991 (nr. 6) , pp. 8-9.

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cei care nu cred in gloante explozive

dl profesor Vladimir Belis, care in decembrie 1989 era directorul Institutului de Medicina Legala Mina Minovici din Bucuresti

Povestile despre teroristi care trageau cu gloante “”dum-dum””, “”gloante cu cap vidia”” sau gloante de calibru mare, atipice pentru unitatile militare romanesti, vor ramane din cauza asta doar niste povesti care nu pot fi confirmate sau infirmate.

http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/34668/belis-nu-a-vazut-cadavrele-ceausestilor

Generalul Dan VOINEA despre decembrie 1989:

“Nu exista victime (persoane impuscate) nici de la gloantele cu cap vidia,

nici de la dum-dum.”

(cu Romulus Cristea, Romania Libera, 22 decembrie 2005)

http://www.romanialibera.ro/a58783/toti-alergau-dupa-un-inamic-invizibil.html

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Arabesque II: Arab Terrorists in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 28, 2009

Alte dezvaluiri nu numai despre existenta teroristilor din decembrie 1989, dar despre existenta unor teroristi arabi:

1)  Viorel Neagoe, seful Carului 3 color al TV.R., amplasat chiar in Piata Palatului:  “(…) In jurul orei 17,30, dupa ce o rafala a spart un geam la etajul al C.C.-ului, ca la un semnal, s-a deschis focul asupra Pietei de la toate geamurile cladirilor care marginesc piata, mai putin C.C.-ul.  Timp de circa 5 minute s-a tras probabil in sus pentru ca, desi ma asteptam ca Piata sa se transforme intr-o baie de sange, oamenii au fost lasati sa se imprastie sau sa se ascunda pe sub camioane.  Dupa un timp insa gloantele au inceput sa coboare, lovind ici, colo cate un civil, dar tirul era concentrat asupra T.A.B.-urilor (5 la numar), care erau amplasate in dreptul Directiei a V-a.  In momentul cand am vazut ca focul nu se mai opreste, am rugat, prin statie, sa ni sa trimita ajutor militar de urgenta.  Focul a fost continuu timp de 80 minute pana cand, in sfirsit, in piata au aparut 6 tancuri (din U.M. 01060 Bucuresti- n.n.), care s-au raspindit in evantai in fata carului si au tras cu mitralierele asupra cladirilor din jur.  Din acel moment focul din partea opusa a incetat, ca dupa 20 de minute sa se reia cu aceeasi intensitate.  Dupa mai multe astfel de reprize, in “Sala diplomatilor” din Consilul de Stat a avut loc o explozie, in urma careia flacarile au izbucnit violent.  Am chemat pompierii, tot prin intermediul turnului si acestia au venit in circa 10 minute.

(…) in urmatorul interval de timp, cei care trageau din Consiliu au inceput sa se urce spre etajele superioare, in final iesind pe acoperis circa 10-12 insi imbracati in pantaloni negri si camasi cu maneca scurta.  Desi au fost somati de mai multe ori–circa 15 minute–sa se predea, ca li se garanteaza viata, acestia continuau sa fluture drapele rosii.  La un moment dat unul din ei a luat o mitraliera de pe acoperis si a inceput sa traga asupra celor din Piata, care iesisera din ascunzatori, in momentul urmator insa o rafala de pe mitraliera unui tanc din fata noastra i-a secerat pe toti (se pare deci ca cei in cauza nu aveau voie sa se predea vii).  Pe doi dintre acesti tipi, prinsi de catre revolutionari in jurul orei 19.00, i-am vazut la 2 metri distanta si aratau a mercenari arabi, dupa culoare si echipament (au fost dusi in C.C., dar nu stiu ce s-a intamplat cu ei).”

(Revolutia Romana in direct, Bucuresti, 1990, pp. 247-248; p. 236 Armata in Revolutia Romana din decembrie 1989.)

2) Liviu Viorel Craciun, fost uslas si “primul ministru de interne pe 22 decembrie 1989,” si dupa data de 27 decembrie 1989 oponent al Frontului National al Salvarii:

…cu o noapte inainte, luptele erau in toi.  Dimineata cind au fost adunate cadavrele si s-a facut un bilant destul de incert, din cinci cadavre de teroristi intinse pe strada, doua apartineau unor mercenari arabi, declara un factor de raspundere.  In aceasta zi de 28 se curata cimpul de bataie.

(“Destainurile unui ministru de interne III” Zig-Zag, nr. 72 august 1991, p. 6)

3) Prigoana vantului Romania Libera 23 decembrie 2008, Romulus Cristea.

Mircea: Am arestat in 24 decembrie 1989 din apartamentul situat pe str.Garii de Nord,vis-a-vis de centrul de calcul un irakian care nu a incetat sa traga pana la venirea mea si a prietenului meu.L-am luat pentru ca era deja drogat.Am avut noroc chior.L-am dus la subsolul Min.Transporturilor unde se aflau demult doua unitati militare.La nivelul 2 subsol am predat pe irakian unui ofiter colonel.Irakianul nu avea viza din anul 1981.Tot ce povestesc aici e extrem de adevarat.Mai multe indicii nu pot sa dau,dar se pare ca in Bucuresti au actionat in jur de 73 de luptatori de gherila urbana specializati in lichidari de persoane de nationalitate araba.Asta e tot ce pot sa scriu.In zona Garii de Nord.
Luni, 06 Aprilie 2009 22:19

4)

The original video posted by destituirea in “The Romanian Revolution for Dum-Dums” can be accessed via the following link:

USLA bullets called \”vidia\” or \”dum-dum\”

destituirea (1 year ago) Show Hide

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Am fost de asemenea intrebat daca stiu sau am dovezi mai clare despre Mercenarii lui Ceausescu.

—partea intai—-

Ce pot sa zic e ca personal nu am dovezi. Dar am vazut cu ochii mei impreuna cu tatal si fratele meu un mercenar ARAB ascunzanduse la bloc fara haine groase pe el.

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—-partea a doua—

Tata i-a dat o haina militara pt ca pe vremea aia era frig si ningea. Nu vorbea Romaneste dar avea accent si silabisea intr-o limba araba care nu am putut la vremea respectiva sa o descifrez a fiin Iraniana, Libaneza, Siriana sau Irakiana. L-am lasat in bloc pe scari singur. A doa zi nu l-am mai vazut. FSN nu era inca infiintat. Blocul era langa cimitirul de pe strada Antiaeriana (Calea Rahovei) ci nu langa MAPN

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– Gloantele Vidia erau marca secreta a Romaniei impotriva unui atac sovietic de care Ceausescu se tot ferea inca de la invadarea Cehoslovaciei in 1968.

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ARABESQUE I:

Arabesque: Arab Terrorist in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution

ARABESQUE: Arab Terrorists in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 27, 2009

(For the English of this discussion, see below the excerpts from “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian”  Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea\’s Campaign 2006)

Chiar daca stim din Inginer Hristea Teodor, fost lucrator in fosta unitate speciala “P” din DSS “USLA s-a transformat in teroristi” ca “In 23 dimineata am tinut o sedinta cu efectivul. Noi suntem ca orice unitate de cercetare si productie (microproductie). Am dat ordin ca documentatiile tehnice cu continut de secret si strict secret sa fie adunate intr-o zona considerata mai sigura. Gen. Militaru s-a referit la transferul unor unitati de la MI si securitate la MApN. A spus ca USLA s-a transformat in teroristi. S-au reluat ascultarile de la unele obiective- in special ambasadele arabe”  S-au reluat ascultarile de la unele obiective- in special ambasadele arab

si stim ca intr-un document cu data de 1 martie 1990, seful de cabinet al directorului Generalul Iulian Vlad, Ion Aurel Rogojan, a fost solicitat sa scria care a fost rolul lui USLA in decembrie 1989 si care a fost relatia intre DSS si unitatea speciala “al-Fatah” a OEP.  In legatura cu solicitarea aceasta, Rogojan a scris despre antrenare cadrelor USLA sub colonelului (r) Firan cu grupa aceasta, pe baza de un protocol semnat in 1979-1980.  (vezi reprooducerea documentului in articolul lui E. O. Ohanesian, “Pe stil vechi-colonel de securitate, pe stil nou-general NATO,” Romania Libera, 8 April 2004),

si chiar daca fost ofiter de Directia 1 a Securitatii la Timisoara Roland Vasilevici a scris…

“Prioritate aveau camerele studentilor straini, in special arabi, care erau ocupate, in mare masura, de indivizi pregatiti prin diverse tabere internationale de antrenament si de instruire terorista sau prin Muntii Fagaras.  Acestia aveau misiunea sa coopereze si cu ofiterii de Securitate, din cadrul U.S.L.A., sectorul de “informatii”, care isi avea “sediul legal” in Timisoara la ultimul nivel al cladirii din Bulevardul Leontin Salajan…Intrucit acestia vorbeau mai mult araba, s-a instituit o sectie de lingvistica cu acest profil de studiu la Scoala de ofiteri de Securitate de la Baneasa, unde fiica lui Ion Dinca (temutul “pumn de fier” al ex-presedintelui, supranumit “te-leaga”) era sefa de catedra.

De foarte multe ori s-a emis si ipoteza ca, in total secret, multi dintre acesti studenti straini, care ii venereaza pe Allah, pe Mahomed sau pe urmasii sai:  Abu-Bekr, Omar, Otman si Ali, fie ca sint palestinieni, irakieni sau libieni–toti beneficiarii unor burse romanesti–ar constitui un “COMANDO” condus de Bucuresti, bine pregatit, menit sa apere, in caz extrem, perechea prezidentiala romana, in schimbul sprijinului acordat de Ceausescu patriei lor, prin donatii de armament, munitii, alimente, si tehnologie de virf importata din Vest.  Revolutia a confirmat aceste suspiciuni, desi adevarul se va cunoaste peste cincizeci de ani, tainuirea avind o motivatie economica, inerenta conjuncturii actuale, cind multi muncitori romani lucreaza pe unele santiere arabo-africane, in zona Golfului…”

“Cei din U.S.L.A. si unii studenti straini, alaturati lor, trageau cu niste cartuse speciale, care, la lovirea tintei, provocau noi explozii.“

Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (editura de vest, 1991), pp. 72, 73, si 61:

totusi, mai exista oameni care nici nu cred in teroristi arabi in decembrie 1989.

in schimb, ei au incredere in procurorul Dan Voinea, cel care a descoperit nici teroristi, nici gloante dum-dum, nici simulatoare, nici razboi-electronic, cu alte cuvinte aproape nimic in legatura cu decembrie 1989…

sau in procurorul Teodor Ungureanu, care se pare crede in teroristi, dar numai daca au fost furnizate de catre aramata (mai ales DIA)…in nici un caz, n-au fost securisti sau mercenari arabi…

Ungureanu ne spune ca el a asistat la audierea “teribilul terorist OWT”…si ca OWT n-a fost nici terorist, nici arab…(sigur domnule, totusi e interesant ca omul nu scrie numele OWT, fiindca stim ca numele cu litera “W” este cum sa zicem foarte rar si in romana si in maghiara…dar nu e asa de rar in numele arab de exemplu, Walid sau asa ceva…deci cum se cheama OWT in realitate?  oricum aici este frumoasa poveste a lui Teodor Ungureanu)

“TEORISTUL OWT”. La un moment dat seful colectivului (M. Popa-Cherecheanu) ne-a chemat in biroul unde se gasea si am asistat la audierea “teribilului terorist OWT”, despre care, in tabelele puse la dispozitie de un ofiter MApN, se consemnase faptul ca fusese retinut in apropierea ministerului, avand un comportament suspect si necunoscand limba romana. Dupa cateva minute de tatonari, s-a constatat cu stupoare ca “teroristul” nu era decat un biet om cu grave deficiente de vorbire, pe fondul unei evidente afectiuni insotita de retard intelectual (neputand sa mormaie decat niste sunete care s-ar fi putut transcrie, fonetic, prin majusculele mai-sus amintite)… Asupra barbatului pipernicit si jerpelit din fata noastra nu se gasise nici arma si nici vreun alt lucru compromitator. De altfel, acesta nu a fost singurul sau cel mai “gogonat” caz dintre cele pe care aveam sa le intalnesc atunci. Am vazut cu ochii mei consemnat, in tabelele intocmite la minister, faptul ca un barbat cu figura mai negricioasa (banuit a fi fost arab) isi pierduse libertatea pentru ca alergase dupa… tramvai! In acele zile si nopti au fost retinuti mai multi cetateni straini, studenti arabi la diferite facultati bucurestene. Pe unii i-am vazut si eu, la MapN. Fusesera retinuti in strada sau in locuintele lor ori ale prietenelor din cartierul Drumul Taberei. Asa se face ca unul dintre acestia, student medicinist, daca nu gresesc, era total “neinspirat” imbracat pentru un anotimp rece… De departe, cel mai “interesant” caz a fost cel al unui alt student de origine araba, parca iranian, care fusese molestat destul de puternic si acuza o fractura costala. Era de-a dreptul comic modul in care se chinuia, pe un dialect colorat, sa ne explice ca “la taru meu trecut doi revoluti si ei nu coasta rupt!”…

teodor ungureanu si teroristul OWT

Hai sa trecem la martuiri mai credibili si putini influentati de politica partizana si securista… despre teroristi arabi vazuti sau arestati:

1) Dl. Savin Chiritescu

“Vreau sa arat ca subsemnatul si mai multi colegi din aceeasi unitate de tancuri [UM 01060 Bucuresti-Pantelimon] am capturat teroristi arabi (dintre care unul ne-a spus ca este din Beirut) inarmati, pe care i-am predate la Marele Stat Major. Unul era student, am gasit asupra lui un pistol mitraliera de calibrul 5.62 seria UF 060866, cu cadenta de ambreiaj, lung de vreo 40 cm, portabil pe sub haine: arma parea facuta dintr-un plastic foarte dur, cu exceptia tevii si a mecanismului de dare a focului. “

Al. Mihalcea, “O gafa monumentala,” Romania Libera, 31 October 1990, p. 5a.

2)  Danka la http://www.jurnalul.ro/comentarii.read.php?id=79510 aprilie 2006

22 decembrie 1989, la unitatea militara 010__ de la marginea padurii Branesti.

Padurea Branesti adaposteste unul din cele mai mari depozite de munitie din jurul capitalei.  Se spune ca o explozie la acest depozit ar rade cartierul Pantelimon de la capatul tramvaiului 14.

Spre seara a inceput sa se traga asupra unitatii dinspre calea ferata.  Se tragea in orice folosindu-se armament de calibru mic si pusti automate.  Dupa focul de la gura tevii pareau 3 persoane ascunse dupa rambeul cai ferate care au deschis foc cu scopul de a creea panica.

Soldatii au iesit din dormitoare si s-au adapostit in parcul auto pe sub camioane.

Nu se putea sta in cladiri, “teroristii” trageau in geamuri.

Desi se daduse alarma in acea zi mai devreme nimeni nu era pregatit sa riposteze decit cei aflati in garda.  Un grup de soldati cu subofiteri si ofiteri echipati cu AK 47, si pistoale TT au pornit la un atac prin invaluire.

Toti au ajuns in amplasamentele stabilite fara incidente, la adapostul intunericului dar si pentru faptul ca intrusi erau mai mult ocupati sa mentina foc consistent asupra unitatii.

La un moment dat soldatii au deschis focul, lupta a durat mai putin de 10 minute.  Micutele lor UZ fara precizie la distanta nu au facut fata la renumitul AK 47

Unul dintre teroristi a fost impuscat in cap iar ceilalti doi au fost raniti cind incercau sa fuga peste cimp in directia opusa unitatii militare.

Cei trei au fost transportati la corpul de garda unde s-a aprins lumina (pina atunci unitate fusese in bezna) si s-a constatat ca unul dintre cei doi suprevietuitori era de fapt femeie.

Toti erasu maslinii la fata, imbracati in combinezoane negre si ce doi suprevietuitori raniti se vaitau spunind ceva in limba araba.

Dupa o jumatate de ora un a sosit un ARO al armatei care s-a spus ca a venit de la statul major al diviziei si i-a luat pe toti trei.  Dupa citeva zile toti soldatii care au participat la actiunea de noaptea aceea au fosti pusi sa semneze o declaratie prin care se angajau sa nu divulge nimic din ce s-a intimplat.

Toate acestea sint adevarate si usor de verificat.”

3) Citeva cazuri in engleza

“Terorist cu un portfel cu pasaport libian si o adevarinta de tipul celor care inlocuiesc buletinul…impuscat mortal in fostul sediu al CC al PCR in seara zilei de 22 decembrie 1989…asupra lui au fost gasite un pumnal militar si un pistol ‘Makarov’ seria DL 7028 ” Weapons similar to those of Directorate V-a and the USLA could have shown up anywhere during the Revolution, in anybody’s hands, but what is interesting is among whose hands they did show up. Official Army documents and recollections by Army participants in the early 1990s show that a citizen with a Libyan passport in his billfold shot in the CC building on the night of 22 December was found in possession of a 9 mm“Makarov” pistol…a pistol whose serial number was traced back to a V-a member who claimed that he had “thrown it away” earlier that afternoon.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[109]<!–[endif]–>

Paul Vincius, “Moartea unui terorist,” Zig-Zag, no. 106 (April 1992), p. 7. One of the documents attesting to the ownership of the weapon is reproduced in the article.

in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[81]<!–[endif]–>Mirel Paun, “Ion Capatana: ‘Argeseni, va cer scuze ca am participat la Revolutie!” Cotidianul Argesul, 5/8/05 online at http://www.cotidianul-argesul.ro.

4) Cazul Brasov

Adrian Socaciu, “Dupa nopti de groaza si tortura, toti teroristi sint liberi,” Cuvintul, nr. 1-2 ianuarie 1991, pp. 3-5.

Pe pagina 3, ziaristul scrie despre gloante de calibru special, cap vidia sau exploziv.
Pe pagina 4, despre un individual la cantina partidului imbracat in negru, cu o pusca cu teava scurta, gloante 7,62 mm dar explozive, despre gloante de “grosimea unui creion, de culoarea aluminumului.”
Pe pagina 5, ca au fost arestati 5 indivizi suspectati ca teroristi, 3 arabi si 2 romani…

5) Cateva martuiri din forumisti..

Am fost martor ocular la capturarea unui terorist (dupa culoarea tenului as jura ca era arab) care folosea un PSL si tragea in populatie… a fost prins viu si batut sub ochii mei de catre armata, apoi luat pe sus intr-un camion, tot de armata… zilele urmatoare s-a continuat sa se sustina sus si tare la radio/TV ca NU au existat teroristi, sau ca nu s-au dat prinsi! Sigur, si-a cumparat PSL-ul de la magazinul universal… dar politica a dictat ca este mai bine pentru interesul meu propriu si personal sa nu se spuna adevarul, nu?
Mai bine imi vad de ale mele.

psl universal

– pe la data de 24 parca, am fost martora vizuala cand soldatii au capturat un lunetist arab (brunet si vorbea stricat romaneste) – folosea vestita Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta (PSL – parca romaneasca) modificata din ak47. Sunt sigura ca fusese folosita, si nu pentru a-l ajuta la deplasare. L-au suit intr-un camion si l-au dus cica la comandamentul unui oras mare (Brasov). Ulterior s-a spus peste tot ca NU au fost implicate forte straine, sau daca au fost, ca nu exista nici un fel de urme care sa dovedeasca asta. Pentru mine a fost momentul in care am inceput sa cred ca inghit o gogoasa cu ulei impotriva vointei mele;

http://forum.softpedia.com/lofiversion/index.php/t96198.html.

6) Fosti securisti siliti sa dea declaratii dupa evenimentele

http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/arhiva/2005_285.html.

Cpt. Soare Ovidiu din fosta Directie a V-a, serviciul 4+5, domiciliul in Bucuresti, strada Mendeleev, declara urmatoarele:
Sediul Ministerului Apararii Nationale,
22/23.12.1989
In noaptea de 22/23 decembrie 1989, aflandu-se in sediul MApN, in jurul orelor 22,00, a inceput un armat, in forta, asupra MApN, din Complexul “Orizont” si dinspre blocurile din stanga si dreapta acestuia. Dupa modul cum au actionat si dupa cum aratau victimele dintre militarii care au aparat peste noapte obiectivul (impuscati in cap sau in zona capului), au concluzionat cu totii ca s-a tras cu arme cu luneta cu dispozitiv de infrarosii. Se afla impreuna cu lt. maj. Grigoras de la S.M.B., cpt. Arusoaie de la Unitatea speciala “T” si alte cadre.
Atacul asupra sediului MApN s-a desfasurat cu fanatism, unul dintre atacatori a sarit gardul inarmat doar cu un cutit, a fost impuscat, iar dimineata l-a vazut de la circa 5-6 metri si afirma ca avea infatisare de arab (ten masliniu, parul si mustata negre si crete). Se spunea ca nu avea asupra sa documente de identitate.
In noaptea de 23/24 decembrie 1989, aflandu-se la locuinta mamei sale, a vazut pe geam cum actionau trei teroristi, atacand sediul MApN Erau in uniforme de armata, cu caschete si actionau astfel:
– fugea cate unul spre chioscul LOTOPRONOSPORT din fata MApN, trageau doua-trei focuri, apoi fugeau inapoi; intre blocuri;
– apoi, in grup, unul tragea spre MApN, iar ceilalti doi trageau in sus cu trasoare.
Despre acest lucru a telefonat si informat la MApN pe maiorul Colt.
NOTA: Relatarile ofiterului se coroboreaza cu declaratiile surorii sale Mihaila Sanda Cristina cu domiciliul in Bucuresti, Aleea Poiana Mare nr. 8, bloc B9, apart. 47, sector 6.

Un articol de Catalin Antohe

Lt. mr. APOSTOL M. ANTON, fost ofiter in serviciul 1 declara:

In ziua de 29 decembrie 1989 a aflat de la vecinul PIPOI REMUS, care locuieste la etajul 2, sub apartamentul lui, ca a vazut mai multe persoane tragand spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, despre care era convins ca nu erau romani. I s-a parut ca ar fi arabi. Trageau cu niste pistoale automate mici.

in sfirsit, ceea ce ne-a spus fostul ofiter USLA Marian Romanescu in 1991

(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLA erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

ENGLISH

excerpts from Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea\’s Campaign 2006

Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.” Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:

“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.

The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital. It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route]. Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad. Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note: possible reference to 5 mm weapons]. Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic. The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks. They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out]. Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty. A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area. All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit. At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes. Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47. One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit. The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman. All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic. After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three. After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened. All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]

liviu viorel craciun  admission

Finally, there are the recollections of eyewitnesses, a decade and a half later, who—despite the onslaught of cynicism toward such ideas—continue to maintain they saw what they thought they saw…

“I was an eyewitness to the capture of a terrorist (based on the color of his tan I’d swear he was Arab) who was using a PSL [i.e. sharpshooting rifle, a lunetist] and firing into the population…he was taken alive and beaten in front of my own eyes by the Army, then taken up into a truck, also by the Army…in the following days they continued to sustain over and over on radio and TV that there did NOT exist any terrorists, or at least that none had been captured…Yeah, I’m sure this guy bought his PSL at the ‘Universal’ department store.”

“On the 24th I think, I was an eyewitness when soldiers captured an Arab sharpshooter (brown[-skinned] and he spoke broken Romanian)—who was using the famous “Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta” (PSL—apparently Romanian) modified from an AK47. I’m sure that he had used it, and not just to help on his travels. They whisked him away in a truck and they brought him to the command [post] of a large town (Brasov). Later it was said that foreign forces were NOT implicated, or if they were, that there were no traces to prove it. For me, that was the moment in which I began to believe that I was having a lie forced down my throat.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[26]<!–[endif]–>

Foreign Involvement

So far in this piece, we have seen references to the arrest or killing as “terrorists” of the following as apparent foreigners, notably Arabs: 1) the arrest of one with a PSL in Bucharest, 2) the arrest of another with a PSL, apparently somewhere near Brasov, 3) the revelations of soldiers who killed and arrested several in the Pantelimon area of Bucharest (I will consider these two revelations one and the same for our purposes here). Years after the Revolution, there are still claims that Arabs were captured elsewhere: in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[81]<!–[endif]–> Later we will see reports written by two Securitate officers immediately after the events—apparently required of them by Army officials—attesting to the killing of Arab “terrorists” in the area around the Defense Ministry building in Bucharest. We shall also see how a weapon registered to a member of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate just happened to show up in the hands of a man with a Libyan passport in his billfold who was shot in the Central Committee building in Bucharest on the night of 22 December.

Indeed, the presence and activity of these foreign, apparently mostly Arab terrorists, was almost prosaic. Liviu Viorel Craciun (appropriately enough craciun means “Christmas”), the so-called “First Interior Minister of the Revolution” in one of the protogovernments that tried to form in the CC after the Ceausescus fled and—a source of much confusion in research on the events (more on this below)—a former USLA officer until 1986, reported that on 28 December 1989: “…in the morning five cadavers were collected and a rough count was made, out of the five terrorist cadavers found in the street, two belonged to Arab mercenaries…The shot terrorists could not be identified and they did not seem to interest anyone.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[82]<!–[endif]–>

So what was the role of foreigners, specifically Arabs, in the Revolution? Interesting in this regard is a report dated 1 March 1990 by Lt-Colonel Ion Aurel Rogojan, who in 1989 was Securitate Director General Vlad’s chief of cabinet staff. As B. Mihalache speculates somebody must have been interested in this question, “since Rogojan was ordered to write a report on it.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[83]<!–[endif]–> Rogojan wrote in his 1 March 1990 report that he “has knowledge of the fact that between the Department of State Security and the ‘Al Fatah’ Security [service] of the Palestinian Liberation Organization there existed relations of cooperation based on a protocol.” Rogojan continues in this report:

“At the same time, some activities for the training of USLA cadres abroad were carried out (the group was led by reserve colonel Firan, former chief of general staff of the mentioned unit). The protocol was established in the period 1979-1980 and a copy can be found in the protocol relations division of the former Independent Judicial Secretariat Service of the DSS [i.e. Securitate]. In connection with the existence of this protocol, I was asked in recent weeks, by Colonel Ardeleanu Gheorghe, USLA Commander. The Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare was coordinated on behalf of the DSS’ Executive Bureau by General-Colonel Iulian Vlad in the period 1977-1987, and after that by Secretary of State General-Major Alexie Stefan and Deputy Minister Major General Bucurescu Gianu. In the USLA there existed a special detachment for antiterrorist intervention, organized in three shifts and subordinated to the chief of the general staff. I don’t have any data concerning the activity of the USLA in the period of the December ’89 events.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[84]<!–[endif]–>

It should also be abundantly clear here that Rogojan was being asked to write not just about the role of outside forces, but specifically about the role of the USLA in December 1989. Once again, why such interest in the USLA?

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go? What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]? Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator? If not for that reason, why? Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released. The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be. It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia. But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original]<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[85]<!–[endif]–>

We know from the revelations of a former worker (engineer Hristea Todor) at the Securitate’s special unit “P,” that the new Front leadership was sufficiently suspicious of Arab presence that “General Militaru referred to the transfer of some units from the MI and Securitate to the Defense Ministry. He said the USLA had transformed into terrorists. The electronic (telephone) surveillance of certain objectives was started up again—in particular Arab embassies.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[86]<!–[endif]–> (Note: this appears yet another reference to the aforementioned meeting at USLA headquarters on the evening of 25 December.) Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[87]<!–[endif]–>

Notably, of course, with these exceptions, the former Securitate and their apologists—whom as Army General Urdareanu suggests uniformly don’t believe in the existence of real terrorists in December 1989, yet who love to blame foreign interference for Ceausescu’s overthrow (in particular, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews)—do not like to make reference to or talk about “Arab terrorists.”

Further evidence of the involvement of “Arab terrorists” comes from the behavior in late December 1989, as much as the later statements, of the usually garrulous Silviu Brucan. In August 1990, Brucan would allege the involvement of “some 30 foreigners,” according to him, mostly Palestinian, who had been trained by the Securitate—what Michael Shafir termed “the first admission of foreign intervention by a member of the December 1989 leadership.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[88]<!–[endif]–> Reminiscent of Tanasescu’s curt response to the reporter’s question about the involvement of foreign terrorists (discussed above)—“I ask that you be so kind as to…” not ask me about this—back on 29 December 1989, Brucan, at the time a key decision-maker in the new Front leadership (he would leave in February), told Le Monde that the issue was “very delicate” and “involving diplomatic implications that must still be worked out”; “better to be cautious,” he opined.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[89]<!–[endif]–> That was, of course, no denial; indeed, it sounds like the new leadership was trying to find a solution to the dilemma they found themselves in.

Suspicion, in particular, surrounded the role of Libyans, which, as we have seen, at the very least, somehow found themselves in areas of gunfire in December. Sergiu Nicolaescu claims—I have been unable to verify this—that of all the countries to recognize the new National Salvation Front government, running to the top of the line to be first was…Qadafi’s Libya!<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[90]<!–[endif]–> The “anonymous plotters” who leaked information to Liviu Valenas of Baricada in August 1990 maintained that “It isn’t accidental that on 25 December 1989, the first plane bringing aid came from Libya. However, when it went on its return route it was loaded with people. In the almost complete chaos that dominated at the time, the New Power [i.e. the Front] did not know what the plane to Libya was carrying (it left from Otopeni, when the airport was still closed to traffic).”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[91]<!–[endif]–> In 1994, two journalists specified that the plane in question on the 25th was a DC9 and that “40 Arabs” had been loaded aboard, and noted that they had learned that on 28-29 December 1989, “the [Otopeni’s] airport archive had disappeared.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[92]<!–[endif]–>

Michael Shafir at Radio Free Europe Research at the time noted in October 1990 that “unconfirmed but very reliable military and governmental Romanian sources interviewed by RFE said that shortly after the capture of Palestinians, Libyans, and other Arabs who had fought on the side of pro-Ceausescu forces, Quadhafi had threatened to kill all Romanian specialists in Libya if the Arabs were not allowed to leave Romania.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[93]<!–[endif]–> Certainly, this is what Constantin Vranceanu hinted at in September 1990 in Romania Libera when he wrote of “Plan Z-Z”—according to him, “practically an alliance, on many levels, including military between Romania and several other countries with totalitarian regimes (Iran, Libya, Syria), to which was added the PLO…which called for the other parties to intervene with armed forces to reestablish state order when one of the leaderships was in trouble”:

“Several weeks after 22 December, the president of one of the countries directly involved threatened the Romanian government that it would make recourse to reprisals against those several thousand Romania citizens who were working in that country if [the Romanian government] did not return the foreign terrorists, [whether] alive or dead. This blackmail worked and a Romanian plane went on an unusual route to a Polish airport, from where the ‘contents,’ unusually including the able-bodied, wounded, and coffins, were transferred to another plane, that took off in an unknown direction.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[94]<!–[endif]–>

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch. This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’ I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people. And I was told: Only you and two other people know this. I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[95]<!–[endif]–>

Relatedly, in July 1990, Liviu Valenas noted that,

“On 24 January 1990, the new Foreign Minister of Romania announced on Television and Radio that a series of secret treaties between the R.S.R. [Romanian Socialist Republic] and third countries had been abrogated, and are no longer valid and operational for the new Romania. The New Power pledged to deal with these countries concerning Romania’s obligations through the abrogation of these accords. An ambiguous text, apparently launched by Sergiu Celac’s group,led public opinion in Romania to believe that these treaties concerned ‘terrorist assistance.’”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[96]<!–[endif]–>

It is noteworthy that in the context of a series entitled “The Truth about the U.S.L.A.,” (more on this infamous series below), Horia Alexandrescu paused on 14 March 1990 to quote from a 1 February article by another journalist about TAROM flight 259 (to Warsaw and back):

“24 January, 4 PM: After the aircraft was inspected [“controlul antiterorist”] (after the Revolution of 22 December, ,soimi’ as those who performed antiterrorist protection [i.e. USLA] were called by the pilots, were removed from both internal and external TAROM flights, even though all airlines have such teams), the plane left for Bucharest. Meanwhile, however, the 45 Libyan passengers, who had gotten off for 5-6 hours in a layover at Otopeni, wanted to cross ‘the Polish border.’”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[97]<!–[endif]–>

According to Alexandrescu, the Polish authorities would not allow the TAROM plane to leave Poland, so it sat on the runway in Warsaw…until a second TAROM plane came—this time, according to Alexandru, including “uslasi”—the moral of the story of course being that the USLA needed to be put back on flights as soon as possible.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[98]<!–[endif]–> It is possible this is the plane Vranceanu was referring to in the quotation above. One thing’s for sure, this seemingly insignificant incident got unusual media coverage, in particular with regard to the USLA.

Not surprisingly, in June 2006, Prosecutor General Dan Voinea reiterated his contention that there was no foreign involvement/intervention in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution!

In early January 1990, “Cpt. Soare Ovidiu, [of Securitate] Directorate V-a, Services 4+5, resident of Bucharest, Mendeleev Street,” presumably under questioning, spoke about those he had seen killed as “terrorists”:

“Defense Ministry Headquarters [M.Ap.N.], 22/23.12.1989

On the night of 22/23 December 1989, being located in the Defense Ministry Headquarters, around 22:00, a forceful attack began upon the building from the ‘Orizont’ Complex and from the blocs to the left and right of it. Based on the manner in which they acted and how the victims from among the soldiers who were defending the building appeared (shot in the head or in the area of the head), everybody concluded that they were shot by guns with infrared night scopes [emphasis added]….The attack upon MapN Headquarters was unleashed with fanaticism, one of the attackers jumped a wall armed with a knife, he was shot, and in the morning I saw him from a distance of about 5-6 meters and I could conclude that he appeared Arab (olive-skinned, black hair and mustache). It was said he had no documents upon his person….”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[117]<!–[endif]–>

Lt. Mr. Apostol M. Anton, Service 1: “On 29 December 1989 he learned form his neighbor Pipoi Remus, who lives on the second floor, beneath his apartment, that he saw many people shooting toward the Defense Ministry, whom he was convinced were not Romanian. They appeared to him to be Arab. They were shooting with small automatic guns.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[118]<!–[endif]–>

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ARABESQUE: Arab Terrorists in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution

Posted by romanianrevolutionofdecember1989 on July 27, 2009

(For the English of this discussion, see below the excerpts from “Orwellian…Positively Orwellian”  Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea\’s Campaign 2006)

Chiar daca stim din Inginer Hristea Teodor, fost lucrator in fosta unitate speciala “P” din DSS “USLA s-a transformat in teroristi” ca “In 23 dimineata am tinut o sedinta cu efectivul. Noi suntem ca orice unitate de cercetare si productie (microproductie). Am dat ordin ca documentatiile tehnice cu continut de secret si strict secret sa fie adunate intr-o zona considerata mai sigura. Gen. Militaru s-a referit la transferul unor unitati de la MI si securitate la MApN. A spus ca USLA s-a transformat in teroristi. S-au reluat ascultarile de la unele obiective- in special ambasadele arabe”  S-au reluat ascultarile de la unele obiective- in special ambasadele arab

si stim ca intr-un document cu data de 1 martie 1990, seful de cabinet al directorului Generalul Iulian Vlad, Ion Aurel Rogojan, a fost solicitat sa scria care a fost rolul lui USLA in decembrie 1989 si care a fost relatia intre DSS si unitatea speciala “al-Fatah” a OEP.  In legatura cu solicitarea aceasta, Rogojan a scris despre antrenare cadrelor USLA sub colonelului (r) Firan cu grupa aceasta, pe baza de un protocol semnat in 1979-1980.  (vezi reprooducerea documentului in articolul lui E. O. Ohanesian, “Pe stil vechi-colonel de securitate, pe stil nou-general NATO,” Romania Libera, 8 April 2004),

si chiar daca fost ofiter de Directia 1 a Securitatii la Timisoara Roland Vasilevici a scris…

“Prioritate aveau camerele studentilor straini, in special arabi, care erau ocupate, in mare masura, de indivizi pregatiti prin diverse tabere internationale de antrenament si de instruire terorista sau prin Muntii Fagaras.  Acestia aveau misiunea sa coopereze si cu ofiterii de Securitate, din cadrul U.S.L.A., sectorul de “informatii”, care isi avea “sediul legal” in Timisoara la ultimul nivel al cladirii din Bulevardul Leontin Salajan…Intrucit acestia vorbeau mai mult araba, s-a instituit o sectie de lingvistica cu acest profil de studiu la Scoala de ofiteri de Securitate de la Baneasa, unde fiica lui Ion Dinca (temutul “pumn de fier” al ex-presedintelui, supranumit “te-leaga”) era sefa de catedra.

De foarte multe ori s-a emis si ipoteza ca, in total secret, multi dintre acesti studenti straini, care ii venereaza pe Allah, pe Mahomed sau pe urmasii sai:  Abu-Bekr, Omar, Otman si Ali, fie ca sint palestinieni, irakieni sau libieni–toti beneficiarii unor burse romanesti–ar constitui un “COMANDO” condus de Bucuresti, bine pregatit, menit sa apere, in caz extrem, perechea prezidentiala romana, in schimbul sprijinului acordat de Ceausescu patriei lor, prin donatii de armament, munitii, alimente, si tehnologie de virf importata din Vest.  Revolutia a confirmat aceste suspiciuni, desi adevarul se va cunoaste peste cincizeci de ani, tainuirea avind o motivatie economica, inerenta conjuncturii actuale, cind multi muncitori romani lucreaza pe unele santiere arabo-africane, in zona Golfului…”

“Cei din U.S.L.A. si unii studenti straini, alaturati lor, trageau cu niste cartuse speciale, care, la lovirea tintei, provocau noi explozii.“

Roland Vasilevici, Piramida Umbrelor (editura de vest, 1991), pp. 72, 73, si 61:

totusi, mai exista oameni care nici nu cred in teroristi arabi in decembrie 1989.

in schimb, ei au incredere in procurorul Dan Voinea, cel care a descoperit nici teroristi, nici gloante dum-dum, nici simulatoare, nici razboi-electronic, cu alte cuvinte aproape nimic in legatura cu decembrie 1989…

sau in procurorul Teodor Ungureanu, care se pare crede in teroristi, dar numai daca au fost furnizate de catre aramata (mai ales DIA)…in nici un caz, n-au fost securisti sau mercenari arabi…

Ungureanu ne spune ca el a asistat la audierea “teribilul terorist OWT”…si ca OWT n-a fost nici terorist, nici arab…(sigur domnule, totusi e interesant ca omul nu scrie numele OWT, fiindca stim ca numele cu litera “W” este cum sa zicem foarte rar si in romana si in maghiara…dar nu e asa de rar in numele arab de exemplu, Walid sau asa ceva…deci cum se cheama OWT in realitate?  oricum aici este frumoasa poveste a lui Teodor Ungureanu)

“TEORISTUL OWT”. La un moment dat seful colectivului (M. Popa-Cherecheanu) ne-a chemat in biroul unde se gasea si am asistat la audierea “teribilului terorist OWT”, despre care, in tabelele puse la dispozitie de un ofiter MApN, se consemnase faptul ca fusese retinut in apropierea ministerului, avand un comportament suspect si necunoscand limba romana. Dupa cateva minute de tatonari, s-a constatat cu stupoare ca “teroristul” nu era decat un biet om cu grave deficiente de vorbire, pe fondul unei evidente afectiuni insotita de retard intelectual (neputand sa mormaie decat niste sunete care s-ar fi putut transcrie, fonetic, prin majusculele mai-sus amintite)… Asupra barbatului pipernicit si jerpelit din fata noastra nu se gasise nici arma si nici vreun alt lucru compromitator. De altfel, acesta nu a fost singurul sau cel mai “gogonat” caz dintre cele pe care aveam sa le intalnesc atunci. Am vazut cu ochii mei consemnat, in tabelele intocmite la minister, faptul ca un barbat cu figura mai negricioasa (banuit a fi fost arab) isi pierduse libertatea pentru ca alergase dupa… tramvai! In acele zile si nopti au fost retinuti mai multi cetateni straini, studenti arabi la diferite facultati bucurestene. Pe unii i-am vazut si eu, la MapN. Fusesera retinuti in strada sau in locuintele lor ori ale prietenelor din cartierul Drumul Taberei. Asa se face ca unul dintre acestia, student medicinist, daca nu gresesc, era total “neinspirat” imbracat pentru un anotimp rece… De departe, cel mai “interesant” caz a fost cel al unui alt student de origine araba, parca iranian, care fusese molestat destul de puternic si acuza o fractura costala. Era de-a dreptul comic modul in care se chinuia, pe un dialect colorat, sa ne explice ca “la taru meu trecut doi revoluti si ei nu coasta rupt!”…

teodor ungureanu si teroristul OWT

Hai sa trecem la martuiri mai credibili si putini influentati de politica partizana si securista… despre teroristi arabi vazuti sau arestati:

1) Dl. Savin Chiritescu

“Vreau sa arat ca subsemnatul si mai multi colegi din aceeasi unitate de tancuri [UM 01060 Bucuresti-Pantelimon] am capturat teroristi arabi (dintre care unul ne-a spus ca este din Beirut) inarmati, pe care i-am predate la Marele Stat Major. Unul era student, am gasit asupra lui un pistol mitraliera de calibrul 5.62 seria UF 060866, cu cadenta de ambreiaj, lung de vreo 40 cm, portabil pe sub haine: arma parea facuta dintr-un plastic foarte dur, cu exceptia tevii si a mecanismului de dare a focului. “

Al. Mihalcea, “O gafa monumentala,” Romania Libera, 31 October 1990, p. 5a.

2)  Danka la http://www.jurnalul.ro/comentarii.read.php?id=79510 aprilie 2006

22 decembrie 1989, la unitatea militara 010__ de la marginea padurii Branesti.

Padurea Branesti adaposteste unul din cele mai mari depozite de munitie din jurul capitalei.  Se spune ca o explozie la acest depozit ar rade cartierul Pantelimon de la capatul tramvaiului 14.

Spre seara a inceput sa se traga asupra unitatii dinspre calea ferata.  Se tragea in orice folosindu-se armament de calibru mic si pusti automate.  Dupa focul de la gura tevii pareau 3 persoane ascunse dupa rambeul cai ferate care au deschis foc cu scopul de a creea panica.

Soldatii au iesit din dormitoare si s-au adapostit in parcul auto pe sub camioane.

Nu se putea sta in cladiri, “teroristii” trageau in geamuri.

Desi se daduse alarma in acea zi mai devreme nimeni nu era pregatit sa riposteze decit cei aflati in garda.  Un grup de soldati cu subofiteri si ofiteri echipati cu AK 47, si pistoale TT au pornit la un atac prin invaluire.

Toti au ajuns in amplasamentele stabilite fara incidente, la adapostul intunericului dar si pentru faptul ca intrusi erau mai mult ocupati sa mentina foc consistent asupra unitatii.

La un moment dat soldatii au deschis focul, lupta a durat mai putin de 10 minute.  Micutele lor UZ fara precizie la distanta nu au facut fata la renumitul AK 47

Unul dintre teroristi a fost impuscat in cap iar ceilalti doi au fost raniti cind incercau sa fuga peste cimp in directia opusa unitatii militare.

Cei trei au fost transportati la corpul de garda unde s-a aprins lumina (pina atunci unitate fusese in bezna) si s-a constatat ca unul dintre cei doi suprevietuitori era de fapt femeie.

Toti erasu maslinii la fata, imbracati in combinezoane negre si ce doi suprevietuitori raniti se vaitau spunind ceva in limba araba.

Dupa o jumatate de ora un a sosit un ARO al armatei care s-a spus ca a venit de la statul major al diviziei si i-a luat pe toti trei.  Dupa citeva zile toti soldatii care au participat la actiunea de noaptea aceea au fosti pusi sa semneze o declaratie prin care se angajau sa nu divulge nimic din ce s-a intimplat.

Toate acestea sint adevarate si usor de verificat.”

3) Citeva cazuri in engleza

“Terorist cu un portfel cu pasaport libian si o adevarinta de tipul celor care inlocuiesc buletinul…impuscat mortal in fostul sediu al CC al PCR in seara zilei de 22 decembrie 1989…asupra lui au fost gasite un pumnal militar si un pistol ‘Makarov’ seria DL 7028 ” Weapons similar to those of Directorate V-a and the USLA could have shown up anywhere during the Revolution, in anybody’s hands, but what is interesting is among whose hands they did show up. Official Army documents and recollections by Army participants in the early 1990s show that a citizen with a Libyan passport in his billfold shot in the CC building on the night of 22 December was found in possession of a 9 mm“Makarov” pistol…a pistol whose serial number was traced back to a V-a member who claimed that he had “thrown it away” earlier that afternoon.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[109]<!–[endif]–>

Paul Vincius, “Moartea unui terorist,” Zig-Zag, no. 106 (April 1992), p. 7. One of the documents attesting to the ownership of the weapon is reproduced in the article.

in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[81]<!–[endif]–>Mirel Paun, “Ion Capatana: ‘Argeseni, va cer scuze ca am participat la Revolutie!” Cotidianul Argesul, 5/8/05 online at http://www.cotidianul-argesul.ro.

4) Cazul Brasov

Adrian Socaciu, “Dupa nopti de groaza si tortura, toti teroristi sint liberi,” Cuvintul, nr. 1-2 ianuarie 1991, pp. 3-5.

Pe pagina 3, ziaristul scrie despre gloante de calibru special, cap vidia sau exploziv.
Pe pagina 4, despre un individual la cantina partidului imbracat in negru, cu o pusca cu teava scurta, gloante 7,62 mm dar explozive, despre gloante de “grosimea unui creion, de culoarea aluminumului.”
Pe pagina 5, ca au fost arestati 5 indivizi suspectati ca teroristi, 3 arabi si 2 romani…

5) Cateva martuiri din forumisti..

Am fost martor ocular la capturarea unui terorist (dupa culoarea tenului as jura ca era arab) care folosea un PSL si tragea in populatie… a fost prins viu si batut sub ochii mei de catre armata, apoi luat pe sus intr-un camion, tot de armata… zilele urmatoare s-a continuat sa se sustina sus si tare la radio/TV ca NU au existat teroristi, sau ca nu s-au dat prinsi! Sigur, si-a cumparat PSL-ul de la magazinul universal… dar politica a dictat ca este mai bine pentru interesul meu propriu si personal sa nu se spuna adevarul, nu?
Mai bine imi vad de ale mele.

psl universal

– pe la data de 24 parca, am fost martora vizuala cand soldatii au capturat un lunetist arab (brunet si vorbea stricat romaneste) – folosea vestita Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta (PSL – parca romaneasca) modificata din ak47. Sunt sigura ca fusese folosita, si nu pentru a-l ajuta la deplasare. L-au suit intr-un camion si l-au dus cica la comandamentul unui oras mare (Brasov). Ulterior s-a spus peste tot ca NU au fost implicate forte straine, sau daca au fost, ca nu exista nici un fel de urme care sa dovedeasca asta. Pentru mine a fost momentul in care am inceput sa cred ca inghit o gogoasa cu ulei impotriva vointei mele;

http://forum.softpedia.com/lofiversion/index.php/t96198.html.

6) Fosti securisti siliti sa dea declaratii dupa evenimentele

http://www.portalulrevolutiei.ro/arhiva/2005_285.html.

Cpt. Soare Ovidiu din fosta Directie a V-a, serviciul 4+5, domiciliul in Bucuresti, strada Mendeleev, declara urmatoarele:
Sediul Ministerului Apararii Nationale,
22/23.12.1989
In noaptea de 22/23 decembrie 1989, aflandu-se in sediul MApN, in jurul orelor 22,00, a inceput un armat, in forta, asupra MApN, din Complexul “Orizont” si dinspre blocurile din stanga si dreapta acestuia. Dupa modul cum au actionat si dupa cum aratau victimele dintre militarii care au aparat peste noapte obiectivul (impuscati in cap sau in zona capului), au concluzionat cu totii ca s-a tras cu arme cu luneta cu dispozitiv de infrarosii. Se afla impreuna cu lt. maj. Grigoras de la S.M.B., cpt. Arusoaie de la Unitatea speciala “T” si alte cadre.
Atacul asupra sediului MApN s-a desfasurat cu fanatism, unul dintre atacatori a sarit gardul inarmat doar cu un cutit, a fost impuscat, iar dimineata l-a vazut de la circa 5-6 metri si afirma ca avea infatisare de arab (ten masliniu, parul si mustata negre si crete). Se spunea ca nu avea asupra sa documente de identitate.
In noaptea de 23/24 decembrie 1989, aflandu-se la locuinta mamei sale, a vazut pe geam cum actionau trei teroristi, atacand sediul MApN Erau in uniforme de armata, cu caschete si actionau astfel:
– fugea cate unul spre chioscul LOTOPRONOSPORT din fata MApN, trageau doua-trei focuri, apoi fugeau inapoi; intre blocuri;
– apoi, in grup, unul tragea spre MApN, iar ceilalti doi trageau in sus cu trasoare.
Despre acest lucru a telefonat si informat la MApN pe maiorul Colt.
NOTA: Relatarile ofiterului se coroboreaza cu declaratiile surorii sale Mihaila Sanda Cristina cu domiciliul in Bucuresti, Aleea Poiana Mare nr. 8, bloc B9, apart. 47, sector 6.

Un articol de Catalin Antohe

Lt. mr. APOSTOL M. ANTON, fost ofiter in serviciul 1 declara:

In ziua de 29 decembrie 1989 a aflat de la vecinul PIPOI REMUS, care locuieste la etajul 2, sub apartamentul lui, ca a vazut mai multe persoane tragand spre Ministerul Apararii Nationale, despre care era convins ca nu erau romani. I s-a parut ca ar fi arabi. Trageau cu niste pistoale automate mici.

in sfirsit, ceea ce ne-a spus fostul ofiter USLA Marian Romanescu in 1991

(Capitanul Romanescu Marian (fost cadru USLA) si Dan Badea, “USLA, Bula Moise, teroristii, si ‘Fratii Musulmani’,” Expres nr. 26 (75), 2-8 iulie 1991, pp. 8-9)

COMANDOURILE USLAC

Cei care au avut si au cunostinta despre existenta si activitatea fortelor de soc subordonate direct lui Ceausescu, au tacut si tac in continuare de frica, sau din calcul.  S-au spus multe despre indivizii imbracati in combinezoane negre, tatuati pe mina stinga si pe piept, fanaticii mercenari care actionau noaptea ucigind cu precizie si retragindu-se cind erau incoltiti in canalele subterane ale Bucurestiului.  S-au spus multe, iar apoi au tacut ca si cind nimic nu s-ar fi intimplat.

Suprapuse Directiei a V-a si USLA comandourile USLA erau constituite din indivizi care “lucrau” acoperiti in diferite posturi. Erau studenti straini, doctoranzi si bastinasi devotati trup si suflet dictatorului.  Foarte multi erau arabi si cunosteau cu precizie cotloanele Bucurestiului, Brasovului si ale altor orase din Romania.  Pentru antrenament aveau la dispozitie citeva centre de instruire subterane:  unul era in zona Brasovului, iar altul–se pare–chiar sub sediul fostului CC-PCR, poligon care au dat–din intimplare citiva revolutionari in timpul evenimentelor din Decembrie.

ENGLISH

excerpts from Orwellian Positively Orwellian: Prosecutor Voinea\’s Campaign 2006

Some of those shot as “terrorists” turn out to have been wearing “black jumpsuits.” Bucking the hegemony of official, elite interpretations denying the very existence of the “terrorists,” a poster calling himself “Danka” posted the following on the Jurnalul National web forum in April 2006:

“22 decembrie 1989, military unit 010_ _ at the edge of the Branesti forest.

The Branesti forest houses one of the largest munitions depots around the capital. It is said that an explosion at this depot would destroy the Pantelimon neighborhood from the beginning of the no. 14 tram [route]. Towards evening gunfire opened on the unit from the railroad. Everything was a target, [and] small caliber arms and semi-automatic weapons were being used [emphasis added; note: possible reference to 5 mm weapons]. Based on the flashes from the gun-barrels it appeared that there were 3 persons hiding among the tracks who opened fire with the goal of creating panic. The soldiers came out of their barracks and set up in the car-park under trucks. They couldn’t stay inside the buildings, “the terrorists” were shooting the windows [out]. Even though an alert had been given earlier in the day, nobody was prepared to respond except those on duty. A group of soldiers with officers and n.c.o.s equipped with AK-47s, and TT pistols launched an attack from the surrounding area. All reached their destined locations without problem by nightfall, in part because the intruders were preoccupied with maintaining a continuous gunfire on the unit. At a given moment, the soldiers opened fire, the gunfight lasted less than 10 minutes. Their little UZIs weren’t equipped for long-distance and thus could not stand up to the renowned AK 47. One of the terrorists was shot in the head, while the other two were wounded when they tried to flee through a field leading away from the military unit. The three were transported to the guard post where the lights were turned on (until then the unit had been in complete darkness) and we realized that one of the two survivors was in fact a woman. All three were olive-skinned, clothed in black jumpsuits [emphasis added] and the two wounded survivors struggled to say something in Arabic. After a half hour an ARO [vehicle] of the Army arrived saying they had come from the Chief of Staff’s Division and they took all three. After a few days all the soldiers who participated in the activities of that night were made to sign a declaration pledging not to divulge anything about what had happened. All of this is true and can easily be verified.”[54]

liviu viorel craciun  admission

Finally, there are the recollections of eyewitnesses, a decade and a half later, who—despite the onslaught of cynicism toward such ideas—continue to maintain they saw what they thought they saw…

“I was an eyewitness to the capture of a terrorist (based on the color of his tan I’d swear he was Arab) who was using a PSL [i.e. sharpshooting rifle, a lunetist] and firing into the population…he was taken alive and beaten in front of my own eyes by the Army, then taken up into a truck, also by the Army…in the following days they continued to sustain over and over on radio and TV that there did NOT exist any terrorists, or at least that none had been captured…Yeah, I’m sure this guy bought his PSL at the ‘Universal’ department store.”

“On the 24th I think, I was an eyewitness when soldiers captured an Arab sharpshooter (brown[-skinned] and he spoke broken Romanian)—who was using the famous “Pusca Semiautomata cu Luneta” (PSL—apparently Romanian) modified from an AK47. I’m sure that he had used it, and not just to help on his travels. They whisked him away in a truck and they brought him to the command [post] of a large town (Brasov). Later it was said that foreign forces were NOT implicated, or if they were, that there were no traces to prove it. For me, that was the moment in which I began to believe that I was having a lie forced down my throat.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[26]<!–[endif]–>

Foreign Involvement

So far in this piece, we have seen references to the arrest or killing as “terrorists” of the following as apparent foreigners, notably Arabs: 1) the arrest of one with a PSL in Bucharest, 2) the arrest of another with a PSL, apparently somewhere near Brasov, 3) the revelations of soldiers who killed and arrested several in the Pantelimon area of Bucharest (I will consider these two revelations one and the same for our purposes here). Years after the Revolution, there are still claims that Arabs were captured elsewhere: in 2005, Catalin Radulescu told a journalist that “two Arabs were caught in Pitesti, dressed in combinezoane negre [emphasis added], and armed with Carpati pistols.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[81]<!–[endif]–> Later we will see reports written by two Securitate officers immediately after the events—apparently required of them by Army officials—attesting to the killing of Arab “terrorists” in the area around the Defense Ministry building in Bucharest. We shall also see how a weapon registered to a member of the Securitate’s Fifth Directorate just happened to show up in the hands of a man with a Libyan passport in his billfold who was shot in the Central Committee building in Bucharest on the night of 22 December.

Indeed, the presence and activity of these foreign, apparently mostly Arab terrorists, was almost prosaic. Liviu Viorel Craciun (appropriately enough craciun means “Christmas”), the so-called “First Interior Minister of the Revolution” in one of the protogovernments that tried to form in the CC after the Ceausescus fled and—a source of much confusion in research on the events (more on this below)—a former USLA officer until 1986, reported that on 28 December 1989: “…in the morning five cadavers were collected and a rough count was made, out of the five terrorist cadavers found in the street, two belonged to Arab mercenaries…The shot terrorists could not be identified and they did not seem to interest anyone.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[82]<!–[endif]–>

So what was the role of foreigners, specifically Arabs, in the Revolution? Interesting in this regard is a report dated 1 March 1990 by Lt-Colonel Ion Aurel Rogojan, who in 1989 was Securitate Director General Vlad’s chief of cabinet staff. As B. Mihalache speculates somebody must have been interested in this question, “since Rogojan was ordered to write a report on it.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[83]<!–[endif]–> Rogojan wrote in his 1 March 1990 report that he “has knowledge of the fact that between the Department of State Security and the ‘Al Fatah’ Security [service] of the Palestinian Liberation Organization there existed relations of cooperation based on a protocol.” Rogojan continues in this report:

“At the same time, some activities for the training of USLA cadres abroad were carried out (the group was led by reserve colonel Firan, former chief of general staff of the mentioned unit). The protocol was established in the period 1979-1980 and a copy can be found in the protocol relations division of the former Independent Judicial Secretariat Service of the DSS [i.e. Securitate]. In connection with the existence of this protocol, I was asked in recent weeks, by Colonel Ardeleanu Gheorghe, USLA Commander. The Special Unit for Antiterrorist Warfare was coordinated on behalf of the DSS’ Executive Bureau by General-Colonel Iulian Vlad in the period 1977-1987, and after that by Secretary of State General-Major Alexie Stefan and Deputy Minister Major General Bucurescu Gianu. In the USLA there existed a special detachment for antiterrorist intervention, organized in three shifts and subordinated to the chief of the general staff. I don’t have any data concerning the activity of the USLA in the period of the December ’89 events.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[84]<!–[endif]–>

It should also be abundantly clear here that Rogojan was being asked to write not just about the role of outside forces, but specifically about the role of the USLA in December 1989. Once again, why such interest in the USLA?

In this regard, further claims related by former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu to Dan Badea, are to say the least intriguing:

Several days before the outbreak of the December events, the commander of the USLA forces—col. ARDELEANU GHEORGHE (his real name being BULA MOISE)—left for Iran, bringing with him a great many gifts; and a car’s load of maps, bags, pens, sacks, etc. What did Col. Ardeleanu need these for in Iran? What was the use of having the head of the USLA go? What did he negotiate with the Iranians before the arrival of Ceausescu [18-19 December]? Could he have contracted the bringing into the country of some shock troops, as they are called, to enforce the guard at the House of the Republic, the civic Center and the principal residences of the dictator? If not for that reason, why? Because it is known what followed…

On 22 December, col. Ardeleanu gave the order that 50 blank cover IDs, with the stamp of the Department of Civil Aviation, be released. The order is executed by Gradisteanu Aurel from the coordinating service of that department—a Securitate captain in reserve—and by lt. Col. SOMLEA ALEXANDRU, the latter receiving the IDs and putting them where they needed to be. It is known that the majority of USLA cadre work under the cover of being in the Militia. But who did these IDs cover in this situation? [emphases and capitalization in original]<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[85]<!–[endif]–>

We know from the revelations of a former worker (engineer Hristea Todor) at the Securitate’s special unit “P,” that the new Front leadership was sufficiently suspicious of Arab presence that “General Militaru referred to the transfer of some units from the MI and Securitate to the Defense Ministry. He said the USLA had transformed into terrorists. The electronic (telephone) surveillance of certain objectives was started up again—in particular Arab embassies.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[86]<!–[endif]–> (Note: this appears yet another reference to the aforementioned meeting at USLA headquarters on the evening of 25 December.) Gheorghe Ratiu, head of the Securitate’s First Directorate, maintains that, on Director Vlad’s orders, between 25 and 27 December 1989 he was tasked with finding out the “truth” concerning the “foreign terrorists” reported to be in the hospitals and morgues; he had to resort to subterfuge to verify the situation, since Army personnel were denying him entrance.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[87]<!–[endif]–>

Notably, of course, with these exceptions, the former Securitate and their apologists—whom as Army General Urdareanu suggests uniformly don’t believe in the existence of real terrorists in December 1989, yet who love to blame foreign interference for Ceausescu’s overthrow (in particular, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews)—do not like to make reference to or talk about “Arab terrorists.”

Further evidence of the involvement of “Arab terrorists” comes from the behavior in late December 1989, as much as the later statements, of the usually garrulous Silviu Brucan. In August 1990, Brucan would allege the involvement of “some 30 foreigners,” according to him, mostly Palestinian, who had been trained by the Securitate—what Michael Shafir termed “the first admission of foreign intervention by a member of the December 1989 leadership.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[88]<!–[endif]–> Reminiscent of Tanasescu’s curt response to the reporter’s question about the involvement of foreign terrorists (discussed above)—“I ask that you be so kind as to…” not ask me about this—back on 29 December 1989, Brucan, at the time a key decision-maker in the new Front leadership (he would leave in February), told Le Monde that the issue was “very delicate” and “involving diplomatic implications that must still be worked out”; “better to be cautious,” he opined.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[89]<!–[endif]–> That was, of course, no denial; indeed, it sounds like the new leadership was trying to find a solution to the dilemma they found themselves in.

Suspicion, in particular, surrounded the role of Libyans, which, as we have seen, at the very least, somehow found themselves in areas of gunfire in December. Sergiu Nicolaescu claims—I have been unable to verify this—that of all the countries to recognize the new National Salvation Front government, running to the top of the line to be first was…Qadafi’s Libya!<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[90]<!–[endif]–> The “anonymous plotters” who leaked information to Liviu Valenas of Baricada in August 1990 maintained that “It isn’t accidental that on 25 December 1989, the first plane bringing aid came from Libya. However, when it went on its return route it was loaded with people. In the almost complete chaos that dominated at the time, the New Power [i.e. the Front] did not know what the plane to Libya was carrying (it left from Otopeni, when the airport was still closed to traffic).”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[91]<!–[endif]–> In 1994, two journalists specified that the plane in question on the 25th was a DC9 and that “40 Arabs” had been loaded aboard, and noted that they had learned that on 28-29 December 1989, “the [Otopeni’s] airport archive had disappeared.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[92]<!–[endif]–>

Michael Shafir at Radio Free Europe Research at the time noted in October 1990 that “unconfirmed but very reliable military and governmental Romanian sources interviewed by RFE said that shortly after the capture of Palestinians, Libyans, and other Arabs who had fought on the side of pro-Ceausescu forces, Quadhafi had threatened to kill all Romanian specialists in Libya if the Arabs were not allowed to leave Romania.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[93]<!–[endif]–> Certainly, this is what Constantin Vranceanu hinted at in September 1990 in Romania Libera when he wrote of “Plan Z-Z”—according to him, “practically an alliance, on many levels, including military between Romania and several other countries with totalitarian regimes (Iran, Libya, Syria), to which was added the PLO…which called for the other parties to intervene with armed forces to reestablish state order when one of the leaderships was in trouble”:

“Several weeks after 22 December, the president of one of the countries directly involved threatened the Romanian government that it would make recourse to reprisals against those several thousand Romania citizens who were working in that country if [the Romanian government] did not return the foreign terrorists, [whether] alive or dead. This blackmail worked and a Romanian plane went on an unusual route to a Polish airport, from where the ‘contents,’ unusually including the able-bodied, wounded, and coffins, were transferred to another plane, that took off in an unknown direction.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[94]<!–[endif]–>

Nestor Ratesh quotes one of Ceausescu’s senior party henchman, Ion Dinca, as having stated at his trial in early February 1990:

“During the night of 27-28 [of January 1990] at 12:30 A.M., I was called by several people from the Prosecutor’s Office to tell what I knew about the agreement entitled Z.Z. between Romania and five other states providing for the dispatching of terrorist forces to Romania in order to intervene in case of a military Putsch. This agreement Z.Z. is entitled ‘the End of the End.’ I stated then, and I am stating now to you, that I have never been involved in this agreement, neither I nor other people. And I was told: Only you and two other people know this. I stated that and a detailed check was made in order to prove that I was not involved in such acts.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[95]<!–[endif]–>

Relatedly, in July 1990, Liviu Valenas noted that,

“On 24 January 1990, the new Foreign Minister of Romania announced on Television and Radio that a series of secret treaties between the R.S.R. [Romanian Socialist Republic] and third countries had been abrogated, and are no longer valid and operational for the new Romania. The New Power pledged to deal with these countries concerning Romania’s obligations through the abrogation of these accords. An ambiguous text, apparently launched by Sergiu Celac’s group,led public opinion in Romania to believe that these treaties concerned ‘terrorist assistance.’”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[96]<!–[endif]–>

It is noteworthy that in the context of a series entitled “The Truth about the U.S.L.A.,” (more on this infamous series below), Horia Alexandrescu paused on 14 March 1990 to quote from a 1 February article by another journalist about TAROM flight 259 (to Warsaw and back):

“24 January, 4 PM: After the aircraft was inspected [“controlul antiterorist”] (after the Revolution of 22 December, ,soimi’ as those who performed antiterrorist protection [i.e. USLA] were called by the pilots, were removed from both internal and external TAROM flights, even though all airlines have such teams), the plane left for Bucharest. Meanwhile, however, the 45 Libyan passengers, who had gotten off for 5-6 hours in a layover at Otopeni, wanted to cross ‘the Polish border.’”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[97]<!–[endif]–>

According to Alexandrescu, the Polish authorities would not allow the TAROM plane to leave Poland, so it sat on the runway in Warsaw…until a second TAROM plane came—this time, according to Alexandru, including “uslasi”—the moral of the story of course being that the USLA needed to be put back on flights as soon as possible.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[98]<!–[endif]–> It is possible this is the plane Vranceanu was referring to in the quotation above. One thing’s for sure, this seemingly insignificant incident got unusual media coverage, in particular with regard to the USLA.

Not surprisingly, in June 2006, Prosecutor General Dan Voinea reiterated his contention that there was no foreign involvement/intervention in the December 1989 Romanian Revolution!

In early January 1990, “Cpt. Soare Ovidiu, [of Securitate] Directorate V-a, Services 4+5, resident of Bucharest, Mendeleev Street,” presumably under questioning, spoke about those he had seen killed as “terrorists”:

“Defense Ministry Headquarters [M.Ap.N.], 22/23.12.1989

On the night of 22/23 December 1989, being located in the Defense Ministry Headquarters, around 22:00, a forceful attack began upon the building from the ‘Orizont’ Complex and from the blocs to the left and right of it. Based on the manner in which they acted and how the victims from among the soldiers who were defending the building appeared (shot in the head or in the area of the head), everybody concluded that they were shot by guns with infrared night scopes [emphasis added]….The attack upon MapN Headquarters was unleashed with fanaticism, one of the attackers jumped a wall armed with a knife, he was shot, and in the morning I saw him from a distance of about 5-6 meters and I could conclude that he appeared Arab (olive-skinned, black hair and mustache). It was said he had no documents upon his person….”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[117]<!–[endif]–>

Lt. Mr. Apostol M. Anton, Service 1: “On 29 December 1989 he learned form his neighbor Pipoi Remus, who lives on the second floor, beneath his apartment, that he saw many people shooting toward the Defense Ministry, whom he was convinced were not Romanian. They appeared to him to be Arab. They were shooting with small automatic guns.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[118]<!–[endif]–>

Se pare, totusi, ca nu toti au uitat…

Mircea: Am arestat in 24 decembrie 1989 din apartamentul situat pe str.Garii de Nord,vis-a-vis de centrul de calcul un irakian care nu a incetat sa traga pana la venirea mea si a prietenului meu.L-am luat pentru ca era deja drogat.Am avut noroc chior.L-am dus la subsolul Min.Transporturilor unde se aflau demult doua unitati militare.La nivelul 2 subsol am predat pe irakian unui ofiter colonel.Irakianul nu avea viza din anul 1981.Tot ce povestesc aici e extrem de adevarat.Mai multe indicii nu pot sa dau,dar se pare ca in Bucuresti au actionat in jur de 73 de luptatori de gherila urbana specializati in lichidari de persoane de nationalitate araba.Asta e tot ce pot sa scriu.In zona Garii de Nord.
Luni, 06 Aprilie 2009 22:19

http://www.romanialibera.ro/a142385/prigoana-vantului-diversiunea-elicopterelor-cu-teroristi-libieni.html

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